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penalty less than death is imposed.

In its assailed
decision, respondent IAC concurred with the trial
court that the charges against accused are capital
A. Bail, defined
offenses and that evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong. However, the respondent Court ruled that
while the evidence clearly established that the
Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court
petitioner 2 "was responsible for the shooting of Atty.
Maramba, Lt. Rumbaoa and Patrolman Sagun and he
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to so admitted responsibility for their death in his
confession" the crime is ostensibly that of homicide
guarantee his appearance before any court as required
merely, not murder. The criterion to determine
under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be
whether the offense charged is capital is the penalty
given in the form of corporate surety, property bond,
provided by the law regardless of the attendant
cash deposit, or recognizance.
circumstances. As pointed out by the petitioner in its
memorandum, the rationale of the provision lies in the
difficulty and impracticability of determining the nature
B. When matter of Right;
of the offense on the basis of the penalty actually
When matter of Discretion
imposable. Otherwise, the test will require
consideration not only of evidence showing
People v. IAC, 147 SCRA 219
commission of the crime but also evidence of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus,
there has to be not only a complete trial but the trial
[G.R. Nos. L-66939-41. January 10, 1987.]
court must also already render a decision in the case.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. This defeats the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and accused to provisional liberty pending trial."cralaw

Section 13




CHARGED IS CAPITAL. An offense is capital, if it
may be punished by death under both the law prevailing
at the time of its commission and that prevailing at the
time of the application for bail, even if after conviction a

of the crimes charged was attended by treachery as
established by the testimony of the eyewitness Virgilio
Yanuaria to the shooting of Atty. Maramba and by
strong evidence as to the treacherous shooting of the
two peace officers. Virgilio Yanuaria testified that
accused suddenly and without warning shot the
deceased Atty. Norberto Maramba when the latter
turned his back towards the accused and returned to

his table to eat. Atty. Maramba was fatally hit on the

back of his head and fell to the cement floor. Atty.
Maramba did not sense any danger that he would be
shot by the accused considering that he and the
accused knew each other personally and that, as
respondent admitted, there was no previous grudge or
misunderstanding between him (accused) and Atty.
Maramba. Successive shots hit the two peace officers
who were caught by surprise as a result of which they
died. The deceased had no inkling that the accused
was armed and that he would be carried by passion to
resort to violence considering his prominent stature in
the locality.



This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision

of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), now
Court of Appeals (CA), in AC-G.R. No. SP-01320-22
promulgated January 24, 1984, granting the petition for
bail of accused Angelito Alivia y Abalos and nullifying
the Orders of the trial court, dated February 23, 1983
and May 13, 1983 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1272-74,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Angelito Alivia y
Abalos. Said orders of the trial court denied accuseds
application for bail holding that the accused Angelito
Alivia is charged with three (3) capital offenses, the
evidence of guilt of which, in each case, is strong.
Accused Angelito Alivia y Abalos was charged before
the then CFI of Isabela with the crimes of (1) assault
upon an agent of person in authority with murder with
the use of illegally possessed firearm, with respect to

the killing of Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa (Crim. Case No. 1272),

(2) assault upon an agent of person in authority with
murder with use of illegally possessed firearm (Crim.
Case No. 1274) and (3) murder of Atty. Norberto
Maramba with the use of illegally possessed firearm,
(Crim. Case No. 1273). The trial court ordered the
consolidation of the three (3) criminal cases since they
arose from the same incident. The Provincial Fiscal
recommended no bail for the accused in the three
aforementioned cases. Accused filed an omnibus
motion praying among other things that he be allowed
bail contending that the evidence of his guilt is not
strong, but said motion was denied by the trial court.
Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Accused
filed with the IAC a petition for certiorari questioning the
decision of the trial court on his motion for bail. After
considering the records of the criminal cases which
were transmitted to it from the trial court, the IAC
promulgated a decision granting petitioner bail and
nullifying the Orders of the trial court dated February 23,
1983 and May 13, 1983 and fixing the amount of bail at
Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00). After denial of
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the present
The facts as found by the trial court, which facts were
adopted by respondent IAC, 1 are as follows:chanrobles
"At the recently concluded barangay elections for
barangay Sarangay, Cabatuan, Isabela, two candidates
ran for the position of Barangay Captain thereat, namely
accused Angelito Alivia and one Antonio Bagauisan.
Herein accused lost in that election, but he filed with the
Municipal Circuit Court of Cabatuan, an election protest.
Antonio Bagauisan was duly proclaimed and he
assumed office accordingly. The late former Municipal
Judge of Cabatuan, Atty. Norberto Maramba (Criminal

Case No. 1273) was counsel for the protestee. (tsn., chaser (pullutan). Accused Angelito Alivia told Pat. del
1982). Rosario to drop by his house and get ammunition for
pistol Cal .38 and Pat. Elpidio Sagun for the armalite
"The hearing of the election protest was set in the magazine. (tsn., pp. 88-93, November 17, 1982).
morning of June 4, 1982, but was postponed. After
which, at about 10:00 oclock that same morning, the "The relative positions and sitting arrangements of the
late Atty. Maramba invited witness Virgilio Yanuaria, two groups as found in the ocular inspection conducted
the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa (Criminal Case in the morning of November 17, 1982, at the Azarcon
No. 1272), Antonio Bagauisan and others to play Restaurant, Cabatuan are the following (pp. 130-131,
bowling/billiards at the Cabatuan Recreation Center. record,
They played up to 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same day with the bet that the loser will pay the beer "The group of accused Angelito Alivia was the first to
ibid) arrive at the Azarcon Restaurant, and this group joined
two small square tables, identified as square tables
"Later, the late Atty. Maramba, Police Lt. Rumbaoa Nos. 5, and 6, to form a rectangle. There are eight (8)
and witness Virgilio Yanuaria (Antonio Bagauisan did of them, namely: (1) accused Angelito Alivia, who
not join them) proceeded to the Azarcon Restaurant seated himself on a stool marked (AA) north of square
at the public market, Cabatuan, Isabela, for lunch. table No. 5; (2) Pat. Danilo Rosario, was seated on a
They occupied round table No. 2 (see sketch). The stool marked (DR) left of accused Alivia, who was
late Police Lt. Rumbaoa was seated on chair No. A, facing south, square table No. 5; (3) a man, unknown,
facing west, the late Atty. Maramba, on chair No. B, occupied a stool marked (UK); (4) further left, by
facing south and witness Virgilio Yanuaria in chair No. Feliciano Gaspar, occupied a stool marked (EG); (5)
C, facing east. They ordered lunch and three (3) exactly opposite the accused, was seated Municipal
bottles of beer, but Atty. Maramba did not drink, Judge Estanislao Cudal marked (EC) on square table
because he joined the group of accused Angelito No. 6; (6) on his left, was seated the late Pat. Elpidio
ibid). Sagun, on a stool marked (ES) in square table No. 6;
(7) left of Elpidio Sagun, was seated, Engr. Charlie
"It appears that the group of the accused Angelito Martin, marked (CM) on table No. 6, and (8) on his left,
Alivia arrived at the Azarcon Restaurant much earlier, was the woman, unknown, on square table No. 5, (tsn.,
and the members of the group are (1) Angelito Alivia, pp.
Accused herein; (2) Municipal Judge Estanislao
Cudal; (3) Feliciano Gaspar; (4) Pat. Elpidio Sagun; "The three member group of the late Atty. Maramba,
(5) Pat. Danilo Rosario; (6) Engr. Charlie Martin; (7-8) who arrived later, occupied round table No. 2, namely:
a newly married couple, not identified. The late (1) the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, facing west,
Patrolman Elpidio Sagun and witness Pat. Danilo del occupied chair A; (2) the late Atty. Maramba, facing
Rosario also went to the Azarcon Restaurant to buy south, occupied chair B; and (3) witness Virgilio
pansit noodles, but were invited by the accused to Yanuaria, facing east, occupied chair C. (tsn, pp. 22join them in their group while drinking beer with 23,

Maramba being ready, the late Police Lt. Cesar

Rumbaoa called for Atty. Maramba to join them and
eat ("kakain na tayo"). Hence, the late Atty. Maramba
stood up from where he was then seated with the
group of accused Angelito Alivia. However, he was
not able to reach round table No. 2 to eat, because
he was suddenly shot on the chest (Dr. Angobung) by
accused Angelito Alivia using a firearm identified as
Llama Automatic Pistol Super 38, SN-532937 (Exh.
"K") causing him to fall to the cemented floor. (tsn.,
"Upon arrival at the Azarcon restaurant, the late Atty. pp.
Maramba, engaged Municipal Judge Estanislao Cudal
in a conversation on topics, among which was about the "While in that lying position, again he was shot on the
barangay election. Thereafter, Judge Cudal and neck. Both gunshot wounds caused his instantaneous
Feliciano Gaspar left and proceeded to the municipal death. Before the second gun report when Virgilio
building. When Judge Cudal and Gaspar left, the late Yanuario was about to run, the late Patrolman Elpidio
Atty. Maramba seated himself on the stool formerly Sagun who was on his left pushed Virgilio Yanuaria to
occupied by Judge Cudal and engaged the accused save him, using his right hand pressing the left
Angelito Alivia who was seated opposite north of square shoulder of Yanuaria. After which, Yanuaria walked
table No. 5, at a distance of 189 centimeters facing crouching passing thru the inside door (No. 3) and
each other, in a conversation on matters the witness went out thru door No. 2, and proceeded to the
can not remember. (tsn. pp. 30-31, November 17, 1982; municipal building to report the incident, after hearing
1982). successive gun reports, the number he cannot
remember. (tsn., pp. 20-22, 34-35, November 17,
"Meanwhile, Pat. del Rosario noticed accused Angelito 1982).
Alivia go out from the Azarcon Restaurant thru the main
door (No. 1 towards the west of the restaurant, where "Witness Virgilio Yanuaria reported the incident to
his car was parked three (3) meters from the main door, Cpl. Jose Pascual in the presence of Pat. Danilo del
east (west) side of the restaurant. (tsn., pp. 98-100, Rosario saying "Lito Alivia shot Atty. Maramba."
1982). Immediately, four policemen, namely, Pat. Danilo del
Rosario, Pat. Jose Pascual, Pat. Jose Angangan and
"Later, Angelito Alivia returned to his former place. In a another one, went to the crime scene. They were later
little while, Patrolman Danilo del Rosario stood up and followed by Pat. Celestino Apaya and Pat. Ricardo
went to the municipal building while the late Patrolman Pedro. Thereat, they saw the body of the late Police
Elpidio Sagun remained inside the restaurant. (tsn., pp. Lt. Rumbaoa (dead already) at the main door (door
1982). No. 1) lying face upward, and inside they saw the
body of the late Atty. Maramba (dead already) face
"The lunch ordered by the group of the late Atty. downward and that of the late Pat. Sagun (still
The distance from chair B, occupied by the late Atty.
Maramba, in round table No. 2, to the tip of square table
No. 6, where Judge Cudal was seated is 90
centimeters, and the distance from the seat of accused
Angelito Alivia, north of square table No. 5, to the stool
of Judge Cudal, which was later occupied by the late
Atty. Maramba is around 189 centimeters. (tsn., pp. 1921,

breathing) face upward (tsn., pp. 45-49, November 17,

"Meanwhile, Dr. Benedicto Acosta, the incumbent
Municipal Mayor of Cabatuan, arrived from Ilagan, at
about 3:10, afternoon of June 4, 1982. In front of his
business residence at Centro, Cabatuan, he was
informed by Dr. Rolando Dacuycuy, a brother-in-law of
the accused, about the shooting incident. Because he
was then riding on his car, he invited him to see the
incident, but Dr. Dacuycuy did not get inside the
restaurant, while Mayor Acosta went inside to
investigate the matter, in his capacity as Chief
Executive of the town. (tsn., pp. 237-238, September
"Inside the restaurant, he saw the owner of the
restaurant Mrs. Azarcon, two maids and two dead
bodies, identified as those of the late Atty. Maramba
and Polie Lt. Rumbaoa. He did not see the body of the
late Pat. Elpidio Sagun because he was informed that
he was then still alive and was rushed to the
emergency hospital in Cauayan but died at the junction
at Luna, Isabela. In his ocular inspection of the crime
scene, he picked up five (5) empty shells (Exhs. "K-2",
"K-3", "K-4", "K-5" and "K-6"), the four inside the
restaurant, while the other one was recovered outside
just in front of the main door. He likewise recovered
inside the restaurant one (1) deformed lead/slug (Exh.
"K-8") and two (2) lead cores (Exhs. "K-9" and "K-10").
He asked the owner Mrs. Delia Azarcon who shot and
killed the late Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa and she said it was Angelito Alivia who shot
them. Being a doctor himself, he examined the two
bodies and found that the late Atty. Maramba suffered
two gunshot wounds, one at the left occipital region on
the head and one at the interior surface of the scapula
(chest) with a bore at his T-shirt. In the case of the late

Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, he suffered a gunshot

wound at the left maxilla surrounded by blackening
discolorations and another wound at the left lateral
surface, both of the neck and also a gunshot wound at
the right lateral root of the neck. (tsn., pp. 238-250, ibid).

"Dr. Ruben Angobung, NBI, Medico Legal Officer,

testified that he conducted the autopsy examination
on the cadaver of the deceased Atty. Norberto
Maramba, Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio
Sagun upon request of their relatives. The cause of
death of each of the three (3) victims was
hemorrhage due to gun shot wounds. It was possible
that deceased Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa were likewise shot when they have already
fallen on the cemented floor as evidenced by the
gunshot wounds on their heads. He found marks on
the head of Police Lt. Rumbaoa which shows that the
assailant was shot at close range and the muzzle of
the gun used was at a distance of not more than 24
inches from the head. From the trajectory of the
gunshot wounds on the head of the deceased Atty.
Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, it was
possible that the assailant was then at the back of
said victims (Testimony of Dr. Angobung). (tsn., pp.

"When Pat. Pedro Constancio arrived, Mayor Acosta

directed him to call for a photographer and also Dr. Juan
Rigor, Jr., the Rural Health Officer of Cabatuan.
Photographer de la Cruz took the pictures and Dr. Rigor
examined the cadavers of the two bodies. The pictures
taken were developed and Mayor Acosta identified the
pictures of the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, as Exhs.
"P", "P-1", "P-2", and "P-3", appearing on Pages 35-36A, record, in Criminal Case No. 1272. Similarly, pictures
were taken of the dead body of the late Atty. Maramba,
duly identified by Mayor Acosta (Exh. "Q," p. 22, record,
Crim. Case No. 1273). Later Mayor Acosta called for
Pat. Miguel Orodio, INP, Investigator, Cabatuan,
Isabela. He also found inside the restaurant one,
revolver, inside a tuck in holster. He likewise noticed
three (3) bullet marks, one beside the fallen body of Atty.
Maramba, another just beneath the head of Police Lt. "Immediately after the shooting, the accused Angelito
Rumbaoa and the other at the left side wall of the Alivia, accompanied by his uncle and counsel de
ibid) parte, Atty. Artemio Alivia, voluntarily surrendered to
the Provincial Commander, Col. Oscar M. Florendo,
"The empty shells and slugs were given to Cpl. Jose at the PC Headquarters, Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela.
Pascual and the latter submitted them to the Police The accused verbally admitted to Col. Florendo that
Investigator. These empty shells, cartridge and he shot to death the Late Atty. Maramba, Police Lt.
deformed slugs, together with the Llama automatic Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun, at the
pistol Cal. 38 with magazine were later submitted to the Azarcon Restaurant, located at the public market,
NBI, Manila, for ballistic examination, which were Cabatuan, Isabela. In the process, the accused
examined by Feliciano S. Lunasco, NBI, Supervising surrendered the firearm, Llama automatic Pistol SNBallistician, and testified in Court that the empty shells, 532937 (Exh. "K") which he used in the killing of the
deformed slugs, cartridge and lead cores were fired three (3) victims. (tsn., pp. 158-167, December 15,
from the same firearm (Exh. "K"). (tsn., pp. 285-288, 1982).
September 21, 1982; tsn., pp. 203-210, December 15,
"In addition to this, the accused executed an extra-

judicial confession (Exhs. "J", "J-1" and "J-2"), taken by

M/Sgt Severino Goday, Jr., PC, in that same afternoon
of June 4, 1982, at PC, Headquarters in the presence
of his lawyer uncle. He freely and voluntarily admitted
having shot to death Atty. Norberto Maramba at Centro,
Cabatuan, Isabela, Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat.
Elpidio Sagun, both of INP, Cabatuan, at around 2:00
oclock P.M. of June 4, 1982, inside the Azarcon
Restaurant, located inside the public market of
Cabatuan, Isabela with the use of Llama automatic
pistol Cal. 38, SN-532937 (Exh. "K"). (Testimonies of
Col. Oscar M. Florendo and M/Sgt. Severino Goday,
Jr., PC). (tsn., pp. 218-225, September 21, 1982).



"Counsel for the defense admits that the offenses with

which the accused was charged are capital offenses,
which carry the supreme penalty of death.
"Eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria testified that the accused
Angelito Alivia suddenly shot the late Atty. Norberto
Maramba, when the latter stood up to eat lunch upon
call by the Late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa. The first
gun shot wound was fatal and the victim Atty. Maramba
fell to the cemented floor. There is evidence that the
accused again shot the victim while lying down.
"Meanwhile, the late Pat. Elpidio Sagun, who was on
his left side, pushed Virgilio Yanuaria on the shoulders
to save him and the latter escaped crouching towards
the inside door (door No. 3) and exited thru door No. 2,
southern portion of the restaurant. He heard several
gun reports thereafter, while he proceeded to the
municipal building to report the incident to Cpl. Jose
Pascual in the presence of Pat. Danilo del Rosario,
both INP of Cabatuan, Isabela, and based on this
report, police investigators repaired to the scene of the



thereafter. Florendo, Provincial Commander, PC, Ilagan. In the

process, Accused surrendered the firearm used,
"There is no eyewitness presented on the shooting of LLama automatic pistol Cal. 38 (Exh. "k"), and orally
the other two victims, namely the late Police Lt. Cesar admitted to Col. Florendo advised the accused in the
Rumbaoa and the late Pat. Elpidio Sagun. However, presence of his lawyer to have his oral confession
there is evidence that said two victims were likewise reduced in writing, which the accused and counsel
shot by the accused Angelito Alivia. The cadavers were agreed. M/Sgt. Severino Goday, Jr., PC Investigator,
examined and the autopsy reports reveal that the cause was tasked to get the statement of the accused, who,
of death of said two victims was hemorrhage due to gun when called to testify in Court told the story that the
shot wounds. The five (6) empty shells (Exhs. "K-2", "K- extra-judicial confession (Exh. "J", p. 7, record, Crim.
3", "K-4", "K-5", and "K-6") and the two lead cores Case No. 1272) was freely and voluntarily given by
(Exhs. "K-9" and "K-10"), all recovered at the crime the accused duly assisted by his counsel.
scene (Azarcon restaurant), were subjected to ballistic
examination at the NBI, Manila. Witness Feliciano "There are present, two (2) mitigating circumstances
Lunasco, NBI, Supervising Ballistician, Manila, testified which may be credited in favor of the accused,
that the empty shells, deformed slugs, cartridge and namely: (1) voluntary surrender and (2) drunkenness
lead cores were fired from the same gun, Llama probably not habitual, but at this stage of the
"K"). proceedings as they relate to the legal incident in
question, such circumstances may not sway to
"Mrs. Delia Azarcon, the owner of the restaurant, when mitigate the question on bail in favor of the accused.
interviewed by Mayor Benedicto Acosta who arrived at Persuasively, said two mitigating circumstances may
the restaurant upon being informed of the incident that have greater weight after trial on the merits." (pp. 10same afternoon not long after the shooting, told the 20,
Mayor, that it was the accused Angelito Alivia who shot
the three (3) victims, whose bodies lay prostrate on the Notwithstanding said findings of facts, the IAC ruled
cemented floor. There were three (3) bullet marks on the that accused is entitled to bail in the account of
cemented floor, one beside the fallen body of the late P80,000.00 thus nullifying the Orders of the trial court,
Atty. Maramba, another just beneath the head of the late dated January 23, 1983 and May 15, 1983. Hence,
Police Lt. Rumbaoa, and the other at the left side wall of this petition with the following assigned alleged
the restaurant. Pictures were taken of the cadavers of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the late Atty. Maramba (Exh. "Q") and that of the late
Police Lt. Rumbaoa (Exhs. "P", "P-1", "P-2" and "P-3", "I. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court gravely
p. 2, and pp. 36-36-A, respectively, record, Crim. Case erred in holding that the evidence of guilt of accused
1272). is not strong, contrary to the findings of the trial court.

their duties as peace officers at the time of the incident;

III. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court gravely
erred in relying on the resolution in the case of
"Montano v. Ocampo" which is not controlling. (p. 21,
The contentions of petitioner are well-taken. The
crimes charged are clearly capital offenses as the
phrase is defined in Sec. 5 Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. An offense is capital, if it may be punished by
death under both the law prevailing at the time of its
commission and that prevailing at the time of the
application for bail, even if after conviction a penalty
less than death is imposed. In its assailed decision,
respondent IAC concurred with the trial court that the
charges against accused are capital offenses and that
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. However, the
respondent Court ruled that while the evidence clearly
established that the petitioner 2 "was responsible for
the shooting of Atty. Maramba, Lt. Rumbaoa and
Patrolman Sagun and he so admitted responsibility for
their death in his confession" the crime is ostensibly

The criterion to determine whether the offense charged

is capital is the penalty provided by the law regardless
of the attendant circumstances. As pointed out by the
petitioner in its memorandum, the rationale of the
provision lies in the difficulty and impracticability of
determining the nature of the offense on the basis of
the penalty actually imposable. Otherwise, the test will
require consideration not only of evidence showing
commission of the crime but also evidence of the
"To top it all, Accused Angelito Alivia, duly assisted by II. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court gravely aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, there
his lawyer-uncle, immediately after the incident, left for erred in holding that Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. has to be not only a complete trial but the trial court
Ilagan and voluntarily surrendered to Col. Oscar M. Elpidio Sagun were not in the official performance of must also already render a decision in the case. This

defeats the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the and close succession of the shots. This is indicated
accused to provisional liberty pending trial." 3 by the fact that a revolver still tucked in its holster was
found at the crime scene beside the bodies of the
The posture taken by the respondent Court in granting victims showing that one of the victims was unable to
bail to the accused and in disregarding the findings by pull out his gun.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
the trial court of the guilt of the accused (respondent
herein) is a clear deviation from Our ruling laid down in The commission of the crimes charged was attended
to by treachery as established by the testimony of the
eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria to the shooting of Atty.
Maramba and by strong evidence as to the
"Under the Constitution, all persons shall, before treacherous shooting of the two peace officers.
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except Virgilio Yanuaria testified that accused suddenly and
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of without warning shot the deceased Atty. Norberto
guilt is strong. It is the trial court which is tasked to Maramba when the latter turned his back towards the
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong accused and returned to his table to eat. Atty.
and it has determined the affirmative in thus case after Maramba was fatally hit on the back of his head and
consideration of the evidence already presented by the fell to the cement floor. Atty. Maramba did not sense
prosecution. In the absence of manifest abuse of any danger that he would be shot by the accused
discretion, We are not prepared to substitute our considering that he and the accused knew each other
judgment for that of the trial court." (Bolanos v. Dela personally and that, as respondent admitted, there
Cruz, supra) (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) (p. 164, was no previous grudge or misunderstanding
between him (accused) and Atty. Maramba.
Successive shots hit the two peace officers who were
Anent the issue of whether or not the deceased Lt. caught by surprise as a result of which they died. The
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun were killed while in the deceased had no inkling that the accused was armed
performance of their duties, the evidence shows that and that he would be carried by passion to resort to
while both were admittedly in civilian clothes during the violence considering his prominent stature in the
incident in question they were in the performance of locality. On these issues the trial court
their duties as police officers when fired upon and killed ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
by the bullets of the accused. As peace officers, their
initial reaction to the shooting was to assert their "There is treachery although the shooting was frontal,
authority in protecting and covering civilians from the when the attack was so sudden and unexpected that
indiscriminate firing by the accused. Accused instead the victim was not in a position to offer an effective
suddenly and without warning, successively shot Lt. defense (People v. Cuadra, L-27973, October 23,
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun to death knowing fully well 1978),and when there was a deliberate surprise
that they were peace officers. Although both were attack upon an unarmed victim, the killing is murder
armed with the service guns, they were unable to offer qualified by treachery (People v. Alegria, L-40792,
resistance and put up a defense due to the suddenness August 18, 1978), and furthermore, sudden,

unexpected, without warning, and without giving the

victim the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
initial attack, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is
evident and the crime committed is murder (People v.
Candado, L-34089-90, August 9, 1979; People v. Payan, L-39089-90, July 31, 1978)." (p. 171, rollo)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving
due course to the petition; the assailed decision of
respondent IAC is hereby SET ASIDE and the orders
of the lower court denying the petition for bail are
hereby REINSTATED. If the accused is out on bail, his
bail bond is hereby cancelled and he is ordered
committed to prison. This decision is immediately


Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr.,

JJ., concur.








3. Petitioners Memorandum, p. 162 & 163,


reconsideration of this last order having been denied,

he filed the present special civil action of certiorari,
It is petitioner's contention that, while under the
claiming that, in denying his motion for bail, the
G.R. No. L-19361
February 26, 1965
Constitution and the Rules of Court, a person charged
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
with a capital offense may be denied bail, before
PEPITO MAGNO, petitioner,
conviction, only if the evidence of guilt against him is
In the order of the respondent judge complained of, strong, the respondent judge denied him bail only on
the strength of a strong presumption of guilt, thereby
His Honor states the following:
committing a grave abuse of discretion.
The hearing of an application for bail is summary in nature.
Tomas Trinidad and Aportadera and Palabrica On
for such hearing, the Court "does not seek to try the merits Petitioner's contention is without merit.
or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that would
A reading of the order complained of clearly shows
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Leo D. Medialdes for
that, in the opinion of the respondent judge, the
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence presented during the summary hearing on
evidence may be therein offered and admitted. (8 C.J.S. 93,
the motion for bail showed "that the accused Pepito
94)." (Padilla, Criminal Procedure 1955 ed. p. 270 citing
Magno has participated in the commission of the
Ocampo vs. Bernabe et al., 77 Phil. 55). It has also been
In Criminal Case No. 285-A filed with the Municipal
offense of which he is charged with other persons."
Court of the City of Davao against Francisco Nuez
andthat "to sustain a refusal of bail in a capital case it is Casting aside other unnecessary pronouncements
enough that evidence induces the belief that the accused
others, for Robbery with Rape, petitioner Pepito Magno
made in the order complained of, we believe that what
was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
by committed the offenses." (Ex-parte Page 255, p. 887, the respondent judge really found and held was that
Cal. App. 576). According to the law as interpreted by the
said court. After proper proceedings, said 82
the evidence of guilt presented against petitioner was
forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance
of like the case cited above it appears that in an strong and justified denial of his motion for bail. At this
for bail the Court does not go into the merits of
Davao where it was docketed as Criminal Caseapplication
stage of the proceeding, there is nothing before us,
inconsistency or contradiction in the
7155. Prior to the filing of the information in the latter
sufficient to justify the conclusion that His Honor erred
of a witness for the prosecution is not sufficient in
court, petitioner filed a motion for bail, but the sametestimony
or abused his discretion in so holding.
itselfitto entitle the accused to bail. It is enough, for the denial
denied by the respondent judge on the ground that
of bail, that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition under
was filed prematurely.
great. It is sufficient that the evidence presented by the consideration is dismissed and the writ prayed for
A second motion for bail was filed subsequently
induces the belief that the accused had denied, with costs.
petitioner, and after a hearing held thereon,committed
the offense.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
respondent judge issued a order on November 24, 1961
granting the motion and fixing the bail bond in theGuided
sum by the above ruling the Court is of the opinion that J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon
accused shall be denied bail. He is accused of a capital J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
of P40,000.00. In the afternoon of the same the
The evidence presented during the hearing of the
however, the fiscal moved for a reconsideration of the
bail, without passing upon the merits of the
order, claiming that he had just received sufficient
shows that the accused Pepito Magno has Aswat v. Galido, 204 SCRA 205, GR No.
evidence to prove the guilt of petitioner. The evidence,
88555, November 21, 1991
in the commission of the offense of which he is
stayed the effectivity of the order granting bail and,participated
a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the charged
order with other persons. The least that can be said about
the evidence on record, without passing on the merits, is that
was finally set aside and another was issued denying
G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991
proof of guilt of the accused is presumptively strong.
the motion for bail. Petitioner's motion thefor

Magna v. Abbas, 13 SCRA 233

filed the instant petition, contending: (1) thatoffenses

the provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such
specification of homicide with which he was charged
ordinances shall be taken into consideration. 5
committed outside a military installation and hence
offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that
Article 94, A.W., in its original form, did refer only to
he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right
offenses committed inside a Philippine military reservation
pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; and
as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948,
(3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay,
however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94, A.W. by
aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed
Pacifico M. Monje for petitioner.
providing that offenses committed outside a military
from the time of commencement of his detention.
reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial may
The Court en banc issued the writ of habeas corpus and direct, but only "when the offended party (and each one of
In this Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner challenges the
required respondent to make a return of the writ before the the offended parties if there be more than one)" is similarly
jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial which was convened
Third Division of the Court. 2 After hearing, the Court, subject to military law. 6
by then respondent Brigadier General Alejandro Galido 1 as
through the Third Division, resolved to require the
There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased
Commanding General of the Southern Luzon Command
parties to file their memoranda in amplification of their
Nebres were subject to military law at the time the latter was
("SOLCOM") to try petitioner for a specification (offense)
respective oral arguments. 3
shot and killed.
committed outside a military reservation or installation.
Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses
Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative
Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were
committed outside and those committed inside a military
relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect
both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
installation or reservation. He assails the jurisdiction of the
recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial.
("AFP") respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and
SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of
Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such
Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM
homicide was committed in Baguio City and in an area
but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General
outside any military installation or reservation.
Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act
Petitioner next contends that his right to bail is explicitly
as a personal driver of Brigadier General Galido's wife. On 29 The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument
guaranteed in Section 13, Article III of the Constitution.
December 1988, petitioner was involved in a shooting was obliterated sometime ago. As the law now stands, as
incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very
under Article 2, A.W., 4 he shall be punished as a recently ruled that the guarantee is not without any
the death of Nebres.
exception. In Comendador vs. De Villa, et al., 7 the Court
court-martial may direct.
Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held:
Art 94.
Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated
at Various Crimes.Any person subject to military law who
that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No.
commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violationWe
of find
the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has been
an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under
detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Camp Guillermo
This much
was suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a
municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed
Nakar, Lucena City since then.
is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail
of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation
On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM
offended party (and each one of the offended parties
if not
General Court-Martial ("SOLCOM-GCM") with violation of
more than one) is a person subject to military The
law, justification
shall be
for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor
Article 94 of the Articles of War ("A.W."), the specification
punished as a court-martial may direct: In imposingGeneral
the penalties
as follows:
being homicide.
for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner

EDUARDO N. ASWAT, petitioner,

in his capacity as Commander of the Southern Luzon
Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp
Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City, respondent.

onstitutional coverage on the right to bail.

his confinement pending the trial and disposition of the case filed
against him.
m structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate
framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of The authority of the respondent to order the arrest and
y the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and confinement of the petitioner flows from his general
t of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry jurisdiction over his command. Petitioner being assaigned
ctivities outside of and against the existing political system.
to SOLCOM, he is directly under the command of then
Brigadier General Galido.
e argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns his right to
atment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply receive base pay and other pay during the pendency of his
ere the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The detention. At present, petitioner is receiving a monthly
cused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of allowance of P540.00. 9
military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
The law defines "pay" to include "base pay and all
cause they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
additional pay for the length of service or type of duty such
mphasis supplied)
as longevity pay and flying pay," and distinguishes "pay"
Petitioner, as already noted, is a person subject to military from "allowances" which is limited to "quarters,
law, and under Article 70, A.W., "any person subject to subsistence, travel, and such other allowances as may by
military law charged with crime or with a serious offense law become payable to army personnel." 10
under these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest,
Concerning this issue, Section 18, Article 6 of R.A. No.
as circumstances may require."
138, as amended, provides:
Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions
Sec. 18. An enlisted man awaiting trial by Court-martial or the
of the General Court-Martial; the more important reason
result thereof, is not entitled to receive pay as distinguished
underlying the authority to impose confinement is the need to
allowances until the result of the trial is known; Provided, that any
enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with
enlisted man who is placed on a full duty status and performs
the command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By
regular duties while awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result
confining the petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct may
thereof, shall be entitled to receive all his pay and allowances for
be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of the command.
the period of such duty unless the same shall have been lawfully
The necessity for such confinement is a matter properly left to
forfeited by the approved sentence of a court-martial prior to actual
the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers. In
payment thereof to the enlisted man. For the purposes of this
Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense, 8 the Court en
section, the restoration to full duty status of enlisted men awaiting
banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Vasquez, held:
trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be as directed by
The petitioner is a person subject to military law facing charges
the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of National
before a general court-martial, and his release from confinement
Defense.' (as amended by R.A. 1067). (Emphasis supplied)
pending the trial of the charges against him is a matter that lies largely
Petitioner, during detention, ceased to perform his ordinary
in the discretion of the military authorities. They are undeniably in a
military duties. His continued detention necessarily
better position to appreciate the gravity of said charges and the
restrains his freedom of work, and he cannot carry out his
feasibility and advisability of releasing him or relaxing the terms of
normal military functions. There is no showing by

petitioner that he was placed on "full duty status" and

performing "regular duties" pending trial. On the premise of
"no work no pay", petitioner cannot insist on his right to
receive base pay or any other pay while under detention.
However, while petitioner is not entitled to receive any base
pay or any other pay during his detention, the law expressly
permits him to receive his regular and other allowances, if
otherwise entitled thereto, while under detention.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
Petition for Habeas Corpus for lack of merit. No
pronouncement to costs.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,

Gov't of USA vs. Purganan, September

24, 2002
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]
AMERICA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees
entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they
entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending? In general,

the answer to these two novel questions is No. The

explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders
dated May 23, 2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.[3] The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court]
finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the
respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable
amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to
be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately
surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to
include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail
Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465
entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6]

the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809
and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs
(SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as
the Extradition Law.

Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001,

the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was
docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No.
99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the
United States and to commit certain offenses in
violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax
evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201;
(3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections
1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Branch 25.[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of
Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in
the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a
vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Exextradition request and its supporting papers and to
Parte Motion,[10] which prayed that petitioners
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
a comment and supporting evidence.[8]
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on
SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
Resolution.[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
to submit their respective memoranda. In his
process. This Resolution has become final and
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer:
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of
post bail in the amount of P100,000.
the United States of America, represented by the

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for

hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.[11] After
he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Petitioner presents the following issues for the
consideration of this Court:
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure
of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

4. On the assumption that bail is available in

extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances which
may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no
special circumstance exists that will engender a wellfounded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on

May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for orders.[14]
bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will
address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice
and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail,
in the absence of any law that provides for such power. issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were]
arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for
relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the
extradition proceedings.
Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.[15]
We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
postulates that will guide us in disposing of the
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
substantive issues.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not
filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion
would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders
are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis
therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent,
as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez
ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and
(4) the issues raised are purely of law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA,
petitioner submits the following reasons: (1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and
such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues
and decides them, the parties would still bring the
matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues
resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding
precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the
Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case[17] ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below
refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide
and all other courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on
bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of
Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this
Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve
to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause
adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to
comply with its obligations under existing extradition

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher
court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of
law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency.[19] As a fourth exception, the Court has also
ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine
qua non, when the questions raised are the same as
those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Aside
from being of this nature, the issues in the present case
also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with.

primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the

interest of speedy justice and to avoid future
litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of
the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring
the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court
of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and
That the Court has the power to set aside its own
rules in the higher interests of justice is wellentrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what
we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but

mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
there are special and important reasons therefor.[21] In Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
been taken by the parties involved and proceed
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy
directly to the merits of the case.
to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held
Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and,
as follows:
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with
in Cuaresma:
that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
petition. This is established policy. x x x.
circumstances justify the same.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all

the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,

we deem it best to take cognizance of the present
case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an
interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law
on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a
treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding
the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer[28] of a fugitive[29]
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of
international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from
one country to another for the purpose of committing
crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that
transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community
have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular system
that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law.[31]

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of

the principle that criminals should be restored to a
jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of
detection and the threat of punishment play a significant
role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits
of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to
the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in
the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the
consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious
criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in
suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate
the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly
entered [into] by our government. More and more,
crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws
involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend
towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a
criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest
of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes,
especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to
be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to

the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both
parties thereto have examined, and that both accept
and trust, each others legal system and judicial
process.[34] More pointedly, our duly authorized
representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic
rights of the person sought to be extradited.[35] That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will
be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings
that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings are not criminal
in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which
is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.

proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In

contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of
the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal
case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.
Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment
becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres
to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of
the case and the demands of the nations foreign
relations before making the ultimate decision to

Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition

court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited.[37]
Such determination during the extradition proceedings
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a will only result in needless duplication and delay.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
assistance through which a person charged with or
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
function of the assisting authorities to enter into
of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
questions that are the prerogative of that
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that jurisdiction.[38] The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
xxx xxx xxx
There are other differences between an extradition
proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily

entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the

presumption that its implementation will serve the

national interest.

state despite learning that the requesting state is

seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged
with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty
to the processes in the requesting state, as well as
promotes comity[40]with the requesting state. On the
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying
paints a bad image of our country before the world
high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has
community. Such failure would discourage other states
the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,
from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity,
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
from fleeing a second time?
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply
First Substantive Issue:
in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.[42]
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
the requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the
other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice,
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him,
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of
and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him
the proper warrant, and the other government is under
notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover,
obligation to make the surrender.[43] Accordingly, the
petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver
dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
the accused, should it be found proper.
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and
war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that
risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement
he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of
in the experience[44] of the executive branch: nothing
his constitutional right to liberty without due process.
short of confinement can ensure that the accused will
He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law
not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to
or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the
thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for
The present extradition case further validates the
extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
formulation of that procedure is within the discretion
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would
of the presiding judge.
not even begin, if only the accused were willing to
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of
submit to trial in the requesting country.[45] Prior acts of
their arguments. It states:
herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest;
right before the conclusion of his indictment
Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested

receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court

shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be
served any where within the Philippines if it
appears to the presiding judge that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received
the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the
presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date
for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having charge
of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans
act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our
Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify
the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices
to the opposing parties,[46] receiving facts and
arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
immediate. The law could not have intended the
word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness
in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further

conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at

such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true
and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient
to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate
of Authentication among others, were the following: (1)
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr.
Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US
Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence
of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1
to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3)
Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers
and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex
GG, the Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental
Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to
132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in
two volumes.[49]

of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting

documents that probable cause did exist. In the
second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US
Government in support of [its] request for extradition
of herein respondent are enough to convince the
Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed
with the hearing against the extraditee.[50]
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing
an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence,
after having already determined therefrom that a
prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for
hearing upon motion of Jimenez.[51]

to the less reasonable x x x .[53]

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons
sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law
could have intended that consequence, for the very
purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
the accused to answer after receiving the summons.
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
however, the word hearing is notably absent from
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
at that stage been intended, the law could have easily
and particularly describing the place to be searched
so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point
and the persons or things to be seized.
that extradition proceedings are summary[52]in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
It is evident that respondent judge could have already
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
step in the entire proceedings.
gotten an impression from these records adequate for
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties
him to make an initial determination of whether the
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
intend something reasonable and something not
accused was someone who should immediately be
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein,
arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. He inconsistent with generally recognized principles of
International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations never was a judge required to go to the extent of
could have determined whether such facts and
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably
determining probable cause for the issuance of a
discreet and prudent person to believe that the
warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge
extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which

to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,

upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated
that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing
before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding
a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on
record, judges merely further examine complainants
and their witnesses.[57] In the present case, validating
the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the
entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard
and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in
his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima
facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings
and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous.
This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature
of extraditions.

justified in view of respondents demonstrated

predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it
wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them
and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance,
(b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At
his discretion, the judge may require the submission
of further documentation or may personally examine
the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite
of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding[58] is possible, the petition may be dismissed
at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie
case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of
justice in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this
constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited.
Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged
with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the
relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable
and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of
PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no
provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of
the word conviction, the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
That the case under consideration is an extradition and
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[60] It
accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on

case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be

heard is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to
will be given full opportunity to be heard
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
corpus finds application only to persons judicially
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
connected with invasion.[61] Hence, the second
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for
supporting documents after a determination that the
the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
extradition request meets the requirements of the law
mean that the right is available even in extradition
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
independent prima facie determination that his arrest
will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity,
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail
argument to grant him one in the present case. To
as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
had already been conducted in that country. But
because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state
before those proceedings could be completed, it was
No Violation of Due Process
hindered from continuing with the due processes
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62]
prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
in arguing that, constitutionally, [n]o one shall be
process now has thus become hollow. He already
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.
of innocence is not at issue.

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the

conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard[63] but, at the
same time, point out that the doctrine does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition

In this light, would it be proper and just for the

government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez
his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to
resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales against
the governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition

Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world

community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the
due process rights accorded to individuals must be
carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run
and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to
increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if,
through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment,
persons sought to be extradited are able to evade
arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of
any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty
-- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition
cases falls into place with and gives life to Article
14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the
requesting state to cut short their detention here.
Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary
nature of extradition cases and the need for their
speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right
in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion[68]
and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules
to protect and enforce constitutional rights.[69]

Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is

broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends
to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is
dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application.[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we
believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,
bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once
granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71]
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory
basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the
exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral
interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is
ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the
need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special
circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court

to grant his request for provisional release on bail.

The performance of legitimate and even essential
We have carefully examined these circumstances and duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
shall now discuss them.
free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed
by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
While his extradition was pending, Respondent
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has already debunked the
physical absence of one or a few of its members.
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
Depending on the exigency of Government that has to
be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can
When the voters of his district elected the accusedappellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness also be deemed the highest for that particular duty.
The importance of a function depends on the need for
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did
its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is
so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with
such legislative results which he could accomplish
unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
full term in office.
classification from those others who are validly
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils
restrained by law.
down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
person be denied the equal protection of laws. This
made in favor of or against groups or types of
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall individuals.
be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
same class as all persons validly confined under law? the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him

from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom

grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[73]
3. Not a Flight Risk?
It must be noted that even before private respondent
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To
ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
already of public knowledge that the United States was
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled
requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were
the country. True, he has not actually fled during the
or should have been prepared for the consequences of
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition.
the extradition case against their representative,
Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not
including his detention pending the final resolution of the
flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion,
case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we
as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
are constrained to rule against his claim that his election
government inching closer and closer. That he has
to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to
him bail.
mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
2. Anticipated Delay
reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the
extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to
judgment, even after bail has been previously
merely to determine whether the extradition petition and denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail,
determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule,
which may be granted in accordance with the
intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional guidelines in this Decision.
rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may,
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition
in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite
court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a
another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any
cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent
further discussion of this point would be merely
Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
anticipatory and academic.
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for
bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by
hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest
considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC

were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers

on the application for bail, both of which were
separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition,
the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and
the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has
patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure
not normally observed in the great majority of cases in
this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been
submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional
pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties
and Counter-Manifestation by private respondent -- in
which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process
would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would
again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it
noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings
and verbal propositions, private respondent has not
asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that
there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.
Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual
presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this
utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and
the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a
remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only
further delay these already very delayed
proceedings,[74] which our Extradition Law requires to
be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on

the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.

Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is
allegedly disregarding basic freedoms when a case is
one of extradition. We believe that this charge is not
only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in
its length and breath, this Decision has taken special
cognizance of the rights to due process and
fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and
stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to
determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that
may be adduced during the hearing of the petition,
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The
proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive
who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that
the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines
is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of
the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the
pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence
is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not
one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the
accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of
the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie

presumption is that the person would escape again if

given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition
is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally
examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that
a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately
issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to
appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

7. This Court will always remain a protector of human

rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and
the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of
the limitations of its authority and of the need for
respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and
co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power
of implementation.

9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight

functions and exercise review authority to prevent or
excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees allow contortions, delays and over-due process every
little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a
history of absconding, they have the burden of
proceedings become not only inutile but also sources
showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger
of international embarrassment due to our inability to
to the community; and (b) there exist special,
comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special
mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
bilateral justice and international cooperation.
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be
context of the peculiar facts of each case.
conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to
and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due technicalities that may negate that purpose.
to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order
that is compatible with the summary nature of
dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted
bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond

posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The

Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate
speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our
Extradition Law. No costs.


Justice Puno.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., joins in

the concurring opinion of Justice Carpio.

Ynares-Santiago, J., see Dissenting Opinion.


Vitug, J., see Dissenting Opinion.

Austria-Martinez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,

Quisumbing, J., concur in the separate opinion of

Bellosillo, J., see Separate Opinion.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., join in the Separate Opinion of

Justice Ynares-Santiago.

Puno, J., see Separate Opinion.

Carpio, J., see concurring Opinion.

[1] Rollo, p. 74.

[2] Id., pp. 122-125.
[3] Presided by Judge Guillermo G. Purganan.
[4] Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 4; Rollo, p. 125.
[5] 322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000; and 343 SCRA 377, October 17, 2000.
[6] Signed on November 13, 1994, and concurred in by the Philippine Senate on November 29, 1995.
[7] In Civil Case No. 99-94684.
[8] The 40-page Decision (322 SCRA 160, January 18, 2000) was penned by Justice Jose A. R. Melo with the concurrence of Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose C. Vitug,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Fidel P. Purisima, Arturo B. Buena, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Sabino R. de Leon Jr. Dissenting were Chief
Justice Hilario Davide Jr.; and Justices Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V. Panganiban, Bernardo P. Pardo and Minerva P. Reyes, with Justices Puno and
Panganiban writing separate Dissents.
[9] Penned by Justice Puno and concurred in by Chief Justice Davide; and Justices Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Reyes and De Leon Jr.
Dissenting were Justices Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Buena and Santiago, with Justices Melo and Santiago writing separate Dissents (343 SCRA 377, October 17,
[10] Annex E of the Petition.
[11] Annex M of the Petition.
[12] Annex O (certified true xerox copy) of the Petition.
[13] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on July 3, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of respondents Counter-Manifestation. Earlier, on September 3, 2001,
this Court received petitioners Memorandum signed by Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez and State Counsel Claro B. Flores. Filed on August 23, 2001 was
private respondents Memorandum signed by Attys. Mario Luza Bautista, Nick Emmanuel C. Villaluz and Brigette M. da Costa of Poblador Bautista and Reyes.
[14] Petition, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[15] During the Oral Argument on August 14, 2001, the Court asked the parties to discuss three issues: 1) the propriety of the filing of the Petition in this case before this

Court; 2) whether Mr. Mark Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and 3) whether the procedure followed by
respondent judge in issuing the warrant of arrest and granting bail was correct.
[16] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
[17] Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice v. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, and Nelson
Marquez, CA-GR SP No. 61079, promulgated on May 7, 2001.
[18] Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[19] Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 215, 219, January 30, 1982; citing Central Bank v. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 April 11, 1972.
[20] Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637, January 22, 1999.
[21] Malonzo v. Zamora, GR No. 137718, July 27, 1999, citing cases.
[22] 289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998, per Martinez, J.
[23] 190 SCRA 31, 38, September 24, 1990, per Fernan, CJ.
[24] Philippine National Bank v. Sayo Jr, 292 SCRA 202, 232, July 9, 1999, per Davide, CJ, citing People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415, April 18, 1999; Defensor-Santiago
v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633, January 27, 1993; Manalo v. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130, September 1, 1994. See also Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
347 SCRA 128, December 6, 2000; Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, GR No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001.
[25] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 ed., p. 37, citing Macondray & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446, July 16, 1937; Roldan v. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12, October 18,
1939; Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, September 21, 1931; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162, September 30, 1976; People v. Concepcion, 44 Phil.
126, November 29, 1922; Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, February 28, 1957; Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364, January 31, 1956.
[26] Last Whereas clause of PD 1069.
[27] See Whereas clause of PD 1069 and preamble of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
[28] Bassiouni, International Extradition, 1987 ed., p.68.
[29] In Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court defined fugitive from justice as one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment or who, after
being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.
[30] Bassiouni, supra, p. 21.
[31] Id., p. 67.
[32] Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., pp. 19-20.
[33] Supra, p. 392, October 17, 2000, per Puno, J.
[34] Coquia, On Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty, The Lawyers Review, August 31, 2000, p. 4.
[35] See Bassiouni, supra, p. 546; citing 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910).

[36] Supra.
[37] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
[38] Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 1971 ed., p. 157.
[39] Id., p. 545.
[40] In line with the Philippine policy of cooperation and amity with all nations set forth in Article II, Section 2, Constitution.
[41] The United States District Court, District of Nevada, Las Vegas, Nevada: In the Matter of the Extradition of Charlie Atong Ang, a fugitive from the country of the
Philippines, [the court] has denied Mr. Angs motion for bail, per petitioners Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
[42] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, supra.
[43] Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62, March 23, 1903.
[44] See footnote no. 41, Petition for Certiorari, p. 18; Rollo p. 19; Manifestation dated June 5, 2002.
[45] Persily, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 Stan. J. Intl L. 407 (Summer, 1998).
[46] Ibid.
[47] 39 CJS 875, citing People v. Blair, 33 NYS 2d 183, 190, 191; Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Hester, 109 P. 2d 820, 821, 188 Okl. 394.
[48] Id.; citing Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 S.W. 2d 767, 165 Tenn. 447.
[49] Petition for Extradition, pp. 2-3; Rollo pp. 49-50.
[50] Order dated July 3, 2001, p. 3; Rollo, 124.
[51] In the questioned July 3, 2001 Order (p. 4; Rollo, p. 125), respondent judge admitted that the Annexes of the Petition for Extradition had been received by the court a
quo on May 25, 2001; yet, in its Order dated May 23, 2001 ( Rollo, p. 74), it already set for hearing the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
[52] See 9, PD 1069.
[53] Bassiouni, International Extradition, supra, p. 87; citing 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law, (8th ed., 1955), pp. 952-53.
[54] 280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997.
[55] Id., p. 381, per Panganiban, J.
[56] 247 SCRA 652, 680, per Puno, J.
[57] IbId.; citing Allado v. Diokno, 233 SCRA 192, May 5, 1994.
[58] Prima facie finding, not probable cause, is the more precise terminology because an extradition case is not a criminal proceeding in which the latter phrase is
commonly used.
[59] SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance

as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
[60] De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J. (later CJ).
[61] 18, Art. VII, Constitution.
[62] Paretti v. United States of America, 122 F. 3d. 758, May 6, 1997.
[63] Garcia v. NLRC, GR No. 110494, November 18, 1996; Paat v. Court of Appeals, January 10, 1997.
[64] See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 536, March 20, 1993.
[65] Ibid. See also Busuego v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 473, March 11, 1999.
[66] Coquia, On the Implementation of the US-RP Extradition Treaty, supra; citing Kelso v. US Department of State, 13 F Supp. 291 [DDC 1998].
[67] It states: If the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the Requesting State, the Requested State may surrender the person as expeditiously as possible
without further proceedings.
[68] 1, Art. VIII, Constitution.
[69] 5, Art. VIII, Constitution.
[70] I.A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1998 ed., p. 98.
[71] Private respondent argues that the following cases -- In re Michell, 171 F. Rep. 289, June 30, 1909; United States v. Kirby, Brennan and Artt, 106 F. 3d. 855,
February 27, 1997 and 158 F. 3d. 462, October 9, 1998. Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 460 F. Supp. 915, March 14, 1977; and 554 F. 2d 1, April 6, 1977 -- should be treated as
examples of special circumstances. In our view, however, they are not applicable to this case due to factual differences. Hence we refrain from ruling on this argument
of Jimenez.
[72] 324 SCRA 689, February 3, 2000, per Ynares-Santiago, J.
[73] Id., pp. 700-702.
[74] The US request for extradition was dated June 16, 1999; and yet, to date, more than three years later, the Petition for Extradition is still languishing in the trial court.

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an

offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be
filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court
conviction the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the
accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accuse, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
B.1. Effect if offense changed from non-bailable aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
to bailable (Rule 114)
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
Sec. 5.
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
Bail, when discretionary.
(c) That he committed the offense while under

probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.

the following Order:

HON. RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
XIV, the motion for bail and the opposition thereto, and, on the
and REY CHRISTOPHER PACLIBAR, andthe complaint at bar and the sworn statement of Patrolman
Elpidio Desquitado, Tadeo Abello and Romeo Torrizo all of the
Integrated National Police, Bantayan (Cebu) Police Station, which
DESAMPARADO alias WALDAS, respondents.
constitute the essential evidence (so far) of the prosecution in this
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
case, this Court hereby resolves to grant the motion for bail presented
by Atty. Bernardito A. Florida and to this end hereby fixes the
Bernardito A. Florido for private respondents.
bailbond for the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar at P50,000.00.


The question presented for resolution in this

for certiorari and prohibition is whether or
prosecution was deprived of procedural due
on account of the grant of bail to the accused
any hearing on the motion for bail.

C. Standards for fixing bail

4. From the foregoing Order, private prosecutor Alex R.

filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
PROCESS, HENCE. NULL AND VOID and thus praying, as

The facts have been summarized as follows;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed
1. On August 11, 1987, an Information for Murder
of this
Court to:
qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
1. Reconsider
premeditation was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of its order dated 29th September l987 granting bail to the
Cebu, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge RenatoRey
C. Christopher Paclibar and set it aside for being null and
Dacudao, against accused Rey Christopher Paclibar
and Nero
Desamparado for the death of Cesarlito Nolasco.
2. To
casethe immediate hearing of the Motion to Bail to determine
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-11463.
the evidence for the prosecution would warrant the denial of
arraignment, accused Rey Christopher Paclibar entered
bail; a plea
of 'not guilty' to the offense charged.
'3. To recommit the accused to jail (CPDRC) immediately until such

2. On September 18, 1987, accused Rey Christopher

time Paclibar
the Honorable Court shall have resolved the Motion to Bail.'
filed a motion for bail, furnishing the Provincial Fiscal
5. Acting
on the motion for reconsideration and the opposition
People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489Cebu with a copy thereof.
thereto filed by accused Rey Christopher Paclibar, respondent
3. On September 29, 1987, and without conducting a hearing
judge issued on November 20, 1987 the following order:
G.R. No. 81389 February 21, 1989
in the application for bail, respondent Judge summarily

he Court hereby resolves to hold in abeyance its resolution on the

osecution's motion for reconsideration of the Court's order dated
ptember 29, 1987 granting bail to the accused, pending the
esentation by the Prosecution of evidence, which it promised to
esent, in support of its proposition that the evidence of guilt against
e accused in this case is strong, and that therefore the accused should
t have been admitted to bail. Unless and until the prosecution
duces the requisite evidence, the Court sees no reason to reconsider
order of September 29, 1987 which was predicated upon the
stulate that the Prosecution evidence thus far attached to the records
es not make out a very strong case for murder, as this evidence
nsists simply of the sworn statement of Pat. Desquitado, Tadeo
bello and Romeo Torrizo of the INP, Bantayan, Cebu, none of whom,
their own account, witnesses (sic) the slaying of the deceased Lito
olasco by the accused Rey Christopher Paclibar.

Government's counsel, the Solicitor General who Thus, this Court, in People v. San Diego (26 SCRA 522
appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the [1968]), held:
Supreme Court. At the very least, the Provincial Fiscal
The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution
himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor General,
was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the
should have raised the issue before us, instead of
We are of the considered opinion that whether the
private prosecutor with the conformity of one of
motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
Assistant Provincial Fiscals of Cebu. In the interest of
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course
a speedy determination of the case, however,of and
a regular trial the prosecution must be given an opportunity
considering the stand taken by the Office ofto the
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
Solicitor General whom we asked to comment,
may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
have decided to resolve this petition on its merits,motion
with for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the
a warning to the private prosecutor and the Assistant
instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied
Provincial Fiscal to follow the correct procedure such
in thean opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural
due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be

The respondent court acted irregularly in grantingconsidered

void on that ground. The orders complained of
he Court hereby gives the prosecution five (5) days from receipt of in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued in
s order within which to submit a pleading or motion for asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution
violation of procedural due process, must be considered null
consideration of the ruling of the Court.
for its conformity or comment, and, as it turned
bailcourt's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be
the meantime reset the continuation of the hearing of this case on later, over its strong objections. The court grantedThe
cember 16, 1987 at 2:30 P.M. Fiscal Napoleon Alburo, Attys. Alex
in the light of a summary of the evidence presented
three policemen, not one of whom apparently
onteclar and Bernardito Florida as well as Atty. Amado Olis are all
by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and
at be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order
tified of this order in open court. The accused is similarly notified. witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed
otify the bondsman of the accused.
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
only for prima facie determining whether or not evidence
for the prosecution followed by its conclusion
O ORDERED.' (pp. 95-98, Rollo)
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded whether
belief of not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of
the 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants
The petitioner now advances the following issue: that that the crime was committed and pinpointingOctober
"Respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with
are defective in form and substance because they do not
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recommit the the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual
contain a summary of the evidence presented by the
accused Rey Christopher Paclibar to jail during the accused still has to be established unlessprosecution.
They only contain the court's conclusion that the
pendency of the hearing of the motion to bail." (p. 6, prosecution submits the issue on whatever itevidence
of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form
already presented. To appreciate the strength
andorsubstance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this
weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
ground, be allowed to stand. (at p. 524; Emphasis supplied)
Before resolving this issue, we must stress that a private must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as
prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the People of the Philippines before this Court. It is the
the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity

for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the

nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal
is neither present nor heard.
The effort of the court to remedy the situation by
conducting the required hearing after ordering the
release of the accused may be a face-saving device for
the Judge but it cannot serve the purpose of validating
the void order granting bail and stamping an imprimatur
of approval on a clearly irregular procedure.
The defense counsel insists that the accused should be
entitled to bail considering the abolition of the death
penalty in the 1986 Constitution. He advances the
argument that due to the abolition of the death penalty,
murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer
punishable with death. This is erroneous because
although the Constitution states that the death penalty
may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition
for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19 [1],
it does not follow that all persons accused of any crime
whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In Art.
111, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "capital offenses" is
replaced by the phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion
Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a hearing before

resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua where the
prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt is strong. The case at bar, which
is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
In its comment, the defense interposes an objection to
the petition on the ground that it is premature and
therefore, should be dismissed. It contends that
certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court has,
through a motion for reconsideration, the opportunity
to correct the errors imputed to it. The general rule is
that a motion for reconsideration should first be
availed of before a petition for certiorari and
prohibition is filed. (Cebu Institute of Technology
[CIT] v. Ople, 156 SCRA 529 [1987]) However, this
rule does not apply when special circumstances
warrant immediate or more direct action. A motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like
this where execution has been ordered and the need
for relief is extremely urgent (Phil. British Assurance
Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA
520 [1989]). In the case at bar, the petitioner is left
with no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law considering that the respondent
court insists on the continuation of the hearing of the
criminal case even while the accused is free to roam
around. Moreover, there is an allegation that the
accused is harassing, threatening and coercing
witnesses who are now afraid to testify. (pp. 87-88,

Information was also for homicide (Annex B, p. 61,

Rollo). We note, however, that when the same was filed
with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an
Information for murder.
The amendment or changing of an information prior to
the plea of the accused is allowed there being no
prejudice to him. Thus, in the case of Gaspar v.
Sandiganbayan (144 SCRA 415 [1986]), this Court
held that, "no actual double jeopardy exists where the
petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to the offense."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
order granting bail is SET ASIDE and the accused is
ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the
bail application.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997)

Adm. Matter RTJ-97-1387
September 10, 1987
[A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387. September 10, 1997]
FLAVIANO B. CORTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE
SEGUNDO B. CATRAL, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Aparri, Cagayan, respondent.

Finally, the defense contends that the Judge did not
commit any error because actually the complaint in ROMERO, J.:
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is for homicide only Once again, the Court is asked to elucidate on the
(Annex A. p. 60, Rollo), and the recommended rules in the grant of the application for bail.

A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano Cortes

charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the RTC of Aparri,
Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of the Law committed as

In his comment dated August 16, 1996, respondent

judge branded the complainant as a self anointed
concern (sic) citizen of Aparri, Cagayan who has
gained notoriety as a character assassinator, a public
nuisance and most often called speaker for hire
during election time. Respondent further laments that
a ghost lawyer is taking advantage of the notoriety
of Mr. Flaviano Cortes by manipulating him like a
robot and letting him loose like a mad dog barking on
the wrong tree and biting everybody including the
other members of the bench.[2]

mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to

determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and
recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead.
Respondent judge acting on the said recommendation
1. He granted bail in murder cases without hearing:
and again guided by the provision of Section 9,
People v. Duerme, et al., Criminal Case No. 07-893 for
Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the
murder and People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal
evidence extant on the record approved the
Case No. 08-866 for murder
recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. [6] A
These two cases are like the case of Teresita Q. Tucay
duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carraos
v. Judge Roger Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 being
letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the
classified as heinous crimes there (sic) are supposedly
provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented
With regard to the first charge, respondent judge, in
by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he
his comment, clarified that Criminal Case No. 07-893
granted bail to the accused without conducting any
2. On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo
is the case of People v. Willie Bumanglag y Magno for
Castanedas Criminal Case No. 11-6250 for Illegal
frustrated homicide pending in Branch 7 of the
Possession of Firearm was raffled and assigned to his
Regional Trial Court of Aparri where the presiding
As regards the third charge concerning the illegal
sala. The provincial prosecutor granted a bailbond of
judge is Hon. Virgilio Alameda. However, if the
possession of firearm against Barangay Captain
P180,000.00 but it was reduced by Judge Segundo
complainant is referring to Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, Rodolfo Castaneda, the bailbond recommended by the
Catral for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no
et al., Criminal Case No. 874[3] for murder pending in prosecutor was P180,000.00. Accused, through
hearing has been made from 1995 to the present
Branch 7 of the RTC where respondent was then
counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed a motion for reduction of
because according to his clerks, he is holding it in
designated as presiding judge, respondent stresses
the bailbond to P30,000.00. Counsel even vouched
abeyance. This Barangay Captain Rodolfo Castaneda that the provincial prosecutor recommended P
and guaranteed the appearance of the accused in
is one of the goons of Julio Bong Decierto his nephew 200,000.00 as bailbond for each of the accused.
court, whenever required. The motion for reduction of
who has a pending murder case;
Subsequently, in a motion for reduction of bailbond,
bailbond was submitted without serious opposition and
the prosecutor mindful perhaps that there is no corpus
the resolution of the motion was submitted to the
3. Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a
of the crime as no firearm was caught or taken from
homicide case was granted with a bailbond of
the fact that the prosecution is banking on weak
the possession of the accused merely submitted the
P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is
circumstantial evidence and guided by the factors
same to the discretion of the court.[8]
too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another
12goon of Julio Bong Decierto;
In Criminal Case No. 08-915 concerning a homicide
94[4] issued an order for reduction of the bailbond
case against Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivero,
4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong
from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.[5]
respondent judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by
was recommended by the acting Officer-In-Charge
Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban
(OIC) as contained in his manifestation accompanying
appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the
the information.[9] Respondent judge then acting on
sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral
the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that
Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the
and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable
the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy
amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the
Siribans house to get the envelop;[1]

evidence on record is merely circumstantial and there

was no eyewitness to the commission of crime granted
bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.[10]
Finally, respondent judge says the accusation regarding
the acquittal of one Jimmy Siriban is simply the product
of a dirty imagination and is a dirty trick intended to
defame the name of his family by rumor mongers who
are unwilling to come out in the open to substantiate
their accusation.
On September 9, 1996, respondent submitted his
additional comment dated September 5, 1996 informing
the Office of the Court Administrator that Criminal Case
No. 07-784, referred to in the letter complainant (sic) of
Mr. Flaviano Cortes, has already been dismissed by
Judge Virgilio Alameda, RTC, Branch 07, Aparri
Cagayan, in his order dated August 16, 1996. [11]
Respondent judge stresses that, as can be gleaned
from the penultimate paragraph of said order, the
accused, despite reduction of their bailbonds, remained
detention prisoners because of their failure to post
bond. In his original comment, respondent stated,
among others, that the evidence against the accused in
Criminal Case No. 07-874 was based on weak
circumstantial evidence which prompted the court to
grant them a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00.
Respondent judge noted that the complaining witnesses
never appeared despite the fact that the case had been
set for hearing several times.

that bad faith motivated the actuation of the

respondent in granting and reducing the amount of
bail of the accused in some of the criminal cases that
were assigned in his sala. x x x it is crystal clear that
the increase or reduction of bail rests in the sound
discretion of the court depending upon the particular
circumstances of the case. It should be noted further
that the reduction in the amount of bail of the accused
in the criminal cases in question were all done by the
respondent with the knowledge and conformity of the
Public Prosecutor concerned. Moreover, the actions
taken by the respondent were in the exercise of
judicial discretion that may not be assailed in an
administrative proceedings (sic).[12]
We do not agree.
Bail is the security required by the court and given by
the accused to ensure that the accused appears
before the proper court at the scheduled time and
place to answer the charges brought against him or
her. It is awarded to the accused to honor the
presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to
prepare his defense without being subject to
punishment prior to conviction.[13]

When a person is charged with an offense punishable

by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
is a matter of discretion. Rule 114, Section 7 of the
Rules of Court states: No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of
guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal action. Consequently, when
the accused is charged with an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not
only to take into account the guidelines set forth in
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily
to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt
or lack of it, against the accused.

A summary hearing means such brief and speedy

method of receiving and considering the evidence of
guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the
court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The
each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet
court which may confine itself to receiving such
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional
evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the provision that bail should not be excessive. [14]
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination
dismissal of the complaint saying that there is nothing in Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of
and cross examination.[16]
the allegations of the complainant that would warrant
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
the imposition of administrative sanction against
be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
accused charged with murder, without having
respondent judge.
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing
conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of
the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into
In recommending the dismissal of the complaint against
guilt against the accused is strong.
account a number of factors such as the applicants
respondent judge, the Office of the Court Administrator
character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or In the case of People v. Ahmed Duerme y Paypon, et
noted, x x x complainant failed to show any indication
al., Criminal Case No. 874, accused Ahmed Duerme
whether he is a fugitive from justice.[15]

together with four other persons were charged with the

crime of murder. The provincial prosecutor
recommended the sum of P200,000.00 as bailbond for
each accused.[17] The records do not reveal whether a
hearing was actually conducted on the application for
bail although respondent judge implies that there was
one, stating that acting on this recommendation of the
provincial prosecutor and taking into account the
guidelines prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative
Circular 12-94, the court issued a warrant of arrest and
fixed the amount of P200,000.00 for the provisional
liberty of each of the accused.[18] Subsequently,
counsel for accused Ahmed Duerme filed a motion for
reduction of bail. The hearing of the motion was
conducted on August 21, 1995 with the prosecution, not
having interposed any opposition, and submitting the
resolution of the motion to the sound discretion of the
court instead. Respondent judge then issued an order
granting a reduced bailbond of P50,000.00 for accused
Ahmed Duerme inasmuch as the evidence was not so
strong to warrant the fixation of said amount.[19]
Respondent judge, in his comment, disclosed that the
prosecution was banking on weak circumstantial
evidence since there was no eyewitness to the
commission of the offense as borne out from the
affidavits and sworn statements of the prosecution
witnesses.[20] The order granting the reduced bailbond,
however, did not contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution.[21]

filed a petition for bail. In the hearing of the petition to

determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against
the accused was strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended the sum of
P200,000.00 instead.[22] Respondent judge, acting
on said recommendation and again guided by the
provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94
in conjunction with the evidence extant on record,
issued an order granting bail to the accused in the
sum of P200,000.00.[23] Unable to post the said
bond, accused through counsel filed a motion to
reduce bail.[24] In the course of the hearing of the
petition, the public prosecutor manifested that he had
no objection to the sum of P50,000.00 as bail for the
accused. Respondent judge, then guided by the
factual setting and the supporting evidence extant on
record[25] reduced the bail bond from P200,000.00
to P50,000.00 as recommended by the prosecutor.
Once again, the order granting the bail of
P200,000.00, as well as the reduced bail bond of
P50,000.00, did not contain a summary of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.

view, the strength of evidence on hand for the state

can only prove the crime of homicide and not
In the recent case of Inocencio Basco v. Judge Leo M.
Rapatalo,[27] this court ruled that x x x the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave
the application of bail to the sound discretion of the
court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a
hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases
wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for
the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.

The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the

determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the
Respondent judge insists that in the aforecited cases,
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing.
a hearing was actually conducted on the application
Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
and motion for reduction of bail, but the public
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
prosecutor opted not to introduce evidence and
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
submitted the resolution of the petition, as well as the
court,[28] it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
motion for reduction of bail, to the sound discretion of
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
the court instead. Respondent observed that since it
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, Criminal
is a basic principle of procedure that the prosecution
cross examination and to introduce evidence in his
Case No. 08-866, accused Bumanglag was charge with of criminal cases is under the direct control and
own rebuttal.[29]
murder in a criminal complaint filed before the Municipal supervision of the fiscal or prosecutor, would it be
Trial Court of Sta. Ana, Cagayan. After conducting a
procedurally proper for the court to compel prosecutor Respondent judge justifies the grant of bail in the two
preliminary investigation, the inquest judge issued a
Apolinar Carrao, the public prosecutor assigned in the cases by stating that the prosecutor recommended the
grant of bail. Respondent also added that in the case
warrant of the arrest for the accused with no bail
case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanlag, Criminal Case
of People v. Ahmed Duerme, there were no
recommended. When the case was elevated to the
No. 08-866, to prove the evidence of guilt of the
Regional Trial Court, the information made no mention
accused for the crime of murder when the prosecutor eyewitnesses to the commission of the offense as
borne out from the affidavits and sworn statements of
of a bailbond. Consequently, accused through counsel candidly admitted in open court that in his honest

the witnesses.[30] As a matter of fact, the case had

already been dismissed for failure to prosecute by
Judge Alameda inasmuch as the prosecutor himself
admitted that there was lack of interest on the part of
the witnesses to pursue the case and not a single
witness ever went to court to see him.[31]

The procedural lapse of respondent judge is

aggravated by the fact that even though the accused
in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed
Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already
fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent
evidently knew that the accused were still at large as
he even had to direct their arrest in the same order
The fact that Criminal Case No. 07-874 was
where he simultaneously granted them bail.[35] At
subsequently dismissed by Judge Alameda does not
this juncture, there is a need to reiterate the basic
completely exculpate respondent judge. We need only
principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by
remind him that he is not bound by the recommendation
a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise
of the prosecutor and the affidavits and sworn
deprived of his liberty[36] and it would be premature,
statements of the witnesses are mere hearsay
not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for
statements which could hardly be the basis for
some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
determining whether or not the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.
With regard to the third charge filed against
respondent judge, we adopt the findings of the Office
Worth noting, too, is the fact that the order granting the
of the Court Administrator that the complainant failed
application, as well as the reduction for bail the
to show that bad faith motivated the actuation of
aforecited cases, did not contain a summary of the
respondent judge in reducing the amount of bail in
evidence presented by the prosecution. In Criminal
Criminal Case No. 11250 for Illegal Possession of
Case No. 07-874, respondent only arrived at the
Firearm against Barangay Captain Rodolfo
conclusion that "the evidence was not so strong to
Castaneda. Respondent judge, in granting and
warrant the fixation of said amount[32] and the
subsequently reducing the recommended bailbond of
observation that: When the hearing of this petition was
P180,000.00 considered the fact that there was no
called, some legal skirmishes arose between the
corpus of the crime as no firearm was taken from the
Prosecutor and the Defense Counsel, after which, the
possession of the accused, as well as the fact that
prosecutor out of humanitarian reason yielded and
counsel for the accused vouched and guaranteed the
manifested that he is amenable that the accused be
appearance of the accused in court whenever
admitted to bail in the amount of P200,000.00 in
required.[37] Moreover, records show that, contrary to
Criminal Case No. 08-866.[33] Well settled in a number
the allegations of the complainant, the trial of the case
of cases[34] is the rule that the courts order granting or
had already been set for hearing but on more than
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
one occasion, the defense counsel, as well as the
for the prosecution, otherwise the order granting or
prosecutor, both moved to have it reset.[38]
denying bail may be invalidated because the summary
of the evidence for the prosecution which contains the
In Criminal Case No. 08-915 for homicide filed
judges evaluation of the evidence may be considered
against accused Nilo de Rivera, complainant alleges
as an aspect of procedural due process for both the
that the amount of P14,800.00 granted by respondent
prosecution and the defense.
as bailbond of the accused is too low. Respondent

judge stresses that the amount was recommended by

the prosecutor and not motu propio by the trial court.
Respondent added that the amount of bail was
appropriate inasmuch as it was fixed in accordance
with the guidelines set forth in Section 9 of
Administrative Circular 12-94. As long as in fixing the
amount of bail, the court is guided by the purpose for
which bail is required, that is, to secure the appearance
of the accused to answer charges brought against him,
the decision of the court to grant bail in the sum it
deems appropriate will not be interfered with.
With respect to the last charge, we adopt the findings
of the office of the Court Administrator that there is
nothing in the record to substantiate the allegation of
the complainant that the acquittal of a certain Jimmy
Siriban by respondent judge was tainted with
irregularity. Other than his bare allegation, complainant
has yet to present evidence as to any irregularity
committed by respondent judge in acquitting Mr.
In sum, we find respondent Judge Segundo B. Catral
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for having granted
bail to the accused in Criminal Cases No. 07-874 and
08-866 without having conducted the requisite
hearing. It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming,
that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges
involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As
a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine
Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the
subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges.
Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of
the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his

recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of

Court as amended);

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in

the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study
them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly,
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous
hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether
decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is
or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
number of cases on bail having already been
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in
accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, the administration of justice can only be engendered if
litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.[39]
cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their
[1] Rollo, p. 83.

grasp of legal principles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Segundo B. Catral is hereby ORDERED to pay
a fine P20,000.00 with the WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., no part, on leave during deliberations.

[2] Rollo, p. 18.

[3] Criminal Case No. 07-874 is actually People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Fernando y Caddarao @ Gardo, Cenon Duerme y Orel, Ahmed Duerme y Paypon,
Roberto Duerme @ Berto/Berting and Florante Duerme y Saguitan @ Berong but for purposes of this case, Criminal Case No. 07-874 shall be referred to as People
v. Ahmed Duerme.
[4] Rule 114 of the Rules of Court on Bail was amended by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated August 16, 1994, the amendments of which took effect on October
1, 1994.
[5] Rollo, p. 14.
[6] Rollo, p. 15.
[7] Rollo, pp. 91-92.
[8] Rollo, p. 16.
[9] Rollo, p. 80.
[10] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[11] Rollo, p.113.
[12] Rollo, p. 5.
[13] Stack v. Boyle, 342 US 1; 96 L ED 3, 72 S Ct. 1; Dudley v. US, 242 F 2d 656.
[14] Article III, Section 13, 1987 Constitution.

[15] Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. See also Asst. Prosecutor Antonio Chin v. Judge Tito G. Gustilo, et al., A.M. No. 94-1243, August 11, 1995.
[16] Siazon v. Presiding Judge, et al., 42 SCRA 184 (1971).
[17] Annex F, Rollo, p. 50.
[18] Rollo, p. 13.
[19] Annex 1; Rollo, p. 55.
[20] Rollo, p. 14.
[21] Annex 1; Rollo, p. 55.
[22] Annex A- A-7; Rollo, pp. 115-122.
[23] Annex O; Rollo, p. 65.
[24] Annex P, Rollo, pp. 66-68.
[25] Rollo, p. 15.

criminal indictment and provisionally released on

bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
D. Right to Bail and Right to Travel
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the
two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Manotok v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities,
Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
the management of the latter into the hands of
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
professional men, he holds no officer-position in
said business, but acts as president of the former
CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused
Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United
States, came home, and together with his coHON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities
Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security and Exchange Commission for the appointment
Command (AVSECOM), respondents.
of a management committee, not only for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for TransFERNAN, J.:
Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for
the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC
review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a

Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the

Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr.,
Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted
and a management committee was organized and
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the
Securities and Exchange Commission requested
the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo
Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of
the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by
Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against petitioner and one Raul
Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due
course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa

were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then

Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases
Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in
the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of
the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon
dated March 9, 1982, reads:
Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to
leave for the United States on the all
embracing ground that his trip is ... relative
to his business transactions and
The Court sees no urgency from this
statement. No matter of any magnitude is
discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on
the proposed trip.
In view thereof, permission to leave the
country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now
or in the future until these two (2) cases are
terminated . 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove
dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
6.-Finally, there is also merit in the
prosecution's contention that if the Court
would allow the accused to leave the

Philippines the surety companies that filed

the bail bonds in his behalf might claim
that they could no longer be held liable in
their undertakings because it was the
Court which allowed the accused to go
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippine Court, should the accused fail or
decide not to return.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused
is DENIED. 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the
Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the
recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum
dated February 4, 1980, but said request was
also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and
26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove,
respectively, as well as the communicationrequest of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad.
He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for
On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered
a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to
which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6

petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for

leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,
petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana,
U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention
of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc."
8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of
the chief executive officer of the Exploration
Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller
9 requesting his presence in the United States to
"meet the people and companies who would be
involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise
manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had
been dismissed as to him "on motion of the
prosecution on the ground that after verification of
the records of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected
with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of
the commission of the offenses imputed to him."
10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained
pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the
dismissal of the other cases against petitioner,
instead of dismissing the cases before him,
ordered merely the informations amended so as to
delete the allegation that petitioner was president
and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority
stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On
September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en
banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to

bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which

granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted
to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function
of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines
bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which
his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the
same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure
the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the
law may require of him. 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs.
Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
... the result of the obligation assumed by
appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court, was to prohibit
said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of

the Philippines, because, otherwise, said

orders and processes will be nugatory,
and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the
courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they
would have no binding force outside of
said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond,
when fully executed or filed of record, and
the prisoner released thereunder, is to
transfer the custody of the accused from
the public officials who have him in their
charge to keepers of his own selection.
Such custody has been regarded merely
as a continuation of the original
imprisonment. The sureties become
invested with full authority over the person
of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the
state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state, more so then has
the court from which the sureties merely derive
such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected
despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this
inherent right of the court is recognized by
petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation
that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for
he would not have filed the motion for permission
to leave the country in the first place, if it were

To support his contention, petitioner places

reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R,
February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following
... The law obliges the bondsmen to
produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not
limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as
demandable only when the appellants are
in the territorial confines of the Philippines
and not demandable if the appellants are
out of the country. Liberty, the most
important consequence of bail, albeit
provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all,
liberty operates as fully within as without the
boundaries of the granting state. This
principle perhaps accounts for the absence
of any law or jurisprudence expressly
declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the
The faith reposed by petitioner on the abovequoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement
suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is,
indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly
declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend
the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for
the reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the
Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused
was able to show the urgent necessity for her
travel abroad, the duration thereof and the
conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel

thereby satisfying the court that she would comply

with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast,
petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown
any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General in his comment:
A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for
Permission to Leave the Country' will show
that it is solely predicated on petitioner's
wish to travel to the United States where he
will, allegedly attend to some business
transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of
petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling
reason can be discerned to justify the grant
of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has
not sufficiently shown that there is absolute
necessity for him to travel abroad.
Petitioner's motion bears no indication that
the alleged business transactions could not
be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf. Neither is there any hint that
petitioner's absence from the United States
would absolutely preclude him from taking
advantage of business opportunities therein,
nor is there any showing that petitioner's
non-presence in the United States would
cause him irreparable damage or prejudice.
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
proposed travel or shown that his surety has
agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his
surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted
cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the
accused to leave the country without the assent of
the surety because in accepting a bail bond or

recognizance, the government impliedly agrees

"that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the
sureties or affect their remedies against him.
Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or
recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is
made without his assent. This result has been
reached as to a stipulation or agreement to
postpone the trial until after the final disposition
of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave
the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order
of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has
been rendered moot and academic by the
dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases
pending before said judge, We see the rationale
behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts
and the appellate court of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, as well as the
consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We
find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having
denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave
the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible
error to have been committed by the appellate
court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country
after it had satisfied itself that she would comply
with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel
shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court, or when

necessary in the interest of national

security, public safety or public
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in
accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in
discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz
and Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., took no part.
1 Annex "D", Petition, p. 44, Rollo.
2 Ibid, p. 44, Rollo.
3 Ibid, p. 44, Rollo.
4 Annex "A Petition, p. 17, Rollo
5 Annex "D", Petition, p. 42, Rollo.
6 p. 87, Rollo.
7 p. 117, Rollo.
8 p. 120, Rollo.
9 Annex "BB", Motion for Leave p.
124, Rollo.
10 p. 117, Rollo.
11 p. 121, Rollo.
12 p. 129, Rollo.
13 6 Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailment,

14 6 Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailments,

15 Comment, pp. 69-70, Rollo.
16 6 Am. Jur. 125

E. Effect on right when Detention is

Rule 114, Rules of Court

F. Right to Bail and Extradition

Government of the United States of
America vs. Hon. Purganan, GR No.
148571, September 24, 2002
(see pages 10 - 23)