REALDEFINITION1

G.Rosen
Reviseddraft,February2015

[Thisversionisquitedifferentfromthepreviousdraft,datedSept.2013.]

1. Thetopic

TheoldSocraticquestionsWhatisjustice?Whatiscourage?callfordefinitions,
notofwordsorconcepts,butofthings.Justiceandcourageandthelikeweresupposed
to be aspects of reality. To answer the question What is courage? in the intended
sense is not to say what the word courage means or what passes before the mind
when we think when we think of courage. It is to say what it is for a person to be
courageoustoidentifythatinwhichthecourageofthecourageouspersonconsists
by specifying nontrivial necessary and sufficient conditions for courage somehow
groundedinthenatureofcourageitself.
The case can be made that contemporary analytic philosophy is up to its ears in
idiomsofdefinition,analysis,reductionandconstitutionthatarebestunderstoodina
similarly metaphysical keyas demands for real definition rather than linguistic or
conceptualanalysis.Onthisview,whenweaskwhatitisforathingtobeapersonor
foracreaturetobeconsciousorforafacttobealawofnatureorfortwoexpressions
tohavethesamemeaningorforanobjecttobecoloredorforanacttobefreeorfor
anartifacttobeanartwork,wearebestunderstoodasseekingrealdefinitionsofthe
properties, kinds, categories or relations that figure in the question, rather than
semanticorconceptualequivalents,evenwhenthenthecorrectnessoftheaccountis

1
ThismaterialwaspresentedattheCRNAPWorkshoponMetaphysicalStructureat
PrincetoninApril2013,attheGenevaWorkshoponGroundingandExistencein
September2014,andatMIT.IamgratefultoRalphBader,SelimBerker,FabriceCorreia,
ShamikDasgupta,MarkJohnston,KathrynKoslicki,BarryMaguire,Michaela
McSweeney,KevinMulligan,JanPlateandAlexSkilesforcommentsandquestions.

meanttoberecognizableapriori.Themainargumentforthisviewisthatwhenwetry
to answer these questions we are happy to entertain analyses cast in terms that fully
competentmastersoftheanalysandumneednotgrasp.Wesimplyhavenoconception
of semantic or conceptual analysis on which this makes sense. And yet our analytical
questions and our practice with them do make sense. And this suggests that our
questions are not semantic or conceptual questions after all. They are rather
metaphysicalquestionsthatcallfordefinitions,notofrepresentationalitems(wordsor
concepts)butofpropertiesandotherfeaturesofmindindependentreality.
InmytravelsIhaveencounteredresistancetothisidea,evenamongphilosophers
who are otherwise sanguine about the recrudescence of premodern metaphysics in
postmodernphilosophy.Thebestwaytoovercomethisskepticismwouldbetoexplain,
in clear and independently intelligible terms, what it is to define a thing, or in other
words,toprovidea(real)definitionof(real)definition.Theaimofthepresentnoteis
todojustthat.

2. Preliminaries
Intheorywecanaskfordefinitionsofitemsinanycategory:objects,properties,
relations,connectives,quantifiers,etc.,allunderstoodasworldlythingsandnotasbits
of mind or language (special cases aside). But it will simplify discussion to focus on
propertiesandrelations.Wewrite

Def(F,)

forourtarget:tobeFistobe ;beingFconsistsin,orreducesto,being ,etc.Asthe

notationsuggests,itwillbeusefultothinkofDefasarelationbetweenthepropertyto
be defined and something else, its definiens. More concretely, I think of as a
structuredcomplex,builtfromworldlyitemsinroughlythesenseinwhichasentenceis
builtfromwords.(ThinkofasastructuredRussellianpropositionalfunctionwithfree
variablescorrespondingtotheargumentplacesinF.)Thisrelationalanalysisisstrictly

optional.Defcouldbeaconnectiveinstead.Butitwillbeimportanttobeabletospeak
oftheconstituentsof.Thusifwesay(asweshould)thattobeanevennumberisto
bedivisibleby2,weshouldbeabletoaddthatthenumber2figuresinthedefinitionof
evennumber.Itakethistomeanthat2thenumberitselfisaconstituentofthe
complex in terms of which the property is defined. So even if the property is
mereologically simple, as it may be, its definiens is not. On this conception, real
definitionsarenotidentities(thoughtheymayentailidentities).Rathertheypairone
(possibly simple) thing the definiendum with another (invariably complex) thing,
itsdefiniens.Thechallengeistosaywhatittakesforapairingofthissorttoconstitute
acorrectdefinition.2

3. Asimplemodalaccount

Beginwithasimpleproposal:

(0)

Def(F,)iffx(Fxx)3

2
Def(F,)presumablyentails:ThepropertyofbeingF=thepropertyofbeing.Butit
doesnotfollowfromthisthatFandmustbeidentical.Tomakesenseofthis,thinkof
thethepropertyofbeingasstandingforafunctionfrompredicableitems
(propertiesandcomplexes)toproperties.ThepropertyofbeingFisnotidenticaltothe
complex.Butitmaybeidenticaltothevalueofthisfunctionwhenistakenasits
argument.See9forfurtherdiscussion.

3
ThisandsubsequentanalysesofDefshouldreallybewritten,notassimple
biconditionals,butasclaimsoftheform:

Def(Def(F,),(F,)))

Thatis:ForittobethecasethatdefinesFisforittobethecasethatFandstandin
suchandsucharelation.Butthisbecomesillegibleveryquickly,sowestickwiththe
shorthandiff.

Thisisimmediatelyobjectionablebecauseitentailsthateverypropertyisdefinable
Def(F, F), whereas in the sense that interests us, it is always a substantive question
whetherFisdefinable.4WemightrespondbyrequiringthatFnotfigurein.Buteven
withthisstipulationtheaccountwillovergenerateforfamiliarreasons.Necessarily,a
thingisgreenifandonlyifitisgrueandobservedorbleenandunobserved(Goodman
1947).Butnoonewithaninterestinthemetaphysicsofcolorwouldacceptthisasan
accountofwhatitisforanobjecttobegreen.

4. ALudovicianaccount
Themostconservativemodificationofthesimplemodalviewinvolvesonenewbit
of ideology: David Lewiss idea that some properties are more natural than others
(Lewis 1983). The idea can be explained in many ways, but lets start with following
rough gloss. Some classes are more homogeneous, more unified, less gerrymandered,
thanothers.Thegreenthingsdifferinvariousways:insizeandshape,butalsoincolor,
some being emerald green, others chartreuse. But the grue things are even more
heterogeneous,sincetheycandifferinallofthesewaysbutalsomoreradically,some
beinggreenandothersblue.Ononeview,thenaturalnessofapropertyisameasureof
thehomogeneityofitsintension:

F is more natural than G iff (quantifying over all possible objects) the most
dissimilarFsarelessdissimilarthanthemostdissimilarGs.

Thismaynotbealtogetheradequateasadefinition;butitsafairapproximationofone
versionofLewissidea.

4
ManywritersnotethattheidiomsweusetoexpressrealdefinitiontobeFistobe
,beingFjustisbeing,etc.canbeheardasreflexive.Itsoundsperfectlytrue,if
uninteresting,tosaythattoberedistobered.Itakethepoint,andsodenythatImin
thebusinessofexplainingthisordinaryidiom.AsIunderstandtheterm,ifthebestwe
candowithredistosaythatbeingredisbeingred,thentheupshotisthatredisnot
definableintheintendedsense.

Withthisinhand,wemightconsideranamendedversionofthemodalaccount
ofrealdefinition:

(1)

Def(F,)iffx(Fxx),
wheretheconstituentsofareallmorenaturalthanF.

Thisrulesoutcirculardefinitions,andalsothespuriousdefinitionofgreenintermsof
grueandbleen.Butconsider:

Tobeasquareistobeanequilateralrectangle.

Thismightbeacorrectrealdefinitionofsquare.Buttheconstituentsofthedefiniens
rectangle and equilateral are less natural than square, at least according to the
accountsketchedabove:theclassofrectanglesismorediversethantheclassofsquares.
Everycorrectdefinitionbygenusanddifferentiaisacounterexampletothisproposal.

Lewis sometimes hints at an account of relative naturalness that would avoid

thisproblem(Lewis1986:61).Onthisaccount,relativenaturalnessisdefinedinterms
ofthenotionofaperfectlynaturalpropertythesortorpropertythatmightfigureina
fundamental law of nature, the sort of property that might correspond to an
Armstrongian universal (Armstrong 1978), the sort of thoroughly determinate, non
disjunctive property that makes for perfect resemblance in some respect among its
instances.Takingthisnotionasbasic,thealternativeaccountmaintainsthat

F is more natural than G iff the shortest definition of F (i.e., the shortest open
sentence cointensive with F) in a language whose predicates correspond to
perfectlynaturalpropertiesisshorterthantheshortestsuchdefinitionofG.

Thisissharplyatoddswiththepreviousaccount.Afterall,whereFisperfectlynatural,
notFwillbealmostperfectlynaturalbythisaccount;butofcoursetheclassofnonFs
willbealmostmaximallyheterogeneous.5
The second account is well suited to solve the problems mentioned above for
modalaccountofdefinition.Eventhoughtheclassofrectanglesismoreheterogeneous
thantheclassofsquares,itisplausiblymorenaturalthantheclassofsquaresaccording
tothesecondconceptionofrelativenaturalness.Afterall,theshortestcharacterization
oftheclassofsquaresinperfectlynaturaltermswillpresumablyconjoinanaccountof
theclassofrectangleswithanaccountofequilaterality,inwhichcasethedefinitionof
squareinperfectlynaturaltermswillbelonger.

Thissolvesoneproblemforthemodalaccountofrealdefinition,buttheaccount

isunacceptableforotherreasons.Considerasupervenientproperty,liketheproperty
ofbeinganuncle.Thisisnotaperfectlynaturalproperty,butthefactsaboutwhoisand
who is not an uncle strongly supervene on the distribution of perfectly natural
properties:foranytwopossibleobjects,xandy,ifxandyarealikeineveryperfectly
natural respect (including extrinsic respects), then both are uncles or neither is. As is
familiar,thissupervenienceclaimguaranteestheexistenceofanecessitateduniversally
quantifiedbiconditionaloftheform:

x(xisanunclex)

constructed as follows: Take all of the uncles, actual and possible: u1,u2, Let D1(x),
D2(x) be their complete descriptions in perfectly natural terms. (D1(x) might be a
completedescriptionofu1inthelanguageofquantumfieldtheory.)Thenconsider:

5
LewismayhaveinmindaversionofthisideaonwhichthedefinitionsofFmustconsist
inpositiveformulae:conjunctionsofdisjunctionsofatomicformulaeinvolvingperfectly
naturalpredicates,withoutnegationortheequivalent.Butthentheworrywillbethat
mostordinarypropertieswillbedefinedonlybyinfinitaryformulae,inwhichcasethe
differencesbetween(say)greenandgruewillbelost.

x(xisanuncle(D1(x)D2(x)))

Everyversionofthemodalaccountthatwehaveconsideredentailsthatthisisacorrect
accountofwhatitistobeanuncle.Butitisnt.Mostimportantly,itfailstobringout
whattheuncleshaveincommon.Itislikeadefinitionofprimenumberaccordingto
which to be a prime is to be either 2 or 3 or 5 or This account is not just less
informative than it might be: it is wrong. It is not so that 3 is prime in virtue of being
either 2 or 3 or 5 or ; 3 is prime in virtue of having 1 as its only proper factor.6
Similarly,itisjustnotsothatFesterisanuncleinvirtueofbeingconfiguredinthisfully
determinateway,orthatfullydeterminateway,orHeisanuncleinvirtueofbeinga
manwithasiblingorsiblinginlawwhoisaparent.
This points to another defect in the disjunctive account: it is overly specific. A
correct definition of uncle should not mention quarks, even though some uncles are
made of quarks, just as a correct definition of house should not mention bricks. The
propertyofbeinganuncleisafunctionalpropertyinthefollowingsense:itsnature
allows for many fully determinate ways in which a thing might be constituted as an
uncle,butdoesnotspecifythesewaysindetail.Toknowwhatitisforapersontobean
uncle is to know that uncles must be made of something; but it is not to know an
exhaustivelistofthevariouswaysinwhichanunclemightbeconstituted.7

5. Anessentialistaccount

Theoverspecificityobjectiontomodalaccountsofdefinitionsuggestsadifferent

approach.KitFinenotesthatinmanycases,andperhapsinall,whenaproposition
holdsofmetaphysicalnecessitywecanpointtooneofmoreitemswhosenatures
groundthatnecessity(Fine1994).SupposeJackis,ofnecessity,Tarzansson.Thenwe
canbeconfidentthatthisisso,notbecauseitliesinTarzansnaturetobeJacksfather,

6
Foranobjectiontolistdefinitionsfromadifferentquarter,seeField1972:362ff.
7
Canwesavethemodalaccountsbyrequiringthatrealdefinitionsbefinite?That
wouldbeunmotivated.Whyshouldnttherebeitemsthatcanonlybedefinedin
infinitarytermsarbitraryinfinitesets,forexample?

butratherbecauseitliesinJacksnaturetobeTarzansson.Toputthepointin
epistemicterms,youcanknoweverythingthereistoknowaboutTarzansessential
naturewithoutknowingthefirstthingaboutJack;butyoucantknowJacksessential
naturewithoutknowingthatTarzanishisfather.Similarly,itmaylieinthenatureof
tablesalttocontainchlorinewithoutitslyinginthenatureofchlorinethatsaltshould
containit.InFinesnotation:

JackTarzanisJacksfather,butnot:TarzanTarzanisJacksfather

saltSaltcontainschlorine,butnot:chlorineSaltcontainschlorine

Fineshowsconvincinglythatthishyperintensionalidiomcanbemadeclear(in

severalways),andthatitissuitableforuseinsystematicmetaphysicsevenifitcannot
bedefinedinmorebasicterms(Fine1995,2000).Soletshelpourselvestoitand
considertheproposal:

(2)

Def(F,)iffFx(Fxx)

Thisavoidsmostofthepitfallswehaveencountered.Itdoesnotlieinthenatureof
greenthatathingisgreeniffgrueandobservedorbleenandunobserved.Acomplete
accountoftheessenceofgreenmightsaysomethingaboutthevariousshadesofgreen,
oraboutwavelengthsoflight;butitwouldnevermentiongrueoranythingofthesort.8
Thenecessarytruthconnectinggreenwithgrueandbleenisrathergroundedinthe
naturesofgrueandbleen;itisbecausethesepropertiesarewhattheyarethatthetruth
inquestionholds.Similarly,itdoesnotlieinthenatureofunclethatonewaytobean
uncleistosatisfysomemaximallydeterminatephysicaldescriptionD1(x),muchlessthat
oneisanuncleiffoneiseitherD1orD2orRatheritliesinthenatureofunclethat

8
Exceptperhapsinsometrivialway:Ifessencesareclosedunderlogicalconsequence,
thenitwillinthenatureofgreenthateverythingiseithergrueornotgrue.

oneisanuncleiffoneisamalesiblingorsiblinginlawofaparent.Nothingaboutthe
detailedphysicalnaturesoftherelevantitemsentersin.

Nowonemaywonderwhatsortofadvanceitcouldbetoexplainourtarget

idiomrealdefinitionintermsofFinesnotionofessence,sincethetwoare
obviouslyveryclose.9Soitsworthstressingthatthesenotionsarenotsimply
equivalent.OnFinesaccount,absolutelyeverythinghasanessence.Givenanyitemx,
definableornot,therewillbetruthsoftheformxp.EveniftheGettierexamples
showthatknowledgeisunanalyzable(Williamson2000),itstillliesinthenatureof
knowledgethatifSknowsthatpthenpistrue.Similarly,whilenegationisalmost
certainlyindefinable,itnonethelessliesinthenatureof(classical)negationthatp
~~p.TheseexamplessufficetoshowthatFinesconceptofessenceisdifferentfrom,
andmoregeneralthan,theconceptofrealdefinitionwevebeendiscussing.Onemight
acceptFinesideologyandstillwonder:Whatisitfortoconstituteacorrectreal
definitionofF?Theaccount(2)isdesignedtoanswerthatquestion.

Isitagoodanswer?Notobviously.Weobjectedtothesimplemodalproposal

(0)becauseitentailedthateverypropertydefinesitself:Def(F,F).Thepresentaccount
facesasimilarproblem.ItisnaturaltosupposethatforanypropertyF,Fx(Fx
Fx).Butinthatcase(2)entailsthateverypropertydefinesitself.

WemightrespondbyrequiringthatFnotoccurin.Butinfactthisrestriction

followsfromamoredemandingrestrictionthatisneededanyway.Supposewe
discover(bywhateverpowerfulmethodsweemployforthesepurposes),that

causexy(xcausesyiffyisaneffectofx),and

effectxy(xcausesyiffyisaneffectofx).

Proposal(2)thenentailsthatcausecanbedefinedintermofeffectandviceversa,and
theremaybeasenseinwhichthisisso(cf.thesenseinwhichconjunctioncanbe

9
Finehimselfsometimesspeaksofessenceanddefinitionasifthenotionswere
interchangeable.Fine1994(REF).

definedintermsofdisjunctionandnegation).Butthereisalsoobviouslyasensein
whichifthisisthebestwecando,therightthingtosayisnotthatcauseadmitsofan
easydefinition,butratherthatcausationisprimitiveandindefinable.(Thedefinitionof
causeintermsofeffectisnotacandidateanswertothequestionthatproponentsof
philosophicalanalysesofcausationhavebeenasking.)

Theneededmodificationisstraightforward.FollowingFine(1994b),saythata

dependsonbwhenbfiguresnontriviallyinasessence:

adependsonbiffa[b],butitsnotthatcasethatax(x).

Wecanthensay:

(3)

Def(F,)iffFx(Fxx),wheretheconstituentsofdonotdepend
onF.

Thisrulesoutcirculardefinitionsanddefinitionalcircles(likethedefinitionofcausein
termsofeffectandviceversa).Moreovertheaddedclauseisnotadhoc.Itmakes
sensethattheconstituentsofadefinitionshouldbeontologicallypriortothething
defined(SeeKment2014:159foraversionofthisproposal).

Thisaccountmayseemtoovergenerate.Tobeaprimenumberistobea

numberwhoseonlyfactorsare1andn.Butconsiderthespuriousdefinition:

Tobeaprimeistobeanevennumberwhoseonlyfactorsare1andn,oranodd
numberwhoseonlyfactorsare1andn.

Orconsiderthelistdefinitionmentionedabove:

Tobeaprimeistobeeither2or3or5or

10

Thesearebaddefinitionsofprime,buttheymightsatisfy(3),andiftheydo,(3)is
inadequate.

Thisproblemarisesifweassumethatessencesareclosedunder

logical/mathematicalconsequence,soonemightseektoevadeitbyinvokinganotion
ofessenceonwhichthisisnotso.Finehimselfdistinguishestheconstitutiveessenceof
xfromtheconsequentialessenceofx,withtheformerstandingtothelatterroughlyas
theaxiomsofatheorystandtothetheoryitself.Theconsequentialessenceofxisa
classofpropositionsclosedunderlogicalconsequence.Theconstitutiveessenceofxisa
privilegedsubclassthatservestogeneratetheconsequentialessence.Itmaylieinthe
consequentialessenceofSocratesthatSocratesishuman,andalsothatSocratesis
eitherhumanorsimian.Butonlythefirstpropositionisacandidateforinclusionin
Socratesconstitutiveessence.InhisformalworkFinemainlyoperateswiththenotion
ofconsequentialessence,sinceheseesnogoodwaytoisolatetheconstitutiveessence
fromamongthecompetingaxiomatizationsoftheconsequentialessence.Buthowever
difficultitmaybetoapplythenotioninpractice,theunderlyingideaseemsclear
enough.Wemaydefineconstitutiveessenceintermsofconsequentialessenceas
follows.

pbelongstotheconstitutiveessenceofxiff(a)pbelongstotheconsequential
essenceofx,and(b)therearenopropositionssuchthat:pbelongstothe
consequentialessenceofxinvirtueofthefactthatbelongstothe
consequentialessenceofx.

IfitspartoftheconsequentialessenceofSocratesthatSocratesiseitherhumanor
simian,thisissobecause,orinvirtueofthefactthat,itisindependentlypartofthe
consequentialessenceofSocratesthatSocratesishuman.Whateverdifficultywemay
haveinisolatingtheconstitutiveessenceofathinggivenitsconsequentialessence
derivesfromourlimitedcapacitytodeterminewhenoneessentialisttruthisgrounded

11

inanother.Thatsarealproblem,butitsanepistemicproblem.Theconceptsareclear
enough,eveniftheyarehardtoapplyinpractice.

Withthenotionofconstitutiveessenceinhand,wecansolvetheovergeneration

problemfor(3).Thespuriousdefinitionsofprimemaybepartsoftheconsequential
essenceofprime.Buttheyarecertainlynotpartsoftheconstitutiveessence.Soifwe
readFin(3)asitliesintheconstitutiveessenceofFthatwesolveourproblem.

Soclarified,(3)ispromising,butithasanumberofunwelcomeconsequences.

Theontologicalindependenceclauseensuresthatrecursivedefinitionsarenever

realdefinitions.Supposewethinkthatnaturalnumberispriortosetoranysimilar
notionintermsofwhichafullyreductivedefinitionmightbegiven.Onemightstillbe
temptedtosay:

Tobeanaturalnumberistobeeitherzeroorthesuccessorofanaturalnumber.

Thiswouldbeuselessiftheaimweretointroduceamathematicalnovicetotheconcept,
butrealdefinitionsarenotconstrainedtobeusefulinthisway.Theclaimwouldrather
bethatasamatterofmetaphysics,whatmakeseachnaturalnumberaninstanceofthe
kindnaturalnumberisthatitiseitherzeroorthesuccessorofanumber,andthatmight
betrue.

Thisproblemcanbesolvedbydeletingtheontologicaldependenceclausein(3).

Theclausewasintroducedtoblocktrivialdefinitionsanddefinitionalcircles.Butnow
thatwehavespecifiedthatwereoperatingwithaconstitutivenotionofessence,this
maynotbenecessary.ItmaybepartoftheconsequentialessenceofFineverycase
thatx(FxFx).Butthiswillnotbepartoftheconstitutiveessence,sincethatwould
beotiose.Itislessclearwhetherthefocusonconstitutiveessenceisenoughtoblock
definitionalcirclesinwhicharelationisdefinedintermsofitsconverseandviceversa,
butsupposeitis.Thepointisthattherevisedaccountmightstilladmitrecursive

12

definitionslikethedefinitionofnumbergivenaboveorthedefinitionofancestorin
termsofparent,sinceitmaywelllieintheconstitutiveessenceofancestorthatxisan
ancestorofyiffxisaparentofyortheparentofanancestorofy.

Stilltheaccountremainsproblematicforatleasttworeasons.Mostimportantly,

itwouldseemtoblockdefinitionalexpansionofacertainfamiliarandstraightforward
sort.Supposethattobeasquareistobeanequilateralrectangle,andthattobea
rectangleistobearightquadrilateral.Itshouldthenfollowthattobeasquareistobe
aright,equilateralquadrilateral.Butitishighlyunlikelythattheconstitutiveessenceof
squarecontainsbothsquaresareequilateralrectanglesandsquaresareequilateralright
quadrilaterals.Thesepropositionsbothbelongtotheconsequentialessenceofsquare.
Butifthefirstpropositionbelongstotheconstitutiveessenceofsquare,thesecond
doesnt,sincethatwouldrendertheconstitutiveessenceneedlesslyredundant.

Asafinalproblem,notethatanaccountframedintermsofconstitutiveessence

willrenderquestionsaboutthedefinablityofFsensitivetoamanifestlyintractable
question.SupposewearetemptedtosaythattobeFistobe,andunderstandthisas
theclaimthat

itliesintheconstitutiveessenceofFthatx(Fxx).

WethennotetheveryrealpossibilitythattheconstitutiveessenceofFdoesnotinclude
thissingle,universallyquantifiedbiconditional,butrathertwoquantifiedconditionals:

ItliesintheconstitutiveessenceofFthatx(Fxx)

ItliesintheconstitutiveessenceofFthatx(xFx)

Itsabsurdtothinkthatthedefinabilityof(say)primenumberturnsonwhetherthe
constitutiveessenceofprimetakesthefirstformorthesecond.Andthatsuggeststhat
theappealtoconstitutiveessencecreatesasmanyproblemsasitsolves.

13

6.TheGroundTheoreticAccount

Idontknowhowtotweaktheessentialistproposaltosolvetheseproblems10,

butevenifitcanbetweaked,itwillstillfailtocaptureanimportantfeatureofreal
definition.Thefeaturehassurfacedoccasionallyinourinformalglosses.Thusin
rejectingtheinfinitelistdefinitionofprimenumber,accordingtowhichtobeaprimeis
beeither2or3or5or,wesaid:

Itisnotsothat3isprimeinvirtueofbeingeither2or3or5or;3isprimein
virtueofhaving1asitsonlyproperfactor.

Thisisobviouslyanobjectiontothelistdefinition,butwhy?Becausewetakeitfor
grantedthatrealdefinitionssupplyexplanatoryinformation.Iftobeprimeistobea
numbernwhoseonlyfactorsare1andn,itfollowsimmediatelythatwhenevernis
prime,nisprimebecausei.e.,invirtueofthefactthatitsonlyproperfactorsare1
andn.

ThisisaninstanceoftheGroundingDefinitionLink:

GDL:IfDef(F,)thennecessarily,forallx,ifxisFthenxisFinvirtueofbeing.

Theessentialistaccountsofrealdefinitionareconsistentwiththisprinciple,butthey
dontentailitorexplainit.ThereisastepfromtheclaimthatitliesinFsnaturethatF
andarecoextensivetotheclaimthatwhenathingisF,itsbeingiswhatmakesitF.
Thechallengefortheessentialististomotivatethisstep.

10
Theexamplesshowthatanessentialistaccountofrealdefinitionneedsanotionof
essencethatisintermediatebetweenconsequentialessenceandconstitutiveessence.
Thenaturalthoughtistostartwiththeconstitutiveessenceandthentocloseundera
limitedsetofoperations.Thetrickistospecifytheseoperations,andIcantseehowto
dothat.

14

Icantseehowtodothis,soIproposeanothertack.Theideaistotakethe

GroundingDefinitionLinkasthekeytotheanalysisofrealdefinition.Thesimplest
approachwouldbetostrengthenGDLasfollows,writingpqforthefactthatp
obtainsinvirtueofthefactthatq,orqgroundsp:

(4)

Def(F,)iffx(Fx(Fxx))

Thisguarantees,asitshould,thatwhendefinesF,theFthingsarealwaysFinvirtue
ofbeing.Butitaddstheconverse:ifasamatterofnecessity,theFthingsarealwaysF
invirtueofbeing,thenthereisnothingmoretobeingFthanbeing.

Butthisisnotquiteright.Anyaccountofrealdefinitionmustensurethat

wheneverdefinesF,Fandarenecessarilycoextensive.(4)obviouslyensuresthat
whendefinesF,everyFis.11Butwithoutfurtherassumptionsitdoesnotensure
thateveryisF.
Thiswouldfollowgivenanattractivebutunderexploredprincipleinthetheory
ofground:

WeakFormality:Ifforsomepossibleobjectx,Fxx,thenforanypossible
objectx,ifxthenFxx.12

AccordingtoWeakFormality,ifsomepossiblethingisgreeninvirtueofhaving(say)
suchandsuchaspectralreflectanceprofile,thenasamatterofnecessity,anythingwith
thatprofileisgreeninvirtueofpossessingit.GivenWeakFormality,wecanreasonas
follows.Supposethatasamatterofnecessity,wheneverathingisF,itisFinvirtueof
being.LeaveasidethevacuouscaseinwhichFisimpossible.Thereisthenapossible

11
SupposeDef(F,),andletabeF.Itthenfollowsimmediatelygiven(4)thataisFin
virtueofbeing,andhencegiventhefactivityofgroundthatais.
12
WeakFormalityisaweakeningoftheprinciplecalledFormalityinRosen(2010,p.
131.)

15

FthatisFinvirtueofbeing.WeakFormalitythenensuresthateverypossiblething
isFinvirtueofbeing,whichinturnentailsgiventhefactivityofgroundthat
everypossiblethingisF.SogivenWeakFormality,(4)guaranteesthatwhen
definesF,andFarenecessarilycoextensive,asanycorrectaccountofdefinitionmust.

WeakFormality,alas,isnotselfevident.Itamountstotheclaimthatwhena

groundsFainsomeparticularcase,thecapacityofthefirstfacttogroundthesecond
derivesentirelyfromthepredicable,andnotfromthecombinationofanda.But
whyshouldnttherebecasesinwhichandatogethermakeitthecasethatFa,inpart
thankstoanditsdistinctivepowers,butalsoinpartthankstoaanditsdistinctive
powers?Idontknowanyplausiblecasesofthissort,soforwhatitsworth,Weak
Formalitystrikesmeasplausible.Butuntilitcanbegivenafirmerrationale,itwouldbe
unwisetorelyonit.

IfwedontassumeWeakFormality,(4)mustbemodifiedasfollows:

(5)

Def(F,)iffx((Fxx)(Fxx))

Thisisinelegant,butitdoesthejob.ItisnowatheoremthatDef(F,)entailsx(Fx
x)).13
Irecommend(5)asthecorrectdefinitionofdefinition.14Althoughitiswritten
asabiconditional,theintendedclaimisstronger:FortodefineFjustisforittobethe

13
Proof:AssumeDef(F,)andletabeanarbitrarypossibleobject.From(5)wehave
Faa(Faa).Fromthefactivityofgroundwehave(Faa)(Faa).
Hence:(Fava)(Faa),whichislogicallyequivalentto(Faa).Butawas
arbitrary,so:x(Fxx).

14
Well,almost.Theaccountbreaksdownwhenappliedtoimpossibleproperties
propertiesnothingcouldpossess.(ThankstoBrianEpsteinforpressingthispoint.)For
letFbesuchapropertye.g.,thepropertyofbeingaroundsquare,andletbean
arbitrarycomplexe.g.,xisamasslessduckwithnopossibleinstances.Our
accountimmediatelyentailsthattobeFistobe.Sincetherecantbearoundsquare

16


oramasslessduck,itsautomaticthatasamatterofnecessity,anythingthingthatisa
roundasquareoramasslessduckisaroundsquareinvirtueofbeingamasslessduck.
Butthisisjusttosay,given(5),thattobearoundsquareistobeamasslessduck.

Thedraconianwaytoabsorbthepointwouldbetoinsistthatthereareno
impossibleproperties,orthatthereisonlyoneandthatitisindefinable.(Seethe
accountofpropertyindividuationin9below.)Butthatseemsadhoc.Iftherecanbe
manypropertiesnecessarilycoextensivewithgreen,whyshouldnttherebemany
propertiesnecessarilycoextensivewithroundsquare?Itwouldbebettertohavean
accountonwhichitisonethingtobearoundsquare,andanotherthingtobea
masslessduck,sinceitisanindisputablefactofmetaphysicsthatthisisso.

Theproblemarisesbecausetherearetwowaysforaclaimoftheform

(*)
x((Fxx)(Fxx)

tobetrue.SuchaclaimcanbetrueinvirtueofthefactthatFandstandinsome
interestingrelation,oritcanbetruesimplybecausenothingcouldbeeitherFor.
Intuitively,isacorrectdefinitionofFonlyifthemodalizedconditionalistrueinthe
firstway.Thetrickistosaythisclearly.

Hereisonewaytoimplementtheidea.Eachtruepropositioncanbeassociated
withagroundingtree,whichspecifiesthevariousclustersoffactsthatimmediately
groundit,thefactsthatimmediatelygroundthosefacts,andsoon.Apathinthe
groundingtreeforpwillstartwithpandthenproceedtoanimmediatefullgroundforp,
animmediatefullgroundforthatground,andsoon.(Utterlybasicfactswillhavetrivial
groundingtrees.Butmodalfactsoftheform(*)willneverbebasic.)Saythata
groundingtreeforsuchafactisvacuousiffeverypathinitinvolvesthefactthatFsare
impossible,orthefactthatsareimpossible,ortheequivalent.Thenwecansay:

(6)Def(F,)iff

(a)x((Fxx)(Fxx)),and

(b)Thefact(a)hasanonvacuousgroundingtree.

Thisisawayoffilteringoutspuriousdefinitionsforwhich(a)holdsonlybecauseFsare
impossible.

Imgoingtoignorethiscomplicationinwhatfollows,butforthosewhocare,(6)
istheofficialdefinitionofdefinition.

17

casethat,asamatterofnecessity,wheneverathingisFor,itisFinvirtueofbeing.
Thismaysoundlikeanuglymouthful,butitsequivalenttoaformofwordsthatmany
philosophershavecometofindquitenatural.TosaythatdefinesF,onmyaccount,is
simplytosaythatasamatterofnecessityFsareFifandonlyif,andbecause,theyare
.15,

7.Featuresoftheproposal.

Thegroundtheoreticaccountofrealdefinitionhasanumberofappealing

features.

(a)

Itexplainswhytrivialdefinitionsareexcluded.Whyaretherenocasesinwhich
Def(F,F)?BecausetherearenocasesinwhichFaFa,i.e.,becausegrounding
isirreflexive.

(b)

Itexplainswhydefinitionalcirclesareexcluded.Whyaretherenocasesinwhich
arelationsRisdefinedintermsofitsconverseR*andviceversa?Becausethere
arenocasesinwhichwehavebothRabR*baandR*baRab,i.e.,because
groundingisasymmetric.

(c)

Itallowsrecursivedefinitionstocountasrealdefinitions.Therecursive
definitionofancestorhasitthatforxtobeanancestorofyisforxtobeeithera
parentofyortheparentofanancestorofy.Theproposalsaysthatthisis
correctiffasamatterofnecessity,wheneverxisanancestorofythisisinvirtue
ofthefactthatxiseitheraparentofyortheparentofanancestorofy,andthat

15
ThankstoSelimBerkerforpointingthisout,andforcommentsthatledtomajor
changesinthissection.

18

mightbetrue.16Thereisnogeneralprincipleinthetheoryofgroundthatrules
itout.

(d)

Itallowsthatasingleproperty,F,mayhavetwocorrectrealdefinitions,and,
providedthatwheneverathingisF,itisFbothbecauseitisandbecauseitis.
Thatthisispossibleisshownbycasesofdefinitionalexpansion.Suppose

Tobeasquareistobeanequilateralrectangle,and

Tobearectangleistobearightquadrilateral.

Theaccountentailsthataissquareinvirtueofbeinganequilateralrectangle,
andrectangularinvirtueofbeingarightquadrilateral.Andfromthese
ingredientsitcanbeshownthataisasquareinvirtueofbeinganequilateral
rightquadrilateral,hencethatsquarehasaseconddefinition:

Tobeasquareistobeanequilateralrightquadrilateral.17

Thereisnoobjectionableoverdeterminationherebecausewehaveachain:

aissquareaisanequilateralrectangleaisanequilateralright

quadrilateral,

16
ThisiscertainlymoreplausiblethantheFregeandefinition,whichdefinesancestorin
termsofset.Intuitively,thefactthatMurrayRosenismyancestormightobtainandbe
groundedjustasitisevenif(perimpossibile)therewerenosets.

17
Theproofinthissimplecaseisstraightforward.(Leftasanexercise.Thekeypremise
isthestrongtransitivityofground:Ifpq,andq,thenp,.(Rosen2010,
p.XXX)Itshouldbepossibletoproveaprinciplethatlicensesarbitrarydefinitional
expansion:

IfDef(F,)andDef(G,),thenDef(F, /G),

where /GistheresultofsubstitutingforGin,butIhaventtried.

19

andgroundistransitive.

Buttheremayalsobecasesinwhichtheseveraldefinitionsofasingle

propertyarenotrelatedinthissimpleway.Itissometimessaid,forexample,
thatprimenumberhastwodefinitions:thegradeschooldefinition,accordingto
whichtobeaprimeistobeanumbernwhoseonlyfactorsare1andn,anda
moreadvanceddefinitionaccordingtowhichtobeprimeistobeanumbern
suchthatwheneverndividesaproductpq,ndivideseitherporq(Tappenden
1998).Thepresentaccountallowsthatthesemaybothbecorrectreal
definitionsofasingleproperty,providedwearepreparedtosaythatwhenever
nisprime,itisprimebothbecauseitsatisfiesthefirstcondition,andbecauseit
satisfiesthesecond.

(e)

Finally,theproposalshedslightonwhywemightcareaboutrealdefinitionsin
philosophy.WhyshoulditbeusefulorinterestingtoknowwhatitistobeF?
BecausesuchknowledgeputsusinapositiontoexplainwhyanygivenFisF,and
explanatoryinformationisalwaysworthhaving.

9.TheIndividuationofproperties

Theargumentsagainstthesimplemodalaccountofdefinitionsuggestthatwe
areoperatingwithahyperintensionalconceptionofpropertiesonwhichitisonething
tobegreen,andsomethingquitedifferenttobegrueandobservedorbleenand
unobserved.Anditisalwaysafairchallengetoanysuchaccounttoaskforclarification
ofthisconception,arequestthatissometimesputasthedemandfortheidentity
conditionsofpropertiesandrelations.SupposewehavepropertiesFandGpickedout
bydifferentbitsoflanguageorbydifferentconcepts.Theintensionalistsaystheyare

20

thesamepropertyifftheyaretheynecessarilycoextensive.Whatdoesthe
hyperintensionalistsay?

Perhapsjustthis:IfFandGindefinable,theyarethesamepropertyifftheyare

necessarilycoextensive;iftheyredefinable,theyareidenticalifftheyhavethesame
definitions:

PropertyIdentity:FandGarethesamepropertyiff

(a)

FandGareindefinableandx(FxGx),or

(b)

FandGaredefinableandforall,(Def(F)Def(G,))

(Ihaventdefendedtheaccountforindefinableproperties,butImawareofnoground
fordistinguishingcointensiveindefinablepropertiesthatwouldnotalsobegroundsfor
distinguishingHesperusandPhosphorus.)Giventhegroundtheoreticaccountof
definition,thisamountstosayingthatdefinablepropertiesareindividuatedbythe
groundsforatomicfactsinvolvingthem.WhenFandGaredefinable,F=Giffinevery
possiblecase,thegroundsforFaarealsogroundsforGaandviceversa.

IftherecanbecasesinwhichFandGarenecessarilycoextensiveandyetthe
groundsforFadifferfromthegroundsforGa,thisaccountwillentailahyperintensional
conceptionofproperties.Butthatturnsouttobeasubstantialif.Strictlyspeaking,
myaccountofdefinitionisconsistentwithanorthodoxintensionalviewofproperties.
Thismaynotbeobvious,sothepointisworthexploring.

IhavecertainlyassumedandoccasionallyarguedthatDef(F,)is

hyperintensional.Thecounterexamplestothesimplemodalaccountallgotoshowthis.
ButthecounterexamplesareallcasesinwhichwehaveDef(F,)andx(xx)
butnotDef(F,).Thatis,theywereallcasesinwhichDef(F,)ishyperintensionalon

21

theright.Theaccountexplainsthishyperintensionalitybyreducingittothe
hyperintensionalityofground.Butallofthisisperfectlyconsistentwiththeassumption
thatDef(F,)issimplyintensionalontheleft,orinotherwords,thatDef(F,)and
x(FxGx)entailDef(G,).

Toseewhy,recallasubtlepointstipulatedattheoutset,namely,thatdefinition

istobeunderstoodasarelationbetweenapropertyandacomplex.Propertiesand
complexesarealikeinthisrespect:bothcombinewithanobject(orasequenceobjects)
toyieldaproposition.Thedifferenceisthatcomplexesarepropositionlikeitemswith
internalstructureopensentencesinaworldlylanguagewhereaspropertiesare
(forallwecare)mereologicallysimple.Thereisthusadifferencebetweenthecomplex

xisgrueandobservedorbleenandunobserved,

whichhasgrue,bleen,observedandvariouslogicalparticlesasconstituents,and

thepropertyofbeinggrueandobservedorbleenandunobserved,

whichdoesnot.Inthisframeworkweshouldthinkofthepropertyofbeing
sometimesregimentedasxxasanoperatorthatattachestoacomplexto
yieldatermthatpicksoutaproperty:xx.Theargumentsforthefunctionare
typicallycomplex;thevaluesofthatfunctionthepropertiesarenot.

ToseethattheviewIvebeendevelopingisconsistentwithintensionalismabout

properties,assumeintensionalismandconsiderthefollowingpackageofclaimsabout
green:

(a)

Asamatterofnecessity,athingisgreeniffitisgrueandobservedorbleenand
unobserved.

22

(b)

Sothepropertyofbeinggreen=thepropertyofbeinggrueandobservedor
bleenandunobserved.

(c)

ButitisnotthecasethatDef(green,xisgrueandobservedorbleenand
unobserved).

Givenouraccountofdefinition,thispackageentailstheplausibleclaimthat

(d)

Thereisapossiblecaseinwhichathingisgreen,butnotinvirtueofbeinggrue
andobservedorbleenandunobserved.

Butitalsoentailsthesomewhatsurprisingclaimthat

(e)

Thereisapossiblecaseinwhichathingpossessesthepropertyofbeinggrue
andobservedorbleenandunobserved,butnotinvirtueofbeinggrueand
observedorbleenandunobserved.

Thisisaclaimoftheform:

Possibly,x(x)a,butnot:x(x)aa

Anditmaybehardtoseehowanysuchclaimcouldbetrue.Butanintensionalistwho
acceptsthegroundingidiomneednotfindthispuzzlingatall.Shecansay:

Thefunctionxtakesfromacomplexxtotheuniquepropertyintensionally
equivalenttox(whenthereisone),muchasthedefinitedescriptionoperator
takesusfromacomplextotheuniquesatisfierofthatcomplex(whenthereis
one).Inthiscase,thepropertyinquestionthepropertyofbeinggrueand
observedorbleenandunobservedjustisthepropertyofbeinggreen.(They

23

mustbethesameproperty,sincetheyreintensionallyequivalent.)Thisproperty
mayormaynothaveadefinition.Butitsdefinitioncantbereadofffromthe
structureofanarbitraryexpressionthatpicksitout,justastheessenceofthe
inventorofbifocalscannotbereadofffromthestructureofanarbitrarydefinite
descriptionthatpickshimout.Ingeneral,from
aisF,and
F=thepropertyofbeing,
itdoesnotfollowthat
aisFinvirtueofbeing.
WhetherthislastclaimistrueistruedependsonthedefinitionofF(aka,the
propertyofbeing),whichisupforgrabs.

Onthisversionofintensionalism,propertiesarelikeobjectsinthisrespect:theycanbe
pickedoutornamedinindefinitelymanyways,mostofwhichwillfailtoencodetheir
definitions.ThisisafamiliarpointifwethinkofdescriptionslikeFredsfavorite
property.Itislessfamiliarwhenthetermsinquestionareoftheformthepropertyof
being.Stillitisacoherentview,andthefactthatitiscoherentservestoshowthat
theconceptionofrealdefinitionthatIvebeenadvancingis,perhapssomewhat
surprisingly,fullyconsistentwithanintensionalistviewofproperties.

Wearepushedtoahyperintensionalviewofpropertiesonlyifwetakeon

additionalcommitments.ConsiderthethesisthatmightbecalledStrongProperty
Abstraction(SPA):

SPA:Foranycomplex,thereisapropertyFsuchthatDef(F,)

Thisismuchstrongerthanordinarypropertyabstraction(whichmaybetoostrong
alreadygiventhethreatofparadox).Ordinarypropertyabstractiontellsusthatforany
complex,thereisapropertyintensionallyequivalentto:xx.Thisnewprinciple

24

tellsusthatforanycomplex,thereisapropertydefinedby,thatis,aproperty
atomicfactsinvolvingwhicharesystematicallygroundedinfactsoftheforma.A
principleofthissortwouldguaranteetheexistenceofapropertyFsuchthattobeFis
tobegrueandobservedorbleenandunobserved.Andifthereissuchaproperty,
intensionalismisfalse,sincethatpropertyisdistinctfromgreenbutnecessarily
coextensivewithit.Butintheabsenceofsomesuchprinciple,itisconsistenttosay
thateverypropertyequivalenttogreenhasthesamedefinitionandisthusidenticalto
green.

WhatisthestatusofSPA?Ifindithardtosay.Iseenoobjectiontothe

hyperintensionalconceptionofproperties,andoftenfinditnatural.Itstrikesmeas
obvious,forexample,thatthepropertyofbeingasquarenumberisdistinctfromthe
propertyofbeingasumofconsecutiveoddnumbersstartingwithone,andthatthisis
shownbythefactthatyoupossessthefirstpropertyinvirtuebeingsomeonessquare,
andthesecondpropertyforanaltogetherdifferentreason.Butanyconsiderationthat
wouldclinchthecaseagainstintensionalisminthisframeworkwouldbehighly
theoreticalandrecherchinsofarasitgoesbeyondthissortofintuition.Theaccount
ofdefinitionIhavegivenisfitsquitenicelywithahyperintensionalviewofproperties,
sinceitgivesthehyperintensionalistsomethingcleartosayinresponsetothedemand
foranaccountofpropertyindividuation.Thepointoftheargumentjustrehearsedisto
showthatevenifwerejecttheintuitionsthatsupportthehyperintensionalview,we
canstillaccepttheaccountofpropertyindividuationsketchedaboveandthe
conceptionofrealdefinitionitpresupposes.

10.Anapplication:Interpretingthedebateovermoralnaturalism.

Toseewhythismightmatter,supposethatafterthedusthassettledinfirst

orderethics,wefindourselveswithacounterexampleproofequivalenceoftheform:

(N)

Necessarily,anactismorallypermissibleiffitis,
25


whereisathoroughlynaturalisticcomplexcomposedofindisputablynonnormative
bitsandpieces:cause,pleasure,etc.Fortheorthodoxintensionalistwhoeschewsfine
grainednotionsofgroundinganddefinition,thisamountstonaturalismaboutmoral
permissibilityonanyplausibleunderstandingofthatthesis,sinceitentailsthatmoral
permissibilityisidenticalwiththepropertyofbeing,whichisclearlyanaturalproperty
byconstruction.18

Inmyframework,bycontrast,(N)isconsistentbothwithnaturalismandwith

nonnaturalismaboutpermissibility.Supposewetakenaturalismtobethethesisthat
everymoralpropertyisanaturalproperty,whereapropertycountsasnaturaliffitis
eitheraprimitivenonnormativepropertyorapropertythatcanbedefined,inour
sense,innonnormativeterms.19(N)isthenconsistentwithnaturalismaboutmoral
permissibility(MP)becauseitsconsistentwithDef(MP,).Thatis,(N)isconsistent
withtheclaimthatwhenanactispermissible,itispermissibleifandonlyif,and
because,itis.But(N)isalsoconsistentwiththedenialofthisclaim.Consider,for
example,thenonnaturalistwhosays:

18
Indeed,sincethestrongsupervenienceofthenormativeonthenonnormative
guaranteestheexistenceofatruthoftheform(N)foreachnormativeproperty,an
orthodoxintensionalistwhoacceptsstrongsupervenienceasalmosteveryonedoes
mustbeamoralnaturalistacrosstheboard.

19
Thisisaplausibleaccountofwhatissometimescalledreductivenaturalismin
metaethics,aviewthatissupposedtocontrastbothwithnonnaturalismandalsowith
somethingcallednonreductivenaturalism.Iconfesstobeingunabletomakesenseof
thelattercontrast.Wecouldidentifynonreductivenaturalismabout(say)moral
permissibilitywiththeviewthatwhilethefactsaboutmoralpermissibilitysuperveneon
thenonnormativefacts,thereisnononnormativeconditionsuchthatDef(MP,).
Butifthatstheview,thenmostselfproclaimednonnaturalistsParfit,Enochand
Scanlon,forexampleareinfactnonreductivenaturalists,andtheonlynonnaturalist
onthecontemporarysceneisKitFine(2000),whorejectsthemetaphysical
supervenienceofthenormativeonthenonnormative.Thatsuggeststhatthisaccount
ofnonreductivenaturalismcantberight;butifthatsnottheview,thenIdontknow
whattheviewissupposedtobe.

26

Iagreethatanactismorallypermissibleifandonlyifitis.Butwhenweask
whyanygivenactismorallypermissible,theansweralwayslookslikethis:Ais
permissibleinvirtueofthefactthatAistogetherwithasubstantivemorallaw
accordingtowhichanactispermissibleifandonlyifitis.

Thisviewaccepts(N)butdeniesDef(MP,)andeverysimilarclaim,andsoconstitutes
agenuinealternativetonaturalism.20

Thisframeworkhastheadvantageofsharpeningthedebateovermoral

naturalisminawaythatmakesitclearwhythedebatehasbeensohardtoresolve.
Thequestionisnotwhethermoralpredicates(orproperties)arenecessarilycoextensive
withnonnormativeconditions,astheymustbegivensupervenience,whichnearly
everyoneaccepts.Nororisitwhethermoralpropertiesareidenticalwithnatural
propertiesonthesimpleintensionalistconceptionofproperties,sinceagain,thatsa
trivialconsequenceofsupervenience.Thequestionisratherwhethermoralproperties
admitofnaturalisticdefinition,orequivalently,whethertheatomicmoralfactsare
systematicallygroundedinnonnormativefacts.ThenaturalistsaysthatwhenAis
permissible,itispermissiblesimplyinvirtueofsatisfyingsomenaturalisticcondition.
Thenonnaturalistdeniesthis,maintainingthatwhenAispermissible,thisfactis

20
Toillustratethepointmadeinthelastsection,itsworthnotingthatthisnon
naturalistviewcomesintwoflavors.Themoststraightforwardversionofitis
hyperintensionalist.Onthisview,therearetwopropertiesnecessarilycoextensivewith
:moralpermissibility,whichisnonnatural,andthepropertyofbeing,whichadmits
ofasimplenaturalisticdefinition:Def(xx,)Butthereisalsoanintensionalist
versionofnonnaturalism.Onthisview,weidentifymoralpermissibilitywiththe
propertyofbeing(sincetheyarecointensive),butinsistthatthispropertycannotbe
definedinnaturalisticterms.InparticularwedenyDef(xx,),rejectingStrong
PropertyAbstractioninthiscase.Icanthinkofnogoodreasontoacceptthisview,or
totakeitseriouslyasapossibilityinmetaethics.Imentionitonlytoshowthatan
intensionalistwhoacceptsafinegrainednotionofgroundanddefinitioncanbeanon
naturalistinethicsevenifshebelievesthateverymoralpropertyisequivalenttoa
naturalisticcondition.

27

groundedinnaturalfactstogetherwithasubstantive,syntheticmoralprinciple.21This
issueismanifestlyarcane.Somequestionsaboutwhatgroundswhatareeasy,butthis
oneisnt.Ifthisiswhatthedebateovernaturalisminethicsboilsdownto,itshould
comeasnosurprisethatwehavenomanagedtoresolveit.

10.Conclusion

Philosophyisuniqueamongdisciplinesintakingfullresponsibilityforitsjargon.
Itsnotthemathematiciansjobtosaywhatanumberis.Itsnotthephysicistsjobto
saywhattimeis.Butwhenaphilosopheremploysanidiomforaseriouspurpose,itis
automaticallyherjob,atsomepoint,tosaywhatcanbesaidbywayofexplanation.As
wehavenoted,everypartofanalyticphilosophyisinthebusinessofgivingaccounts
ordefinitionsoranalyses.Andsoitfallstoustosaywhatweredoingwhenwedo
this.

Ihavesupposedthattheobjectsofanalysisarepropertiesandrelations,andIve

given a thoroughly metaphysical account of what definition comes to. According to

that account, to define a property is to identify a necessary truth that specifies, in a
uniform way, how atomic facts involving that property are grounded in more
fundamentalfacts.

My account employs one moderately exotic primitive: a notion of ground that

seems to me to be needed anyway and for which detailed theories have been given
elsewhere.22Itwouldbegoodifwecoulddowithoutit,butIdontseehowthiscanbe
done,andsoIofferthefollowingconjecture.Theidiomsofdefinitionandanalysisthat
wetakeforgrantedinphilosophystandorfallwiththegroundingidiom,sincethereis
nowaytoexplainthemwithoutit.Ifyoureallergictoground,youshouldstopasking
whatitisforacreaturetobeconsciousorforafacttobealawofnatureorfortwo

21
Oralternatively,thattheatomicmoralfactshavenofullgrounds,beingatbestpartly
groundedintheparticularnaturalfactsthatunderliethem.Thisisanoptionforradical
particularists,forwhomgeneralmorallawsplaynoexplanatoryrole.
22
SeeCorreiaandSchnieder(2012)forthestateoftheart(asof2012).

28

expressionstohavethesamemeaningorforanacttobefreeorforanartifacttobean
artwork,sinceyoucantexplainwhatyourquestionsmeanwithoutinvokingaconcept
youreject.Ontheotherhand,ifyouthinkthesequestionsmakegoodsense,thenyou
shouldmakeyourpeacewithgrounding,sinceyouarecommittedtomakingsenseofit
bythequestionsyoumakeityourbusinesstoaskandanswer.

29