Contents

CAN PUTIN SURVIVE?..................................................................................................... 6

Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline ......................................................... 7
The Tide Turns Against Putin ........................................................................................ 8
Imagining Russia After Putin ....................................................................................... 10
A CHRONOLOGY OF RUSSIA FROM YELTSIN'S FALL THROUGH PUTIN'S RISE ... 11
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 12
Kosovo Crisis Sets Template for New Russian Politics .......................................... 13
In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute .............................................................. 13
Former Soviet Union Net Assessment 2005: Unilateral Concessions to the West
Are Over, Reaction Has Begun............................................................................... 13
Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus ....................................................................... 13

Russia: Rebuilding an Empire While It Can ............................................................ 14

KOSOVO CRISIS SETS TEMPLATE FOR NEW RUSSIAN POLITICS ......................... 15
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 15
IN RUSSIA, PUTIN'S POWER ALMOST ABSOLUTE .................................................... 18
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 18
FORMER SOVIET UNION NET ASSESSMENT -- 2005 ................................................ 19
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 19
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 20
The FSU's Social and Political Drivers ........................................................................ 25
Restraints or Arresting Factors.................................................................................... 29
Enablers ...................................................................................................................... 31
RUSSIA AND ROTATING THE U.S. FOCUS ................................................................. 33
Exploiting U.S. Distractions ......................................................................................... 33
NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions .................................................................... 34
The Closing Window ................................................................................................... 35
The Middle East Connection ....................................................................................... 36
Bush's Long Shot ........................................................................................................ 37
RUSSIA: REBUILDING AN EMPIRE WHILE IT CAN ..................................................... 39
Geography and Empire-Building ................................................................................. 39
Maintaining a Strong State .......................................................................................... 40
Putin's Plans ................................................................................................................ 41
RUSSIA AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY DANCE ............................................................... 44
THE WESTERN VIEW OF RUSSIA ................................................................................ 46
Cold War vs. Post-Cold War ....................................................................................... 46
The Post-Post Cold War World ................................................................................... 48
Responding to the United States ................................................................................ 50
RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, INTRODUCTION: THE TARGETS .................... 52
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 52
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 52
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 53

The Inherent Russian Struggle ............................................................................... 53

The Window of Opportunity .................................................................................... 54
The Russian Plan.................................................................................................... 55
A Closing Window ................................................................................................... 56
RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 1: THE NECESSITIES ............................ 57
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 57
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 57
Ukraine .................................................................................................................... 58
Russia's Levers ....................................................................................................... 59
Russia's Success and Roadblocks ......................................................................... 60
Belarus .................................................................................................................... 61
Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................. 63
Georgia ................................................................................................................... 64
RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 2: THE DESIRABLES ............................. 67
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 67
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 68
The Baltics .............................................................................................................. 68
Azerbaijan ............................................................................................................... 70
Turkmenistan .......................................................................................................... 72
Uzbekistan .............................................................................................................. 73
RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 3: THE EXTRAS ..................................... 75
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 75
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 75
Moldova .................................................................................................................. 75
Armenia................................................................................................................... 78
Kyrgyzstan .............................................................................................................. 79
Tajikistan ................................................................................................................. 81
RUSSIA'S EXPANDING INFLUENCE, PART 4: THE MAJOR PLAYERS ..................... 83
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 83
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 83

Germany ................................................................................................................. 84
France ..................................................................................................................... 86
Turkey ..................................................................................................................... 87
Poland ..................................................................................................................... 88
The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle .............................................................. 89
Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 90
Geopolitical Imperatives .............................................................................................. 97
Strategy of the Russian Empire................................................................................... 98
Contemporary Russia................................................................................................ 102
The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength......................................... 107
The State of the Russian State ................................................................................. 107
Geography and Development ................................................................................... 109
The Reality of Russian Power ................................................................................... 111
The Coming Era of Russia's Dark Rider ........................................................................ 114
The Russian Cycle .................................................................................................... 115
The Dark Rider .......................................................................................................... 117
Why the Crackdown? ................................................................................................ 118
Russian Resurgence Timeline ....................................................................................... 120
Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence .............................................. 120
Russia's Growing Resurgence ................................................................... 120
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 4: The Major Players ................ 120
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras............................... 120
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables ...................... 120
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities .................... 120
Russia's Expanding Influence, Introduction: The Targets ................. 120
Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence ................................. 120
Russia, Turkey: The Resurgent Powers' Wary Approach ................. 120
Russian Oligarchs Part 3: The Party's Over .......................................... 120
Russian Oligarchs Part 2: The Evolution of a New Business Elite. 121
Russian Oligarchs Part 1: Putin's Endgame Against His Rivals ..... 121

Editor's Choice ..................................................................................................... 121

Nigeria: Opting Out of an Insurgency....................................................... 121
Turkey and Qatar's Shared Regional Interests ..................................... 121
Israel and Gaza: Then and Now ................................................................ 121
Related Content ................................................................................................... 121
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables ...................... 121
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras............................... 121
Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities .................... 122
Related Situation Reports ................................................................................ 122
Ukraine: Germany Welcomes Reduced Russian Troop Deployment
On Border .......................................................................................................... 122
Germany: Russia's Actions In Crimea Understandable, Former
Chancellor Says .............................................................................................. 122
Russia: France, Germany Warn Of Further Sanctions If Ukrainian
Election Stopped ............................................................................................. 122

CAN PUTIN SURVIVE?

Geopolitical Weekly
Monday, July 21, 2014 - 16:05 Print Text Size
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/can-putin-survive#axzz38H8hgZNx

Stratfor
By George Friedman
There is a general view that Vladimir Putin governs the Russian Federation as a dictator,
that he has defeated and intimidated his opponents and that he has marshaled a
powerful threat to surrounding countries. This is a reasonable view, but perhaps it should
be re-evaluated in the context of recent events.

Ukraine and the Bid to Reverse Russia's Decline

Ukraine is, of course, the place to start. The country is vital to Russia as a buffer against
the West and as a route for delivering energy to Europe, which is the foundation of the
Russian economy. On Jan. 1, Ukraine's president was Viktor Yanukovich, generally
regarded as favorably inclined to Russia. Given the complexity of Ukrainian society and
politics, it would be unreasonable to say Ukraine under him was merely a Russian
puppet. But it is fair to say that under Yanukovich and his supporters, fundamental
Russian interests in Ukraine were secure.
This was extremely important to Putin. Part of the reason Putin had replaced Boris
Yeltsin in 2000 was Yeltsin's performance during the Kosovo war. Russia was allied with
the Serbs and had not wanted NATO to launch a war against Serbia. Russian wishes
were disregarded. The Russian views simply didn't matter to the West. Still, when the air
war failed to force Belgrade's capitulation, the Russians negotiated a settlement that
allowed U.S. and other NATO troops to enter and administer Kosovo. As part of that
settlement, Russian troops were promised a significant part in peacekeeping in Kosovo.
But the Russians were never allowed to take up that role, and Yeltsin proved unable to
respond to the insult.
Putin also replaced Yeltsin because of the disastrous state of the Russian economy.
Though Russia had always been poor, there was a pervasive sense that it been a force
to be reckoned with in international affairs. Under Yeltsin, however, Russia had become
even poorer and was now held in contempt in international affairs. Putin had to deal with
both issues. He took a long time before moving to recreate Russian power, though he
said early on that the fall of the Soviet Union had been the greatest geopolitical disaster
of the 20th century. This did not mean he wanted to resurrect the Soviet Union in its
failed form, but rather that he wanted Russian power to be taken seriously again, and he
wanted to protect and enhance Russian national interests.
The breaking point came in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004. Yanukovich
was elected president that year under dubious circumstances, but demonstrators forced
him to submit to a second election. He lost, and a pro-Western government took office.
At that time, Putin accused the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies of having
organized the demonstrations. Fairly publicly, this was the point when Putin became
convinced that the West intended to destroy the Russian Federation, sending it the way
of the Soviet Union. For him, Ukraine's importance to Russia was self-evident. He
therefore believed that the CIA organized the demonstration to put Russia in a
dangerous position, and that the only reason for this was the overarching desire to

cripple or destroy Russia. Following the Kosovo affair, Putin publicly moved from
suspicion to hostility to the West.
The Russians worked from 2004 to 2010 to undo the Orange Revolution. They worked to
rebuild the Russian military, focus their intelligence apparatus and use whatever
economic influence they had to reshape their relationship with Ukraine. If they couldn't
control Ukraine, they did not want it to be controlled by the United States and Europe.
This was, of course, not their only international interest, but it was the pivotal one.
Russia's invasion of Georgia had more to do with Ukraine than it had to do with the
Caucasus. At the time, the United States was still bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While Washington had no formal obligation to Georgia, there were close ties and implicit
guarantees. The invasion of Georgia was designed to do two things. The first was to
show the region that the Russian military, which had been in shambles in 2000, was able
to act decisively in 2008. The second was to demonstrate to the region, and particularly
to Kiev, that American guarantees, explicit or implicit, had no value. In 2010, Yanukovich
was elected president of Ukraine, reversing the Orange Revolution and limiting Western
influence in the country.
Recognizing the rift that was developing with Russia and the general trend against the
United States in the region, the Obama administration tried to recreate older models of
relationships when Hillary Clinton presented Putin with a "restart" button in 2009. But
Washington wanted to restore the relationship in place during what Putin regarded as
the "bad old days." He naturally had no interest in such a restart. Instead, he saw the
United States as having adopted a defensive posture, and he intended to exploit his
advantage.
One place he did so was in Europe, using EU dependence on Russian energy to grow
closer to the Continent, particularly Germany. But his high point came during the Syrian
affair, when the Obama administration threatened airstrikes after Damascus used
chemical weapons only to back off from its threat. The Russians aggressively opposed
Obama's move, proposing a process of negotiations instead. The Russians emerged
from the crisis appearing decisive and capable, the United States indecisive and
feckless. Russian power accordingly appeared on the rise, and in spite of a weakening
economy, this boosted Putin's standing.

The Tide Turns Against Putin

Events in Ukraine this year, by contrast, have proved devastating to Putin. In January,
Russia dominated Ukraine. By February, Yanukovich had fled the country and a pro-

Western government had taken power. The general uprising against Kiev that Putin had
been expecting in eastern Ukraine after Yanukovich's ouster never happened.
Meanwhile, the Kiev government, with Western advisers, implanted itself more firmly. By
July, the Russians controlled only small parts of Ukraine. These included Crimea, where
the Russians had always held overwhelming military force by virtue of treaty, and a
triangle of territory from Donetsk to Luhansk to Severodonetsk, where a small number of
insurgents apparently supported by Russian special operations forces controlled a dozen
or so towns.
If no Ukrainian uprising occurred, Putin's strategy was to allow the government in Kiev to
unravel of its own accord and to split the United States from Europe by exploiting
Russia's strong trade and energy ties with the Continent. And this is where the crash of
the Malaysia Airlines jet is crucial. If it turns out -- as appears to be the case -- that
Russia supplied air defense systems to the separatists and sent crews to man them
(since operating those systems requires extensive training), Russia could be held
responsible for shooting down the plane. And this means Moscow's ability to divide the
Europeans from the Americans would decline. Putin then moves from being an effective,
sophisticated ruler who ruthlessly uses power to being a dangerous incompetent
supporting a hopeless insurrection with wholly inappropriate weapons. And the West, no
matter how opposed some countries might be to a split with Putin, must come to grips
with how effective and rational he really is.
Meanwhile, Putin must consider the fate of his predecessors. Nikita Khrushchev returned
from vacation in October 1964 to find himself replaced by his protege, Leonid Brezhnev,
and facing charges of, among other things, "harebrained scheming." Khrushchev had
recently been humiliated in the Cuban missile crisis. This plus his failure to move the
economy forward after about a decade in power saw his closest colleagues "retire" him.
A massive setback in foreign affairs and economic failures had resulted in an apparently
unassailable figure being deposed.
Russia's economic situation is nowhere near as catastrophic as it was under Khrushchev
or Yeltsin, but it has deteriorated substantially recently, and perhaps more important, has
failed to meet expectations. After recovering from the 2008 crisis, Russia has seen
several years of declining gross domestic product growth rates, and its central bank is
forecasting zero growth this year. Given current pressures, we would guess the Russian
economy will slide into recession sometime in 2014. The debt levels of regional
governments have doubled in the past four years, and several regions are close to
bankruptcy. Moreover, some metals and mining firms are facing bankruptcy. The
Ukrainian crisis has made things worse. Capital flight from Russia in the first six months

stood at $76 billion, compared to $63 billion for all of 2013. Foreign direct investment fell
50 percent in the first half of 2014 compared to the same period in 2013. And all this
happened in spite of oil prices remaining higher than $100 per barrel.
Putin's popularity at home soared after the successful Sochi Winter Olympics and after
the Western media made him look like the aggressor in Crimea. He has, after all, built
his reputation on being tough and aggressive. But as the reality of the situation in
Ukraine becomes more obvious, the great victory will be seen as covering a retreat
coming at a time of serious economic problems. For many leaders, the events in Ukraine
would not represent such an immense challenge. But Putin has built his image on a
tough foreign policy, and the economy meant his ratings were not very high before
Ukraine.

Imagining Russia After Putin

In the sort of regime that Putin has helped craft, the democratic process may not be the
key to understanding what will happen next. Putin has restored Soviet elements to the
structure of the government, even using the term "Politburo" for his inner Cabinets.
These are all men of his choosing, of course, and so one might assume they would be
loyal to him. But in the Soviet-style Politburo, close colleagues were frequently the most
feared.
The Politburo model is designed for a leader to build coalitions among factions. Putin
has been very good at doing that, but then he has been very successful at all the things
he has done until now. His ability to hold things together declines as trust in his abilities
declines and various factions concerned about the consequences of remaining closely
tied to a failing leader start to maneuver. Like Khrushchev, who was failing in economic
and foreign policy, Putin could have his colleagues remove him.
It is difficult to know how a succession crisis would play out, given that the constitutional
process of succession exists alongside the informal government Putin has created. From
a democratic standpoint, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Moscow Mayor Sergei
Sobyanin are as popular as Putin is, and I suspect they both will become more
popular in time. In a Soviet-style struggle, Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov and Security
Council Chief Nicolai Patryushev would be possible contenders. But there are others.
Who, after all, expected the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev?
Ultimately, politicians who miscalculate and mismanage tend not to survive. Putin
miscalculated in Ukraine, failing to anticipate the fall of an ally, failing to respond
effectively and then stumbling badly in trying to recoup. His management of the economy

has not been exemplary of late either, to say the least. He has colleagues who believe
they could do a better job, and now there are important people in Europe who would be
glad to see him go. He must reverse this tide rapidly, or he may be replaced.
Putin is far from finished. But he has governed for 14 years counting the time Dmitri
Medvedev was officially in charge, and that is a long time. He may well regain his
footing, but as things stand at the moment, I would expect quiet thoughts to be stirring in
his colleagues' minds. Putin himself must be re-examining his options daily. Retreating in
the face of the West and accepting the status quo in Ukraine would be difficult, given that
the Kosovo issue that helped propel him to power and given what he has said about
Ukraine over the years. But the current situation cannot sustain itself. The wild card in
this situation is that if Putin finds himself in serious political trouble, he might become
more rather than less aggressive. Whether Putin is in real trouble is not something I can
be certain of, but too many things have gone wrong for him lately for me not to consider
the possibility. And as in any political crisis, more and more extreme options are
contemplated if the situation deteriorates.
Those who think that Putin is both the most repressive and aggressive Russian leader
imaginable should bear in mind that this is far from the case. Lenin, for example, was
fearsome. But Stalin was much worse. There may similarly come a time when the world
looks at the Putin era as a time of liberality. For if the struggle by Putin to survive, and by
his challengers to displace him, becomes more intense, the willingness of all to become
more brutal might well increase.

A CHRONOLOGY OF RUSSIA
FROM YELTSIN'S FALL THROUGH
PUTIN'S RISE
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chronology-russia-yeltsins-fall-through-putinsrise#axzz38H8hgZNx

Analysis
July 20, 2014 | 0611 Print Text Size

Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses a joint session of the Russian parliament in Moscow on
March 18. (SERGEI ILNITSKY/AFP/Getty Images)

Analysis
Editor's Note: As Stratfor readies to look forward in coming days at the implications for
Russia -- and its leader Vladimir Putin -- in the downing July 17 of a Malaysian jetliner,
we also invite readers to take stock with us of past forecasts of Russias geopolitical
evolution in the context of global events. Stratfor Chairman George Friedman will
examine the likelihood of Putins undoing in the next issue of Geopolitical Weekly, to
publish July 22. Accordingly, we look back here at 1998, when we predicted the
unfolding Kosovo crisis would be the undoing of late Russian President Boris Yeltsin. We
share our assessment from 2000, when we assessed how newly elected President Putin
was rapidly consolidating absolute power. In 2005, Stratfor reassessed Putin's situation
after his first presidential term and laid out how his leadership would begin to reverse the
tide of concessions and reassert Russias role in line with historical cycles -- including
the forging of strategic relationships with countries such as Germany. In 2008, we looked
at how Russia would capitalize on American weaknesses, including the fatigue of wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2011, we foresaw the next stage, as Russia moved to solidify its
sphere of influence while still able. In this forecast, we saw the events setting the stage

for todays crisis in Ukraine. Now, we foresee more historical change. We offer this
chronology of forecasts in advance of our next report on Russias future.
Kosovo Crisis Sets Template for New Russian Politics
During the Kosovo crisis, as Russian politicians rallied to challenge NATO intervention in
Serbia and found a new source of unity, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin found
himself isolated.
Oct. 15, 1998: One voice that has been relatively weak has been that of embattled
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Though he declared his firm opposition to NATO strikes
on October 9, Russia's nationalists and communists have claimed that weak Yeltsin
leadership allowed the U.S. and the West to assert hegemony. Yeltsin is even losing
control of national policy regarding Kosovo. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was
forced to rebut Defense Ministry statements on the issue, claiming only Yeltsin and the
Foreign Ministry could make official policy. Kosovo may be Yeltsin's undoing, as it has
united and revitalized his opponents.
In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute
Following Boris Yeltsin's December 1999 resignation, Vladimir Putin became acting
president and then president in 2000.
Dec. 27, 2001: Two allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin joined Russia's most
influential business lobby on Dec. 21. That was followed by a live, national call-in
program Dec. 24 -- broadcast via television, radio and Internet -- in which Putin fielded
questions from his countrymen for 2 1/2 hours. Taken together, these events signal Putin
has nearly finished consolidating his economic, political and social control and is now
better positioned to hammer the few resistant elements into line. With newfound political
stability, the president will set about implementing reforms passed in 2001 and begin
crafting a new raft of reforms in 2002.
Former Soviet Union Net Assessment 2005: Unilateral Concessions to the West
Are Over, Reaction Has Begun
July 15, 2005: In this era, there have been two different phases. The first -- a phase of
outright geopolitical retreat by Russia and the FSU's other states, with no real attempts
to resist outside powers' strategic penetration -- started in 1991 and appears to have
ended by 2004 or 2005 at the latest. Currently, the second phase is starting, as regional
powers -- led by Russia -- begin a strategic response to the recent decline and to outside
powers' increasing influence. The attempts to reverse the tide started after Russian
President Vladimir Putin was re-elected for his second term last year.
Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus

With the United States entangled in wars in the Middle East and South Asia:
April 1, 2008: Russia has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military
posture to attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. To
this end, Russia has taken advantage of its enhanced financial position -- due to soaring
commodity prices, particularly in the energy sector -- as well as a lack of American
options in the region.
Russia: Rebuilding an Empire While It Can
Oct. 31, 2011: U.S.-Russian relations seem to have been relatively quiet recently, as
there are numerous contradictory views in Washington about the true nature of Russia's
current foreign policy. Doubts remain about the sincerity of the U.S. State Department's
so-called "reset" of relations with Russia -- the term used in 2009 when U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton handed a reset button to her Russian counterpart as a symbol of a
freeze on escalating tensions between Moscow and Washington. The concern is
whether the "reset" is truly a shift in relations between the two former adversaries or
simply a respite before relations deteriorate again.

KOSOVO CRISIS SETS TEMPLATE

FOR NEW RUSSIAN POLITICS
Analysis
October 15, 1998 | 0000 Print Text Size

Analysis
Though it continues to suffer from economic collapse and domestic political turmoil,
Russia has rallied behind one issue, the Kosovo crisis, setting the mold for both internal
and external Russian politics for some time to come. The United States is crediting the
threat of NATO action with forcing Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic into accepting
a diplomatic resolution to the Kosovo crisis, claiming that the threat of military action
made use of military force unnecessary. However, it remains to be seen whether
anything was really achieved in Kosovo -- as the fox was thrown out of the coop after it
already killed the hen -- and Milosevic has already begun to make good on his threat to
take vengeance against the intervening foreigners by targeting their allies in Belgrade,
the independent press and rights groups. Much more important than the outcome in
Yugoslavia, however, is how NATO's standoff with Milosevic has played in Moscow.
Divided over every other policy issue, Russian politicians have come together to
challenge NATO intervention in Serbia. Even the most Western oriented have insisted
that only the UN Security Council has the right to authorize military intervention in
Yugoslavia, while the Communists have warned of the resumption of the Cold War and
radical firebrand Viktor Ilyukhin has gone so far as to threaten the lives of Western
diplomats in Moscow. Leonid Ivashov, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's main
directorate for international military cooperation, told Russian Public TV on October 13
that "the operation which is being prepared against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
a provocation by the alliance's military forces against Russia, too. Yes, this will only
create a precedent. Other countries in Europe, the CIS and Russia included, could find
themselves the next targets of NATO action." Ivashov said that, if NATO launched
strikes against Yugoslavia, Russia would resume full military cooperation with Belgrade,
including violating the arms sale embargo against Yugoslavia. In addition, Ivashov
claimed that Russia would respond to any attack on Yugoslavia with "a change in
partnership with NATO" and a search for "possible new military allies to maintain the

necessary military balance." Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov announced that Russia's
relations with NATO may have to be reevaluated, and Russia already recalled its
representatives to NATO on October 12.
The factions in the Russian Duma have also united over the Kosovo issue. Duma
Chairman Gennady Seleznev said that NATO should reconsider its actions in Kosovo
because a military attack would give "an impetus for the start of a cold war." Seleznev
announced that the Duma has decided to send a four-member parliamentary delegation
to Yugoslavia, which will stay in the country until the termination of NATO ultimatum.
Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Ryzhkov announced that the Duma is planning to pass a
resolution calling any NATO strike on Yugoslavia an "unmitigated threat to the Russian
Federation."
Seleznev also issued a pan-Slavic appeal to Russia's "friends and allies", including
Belarus and Ukraine, to also send delegations to Yugoslavia. As usual, Belarus is way
ahead of Moscow on this. On October 12, the Belarusian news agency "Belapan"
reported that 200 Belarusian citizens stand ready to go to Yugoslavia as volunteers to
combat NATO intervention in Kosovo. Ukraine has been more restrained, with Foreign
Minister Tarasyuk claiming "it is only the UN Security Council which has the right to take
a decision on the use of force." Ukraine also offered to participate in OSCE monitoring of
the situation in Kosovo.
Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov declared that "an attack on
Yugoslavia with would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Russia." He
reinforced the Russia military's warning, saying "in the event of an attack we would
support Yugoslavia with all our forces." Zyuganov echoed Seleznev's assertion that, if
NATO carries out an attack on Yugoslavia, the Russian Parliament will revoke all
cooperation agreements with NATO and withdraw from the weapons embargo against
Yugoslavia.
The radical Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the Duma's Security Committee and leader of
the Movement for Support of the Army, Defense Industry and Military Science, said on
October 13 that the Movement was "ready at the first call to send military specialists to
Yugoslavia to organize resistance in the event of NATO strikes against Serbia."
Moreover, Ilyukhin threatened the West by saying that "in view of growing anti-NATO
and anti- American moods in Russia, it is impossible to guarantee that no hostile acts will
be carried out against diplomats and other representatives of NATO member states
working in Moscow. NATO's terrorist methods in relation to Yugoslavia may boomerang
and hit those who initiate them."

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on October 14 praised Russian unity over Kosovo.
He said that "It is the first time that I observe such a situation where on such an
important international problem Russia has spoken with a single voice. Ivanov credited
Russian unity with averting a NATO strike on Yugoslavia. Kosovo has given Russia's
political factions a source of unity, something they will remember even if the situation in
Yugoslavia calms down. Pan-Slavism works. Assertive foreign policy works.
Confrontation with NATO works. These themes unite Russia internally, help rebuild ties
within its former empire, and help reestablish Russia as a great power.
But talk, as they say, is cheap. More alarming than this rhetoric, however, have been
reports suggesting that Russia has already violated the arms embargo against
Yugoslavia, and has provided the Serbs with military aid. On October 7, the Times of
London reported that Russia has supplied the Yugoslav army with new warheads, fuses,
and sensors for its SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, a charge that Russian state arms export
company Rosovooruzheniye has denied. According to the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Yugoslavia has eight surface-to- air missile batteries at eight sites, as
well as 100 other missiles. According to Jane's, the Yugoslav army has an unknown
number of SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, SA-9, SA-11, and SA-13 towed or mobile surface-toair missile systems, as well as a variety of man-portable missiles.
However, according to an unconfirmed report we have received from a source in St.
Petersburg, Yugoslavia may have acquired far more than just an upgrade for its SA-6
missiles. According to our source, a few weeks ago Russia shipped 50 2S6M
"Tunguska" self- propelled air-defense systems to the Serbs. The Tunguska is one of
Russia's newest weapons systems, mounting two 30mm antiaircraft guns and up to eight
9M311 (SA-19) two-stage, hypersonic, low to medium altitude surface-to-air missiles.
The Tunguska is reportedly in service only with the CIS and India.
If this report of deployment to Yugoslavia is true, it would indicate a serious threat to
either air-strikes or reconnaissance against the Serbs. It would also demonstrate that
Russia has crossed the line, putting its missiles where its mouth is. Interestingly, on
October 9, ITAR-TASS cited an anonymous senior Defense Ministry official as saying
Yugoslavia now has both passive and active defense mechanisms to either destroy or
misdirect Tomahawk cruise missiles. Finally, if the Tunguskas were not flown into
Belgrade, then this report would indicate that Russia now has the tacit backing of either
Romania or Bulgaria, as the weapons would have had to come in by rail. On October 12,
the state secretary of the Russian-backed breakaway Dnestr region of Moldova denied
reports that Russian troops and equipment were being shipped to Yugoslavia via the

Dnestr region. Valeriy Litsky claimed that, such activity could not be occurring because it
would have to cross the territory of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania.
Regardless of the veracity of the various arms transfer reports, interesting though they
may be, the real story is the fact that Russia's response to the Kosovo crisis has set the
pattern for Russian foreign and domestic politics for the forseeable future. Russia has
united to reaffirm its claim to its traditional sphere of influence. Pan-Slavism and
opposition to NATO and the West can serve as a unifying force to stabilize Russia's
internal disputes, to attract Russia's CIS allies into closer ties, and to begin the process
of reestablishing Russia as a regional, if not a great power.
One voice that has been relatively weak has been that of embattled Russian President
Boris Yeltsin. Though he declared his firm opposition to NATO strikes on October 9,
Russia's nationalists and communists have claimed that weak Yeltsin leadership allowed
the U.S. and the West to assert hegemony. Yeltsin is even losing control of national
policy regarding Kosovo. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was forced to rebut
Defense Ministry statements on the issue, claiming only Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry
could make official policy. Kosovo may be Yeltsin's undoing, as it has united and
revitalized his opponents. However, Yeltsin has always been an opportunist, and he may
yet see his salvation in seizing this issue and being more nationalistic and aggressive
than his opponents. What that would look like is frightening to contemplate.

IN RUSSIA, PUTIN'S POWER

ALMOST ABSOLUTE
Analysis
December 27, 2001 | 0000 Print Text Size

Analysis
Two allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin joined Russia's most influential business
lobby on Dec. 21. That was followed by a live, national call-in program Dec. 24 -broadcast via television, radio and Internet -- in which Putin fielded questions from his

countrymen for 2 1/2 hours. Taken together, these events signal Putin has nearly
finished consolidating his economic, political and social control and is now better
positioned to hammer the few resistant elements into line. With newfound political
stability, the president will set about implementing reforms passed in 2001 and begin
crafting a new raft of reforms in 2002.This fresh momentum comes at a fortuitous
moment. U.S. and European leaders are now openly saying Russia should join the
World Trade Organization in 2003. For that to happen, Putin must prove to the world that
Russia can make its reform laws stick in 2002.Russia's oligarchs control the bulk of the
economy and have made the reform process a nightmare. On Dec. 21, the president and
his allies took yet another step to bring the oligarchs to heel: Former prime minister
Yevgeny Primakov and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller joined the Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs, commonly known as the trade union of the oligarchs. Putin can now
manipulate the oligarchs, or at a bare minimum eviscerate the body they use to
coordinate their actions.

Read more: In Russia, Putin's Power Almost Absolute | Stratfor

FORMER SOVIET UNION NET

ASSESSMENT -- 2005
Analysis
July 15, 2005 | 2131 Print Text Size

Summary
The Former Soviet Union (FSU) has been one of the world's most influential regions for
more than a thousand years, due in part to its strategic location and valuable resources.
It has entered a new epoch where outside forces -- mainly the United States -- are
gaining the upper hand in the region while Russia suffers a systemic crisis. Given the
FSU's past geopolitical performance, a move to repel outside forces probably is brewing.
The FSU's geopolitical drivers include the desire for strong centralized power, Russia's
self-perception as a great nation, a developed sense of common regional identity, a

sense of social justice, and elites' admiration for the West -- which often is not shared by
the masses and creates a backlash.

Analysis
Cycles of Northern Eurasia's Geopolitical History
The Former Soviet Union (FSU), or Northern Eurasia, occupies one-sixth of the Earth's
land area. Both geography and history bear enormously on its current and future
geopolitics. It is centrally located in respect to other major parts of Eurasia -- Europe, the
Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and China/East Asia -- and contains the shortest
land connection between Eurasia's Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Because of its
geography, Northern Eurasia represents both a threat and an opportunity for outside
powers -- something evident throughout the long history of dramatic struggles between
internal and external forces vying for control of this critical land mass.
Northern Eurasia's geopolitical history can be divided into several large epochs:
The World's Periphery: Antiquity to the 9th Century
In its first historic epoch, Northern Eurasia was an object of geopolitics, influenced by
outside forces, rather than a geopolitical subject affecting the rest of the world. Its first
states were indigenous, but the only significant internal regional forces were the
countless nomadic tribes dominating the Eurasian steppes -- and at times turning
themselves into invincible invading armies of horsemen, sowing horror from Europe in
the west to China in the east. Outside powers -- the ancient Greeks, Persians, Alexander
the Great's Greek-Macedonian warriors and the Roman and Byzantine empires -conquered Northern Eurasia's edges and defined the region's fate.
Russia's First Rise and Decline: 9th Century to 1480
The second epoch lasted from the end of the 9th century through 1480. During that
epoch Russia appeared for the first time in world history and made itself important. In
882, the united state of Rus' formed, embracing all Eastern Slavs -- who were one
people, not yet divided into Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians -- and non-Slavic
tribes in Eastern Europe. Kiev, a city known to have existed since the 5th century,
served as the first capital of Rus'.
In 988, the Russians adopted Orthodox Christianity from the Byzantine Empire, rejecting
the Roman Catholic Pope's entreaties to adopt Catholicism -- a move that continued to

bear heavily on the fundamental differences and uneven, often turbulent, relations
between Russia and the West.
Rus', by then known as Russia, became important to Europe when it successfully
defended itself (and Europe) from the Eurasian nomads. Russia entered European
politics through royal intermarriages, diplomatic ties, trade, alliances and wars. Russia
began to prosper from its control over important trade routes from the Baltic to the Black
Sea, linking Western and Northern Europe to the Byzantine Empire and the Middle East.
But after an initial burst of importance and prosperity, the second half of this epoch
proved catastrophic for Russia and the rest of Northern Eurasia. Genghis Khan's
Mongolian Empire conquered -- and, for the first time, united -- much of the region from
the 13th through the 15th centuries. Russia's rulers then had to pay tribute to the Golden
Horde, a successor of the Mongolian Empire.
The West took a great deal of geopolitical advantage of Russia's defeat at the hands of
the Mongols. Germans, Swedes and Danes conquered the Baltics, forcing Russian
forces allied with some Baltic tribes to retreat to the east and cutting off Russia's access
to the Baltic Sea for centuries. Even worse for Russia, Poles and Lithuanians chipped
away Russia's western principalities and divided the formerly united Eastern Slavs into
three groups: the Russians, who fell under the Golden Horde's control, and the
Ukrainians and the Belarusians, who were both eventually subjugated by Poland -which persecuted Russian Orthodox adherents and forced many to convert to
Catholicism. Russia was not without success during this era --it managed to check the
Germans and Swedes trying to conquer northwest Russia by defeating their invading
armies of knights in 1240 and 1242.
Russia's Rebirth and Unification of the Region: 1480 to 1861
The third epoch began in 1480, when Russia -- then under Moscow, after Kiev fell into
Polish hands -- overthrew the Golden Horde's control and became independent again; it
finished in 1861, when Russia became a truly modern state. The beginning of that epoch
for Russia almost exactly matches our definition of the beginning of the global modern
epoch -- with the discovery of the Americas in 1492. But Russia's path in that epoch was
very different from that of the seafaring West. Russia embarked on a long quest to unite
all of Northern Eurasia, moving by land from Europe through Northern Asia till it reached
the Pacific.
In the first era of this epoch, from 1480 to 1700, the major geopolitical feature in
Northern Eurasia was Russia's eastward expansion. Even before that, after the Muslim

Ottoman Turkish Empire put an end to the Byzantine Empire in 1453, Russia's Tsar Ivan
III married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor and inherited the geopolitical mission
of the Orthodox Christian world's prime defender. For Russia, this mission is not over
and is remembered in the saying, "Moscow is the Third Rome," establishing succession
after the original Roman Empire and the "Second Rome" of the Byzantine Empire. Also
during this era, Ivan the Terrible made huge gains for Russia, destroying several
Mongolian successor states and thus clearing the way for Russia to expand into Siberia.
However, his attempt to re-open Russia's Baltic Sea access failed.
Peter the Great began another era in this long epoch when in the Northern War, 1700 to
1721, he defeated what was then Europe's best army -- the Swedes -- and took the
Baltics from them. Peter also established the Russian Empire, reformed the country after
Western patterns, opened Russia to world trade and reintroduced Russia into European
geopolitics. Under Catherine the Great, Russia defeated the Turks and gained access to
the Black Sea, through which the Russian fleet was able to go to the Mediterranean in
the second half of the 18th century. The Russian Empire's peak achievement was
defeating Napoleon's 600,000-strong invading army in 1812, playing a major role in
liberating Europe from Napoleon. Russia entered Paris in 1814 and legally established
itself as a centerpiece of European geopolitics at the Vienna Congress in 1815.
Russia's prominence prompted several other big players -- namely Britain, France,
Turkey and Sardinia -- to combine their forces and attack Russia along its borders from
the north through the Crimea and to the Pacific, during the Crimean War from 18531856. In spite of its defeat, by 1861 Russia had all of Northern Eurasia under its power,
with the Amur River lands in the Far East as the latest addition.
World Prominence and Decline: 1861 to 1991
The fourth epoch, from 1861 through 1991, saw Russia's uneven and hard march to
world prominence. This began with the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and continued on
through capitalist reforms in the country, Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese in
1905 and Russia's participation in World War II. The region changed radically in 1917,
when the Bolshevik October Revolution transformed the Russian Empire into the Soviet
Union.
That revolution began the era in which Russia fought for its survival, 1917 through 1945.
During this period, the Soviets repulsed the 14-nation Entente's invasion of Russia in
1918-1922 and the Nazi invasion during World War II. Meanwhile, Russia became
economically formidable through industrialization -- accomplished with no foreign direct
investment -- and a cultural revolution which resulted in complete literacy.

After its May 1945 victory over Germany, the Soviets quickly restored their war-torn
country, developed an indigenous nuclear program, helped anti-colonial movements
around the world and launched the world's first satellite in 1957 and the first man in orbit
in 1961 -- in short, by 1961 Russia was world's second superpower.
However, as in previous epochs, Russia's prominence was followed by decline. From
1961 through 1991 Russia stagnated, overburdened by the exhausting arms race
against the United States and the country's ineffective management. In the end, it was
the Soviet ruling elites -- wishing to change themselves from the country's managers to
the country's owners -- who made a conscious decision for the Soviet Union to cease to
exist.
Current Trends in Northern Eurasia
The region began its fifth historic epoch with the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is
hard to say how long this epoch will last and what it will bring to the FSU in the end, but
we believe the first era in this new epoch is ongoing now. This era is about
disintegration, though there have been attempts at reintegrating the region. Internal
forces are weak but are trying to block outside powers that are making major geopolitical
efforts to establish their positions and even dominance.
For the first time in a long while, Northern Eurasia is not united, and centrifugal forces
are prevailing over centripetal. Also for the first time in a long while, the FSU's strongest
power -- Russia -- is not strong enough to check foreign powers' penetration into the
region. As in ancient times, Northern Eurasia is becoming more of an object of
geopolitics than its subject, with outside powers' exerting much stronger influence on it
than it can project outside its borders. This weakening and pulling apart of the FSU has
been accompanied by the severe post-Soviet economic decline and systemic crisis in
the region's states.
Unilateral Concessions to the West Are Over, Reaction Has
Begun
In this era, there have been two different phases. The first -- a phase of outright
geopolitical retreat by Russia and the FSU's other states, with no real attempts to resist
outside powers' strategic penetration -- started in 1991 and appears to have ended by
2004 or 2005 at the latest. Currently, the second phase is starting, as regional powers -led by Russia -- begin a strategic response to the recent decline and to outside powers'
increasing influence. The attempts to reverse the tide started after Russian President
Vladimir Putin was re-elected for his second term last year. It is likely that these attempts

did not start earlier because some parts of the Russian elite -- and perhaps other
regional upper classes, too -- realized only recently that this current epoch and era could
be about something much worse than a temporary decline: Their states' very existence
could well come to an end unless dramatic measures are taken quickly.
Taking into account that Ukraine -- the region's strongest power after the Russian
Federation and also Moscow's closest ally -- became pro-Western in late 2004, that
Moscow is failing on virtually all fronts and that Russians are dying at a rate of about a
million a year while the birth rate in Russia is one-sixth of the abortion rate, it becomes
clear that Russia is doomed to disappear not just politically but also demographically
unless it fights with all the power it can muster to reverse these current trends.
This year's events and developments indicate that Russian policy has just turned the
corner and is fighting against the U.S.-led geopolitical offensive into the FSU. Russia is
refusing to make new unilateral concessions to Washington, while forming a meaningful
strategic partnership with China and seeking other allies; Moscow is making major arms
sales and other cooperative deals with the United States' foes; Russian officials are
talking publicly for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union about U.S. intelligence
services using nongovernmental organizations to foment unrest in the FSU against
Russian interests; the list goes on.
However, this new policy is still in its embryonic stage. The Kremlin still is seeking the
best answers to its multiple problems -- starting with how to take U.S. pressure off of
Russia without confronting Washington directly, and finishing with how to fight the U.S.led geopolitical thrust without scaring Western investors away from Russia. So it appears
that much fighting for Russia's survival is still ahead.
During this transitional time, Putin is doing a lot of fence-sitting. For example, within just
a few days, He joined China's President Hu Jintao in calling for the end of unilateralism - referring to the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush and its striving for
global dominance -- but also asked the G-8 to deny aid to Zimbabwe, ruled by the
stridently anti-U.S. Robert Mugabe. Given these apparently opposing impulses, it comes
into question whether Putin has the political will to deploy all means necessary to repel
the U.S. strategic geopolitical attack. However, geopolitics teaches that though leaders'
roles are important, it is the country's national interests that determine a nation's fate.
Russia's utmost interest and concern now is its survival as an independent and
sovereign state and as a united entity. This is the highest stake possible. Thus, if Putin
does not take action, then his replacement -- made constitutionally or otherwise -- will
drive Russia on its next, and perhaps final, bid to save itself from geopolitical oblivion.

It should be noted that not just Russia, but all the FSU nations are in the same boat -their failure as states, to the point of disappearing from the map, is a very real prospect.
This concerns all FSU states no matter whether they are aligned with Washington or
Moscow. Unofficial data says more Azerbaijanis have to live in Russia than in Azerbaijan
because there are no jobs available at home. Witnesses say the entire male populations
of many western Ukrainian villages have to seek low-paying jobs abroad to secure their
families' survival. Millions have left Georgia and Armenia since the end of the Soviet
Union. These are only a few among many signs of decline.

The FSU's Social and Political Drivers

Through the course of Northern Eurasia's history, several core drivers have
always shaped the region's politics.
The Desire for a Strong Central Power
The desire for strong -- at times, absolute -- central power has always been present in
the region. No matter who ruled it, be it a Mongolian khan, a Russian tsar, a Russian
emperor or a Soviet president, all have tried to concentrate as much power as possible
at the very top level. This desire for strong power could be called a whim on the part of
power-hungry rulers, were it not that the masses and sometimes the elites have strongly
supported this tendency. This indicates that the pattern has its objective roots in the
FSU's geography and history.
To start with, the region's sheer size and ethnic diversity make foreign and internal
relations difficult to manage. The diverse and often conflicting agendas of neighboring
states and distant powers alike only adds to that challenge -- as does the need to protect
thousands of miles of borders. Perhaps more important, Northern Eurasia's vastness
makes it impossible to develop it internally as a viable, unified economic or political entity
without a very strong central power.
This geography lesson was long ago learned by locals who wanted a mighty central
power and supported it against competing elites trying to gain independence from the
top ruler. In fact, the region's history is full of examples of the masses supporting a tsar
against landowners and nobles, or supporting a strong Soviet ruler against Soviet elites.
Now the FSU's masses who want to see their countries revived, strong and united are
supporting centralized governments under strong rulers, rather than regional and local
elites who are vying for more autonomy or even independence.

The FSU nations' geopolitical mentality also calls for supporting a strong central power.
In Russia, this attitude has been long reinforced by Orthodox Christian beliefs and
historical experience which both point to the necessity of a strong central government,
even a single ruler, for the good of the nation. Indeed, when Northern Eurasia becomes
fractionalized, it usually suffers disastrous consequences -- as it did in the 12th and 13th
centuries, when the power of the ruler in Kiev became nominal and the Russian regions,
driven apart from each other by local princes, were unable to defend themselves
individually from invading Mongols.
This desire for centralized power at the top drives not only Russia but all the other
nations in the region. Take Belarus or the Central Asian nations, for example. Their
highly centralized structure is not simply due to the leaders' desires for power -- it is
driven by their peoples' historically tested thinking that a weak central power would leave
their countries vulnerable to foreign incursions and to internal chaos.
Insiders vs. Outsiders
The FSU's people have always had to defend their independence from outside powers.
A sense of common regional identity has helped this attitude to persist, as has the longestablished presence of ethnically mixed communities throughout Northern Eurasia. The
inclination of regional powers to stand together against an outside power has been
demonstrated numerous times. This tendency seems to have waned in importance since
the end of the Soviet Union, but it is still present -- as evidenced by several FSU nations
working together, rather than with outside forces, to block the spread of Islamist
militancy.
The resistance to the U.S. expansion into the FSU should be viewed in this framework,
too. Though it appears that a majority of non-Russian elites -- and even some Russian
elites -- welcome the U.S. advance and its accompanying political and financial benefits,
the majority among the masses in the FSU oppose this development and see it as a
grave danger to their countries. It should not be forgotten that many in the region -mostly among the general populace, but some among the elites -- still think of the FSU
as one entity which should be united from the inside. This is why nostalgia for the Soviet
era is so strong not only in Russia but in some other FSU countries. It is not a desire to
return to the Soviet Union and the communist system (though millions would like to see
that happen). Rather it is a desire for some sort of reunification into an economic and
even political union, in which the region's peoples will feel secure against the current
turbulence -- which many see as a result of outside forces trying to take over the region
and its resources, and make its people servants to the West.

Russian Self-Perception as Great Nation

There is a long-entrenched view among Russians that they are a great nation -- born in
the many wars Russia won throughout the centuries, successful (more often than not) in
acquiring new territories, and almost always successful in defending their own. This
perception has been strengthened by the Russian state's continuous existence -- now
for more than 1100 years -- while other states have disappeared into the darkness of
history. This attitude will no doubt be a driving force if the nation makes a grand push to
save itself from the geopolitical catastrophe it now faces.
Orthodox Christianity
Orthodox Christianity is not only found among the majority of Russia's people, it is strong
in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. Orthodox Christian beliefs and
ideals have played a vital role in keeping parts of Northern Eurasia together for
centuries. Russia's revival and renewed alliance with other FSU nations will have
Orthodox Christianity as one of its most important unifiers and drivers.
Though Western media correctly report that the Russian Orthodox Church is trying to
stop what it calls "Protestant proselytization" into traditional Orthodox strongholds, it
should be noted that one of the Church's goals is to keep Russians mindful of their
national interests. Indeed, some Russian Protestant converts not only do care for
Russia, but refuse to think of Russia as their motherland. Geopolitically speaking, if such
views spread in Russia, the country will have no hope for revival.
Westernization of Elites -- and Backlash
Be they tsarist aristocrats or 19th-century democrats, modern-day liberals or
bureaucrats, many -- in fact, the majority -- of the region's national elites have long
looked (openly or secretly) to the West as a model. In some cases, admiration for the
West has helped the local elites make their nations stronger and more advanced while
remaining independent from the West -- as when Peter the Great forcefully Westernized
Russia, opened access to the Baltic Sea and successfully confronted some Western
European foes. But in other cases it has led to subjugation to the West -- as when Peter
III, a servile admirer of Prussia's King Friedrich II, withdrew from Berlin and the other
German territories the Russian army had gained during the Seven Years War (1756 to
1763).
While there is no doubt that Putin is a true Westernizer, it is unclear whether he will
ultimately choose to stand up openly to the United States to protect Russia's interests.
So far, his timid attempts to make trouble for Washington -- by aiding U.S. foes while

trying to avoid confrontation with Washington, even at the cost of unilateral concessions
-- do not put Putin on the same level as Peter the Great.
Russian elites' admiration for the West has always caused a backlash from the masses,
and from those leaders and elites who believe the region should follow its own path.
Hence, there has been a constant struggle between Westernizers and those insisting
that Russia has its own place in geopolitics and should make its own way.
Striving to Unite Around the Strongest
The tendency to unite around the strongest power has been an important regional driver
-- but it ultimately helps only powers that are truly strong. A weak central power gets no
respect -- as evidenced now by Russia's consistently humiliation at the hands of its tiny
neighbors who have Washington's backing. When Russia was strong, this tendency
helped it a lot; no matter whether other elites in the region agreed with Russia's agenda
at the time, they flocked to Moscow and helped it defeat outsiders. Now, however, this
pattern often works in favor of the United States in the FSU because local elites consider
Washington far stronger than other powers, including Moscow.
Social Justice
The FSU's mentality calls for locals, on both individual and national levels, to put social
justice and fairness as their paramount motivation, sometimes even surpassing
patriotism. The regional understanding of justice is strikingly different from that in the
West, especially in the United States. For people in the FSU, justice is about every
human being's inalienable right to housing, work, food and other elements necessary for
survival. It is also about equality, with people firmly believing that all, no matter how rich
or poor they are, should have the same access to everything. The region's people
traditionally have been averse to seeing the accumulation of wealth as a person's
ultimate goal. Many despise financial speculation, and greed is the most universally
deplored sin in the FSU. Success is not considered a category by which to distinguish
people; those who are unlucky receive sympathy.
This striving for social justice has much more to do with the FSU's internal policies -- i.e.,
how power players and other inhabitants shape their societies -- than with the FSU's
foreign policies, which are mostly shaped by geopolitical concerns. The struggle for
social justice has been a constant feature in the region, with Russia alone having
experienced four major peasant wars and hundreds of major uprisings over the last
several centuries. For this reason, Northern Eurasia became the first place in the world
where communism -- which many consider a practical expression of this concept of

social justice in the modern world -- came into being. Russian rural communities, based
on equality and collectivism, formed the core of Russia's society for more than a
thousand years until they were destroyed by Pyotr Stolypin's capitalist reforms after the
revolution of 1905 -- this paved the way for the October Revolution of 1917 and for the
success of communism. Even now, with capitalism reigning almost everywhere in the
region, a majority of people believe that social justice is more important than profits.
Even many of the rich there -- often called New Russians -- behave dramatically
differently from Western capitalists. For the New Russians, having money is more about
showing off than about accumulating wealth. It is difficult to imagine a Russian in his 80s
still working to accumulate wealth; it would not make sense to the Russians, who learn
from the Orthodox Church that they cannot take their wealth to Heaven.
The drive for social justice has enormous geopolitical implications. First, the Bush
administration's policies are unpopular among the region's masses, meaning that many
could turn away from cooperating with U.S. forces or policies. Some local elites could
face pressure from the masses and begin resisting U.S. policies. Second, many in the
FSU see Islam as a religion of justice and see Islamists -- both moderate and radical -as defenders of justice against corrupt local leaders who sold their nations out to the
unjust West; thus Islamist militants are getting a great deal of sympathy in the region.
Finally, local militaries -- particularly the Russians -- have a historical tendency to fight
valiantly if they believe they are fighting for a just cause; they perform much more poorly
if they do not. For example, many Russian soldiers fighting in World War I, disappointed
with the tsarist regime, deserted the front, though in World War II many soldiers -including some who had deserted in World War I -- fought to the death, convinced they
were defending their motherland and system of social justice.

Restraints or Arresting Factors

Too Much Bureaucracy and Widespread Corruption
Bureaucracy and corruption have been grave obstacles indeed for whatever
undertakings Northern Eurasian governments have launched through the centuries, and
it remains a major arresting factor. For example, Russia's defeats in the Crimean War
(1853 to 1856) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904 to 1905) were caused not only by
poor technology and lack of rail transportation, but also by an absolutely immovable
tsarist bureaucracy whose procrastination, lethargy and indifference became legendary.
Corruption has also been a major trademark of regional bureaucracies. Widespread
corruption -- often bordering on or crossing the line into treason -- has often helped the
region's foes and continues to do so. For example, the main factor deciding the success

of pro-U.S. "revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was that local security
service leaders in those countries switched sides after secret talks with the opposition
and representatives of the West. While some of the local officials were scared into
switching sides by threats -- for example, threats to seize their often "dirty" secret bank
accounts in the West -- others were bribed in different ways.
Poor Local Democracy Traditions
This is an important arresting factor, because the lack of democratic traditions has often
left local communities very poorly organized on the grassroots level when such
organization was most required, such as during an invasion. This in turn has led
passivity when urgent mobilization is needed, with leaders on all levels waiting too long
for instructions from the central government.
Attempts to revive the region would have a greater chance of success if local forces
learned from the Western experience of democratic self-organization, and discovered
solutions that would work for Northern Eurasia. Indeed, there is some local history of
democratic traditions, though mostly from earlier times. In Russia, for example, the
medieval city-republics of Novgorod and Pskov were democratically elected; Ukraine has
had elements of direct rule by the people when the Cossacks held democratic elections;
and many Belarusians were able to organize themselves quickly on a local level, without
outsiders' help, and take the initiative to attack Nazi German occupying troops in 1941.
So despite the masses' current passivity in those countries, there could be some limited
grassroots organization when the masses perceive that their nations are threatened.
This happened when mass protests against the monetization of social benefits -- first
organized by local leaders not linked to political parties -- spread through Russia in
spring 2005.
However, patriarchal and patronage-type relations seem to still prevail on the whole in
the region. The thousand-year-long tradition of following orders from the central
government or from the top clan leader may well continue to inhibit the masses from
organizing themselves.
Geographic Constraints
Geography severely limits FSU nations' capabilities and choices in responding to
external -- and sometimes even internal -- challenges. Rough terrain in some areas
makes quick mobilization difficult, and many of the countries in the region either are
completely landlocked or must contend with seas that freeze over. Russia, for example,
has access to three oceans, but it is too far north to succeed as a sea power; most of its

seaports and naval bases are iced in for months at a time. Thus, seafaring nations such
as the United States and the United Kingdom have always had -- and will always have -an advantage over Northern Eurasian nations in naval power, and therefore in projecting
power globally.
The region's climate is yet another constraint -- it has made it improbable, if not
impossible, for Northern Eurasian economies to ever attain the world's best standards of
productivity and efficiency. The FSU's location in the northern latitudes means that most
industries must put in more effort than their southern counterparts to produce or extract a
unit of any product. For this reason, Russian and even Caspian oil exploration,
extraction, refining and transportation are doomed to be significantly more expensive
than such operations in the Middle East.

Enablers
Presence of a Strong Unifying Nation
There is a longstanding geopolitical tradition in Northern Eurasia that weaker nations
facing national security threats from powerful outside enemies ask for (and receive) help
from the strongest state in the region. Traditionally, Russia has been that power, leading
not only by force but also by example. History shows that while some smaller nations
joined with Russia under coercion, others did so because of threats posed by external
powers. Faced with genocide at the hands of the Ottoman and Persian empires, Georgia
at the end of the 18th century volunteered to join with Russia -- and Russia has
defended Georgia since then, while providing Georgian elites the same privileges the
Russian elites had. Kazakhs did the same when they faced threats from powerful
nomadic tribes invading from northwest China. Russia also bore the main brunt and
burden of World War II, though defending the Soviet Union was a common effort by all
then-Soviet peoples.
Currently, Russia does not seem to have the qualities needed to lead other states -- and
other regional powers have noticed this, leading them to turn away from Moscow. But
given Russia's centuries-long record of leadership, its current weakness might be the
exception rather than the rule. Russia seems to have a chance to resume its leadership
role if it responds quickly and forcefully to external powers' penetration into the FSU, and
if it helps those governments that want to survive pro-Western "revolutions." Moscow is
already trying to revive its leadership role in Central Asia, where governments such as
Uzbekistan find Russia (albeit in league with China) capable of providing needed support
and furthering the shared goal of checking the U.S. advance in the region.

Human Capital
For centuries, in times of national crisis, the FSU -- especially Russia -- has always had
talented leaders or organizers who appeared suddenly and took on critically important
functions to see the region through history's deadliest turns. For example, at the
beginning of the 17th century, Polish troops occupied Moscow and the half-disintegrated
and partly-occupied Russia had no ruler or national army. Provincial mid-level trader
Kuzma Minin organized and began financing a people's militia in Nizhny Novgorod, and
Dmitry Pozharsky led the militia to liberate Moscow and subsequently the country,
restoring its central authority and sovereignty. Russia has also had fantastic scientific
potential, in part because of high-quality Russian intellectual capital.
Today, when Russia is in a deep and prolonged crisis and suffering a "brain drain," there
are still plenty of talented Russian high-tech professionals in sectors ranging from space
to military-industrial industries to academic sciences who remain in the country and work
for low salaries because of their patriotism. It is possible that, when Russia enters
decisive battles in the future, new talented leaders could replace those in charge now
who seem unable to get Russia through its present difficulties.
Fighting Hardest in Times of Crisis
The quality that makes the FSU most dangerous to its foes is that its people fight best
when facing life-or-death situations. In the past, they have made apparent miracles
happen as they fought against all odds and saved their countries -- overthrowing the
Golden Horde; defeating Polish-Swedish occupying forces in the 17th century and then
the army of King Carlos XII in the 18th century; handing the previously undefeated
Napoleon's forces a crushing defeat and then taking Paris in the 19th century; and
repelling the 14-state Entente and defeating Nazi German forces in the 20th century.
It remains to be seen whether the FSU can still muster the strength to achieve such
successes, though many FSU nations do seem to be facing life-or-death situations. But
given their past performances, there is at least a possibility that they will rescue
themselves.

Read more: Former Soviet Union Net Assessment -- 2005 | Stratfor

RUSSIA AND ROTATING THE U.S.

FOCUS
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, April 1, 2008 - 11:59 Print Text Size
By George Friedman

For the past year, STRATFOR has been focusing on what we see as the critical global
geopolitical picture. As the U.S.-jihadist war has developed, it has absorbed American
military resources dramatically. It is overstated to say that the United States lacks the
capacity to intervene anywhere else in the world, but it is not overstated to say that the
United States cannot make a major, sustained intervention without abandoning Iraq.
Thus, the only global power has placed almost all of its military chips in the Islamic
world.

Exploiting U.S. Distractions

Russia has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military posture to
attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. To this end,
Russia has taken advantage of its enhanced financial position -- due to soaring
commodity prices, particularly in the energy sector -- as well as a lack of American
options in the region.
The Russians do not have any interest in re-establishing the Soviet Union, nor even in
controlling the internal affairs of most of the former Soviet republics. Moscow does want
to do two things, however. First, it wants to coordinate commodity policies across the
board to enhance Russian leverage. Second, and far more important, it wants to limit
U.S. and European influence in these countries. Above all, Russia does not want to see
NATO expand any further -- and Moscow undoubtedly would like to see a NATO
rollback, particularly in the Baltic states.
From a strategic point of view, the United States emerged from the Cold War with a
major opportunity. Since it is not in the United States' interests to have any great power
emerge in Eurasia, making certain that Russia did not re-emerge as a Eurasian
hegemon clearly was a strategic goal of the United States. The Soviet disintegration did
not in any way guarantee that it would not re-emerge in another form.

The United States pursued this goal in two ways. The first was by seeking to influence
the nature of the Russian regime, trying to make it democratic and capitalist under the
theory that democratic and capitalist nations did not engage in conflict with democratic
and capitalist countries. Whatever the value of the theory, what emerged was not
democracy and capitalism but systemic chaos and decomposition. The Russians
ultimately achieved this state on their own, though the United States and Europe
certainly contributed.
The second way Washington pursued this goal was by trying to repeat the containment
of the Soviet Union with a new containment of Russia. Under this strategy, the United
States in particular executed a series of moves with the end of expanding U.S. influence
in the countries surrounding Russia. This strategy's capstone was incorporating new
countries into NATO, or putting them on the path to NATO membership.

NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions

The Baltic states were included, along with the former Soviet empire in Central Europe.
But the critical piece in all of this was Ukraine. If Ukraine were included in NATO or fell
under Western influence, Russia's southern flank would become indefensible. NATO
would be a hundred miles from Volgograd, formerly known as Stalingrad. NATO would
also be less than a hundred miles from St. Petersburg. In short, Russia would become a
strategic cripple.
The U.S. strategy was to encourage pro-American, democratic movements in the former
Soviet Republics -- the so-called "color revolutions." The Orange Revolution in Ukraine
was the breaking point in U.S.-Russian relations. The United States openly supported
the pro-Western democrats in Ukraine. The Russians (correctly) saw this as a direct and
deliberate challenge by the United States to Russian national security. In their view, the
United States was using the generation of democratic movements in Ukraine to draw
Ukraine into the Western orbit and ultimately into NATO.
Having their own means of influence in Ukraine, the Russians intervened politically to put
a brake on the evolution. The result was a stalemate that Russia appeared destined to
win by dint of U.S. preoccupation with the Islamic world, Russian proximity, and the fact
that Russia had an overwhelming interest in Ukraine while the Americans had only a
distant interest.
U.S. interest might have been greater than the Russians thought. The Americans have
watched the re-emergence of Russia as a major regional power. It is no global
superpower, but it certainly has regained its position as a regional power, reaching

outside of its own region in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Iranians and Germans
must both take Russia into account as they make their calculations. The Russian
trajectory is thus clear. They may never be a global power again, but they are going to
be a power that matters.

The Closing Window

It is far easier for the United States to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon
than to control one that has already emerged. Logically, the United States wants to block
the Russian re-emergence, but Washington is running out of time. Indeed, one might say
that the Americans are already out of time. Certainly, the United States must act now or
else accept Russia as a great power and treat it as such.
This is why U.S. President George W. Bush has gone to Ukraine. It is important to recall
that Bush's trip comes in the context of an upcoming NATO summit, where the United
States has called for beginning the process that will include Ukraine -- as well as
Georgia and other Balkan powers -- in NATO. Having gone relatively quiet on the issue
of NATO expansion since the Orange Revolution, the United States now has become
extremely aggressive. In traveling to Ukraine to tout NATO membership, Bush is directly
challenging the Russians on what they regard as their home turf.
Clearly, the U.S. window of opportunity is closing: Russian economic, political and
military influence in Ukraine is substantial and growing, while the U.S. ability to
manipulate events in Ukraine is weak. But Bush is taking a risky step. First, Bush doesn't
have full NATO support, which he needs since NATO requires unanimity in these issues.
Several important NATO countries --particularly Germany -- have opposed this
expansion on technical merits that are hard to argue with. Germanys stance is that not
only is Ukraine not militarily ready to start meaningful membership talks, but that the
majority of its population opposes membership in the first place.
Assuming Bush isn't simply making an empty gesture for the mere pleasure of irritating
the Russians, the United States clearly feels it can deal with German objections if it
creates the proper political atmosphere in Ukraine. Put another way, Bush feels that if he
can demonstrate that the Russians are impotent, that their power is illusory, he can
create consensus in NATO. Russia's relatively weak response over Kosovo has been
taken by Washington and many in Europe (particularly Central Europe) as a sign of
Russian weakness. Bush wants to push the advantage now, since he won't have a
chance later. So the visit has been shaped as a direct challenge to Russia. Should

Moscow fail to take up the challenge, the dynamics of the former Soviet Union will be
changed.
The Russians have three possible countermoves. The first is to use the Federal Security
Service (FSB), its intelligence service, to destabilize Ukraine. Russia has many assets in
Ukraine, and Russia is good at this game. Second, Russia can use its regional military
power to demonstrate that the United States is the one bluffing. And third, Russia can
return the favor to the Americans in a place that will hurt very badly; namely, in the
Middle East -- and particularly in Iran and Syria. A decision to engage in massive
transfers of weapons, particularly advanced anti-aircraft systems, would directly hurt the
United States.
Of these options, the first is certainly the most feasible. Not only is it where the Russians
excel -- and will such a strategy leave few fingerprints and produce results quickly -- but
the other two options risk consolidating the West into a broad anti-Russian coalition that
may well return the favor across the entire Russian periphery. The latter two options
would also commit much of Russia's resources to a confrontation with the West, leaving
precious little to hedge against other powers, most notably a China which is becoming
more deeply enmeshed in Central Asia by the day.

The Middle East Connection

Still, the United States must focus on where most of its troops are fighting. It would thus
appear that provoking the Russians is a dangerous game. This is why events in Iraq this
week have been particularly interesting. A massive battle broke out between two Shiite
factions in Iraq. One, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- who effectively controls Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki due to the small size and fractured nature of al-Maliki's party -confronted the faction led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Clearly, this was an attempt by the
dominant Shiite faction to finally deal with the wild card of Iraqi Shiite politics. By the
weekend, al-Sadr had capitulated. Backed into a corner by overwhelming forces,
apparently backed by U.S. military force, al-Sadr effectively sued for peace.
Al-Sadr's decision to lay down arms was heavily influenced by the Iranians. We would go
further and say the decision to have al-Sadr submit to a government dominated by his
Shiite rivals was a decision made with Iranian agreement. The Iranians had been
restraining al-Sadr for a while, taking him to Tehran and urging him to return to the
seminary to establish his clerical credentials. The Iranians did not want to see a civil war
among the Iraqi Shia. A split among the Shia at a time of increasing Sunni unity and
cooperation with the United States would open the door to a strategically unacceptable

outcome for Iran: a pro-American government heavily dominated by Sunnis with

increasing military power as the Shia are fighting among themselves.
The Americans also didn't want this outcome. While the Iranians had restrained al-Sadr
at the beginning of the U.S. surge -- and thereby massively contributed to the end of the
strategy of playing the Sunnis against the Shia -- Tehran had not yet dealt with al-Sadr
decisively. Just like Iran, the United States prefers not to see a new Sunni government
emerge in Iraq. Instead, Washington wants a balance of power in Baghdad between
Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, and it wants intra-communal disputes to be contained within this
framework. If a stable government is to emerge, each of the communities must be
relatively (with an emphasis on "relatively") stable. Thus, not for the first time, American
and Iranian interests in Iraq were aligned. Both wanted an end to Shiite conflict, and that
meant that both wanted al-Sadr to capitulate.
This is the point where U.S. and Iranian interests can diverge. The Iranians have a
fundamental decision to make, and what happens now in Iraq is almost completely
contingent upon what the Iranians decide. They can do three things. First, they can hold
al-Sadr in reserve as a threat to stability if things don't go their way. Second, they can
use the relative unity of the Shia to try to impose an anti-Sunni government in Baghdad.
And third, they can participate in the creation of that government.
We have long argued that the Iranians would take the third option. They certainly
appeared to be cooperating in the last week. But it has not been clear what the U.S.
government thought, partly because they have been deliberately opaque in their thinking
on Iran, and partly because the situation was too dynamic.

Bush's Long Shot

It is the decision to visit Ukraine and challenge the Russians on their front porch that
gives us some sense of Washington's thinking. To challenge Moscow at a time when the
Russians might be able to support Iran in causing a collapse in the Iraqi process would
not make sense. The U.S. challenge is a long shot anyway, and risking a solution in Iraq
by giving the Iranians a great power ally like Russia would seem too much of a risk to
take.
But Bush is going to Ukraine and is challenging the Russians on NATO. This could mean
he does not think Russia has any options in the Middle East. It also could mean that he
has become sufficiently confident that the process (let's not call it a relationship) that has
emerged with the Iranians is robust enough that Tehran will not sink it now in exchange
for increased Russian support, and that while a crisis with Syria is simmering, the

Russians will not destabilize the situation there -- Syria lacks the importance that Iran
holds for U.S. strategy in Iraq, anyway.
Bush's decision to go to Ukraine indicates that he feels safe in opening a new front -- at
least diplomatically -- while an existing military front remains active. That move makes no
sense, particularly in the face of some European opposition, unless he believes the
Russians are weaker than they appear and that the American position in Iraq is resolving
itself. Bush undoubtedly would have liked to have waited for greater clarity in Iraq, but
time is almost up. The Russians are moving now, and the United States can either
confront them now or concede the game until the United States is in a military position to
resume Russian containment. Plus, Bush doesn't have any years left in office to wait.
The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing. Having
gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global power is trying
to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and confronting a longer-term
Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires
deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards
to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. Bush is risking Russia
disrupting the Middle East as well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either
thinks it is worth the risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is
an important moment.

Read more: Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus | Stratfor

RUSSIA: REBUILDING AN EMPIRE

WHILE IT CAN
Geopolitical Weekly
Monday, October 31, 2011 - 16:23 Print Text Size
Stratfor
By Lauren Goodrich
U.S.-Russian relations seem to have been relatively quiet recently, as there are
numerous contradictory views in Washington about the true nature of Russia's current
foreign policy. Doubts remain about the sincerity of the U.S. State Department's socalled "reset" of relations with Russia -- the term used in 2009 when U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton handed a reset button to her Russian counterpart as a symbol of a
freeze on escalating tensions between Moscow and Washington. The concern is
whether the "reset" is truly a shift in relations between the two former adversaries or
simply a respite before relations deteriorate again.
The reset actually had little to do with the United States wanting Russia as a friend and
ally. Rather, Washington wanted to create room to handle other situations -- mainly
Afghanistan and Iran -- and ask Russia for help. (Russia is aiding in moving supplies into
Afghanistan and withholding critical support from Iran.) Meanwhile, Russia also wanted
more room to set up a system that would help it create a new version of its old empire.
Russia's ultimate plan is to re-establish control over much of its former territories. This
inevitably will lead Moscow and Washington back into a confrontation, negating any socalled reset, as Russian power throughout Eurasia is a direct threat to the U.S. ability to
maintain its global influence. This is how Russia has acted throughout history in order to
survive. The Soviet Union did not act differently from most of the Russian empires before
it, and Russia today is following the same behavioral pattern.

Geography and Empire-Building

Russia's defining geographic characteristic is its indefensibility, which means its main
strategy is to secure itself. Unlike most powerful countries, Russia's core region,

Muscovy, has no barriers to protect it and thus has been invaded several times. Because
of this, throughout history Russia has expanded its geographic barriers in order to
establish a redoubt and create strategic depth between the Russian core and the myriad
enemies surrounding it. This means expanding to the natural barriers of the Carpathian
Mountains (across Ukraine and Moldova), the Caucasus Mountains (particularly to the
Lesser Caucasus, past Georgia and into Armenia) and the Tian Shan on the far side of
Central Asia. The one geographic hole is the North European Plain, where Russia
historically has claimed as much territory as possible (such as the Baltics, Belarus,
Poland and even parts of Germany). In short, for Russia to be secure it must create
some kind of empire.
There are two problems with creating an empire: the people and the economy. Because
they absorb so many lands, Russian empires have faced difficulties providing for vast
numbers of people and suppressing those who did not conform (especially those who
were not ethnic Russians). This leads to an inherently weak economy that can never
overcome the infrastructural challenges of providing for the population of a vast empire.
However, this has never stopped Russia from being a major force for long periods of
time, despite its economic drawbacks, because Russia often emphasizes its strong
military and security apparatus more than (and sometimes at the expense of) economic
development.

Maintaining a Strong State

Russian power must be measured in terms of the strength of the state and its ability to
rule the people. This is not the same as the Russian government's popularity (though
former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's popularity is undeniable); it
is the ability of the Russian leadership, whether czar, Communist Party or prime minister,
to maintain a tight grip on society and security. This allows Moscow to divert resources
from popular consumption to state security and to suppress resistance. If the
government has firm control over the people, popular discontent over politics, social
policies or the economy do not pose a threat to the state -- certainly not in the short term.
It is when the Russian leadership loses control over the security apparatus that Russian
regimes collapse. For example, when the czar lost control of the army during World War
I, he lost power and the Russian empire fell apart. Under Josef Stalin, there was massive
economic dysfunction and widespread discontent, but Stalin maintained firm control over
both the security apparatuses and the army, which he used to deal with any hint of
dissent. Economic weakness and a brutal regime eventually were accepted as the
inevitable price of security and of being a strategic power.

Moscow is using the same logic and strategies today (video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=aKqNjCjYhPw) When
Putin came to power in 1999, the Russian state was broken and vulnerable to other
global powers. In order to regain Russia's stability -- and eventually its place on the
global stage -- Putin first had to consolidate the Kremlin's power within the country,
which meant consolidating the country economically, politically and socially. This
occurred after Putin reorganized and strengthened the security apparatuses, giving him
greater ability to dominate the people under one political party, purge foreign influence
from the economy and build a cult of personality among the people.
Putin then set his sights on a Russian empire of sorts in order to secure the country's
future. This was not a matter of ego for Putin but a national security concern derived
from centuries of historic precedent.
Putin had just seen the United States encroach on the territory Russia deemed
imperative to its survival: Washington helped usher most Central European states and
the former Soviet Baltic states into NATO and the European Union; supported proWestern "color revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan; set up military bases in
Central Asia; and announced plans to place ballistic missile defense installations in
Central Europe. To Russia, it seemed the United States was devouring its periphery to
ensure that Moscow would forever remain vulnerable.
Over the past six years, Russia has pushed back to some degree against Western
influence in most of its former Soviet states. One reason for this success is that the
United States has been preoccupied with other issues, mostly in the Middle East and
South Asia. Moreover, Washington has held the misconception that Russia will not
formally attempt to re-create a kind of empire. But, as has been seen throughout history,
it must.

Putin's Plans
Putin announced in September that he would seek to return to the Russian presidency in
2012, and he has started laying out his goals for his new reign. He said Russia would
formalize its relationship with former Soviet states by creating a Eurasia Union (EuU);
other former Soviet states proposed the concept nearly a decade ago, but Russia is now
in a position in which it can begin implementing it. Russia will begin this new iteration of
a Russian empire by creating a union with former Soviet states based on Moscow's
current associations, such as the Customs Union, the Union State and the Collective

Security Treaty Organization. This will allow the EuU to strategically encompass both the
economic and security spheres.
The forthcoming EuU is not a re-creation of the Soviet Union. Putin understands the
inherent vulnerabilities Russia would face in bearing the economic and strategic burden
of taking care of so many people across nearly 9 million square miles. This was one of
the Soviet Union's greatest weaknesses: trying to control so much directly. Instead, Putin
is creating a union in which Moscow would influence foreign policy and security but
would not be responsible for most of the inner workings of each country. Russia simply
does not have the means to support such an intensive strategy. Moscow does not feel
the need to sort through Kyrgyz political theater or support Ukraine's economy to control
those countries.
The Kremlin intends to have the EuU fully formed by 2015, when Russia believes the
United States will return its focus to Eurasia. Washington is wrapping up its
commitments to Iraq this year and intends to end combat operations and greatly reduce
forces in Afghanistan, so by 2015, the United States will have military and diplomatic
attention to spare. This is also the same time period in which the U.S. ballistic missile
defense installations in Central Europe will break ground. To Russia, this amounts to a
U.S. and pro-U.S. front in Central Europe forming on the former Soviet (and future EuU)
borders. It is the creation of a new version of the Russian empire, combined with the
U.S. consolidation of influence on that empire's periphery, that most likely will spark new
hostilities between Moscow and Washington.
This could set the stage for a new version of the Cold War, though it would not be as
long-lived as the previous one. Putin's other reason for re-establishing some kind of
Russian empire is that he knows the next crisis to affect Russia most likely will keep the
country from ever resurging again: Russia is dying. The country's demographics are
among some of the world's worst, having declined steadily since World War I. Its birth
rates are well below death rates, and it already has more citizens in their 50s than in
their teens. Russia could be a major power without a solid economy, but no country can
be a global power without people. This is why Putin is attempting to strengthen and
secure Russia now, before demographics weaken it. However, even taking its
demographics into account, Russia will be able to sustain its current growth in power for
at least another generation. This means that the next few years likely are Russia's last
great moment -- one that will be marked by the country's return as a regional empire and
a new confrontation with its previous adversary, the United States.

Read more: Russia: Rebuilding an Empire While It Can | Stratfor

RUSSIA AND ITS FOREIGN

POLICY DANCE
Geopolitical Diary
Wednesday, January 5, 2011 - 20:42 Text Size Print
The Kremlin announced Wednesday that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is going to
visit the Palestinian territories in a few weeks, just as Medvedevs trip to Israel has been
canceled. Medvedev had planned to go to Israel on Jan. 17-19, but his trip was
postponed due to a strike at the Israeli Foreign Ministry. While this may just seem like a
logistical and technical issue, there is a shifting Russian foreign policy strategy, giving
Moscow freer capability to act against the Israelis and increase support for the
Palestinians.
Russia and Israel have had ongoing tense and complex relations. After a post-World
War II alliance in the late 1940s, Soviet-era Moscow was a patron of Israels enemies -Egypt and Syria. At the time, this was not really about Russia siding against Israel as
much as it was about pressuring the United States interests in the Middle East.
After the Cold War, Israeli and Russian relations were tolerable. Moscow had to pull its
support from the Middle East as its empire crumbled and it fought to keep the Russian
state together. All this changed in the past decade when Russia began to consolidate,
and announced that Russia was on its way back and would soon return as a major
player on the international stage.
During this time, Moscow accused Israel of meddling in Russias interests by financially
and politically backing the anti-Kremlin oligarchs, and militarily supporting Georgia and
Russian Muslim republics of Dagestan and Chechnya. Since then, it has been a tit-for-tat
between Russia and Israel with Moscow countering those Israeli moves by supporting
Iran and Syria in recent years.
Russia is working with all players in the region -- keeping everyone dizzy and guessing
what it will do next.
This was part of Russias overall foreign policy at the time to unilaterally retaliate for
moves made against its interests. One of the larger examples of this was the Wests
recognition of an independent Kosovo, followed by Russias recognition of independent

Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- after its war with Georgia. But Russias resurgence has
now entered a new stage, in which Moscow feels comfortable in its sphere of influence.
Naturally, Moscow is still mindful of foreign moves in its surrounding regions, but is
confident such moves do not threaten its overall control in the region. Moscow is not only
secure enough in its power over Georgia that the issue isnt a red line in Russian-Israeli
relations; Moscow retains options for escalation in Israel's neighborhood that can deter
Israeli actions in Georgia.
This new shift has allowed Russia to be able to play more ambiguously than unilaterally
in all its foreign policy issues. With Russia in a comfortable status, it feels it can make
bolder moves outside of Eurasia. Such alterations have been seen in Russias policies in
the Middle East, where Moscow has been striking military deals with anyone it can -Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
This time, increased Russian activity around the world could go beyond theatrics and
translate into further support for the Palestinians. There are rumors that Russia is
considering actually recognizing an independent Palestinian state. There has already
been a change in some weightier countries, like Brazil, supporting Palestine. The
Russians could be the next in line. The difference is the Russians have a history of not
just diplomatically supporting the Palestinians, but through military, financial and
intelligence support.
Moscows motivations behind supporting the Palestinians at this time are not clear, since
it has been making so many deals with so many countries in the region. Russia could be
attempting to make a show against one of Washington's closest allies -- Israel -- and the
timing of the cancellation of Medvedevs trip to Israel is suspicious. Russia could be
choosing to make this move because of increased discussion of Palestinian support in
the European Union -- and Russia is looking for agenda issues in which to align. Russia
could be in coordination with Brazil, as both countries are strangely side-by-side on
myriad foreign policy issues. Additionally, it could be Russia simply wanting to make a
global statement that it isnt worried about repercussions for taking sides on such a
controversial issue.
Even if Moscows reasoning or endgame is unknown at this time, it's plain that Russia is
working with all players in the region -- keeping everyone dizzy and guessing what it will
do next.

Read more: Russia and its Foreign Policy Dance | Stratfor

THE WESTERN VIEW OF RUSSIA

Geopolitical Weekly
Monday, August 31, 2009 - 15:11 Print Text Size
By George Friedman
A months-long White House review of a pair of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD)
installations slated for Poland and the Czech Republic is nearing completion. The review
is expected to present a number of options ranging from pushing forward with the
installations as planned to canceling them outright. The Obama administration has yet to
decide what course to follow. Rumors are running wild in Poland and the Czech Republic
that the United States has reconsidered its plan to place ballistic defense systems in
their countries. The rumors stem from a top U.S. BMD lobbying group that said this past
week that the U.S. plan was all but dead.
The ultimate U.S. decision on BMD depends upon both the upcoming summit of the five
permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany on the Iranian nuclear
program and Russia's response to those talks. If Russia does not cooperate in
sanctions, but instead continues to maintain close relations with Iran, we suspect that the
BMD plan will remain intact. Either way, the BMD issue offers a good opportunity to reexamine U.S. and Western relations with Russia and how they have evolved.

Cold War vs. Post-Cold War

There has been a recurring theme in the discussions between Russia and the West over
the past year: the return of the Cold War. U.S. President Barack Obama, for example,
accused Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of having one foot in the Cold War. The
Russians have in turn accused the Americans of thinking in terms of the Cold War.
Eastern Europeans have expressed fears that the Russians continue to view their
relationship with Europe in terms of the Cold War. Other Europeans have expressed
concern that both Americans and Russians might drag Europe into another Cold War.
For many in the West, the more mature and stable Western-Russian relationship is what
they call the "Post-Cold War world." In this world, the Russians no longer regard the
West as an enemy, and view the other republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) as
independent states free to forge whatever relations they wish with the West. Russia
should welcome or at least be indifferent to such matters. Russia instead should be

concentrating on economic development while integrating lessons learned from the West
into its political and social thinking. The Russians should stop thinking in politico-military
terms, the terms of the Cold War. Instead, they should think in the new paradigm in
which Russia is part of the Western economic system, albeit a backward one needing
time and institution-building to become a full partner with the West. All other thinking is a
throwback to the Cold War.
This was the thinking behind the idea of resetting U.S.-Russian relations. Hillary
Clinton's "reset" button was meant to move U.S.-Russian relations away from what
Washington thought of as a return to the Cold War from its preferred period, which
existed between 1991 and the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations after Ukraine's
2004 Orange Revolution. The United States was in a bimodal condition when it came to
Russian relations: Either it was the Cold War or it was post-Cold War.
The Russians took a more jaundiced view of the post-Cold War world. For Moscow,
rather than a period of reform, the post-Cold War period was one of decay and chaos.
Old institutions had collapsed, but new institutions had not emerged. Instead, there was
the chaos of privatization, essentially a wild free-for-all during which social order
collapsed. Western institutions, including everything from banks to universities, were
complicit in this collapse. Western banks were eager to take advantage of the new pools
of privately expropriated money, while Western advisers were eager to advise the
Russians on how to become Westerners. In the meantime, workers went unpaid, life
expectancy and birth rates declined, and the basic institutions that had provided order
under communism decayed -- or worse, became complicit in the looting. The post-Cold
War world was not a happy time in Russia: It was a catastrophic period for Russian
power.
Herein lies the gulf between the West and the Russians. The West divides the world
between the Cold War and the post-Cold War world. It clearly prefers the post-Cold War
world, not so much because of the social condition of Russia, but because the post-Cold
War world lacked the geopolitical challenge posed by the Soviet Union -- everything from
wars of national liberation to the threat of nuclear war was gone. From the Russian point
of view, the social chaos of the post-Cold War world was unbearable. Meanwhile, the
end of a Russian challenge to the West meant from the Russian point of view that
Moscow was helpless in the face of Western plans for reordering the institutions and
power arrangements of the region without regard to Russian interests.
As mentioned, Westerners think in term of two eras, the Cold War and the Post-Cold
War era. This distinction is institutionalized in Western expertise on Russia. And it

divides into two classes of Russia experts. There are those who came to maturity during
the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s, whose basic framework is to think of Russia as a
global threat. Then, there are those who came to maturity in the later 1980s and 1990s.
Their view of Russia is of a failed state that can stabilize its situation for a time by
subordinating itself to Western institutions and values, or continue its inexorable decline.
These two generations clash constantly. Interestingly, the distinction is not so much
ideological as generational. The older group looks at Russian behavior with a more
skeptical eye, assuming that Putin, a KGB man, has in mind the resurrection of Soviet
power. The post-Cold War generation that controlled U.S.-Russian policy during both the
Clinton and Bush administrations is more interesting. During both administrations, this
generation believed in the idea that economic liberalization and political liberalization
were inextricably bound together. It believed that Russia was headed in the right
direction if only Moscow did not try to reassert itself geopolitically and militarily, and if
Moscow did not try to control the economy or society with excessive state power. It saw
the Russian evolution during the mid-to-late 2000s as an unfortunate and unnecessary
development moving Russia away from the path that was best for it, and it sees the Cold
War generation's response to Russia's behavior as counterproductive.

The

Post-Post

Cold

War

World

The U.S. and other Westerners' understanding of Russia is trapped in a nonproductive

paradigm. For Russia, the choice isn't between the Cold War or the Post-Cold War
world. This dichotomy denies the possibility of, if you will, a post-post-Cold War world -or to get away from excessive posts, a world in which Russia is a major regional power,
with a stable if troubled economy, functional society and regional interests it must
protect.
Russia cannot go back to the Cold War, which consisted of three parts. First, there was
the nuclear relationship. Second, there was the Soviet military threat to both Europe and
the Far East; the ability to deploy large military formations throughout the Eurasian
landmass. And third, there were the wars of national liberation funded and guided by the
Soviets, and designed to create powers allied with the Soviets on a global scale and to
sap U.S. power in endless counterinsurgencies.
While the nuclear balance remains, by itself it is hollow. Without other dimensions of
Russian power, the threat to engage in mutual assured destruction has little meaning.
Russia's military could re-evolve to pose a Eurasian threat; as we have pointed out
before, in Russia, the status of the economy does not historically correlate to Russian
military power. At the same time, it would take a generation of development to threaten

the domination of the European peninsula -- and Russia today has far fewer people and
resources than the whole of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that it rallied to that
effort. Finally, while Russia could certainly fund insurgencies, the ideological power of
Marxism is gone, and in any case Russia is not a Marxist state. Building wars of national
liberation around pure finance is not as easy as it looks. There is no road back to the
Cold War. But neither is there a road back to the post-Cold War period.
There was a period in the mid-to-late 1990s when the West could have destroyed the
Russian Federation. Instead, the West chose a combined strategy of ignoring Russia
while irritating it with economic policies that were unhelpful to say the least, and military
policies like Kosovo designed to drive home Russia's impotence. There is the old saw of
not teasing a bear, but if you must, being sure to kill it. Operating on the myth of nationbuilding, the West thought it could rebuild Russia in its own image. To this day, most of
the post-Cold War experts do not grasp the degree to which Russians saw their efforts
as a deliberate attempt to destroy Russia and the degree to which Russians are
committed never to return to that time. It is hard to imagine anything as infuriating for the
Russians as the reset button the Clinton administration's Russia experts -- who now
dominate Obama's Russia policy -- presented the Russian leadership in all seriousness.
The Russians simply do not intend to return to the Post-Cold War era Western experts
recall so fondly.
The resurrection of talks on the reduction of nuclear stockpiles provides an example of
the post-Cold generation's misjudgment in its response to Russia. These START talks
once were urgent matters. They are not urgent any longer. The threat of nuclear war is
not part of the current equation. Maintaining that semblance of parity with the United
States and placing limits on the American arsenal are certainly valuable from the
Russian perspective, but it is no longer a fundamental issue to them. Some have
suggested using these talks as a confidence-building measure. But from the Russian
point of view, START is a peripheral issue, and Washington's focus on it is an indication
that the United States is not prepared to take Russia's current pressing interests
seriously.
Continued lectures on human rights and economic liberalization, which fall on similarly
deaf Russian ears, provide another example of the post-Cold War generation's
misjudgment in its response to Russia. The period in which human rights and economic
liberalization were centerpieces of Russian state policy is remembered -- and not only by
the Russian political elite -- as among the worst periods of recent Russian history. No
one wants to go back there, but the Russians hear constant Western calls to return to
that chaos. The Russians' conviction is that post-Cold War Western officials want to

finish the job they began. The critical point that post-Cold War officials frequently don't
grasp is that the Russians see them as at least as dangerous to Russian interests as the
Cold War generation.
The Russian view is that neither the Cold War nor the post-Cold War is the proper
paradigm. Russia is not challenging the United States for global hegemony. But neither
is Russia prepared simply to allow the West to create an alliance of nations around
Russia's border. Russia is the dominant power in the FSU. Its economic strategy is to
focus on the development and export of primary commodities, from natural gas to grain.
In order to do this, it wants to align primary commodity policies in the republics of the
former Soviet Union, particularly those concerning energy resources. Economic and
strategic interests combine to make the status of the former Soviet republics a primary
strategic interest. This is neither a perspective from the Cold War or from the post-Cold
War, but a logical Russian perspective on a new age.
While Russia's concerns with Georgia are the noisiest, it is not the key Russian concern
in its near abroad -- Ukraine is. So long as the United States is serious about including
Ukraine in NATO, the United States represents a direct threat to Russian national
security. A glance at a map shows why the Russians think this.
Russia remains interested in Central Europe as well. It is not seeking hegemony, but a
neutral buffer zone between Germany in particular and the former Soviet Union, with
former satellite states like Poland of crucial importance to Moscow. It sees the potential
Polish BMD installation and membership of the Baltic states in NATO as direct and
unnecessary challenges to Russian national interest.

Responding to the United States

As the United States causes discomfort for the Russians, Russia will in turn cause
discomfort for the United States. The U.S. sore spot is the Middle East, and Iran in
particular. Therefore, the Russians will respond to American pressure on them where it
hurts Washington the most.
The Cold Warriors don't understand the limits of Russian power. The post-Cold Warriors
don't understand the degree to which they are distrusted by Russia, and the logic behind
that distrust. The post-Cold Warriors confuse this distrust with a hangover from the Cold
War rather than a direct Russian response to the post-Cold War policies they nurtured.
This is not an argument for the West to accommodate the Russians; there are grave
risks for the West there. Russian intentions right now do not forecast what Russian

intentions might be were Moscow secure in the FSU and had it neutralized Poland. The
logic of such things is that as problems are solved, opportunities are created. One
therefore must think forward to what might happen through Western accommodation.
At the same time, it is vital to understand that neither the Cold War model nor the postCold War model is sufficient to understand Russian intentions and responses right now.
We recall the feeling when the Cold War ended that a known and understandable world
was gone. The same thing is now happening to the post-Cold War experts: The world in
which they operated has dissolved. A very different and complex world has taken its
place. Reset buttons are symbols of a return to a past the Russians reject. START talks
are from a world long passed. The issues now revolve around Russia's desire for a
sphere of influence, and the willingness and ability of the West to block that ambition.
Somewhere between BMD in Poland and the threat posed by Iran, the West must make
a strategic decision about Russia, and live with the consequences.

Read more: The Western View of Russia | Stratfor

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING
INFLUENCE, INTRODUCTION: THE
TARGETS
Analysis
March 8, 2010 | 1602 Print Text Size

Stratfor

Analysis
Editor's note: This introduction launches a four-part series that will examine Russia's
efforts to exert influence beyond its borders.

Summary
The United States' involvement in the Middle East -- wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a
standoff with Iran over its nuclear program -- has given Russia an opportunity to expand
its influence in the former Soviet Union. Moscow has already had some success in
consolidating control over what it considers the four most crucial countries, but it would

like to push back against the West in several other countries if it has time to do so before
Washington's attention returns to Eurasia.

Analysis
Russia today is vastly different from the Russia of 10 or 20 years ago. After the fall of the
Soviet Union, the West began a geopolitical offensive in Russia's near abroad, and met
with some success. However, the past two months have seen a drastic rollback of
Western influence in the former Soviet Union, with Russia forming unions with
Kazakhstan and Belarus and a pro-Russian government returning to Ukraine. Moscow is
making progress in its grand scheme to solidify its position as a regional power in
Eurasia once again, reversing what it sees as Western infiltration. The question now is
how far Russia wants to go -- or how far it feels it must and can go -- in this quest.
The Inherent Russian Struggle
Russia's defining problem stems from its geographic indefensibility. Russia has no
rivers, oceans, swamps, mountains or other natural features truly protecting it. To
compensate for these vulnerabilities, Russia historically has had to do two things:
Consolidate forces at home while purging outside influences, and expand in order to
create buffers around its borders. At times, Russia reached out too far and collapsed,
which forced it to start over. But Russia has only been a stable, strong power -regionally and globally -- when it had a buffer zone surrounding its core. The best
example of this was the Soviet Union, in which Russia surrounded itself with a sphere of
countries under its control, from Central Asia to the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. This
gave Moscow the insulation it needed to project influence far beyond its borders.
But in 1989, the Soviet Union lost control of Eastern Europe and had disintegrated by
1991, returning Russia essentially to its 17th century borders (except for Siberia). Russia
was broken, vulnerable and weak.
The United States, on the other hand, emerged from the Cold War with a huge
opportunity to contain Russia and prevent its re-emergence as a great power in Eurasia.
The Soviet disintegration did not in any way guarantee that Moscow would not resurge
eventually in another form, so the West had to neuter Russia both internally and
externally. First the United States nudged the pro-democratic and capitalist forces inside
Russia to try to change the nature of the Kremlin. Theoretically, this led to the
democratic experiment of the 1990s that ended in bitter chaos, rather than democracy,

within Russia. Yet it did prevent the Russian government from becoming a consolidated
(let alone powerful) entity.
The United States also began working to contain Russia's influence inside its borders
and pick away at its best defense: its buffer. The United States and Western Europe
carried out this strategy in several ways. The West used its influence and money quickly
after the fall of the Soviet Union to create connections with each former Soviet state. It
also fomented a series of color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Kyrgyzstan that solidified Western influence in those countries. NATO and the European
Union also expanded into former Soviet territory to include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
Washington and NATO even opened military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to
facilitate moving supplies into Afghanistan.
Moscow saw this as a direct and deliberate challenge to Russian national security. But
before it could even consider reaching across its borders to counter the West's
geopolitical encroachment, Russia had to clean house. Under former Russian President
(and current Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, Russia's internal consolidation began with
the Kremlin regaining control over the country politically, economically and socially while
re-establishing its control over Russia's wealth of energy reserves. The Kremlin also put
an end to the internal volatility created by the oligarchs, organized crime and wars in the
Caucasus. The recentralization of the Russian state under Putin's rule, coupled with high
energy prices bringing in exorbitant amounts of money, made Russia strong again, but it
still needed to reclaim its buffer zone.
The Window of Opportunity
While Russia reconsolidated, the United States became preoccupied with the Islamic
world. As the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed, they have absorbed
Washington's focus, presenting Russia with an opportunity to push back against the
West's increased influence in Eurasia. It remains unclear whether Russia would have
been able to counter the Western infiltration of the former Soviet states if the United
States had not been looking elsewhere. But Russia has taken advantage of
Washington's preoccupation to attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the
former Soviet Union.
The U.S. absorption on Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan has not occurred without Russian
involvement. Russia has used its connections in the Middle East and Afghanistan as
leverage in its negotiations with the United States for years, demanding that Washington
outright abandon moves to solidify Western influence in the former Soviet states.

Furthermore, Moscow's plan to expand its influence into the former Soviet sphere
depends on Washington's preoccupation. Thus, Russia has openly supported Iran with
political, nuclear and military deals, and has made negotiations for military supply routes
into Afghanistan more difficult for the United States and NATO.
The geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Moscow has not been easy. But
while Washington has been preoccupied with its wars, Russia has been able to
reconsolidate its influence in countries that never strayed far from Moscow's hand, such
as Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia proved that the West could not stop it from militarily
rolling back into its former territory during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Russia's most
crucial victory to date has been in Ukraine, where the top four candidates in the country's
January presidential election were all pro-Russian, thus ensuring the end of the proWestern Orange movement.
The question now is: What does Russia feel it must accomplish before the United States
is freed up from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or its standoff with Iran?
The Russian Plan
The Kremlin is not looking to re-establish the Soviet Union. Rather, Moscow has stepped
back and looked at its former Soviet sphere and determined what is imperative to the
future of Russia's regional power and stability. Essentially, Russia has placed the
countries of its former sphere of influence and other regional powers into four categories:
First are four countries where Russia feels it must fully reconsolidate its influence:
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Georgia. These countries protect Russia from
Asia and Europe and give Moscow access to the Black and Caspian seas. They
are also the key points integrated with Russia's industrial and agricultural
heartland. Without all four of them, Russia is essentially impotent. So far, Russia
has reconsolidated power in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and part of
Georgia is militarily occupied. In 2010, Russia will focus on strengthening its
grasp on these countries.
Next are six countries where Moscow would like to reconsolidate its influence if it
has the opportunity to do so before Washington's attention turns back to Eurasia:
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Russia
does not need these countries in order to remain strong, but without them the
West is too close to the Russian core for comfort. These countries have either
strategic geographic locations, links to Russia or valuable assets. Estonia could
almost be put into the first category, as some forces inside Moscow consider it
more important because of location near Russia's second-largest city, St.

Petersburg, and on the Baltic Sea. Russia will attempt to deal with these
countries only after its four top priorities are met.
The third group on Russia's list consists of countries that are not critical to the
Kremlin, but Moscow feels could easily be controlled because of their own
inherent vulnerabilities. These countries -- Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Armenia -- are not geographically, politically or economically important and are so
unstable that Moscow could consolidate control over them rather quickly. Some
of these countries are already under Russian control, through no concerted effort
on Moscow's part, but their natural instability and weakness can make them more
trouble than they are worth.
The final group on Russias list consists of countries that are not former Soviet
states or countries Russia thinks it can pull in under its influence. These last
countries -- Germany, Turkey, France and Poland -- are regional powers (or
future powers) in Eurasia that could complicate Russia's efforts. Moscow feels it
needs to form a strong relationship, or at least an understanding, with these
countries about Russia's dominance in the former Soviet sphere. These countries
are all NATO members, and each has its own complex relationship with the
United States. But Moscow again is taking advantage of the United States'
distraction to leverage its own relationship with these countries. Moscow will have
to play a very delicate game with these regional heavyweights to make sure it
does not turn them into enemies.
A Closing Window
Russia has had some success in meeting its goals while the United States has been
preoccupied, but it also knows Washington is attempting to wrap up its affairs in Iraq,
Iran and Afghanistan and have a freer hand in other areas. For Russia, the clock is
ticking.
Russia does have the advantage, in that it is easier for the United States to prevent the
emergence of a regional hegemon than to control one that has already emerged. The
United States' focus will return to Eurasia after Russia has already made significant
progress on its to-do list. But this is not to say that Russia is the definite winner. Russia's
geopolitical imperatives remain: The country must expand, hold together and defend the
empire, even though expansion can create difficulties in the Russian core. This is
already a difficult task; it will be made even harder when the United States is free to
counter Russia.
In this series, Stratfor will break down exactly how Russia will be tackling its to-do list of
countries, examining the different levers Moscow holds over each country and what
bumps it may experience along the way.

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING
INFLUENCE, PART 1: THE
NECESSITIES
March 9, 2010 | 1404 Print Text Size

Stratfor
Editor's note: This is part one of a four-part series that examines Russia's efforts to
exert influence beyond its borders.

Summary
As Russia seeks to expand its influence outside its borders, it has identified four
countries that are crucial to its plan to become a major power again. Of those four
countries -- Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia -- the first three are already
under Russian control. The last one, Georgia, will be the center of Russia's very focused
attention until it too is back in the Russian fold.

Analysis

Russia has been working on consolidating its affairs at home and re-establishing the
former Soviet sphere for many years now and has recently made solid progress toward
pulling the most critical countries back into its fold. For Russia, this consolidation of
control is not about expansionism or imperial designs; it is about national security and
the survival of the geographically vulnerable Russian heartland, which has no natural
features protecting it.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most of Russia's buffer (made up mainly
of former Soviet states) fell under pro-Western influence and drifted away from Moscow.
But the past few years have seen a shift in global dynamics in which much of the West -particularly the United States -- has been preoccupied by events in the Middle East and
Afghanistan, leaving little time and energy to devote to increasing its influence in the
former Soviet sphere. Russia has used this time to begin rolling back such influence. But
Moscow knows that this opportunity will not last forever, so it has prioritized the countries
involved. This essentially has created four tiers: countries Russia has to consolidate,
countries it wants to consolidate, countries it can consolidate but are not high priority and
regional powers with which Russia must create an understanding about the new reality
in Eurasia.
The countries in the first category -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Georgia -- are the
most critical to Moscow's overall plan to return as a Eurasian power. For Russia, these
countries became a major focus even before the Kremlin was done consolidating power
at home. These countries give Russia access to the Black and Caspian seas and serve
as a buffer between Russia and Asia, Europe and the Islamic world. So far, Russia has
consolidated its influence in three of the four countries; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
all have pro-Russian leaders, and the last country -- Georgia -- is partially occupied by
Russia. Solidifying plans for these countries will be Moscow's main focus in 2010.
Ukraine
Ukraine is the cornerstone to Russia's defense and survival as any sort of power. The
former Soviet state hosts the largest Russian community in the world outside of Russia,
and is tightly integrated into Russia's industrial and agricultural heartland. Ukraine is the
transit point for 80 percent of the natural gas shipped from Russia to Europe and is the
connection point for most infrastructure -- whether pipeline, road, power or rail -- running
between Russia and the West.
Ukraine gives Russia the ability to project political, military and economic power into
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Ukrainian territory also pushes deep

into Russia's sphere, with only a mere 300 miles from Ukraine to either Volgograd or
Moscow. To put it simply, without Ukraine, Russia would have fewer ways to become a
regional power and would have trouble maintaining stability within itself. This is why
Ukraine's pro-Western 2004 Orange Revolution was a nightmare for Russia. The change
in government in Kiev during the revolution brought a president that was hostile to
Russian interests, and with him a slew of possibilities that would harm Russia, including
Ukraine's integration into the European Union or even NATO.
Russia's Levers
After 2004, Russia was content to merely meddle in and destabilize Ukraine in order to
ensure it never fully fell into the West's orbit. However, the West's distraction outside of
Eurasia has given Russia a limited amount of time to decisively break Ukraine's proWestern ties. Ukraine is one of the countries where Russia has the most leverage to
increase its influence.
Population: Russia's greatest tool inside of Ukraine is that the population is split
dramatically, and half the population has pro-Russian leanings. A large Russian
minority comprises about 17 percent of the total population, more than 30 percent
of all Ukrainians speak Russian as a native language, and more than half of the
country belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow patriarch.
Ukrainians living east of the Dnieper River tend to identify more with Russia than
the West, and most of those in the Crimean peninsula consider themselves
Russian. This divide is something Russia has used not only to keep the country
unstable, but to turn the country back toward the Russian fold.
Politics: Russia has been the very public sponsor of a pro-Russian political
movement in Ukraine mainly under newly elected President Viktor Yanukovich
and his Party of Regions. But Russia has also supported a slew of other political
movements, including outgoing Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and her
eponymous party. According to polls, Ukraine's only outwardly pro-Western
political party -- that of outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko -- has support in
the single digits.
Energy: Russia currently supplies 80 percent of Ukraine's natural gas, and 2-3
percent of Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) comes from transiting natural
gas from Russia to the West. This has been one of Moscow's favorite levers to
use against Kiev; it has not shied away from turning off natural gas supplies at
the height of winter. Such moves have created chaos in Ukraine's relations with
both Russia and Europe, forcing Kiev to negotiate on everyone else's terms.
Economics: Russia controls quite a bit of Ukraine's strategic sectors other than
energy. Most important, Russia controls a large portion of Ukraine's metal
industry, owning factories across the eastern part of the country while influencing
many Ukrainian steel barons. The steel industry makes up about 40 percent of

Ukrainian exports and 30 percent of its GDP. Russia also owns a substantial
portion of Ukrainian ports in the south.
Oligarchs: Ukraine's oligarchs are much like Russia's in the 1990s in that they
wield enormous power and wealth. Quite a few of these oligarchs pledge
allegiance to Russia based on relationships left over from the Soviet era. These
oligarchs allow the Kremlin to shape their business ventures and have a say in
how the oligarchs influence Ukrainian politics. The most influential of this class is
Ukraine's richest man, Rinat Akhmetov, who not only does the Kremlin's bidding
inside Ukraine, but also has aided the Kremlin during the recent financial crisis.
Other notable pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs include Viktor Pinchuk, Igor
Kolomoisky, Sergei Taruta and Dmitri Firtash.
Military: One of Russia's most important military bases is in Ukraine, at the Black
Sea port of Sevastopol -- the Russian military's only deep-water port. Russia's
Black Sea naval fleet in Crimea is many times larger than Kiev's small fleet. The
Russian Black Sea Fleet also contributes to the majority of Crimea's regional
economy -- something that keeps this region loyal to Russia.
Intelligence: Ukraine's intelligence services are still heavily influenced by Russia;
not only did they originate from Moscow's KGB and Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR), but most of the officials were trained by the Russian services. The
descendant of the KGB, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), has a heavy
presence within Ukraine's intelligence agencies, making the organization a major
tool for Russia's interests.
Organized crime: Russian and Ukrainian organized crime have a deep
connection that has lasted more than a century. Russia has been especially
successful in Ukraine's illegal natural gas deals, arms trade, drug and human
trafficking, and other illicit business.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
The tide of Western influence in Ukraine was officially reversed in early 2010, when
Ukraine's presidential elections brought the return of a pro-Russian government to Kiev.
Furthermore, all the top candidates in the election were pro-Russian or at least had
accommodating attitudes toward Russia. This was not Russia taking hold of Ukraine via
some revolution or by force, but the Ukrainian people choosing a pro-Russian
government, with the majority of independent and European observers calling the
election free and fair. Ukraine chose to return to Russia, proving that all the levers
Moscow used to influence the country were effective.
Russia still has work to do, in that half of Ukraine still believes the country can still be
tied to the West. Also, Ukraine's inherent instability -- mainly due to its demographic split
-- can make controlling Kiev problematic. Furthermore, the West's ties to Ukraine grew
stronger after the Orange Revolution. The West has infiltrated Ukraine's banking,

agricultural, transportation and energy sectors. Russia may have had solid success in
Ukraine recently, but it will have to keep focusing on the critical state to keep Western
influence from pulling Kiev away from Moscow again.
Belarus
Belarus is the former Soviet state that has stayed closest to Russia. The Belarusian
identity has strong ties to Russia; most Belarusians are Russian Orthodox, and Russian
is one of the country's official languages (the other being Belarusian). Belarus, along
with Ukraine, links Russia to Europe, and the distance between Minsk and Moscow is
merely 400 miles. Belarus lies in one of Russia's most vulnerable areas, in that it is on
the North European Plain -- the main invasion route from the west, used by both the
Nazis in World War II and by Napoleon in 1812.
Belarus is different from the other former Soviet states in that it did not flirt too much with
the West after the fall of the Soviet Union, creating a Commonwealth of Russia and
Belarus in 1996 -- an alliance that transformed into the present-day vague partnership of
the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Belarus rushed to strengthen ties with Russia
because Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko believed that if the two countries
integrated, he would naturally become vice president -- and next in line for the Russian
presidency.
Instead, Russia used Lukashenko's ambition to keep Belarus tied to Russia without
providing any real integration between the countries. Russia and Belarus have
independent governments, militaries, foreign policies, economies (for the most part) and
national symbols. Belarus has never been reintegrated into Russia because Russian
Prime Minister (and former President) Vladimir Putin, like most Russians, believes
Belarusians to be naturally inferior. Moreover, Putin openly loathes Lukashenko on a
personal level.
But this does not mean that Russia does not want to secure Belarus as a buffer between
it and the European Union, or risk allowing Belarus to become seduced by the West.
Russia simply wants Minsk to know that in any formal alliance between the countries,
Belarus will not be an equal partner.
Russia's Levers
Population: Belarus' demographic makeup is Russia's greatest lever. Russians
make up roughly 11 percent of Belarus' population. More than 70 percent of the

population speaks Russian, and some 60 percent of the population belongs to the
Russian Orthodox Church.
Political: Belarus is politically consolidated under the authoritarian Lukashenko.
Though he has regular spats with Moscow, Lukashenko is manifestly pro-Russian
and even aspires to be part of the Kremlin's leadership. Russia and Belarus have
their own union state, though the definition of this alliance is extremely vague.
The countries have discussed sharing a common foreign and defense policy,
monetary union and even a single citizenship.
Economic: Belarus is heavily tied to Russia economically, with the latter providing
more than 60 percent of Belarus's imports, 85 percent of its oil and nearly all of its
natural gas. Belarus also transports 20 percent of Russia's natural gas to Europe.
Russia is deeply integrated into Belarus' industrial sector, which makes up 40
percent of the country's GDP. During the financial crisis, Russia has also supplied
Belarus with loans totaling more than $1 billion.
Military: During the Soviet era, the Russian and Belarusian military and industrial
sectors were fully integrated. Those ties still exist; the Belarusian military is
armed exclusively with Russian or Soviet-era equipment. Belarus is a member of
the Russian-led military alliance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), which allows Russian soldiers access to Belarus at Moscow's will.
Russia and Belarus also share a unified air defense system, something that has
led Russia to consider stationing its Iskander missile system along Belarus'
European borders.
Intelligence: The Russian and Belarusian intelligence services are nearly
indivisible. The Russian KGB is parent to the Belarusian KGB, and today's
Russian FSB and SVR are still deeply entrenched in Belarus.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia has long kept Belarus close, but ties grew even stronger on Jan. 1 when the two
countries, along with Kazakhstan, launched an official customs union. This is the first
step in creating a single economic space. The union is also beginning to consider
expanding to include security issues, like border control. Such a move would nearly
completely integrate Belarus with Russia politically, economically and in security matters.
Russia is formally reassimilating Belarus, preventing Minsk from having any meaningful
relationship with the West.
But Russia will have to watch out for Lukashenko's argumentative tendencies. Belarus'
erratic behavior hardly ever creates real breaks between the two countries, but does
allow a very public display of Russia's lack of control over Minsk's theatrics. The second
thing for which Russia must account is increased attention from the European Union;
trade with the union accounts for one-third of Belarus' total trade. Many EU states have
pushed for closer ties to Belarus through the union's Eastern Partnership program,

though there is hardly a consensus in Europe or any agreement from Minsk as to what
the EU partnership deal should mean. Belarus wants expertise and funding, while the
European Union wants concrete political changes -- and neither is likely to get any
significant portion of what it wants. Belarus has never worried Russia too much, but
Russia is taking precautions to keep Belarus pro-Russian, if not part of Russia.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan protects Russia from the Islamic and Asian worlds. Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has been the most important of the Central Asian states. It is
the largest and most resource-rich of the region's five countries and tends to serve as a
bellwether for the region's politics. Kazakhstan is strategically and geographically the
middleman between its fellow Central Asian states (all of which it borders except
Tajikistan) and Russia.
Moscow intentionally made Kazakhstan the center of the Central Asian universe during
the Soviet era. The reason for this was twofold. First, Russia did not want Central Asia's
natural regional leader, Uzbekistan, continuing in this role since it rarely followed orders
from Moscow. Second, Russia knew Kazakhstan would be much easier to keep handle
than the other Central Asian states, since Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state
Russia borders. Ease of control aside, Kazakhstan is critical to the Russian sphere for
myriad reasons. Kazakhstan possesses plentiful oil and natural gas resources, and is a
key access route for Russia to the rest of Central Asia and Asia proper. Furthermore,
Kazakhstan abuts Russia's transportation links to the rest of Siberia and Russia's Far
East. Essentially, losing Kazakhstan could split Russia in two.
Russia's Levers
Geography and population: Kazakhstan's size -- nearly one third the size of the
continental United States, but with 5 percent of the population -- makes it a
difficult country to consolidate. Kazakhstan and Russia share a nearly 5,000-mile
border that is almost completely unguarded. The population is split between the
north and south with vast barren stretches in between. Russians make up nearly
20 percent of the Kazakh population. Around 25 percent of all Kazakhs work
abroad, mostly in Russia, and 6 percent of Kazakh GDP comes from remittances.
Politics: Kazakhstan has been ruled by a single dynasty under Nursultan
Nazarbayev since before the fall of the Soviet Union. Of all the leaders of nonRussian former Soviet states, Nazarbayev was the most vocal about not wanting
the Soviet Union to disintegrate. Since then, Kazakhstan has flirted with the
possibility of forming a political union state with Russia as Belarus has done.

Economics: Most of Kazakhstan's economic infrastructure -- pipelines, rails and

roads -- is linked into Russia. Ninety-five percent of all natural gas and 79 percent
of all oil from Kazakhstan is sent to Russia for export. Kazakhstan's exports to
China are increasing and it sends a few sporadic shipments to Europe via
Azerbaijan, but Russia still controls most of Kazakhstan's energy exports. During
the recent financial crisis, Russia penetrated Kazakh business, buying up banks
and industrial assets.
Military and security: Kazakhstan and Russia are heavily militarily integrated;
Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, and nearly all of the Kazakh military uses
Russian or Soviet-era equipment. Roughly 70 percent of Kazakhstan's military
officers are ethnically Russian and trained by Russia. Kazakhstan's largest
security concern is from its regional rival, Uzbekistan. Russia is Kazakhstan's
main protector.
Intelligence: The Kazakh security apparatus KNB was born out of the Soviet KGB
and is closely linked into Russia's present day FSB and SVR. Most Kazakh
security chiefs were trained by and are loyal to Moscow.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Though Russia and Kazakhstan have shared a close relationship since the fall of the
Soviet Union, Moscow solidified its hold on its southern neighbor by creating the
aforementioned customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus on Jan. 1. For Kazakhstan,
this union makes it generally more expensive to purchase non-Russian goods and
weakens the indigenous Kazakh economy. It essentially starts the re-creation of a single
economic sphere for the three states under Moscow, which they have pledged to
complete by 2012. As mentioned before, the customs union is also considering
expanding into security.
But unlike Belarus, Kazakhstan has yet to agree to any political union with Russia. There
are two large problems that Russia must watch in order to keep Kazakhstan in its fold.
The first is China. Kazakhstan has flirted with the West, but Western infiltration has been
limited to energy projects and has not entered the political realm. However, this is not
true for Chinese influence. China has been slowly and quietly building ties with
Kazakhstan on energy, politics and economics and on the social level. Russia will have
to keep the Chinese in check just as it must with the West in the other former Soviet
states. The other potential problem for Russia's plan would arise if there were a
leadership change in Astana. It is not clear what the result of a succession crisis would
be in Kazakhstan or if it would change the country's willingness to work with Russia.
Such an unknown is something Moscow must consider.
Georgia

Of the four countries Russia believes it has to pull back into its orbit, Georgia is the one
with which Russia has the most problems and is the least consolidated. Georgia borders
Russia on the strip of land known as the Caucasus -- a region between Europe, Asia and
the Middle East. The Caucasus is critical for Russia to protect itself from all those
regions. Georgia, as the northernmost country in the Caucasus (besides the Russian
republics), is an Achilles' heel for Russia. Georgia also flanks Russia's southern
Caucasus republics -- including Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan -- and acts as a
Christian buffer between Islamic influences from the south and Russia's Muslim regions.
Though Russia and Georgia share many social attributes, such as the Orthodox religion,
this state was one of the first former Soviet states -- after the Baltics -- to formally move
toward the West. In 2003, the first of the pro-Western color revolutions swept into the
former Soviet states with Georgia's Rose Revolution. Since then, Georgia has sought
formal membership in several Western institutions like NATO and the European Union.
Because of the decisive break from Russia, Georgia and Russia do not formally share
official diplomatic ties; the countries' leaders are not even on speaking terms.
Russia's Levers
Geography: Russia formally occupies the two main secessionist regions of
Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The two regions, which make up a third of
Georgian territory, have declared their independence with Russian recognition.
Russia also heavily influences Georgia's southern secessionist regions of Adjara
and Samtskhe-Javakheti.
Population: Though there is no sizable Russian population in Georgia, nearly 80
percent of the Georgian population is Orthodox with close ties to the Moscow
Patriarch. The Russian Orthodox Church does not formally preside over the
Georgian Orthodox Church, unlike in Ukraine and Belarus, but the ties between
the two groups have long helped Russia to push into Georgia socially.
Politics: The Georgian government is led by vehemently anti-Russian President
Mikhail Saakashvili, but more than a dozen opposition groups have tried to
destabilize the Rose Revolution president -- something that Russia has sought to
take advantage of in the past year. Moreover, Russia is just now starting to
organize a formally pro-Russian opposition movement in Georgia.
Military: This is the main lever Russia holds in Georgia mainly due to the large
Russian military presence inside of Georgia and flanking the country's southern
border. Russia proved in its 2008 war with Georgia that it can quickly invade the
country should the need arise.

Russia's Success and Roadblocks

Russia may have many levers in Georgia, but none has allowed Russia to consolidate
control over the country. Instead, Russia has had to prove to Georgia (and the West)
that it would never be allowed to stray from its former master. Essentially, Russia had to
very publicly break the country. In 2008, Russia carried out a five-day war with Georgia,
pushing the Russian military nearly to the capital of Tbilisi. Though Georgia was an ally
of the United States and NATO, the West did not involve itself in the conflict. Georgia
ended up having a third of its territory split from the country and declared "independent,"
with Russian forces formally stationed in the regions.
This war has had enormous repercussions not only for Georgia, but for the entire Soviet
sphere and the West. Russia proved that it could do more than use its political,
economic or energy levers in former Soviet states to influence their return to the Russian
fold; it could force them back into submission.
But Russia has a long way to go in getting Georgia under control. Tbilisi still openly
defies Moscow and has asked the West for any kind of support possible, especially
military support.
With the other three imperative countries falling back into Russia's orbit, Georgia will
have Russia's most focused attention. Russia must have all four countries under its
control in order to succeed with any other part of its plan to become a major power in
Eurasia once again.
Read more: Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities | Stratfor

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING
INFLUENCE, PART 2: THE
DESIRABLES
Analysis
March 10, 2010 | 0710 Print Text Size

Stratfor
Editor's note: This is part two of a four-part series that examines Russia's efforts to
exert influence beyond its borders.

Summary
After Russia consolidates control over the countries it has deemed necessary to its
national security, it will turn its focus to a handful of countries that are not as important
but still have strategic value. These countries -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- are not necessary to Russia's survival but are of some
importance and can keep the West from moving too close to Russia's core.

Analysis
After years of work, Moscow has made significant progress in regaining control over the
former Soviet states that are crucial to Russia's security. Russia's window of opportunity
to exert control in its near abroad is a narrow one, however, and so Moscow has
prioritized its list of countries where it is trying to consolidate influence. After reining in
the four countries imperative to Moscow's interests -- Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Georgia -- Moscow will turn its attention to a group of countries where it would like to
have more influence.
There are six countries -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan -- where Moscow would like to reconsolidate its influence if it has the
opportunity. Although these countries are not crucial to Russia's survival, as long as they
remain outside Moscow's control, the West has the ability to get too close to the Russian
core for comfort. All these countries know how serious Russia is about its grand plan of
expansionism. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war revealed Moscow's willingness to militarily
intervene on its former Soviet turf and sent the message to these countries that they
must obey or cut a deal with Moscow, or else risk being crushed. Since then, these
countries have watched Russia consolidate Kazakhstan and Belarus into a customs
union (with the promise of becoming a formal union) and have seen a pro-Russian wave
engulf Ukraine.
The Baltics
Out of the six countries on this shopping list, the Baltics (particularly Estonia and Latvia)
are the most critical to Russia's plan. Estonia and Latvia are a stone's throw from
Russia's most important cities, with Tallinn just 200 miles from St. Petersburg and
eastern Latvia just 350 miles from Moscow. The Baltics lie on the North European Plain,
Europe's easiest route for marching into Russia -- something Moscow knows all too well.
Each Baltic state has its own importance to Russia. Whoever controls Estonia also
controls the approach to the Gulf of Finland, Russia's main access to the Baltic Sea.
Estonia is also mainly ethnically Ugro-Finnish, which means that Russians are
surrounded by Ugro-Finns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. Latvia has the largest
Russian population in the Baltics and the port of Riga, which Russia covets. Lithuania is
different from its Baltic brothers since it does not border Russia proper, although it does
border Kaliningrad, Russia's exclave, which is home to half of Russia's Baltic Fleet and
more than 23,000 troops. Lithuania is the largest of the Baltic states, both in terms of
territory and population. It also had been a key industrial center under the Soviet Union.

The Baltic states were the only countries in the former Soviet Union to be shuffled into
the Western set of alliances, being admitted into the European Union and NATO in 2004.
This put the Western alliances right on Russia's doorstep. Estonia and Latvia are
fervently anti-Russian, while Lithuania is more pragmatic, feeling less threatened by
Moscow since it does not actually border mainland Russia.
The Russian administration is split over whether the Baltics belong on Russia's "must
have" or "would like to have" list. The Kremlin is especially torn over how aggressively to
go after Estonia, which is geographically isolated sharing land borders only with Russia
and Latvia, and thus in a particularly sensitive position.
Russia's Levers
Russia holds many levers within the Baltic states, making their future highly uncertain.
Geography: The Baltics are virtually indefensible, lying on the North European
Plain. Their small size also makes them incredibly vulnerable. Furthermore, they
are bordered by Russia to the east, Kaliningrad to the west and Russian ally
Belarus to the south.
Population: Each Baltic state has a sizable Russian population: Russians or
Russian speakers make up 30 percent of the population in Estonia, 40 percent in
Latvia and nearly 10 percent of Lithuania. Roughly 15 percent of Estonians and
30 percent of Latvians are Orthodox, with many loyal to the Moscow Patriarchy.
Economic: The most critical economic lever for Russia in the Baltics is energy.
The Baltics rely on Russia for 90-99 percent of their natural gas supplies and
most of their oil. Russia has proven in the past that it is willing to cut these
supplies (for example, through the breaking of the Druzhba pipeline). Russia also
owns a third of Estonia's natural gas company and has been in talks to purchase
Lithuania's main refinery. Russia's economic levers are mainly in Latvia, which
relies on Russia for one-third of its energy imports
Military: Russia has 23,000 troops in Kaliningrad and recently moved 8,000
troops to just outside St. Petersburg, near the Estonian border. Russia has also
regularly held military exercises in Belarus and Kaliningrad under the guise of
contingency planning for an invasion of the Baltics (should one ever be
necessary).
Security: Russia's nationalist youth movements, like Nashi, have continually
crossed the border into Estonia and Latvia in order to commit vandalism or stir up
pro-Russian sentiments. Estonia has also been one of the prime targets for cyber
attacks from Russia, especially at politically heated times.
Political: This is the weakest link for Russia in the Baltics, since each country is
pro-Western and a member of the European Union and NATO. However Russia
does have some small footholds in Latvia and Lithuania. In 2009, the Harmony
Center coalition -- comprising parties that mainly represent Latvia's Russian

population -- placed second in the country's European Parliament elections and

was as recently as January ranked as the most popular Latvian party, with 16.5
percent approval. There has also been a tradition of pro-Russian parties in
Lithuania, though this has tapered off in recent years. The Labor Party, funded by
Russian-born billionaire Viktor Uspaskich, was the strongest party in Lithuania in
the mid-2000s. However, Uspaskich's fortunes turned when he was charged with
corruption and tax evasion, forcing him to flee to Russia in 2006 to avoid arrest.
He has since returned to Lithuania and assumed leadership of the Labor Party,
which came fifth in the October 2008 elections.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Moscow has not yet made much progress in consolidating its influence in the Baltics.
Estonia and Latvia are still vehemently anti-Russian. They have taken refuge in Western
alliances, but after watching what happened to NATO ally Georgia in 2008, both
countries -- particularly Estonia -- are unsure about the West's ability to come to their aid
should Russia actively target them. Instead, Estonia and Latvia tend to look to Sweden
and Finland as patrons. These countries hold unique relationships with Russia that could
help them curb any Russian action in Latvia and Estonia.
Lithuania has been more pragmatic about its relationship with Russia, counting on its
location away from the Russian border to protect it but not wanting to test Moscow's
patience. In recent weeks, Lithuania has been more open to NATO discussions with
Russia and negotiations on Russian involvement in the country's energy sector.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is important to Russia for many reasons. Though the Caucasus state borders
Russia, it has been rather independently minded. However, it could be drawn in not only
by the West but by other regional powers, like Turkey and Iran (Azerbaijan borders Iran,
which has a sizeable Azerbaijani population). For Russia, controlling Azerbaijan is about
preventing other powers from gaining a foothold in the Caucasus.
Azerbaijan also has access to vast amounts of energy wealth -- not only because of its
own oil and natural gas resources but also because of its geographic location between
Central Asia and the West. Many countries want to tap into Azerbaijan's energy
potential. The West has developed Azerbaijan's resources in order to have an alternative
to Russian energy supplies, while Russia wants to control the flow of Azerbaijan's oil and
natural gas supplies.

Russia's Levers
Geographic: Azerbaijan's location is a blessing and a curse. It is near many
regional powers, but is torn between them. Russia is skilled in playing the
regional powers off each other in order to gain more leverage in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's main energy route also transits Georgia -- and Russia proved its
willingness to cut that route during the 2008 war.
Political: Azerbaijan and its neighbor Armenia have been locked in a political
conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh since a war over the
region from 1988-1994. Russia is the key power influencing all parties involved in
the negotiations and can easily complicate or keep calm this complex standoff.
Security: Besides the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, Azerbaijan is also highly
concerned with militants from Russia's Muslim regions coming into the country.
Baku has complained that Moscow could easily send down militants from
Dagestan or Chechnya to destabilize the country if needed.
Military: Russia has 5,000 troops stationed inside Armenia and has an agreement
with Yerevan that it can move the troops to the borders as it pleases. Russia also
has a military radar base in Gabala, Azerbaijan, but this is in the process of being
shut down.
Economic: Azerbaijan is in the process of reviving its energy ties to Russia with
deals for natural gas purchases to start this year. Russia has also offered to
purchase all of Azerbaijan's natural gas. Baku has attempted to diversify where it
sends its energy, with links to Europe, Iran and now Russia. But as Russia has
proven, it is willing to cut some of these links for its own needs.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia has been quite successful in the past year in re-establishing its influence over
Azerbaijan. Though it traditionally has sought to balance itself among the region's three
powers, Azerbaijan is now reconsidering its relationship with Turkey and becoming more
worried about keeping ties with Iran due to Western pressure. This is beginning to leave
Russia as Baku's only option, and Moscow knows it. Furthermore, as the political dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia heated up due to a proposed political deal between
Armenia and Azerbaijan's traditional ally Turkey, Baku felt abandoned by Ankara, and
Russia stepped in to console Azerbaijan. Russia has skillfully played each party in this
disagreement -- Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey -- off each other, and gained leverage
to use on each one.
Azerbaijan is still very wary of Russian control, but understands it must deal carefully
with Moscow. Unfortunately for Baku, besides other powers' interest in the country and
its geographic location, Azerbaijan has few tools at its disposal to counter Russian
pressure.

Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan acts as a buffer for Russia between the critical state of Kazakhstan and
the regional power of Iran. It also stands between the former Soviet sphere and the
highly unstable South Asian countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Turkmenistan is
strategically important to Russia for two other reasons: energy and Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan holds the world's fourth-largest natural gas supplies and sizable oil
supplies --something sought by the West, the Far East and the Middle East. Russia
wants to ensure that these supplies only go where it wants and do not become
competition for Russia's supplies.
Turkmenistan also flanks most of the southern portion of Uzbekistan, Central Asia's
natural leader and a country Russia wants to control. Russia has been able to use the
long-standing tensions between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to its advantage.
Russia's Levers
Turkmenistan's sparse population and economy makes it difficult to influence, but Russia
has some very specific levers in the country.
Geography and population: Turkmenistan does not border Russia, but its
geography and lack of consolidation give Russia easy access. Turkmenistan
lacks any geographic protective features, except for its size and the large desert
that crosses most of the country. Furthermore, its population is split between the
Caspian coast and its border with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Russia holds
influence over the population in the southeast mainly because the clan that runs
that area allegedly is involved in the drug trade, and Russia is said to oversee
exports from Turkmenistan through Russia and on to Europe.
Political and security: As mentioned above, Russia holds great political leverage
over the southern Turkmen population because of its control over this area's main
economic staple: drugs. This population, led by the Mary Clan, does not run the
country politically but could easily challenge the government if it wanted, since it
comprises a large percentage of the population. Russia has yet to play this card,
but it would not be difficult to do so.
Military: Russian military influence in Turkmenistan has increased. The country
cannot defend itself, especially from its neighbor Uzbekistan, so Russia has
supplied the Turkmen military and security forces with arms and training. Russia
has placed a small contingent of troops inside Turkmenistan as well in order to
deter Uzbekistan.
Economic: Fifty percent of Turkmenistan's gross domestic product comes from
energy, with 90 percent of Turkmen energy supplies transiting Russia. Moscow
has proven in the past that it is willing to cut these energy supply routes if

politically necessary and knows that doing so would crush Turkmenistan

economically.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia has been able to keep Turkmenistan under its thumb via energy and security.
The country understands that it is beholden to Russia for the bulk of its economy and for
protection from Uzbekistan. However, part of this equation is changing, since
Turkmenistan has expanded its energy infrastructure into China -- a major energy
consumer. These links depend on the transit of supplies via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
but are the start of a diversification of energy shipments and funding for Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is the heart of Central Asia, holding a large bulk of its population and many of
its resources. Uzbekistan's population, 27 million, dwarfs that of its neighbors. It holds
the world's 11th-largest natural gas reserves and is Central Asia's major electricity
exporter. Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in food as well, controlling the fertile Fergana
Valley. Its size, resources and location grant Uzbekistan a greater degree of
independence than the other Central Asian states.
This independence is something Russia wants to curb. Russia is not so concerned with
other powers influencing Uzbekistan -- though the West, China, Turkey and Iran have
tried. Instead Moscow is worried about Uzbekistan becoming a regional leader in its own
right, commanding the other Central Asian states. Such a move would shift the whole of
Central Asia away from Russian control. Losing Uzbekistan would mean losing half of
Kazakhstan (including the critical southern region around Almaty), Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan and half of Kyrgyzstan. These areas would end up isolated from Russia.
Russia's Levers
Geographic: Uzbekistan is surrounded by former Soviet states. It has no borders
with the non-Soviet world, save a very small border with Afghanistan. As long as
Russia controls the other states it can influence Uzbekistan to some extent.
Security: Uzbekistan has faced a great number of security concerns, from its own
militant movements in the Fergana Valley to the insurgency in Afghanistan
crossing the border. Russia has placed its troops in neighboring countries to
counter these militants and can help mold their movements. Moscow also has
deep connections with many militant movements in Afghanistan left over from the
war in the 1980s.
Economic: Roughly 21 percent of all Uzbek exports -- mainly energy, cotton and
cars -- go to Russia. Natural gas accounts for nearly 32 percent of Uzbekistan's

exports, and 75 percent of that goes to Russia. Uzbekistan may be self-sufficient

in energy and food, but all refined energy products (like lubricants) and most
processed foods come from Russia. Russia also controls much of the drug flow
out of Central Asia and Afghanistan into Russia and Europe. This drug flow is key
to the Uzbek economy and many of the power circles in the country.
Military: Russia currently has troops near the Uzbek border in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan and has trained Turkmen troops that are stationed on the TurkmenUzbek border.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia was briefly successful in pulling Uzbekistan back into the Russian fold in 2005,
pushing Tashkent to evict the United States from a military base it was using to get
supplies to troops in Afghanistan.
But as Tashkent has seen its neighbors and other former Soviet states grow closer to
Russia, it has moved in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan's reaction to the Russian
resurgence has been to become increasingly independent and hostile toward Russia.
Tashkent feels it should be the natural and independent leader of Central Asia and does
not want Russia ruling the region. Uzbekistan has continued to buck Russia's demands
on energy supplies and military locations, and has joined the trend of building pipelines
heading to China. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan is Moscow's biggest and most important
challenge.
Read more: Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables | Stratfor

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING
INFLUENCE, PART 3: THE EXTRAS
Analysis
March 11, 2010 | 1632 Print Text Size

Stratfor
Editor's note: This is part three of a four-part series that examines Russia's efforts to
exert influence beyond its borders.

Summary
Of the countries in Russia's periphery, there are four which Moscow considers important
but not critical to Russia's security: Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These
countries each have value to Moscow but are seen as vulnerable and easy to control.
Thus, Russia is keeping them at the bottom of its list of priorities, for now.

Analysis
As Moscow surveys its periphery -- essentially the territory it once controlled as the
Soviet Union -- it places countries in one of three categories: countries it has to control,
countries that are not essential but that it wants to control and countries that are valuable
but are not in Moscow's sights because they are easy to control. Moldova, Armenia,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are all in the third category.
These countries are not politically or economically essential for the survival of the
Russian state. Aside from Moldova, these states also are not geographically critical; they
are important, but Russia has survived without them in the past. Furthermore, because
of their inherent weaknesses, Moscow feels that control over them would be easy to
maintain. In fact, they are -- to varying degrees -- already under Russia's control, through
very little exertion on Moscow's part.
Moldova

Moldova is geographically a key state. It sits above the Bessarabian gap, the lowland
between the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea that serves as one of two
overland routes connecting Eastern and Western Europe (the vast North European Plain
being the other). Because of the strategic advantage of the Bessarabian gap, the
territory known as Moldova historically has been the object of disputes between the
Ottoman and Russian empires. Moldova currently serves as an anchor in the
Carpathians that allows Russia to control access between the Balkans and its sphere of
influence. Important energy infrastructure traverses the Bessarabian gap between
Ukraine and Romania and on to Turkey, simply because sending energy supplies
through the Carpathians (or under the Black Sea) is too difficult. Moldova also lies on
Ukraine's western border, abutting the most pro-Western part of Ukraine. Whoever
controls Moldova controls the western approaches to Odessa and on to Crimea, where
Russia houses its Black Sea Fleet.
Regardless of its geographic importance, economically and politically Moldova is an
afterthought. It is the poorest country in Europe and is in political disarray. Even after the
April 2009 elections that seemed to bring a pro-Western government to power, the
country still has not emerged from its political crisis. Moldova could see another general
election in the fall, but there is no guarantee that the pro-Western parties will consolidate
their hold on power in the polls.
Furthermore, Russia has firm control of Moldova's breakaway province of Transdniestria.
This is sufficient for Moscow, since it really only needs a foothold in Moldova, not
necessarily control of the whole country (and the costs that would accompany such
control). Situated on the eastern bank of the Dniestr River, Transdniestria serves as a
foothold for Russia in the Carpathians, gives Moscow a presence in the Bessarabian
gap, and borders Ukraine, which is far more important to Russia than Moldova.
Russia's Levers
Geography and politics: With Ukraine re-entering Moscow's fold, Moldova is
again directly on the border of Russia's sphere of influence. Despite changes in
government in Chisinau and the collapse of the Communist Party's rule,
Transdniestria is still firmly beholden to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Communist
Party of Moldova -- although not currently in government -- is still the largest
single party in the country and still has substantial popular support. It is also not
clear that the four pro-Western parties in power will be able to sustain their
coalition.

Population: Moldovans have very close ethnic ties with their neighbors the
Romanians, but the breakaway province of Transdniestria has a RussianUkrainian majority.
Energy and economy: Moldova depends entirely on Russia for natural gas
supplies. In fact, natural gas accounted for 47 percent of total imports from
Russia to Moldova and was valued at around $238 million in 2008 -- nearly 4
percent of Moldova's gross domestic product (GDP). Russian control of
Transdniestria on economic matters is total. It holds around two-thirds of the
province's debt and forwarded it a $200 million loan in 2009 and is considering
another in 2010. Russia also offered Moldova a $500 million loan while
Communist leader Vladimir Voronin was ostensibly still in power in Chisinau.
Russia is also a key market for Moldovan goods; some 20 percent of Moldovan
exports go to Russian markets.
Military: Around 350 Russian troops are stationed in Transdniestria, the remnants
of Russia's involvement in the 1992 war between Moldova and the breakaway
province. Transdniestria has also offered to host Russia's Iskander tactical
missiles as a response to the U.S. decision to place a ballistic missile defense
system in Romania.
Intelligence: Russian intelligence agencies like to use Moldova as a gateway into
Europe, especially because of the close links between Moldova and Romania.
Because the pro-Moscow Communist Party had ruled Moldova from 2001 to
2009, it will take the current pro-Western government considerable time to
sufficiently vet Moldova's intelligence services and free them of Russian
influence. Furthermore, Russia uses its military personnel stationed in
Transdniestria for gathering intelligence. Five Russian intelligence officers
stationed as ordinary military personnel in Transdniestria were arrested Feb. 3 in
Odessa, Ukraine, for allegedly conducting operations to acquire Ukrainian military
secrets.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia believes its robust presence in Transdniestria is sufficient to keep Moldova under
control. However, there is a debate in the Kremlin over whether Russia should be more
concerned about Moldova and perhaps consider it crucial to Russian security, in which
case Moscow could consider increasing its efforts in Moldova.
With Ukraine back in Russia's orbit, extending control into Moldova seems natural. But
beyond that, Russia wants to counter Romania's rising influence in Moldova. Moldovans
are extremely similar to Romanians linguistically and culturally. Romania, particularly
under the leadership of President Traian Basescu, has moved aggressively to pull
Moldova into its sphere of influence, going so far as to spur public talk of unification and
to offer Romanian passports to a large number of Moldovans. Russia may be content to
leave Moldova among the countries it is not worried about as long as Chisinau remains

politically chaotic, but it likely would not accept a Moldova wholly dominated by -- or
integrated into -- Romania. Moscow could therefore upgrade Moldova's status, making it
a country of considerable interest, if it feels Bucharest is making too many gains.
Armenia
Armenia's primary importance is in its geography. It is at the center of the south
Caucasus and splits natural allies Turkey and Azerbaijan, preventing Ankara from having
direct access to the energy-rich Caspian Sea region and therefore preventing Europe
from accessing those resources. Armenia also partially seals off Iran's influence from the
Caucasus.
Armenia is thoroughly entrenched in the Russian sphere of influence. This was not
always the case -- technically it only began in the early 2000s -- but enveloping Armenia
was a process that Moscow completed quickly. Today, its economy is propped up by
Moscow and Russia has troops stationed on its soil, both as a deterrent to any potential
hostility with Azerbaijan and as a way to keep an eye on neighboring Iran and Turkey.
The Kremlin is not focused on Armenia at the moment because Yerevan is so beholden
to Moscow that Russia does not need to exert any effort to maintain its foothold in the
country. In short, Armenia is too weak to worry about.
Russia's Levers
Geography: Geographic disadvantages hobble Armenia's economy from the
outset. Armenia is a tiny, landlocked country in the Caucasus Mountains. Even if
Armenia did have access to the sea, it has virtually no natural resources of value.
It does export electricity and gasoline to Iran, due to refining and electricity
generating infrastructure left over from the Soviet era, but even then it depends
on imports of raw materials for those exports. Armenia's border with Turkey is
closed, and its border with Georgia is partially closed. Russia is by far Armenia's
strongest ally in the region.
Politics: Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian is a strong Russian ally. Russia
recently has increased its political influence by encouraging a normalization of
ties between Armenia and Turkey, which has disrupted the fragile relations in the
region. The negotiations between Armenia and Turkey have increased tensions
between Armenia and Azerbaijan by bringing the issue of the disputed breakaway
region of Nagorno-Karabakh into focus. Azerbaijan has started drifting away from
its traditional ally Turkey because it feels abandoned by Ankara on the NagornoKarabakh issue. Thus, the Turkey-Armenia talks have brought both Armenia and
Azerbaijan closer to Russia.

Population: Russians make up a very small percentage of Armenia's population,

but Russia has one of the largest Armenian diasporas in the world, numbering
between 1.5 and 2.5 million. Armenia and Russia share an Orthodox Christian
religion.
Economy: Economy and ethnic levers are interrelated, since Armenia depends so
much on remittances from Armenians abroad (remittances amounted to 18.5
percent of Armenia's GDP in 2006). Russia also essentially owns all of the
strategic energy, rail and telecommunications assets (among many others) in
Armenia. Moscow has consolidated its influence by taking control of any piece of
infrastructure that could help Armenia break away from Russia's grip, including a
natural gas pipeline connecting the country to Iran, Armenia's only other regional
ally.
Military/Security: Russia has more than 5,000 troops stationed in Armenia and
has been discussing deploying even more as part of its Collective Security Treaty
Organization rapid-reaction force. Russia uses Armenia to project power in the
region and to flank pro-Western Georgia. Armenia also has a long-time rivalry
with Azerbaijan, and the two countries fought a bloody war in the early 1990s
over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although Armenia won the war -- and today controls
Nagorno-Karabakh and the region between Armenia and the province -Azerbaijan has since upgraded its military substantially. If Armenia wants to have
any real chance of winning the next military confrontation with Azerbaijan, it
needs a powerful sponsor to sustain it economically and provide it military
support.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Armenia is squarely within Russia's sphere of influence. However, Yerevan has a very
good relationship with Tehran, fostered by its exports of gasoline and electricity as well
as common mistrust -- if not outright hostility -- toward Azerbaijan. Armenia also uses its
diaspora in the West to keep good relations open with countries like France and the
United States, both of which have considered sponsoring Armenia. However, neither
country wants to anger Turkey -- a key NATO ally -- or Azerbaijan, which are seen as
keys to Europe's diversification from Russian energy resources, by becoming Armenia's
patron.
The current negotiations between Turkey and Armenia could throw the region's
dynamics into flux. If Armenia or Azerbaijan reverts to using force to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, Russia and Turkey could find themselves drawn into a
confrontation neither wants.
Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is important for Russia for three reasons. First, it abuts a major regional
power -- China -- thus giving whoever controls Kyrgyzstan a good position from which to
monitor Chinese moves in the region. It also encircles the Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan's
key population and agricultural center. Kyrgyzstan leaves Uzbekistan's core exposed,
because Kyrgyzstan controls the high ground -- a valuable position for pressuring
Uzbekistan. Third, the Kyrgyz capital is situated close to Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan's
borders are an example of creative Soviet mapmaking; geographically, Bishkek is more
part of Kazakhstan than Kyrgyzstan and is only 120 miles from the largest Kazakh city,
Almaty. Bishkek is in fact situated on the northern slopes of the Tian Shan mountain
range, while the rest of the population is mainly situated on the slopes around the
Fergana Valley. Between the two population centers is an almost impenetrable mountain
range.
Furthermore, the Kyrgyz are ethnically and linguistically more closely related to the
Kazakhs than any other Central Asian ethnic group. Thus, a Russian-dominated
Kyrgyzstan can be used as a lever against Kazakhstan if needed. And because of
Kyrgyzstan's poverty and helplessness, Russia does not have to expend much energy to
dominate it.
Russia's levers
Economy: Russia pays a hefty sum -- raised to $2 billion in late 2008 -- to lease
its military installations in Kyrgyzstan. Russia has also pledged to assist
Kyrgyzstan in building hydroelectric power stations because Uzbekistan
frequently cuts natural gas exports and removed its electricity from the joint
Central Asian power grid, on which Kyrgyzstan greatly depends. Large numbers
of Kyrgyz migrants work in Russia, sending home remittances that made up more
than 30 percent of GDP in 2006 (though with the onset of the economic crisis in
Russia, these numbers have dropped).
Population: Russians make up a considerable minority in Kyrgyzstan, at around 9
percent of the total population. It is not as large as Russian minorities in other
reaches of the former Soviet empire, but important enough that Russia can use
its new policy of protecting Russians abroad to pressure Kyrgyzstan in the future,
if needed.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Kyrgyzstan is so dependent on Russia economically that it has no real counterlevers.
However, Bishkek has used the U.S. presence at the Manas air base to extract
monetary benefits from Russia. Moscow has used Kyrgyzstan's close proximity to
Afghanistan as a bargaining chip with the West, while Kyrgyzstan has flip-flopped on

whether to allow the United States to use Manas for its efforts in Afghanistan. Moscow is
miffed about the U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, but understands that the United States is
consumed by the conflict in Afghanistan and will tolerate Russian control of Kyrgyzstan
in return for reliable access to Manas. Russia has made it very clear to all of the Central
Asian countries that they have to go through Russia when they deal with the United
States. Memories of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war help to ensure compliance.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is Iran's traditional foothold in Central Asia. Though the countries are
separated by both Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, Tajiks are ethnic Persians and thus
share linguistic and ethnic bonds with Iran. Geographically, Tajikistan also cuts
Uzbekistan's access into the Fergana Valley. Considering that Uzbekistan is the
powerhouse of Central Asia, Tajikistan's potential to interfere with Uzbekistan's ability to
consolidate its core and the rest of its territory is a significant lever. Finally, much like
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan is home to several Russian military bases and because of its
geography it is also a primary route for drug smuggling from Afghanistan into Russia.
This makes it a key Central Asian state for security considerations.
However, just as with Kyrgyzstan, Moscow has sufficient levers on Tajikistan that it does
not consider it a priority for consolidation right now.
Russia's levers
Geography: Because Tajikistan does not border Russia, it might appear to be in a
good position to avoid pressure from Moscow. However, Tajikistan's proximity to
and enmity with Uzbekistan means that it needs a patron to protect it. Despite
Iran's interest in the country, Russia is the only state with the financial and military
muscle to fit that role.
Politics: Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon has been in power since the Soviet
Union broke up in 1991 and is seen as pro-Russian with virtually no significant
pro-Western leanings. Like other Central Asian presidents, Rakhmon clamps
down on all opposition and is entrenched in power.
Economy: In 2006, prior to the financial crisis, Tajik migrants working mainly in
Russia sent back remittances that made up more than 35 percent of the country's
GDP. These numbers have been dropping since the financial crisis, but
remittances from Russia are still a key contribution to the country's economy.
Russia also supplies billions of dollars each year in both food and monetary aid to
the country and mediates between Tajikistan and its neighbors to get electricity
supplies to the country.

Military and security: Tajikistan is a key route for access to Afghanistan and
provides key air space passage for U.S. flights from Kyrgyzstan. However, when
the United States was forced out of its base in Uzbekistan at Karshi-Khanabad in
2005 and began looking around for new bases in Central Asia, Russia moved in
to prevent the establishment of a U.S. military presence in Tajikistan. Russian
forces were already positioned at facilities in Dushanbe (and a military space
monitoring complex in Nurek). Moscow then immediately moved into bases in
Kurgan-Tyube, Kulyab and Khujand, leaving the United States with rights to the
airspace, but little else.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
In the long term, Tajikistan could turn to Iran for patronage, but Tehran does not want to
be on Russia's bad side because it depends on Moscow's support in its standoff with the
West. Also, it would be difficult for Iran to support Tajikistan because Tehran lacks
Moscow's financial and military reach. Tajikistan is therefore left with very few
counterlevers to Moscow.
Russia meanwhile does not feel that it has to do much to keep Tajikistan in line; like
Kyrgyzstan, it is an impoverished country in which Russia has a military presence, and
its options are severely limited.
Russia feels relatively comfortable about its position in all four of these countries.
Moldova is the only one that elicits debate in the Kremlin, and it could very well start
moving up the list of priorities if the pro-Western forces in Chisinau begin to consolidate
their hold on power or if Bucharest becomes more aggressive. For now, however,
Russia will leave these countries to simmer on the back burner while it prepares to deal
with the main course in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan.

Read more: Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras | Stratfor

RUSSIA'S EXPANDING
INFLUENCE, PART 4: THE MAJOR
PLAYERS
Analysis
March 12, 2010 | 1548

Stratfor
Editor's note: This is part four of a four-part series that examines Russia's efforts to exert
influence beyond its borders.

Summary
Russia is working to form an understanding with regional powers outside the former
Soviet sphere in order to facilitate its plans to expand its influence in key former Soviet
states. These regional powers -- Germany, France, Turkey and Poland -- could halt
Russia's consolidation of control if they chose to, so Moscow is working to make
neutrality, if not cooperation, worth their while.

Analysis

Today's Russia cannot simply roll tanks over the territories it wants included in its sphere
of influence. Its consolidation of control in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central
Asia would be difficult, if not impossible, if Moscow faced opposition from an array of
forces. Moscow's resurgence in its old Soviet turf is possible because the United States
is distracted with issues in the Islamic world, but also because regional powers
surrounding Russia are not unified in opposition to the Kremlin.
Moscow is working to cultivate an understanding with regional powers outside the former
Soviet Union that are critical to its expansion: Germany, France, Turkey and Poland. If
these countries committed to halting Russia's resurgence, Moscow would be stymied.
This is why Russia is determined to develop an understanding -- if not also a close
cooperative relationship -- with each of these countries that will clearly delineate the
Russian sphere of influence, give each country incentive to cooperate and warn each
country about opposing Moscow openly.
This is not a new policy for Russia. Especially before the Cold War with the West,
Moscow traditionally had a nuanced policy of alliances and understandings. Germany
and Russia have cooperated many times; Russia was one of the German Empire's first
true allies, through the Dreikaiserbund, and was the only country to cooperate with postVersailles Germany with the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Russia was also France's first ally
after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war -- an alliance whose main purpose was to isolate
Germany.
Russia's history with modern Turkey (and its ancestor the Ottoman Empire) and Poland
admittedly has far fewer examples of cooperation. Russia throughout the 19th century
coveted territory held by the crumbling Ottoman Empire -- especially around the Black
Sea and in the Balkans -- and had plans for dominating Poland. Currently, however,
Moscow understands that the two regional powers with most opportunities to subvert its
resurgence are Poland (in Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states) and Turkey (in the
Caucasus).
Germany
Germany is the most important regional power with which Russia wants to create an
understanding. Berlin is the largest European economy, an economic and political leader
within the European Union and a key market for Russian energy exports -- with Russian
natural gas exports filling 47 percent of Germany's natural gas needs. German
opposition to Russian consolidation in Eastern Europe would create problems, especially
since Berlin could rally Central Europeans wary of Moscow to oppose Russia's

resurgence. However, Germany has offered little resistance to Russia's increasing

influence in Eastern Europe. In fact, it has primarily been Germany's opposition to NATO
membership for Ukraine and Georgia that stymied Washington's plans to push NATO's
boundaries further eastward.
If it chose to, Germany could become Russia's greatest roadblock. It is geographically
more of a threat than the United States, due to its position on the North European Plain
and the Baltic Sea, and it is a leader in the European Union and could offer Ukraine and
Belarus substantial political and economic alternatives to their ties to Russia. With this in
mind, Russia has decided to make cooperation worthwhile for Berlin.
Russia's Levers
Russia's obvious lever in Germany is natural gas exports. Germany wants a reliable flow
of energy, and it is not willing to suffer blackouts or freezing temperatures for the sake of
a Western-oriented Ukraine or Georgia. Germany initially fumed in 2005 over Russian
gas cutoffs to Ukraine, but later realized that it was much easier to make an arrangement
with Russia and back off from supporting Ukraine's Western ambitions. Moscow carefully
managed subsequent Russian gas disputes with Ukraine to limit German exposure, and
Berlin has since fully turned against Kiev, which it now sees as an unreliable transit
route.
Germany is expanding its energy relationship with Russia, since the upcoming Nord
Stream pipeline will not only make more natural gas available to German consumers and
industry, it will also make Germany a key transit route for Russian gas. The Nord Stream
pipeline project also suggests that Germany does not just want Russia's gas; it wants to
be Russia's main distributor to Central Europe, which would give Berlin even more
political power over its neighbors.
Russia has also very directly offered Germany a key role in the upcoming privatizations
in Russia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally has invited German
businesses to invest in Russia. Putin also personally intervened in the General Motors
Corp.-Opel dispute in 2009, offering to save Opel and German jobs -- a move designed
to curry favor with German Chancellor Angela Merkel before Germany's September
2009 general elections.
Another prominent example of the budding economic relationship between Berlin and
Moscow is German industrial giant Siemens' decision to end its partnership with French
nuclear giant Areva, to which it felt it would always be a junior partner, and begin
cooperating with Russia's Atomenergoprom. Siemens and Atomenergoprom will work
together to develop nuclear power plants in Russia, Germany and other countries.

France
France and Germany are important partners for Russia because Moscow needs
guarantees that its resurgence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus will not face
opposition from a united EU front. Initiatives such as the Swedish-Polish "Eastern
Partnership" -- which seeks to upgrade relations between the EU states and most former
Soviet Union states -- are seen as a threat to Moscow's sphere of influence. The Kremlin
feels it can keep these Central European initiatives from gaining steam by setting up
informal understandings with Paris and Berlin.
France is a key part of this effort because Russia considers it -- rightfully so -- as the
political leader of the European Union. Moscow therefore wants to secure a mutually
beneficial relationship with Paris.
Russia's Levers
Russia has less leverage over France than over any of the other regional powers
discussed. In fact, Russia and France have few overlapping geopolitical interests.
Historically, they have intersected occasionally in North Africa, Southeast Asia and the
Middle East, but contemporary Moscow is concentrating on its near abroad, not global
dominance. France does not depend on trade with Russia for export revenue and is one
of the few continental European powers not to depend on Russia for energy; 76 percent
of France's energy comes from nuclear power.
This is why Moscow is making every effort to offer Paris the appropriate "sweeteners,"
many of which were agreed upon during Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's visit to
France on March 2. One of the most recent -- and most notable -- is a deal to purchase
the $700 million French Mistral-class helicopter carrier. This would be the Russian
military's first major purchase of non-Russian technology and would give Russia a useful
offensive weapon to put pressure on the Baltic states and the Caucasus (via the Black
Sea). Russia has suggested that it may want to purchase four vessels in total for $2.2
billion -- something that recession-hit Paris would be hard pressed to decline.
Russia has worked hard on getting energy-independent France involved in its energy
projects. French energy behemoth Total owns a quarter of the enormous Barents Sea
Shtokman gas field and on Feb. 5 reiterated its commitment to the project despite
announced delays in production from 2013 to 2016. French energy company EDF is also
negotiating entry into the South Stream natural gas pipeline, while energy company GDF
Suez signed an agreement with Gazprom for a 9 percent stake in Nord Stream on March
2. Furthermore, France's Societe Generale and Renault both have interests in Russia

through ownership of Russian enterprises, and French train manufacturer Alstom has
agreed to invest in Russia's Transmashholding.
Finally, Russia knows how to play to France's -- particularly French President Nicolas
Sarkozy's -- need to be the diplomatic center of attention. Russia gives France and
Sarkozy the respect reserved for Europe's leader, for example by allowing Sarkozy to
negotiate and take credit for the peace deal that ended the Russo-Georgian war in
August 2008. This is no small gesture from Paris' perspective since France is constantly
under pressure to prove its leadership mettle compared to the richer and more powerful
Germany.
Turkey
Turkey is a rising regional power looking to expand its influence mainly along the lines of
the former Ottoman Empire. Like an adolescent testing his or her own strengths and
limitations, Turkey is not focused on any one area, but rather surveying the playing field.
Moscow has allowed Turkey to become focused, however, on the negotiations with
Armenia, presenting itself as a facilitator but in reality managing the negotiations behind
the scenes.
Russia wants to manage its relationship with Turkey for two main reasons: to guarantee
its dominance of the Caucasus and assure that Turkey remains committed to
transporting Russia's -- rather than someone else's -- energy to Europe. Russia also
wants to make sure that Turkey does not use its control of the Bosporus to close off the
Black Sea to Russian trade, particularly oil exports from Novorossiysk.
Russia's Levers
Moscow's main lever with Ankara is energy. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of
its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Russia is also looking to expand its
investments in Turkey, with refineries and nuclear power plants under discussion.
The second key lever is political. Moscow has encouraged Russian-dominated Armenia
to entertain Turkish offers of negotiations. However, this has caused a rift between
Turkey and its traditional ally Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan does not want to see Armenia and
Turkey conclude their negotiations without first winning concessions from Armenia over
the de facto Armenian controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region. The negotiation process -openly encouraged by Moscow -- therefore has forced energy-rich Azerbaijan into
Russia's arms and strained the relationship between Ankara and Baku.
Russia has plenty of other levers on Turkey, trade being the most obvious. Turkey's
exports to Russia are considerable; 5 percent of its total exports in 2008 went to Russia

(though that number dipped in 2009 due to the recession). Russia has cut this trade off
before -- like in August 2008, when Turkey and NATO held maneuvers in the Black Sea - as a warning to Ankara. Russia is also considering selling Turkey its advanced air
defense system, the S-400.
Poland
The final regional power with which Russia wants an understanding is Poland. Poland
may not be as powerful as the other three -- either economically or politically -- but it has
considerable influence in Ukraine and Belarus and has taken it upon itself to champion
expansion of the European Union eastward. Furthermore, the U.S. military could
eventually use Poland as a base from which to threaten the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad along with Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic Sea. Moscow thus sees the U.S.
plan to position a Patriot air defense battery -- or any part of the BMD system -- in
Poland as a key threat.
Russia does not want to see the U.S.-Polish alliance blossom, allowing the United States
-- once it extricates itself from the Middle East -- to reposition itself on Russia's borders.
Russia's Levers
The most obvious lever Russia has in Poland is energy. Poland imports around 57
percent of its natural gas from Russia, a number that is set to rise to more than 70
percent with the new Polish-Russian natural gas deal signed in January. Poland is also
planning on switching a considerable part of its electricity production from coal to natural
gas -- in order to meet EU greenhouse gas emission standards -- thus making Russian
natural gas imports a key source of energy. Poland also imports more than 90 percent of
its oil from Russia.
Poland, as a NATO member state, is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, as
Polish politicians often point out, NATO has offered very few real guarantees to Poland's
security. Russia maintains a considerable military presence in nearby Kaliningrad, with
more than 200 aircraft, 23,000 troops and half of Russia's Baltic fleet stationed between
Poland and Lithuania. Russia has often used military exercises -- such as the massive
Zapad military maneuvers with Belarus in September 2009 -- to put pressure on Poland
and the Baltic states.
But despite a tense relationship, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has launched
something of a charm offensive on Warsaw, and particularly on Polish Prime Minister
Donald Tusk, who is seen as much more pragmatic than the anti-Russian President
Lech Kaczynski. Putin made a highly symbolic gesture by being present at the

September 2009 ceremonies in Gdansk marking the 70th anniversary of the German
invasion of Poland. He also addressed the Polish people in a letter published by Polish
daily Gazeta Wyborcza in which he condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, a
nonaggression treaty between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Putin has also made
a point to smooth relations between Poland and Russia on the issue of the Katyn
massacre of Polish officers by Soviet troops in World War II, inviting Tusk to attend the
first ever Russian-organized ceremonies marking the event.
The charm offensive is intended to outmaneuver the knee-jerk anti-Russians among the
Polish elites and to make sure that Poland does not create problems for Russia in its
efforts to expand influence in its near abroad. It is similar to the charm offensives the
Soviet Union used that intended to illustrate to the European left and center-left that the
Kremlin's intentions were benign and that the right-wing "obsessions" about the Kremlin
were irrational.
Ultimately, Moscow's strategy is to assure that Germany, France, Turkey and Poland
stay out of -- or actively support -- Russia's consolidation efforts in the former Soviet
sphere. Russia does not need the four powers to be its allies -- although it certainly is
moving in that direction with Germany (and possibly France). Rather, it hopes to reach
an understanding with them on where the Russian sphere ends, and establish a border
that is compatible with Russian interests.
Read more: Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 4: The Major Players | Stratfor

THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA:

PERMANENT STRUGGLE
Analysis
April 15, 2012 | 0847 Print Text Size

Analysis
Editor's Note: This is the fourth in a series of monographs on the geopolitics of
countries influential in world affairs. This was originally published in October 2008.
Russia's defining characteristic is its indefensibility. Unlike the core of most states that
are relatively defensible, core Russia is limited to the region of the medieval Grand
Principality of Muscovy. It counts no rivers, oceans, swamps or mountains marking its
borders -- it relies solely on the relatively inhospitable climate and its forests for defense.
Russian history is a chronicle of the agony of surviving invasion after invasion.

raditionally these invasions have come from two directions. The first is from the steppes - wide open grasslands that connect Russia to Central Asia and beyond -- the path that
the Mongols used. The second is from the North European Plain, which brought to
Russia everything from the Teutonic Knights to the Nazi war machine.
To deal with these vulnerabilities, Russia expanded in three phases. In the first, Russia
expanded not toward the invasion corridors to establish buffers but away from them to

establish a redoubt. In the late 15th century, under Ivan III, Russia did creep westward
somewhat, anchoring itself at the Pripet Marshes, which separated Russia from the Kiev
region. But the bulk of Russia's expansion during that period was north to the Arctic and
northeast to the Urals. Very little of this territory can be categorized as useful -- most was
taiga or actual tundra and only lightly populated -- but for Russia it was the only land
easily up for grabs. It also marked a natural organic outgrowth of the original Muscovy -all cloaked in forest. It was as defensible a territory as Russia had access to and their
only hope against the Mongols.

The Mongols were horsemen who dominated the grasslands with their fast-moving
cavalry forces. Their power, although substantial, diminished when they entered the
forests and the value of their horses, their force multipliers, declined. The Mongols had
to fight infantry forces in the forests, where the advantage was on the defender's side.
The second phase of expansion was far more aggressive -- and risky. In the mid-16th
century, Under Ivan IV, Russia finally moved to seal off the Mongol invasion route.

Russia pushed south and east, deep into the steppes, and did not stop until it hit the
Urals in the east and the Caspian Sea and Caucasus Mountains in the south. As part of
this expansion, Russia captured several strategically critical locations, including
Astrakhan on the Caspian, the land of the Tatars -- a longtime horse-mounted foe -- and
Grozny, which was soon transformed into a military outpost at the foot of the Caucasus.
Also with this expansion, Ivan IV was transformed from Grand Prince of Moscow to Tsar
of All Russia, suggesting the empire to come. Russia had finally achieved a measure of
conventional security. Holding the northern slopes of the Caucasus would provide a
reasonable defense from Asia Minor and Persia, while the millions of square kilometers
of steppes gave birth to another defensive strategy: buffers.
Russia -- modern, medieval or otherwise -- cannot count on natural features to protect it.
The Pripet Marshes were small and could in many cases simply be avoided. There is no
one who might wish to attack from the Arctic. Forests slowed the Mongol horsemen, but
as Muscovy's predecessor -- Kievan Rus -- aptly demonstrated, the operative word was
slowed, not stopped. The Mongols conquered and destroyed Kievan Rus in the 13th
century.
That leaves buffers. So long as a country controls territory separating itself from its foes - even if it is territory that is easy for a hostile military to transit -- it can bleed out any
invasion via attrition and attacks on supply lines. Such buffers, however, contain a
poison pill. They have populations not necessarily willing to serve as buffers. Maintaining
control of such buffers requires not only a sizable standing military for defense but also a
huge internal security and intelligence network to enforce central control. And any
institution so key to the state's survival must be very tightly controlled as well.
Establishing and maintaining buffers not only makes Russia seem aggressive to its
neighbors but also forces it to conduct purges and terrors against its own institutions in
order to maintain the empire.
The third expansion phase dealt with the final invasion route: from the west. In the 18th
century, under Peter and Catherine the Great, Russian power pushed westward,
conquering Ukraine to the southwest and pushing on to the Carpathian Mountains. It
also moved the Russian border to the west, incorporating the Baltic territories and
securing a Russian flank on the Baltic Sea. Muscovy and the Tsardom of Russia were
now known as the Russian Empire.
Yet aside from the anchor in the Carpathians, Russia did not achieve any truly
defensible borders. Expansions to the Baltic and Black Seas did end the external threat
from the Cossacks and Balts of ages past, but at the price of turning those external

threats into internal ones. Russia also expanded so far and fast that holding the empire
together socially and militarily became a monumental and ongoing challenge (today
Russia is dealing with the fact that Russians are barely a majority in their own country).
All this to achieve some semblance of security by establishing buffer regions.
But that is an issue of empire management. Ultimately the multi-directional threat defined
Muscovy's geopolitical problem. There was a constant threat from the steppes, but there
was also a constant threat from the west, where the North European Plain allowed for
few natural defenses and larger populations could deploy substantial infantry (and could,
as the Swedes did, use naval power to land forces against the Muscovites). The forests
provided a degree of protection, as did the sheer size of Russia's holdings and its
climate, but in the end the Russians faced threats from at least two directions. In
managing these threats by establishing buffers, they were caught in a perpetual juggling
act: east vs. west, internal vs. external.
The geography of the Russian Empire bequeathed it certain characteristics. Most
important, the empire was (and remains) lightly settled. Even today, vast areas of Russia
are unpopulated while in the rest of the country the population is widely distributed in
small towns and cities and far less concentrated in large urban areas. Russia's
European part is the most densely populated, but in its expansion Russia both resettled
Russian ethnics and assimilated large minorities along the way. So while Moscow and its
surroundings are certainly critical, the predominance of the old Muscovy is not decisively
ironclad.

The result is a constant, ingrained clash within the Russian Empire no matter the time
frame, driven primarily by its size and the challenges of transport. The Russian empire,
even excluding Siberia, is an enormous landmass located far to the north. Moscow is at
the same latitude as Newfoundland while the Russian and Ukrainian breadbaskets are at
the latitude of Maine, resulting in an extremely short growing season. Apart from limiting
the size of the crop, the climate limits the efficiency of transport -- getting the crop from
farm to distant markets is a difficult matter and so is supporting large urban populations
far from the farms. This is the root problem of the Russian economy. Russia can grow
enough to feed itself, but it cannot efficiently transport what it grows from the farms to the
cities and to the barren reaches of the empire before the food spoils. And even when it
can transport it, the costs of transport make the foodstuffs unaffordable.

Population distribution also creates a political problem. One natural result of the
transport problem is that the population tends to distribute itself nearer growing areas
and in smaller towns so as not to tax the transport system. Yet these populations in
Russia's west and south tend to be conquered peoples. So the conquered peoples tend
to distribute themselves to reflect economic rationalities, while need for food to be
transported to the Russian core goes against such rationalities.
Faced with a choice of accepting urban starvation or the forcing of economic destitution
upon the food-producing regions (by ordering the sale of food in urban centers at prices
well below market prices), Russian leaders tend to select the latter option. Joseph Stalin
certainly did in his efforts to forge and support an urban, industrialized population. Forcefeeding such economic hardship to conquered minorities only doubled the need for a
tightly controlled security apparatus.
The Russian geography meant that Russia either would have a centralized government - and economic system -- or it would fly apart, torn by nationalist movements, peasant
uprisings and urban starvation. Urbanization, much less industrialization, would have
been impossible without a strong center. Indeed, the Russian Empire or Soviet Union
would have been impossible. The natural tendency of the empire and Russia itself is to
disintegrate. Therefore, to remain united it had to have a centralized bureaucracy
responsive to autocratic rule in the capital and a vast security apparatus that compelled
the country and empire to remain united. Russia's history is one of controlling the
inherently powerful centrifugal forces tearing at the country's fabric.
Russia, then, has two core geopolitical problems. The first is holding the empire
together. But the creation of that empire poses the second problem, maintaining internal
security. It must hold together the empire and defend it at the same time, and the
achievement of one goal tends to undermine efforts to achieve the other.

Geopolitical Imperatives
To secure the Russian core of Muscovy, Russia must:

Expand north and east to secure a redoubt in climatically hostile territory that is
protected in part by the Urals. This way, even in the worst-case scenario (i.e.,
Moscow falls), there is still a Russia from which to potentially resurge.
Expand south to the Caucasus and southeast into the steppes in order to hamper
invasions of Asian origin. As circumstances allow, push as deeply into Central
Asia and Siberia as possible to deepen this bulwark.

Expand as far west as possible. Do not stop in the southwest until the
Carpathians are reached. On the North European Plain do not stop ever. Deeper
penetration increases security not just in terms of buffers; the North European
Plain narrows the further west one travels making its defense easier.
Manage the empire with terror. Since the vast majority of Russian territory is not
actually Russian, a very firm hand is required to prevent myriad minorities from
asserting regional control or aligning with hostile forces.
Expand to warm water ports that have open-ocean access so that the empire can
begin to counter the economic problems that a purely land empire suffers.

Given the geography of the Russian heartland, we can see why the Russians would
attempt to expand as they did. Vulnerable to attack on the North European Plain and
from the Central Asian and European steppes simultaneously, Russia could not
withstand an attack from one direction -- much less two. Apart from the military problem,
the ability of the state to retain control of the country under such pressure was dubious,
as was the ability to feed the country under normal circumstances -- much less during
war. Securing the Caucasus, Central Asia and Siberia was the first -- and easiest -- part
of dealing with this geographic imbroglio.
The western expansion was not nearly so "simple." No matter how far west the Russians
moved on the European plain, there was no point at which they could effectively anchor
themselves. Ultimately, the last effective line of defense is the 400 mile gap (aka Poland)
between the Baltic Sea and Carpathian Mountains. Beyond that the plains widen to such
a degree that a conventional defense is impossible as there is simply too much open
territory to defend. So the Soviet Union pressed on all the way to the Elbe.
At its height, the Soviet Union achieved all but its final imperative of securing ocean
access. The USSR was anchored on the Carpathians, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and
the Urals, all of which protected its southern and southwestern flanks. Siberia protected
its eastern frontier with vast emptiness. Further to the south, Russia was anchored
deeply in Central Asia. The Russians had defensible frontiers everywhere except the
North European Plain, ergo the need to occupy Germany and Poland.

Strategy of the Russian Empire

The modern Russian empire faces three separate border regions: Asian Siberia, Central
Asia and the Caucasus (now mostly independent states), and Western Europe.
First, Siberia. There is only one rail line connecting Siberia to the rest of the empire, and
positioning a military force there is difficult if not impossible. In fact, risk in Russia's far

east is illusory. The Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) runs east-west, with the Baikal Amur
Mainline forming a loop. The TSR is Russia's main lifeline to Siberia and is, to some
extent, vulnerable. But an attack against Siberia is difficult -- there is not much to attack
but the weather, while the terrain and sheer size of the region make holding it not only
difficult but of questionable relevance. Besides, an attack beyond it is impossible
because of the Urals.
East of Kazakhstan, the Russian frontier is mountainous to hilly, and there are almost no
north-south roads running deep into Russia; those that do exist can be easily defended,
and even then they dead-end in lightly populated regions. The period without mud or
snow lasts less than three months out of the year. After that time, overland resupply of
an army is impossible. It is impossible for an Asian power to attack Siberia. That is the
prime reason the Japanese chose to attack the United States rather than the Soviet
Union in 1941. The only way to attack Russia in this region is by sea, as the Japanese
did in 1905. It might then be possible to achieve a lodgment in the maritime provinces
(such as Primorsky Krai or Vladivostok). But exploiting the resources of deep Siberia,
given the requisite infrastructure costs, is prohibitive to the point of being virtually
impossible.
We begin with Siberia in order to dispose of it as a major strategic concern. The defense
of the Russian Empire involves a different set of issues.

Second, Central Asia. The mature Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were anchored
on a series of linked mountain ranges, deserts and bodies of water in this region that
gave it a superb defensive position. Beginning on the northwestern Mongolian border
and moving southwest on a line through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the empire was
guarded by a north extension of the Himalayas, the Tien Shan Mountains. Swinging west
along the Afghan and Iranian borders to the Caspian Sea, the empire occupied the
lowlands along a mountainous border. But the lowlands, except for a small region on the
frontier with Afghanistan, were harsh desert, impassable for large military forces. A
section along the Afghan border was more permeable, leading to a long-term Russian
unease with the threat in Afghanistan -- foreign or indigenous. The Caspian Sea
protected the border with Iran, and on its western shore the Caucasus Mountains began,
which the empire shared with Iran and Turkey but which were hard to pass through in
either direction. The Caucasus terminated on the Black Sea, totally protecting the
empire's southern border. These regions were of far greater utility to Russia than Siberia

and so may have been worth taking, but for once geography actually helped Russia
instead of working against it.
Finally, there is the western frontier that ran from west of Odessa north to the Baltic. This
European frontier was the vulnerable point. Geographically, the southern portion of the
border varied from time to time, and where the border was drawn was critical. The
Carpathians form an arc from Romania through western Ukraine into Slovakia. Russia
controlled the center of the arc in Ukraine. However, its frontier did not extend as far as
the Carpathians in Romania, where a plain separated Russia from the mountains. This
region is called Moldova or Bessarabia, and when the region belongs to Romania, it
represents a threat to Russian national security. When it is in Russian hands, it allows
the Russians to anchor on the Carpathians. And when it is independent, as it is today in
the form of the state of Moldova, then it can serve either as a buffer or a flash point.
During the alliance with the Germans in 1939-1941, the Russians seized this region as
they did again after World War II. But there is always a danger of an attack out of
Romania.
This is not Russia's greatest danger point. That occurs further north, between the
northern edge of the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea. This gap, at its narrowest point, is
just under 300 miles, running west of Warsaw from the city of Elblag in northern Poland
to Cracow in the south. This is the narrowest point in the North European Plain and
roughly the location of the Russian imperial border prior to World War I. Behind this
point, the Russians controlled eastern Poland and the three Baltic countries.
The danger to Russia is that the north German plain expands like a triangle east of this
point. As the triangle widens, Russian forces get stretched thinner and thinner. So a
force attacking from the west through the plain faces an expanding geography that thins
out Russian forces. If invaders concentrate their forces, the attackers can break through
to Moscow. That is the traditional Russian fear: Lacking natural barriers, the farther east
the Russians move the broader the front and the greater the advantage for the attacker.
The Russians faced three attackers along this axis following the formation of empire -Napoleon, Wilhelm II and Hitler. Wilhelm was focused on France so he did not drive hard
into Russia, but Napoleon and Hitler did, both almost toppling Moscow in the process.
Along the North European Plain, Russia has three strategic options:
1. Use Russia's geographical depth and climate to suck in an enemy force
and then defeat it, as it did with Napoleon and Hitler. After the fact this
appears the solution, except it is always a close run and the attackers
devastate the countryside. It is interesting to speculate what would have

happened in 1942 if Hitler had resumed his drive on the North European
Plain toward Moscow, rather than shift to a southern attack toward
Stalingrad.
2. Face an attacking force with large, immobile infantry forces at the frontier
and bleed them to death, as they tried to do in 1914. On the surface this
appears to be an attractive choice because of Russia's greater manpower
reserves than those of its European enemies. In practice, however, it is a
dangerous choice because of the volatile social conditions of the empire,
where the weakening of the security apparatus could cause the collapse of
the regime in a soldiers' revolt as happened in 1917.
3. Push the Russian/Soviet border as far west as possible to create yet
another buffer against attack, as the Soviets did during the Cold War. This
is obviously an attractive choice, since it creates strategic depth and
increases economic opportunities. But it also diffuses Russian resources
by extending security states into Central Europe and massively increasing
defense costs, which ultimately broke the Soviet Union in 1992.

Contemporary Russia
The greatest extension of the Russian Empire occurred under the Soviets from 1945 to
1989. Paradoxically, this expansion preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
contraction of Russia to its current borders. When we look at the Russian Federation
today, it is important to understand that it has essentially retreated to the borders the
Russian Empire had in the 17th century. It holds old Muscovy plus the Tatar lands to the
southeast as well as Siberia. It has lost its western buffers in Ukraine and the Baltics and
its strong foothold in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.
To understand this spectacular expansion and contraction, we need to focus on Soviet
strategy. The Soviet Union was a landlocked entity dominating the Eurasian heartland
but without free access to the sea. Neither the Baltic nor Black seas allow Russia free
oceangoing transport because they are blocked by the Skagerrak and the Turkish straits,
respectively. So long as Denmark and Turkey remain in NATO, Russia's positions in St.
Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Sevastopol and Novorossiysk are militarily dubious.
There were many causes of the Soviet collapse. Some were:

Overextending forces into Central Europe, which taxed the ability of the Soviet
Union to control the region while economically exploiting it. It became a net loss.
This overextension created costly logistical problems on top of the cost of the

military establishment. Extension of the traditional Russian administrative

structure both diffused Russia's own administrative structure and turned a
profitable empire into a massive economic burden.
Creating an apparent threat to the rest of Europe that compelled the United
States to deploy major forces and arm Germany. This in turn forced the Russians
into a massive military buildup that undermined its economy, which was less
productive than the American economy because of its inherent agricultural
problem and because the cost of internal transport combined with the lack of
ocean access made Soviet (and Russian) maritime trade impossible. Since
maritime trade both is cheaper than land trade and allows access to global
markets, the Soviet Union always operated at an extreme economic
disadvantage to its Western and Asian competitors.
Entering an arms race with much richer countries it could compete against only
by diverting resources from the civilian economy -- material and intellectual. The
best minds went into the military-industrial complex, causing the administrative
and economic structure of Russia to crumble.

In 1989 the Soviet Union lost control of Eastern Europe and in 1992 the Soviet Union
itself collapsed. Russia then retreated essentially to its 17th century borders -- except
that it retained control of Siberia, which is either geopolitically irrelevant or a liability.
Russia has lost all of Central Asia, and its position in the Caucasus has become
tenuous. Had Russia lost Chechnya, its eastern flank would have been driven out of the
Caucasus completely, leaving it without a geopolitical anchor.
The gap between Kazakhstan in the east and Ukraine in the west, like the narrowest
point in the North European Plain, is only 300 miles wide. It also contains Russia's
industrial heartland. Russia has lost Ukraine, of course, and Moldova. But Russia's most
grievous geopolitical contraction has been on the North European Plain, where it has
retreated from the Elbe in Germany to a point less than 100 miles from St. Petersburg.
The distance from the border of an independent Belarus to Moscow is about 250 miles.

To understand the Russian situation, it is essential to understand that Russia has in

many ways returned to the strategic position of late Muscovy. Its flank to the southeast is
relatively secure, since China shows no inclination for adventures into the steppes, and
no other power is in a position to challenge Russia from that direction. But in the west, in
Ukraine and in the Caucasus, the Russian retreat has been stunning.
We need to remember why Muscovy expanded in the first place. Having dealt with the
Mongols, the Russians had two strategic interests. Their most immediate was to secure
their western borders by absorbing Lithuania and anchoring Russia as far west on the
North European Plain as possible. Their second strategic interest was to secure Russia's
southeastern frontier against potential threats from the steppes by absorbing Central
Asia as well as Ukraine. Without that, Muscovy could not withstand a thrust from either
direction, let alone from both directions at once.
It can be said that no one intends to invade Russia. From the Russian point of view,
history is filled with dramatic changes of intention, particularly in the West. The
unthinkable occurs to Russia once or twice a century. In its current configuration, Russia
cannot hope to survive whatever surprises are coming in the 21st century. Muscovy was
offensive because it did not have a good defensive option. The same is true of Russia.
Given the fact that a Western alliance, NATO, is speaking seriously of establishing a
dominant presence in Ukraine and in the Caucasus -- and has already established a
presence in the Baltics, forcing Russia far back into the widening triangle, with its
southern flank potentially exposed to Ukraine as a NATO member -- the Russians must
view their position as dire. As with Napoleon, Wilhelm and Hitler, the initiative is in the
hands of others. For the Russians, the strategic imperative is to eliminate that initiative
or, if that is impossible, anchor Russia as firmly as possible on geographical barriers,
concentrating all available force on the North European Plain without overextension.
Unlike countries such as China, Iran and the United States, Russia has not achieved its
strategic geopolitical imperatives. On the contrary, it has retreated from them:
Russia does hold the northern Caucasus, but it no longer boasts a deep
penetration of the mountains, including Georgia and Armenia. Without those
territories Russia cannot consider this flank secure.
Russia has lost its anchor in the mountains and deserts of Central Asia and so
cannot actively block or disrupt -- or even well monitor -- any developments to its
deep south that could threaten its security.
Russia retains Siberia, but because of the climatic and geographic hostility of the
region it is almost a wash in terms of security (it certainly is economically).

Russia's loss of Ukraine and Moldova allows both the intrusion of other powers
and the potential rise of a Ukrainian rival on its very doorstep. Powers behind the
Carpathians are especially positioned to take advantage of this political
geography.
The Baltic states have re-established their independence, and all three are east
and north of the Baltic-Carpathian line (the final defensive line on the North
European Plain). Their presence in a hostile alliance is unacceptable. Neither is
an independent or even neutral Belarus (also on the wrong side of that line).
Broader goals, such as having a port not blocked by straits controlled by other countries,
could have been pursued by the Soviets. Today such goals are far out of Russian reach.
From the Russian point of view, creating a sphere of influence that would return Russia
to its relatively defensible imperial boundaries is imperative.
Obviously, forces in the peripheral countries as well as great powers outside the region
will resist. For them, a weak and vulnerable Russia is preferable, since a strong and
secure one develops other appetites that could see Russia pushing along vectors such
as through the Skagerrak toward the North Sea, through the Turkish Straits toward the
Mediterranean and through La Perouse Strait toward Japan and beyond.
Russia's essential strategic problem is this: It is geopolitically unstable. The Russian
Empire and Soviet Union were never genuinely secure. One problem was the North
European Plain. But another problem, very real and hard to solve, was access to the
global trading system via oceans. And behind this was Russia's essential economic
weakness due to its size and lack of ability to transport agricultural produce throughout
the country. No matter how much national will it has, Russia's inherently insufficient
infrastructure constantly weakens its internal cohesion.
Russia must dominate the Eurasian heartland. When it does, it must want more. The
more it wants the more it must face its internal economic weakness and social instability,
which cannot support its ambitions. Then the Russian Federation must contract. This
cycle has nothing to do with Russian ideology or character. It has everything to do with
geography, which in turn generates ideologies and shapes character. Russia is Russia
and must face its permanent struggle.
Read more: The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle | Stratfor

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE SIX

PILLARS OF RUSSIAN STRENGTH
Geopolitical Weekly
Tuesday, March 3, 2009 - 09:17 Print Text Size
By Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has been re-establishing much of its lost
Soviet-era strength. This has given rise to the possibility -- and even the probability -that Russia again will become a potent adversary of the Western world. But now, Russia
is yet again on the cusp of a set of massive currency devaluations that could destroy
much of the country's financial system. With a crashing currency, the disappearance of
foreign capital, greatly decreased energy revenues and currency reserves flying out of
the bank, the Western perception is that Russia is on the verge of collapsing once again.
Consequently, many Western countries have started to grow complacent about Russia's
ability to further project power abroad.
But this is Russia. And Russia rarely follows anyone else's rulebook.

The State of the Russian State

Russia has faced a slew of economic problems in the past six months. Incoming foreign
direct investment, which reached a record high of $28 billion in 2007, has reportedly
dried up to just a few billion. Russia's two stock markets, the Russian Trading System
(RTS) and the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), have fallen 78 and 67
percent respectively since their highs in May 2008. And Russians have withdrawn $290
billion from the country's banks in fear of a financial collapse.
One of Moscow's sharpest financial pains came in the form of a slumping Russian ruble,
which has dropped by about one-third against the dollar since August 2008. Thus far, the
Kremlin has spent $200 billion defending its currency, a startling number given that the
currency still dropped by 35 percent. The Russian government has allowed dozens of
mini-devaluations to occur since August; the ruble's fall has pushed the currency past its
lowest point in the 1998 ruble crash.
The Kremlin now faces three options. First, it can continue defending the ruble by
pouring more money into what looks like a black hole. Realistically, this can last only

another six months or so, as Russia's combined reserves of $750 billion in August 2008
have dropped to just less than $400 billion due to various recession-battling measures
(of which currency defense is only one). This option would also limit Russia's future antirecession measures to currency defense alone. In essence, this option relies on merely
hoping the global recession ends before the till runs dry.
The second option would be to abandon any defense of the ruble and just let the
currency crash. This option will not hurt Moscow or its prized industries (like those in the
energy and metals sectors) too much, as the Kremlin, its institutions and most large
Russian companies hold their reserves in dollars and euros. Smaller businesses and the
Russian people would lose everything, however, just as in the August 1998 ruble crash.
This may sound harsh, but the Kremlin has proved repeatedly -- during the Imperial,
Soviet and present eras -- that it is willing to put the survival of the Russian state before
the welfare and survival of the people.
The third option is much like the second. It involves sealing the currency system off
completely from international trade, relegating it only to use in purely domestic
exchanges. But turning to a closed system would make the ruble absolutely worthless
abroad, and probably within Russia as well -- the black market and small businesses
would be forced to follow the government's example and switch to the euro, or more
likely, the U.S. dollar. (Russians tend to trust the dollar more than the euro.)
According to the predominant rumor in Moscow, the Kremlin will opt for combining the
first and second options, allowing a series of small devaluations, but continuing a partial
defense of the currency to avoid a single 1998-style collapse. Such a hybrid approach
would reflect internal politicking.
The lack of angst within the government over the disappearance of the ruble as a symbol
of Russian strength is most intriguing. Instead of discussing how to preserve Russian
financial power, the debate is now over how to let the currency crash. The destruction of
this particular symbol of Russian strength over the past ten years has now become a
given in the Kremlin's thinking, as has the end of the growth and economic strength seen
in recent years.
Washington is interpreting the Russian acceptance of economic failure as a sort of
surrender. It is not difficult to see why. For most states -- powerful or not -- a deep
recession coupled with a currency collapse would indicate an evisceration of the ability
to project power, or even the end of the road. After all, similar economic collapses in
1992 and 1998 heralded periods in which Russian power simply evaporated, allowing
the Americans free rein across the Russian sphere of influence. Russia has been using

its economic strength to revive its influence as of late, so -- as the American thinking
goes -- the destruction of that strength should lead to a new period of Russian
weakness.

Geography and Development

But before one can truly understand the roots of Russian power, the reality and role of
the Russian economy must be examined. From this perspective, the past several years
are most certainly an aberration -- and we are not simply speaking of the post-Soviet
collapse.
All states economies' to a great degree reflect their geographies. In the United States,
the presence of large, interconnected river systems in the central third of the country, the
intracoastal waterway along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, the vastness of San Francisco
Bay, the numerous rivers flowing to the sea from the eastern slopes of the Appalachian
Mountains and the abundance of ideal port locations made the country easy to develop.
The cost of transporting goods was nil, and scarce capital could be dedicated to other
pursuits. The result was a massive economy with an equally massive leg up on any
competition.
Russia's geography is the polar opposite. Hardly any of Russia's rivers are
interconnected. The country has several massive ones -- the Pechora, the Ob, the
Yenisei, the Lena and the Kolyma -- but they drain the nearly unpopulated Siberia to the
Arctic Ocean, making them useless for commerce. The only river that cuts through
Russia's core, the Volga, drains not to the ocean but to the landlocked and sparsely
populated Caspian Sea, the center of a sparsely populated region. Also unlike the United
States, Russia has few useful ports. Kaliningrad is not connected to the main body of
Russia. The Gulf of Finland freezes in winter, isolating St. Petersburg. The only true
deepwater and warm-water ocean ports, Vladivostok and Murmansk, are simply too far
from Russia's core to be useful. So while geography handed the United States the
perfect transport network free of charge, Russia has had to use every available kopek to
link its country together with an expensive road, rail and canal network.
One of the many side effects of this geography situation is that the United States had
extra capital that it could dedicate to finance in a relatively democratic manner, while
Russia's chronic capital deficit prompted it to concentrate what little capital resources it
had into a single set of hands -- Moscow's hands. So while the United States became
the poster child for the free market, Russia (whether the Russian Empire, Soviet Union
or Russian Federation) has always tended toward central planning.

Russian industrialization and militarization began in earnest under Josef Stalin in the
1930s. Under centralized planning, all industry and services were nationalized, while
industrial leaders were given predetermined output quotas.
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference between the Western and Russian development
paths was the different use of finance. At the start of Stalin's massive economic
undertaking, international loans to build the economy were unavailable, both because
the new government had repudiated the czarist regime's international debts and
because industrialized countries -- the potential lenders -- were coping with the onset of
their own economic crisis (e.g., the Great Depression).
With loans and bonds unavailable, Stalin turned to another centrally controlled resource
to "fund" Russian development: labor. Trade unions were converted into mechanisms for
capturing all available labor as well as for increasing worker productivity. Russia
essentially substitutes labor for capital, so it is no surprise that Stalin -- like all Russian
leaders before him -- ran his population into the ground. Stalin called this his "revolution
from above."
Over the long term, the centralized system is highly inefficient, as it does not take the
basic economic drivers of supply and demand into account -- to say nothing of how it
crushes the common worker. But for a country as geographically massive as Russia, it
was (and remains) questionable whether Western finance-driven development is even
feasible, due to the lack of cheap transit options and the massive distances involved.
Development driven by the crushing of the labor pool was probably the best Russia
could hope for, and the same holds true today.
In stark contrast to ages past, for the past five years foreign money has underwritten
Russian development. Russian banks did not depend upon government funding -- which
was accumulated into vast reserves -- but instead tapped foreign lenders and
bondholders. Russian banks took this money and used it to lend to Russian firms.
Meanwhile, as the Russian government asserted control over the country's energy
industries during the last several years, it created a completely separate economy that
only rarely intersected with other aspects of Russian economic life. So when the current
global recession helped lead to the evaporation of foreign credit, the core of the
government/energy economy was broadly unaffected, even as the rest of the Russian
economy ingloriously crashed to earth.
Since Putin's rise, the Kremlin has sought to project an image of a strong, stable and
financially powerful Russia. This vision of strength has been the cornerstone of Russian
confidence for years. Note that STRATFOR is saying "vision," not "reality." For in reality,

Russian financial confidence is solely the result of cash brought in from strong oil and
natural gas prices -- something largely beyond the Russians' ability to manipulate -- not
the result of any restructuring of the Russian system. As such, the revelation that the
emperor has no clothes -- that Russia is still a complete financial mess -- is more a blow
to Moscow's ego than a signal of a fundamental change in the reality of Russian power.

The Reality of Russian Power

So while Russia might be losing its financial security and capabilities, which in the West
tend to boil down to economic wealth, the global recession has not affected the reality of
Russian power much at all. Russia has not, currently or historically, worked off of anyone
else's cash or used economic stability as a foundation for political might or social
stability. Instead, Russia relies on many other tools in its kit. Some of the following six
pillars of Russian power are more powerful and appropriate than ever:
1. Geography: Unlike its main geopolitical rival, the United States, Russia borders
most of the regions it wishes to project power into, and few geographic barriers
separate it from its targets. Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states have zero
geographic insulation from Russia. Central Asia is sheltered by distance, but not
by mountains or rivers. The Caucasus provide a bit of a speed bump to Russia,
but pro-Russian enclaves in Georgia give the Kremlin a secure foothold south of
the mountain range (putting the August Russian-Georgian war in perspective).
Even if U.S. forces were not tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States
would face potentially insurmountable difficulties in countering Russian actions in
Moscow's so-called "Near Abroad." Russia can project all manner of influence
and intimidation there on the cheap, while even symbolic counters are quite
costly for the United States. In contrast, places such as Latin America, Southeast
Asia or Africa do not capture much more than the Russian imagination; the
Kremlin realizes it can do little more there than stir the occasional pot, and
resources are allotted (centrally, of course) accordingly.
2. Politics: It is no secret that the Kremlin uses an iron fist to maintain domestic
control. There are few domestic forces the government cannot control or balance.
The Kremlin understands the revolutions (1917 in particular) and collapses (1991
in particular) of the past, and it has control mechanisms in place to prevent a
repeat. This control is seen in every aspect of Russian life, from one main political
party ruling the country to the lack of diversified media, limits on public
demonstrations and the infiltration of the security services into nearly every
aspect of the Russian system. This domination was fortified under Stalin and has
been re-established under the reign of former President and now-Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin. This political strength is based on neither financial nor economic
foundations. Instead, it is based within the political institutions and parties, on the

lack of a meaningful opposition, and with the backing of the military and security
services. Russia's neighbors, especially in Europe, cannot count on the same
political strength because their systems are simply not set up the same way. The
stability of the Russian government and lack of stability in the former Soviet
states and much of Central Europe have also allowed the Kremlin to reach
beyond Russia and influence its neighbors to the east. Now as before, when
some of its former Soviet subjects -- such as Ukraine -- become destabilized,
Russia sweeps in as a source of stability and authority, regardless of whether this
benefits the recipient of Moscow's attention.
3. Social System: As a consequence of Moscow's political control and the
economic situation, the Russian system is socially crushing, and has had longterm effects on the Russian psyche. As mentioned above, during the Soviet-era
process of industrialization and militarization, workers operated under the direst
of conditions for the good of the state. The Russian state has made it very clear
that the productivity and survival of the state is far more important than the
welfare of the people. This made Russia politically and economically strong, not
in the sense that the people have had a voice, but in that they have not
challenged the state since the beginning of the Soviet period. The Russian
people, regardless of whether they admit it, continue to work to keep the state
intact even when it does not benefit them. When the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, Russia kept operating -- though a bit haphazardly. Russians still went to
work, even if they were not being paid. The same was seen in 1998, when the
country collapsed financially. This is a very different mentality than that found in
the West. Most Russians would not even consider the mass protests seen in
Europe in response to the economic crisis. The Russian government, by contrast,
can count on its people to continue to support the state and keep the country
going with little protest over the conditions. Though there have been a few
sporadic and meager protests in Russia, these protests mainly have been in
opposition to the financial situation, not to the government's hand in it. In some of
these demonstrations, protesters have carried signs reading, "In government we
trust, in the economic system we don't." This means Moscow can count on a
stable population.
4. Natural Resources: Modern Russia enjoys a wealth of natural resources in
everything from food and metals to gold and timber. The markets may take a
roller-coaster ride and the currency may collapse, but the Russian economy has
access to the core necessities of life. Many of these resources serve a double
purpose, for in addition to making Russia independent of the outside world, they
also give Moscow the ability to project power effectively. Russian energy -especially natural gas -- is particularly key: Europe is dependent on Russian
natural gas for a quarter of its demand. This relationship guarantees Russia a
steady supply of now-scarce capital even as it forces the Europeans to take any
Russian concerns seriously. The energy tie is something Russia has very publicly

used as a political weapon, either by raising prices or by cutting off supplies. In a

recession, this lever's effectiveness has only grown.
5. Military: The Russian military is in the midst of a broad modernization and
restructuring, and is reconstituting its basic warfighting capability. While many
challenges remain, Moscow already has imposed a new reality through military
force in Georgia. While Tbilisi was certainly an easy target, the Russian military
looks very different to Kiev -- or even Warsaw and Prague -- than it does to the
Pentagon. And even in this case, Russia has come to rely increasingly heavily on
its nuclear arsenal to rebalance the military equation and ensure its territorial
integrity, and is looking to establish long-term nuclear parity with the Americans.
Like the energy tool, Russia's military has become more useful in times of
economic duress, as potential targets have suffered far more than the Russians.
6. Intelligence: Russia has one of the world's most sophisticated and powerful
intelligence services. Historically, its only rival has been the United States (though
today the Chinese arguably could be seen as rivaling the Americans and
Russians). The KGB (now the FSB) instills fear into hearts around the world, let
alone inside Russia. Infiltration and intimidation kept the Soviet Union and its
sphere under control. No matter the condition of the Russian state, Moscow's
intelligence foundation has been its strongest pillar. The FSB and other Russian
intelligence agencies have infiltrated most former Soviet republics and satellite
states, and they also have infiltrated as far as Latin America and the United
States. Russian intelligence has infiltrated political, security, military and business
realms worldwide, and has boasted of infiltrating many former Soviet satellite
governments, militaries and companies up to the highest level. All facets of the
Russian government have backed this infiltration since Putin (a former KGB man)
came to power and filled the Kremlin with his cohorts. This domestic and
international infiltration has been built up for half a century. It is not something
that requires much cash to maintain, but rather know-how -- and the Russians
wrote the book on the subject. One of the reasons Moscow can run this system
inexpensively relative to what it gets in return is because Russia's intelligence
services have long been human-based, though they do have some highly
advanced technology to wield. Russia also has incorporated other social
networks in its intelligence services, such as organized crime or the Russian
Orthodox Church, creating an intricate system at a low price. Russia's intelligence
services are much larger than most other countries' services and cover most of
the world. But the intelligence apparatus' most intense focus is on the Russian
periphery, rather than on the more expensive "far abroad."
Thus, while Russia's financial sector may be getting torn apart, the state does not really
count on that sector for domestic cohesion or stability, or for projecting power abroad.
Russia knows it lacks a good track record financially, so it depends on -- and has shored
up where it can -- six other pillars to maintain its (self-proclaimed) place as a major

international player. The current financial crisis would crush the last five pillars for any
other state, but in Russia, it has only served to strengthen these bases. Over the past
few years, there was a certain window of opportunity for Russia to resurge while
Washington was preoccupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This window has been
kept open longer by the West's lack of worry over the Russian resurgence given the
financial crisis. But others closer to the Russian border understand that Moscow has
many tools more potent than finance with which to continue reasserting itself.

Read more: The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength | Stratfor

THE COMING ERA OF RUSSIA'S

DARK RIDER
Geopolitical Weekly
Monday, September 24, 2007 - 01:53 Print Text Size

Russian President Vladimir Putin MARTIN BUREAU/AFP/Getty Images

Editor's note: As Vladimir Putin's inauguration May 7 marks the beginning of his
third term as president of Russia, Stratfor looks back at our previous assessments
of Putin's leadership and forecasts of Russia's return to global prominence. In
2000, Stratfor assessed how newly elected President Putin would assert his
power: centralizing control over Russia's regions, clamping down on the militant
Caucasus, purging the Russian oligarchs, controlling the economy and forging
strategic foreign relationships (such as with Germany). In 2005, Stratfor
reassessed Putin's situation after his first presidential term and laid out how his
leadership was in line with the role Russian leaders inevitably play in this stage of
the country's historical cycle. Looking forward, Stratfor sees Putin's leadership
moving Russia into the next stage where Russia solidifies its resurgence into
most of its former sphere of influence.
By Peter Zeihan
Russian opposition members rallied in Moscow's Pushkin Square on April 14. The socalled Dissenters' March was organized by Other Russia, an umbrella group that
includes everyone from unrepentant communists and free-market reformers to far-right
ultranationalists whose only uniting characteristic is their common opposition to the
centralization of power under President Vladimir Putin's administration.
Minutes after the march began, the 2,000 or so protesters found themselves
outnumbered more than four to one by security forces. They quickly dispersed the
activists, beating and briefly detaining those who sought to break through the riot-control
lines. Among those arrested were chess-champion-turned-political-activist Garry
Kasparov and Maria Gaidar, the daughter of Russia's first post-Soviet reformist prime
minister. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov only avoided arrest because his
bodyguards helped him to escape. A Reuters crew was permitted to capture the events
and disseminate them to the West. A day later, another protest, albeit far smaller, was
broken up in a similar way in St. Petersburg, though Kasparov was detained before the
protest even began.
The protests were insignificant in both numerical and political terms, and with all that is
going on in the world right now, the last thing the Putin government needs is to attract
negative attention to itself. But the government's actions are better understood when one
considers Russia's point in its historical cycle and the mounting pressures on Putin
personally that have nothing whatsoever to do with "democracy."

The Russian Cycle

At the risk of sounding like a high school social studies teacher (or even George
Friedman), history really does run in cycles. Take Europe for example. European history
is a chronicle of the rise and fall of its geographic center. As Germany rises, the powers
on its periphery buckle under its strength and are forced to pool resources in order to
beat back Berlin. As Germany falters, the power vacuum at the middle of the Continent
allows the countries on Germany's borders to rise in strength and become major powers
themselves.
Since the formation of the first "Germany" in 800, this cycle has set the tempo and tenor
of European affairs. A strong Germany means consolidation followed by a catastrophic
war; a weak Germany creates a multilateral concert of powers and multistate competition
(often involving war, but not on nearly as large a scale). For Europe this cycle of German
rise and fall has run its course three times -- the Holy Roman Empire, Imperial Germany,
Nazi Germany -- and is only now entering its fourth iteration with the reunified Germany.
Russia's cycle, however, is far less clinical than Europe's. It begins with a national
catastrophe. Sometimes it manifests as a result of disastrous internal planning;
sometimes it follows a foreign invasion. But always it rips up the existing social order and
threatens Russia with chaos and dissolution. The most recent such catastrophe was the
Soviet collapse followed by the 1998 financial crisis. Previous disasters include the
crushing of Russian forces in World War I and the imposition of the Treaty of BrestLitovsk; the "Time of Troubles," whose period of internal warfare and conspiracy-laden
politics are a testament to the Russian predilection for understatement; and near
annihilation under the Mongol occupation.
Out of the horrors of defeat, the Russians search desperately for the second phase of
the cycle -- the arrival of a white rider -- and invariably they find one. The white rider
rarely encapsulates what Westerners conceive of as a savior -- someone who will bring
wealth and freedom. Russian concerns after such calamities are far more basic: they
want stability. But by Russian standards, the white rider is a rather optimistic fellow. He
truly believes that Russia can recover from its time of trial, once a level of order is
restored. So the Russian white rider sets about imposing a sense of consistency and
strength, ending the free fall of Russian life. Putin is the current incarnation of Russia's
white rider, which puts him in the same category as past leaders such as Vladimir Lenin
and, of course, Russia's "Greats": Catherine and Peter.
Contrary to portrayals of him by many in the Western media, Putin is not a hard-nosed
autocrat set upon militarization and war. He is from St. Petersburg, Russia's "window on
the West," and during the Cold War one of his chief responsibilities was snagging bits of

Western technology to send home. He was (and remains) fully cognizant of Russia's
weaknesses and ultimately wanted to see Russia integrated as a full-fledged member of
the Western family of nations.
He also is pragmatic enough to have realized that his ideal for Russia's future and
Russia's actual path are two lines that will not converge. So, since November 2005,
Putin has been training two potential replacements: First Deputy Prime Ministers Dmitri
Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov. At this point, nearly a year before Russia's next
presidential election, determining which one will take over is a matter of pure guesswork.
Also unclear is what role, if any, Putin will grab for himself -- up to and including a
continuation of his presidency.
The question of who takes over in March 2008 is generating much interest and debate
among Kremlinologists. It clearly matters a great deal both politically and economically,
though geopolitically the discussion misses the point. The real takeaway is that Russia's
current white horse period is coming to an end. Putin's efforts to stabilize Russia have
succeeded, but his dreams of Westernizing Russia are dead. The darkness is about to
set in.

The Dark Rider

In the third phase of the Russian cycle, the white rider realizes that the challenges ahead
are more formidable than he first believed and that his (relative) idealism is more a
hindrance than an asset. At this point the white rider gives way to a dark one, someone
not burdened by the white rider's goals and predilections, and willing to do what he feels
must be done regardless of moral implications. The most famous Russian dark rider in
modern times is Josef Stalin, of course, while perhaps the most consuming were the
"Vasilys" of the Vasily Period, which led to the greatest civil war in Russian medieval
history. In particularly gloomy periods in Russia's past (which is saying something) the
white rider himself actually has shed his idealism and become the dark rider. For
example, Ivan the IV began his rule by diligently regenerating Russia's fortunes, before
degenerating into the psychotic madman better known to history as Ivan the Terrible.
Under the rule of the dark rider, Russia descends into an extremely strict period of
internal control and external aggression, which is largely dictated by Russia's geographic
weaknesses. Unlike the United States, with its deep hinterland, extensive coasts and
lengthy and navigable river networks, Russia's expansive barren landscape and lack of
maritime transport options make trade, development and all-around life a constant

struggle. Russia also lacks any meaningful barriers to hide behind, leaving it consistently
vulnerable to outside attack.
Understanding that this geographic reality leaves Russia extremely insecure is critical to
understanding Russia's dark periods. Once the dark rider takes the state's reins, he acts
by any means necessary to achieve Russian security. Internal opposition is ruthlessly
quashed, economic life is fully subjugated to the state's needs and Russia's armies are
built furiously with the intent of securing unsecurable borders. That typically means war:
As Catherine the Great famously put it: "I have no way to defend my borders except to
extend them."
After a period of unification and expansion under the dark rider, Russia inevitably suffers
from overextension. No land power can endlessly expand: the farther its troops are from
core territories, the more expensive they are to maintain and the more vulnerable they
are to counterattack by foreign forces. Similarly, the more non-Russians who are brought
under the aegis of the Russian state, the less able the state is to impose its will on its
population -- at least without Stalin-style brute force. This overextension just as inevitably
leads to stagnation as the post-dark rider leadership attempts to come to grips with
Russia's new reality, but lacks the resources to do so. Attempts at reform transform
stagnation into decline. Stalin gives way to a miscalculating Nikita Khrushchev, a barely
conscious Leonid Brezhnev, an outmatched Mikhail Gorbachev and a very drunk Boris
Yeltsin. A new disaster eventually manifests and the cycle begins anew.

Why the Crackdown?

The April 14-15 protests occurred at an inflection point between the second and third
parts of the cycle -- as the white rider is giving way to a dark rider. Past Russian protests
that involved 2,500 total people at most would have been allowed simply because they
did not matter. The Putin government has a majority in the rubber-stamp Duma sufficient
to pass any law or constitutional change in a short afternoon of parliamentary fury. All
meaningful political parties have been disbanded, criminalized or marginalized; the
political system is fully under Kremlin control. The Kasparov/Kasyanov protests did not
threaten Putin in any meaningful way -- yet in both Moscow and St. Petersburg a few
dozen people were blocked, beaten and hauled off to court.
This development was no accident. Roughly 9,000 riot police do not spontaneously
materialize anywhere, and certainly not as the result of an overenthusiastic or less-thansober local commander. A crackdown in one city could be a misunderstanding; a
crackdown in two is state policy. And one does not send hundreds of batons swinging

while allowing Reuters to keep filming unless the objective is to allow the world to see.
Putin chose to make these protests an issue.
Putin, then, is considering various groups and rationalizing his actions in the context of
Russia's historical cycle:
The West: Putin certainly does not want any Western capital to think he will take
exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky's recent threats of forcible revolution lying down.
Berezovsky says violence is a possibility -- a probability even -- in the future of
regime change in Russia? Fine. Putin can and did quite easily demonstrate that,
when it comes to the application of force in internal politics, the Russian
government remains without peer.
The people: Putin knows that governance is not so much about ruling as it is
about managing expectations. Russians crave stability, and Putin's ability to grant
that stability has earned him significant gravitas throughout Russia as well as a
grudging respect from even his most stalwart foes. He is portraying groups such
as the Other Russia as troublemakers and disturbers of the peace. Such
explanations make quite attractive packaging to the average Russian.
The opposition: It is one thing to oppose a wildly powerful and popular
government. It is another thing when that government beats you while the people
nod approvingly and the international community barely murmurs its protest.
Putin has driven home the message that the opposition is not just isolated and
out of touch, but that it is abandoned.
The Kremlin: Just because Putin is disappointed that his dreams are
unattainable does not mean he wants to be tossed out the proverbial air lock.
Showing any weakness during a transition period in Russian culture is
tantamount to surrender -- particularly when Russia's siloviki (nationalists) are
always seeking to rise to the top of the heap. Putin knows he has to be firm if he
is to play any role in shaping Russia during and after the transition. After all,
should Medvedev and Ivanov fail to make the grade, someone will need to rule
Russia -- and the only man alive with more experience than Putin has a bloodalcohol level that precludes sound decision-making.

Read more: The Coming Era of Russia's Dark Rider | Stratfor

RUSSIAN RESURGENCE
TIMELINE
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Apr 13, 2010

Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence

Apr 9, 2010

Russia's Growing Resurgence

Mar 12, 2010

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 4: The Major Players

Mar 11, 2010

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 3: The Extras

Mar 10, 2010

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 2: The Desirables

Mar 9, 2010

Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities

Mar 8, 2010

Russia's Expanding Influence, Introduction: The Targets

Jan 26, 2010

Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence

Jun 25, 2009

Russia, Turkey: The Resurgent Powers' Wary Approach

May 28, 2009

Russian Oligarchs Part 3: The Party's Over

May 27, 2009

Russian Oligarchs Part 2: The Evolution of a New Business Elite

May 26, 2009

Russian Oligarchs Part 1: Putin's Endgame Against His Rivals

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