FACTS:

Mr. Protik Singhal (for the sake of brevity herein after referred as Mr. Singhal) is
a distinguished social worker and prominent name in the field of herbal farming.
To develop the herbal farming activities in Jaipur, He developed the land bearing
Khasra No. 226 area 0.13 hectares and Khasra No. 224 area 0.72 hectares, in total
area of 0.85 hectares in village Jhai tahsil sanganer as Ayurvedic Medicine Farm
named Gandhi Herbal Farm. It is pertinent to mention that the whole
development, construction and plantation were carried out by the Mr. Singhal over
the aforesaid land in the year 1993.
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation popularly
known as RIICO is a premier agency of Government of Rajasthan that has played
an important role in the industrial development of Rajasthan. On 12.08.2003,
RIICO published a notification in the official gazette under Section 4 of the Act of
1894 to initiate the acquisition proceedings to establish Special Economic Zone for
land measuring 648.9 hectares (approximately 2569 bighas). The said notification
was subsequently published in the Dainik Navjyoti and Times of India on
17.08.2003 and 1.11.2003.
That to the utter shock and dismay of Mr. Singhal, holder of a well developed area
of land, Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 18.08.2007

for land measuring 648.9 hectares (approximately 2569 bighas) in which the
appellants land was also included. The said Notification was specifically issued to
implement a multipurpose scheme known as Scheme No. 13 as mentioned above.
The aforesaid Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in the
official gazette on 23.08.2007 followed by publication in the newspapers and a
public notice. It is pertinent to note that after the gazette notification of Section 4,
the same was published in the local newspapers only on 06.11.2007 and
08.11.2007. Moreover, as stated in the report of objections under Section 5-A the
notice of the substance of Section 4 notification called as the public notice was
done on 20.06.2008, which is after an unreasonable delay of almost 10 months
after publication of notification in the official gazette. The respondents have failed
to comply with the provisions of the Act of 1894. It is a well settled principle of law
that the publication in the concerned locality if not made simultaneously, has to
be made atleast immediately after the publication of the notification in the official
gazette. And there was no reason given by the respondents for such delay and the
gross violation of the provisions of the Act of 1894. It is upon the State to show
that whatever time was taken to publish the substance of the notification in the
concerned locality was the minimum possible time taken for this purpose, failing
which the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and any
proceedings taken thereunder would be invalid, ineffective and liable to be struck
down.

1. That, the respondents, thereafter, issued Declaration under Section 6 of the

Act of 1894 on 25.08.2009. It is to be noted that notice of the substance of

notification under section 4 termed as public notice was caused on
20.06.2008 which is relevant and crucial to determine the period of one year
for issuance of Declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Therefore the
Declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was made on 25.08.2009
which is after a period of one year from the public notice under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894. Therefore the contention of the appellant was that the
acquisition proceedings lapsed due to delay in Declaration under Section 6
of the Act of 1894.
2. That the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to delay in compliance

of the procedure given under the Act of 1894 as enumerated above and as
discussed herein below. Not only was there undue delay of several months
between the publication of Section 4 Notification in the official gazette and
the public notice, there was also a delay of more than a year between the
date of public notice made under Section 4 and the date of Declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Under Section 6(1)(ii) of the Act of 1894
it has been specifically enacted that there cannot be a gap of more than a
year between the last date of publication of the Notification under Section 4
and Declaration under 6 of the Act of 1894. The same was established by
the perusal of the record and the order passed under Section 5A of the Act

of 1894. The date of public notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 is
dated 20.06.2008 in the aforesaid order passed under Section 5A and as per
the aforesaid date, Declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was after
a period of one year. It is pertinent to note that the Land Acquisition Officer
himself has taken the date of public notice under Section 4 of the Act of
1894 to be of 20.06.2008.
3. That the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was made on

25.08.2009 allegedly within a year of publication of the Notification under

Section 4 of the Act of 1894 assuming the date of affixation of notice to be
28.08.2008 & not on 20.06.2008, as alleged by the respondent. It is
pertinent to mention that the public notice under Section 4 was made on
20.06.2008 and not on 28.08.2008. As mentioned above, the Land
Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as the LAO) in the report of
Section 5A had also taken the date of publication of public notice to be
20.06.2008. In that event, the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act of
1894 dated 25.08.2009 is after a period of one year prescribed under the
Act of 1894 and therefore, the acquisition proceedings deserve to be
quashed on this ground. To validate the contention there is a viewpoint
taken by the Court of law that if there is an undue delay in the publication
of public notice i.e. date of public notice after the issuance of Notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, in that case, the period of limitation for

Declaration under Section 6 shall commence from publication of the

notification in the newspaper in accordance with the Act of 1894. The
Declaration under Section 6 is clearly beyond the period of limitation of one
year starting from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894. Therefore, the land acquisition proceedings being illegal
deserve to be quashed and set aside.
4. That there was a procedural lapse on every account as even assuming but

not conceding that substance of public notice was caused on 28.08.2008,

the objections under Section 5A the Act of 1894 were decided by the LAO on
14.08.2008. The respondents have relied heavily on the date of public notice
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 to be 28.08.2008 which is subsequent to
the decision of the objections under Section 5A. The Act of 1894, which
gives an opportunity to the landowners to file objections against the
proposed acquisition, was required to be given only after completing and
complying with the provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 1894. Even if notice
was affixed after the report under section 5A given, that would defeat the
purpose of hearing objections of the landowners whose land is getting
acquired and provide them with an opportunity of hearing. The legislature
purposely made the provision of giving public notice of the substance of
such notification at convenient places in the concerned locality with a view
more or less to give direct information of the proposed acquisition to the

affected persons. But, ignoring such a fundamental procedural compliance

the objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 were called even before
publication of such public notice under section 4 of the Act of 1894.
Therefore, on this ground alone, the land acquisition proceedings deserve to
be declared invalid and quashed and set aside as such impermissible and
flagrant violation vitiates the whole proceeding.
5. That even the objections filed by the appellants under Section 5A of the Act

of 1894 were not dealt with properly and decided arbitrarily by the LAO. The
order under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 was arbitrarily passed by the LAO
without giving an opportunity of hearing to the landowners whose land was
acquired and thus the basic principle of natural justice was violated. There
is prima facie case of violation of the procedural compliance and violation of
the principles of natural justice. It has been reiterated by the Honble
Supreme Court in various judgments that the Act of 1894 is an expropriated
legislation and the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed.
6. That the appellants land was a fertile land and also there was construction

done for development of the land. The Honble Supreme Court has held that
the urban areas should not be extended so as to annihilate the fertile
agricultural sector. Further the appellants land was used for plantation of
Ayurvedic and Herbal Medicines, and appellant has constructed four walls,

the residential house for themselves and residential rooms along with
washrooms and pump house for workers and laborers for the aforesaid
medicinal farm. Along with water and electricity supply connection pukka
drainage system for irrigation of plants and trees of the farm has also been
constructed. Furthermore construction made on the land in question was in
existence before the announcement of Scheme no. 13. And the initiation of
the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894. This issue was also
raised by the appellant in the Section 5A objection filed under the Act of
1894. Moreover, this fact was affirmed by Order sheet of LAO wherein it was
stated on 11.03.2008 that as per the Mauka Report there is construction
[a residential house (367x2110 & 197x 106), servant quarter and four
walls] over the concerned land area. Similar facts have been affirmed in the
UIT report dated 01.12.2009. Therefore, this statement of fact with regard to
construction during acquisition proceedings is a serious concern as the
appellants land was not included in the de-acquisition on the basis which is
evidently contrary to the records.
7. That it has been specifically averred in the writ petition that despite the

recommendations of public representatives and officer, the appellants land

was acquired while that of Chandrawati Education Trust and that of OMG
City has been de-acquired. It is to be noted that the land de-acquired with a
malafide intention either had construction over it or was to be used for the

purpose of community, and the appellants land satisfies both the

conditions.
8. That after the de-acquisition of the aforesaid land many affected landowners

had approached the Chief Minister of the State of Rajasthan and filed
representations

before

him

stating

the

illegality

committed

by

the

respondents in the acquisition proceedings for the implementation of

Scheme no. 13. Thereafter, the special secretary to the Urban Development
and Housing Minister wrote a letter and asked him to re-examine the matter
and upon receipt of the aforesaid letter, secretary of respondent no. 2 sent a
letter to the respondent no. 2, land acquisition officer who re-examined the
matter and sent his enquiry report to the Deputy Secretary Urban
Development and Housing Department on 11.08.2009. On the perusal of
the aforesaid report it was revealed that the LAO has admitted that the land
of OMG City and Chandrawati Educational Trust has been de-acquired by
the State of Rajasthan. And also that the land situated at Chack no.1
Bharatpur, which were notified under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, has been
recommended for being de-acquired on the same reasoning and grounds on
which the appellant were relying on for the purpose of de-acquisition of their
land. Therefore, while issuing Notification under Section 4 of the Act of
1894, land sought to be acquired was notified, however, out of it, certain
khasras were left out from acquisition at a later stage thus serious issue of

discrimination need to be looked into by the Honble Court. Therefore, on

this ground of discrimination the acquisition deserves to be quashed and set
aside.
9. That as far as Scheme no. 13 is concerned the notification notifying the said

scheme, remained in force for six months only. And reiterating what has
been stated in the writ petition which has been completely ignored and
overlooked by the learned Single Judge is the fact that the said period of six
months was not extended further and the Scheme No. 13 had no legal
existence at the time of initiation of the land acquisition proceedings which
are under challenge. Moreover, the requirements of the statute for
completing the scheme, for the purpose of which the acquisition had been
initiated, had not been complied with and, therefore, no action for
acquisition under the scheme could have been taken. Hence, on this ground
alone, the acquisition proceedings deserve to be quashed and set aside.
10. That it is pertinent to note that the Notification under Section 4 under the

Act of 1894 was issued for acquisition of land for the purpose of
development of the Scheme no. 13 proposed by UIT, Bharatpur and on the
date of issuance of the said notice, the Scheme no. 13 had no existence. It is
a settled principle of law that the public purpose mentioned in the
Notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 should not be vague and

should contain specific details relating to the scheme for which the
acquisition is sought to be made. Mere statement in the notification that
land is required for the purpose as mentioned would not by itself attract the
said principle and ratio. The same also implies that the state authority
executing the scheme and acquiring land on its behalf must have adequate
resources to execute the scheme in question. However, in this particular
case, the appellants had raised an objection under Section 5A of the Act of
1894 that the concerned state authority is incapable of executing the
scheme and paying the compensation as required to be paid to the
landowners. The same is substantiated by a meeting dated 24.02.2010 held
in respect of land acquisition for Scheme no. 13 conducted which included,
the District Collector cum Chairman Urban Improvement Trust, Bharatpur,
the Secretary, Urban Improvement Trust, Bharatpur, Deputy Town Planner
and the Assistant Account Officer of Urban Improvement Trust, Bharatpur.
The minutes of the aforesaid meeting was issued by the Secretary UIT,
Bharatpur on 12.04.2010 and the same was placed on record by the
appellants during the pendency of the writ petition for the perusal of the
Honble Court by way of an additional affidavit. The following contentions
were raised in the report :-

a. The respondent no.2 itself admitted the fact that sufficient financial

resources are not available and they are not in a position to pay
compensation to the respective landowners.
b. Due to non-availability of the resources or lack of sufficient funds for
compensation, even in future the respondent no.2 is not in a position
to the required compensation for such a big scheme at once.
c. It was discussed that the implementation of the scheme which is too
big to be executed by respondent no.2 in one phase shall be divided
into three parts on zone basis.
11.That it is abundantly clear from the perusal of the report dated 12.04.2010
that the respondent no.2 was not in a position to pay the amount of
compensation at all and the land could not have been acquired for the
aforesaid scheme. Therefore, not only was the scheme not feasible to be
executed, it was also not properly thought after before initiating the
acquisition proceedings and arbitrarily acquiring the land of the aggrieved
landowners.
12.That appellants are reiterating the fact that the respondent no.2 is a Local
Authority and by virtue of Section 3 (f)(vi) of the Act of 1894 a prior approval
of the scheme by respondent no.1 is a condition precedent for initiation of
acquisition proceedings and before issuance of the Notification under
Section 4 of the Act of 1894. But, by the perusal of the report dated
12.04.2010 it is evident that no approval of the scheme was obtained by

respondent no.2 from respondent no.1. And on the basis of this, the entire
acquisition proceeding is liable to set aside.
That aggrieved by the impugned order dated 07.05.2014 passed by the learned
Single Judge the appellant is constrained to submit the instant Special Appeal on
the following amongst other grounds which are in alternative and without
prejudice to each other:-