EN BANC

ANTONIO LEJANO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 176389

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------- x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,

G.R. No. 176864

- versus HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,

ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL
A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ,
PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
Promulgated:

BIONG,
Appellants.
January 18, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
ABAD, J.:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and acquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the ground of
lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate
relative of the victims, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts;
unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous
decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or
committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses.[1]
But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it
places the accused under double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section
21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy

of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved. There is
reason for this provision of the Constitution. In criminal cases, the full power of
the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute
the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and
capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually
overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:[2]

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely
to subject the citizen to a second judgment for the same offense would arm
the government with a potent instrument of oppression. The provision
therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Societys awareness of the
heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single
criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of
criminal laws.[3]

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is

possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that
absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction,
or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the
decision by special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65.[4]
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been
unable to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance,
he avers that the Court must ensure that due process is afforded to all parties and
there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of witnesses and the
evidence.[5] But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His
claim that the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints
with serious doubts the validity of the decision [6] is, without more, a mere
conclusion drawn from personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[7] as
authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present
case. But the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of
due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and
scripted.[8] It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that the
Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that

the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who
voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited
themselves did not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts
appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses
credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding that Alfaro was not a
credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the
defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the
evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is
not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et
als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be
disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G.
Vizcondes motion for reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to
intervene of Fr. Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio
L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime
and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

I vote to grant the M.R.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

No part, prior inhibition

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

No part due to relastionship to a party

No part; filed pleading as Sol Gen
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

No part
reconsideration
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

Same vote as J. Villarama

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

I vote to grant the motion for

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

See concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]

Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.

G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185.
Id. at 207.
Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684.
Supra note 1, at 7.
Id. at 12.
228 Phil. 42 (1986).
Id. at 89.

THIRD DIVISION

PROSECUTOR HILARIO
RONSON H. TILAN,
Complai

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188

(Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No. 082995-RTJ)

Present:

nant,

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and

- versus -

SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:

JUDGE ESTER PISCOSOFLOR, RTC, BRANCH 34,

BANAUE, IFUGAO,
Respo
ndent.

January 10, 2011

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the Administrative Matter against

Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
Banaue, Ifugao.

The Antecedents

The
case
arose
from
the
verified
complaint,
[1]
dated September 1, 2008, filed by Public Prosecutor Hilario
Ronson H. Tilan, charging Judge Piscoso-Flor with gross
inefficiency, gross negligence and dishonesty.
The records show that the prosecutor was then handling
Criminal Case No. 127, People of the Philippines v. Juanito
Baguilat, for Falsification of Public Document, and Criminal Case
No. 140, People of the Philippines v. Wihlis Talanay, for Violation
of RA 7610, pending promulgation before Judge Piscoso-Flor. He
was also handling Criminal Case No. 221, People of

the Philippines v.
Macario
Tenefrancia,
arraignment in the same court.

for

Libel, pending

In People v. Baguilat, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order

dated October 20, 2007[2] directing the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
order. The complainant alleged that the judge failed to render a
decision within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period; instead,
she issued an order, dated April 8, 2008,[3] reiterating her earlier
directive for the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In People v. Talanay, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an order
dated September 25, 2007[4] giving the accused fifteen (15) days
to file his formal offer of evidence, and five (5) days for the
prosecution to file its comment/objections. Allegedly, Judge
Piscoso-Flor again failed to resolve the case within the 90-day
reglementary period; instead, she issued another order dated May
21, 2008[5] giving the parties fifteen (15) days within which to file
their memoranda.
Prosecutor Tilan claimed that in both cases, Judge PiscosoFlor resorted to the issuance of an order requiring the submission
of the parties memoranda to circumvent the statutory period for
the resolution of cases. Prosecutor Tilan pointed out that the
father of the victim (a minor) in People v. Talanay sought the
assistance of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) regarding
the slow process of resolving the case, [6] and the CHR even called
his attention on the matter.[7]
In People v. Tenefrancia, Prosecutor Tilan alleged that the
accused filed a Petition for Suspension of Trial, prompting Judge
Piscoso-Flor to call a hearing on the petition. Despite the parties
submission of the matter for resolution, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed
to resolve the petition within the required period.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) [8] required Judge

Piscoso-Flor to submit her comment, and she complied
on November 7, 2008.[9] She offered the following explanation:
in the courts monthly report for January 2008,[10] Criminal Case
No. 127, People v. Baguilat, was submitted for decision on January
31, 2008,
and
was due for
decision on May 1,
2008; the reason for this was the parties failure to submit their
memoranda as required in her order dated October 20, 2007; on
April 8, 2008, she issued another order reiterating her directive
for the parties to file their memoranda because the case had been
heard previously by her two predecessors.
Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that on April 28, 2008,
accused Baguilat moved for extension of time to submit his
memorandum.[11] She herself requested for an extension of time
to decide the case up to July 2, 2008.[12] She promulgated the
decision on September 29, 2008,[13] after several postponements
due to the absence of Prosecutor Tilan, the counsel for the
accused, and of the accused himself.
In conclusion, she stated that Prosecutor Tilan filed the
present complaint after she personally went to Justice Secretary
Raul M. Gonzales to complain about the formers actuations
towards her,[14]and after she cited him for direct contempt. [15]
On November 19, 2008, Prosecutor Tilan filed a reply,
reiterating the allegations in his complaint, and adding that he
filed a Motion for Inhibition of Judge Piscoso-Flor in Criminal Case
No. 228, People of the Philippines v. Eddie Immongor and
Senando Bannog, which was deemed submitted for resolution on
July 18, 2008.
[16]

In a rejoinder dated November 25, 2008,[17] Judge PiscosoFlor explained that in Criminal Case No. 142, People of the
Philippines v. Myleen Dimpatan, for Estafa, which Prosecutor Tilan

mentioned in his reply, she received the accuseds memorandum

on April 20, 2007, and that of the prosecution on April 17,
2007. She added that on July 24, 2007, the court received a
joint manifestation by Prosecutor Tilan, Private Prosecutor
Rufino Lamase, and the accuseds counsel (Atty. Gerald
Tabayan) asking that the promulgation of the decision be deferred
pending a possible settlement of the case. It was only on October
8, 2008 that Prosecutor Lamase moved to have the case
resolved for failure of the accused to settle the civil aspect of
the
case.
She
immediately
finalized
the
decision
and scheduled its promulgation on November 14, 2008, but this
was reset toNovember 24, 2008 upon motion of the counsel for
the accused.
Judge Piscoso-Flor further explained that the motion for
inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228 had been the subject of a
contempt case which reached the Court of Appeals and gave rise
to numerous complaints filed by Prosecutor Tilan against her. One
of the cases had been considered closed and terminated by
Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P. de la Cruz in a letter
dated November 4, 2008.[18]
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court issued a
Resolution on July 6, 2009:[19] (1) re-docketing the case as a
regular administrative matter; (2) directing Judge Piscoso-Flor to
conduct an inventory of cases pending in her court and find out
whether there were cases submitted for decision that had not
been decided within the required period, and to decide these
cases within thirty (30) days; and (3) requiring the parties to
manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings and the records.
Judge Piscoso-Flor and Prosecutor Tilan submitted the case
for resolution on August 27, 2009 and October 8, 2009,
respectively.

The Courts Ruling

In his Memorandum dated March 19, 2009,[20] Court

Administrator Jose P. Perez (now a member of the Court) found
Judge Piscoso-Flor to have been remiss in her duty to decide
cases within the period required by law. He recommended that
the judge be merely admonished considering that this is her first
infraction and that she inherited most of the cases that
gave rise to the complaint. At
the
same
time,
he
recommended that a stern warning be given against the
commission of a similar offense in the future.
The OCA evaluation tells us that Judge Piscoso-Flor is guilty
of failing to decide cases within the required periods, citing
Criminal Case No. 127 (People v. Juanito Baguilat) as the
principal basis of its conclusion. In this case, the OCA faulted
Judge Piscoso-Flor for using as justification for her inaction the
parties
failure
to
submit
their
respective
memoranda. The OCA opined that this is not a valid reason for
not deciding the case; if she believed she would not be able to
decide the case on time, she could have asked the Court for an
extension of the required period. The OCA acknowledged though
that Judge Piscoso-Flor requested for an extension to decide the
case in her monthly report of cases and certificate of service. [21]
We find the OCA evaluation in order. Although Judge
Piscoso-Flor claimed that she had requested for an extension of
time to decide Criminal Case No. 127, there was no showing that
the request was ever granted. Over and above this consideration,
she allowed the parties to control the period of disposition of the
case through their lukewarm response to her call for the
submission of memoranda, which she had to do twice. She could
have acted more firmly, considering, as she said, that she only
inherited the case, which implies that it had been on the docket
for quite some time. In any event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should have
known that [t]he Court may grant extension of time to file

memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for deciding the case
shall not be interrupted thereby.[22]
The same is true with Criminal Case No. 140 (People v.
Talanay). As early as March 6, 2006,[23] the CHR Office in the
Cordillera Administrative Region relayed to Judge Piscoso-Flor the
concern of the parent of the victim of the child abuse regarding
the delay in the resolution of the case. It was only on May 21,
2008 when Judge Piscoso-Flor called for the submission of
memoranda.
Judge Piscoso-Flor had no comment on Criminal Case No.
221 (People v. Tenefrancia). On the other hand, the Motion for
Inhibition in Criminal Case No. 228, filed by Prosecutor Tilan, was
deemed submitted for resolution on July 18, 2008,[24] but Judge
Piscoso-Flor herself admitted that she resolved the motion
on November 10, 2008 or beyond the required 90-day period.
Judge Piscoso-Flor, however, cannot be held liable for delay
in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 142 (People v. Dimpatan),
which Prosecutor Tilan cited in his reply. [25] While he claimed that
the case was deemed submitted for decision on March 12, 2007,
it appears from the records that he, Private Prosecutor Rufino
Lamase,
and
the
accuseds
counsel (Atty.
Gerald
[26]
Tabayan) executed a joint manifestation
praying that the
promulgation of the decision be deferred pending negotiations
among them on the civil aspect of the case. When the
negotiations bogged down and upon motion of Prosecutor Lamase
(dated October 8, 2008),[27] Judge Piscoso-Flor promulgated the
decision on November 24, 2008.
On the whole, we find Judge Piscoso-Flor guilty of undue
delay in the disposition of cases. Except for People v. Dimpatan,
Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to resolve the other cases within the
required period, in violation of the law and the rules. No less than

the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important aspect in the

administration of justice. It mandates that lower courts have
three (3) months or ninety (90) days within which to decide cases
or matters submitted to them for resolution. [28] Also, the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Courts business
promptly and decide cases within the prescribed period. [29]

It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to decide

cases promptly and expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of
cases, it must again be stated, is a major cause in the erosion
of public faith and confidence in the justice system. [30] For this
fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to
decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the
reglementary period. Failure to comply constitutes gross
inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the erring magistrate. [31]
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court defines undue
delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge,
punishable under Section 11(b) of the same Rule and imposes
a penalty of suspension from office, without salary and other
benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. In light, however, of the fact that this is
Judge Piscoso-Flors first infraction and considering that most of
the cases involved were inherited cases, we deem a fine in its
minimum range an appropriate penalty for Judge Piscoso-Flor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor
is
declared
liable
for
delay
in
the
disposition
of
cases. Accordingly, she is FINED P10,000.00, with a stern
warning against the commission of a similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 2-3.

[2]

Id. at 5; Complaint, Annex A.

[3]

Id. at 6; Complaint, Annex B.

[4]

Id. at 7; Complaint, Annex C.

[5]

Id. at 8; Complaint, Annex D.

[6]

Id. at 11.

[7]

Id. at 10.

[8]

Id. at 16; 1st Indorsement, September 29, 2008.

[9]

Id. at 17-18.

[10]

Id. at 19-20; Comment, Annex A.

[11]

Id. at 21-22; Comment, Annex B.

[12]

Id. at 23-24; Comment, Annex C & D.

[13]

Id. at 25-33; Comment, Annex E.

[14]

Id. at 38; Comment, Annex I.

[15]

Id. at 40; Comment, Annex K.

[16]

Id. at 42.

[17]

Id. at 63.

[18]

Id. at 66; Rejoinder, Annex C.

[19]

Id. at 7.

[20]

Id. at 67-71.

[21]

Supra note 12.

[22]

Administrative Circular No. 28, July 3, 1989.

[23]

Supra note 6.

[24]

Supra note 16.

[25]

Rollo, p. 42.

[26]

Id. at 64; Rejoinder, Annex A.

[27]

Id. at 65; Rejoinder, Annex B.

[28]

CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 15(1).

[29]

Rule 3.05.

[30]

Michael G. Plata v. Judge Lizabeth G. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-08-172, October 24, 2008, 570 SCRA 14.

[31]

Sanchez v. Vestil, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419, October 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 1.