VOL. 129, APRIL 27.

1984
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Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
ANNOTATION
ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS
By
DOMINGO LUCENARIO*
1.Concept, p. 41
2.Purpose, p. 42
3.Peculiar features, p. 43
4.Computation of the period for filing claims against decedents estate, p. 44
5.Special circumstances that may justify filing of late claims, p. 44
6.Types of claims covered by the statute of non-claims, p. 46
7.Resume, p. 49
______________
1. Concept
The Statute of Non-Claims is a rule of procedure (Sec. 2, Rule 86, Rules of Court),
requiring certain creditors of a deceased person to present their claims for
examination and allowance within a specified period, the purpose thereof being to
settle the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons
entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for
claims, which,
_________________
* Practising attorney (1956-1971); City Judge (now MTCC Trial Judge), Br. I, Legazpi
City Court; Law Professor, and Pre-Bar Reviewer in Remedial Law, Civil Law and
Commercial Law.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed. (Santos v.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 213).
The period, fixed by Section 2 of Rule 86 for the filing of money claims against a
decedents estate, is known as the statute of non-claims.
Textually, our Statute of Non-Claims provides that, in the probate courts order,
granting letters testamentary or of administration, said court shall state the time for
the filing of certain claims against the estate, which shall not be more than 12 nor
less than 6 months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at
any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who
has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within
a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Secs. 1-2, Rule 86, supra).
2. Purpose
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the
probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor
or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions

requiring presentation (Secs. 2 & 5, Rule 86) is to appraise the administrator and
the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely
arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by prorata portion in the due
course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire
estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy
any preference or priority (except in accordance with law); all of them shall share
pro-rata (or with preference in consonance with law). (Estate of Olave v. Reyes, L29407, July 29, 1983, in rel. Phil. Savings Bank v. Lantin, L-33929, Sept. 2, 1983, and
Arts. 2236-2251, New Civil Code).
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Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
3. Peculiar features
In the absence of some provision to the contrary, the statutes of non-claims run
against non-resident, resident, and infant, as well as adult claimants, and also
against insane persons, and the estate of a deceased creditor (18 Cyc. 468).
Perceptibly, this is so because, a judicial settlement of a decedents estate, in which
the Statute of Non-Claims plays its major role, is a proceeding in rem which is
binding against the whole world (Sec. 49[a], Rule 39, id). All persons having interest
in the subject matter involved, whether they be notified or not are equally bound
(Phil. Savings Bank v. Lantin, L-33929, Sept. 2, 1983).
According to the weight of authority, the statute of non-claims, unlike the general
statutes of limitations, runs against the State (Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San, 47 Phil.
89, 94). However, in our jurisdiction, tax claims appear to be outside the purview of
the statute of non-claims they are not required by the rules (Secs 2 & 5, Rule 86) to
be presented as claims against the decedents estate (cf. Gonzales v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 101 SCRA 633). Understandably, this is so because the distribution of a
decedents assets may only be ordered by the court when the inheritance tax,
among others, is paid (Vera v. Navarro, 79 SCRA 408; Sec. 1, Rule 90, id).
Another feature of the statute of non-claims is that it refers also to the prescribed
period for filing claims, already involved in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon (Sec 21, Rule 3), against a defendant who dies
(Secs. 17 & 21, Rule 3) before execution is actually levied upon any of his
property (Sec. 7[c], Rule 39) and the claim is x x x extinguished (Sec. 17, Rule 3)
in such ordinary action because the same claim is to be prosecuted by the
surviving plaintiff-creditor in the manner especially provided (Sec. 21, Rule 3) in
Sections 2 and 5 of Rule 86 (see Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, in rel. Evangelista v.
La Proveedora, Inc., 38 SCRA 170; and Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, 70 SCRA 130).
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
4. Computation of the period for filing claims against decedents estate
The initial period for the filing of money claims, against the decedents estate,
where such claims are required by Section 5 of Rule 86 to be filed, starts to run from
the date of the first publication of the required notice (Sec. 2, Rule 86). The
publication of the notice to the creditors is constructive notice to all of them, hence,

a creditor, contemplated by Section 5 of Rule 86, cannot generally be permitted to

file his claim beyond the period fixed in said notice on the bare excuse that he had
no actual knowledge of the administration proceedings (Villanueva v. PNB, L-18403,
Sept. 30, 1963).
Section 2 of Rule 86, however, gives the probate court sound discretion to allow
claims presented beyond the period previously fixed, provided the following
conditions concur: (1) there must be a timely motion or petition for extension of
time to file such a claim, that is, the motion or petition therefor must be filed in the
probate court before the lapse of the period to be extended (Villanueva v. PNB, 9
SCRA 145); (2) a good cause must be shown why the permission should be granted
(Barredo v. Court of Appeals, 6 SCRA 620); and (3) the extension of time prayed for
shall not exceed one month from the expiration of such period but in no case
beyond the date of entry of the order of distribution (Danan v. Buencamino, 110
SCRA 353, 357-358 [Dec. 14, 1981]; contra: Paulin v. Aquino, L-11267, March 20,
1958, and Barredo v. CA, 6 SCRA 620).
It was previously held that the one-month period for filing late claims is to begin
from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the
extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the
court for the presentation of claims (Barredo v. CA, 6 SCRA 620, 623 [Nov. 28,
1962], citing Paulin v. Aquino, L-11267, March 30, 1958).
5. Special circumstances that may justify filing of late claims
In Paulin v. Aquino, supra, the Supreme Court held that the
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Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
late filing was justified by the fraudulent omission of certain assets in the inventory;
in Gallinero v. Torres, L-2329, June 30, 1950, it was also held that the ground of
fraudulent inducement upon claimant is a justification for late filing of claims. To
justify the filing of late claims, there must be evidence of diligence and of
unavoidable mistake or accident or of a fraud of a nature analogous to that which
warrants interposition of a court of equity to grant new trial (Nebraska Wesleyan
University v. Bowen, 103 N.W. 275, cited in footnote 1, Barredo v. CA, 6 SCRA 620,
624).
Another special circumstance, justifying the filing of a late claim, is reflected in this
illustrated case:
In Civil Case No. 14578, Manila RTC, Branch I, plaintiff A sued defendant B for
collection of P165,000 upon the latters contractual obligation to the former. After A
offered his evidence and rested his case, B died, and Special Proceeding (Sp. Proc.)
No. 25256, Branch II, same Manila RTC, was commenced by C, another creditor of B,
to settle and distribute Bs estate. Upon improper motion of A, the judge of Branch I,
in Case 14578, erroneously ordered X, the administrator of Bs estate in Sp. Proc.
25256, to be substituted as party-defendant in said Case 14578. Judgment was
rendered in favor of A but X appealed. However, after the appealed judgment was
affirmed, the period, for the filing of As claim against Bs estate in Sp. Proc. 25256,
had long lapsed. May the probate court, in Sp. Proc 25256, properly admit As claim
against Bs estate, as reflected in the affirmed judgment? Yes. Of course, upon the
demise of B during the pendency of the ordinary civil action (No. 14578), the trial
court therein should have dismissed the same (Secs. 17 & 21, Rule 3) so that A

could present the same to the probate court, in Sp. Proc. 25256, for allowance
within the statute of non-claims (Secs. 2 & 5, Rule 86), to avoid useless duplicity of
procedure (Ignacio v. Pambusco, Inc., 20 SCRA 125). But procedural niceties should
be aside here because, the substitution of X and the continuation of the ordinary
civil action (No. 14578) against him, who is Bs representative and the administrator
of Bs estate, is considered as equivalent to presentation of As claim in the probate
court in Sp. Proc. 25256, and dispenses with the actual presentation of the claim
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
within the statute of non-claim (Ibid, p. 133, citing Laserna v. Altavas, 68 Phil. 703.
See also De Rama v. Palileo, L-18935, Feb. 26, 1965).
Another related illustrative case:
In the RTC, X sued Y for recovery of P25,000 arising from contract. The consequent
money judgment in favor of X was appealed by Y who died during the pendency of
the appeal. The affirmed judgment was promulgated after the lapse of the period
provided for in the notice of creditors (but before the entry of the probate courts
order of distribution of Ys estate). May X be allowed to present to the probate court
his money judgment as a claim against Ys estate? Yes because the promulgation of
the money judgment, after the lapse of the period prescribed by the statute of nonclaims, constitutes a sufficient special circumstance that justifies the presentation of
Xs claim, arising from the money judgment, against Ys estate. This conclusion
holds true provided (1) that X filed his claim within the one-month extension period,
from the issuance of the order authorizing such extension and (2) that Xs claim
was presented to the probate court before the entry, in the judgment book (Sec. 2,
Rule 36), of the order of distribution of Ys estate (De Rama v. Palileo, 13 SCRA 230231).
6. Types of claims covered by the statute of non-claims
Not all kinds of creditors claims against a decedent could be filed and admitted in
the special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. For, the statute of nonclaims (Sec. 2, in rel. Sec. 5. Rule 86) extends only to the following types of claims:
First. Money claims against the decedent, arising from contract (express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent), except those arising from (1)
contracts of mortgage or other collateral security (Sec. 7, Rule 86; Manalansan v.
Castaeda, Jr., 83 SCRA 777), or those (2) arising from contracts which create a lien
on real or personal property (Sec. 1, Rule 87; Olave v. Canlas, L-12709, Feb. 28,
1962; Director of Lands v. Ababa, et al., 88 SCRA 513).
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Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
One illustrative case, on the first kind of claim, is this: In the RTC, A sued B for
collection of P21,000, arising from a loan contract. B appealed the resulting
judgment against him. During the pendency of the appeal, B died. Bs wife W, the
administratrix of his estate, was substituted in his place as party-appellant. Later,
the judgment was affirmed on appeal and became executory. May the RTC legally
order the execution of its judgment and the levy of Bs estate to satisfy the

judgment? No, because, under the applicable rules (Secs. 17, 21, Rule 3; Sec. 5,
Rule 86; Sec. 1, Rule 88; Rule 9 (B), Interim Rules), A should present his money
judgment to the probate court, thru a petition therefor (Sec. 9, Rule 86), praying for
an order directing administratrix W to admit and satisfy the judgment (Sec. 11, Rule
86). The trial court (RTC) that rendered the judgment has no power to order its
execution, or to order a levy on Bs properties because the same are already in
custodia legis in the probate court which appointed W as administratrix for the
settlement of Bs estate. That money judgment must be presented to the probate
court within the period prescribed by the statute of non-claims, (cf. Paredes v. Moya,
61 SCRA 530).
One illustrative case of a claim, arising from a contract of mortgage, which is not
required to be filed within the statute of non-claims, is the following:
In the RTC, A sued spouses H and W for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. From
the judgment of foreclosure, H and W appealed on certiorari to the Supreme Court,
but, during the pendency of the appeal, H died; and, thereafter, intestate
proceedings for the settlement of Hs estate was instituted. Upon the final
affirmance of the foreclosure judgment, the trial court of origin issued a writ of
execution, but, on motion of W, it set aside the execution writ and (1) ordered that a
copy of the judgment be served upon the administratrix of the estate of H, who
incidentally is also W, and (2) delegated to the probate court the authority to
execute the foreclosure judgment and enforce the mortgage lien. Is the trial courts
order and delegation of authority to the probate court, correct? No, because the
action of A is one for foreclosure of real estate mortgage, or an action to enforce a
lien on property. Hence,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
under the applicable rule (Sec. 1, Rule 87), it is an action that survives in the special
civil action (foreclosure of mortgage) in the RTC exercising its regular and general
jurisdiction (Rule 68, in rel. Sec. 1, Rule 62). (cf. Manalansan v. Castaeda, Jr., 83
SCRA 777). In other words, when mortgagor-defendant H died during the pendency
of his appeal, As action for foreclosure was not extinguished (in the RTC exercising
general and regular jurisdiction) because the claim against him and his wife W is not
a pure money claim (Sec. 5, Rule 86) but an action which survives Hs death and
which can proceed independently of the special proceedings for the settlement of
his estate (Secs. 16, 17 & 21, Rule 3, in rel. Sec. 1, Rule 87). And, since W survived
her husband H, and she is also the appointed administratrix of Hs estate, she
should be substituted, in the special civil action, for her deceased husband.
Second. Judgment for money against the decedent (Sec. 5, Rule 86), arising from
contract (Republic v. Bagtas, 6 SCRA 262).
In the Republic case, the plaintiff Republic obtained from a trial court, in an ordinary
civil action, a P4,251.26money judgment against defendant Bagtas, arising from a
contract, claimed as a commodatum of 3 bulls. Before execution is levied upon his
property to satisfy the judgment, Bagtas died and special proceeding was
immediately commenced, in the probate court, for the settlement of his estate. May
the trial court enforce its judgment by a writ of execution? No, because the money
judgment must be presented to the probate court for payment by W, the
administratrix (6 SCRA 267).

Note, however, that, if, in the preceding problem, defendant Bagtas died after
execution is actually levied upon any of his property, the rule (Sec. 7[c], Rule 39)
dispenses with the presentation of the money judgment (as a claim against the
estate within the statute of non-claims) because the prescribed procedure, in such a
situation, is that the property actually levied upon (Sec. 7, Rule 57) may be sold by
the sheriff for the satisfaction of the money judgment, and the officer making the
sale shall account to the corresponding executor or
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Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
administrator for any surplus in his hands (Sec. 7[c], Rule 39; Evangelista v. La
Proveedora, Inc., 38 SCRA 379, 381, reiterated in Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, 70 SCRA
130).
Third. All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last illness of the
decedent.
Only the three types of claims discussed and demonstrated must be filed in the
office of the clerk of the probate court within the statute of non-claims (Secs. 2 & 5,
Rule 86), otherwise, they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against
the claimants (Sec. 5, Rule 86, in rel Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).
7. Resume
The statute of non-claims (Sec. 2, Rule 86) bars only the filing of claims required by
the rule (Sec. 5, Rule 86) to be filed against the decedents estate. Whether or not
such claims, required to be filed, by the subject statute, are already involved in an
ordinary civil action, before a trial court exercising regular and general jurisdiction,
is not important.
Sections 17 and 21 of Rule 3 and sections 2 and 5 of Rule 86 are sister provisions.
This, because, the clause, x x the claim is not extinguished x x, contemplated by
section 17 of Rule 3, refers to such claim (1) outside the three types of claims
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 86 and (2) within the contemplated claims in (a)
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon (Sec. 1, Rule 87); (b) actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, that is, those claims or actions arising from the crime,
quasi-offense, or quasi-delict (To Guioc Co. v. Del Rosario, 7 Phil. 126); and (c) such
other actions for causes which survive (Sec. 2, Rule 87), either in the ordinary civil
action (Sec. 7, Rule 86 & Sec. 1, Rule 87), or in the special civil action (Manalansan
v. Castaeda, Jr., supra), in which case, there must be a substitution therein (De La
Cruz v. CA, 88 SCRA 695, 701-702; Caseas v. Rosales, 19 SCRA 466; De Misa v.
Mencias, 18 SCRA 540), either of the executor,
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims
administrator, heir, or representative for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased (Sec. 17, Rule 3) defendant.
Conversely, the phrase, where claim does not survive, contemplated by Section
21 of Rule 3, or the clause, the claim is x x thereby extinguished, intended by

section 17 of the same Rule 3, refers to the three types of money claims in section 5
of Rule 86 (Estate of Olave v. Reyes, L-29407, July 29, 1983), which cannot survive
(Sec. 21, Rule 3), in the ordinary civil action (before a trial court exercising general
and regular jurisdiction) because such money claims shall be dismissed (Sec.
21, Rule 3) by that trial court, because they are to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided (ibid) in Sections 2 and 5 of Rule 86, for two reasons: (1) to
avoid useless duplicity of procedure (Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., 20 SCRA
126, 129), and (2) to enable all creditors of the deceased defendant to share in the
distribution of his estate, in accordance with the New Civil Codes provisions on
concurrence and preference of credits (Arts. 2236-2251; Macondray & Co., Inc. v.
Dungao, 11 SCRA 72, 83).
o0o
[Analysis of the Statute of Non-Claims, 129 SCRA 41(1984)]