G.R. No.

167571

November 25,

2008
LUIS

PANAGUITON,

JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C.
TONGSON

and

RODRIGO

G.

CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This

is

Petition

for

Review1 of

the

resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated

29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA
G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for

certiorari and his subsequent motion for

reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records,
follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed
various

sums

of

money

amounting

to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8

January 1993, Cawili and his business
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3)
checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the
signatures of both Cawili and Tongson.
Upon presentment for payment on 18
March 1993, the checks were dishonored,
either for insufficiency of funds or by the

closure of the account. Petitioner made

formal demands to pay the amounts of the
checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no
avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a
complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Blg.

22)5 before

the

Quezon

City

Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary

investigation, only Tongson appeared and
filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed
that he had been unjustly included as
party-respondent

in

the

case

since

petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the

latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like

petitioner, he had lent various sums to

Cawili and in appreciation of his services,
he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil
Corporation. He averred that he was not
Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Tongson denied that he had issued the
bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner
presented

several

documents

Tongson's

signatures,

purportedly

the

same

showing

which
as

the

were
those

appearing on the checks.7 He also showed

a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In

resolution

dated

December

1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara

found probable cause only against Cawili
and

dismissed

the

charges

against

Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal

before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
even while the case against Cawili was
filed before the proper court. In a letterresolution

dated

11

July

1997,10 after

finding that it was possible for Tongson to

co-sign the bounced checks and that he
had deliberately altered his signature in

the

pleadings

preliminary

submitted

investigation,

during
Chief

the
State

Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the

City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson
and to refer the questioned signatures to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution, but his motion was denied
for lack of merit.
On

15

March

1999,

Assistant

City

Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP

Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the
NBI

per

resolution.

the
In

Chief
her

State

Prosecutor's

resolution,11 ACP

Sampaga held that the case had already

prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended,12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years. In this case, the four
(4)-year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the
complaint

before

the

Quezon

City

Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not

interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period, as the law contemplates judicial,
and not administrative proceedings. Thus,
considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed
and no information had as yet been filed
against Tongson, the alleged violation of

B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already

prescribed.13 Moreover,

ACP

Sampaga

stated that the order of the Chief State

Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI
could

no

longer

be

sanctioned

under

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure because the initiative should
come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating
Sampaga

prosecutor.14 Finally,

found

that

Tongson

had

ACP
no

dealings with petitioner.15

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the
DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating
that the offense had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration of the DOJ

resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this
time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and

that

the filing

complaint

the

prosecutor's

with

of

the

office

interrupted the running of the prescriptive

period

citing Ingco

v.

Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the

City

Prosecutor

directed

to

of

file

Quezon
three

(3)

City

was

separate

informations against Tongson for violation

of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City
Prosecutor's

Office

filed

an

information20 charging petitioner with three

(3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August

2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a
motion

for

reconsideration

filed

by

Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had

already

prescribed

and

ordered

"the

withdrawal of the three (3) informations for

violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson.
In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not
provide for a prescriptive period for the
offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as
a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and
punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and
not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code
which governs the prescription of offenses

penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited

the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein
the

Supreme

Court

ruled

that

the

proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as

amended, are judicial proceedings, and not
the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner

thus

filed

petition

for

certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals

assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of
the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's
failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted
that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ
attached

to

the

petition

is

mere

photocopy.26 Petitioner

moved

for

the

reconsideration of the appellate court's

resolution, attaching to said motion an
amended Verification/Certification of NonForum

Shopping.27Still,

the

Court

of

Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating

that

subsequent

formal

compliance

requirements

se warrant

would

reconsideration

with

the

not per
of

its

resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals

added, the petition is patently without
merit and the questions raised therein are
too

unsubstantial

to

require

consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims
that the Court of Appeals committed grave

error in dismissing his petition on technical

grounds and in ruling that the petition
before it was patently without merit and
the questions are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the
Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the
filing of a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues
that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which
does not provide for its own prescriptive

period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years

in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili

and

comment,

Tongson

arguing

submitted

that

the

their

Court

of

Appeals did not err in dismissing the

petition for certiorari. They claim that the
offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In
addition, they claim that the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State,
violated their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification

attached to his petition before the Court of
Appeals substantially complies with the
rules,

the

verification

being

intended

simply to secure an assurance that the

allegations in the pleading are true and
correct

and

not

product

of

the

imagination or a matter of speculation. He

points out that this Court has held in a
number of cases that a deficiency in the
verification can be excused or dispensed
with, the defect being neither jurisdictional
nor always fatal.

31

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal

requirement

intended

to

secure

an

assurance that matters which are alleged

are true and correctthe court may simply

order the correction of unverified pleadings
or act on them and waive strict compliance
with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may be served,32 as in the instant
case. In the case at bar, we find that by
attaching the pertinent verification to his
motion

for

reconsideration,

petitioner

sufficiently complied with the verification

requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on
the ground that there was failure to attach
a certified true copy or duplicate original of
the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We

agree. A plain reading of the petition

before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the
annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9
August 2004,33 a certified true copy of
which

was

"A."34 Obviously,

attached
the

Court

as

Annex

of

Appeals

committed a grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner

assails

the

DOJ's

reliance

on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the

violation of a municipal ordinance, in
declaring that the prescriptive period is
tolled only upon filing of the information in
court. According to petitioner, what is
applicable

in

this

case

is Ingco

v.

Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled

that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office for preliminary investigation
suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco
case similarly involved the violation of a
special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He
argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the
Court of Appeals' pronouncements would
result in grave injustice to him since the
delays in the present case were clearly
beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326,
appropriately entitled An Act to Establish

Prescription for Violations of Special Acts

and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law
applicable to offenses under special laws
which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special
acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four
years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two
years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at

the time, from the discovery thereof and

the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings

are

instituted

against

the

guilty person, and shall begin to run again

if

the

proceedings

are

dismissed

for

reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to
offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense
under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years
from the commission of the offense or, if

the same be not known at the time, from

the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we
cannot uphold the position that only the
filing of a case in court can toll the running
of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No.
3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary

investigation

of

criminal

offenses was conducted by justices of the

peace, thus, the phraseology in the law,
"institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment,"39 and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.40

The

historical

application

perspective

of

Act

No.

on
3326

the
is

illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved

on 4 December 1926 at a time when the
function of conducting the preliminary
investigation

of

criminal

offenses

was

vested in the justices of the peace. Thus,

the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in
the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v.
Joson,43 is that the prescription of the
offense is tolled once a complaint is filed
with

the

justice

of

the

peace

for

preliminary investigation inasmuch as the

filing of the complaint signifies the
institution

of

the

criminal

proceedings

against the accused.44 These cases were

followed by our declaration in People v.

Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken
in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial
proceeding

which

suspends

the

prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently,

in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing
of the complaint in the Municipal Court,
even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on
the merits. In addition, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case,

its actuations already represent the initial

step

of

the

offender,48 and

proceedings
hence,

against

the

the

prescriptive

period should be interrupted.

In Ingco

v.

Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio

Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved

violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),
which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the
more

recent

Exchange

case of

Commission

Securities
v.

and

Interport

Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court

ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on violations of
the

Revised

Securities

Act,52 another

special law, is equivalent to the preliminary

investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal

cases,

and

thus

effectively

interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport
Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term
"judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No.
3326 appears before "investigation and
punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the

investigation of the charge for purposes of

prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character:
executive

when

it

involves

the

investigation phase and judicial when it

refers to the trial and judgment stage. With
this clarification, any kind of investigative
proceeding instituted against the guilty
person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the
injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his

control.55 A clear example would be this

case,

wherein

petitioner

filed

his

complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well

within the four (4)-year prescriptive period.
He likewise timely filed his appeals and his
motions

for

reconsideration

on

the

dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper
channels, within the prescribed periods.
However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the
City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the
time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution,
an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's

control.

After

all,

he

had

already initiated the active prosecution of

the case as early as 24 August 1995, only
to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flipflopping resolutions and its misapplication
of

Act

No.

3326.

Aggrieved

parties,

especially those who do not sleep on their

rights and actively pursue their causes,
should

not

be

allowed

to

suffer

unnecessarily further simply because of

circumstances beyond their control, like
the accused's delaying tactics or the delay
and

inefficiency

of

the

investigating

agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has
not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the

City

Prosecutor

signified

the

on

24

August

commencement

1995

of

the

proceedings for the prosecution of the

accused and thus effectively interrupted
the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding
of probable cause, with the debunking of
the claim of prescription there is no longer
any

impediment

to

the

filing

of

the

information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution
of the Department of Justice dated 9

August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET

ASIDE.

The

ORDERED

to

Department
REFILE

of

Justice

is

the

information

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

G.R.

against the petitioner.

NO. 140231
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), represented by ORLANDO
L. SALVADOR,
Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
-

versus
AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

NACHURA, JJ.

HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,

Office of the Ombudsman-Manila,

CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB

BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS
CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,
LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS
BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and
NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR
INDUSTRIES,
(NOCOSII),

INC.
Promulgated:
Respondents.

July 9, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The

Presidential

Commission

on

Good Government[1] (petitioner) filed the

herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of

the

Rules

of

Resolution[2] dated

Court
May

assailing
21,

1999

the
of

Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No.

0-95-0890

which

dismissed

petitioner's

criminal complaint for violation of Section

3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.

3019[3] against

concerned

members

of

Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of

Directors

and

Northern Cotabato Sugar

Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely:

Reynaldo Tuason,
Jose Barquillo,

Carlos Cajelo,
Jr.,

Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John

Does (respondents); and the Order[4] dated
July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President

Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order

No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc

Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee) which was tasked to inventory
all behest loans, determine the parties
involved

and

recommend

whatever

appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos

issued

Memorandum

Order

No.

61

expanding the functions of the Committee

to include the inventory and review of all
non-performing loans, whether behest or
non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria

to show the earmarks of a behest loan,
to wit: a) it is undercollaterized; b) the
borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high
government
marginal
officers

officials

notes;
or

d)

agents

like

presence

the

stockholders,

of

the

of

borrower

corporation are identified as cronies; e) a

deviation of use of loan proceeds from the
purpose intended; f) the use of corporate
layering;

g)

the

non-feasibility

of

the

project for which financing is being sought;

and, h) the extraordinary speed in which
the loan release was made.

Among

the

accounts

Committee's

Technical

referred
Working

to

the

Group

(TWG) were the loan transactions between

NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all

the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the
loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
behest

because

capital

of NOCOSIIs insufficient
and

inadequate

collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's

investigation

revealed

that

in

1975,

NOCOSII obtained loans by way of StandBy Letters of Credit from the PNB; that
NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value

from the offered collateral or an excess of

85% from the required percentage limit;
that the plant site offered as one of the
collaterals was a public land contrary to
the General Banking Act; that by virtue of
the marginal note of then President Marcos
in

the

letter

of Cajelo,

NOCOSII

was

allowed to use the public land as plant site

and

to

dispense

with

the

mortgage

requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paidup capital at the time of the approval of
the guaranty was onlyP2,500,000.00 or
only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of

PCGG

consultant

Orlando

Salvador,

petitioner filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman
against

the

criminal

complaint

respondents. Petitioner

alleges

that respondents violated the following

provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public

officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

e. Causing undue injury to any

party, including the Government or giving
any

private

party

any

unwarranted

benefits, advantage or preference in the

discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial
partiality,

functions
evident

inexcusable

through
bad

faith

negligence.

This

manifest
or

gross

provision

shall apply to officers and employees of

offices

or

government

corporations

charged with the grant of licenses or

permits or other concessions.
xxx

g.

Entering,

Government,
transaction

into

on

behalf

any

manifestly

of

the

contract

or

and

grossly

disadvantageous to the same, whether or

not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.

The respondents failed to submit any

responsive

pleading

the the Ombudsman,

prompting

before
Graft

Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. DiazSalcedo to resolve the case based on the
available evidence.

In a Resolution dated January 12,

1998 in

OMB-0-95-0890,

GIO

Diaz-

Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the

case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence or lack of probable cause against
the respondents and for prescription of the
offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved
the recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5]

Petitioner

filed

Motion

for

Reconsideration[6] but it was denied by GIO

Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9,
1999,which

was

approved

Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]

by

Forthwith, petitioner elevated the

case to this Court and in support of its
petition alleges that:

A)

The

Respondent

Ombudsman

gravely abused his discretion or acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing

the complaint filed by the

Petitioner on the ground of Prescription

considering that:
1.

THE

RIGHT

OF

THE

STATE

TO

RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN

WEALTH

IS

IMPRESCRIPTIBLE

UNDER

ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15, OF THE 1987

CONSTITUTION;

2.

PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN

FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE

OF THE BENEFICIARY;

3.

THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN

THE NATURE OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS

THE STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY
ON EACH DAY OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT.
HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

4.

PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF

DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE,

IT IS DEEMED WAIVED;

5.

PRESCRIPTION

HAS

NOT

BEEN

INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE

WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE,
THE

OMBUDSMAN

PROPRIO DISMISS

THE

CANNOT MOTU
COMPLAINT

ON

GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

6.

ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL

CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE DISCOVERY

RULE SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;

7.

THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER

LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF

BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.[8]

B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely

abused his discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in not finding that a
probable cause exists for violation by the
private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g)
of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear,
overwhelming andunrebutted evidence.[9]

In its Comment, the Ombudsman,

without

delving

on

the

issue

of

prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc

Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto (1999),[10] contends

that

its

finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack

of probable cause against respondents

deserves great weight and respect, and

must be accorded full weight and credit.

No comment was filed by the rest of

the respondents.

The

issue

before

the

Court

is

whether the Ombudsman committed grave

abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the
offense leveled against respondents has
prescribed; and (b) no probable cause
exists against respondents.

The petition is partly meritorious.

Respondent Ombudsman committed

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
subject

complaint

on

the

ground

of

prescription.

Respondents members of the PNB

Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII
are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019,
a special law. Amending said law, Section
4, Batas Pambansa Blg.

195,[11] increased

the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen

years.

The

applicable

law

in

the

computation of the prescriptive period is

Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[12] as amended,
which provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to

run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be
known at the time, from the discovery
thereof

and

proceedings

the
for

institution
its

of

judicial

investigation

and

punishment.

The
interrupted

prescription
when

shall

be

proceedings

are

instituted against the guilty person, and

shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.

The issue of prescription has long

been

laid

to

rest

in

the

aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding

Committee

on

Behest

Loans

v. Desierto,[13] where the Court held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the

State, the aggrieved party, to have known
the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time
the questioned transactions were made

because, as alleged, the public officials

concerned connived or conspired with the
beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree
with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period

for

respondents

the
in

offenses

with

which

OMB-0-96-0968

were

charged should be computed from the

discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the
phrase if the same not be known in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean
lack of knowledge but that the crime is
not reasonably knowable is unacceptable,
as it provides an interpretation that defeats
or negates the intent of the law, which is

written

in

clear

and

unambiguous

language and thus provides no room for

interpretation but only application.[14]

The Court reiterated the above ruling

in Presidential
Committee

Ad

Hoc

on

Fact-Finding

Behest

Loans

v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No.

3019 committed prior to the February
1986 Edsa Revolution

that

ousted

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled

that the government as the aggrieved
party

could

not

have

known

of

the

violations at the time the questioned

transactions

were

made

(PCGG

vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19,

2001,

349

SCRA

767; Domingo

v. Sandiganbayan,
14; Presidential

supra, Note

Ad

Hoc

Fact

Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,

supra, Note

16).

Moreover,

no

person

would have dared to question the legality

of those transactions. Thus, the counting of
the prescriptive period commenced from
the date of discovery of the offense in
1992 after an exhaustive investigation by
the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on
Behest Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was

interrupted,

the

second

paragraph

of

Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended,

provides that prescription is interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.[16]

Records

show

that

the

act

complained of was discovered in 1992. The

complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,[17] or within
three (3) years from the time of discovery.
Thus, the filing of the complaint was well
within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

On

the

issue

of

whether

the

Ombudsman committed grave abuse of

discretion in finding that no probable cause
exists against respondents, it must be
stressed

that

the

Ombudsman

is

empowered to determine whether there

exists reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter,

to

file

the

corresponding

information with the appropriate courts.

[18]

Settled is the rule that the Supreme

Court will not ordinarily interfere with the

Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory
and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
[19]

Said exercise of powers is based upon

his

constitutional

mandate[20] and

the

courts will not interfere in its exercise. The

rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory

and prosecutory powers

granted by the Constitution to the Office of

the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as
well.

Otherwise,

seeking

innumerable

dismissal

proceedings

of

petitions

investigatory

conducted

by

the

Ombudsman will grievously hamper the

functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise
of

discretion

on

the

part

of

public

prosecutors each time they decided to file

an information or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.[21]

While there are certain instances

when

this

Court

may

intervene

in

the prosecution of cases, such as, (1)

when

necessary

to

afford

adequate

protection to the constitutional rights of

the accused; (2) when necessary for the
orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3)
when there is a prejudicial question which
is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the
officer

are

without

or

in

excess

of

authority; (5) where the prosecution is

under

an

invalid

law,

ordinance

or

regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is

clearly apparent; (7) where the court has

no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where

it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance; and (10) when there is
clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied,[22] none apply
here.

After examination of the records and

the evidence presented by petitioner, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the Ombudsman.

No grave abuse of discretion can be

attributed

to

the

Ombudsman. Grave

abuse of discretion implies a capricious

and

whimsical

exercise

of

judgment

tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[23] The

exercise of power must have been done in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility. It must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.[24]

The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo,

in dismissing the criminal complaint, as

approved

by

Ombudsman Desierto,

is

worth-quoting, thus:
Taking

into

consideration

the

provisions of Administrative Order No. 13

and

Memorandum

Order

No.

61,

the

subject transactions can not be classified

as behest.

Evaluation of the records of this

case reveals that the loans acquired by
NOCOSII are actually foreign loans from
Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were
no direct loans released by PNB but merely
credit accommodations to guaranty the
loans from Midland Bank.

Anent complainant's claim that the

collaterals

offered

by

NOCOSII

are

insufficient, it should be noted that under

PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July
30, 1975, one of the conditions imposed to
NOCOSII was the execution of contract
assigning all NOCOSII'sshare of sugar and
molasses

to

PNB. NOCOSII

was

also

required to increase its paid up capital

at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30,
1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total
of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the
stockholders of NOCOSII were required to
pledge or assign all their present and
future

shares

to

PNB

while

the

accommodation

remains

standing. The

proposed plant site which was offered as

collateral

was

estimated

cost P307,903,000.00. The

to

foregoing

collaterals offered by NOCOSII are more

than

sufficient

to

cover

the

loans

of P333,465,260.00.

Furthermore, since the loan was

approved by PNB, it presupposes that all
the required clearances were submitted by
NOCOSII including the clearance from the
Office

of

complied

the
with

President;
all

the

and

having

documentary

requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to

the release of the loan.

Complainant further alleged that

NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its
paid

up

capital

was

only P50,000,000.00. Complainant,

however, failed to consider the other
assets of NOCOSII which also form part of
its capital. x x x[25]

The

finding

of

insufficiency

of

evidence or lack of probable cause by the

Ombudsman is borne out by the evidence
presented by petitioner: firstly, there were
no direct loans released by PNB but merely

credit

accommodations

guaranty NOCOSII's foreign

to

loans

from

Midland Bank Ltd. of London; secondly,

NOCOSII

effectively

came

under

government control since 1975 when PNB

acquired a majority of the voting rights in
NOCOSII and was given the power to
appoint

comptroller

therein; thirdly, PNB's credit

accommodations

to

NOCOSII

between

1975 and 1981 in the aggregate sum

of P333,465,260.00
secured

by:

Subscription

(1)
Rights

were
the

sufficiently

Assignment

and/or

of

Pledge

of

Shares dated September 5, 1975 whereby

NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of
stock,

representing

90%

of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock, and

assigned their subscription rights to future
stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of
Assignment

dated

September

5,

1975

whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of

sugar and molasses from the operation of
its

sugar

central

located

at Barrio Mateo, Matalam,

North Cotabato in favor of PNB;[27] (3) the
Joint

and Solidary Agreement

dated

September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII

officers

bound

themselves

jointly

and

severally liable with the corporation for the

payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;
[28]

(4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated

October

2,

1981

whereby

NOCOSII

mortgaged various buildings, machineries

and equipments, otherwise known as the

NOCOSII

Sugar

Mill

estimated

value

favor

PNB;[29] and

of

Plant,

with

of P307,593,000.00
(5)

the

an
in

Chattel

Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated

October

2,

mortgaged

1981

whereby

various

NOCOSII

transportation,

agricultural and heavy equipment in favor

of the PNB;[30] fourthly, PNB imposed other
conditions, such as, (1) the submission by
NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval of
its foreign loans; (2) the submission by
NOCOSII of the required clearances from
the

National

Authority

Economic

(NEDA)

and/or

Development
Presidential

Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN);

(3) submission by NOCOSII of its milling

contracts covering a total area of not less

than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by
NOCOSII of the government permit that the
planters

can

cultivate

the

required hectarage; (5) further increase

in NOCOSII's total

paid-in

capital

to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year

starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980;
(6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the
PNB

of

all

cash

proceeds

of NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition

of which shall be subject to the bank's
control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of
its own representatives in NOCOSII'sBoard
of Directors and its own comptroller who
shall have the authority to control all

disbursements and receipts of funds of

NOCOSII.[31]

The

herein

assailed Orders

being

supported by substantial evidence, there is

no basis for the Court to exercise its
supervisory powers over the ruling of the
Ombudsman.
evidence

As

supports

long

as

the

substantial

Ombudsmans

ruling, that decision will not be overturned.

[32]

WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription,

the

assailed Resolution

dated May

21,

1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the

Ombudsman

in

OMB

No.

0-95-0890

are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158131

August 8,

2007
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT
MARTEL,

OF

OLGA

SYSTEMS

JUSTICE,
S.

MARTEL,

AND

CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

JOSE

V.
and

ENCODING

The Case
This is a petition for review1 filed by the
Social Security System (petitioner) of the
Decision2 dated

17

October

2002

and

Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court

of Appeals. The Decision of 17 October
2002 affirmed the ruling of the Department
of

Justice

complaint

(DOJ)
against

dismissing

petitioners

respondents

Jose

V.

Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other

individuals3 for violation of Section 22(a)
and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of
Republic

Act

No.

1161

(RA

1161),4 as

amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (RA

8282),5 for non-remittance of contributions
to petitioner. The 5 May 2003 Resolution

denied

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration.
The Facts
Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S.
Martel (respondent Martels) are directors of
respondent

Systems

and

Corporation

(SENCOR),

an

Encoding
information

technology firm, with respondent Jose V.

Martel serving as Chairman of the Board of
Directors.
owned

Petitioner
and

is

government-

controlled

corporation

mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to

provide financial benefits to private sector
employees. SENCOR is covered by RA
1161, as amended by RA 8282, Section 22
of which requires employers like SENCOR

to remit monthly contributions to petitioner

representing the share of the employer and
its employees.
In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office a complaint against
respondent Martels and their five coaccused (docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534)
for

SENCORs

non-payment

of

contributions amounting toP6,936,435.80

covering the period January 1991 to May
1997. To pay this amount, respondent
Martels offered to assign to petitioner a
parcel of land in Tagaytay City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26340
issued under respondent Martels name.
Petitioner accepted the offer "subject to

the condition that x x x [respondent

Martels] will x x x settle their obligation
either by way of dacion en pago or through
cash settlement within a reasonable time x
x

x."6 Thus,

petitioner

withdrew

its

complaint from the Pasay City Prosecutors

Office but reserved its right to revive the
same "in the event that no settlement is
arrived at." Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L1534.
In December 2001, respondent Jose V.
Martel wrote petitioner offering, in lieu of
the

Tagaytay

City

property,

computer-

related services. The record does not

disclose petitioners response to this new

offer but on 7 December 2001, petitioner

filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office
another

complaint

Martels

and

(docketed

as

against

their
I.S.

No.

five

respondent
co-accused

00-L-7142)

for

SENCORs non-remittance of contributions,

this time from February 1991 to October
2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.
In

their

counter-affidavit,

respondent

Martels and their co-accused alleged that

petitioner is estopped from holding them
criminally

liable

since

petitioner

had

accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay

City property as payment of SENCORs
liability. Thus, according to the accused,
the relationship between SENCOR and

petitioner was "converted" into an ordinary

debtor-creditor

relationship

through

novation.
The

Ruling

of

the

Pasay

City

Prosecutors Office
In the Resolution of 28 February 2001,
Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor Artemio
Puti (Prosecutor Puti) found probable cause
to indict respondent Martels for violation of
Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section
28(e) of RA 1161, as amended by RA
8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent
Martels claim of "negation" of criminal
liability

by

novation,

holding

that

(1)

SENCORs criminal liability was already

"consummated" before respondent Martels

offered to pay SENCORs liability and (2)

the dacion en pago involving the Tagaytay
City

property

Prosecutor

Puti

did
noted

not
that

materialize.
respondent

Martels did not dispute petitioners claim

on

SENCORs

non-remittance

of

contributions.8 Accordingly, the Pasay City

Prosecutors Office filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City the corresponding
Information against respondent Martels,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0517.
Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.
The

Ruling

of

the

Department

of

Justice
In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001
signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel A.J.

Teehankee, the DOJ granted respondent

Martels appeal, set aside Prosecutor Putis
Resolution

of

28

February

2001,

and

ordered the withdrawal of the Information

filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The DOJ
found

that

petitioner
agreement

respondent

entered

into

before

the

Martels
a

and

compromise

filing

of

the

Information in Criminal Case No. 01-0517

and that such "negated" any criminal
liability on respondent Martels part. The
DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be
denied that the dismissal of the first
complaint docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534
constituted the compromise agreement

between the parties whereby complainant

SSS

agreed

to

respondents

mode

of

settling their liability through a "dacion en

pago". Consequently, the original relation
between the parties was converted to that
of an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship
thereby

extinguishing

the

original

obligation by a new one. Complainant,

therefore, cannot insist on the original trust
it had with respondents existing prior to
the dismissal of the former complaint (I.S.
No. 98-L-1534) by filling [sic] the present
complaint (I.S. No. 00-L-7142 now subject
of this appeal). Incidentally, this Office
considers the latter complaint as a mere
refilling

[sic]

of

the

former

already

compromised and dismissed [complaint],

because of the similarity of the parties and

causes of action.
After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S.
No. 98-L-1534 and prior to the filing of the
complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142,
respondents

have

exerted

great

effort

towards complying with the terms and

conditions of the compromise by way of
"dacion

en

pago".

For

example,

respondents cite their arrangement for

ocular inspection of the Tagaytay land by
the Presidential Commission on TagaytayTaal and with the Municipal Engineer of
Laurel, Batangas. The approval of the said
commission to build a 12-storey building
had

been

complied

with.

This

is

not

disputed by complainant. Access roads

were

acquired

by

respondents

from

adjacent owners, ready to be titled in

complainants name. Papers and permits
like ecological impact certification, site
resurvey, soil test and site appraisal were
secured

from

Municipality

various

of

Laurel,

offices
the

like

the

Municipal

Engineer, the Presidential Commission on

Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology
Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the
Department of Agriculture, among others.
On the part of complainant, it equally
shows [sic] adherence to the agreement to
compromise.

Records

show

that

on

October 1999, one of its officers, Atty.

Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino, assistant vicepresident, had expressed in writing his

finding to the effect that "(they) are
satisfied to see the lot that (respondents)
have negotiated with Congressman Dumpit
that (respondents) offered as access road
to (respondents[]) property" (Annex "8" of
Petition for Review). And, as borne by the
records, a Dacion En Pago Committee had
been created by complainant SSS precisely
to set the mechanism of the settlement in
motion. Further, respondents proposed an
alternative mode of settlement through
computer-related services, which proposal
was submitted to complainant as late as
December 1, 2000.

Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show

that the parties had acted with an obvious
intention

to

compromise.

Hence,

respondents reliance on the doctrine of

incipient criminal liability had [sic] factual
and legal bases. While the rule provides
that novation does not extinguish criminal
liability, this rule, however holds true only
if a criminal information is already filed in
court. Before that bench mark point, the
criminal liability is only at its incipient
stage and the new relation between the
parties forged at such stage had the effect
of negating the criminal liability of the
offender (People vs. Galsim, People vs.
Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x

In

fine,

the

compromise

agreement

between the parties whereby respondents

obligation will be settled through a "dacion
en

pago"

and

the

dismissal

of

the

complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has [sic] all

the

earmarks

respondents

of

novation

criminal

negating

liability.

Ergo,

complainant is precluded from filing the

present

criminal

complaint

against

respondents.9
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the
DOJ denied its motion in the Resolution of
20 September 2001.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
in a petition for certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJs rulings
and dismissed petitioners petition. The
appellate court deferred to the DOJs power
to review rulings of prosecutors and held
that in reversing Prosecutor Putis findings,
the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of
discretion.10
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the
appellate court denied its motion in the
Resolution of 5 May 2003.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the DOJs rulings because (1) respondent
Martels were charged not with Estafa but
with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in

relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as

amended, a special law impressed with
public interest; (2) petitioner did not agree
to

settle

respondent

Martels

criminal

liability; and (3) novation serves only to

negate civil, but not criminal, liability.
In

their

Comment,

respondent

Martels

countered that the DOJ correctly applied

the concept of novation as they had settled
SENCORs
added

liability.

that

Comment,

as

of

they

Respondent
the

filing
had

Martels
of

their

already

paidP17,887,442.54 of SENCORs liability.

In its Reply, petitioner contended that
although respondent Martels attempted to
pay

SENCORs

overdue

contributions

through dacion en pago, no payment took

place, as evidenced by respondent Martels
alternative

offer

to

provide

computer

related services to petitioner instead of

assigning the Tagaytay City realty. On
respondent Martels partial payment of
SENCORs liability, petitioner contended
that such does not preclude the resolution
of this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether the concept of
novation serves to abate the prosecution of
respondent Martels for violation of Section
22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of
RA 1161, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the negative and accordingly

grant the petition.
The Concept of Novation Finds No
Application Here
Novation, a civil law concept relating to the
modification of obligations,11 takes place
when the parties to an existing contract
execute

new

contract

which

either

changes the object or principal condition of

the

original

contract,

substitutes

the

person of the debtor, or subrogates a third

person in the rights of the creditor.12 The
effect is either to modify or extinguish the
original contract. In its extinctive form, the
new

obligation

replaces

the

original,

extinguishing

the

obligors

obligations

under the old contract.13

This Court first recognized the possibility of
applying

the

concept

of

novation

to

criminal cases in People v. Nery,14involving

a case for Estafa. In that case, the Court
observed that although novation is not one
of the means recognized by the Revised
Penal

Code

liability,15 it

to

may

extinguish
"prevent

the

criminal
rise

of

criminal liability or to cast doubt on the

true

nature

of

the

original

basic

transaction," provided the novation takes

place before the filing of the Information
with the trial court. We held:

The novation theory may perhaps apply

prior

to

information

the
in

filing
court

of
by

the

criminal

the

state

prosecutors because up to that time the

original trust relation may be converted by
the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor
situation, thereby placing the complainant
in estoppel to insist on the original trust.
But after the justice authorities have taken
cognizance of the crime and instituted
action in court, the offended party may no
longer divest the prosecution of its power
to

exact

the

criminal

liability,

as

distinguished from the civil. The crime

being an offense against the state, only the
latter can renounce it x x x.

It may be observed in this regard that

novation is not one of the means
recognized
whereby

by

criminal

extinguished;
novation

the

may

Penal

liability

hence, the
only

be

Code

can

be

role

of

to

either

prevent the rise of criminal liability or

to cast doubt on the true nature of
the

original

basic

transaction,

whether or not it was such that its

breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned
is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to x x
x.16(Emphasis supplied)

Thus,

novation

has

been

invoked

to

reverse convictions in cases where an

underlying contract initially defined the
relation of the parties such as the contract
in sale on commission in Estafa cases17 or
the contract in sale of goods in cases of
violation

of

the

Trust

Receipts

Law.18 Further, the party invoking novation

must prove that the new contract did
indeed take effect.19
The

facts

of

this

case

negate

the

application of novation. In the first place,

there is, between SENCOR and petitioner,
no original contract that can be replaced
by a new contract changing the object or
principal condition of the original contract,

substituting the person of the debtor, or

subrogating a third person in the rights of
the

creditor.

The

original

relationship

between SENCOR and petitioner is defined

by law RA 1161, as amended which
requires employers like SENCOR to make
periodic contributions to petitioner under
pain

of

criminal

prosecution.

Unless

Congress enacts a law further amending

RA 1161 to give employers a chance to
settle

their

prevent

prosecution,

agreements
SENCOR

overdue
between

(represented

contributions

to

no

of

amount

petitioner
by

and

respondent

Martels) can change the nature of their

relationship

and

the

consequence

SENCORs non-payment of contributions.

of

The indispensability of a prior contractual

relation between the complainant and the
accused as requisite for the application of
novation

in

criminal

cases

was

underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In that

case, the accused, who was charged with
Qualified Theft, invoked People v. Nery to
support his claim that the complainants
acceptance of partial payment of the
stolen

funds

before

the

filing

of

the

Information with the trial court converted

his liability into a civil obligation thus
rendering baseless his prosecution. The
Court rejected this claim and held that
unlike in Nery, there was, in that case, no
prior "contractual relationship or bilateral

agreement, which can be modified or

altered by the parties," thus:
Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in
support

of

the

contention

that

the

acceptance by complainant of payment

converted the liability of the accusedappellant into a civil obligation or else that
it

estopped

said

complainant

from

proceeding with the prosecution of the

case, is misplaced and unwarranted.
[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for
estafa, there
was contractual relationship between
the

parties

that

can

be

validly

novated by the settlement of the

obligation of the offender. Whatever

was

said

in

that

case,

therefore,

cannot be invoked in the present case

where no contractual relationship or
bilateral agreement, which can be
modified or altered by the parties, is
involved.

There

is

here

merely

taking of the complainants property

by one who never acquired juridical
possession thereof, qualified by grave
abuse of confidence.21 (Italicization in
the original; boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Similarly,

there

is

here

merely

an

employers failure to pay its contributions

to a government corporation as mandated
by that corporations charter.

Secondly,

as

Prosecutor

Puti

correctly

noted, the agreement between petitioner

and respondent Martels for the latter to
pay

SENCORs

overdue

contributions

through the assignment to petitioner of a

piece

of

realty

Petitioners

never

acceptance

materialized.
of

respondent

Martels offer was subject to a suspensive

condition that "x x x [private] respondents
will x x x settle their obligation either by
way of dacion en pago or through cash
settlement within a reasonable time x x x."
This condition was not met because three
years

after

respondent

Martels

offer,

petitioner did not receive any payment. In

fact, respondent Jose Martel, at that point,
changed

the

terms

of

the

supposed

settlement by offering computer-related

services instead of assigning the Tagaytay
City

realty.

In

their

Comment

to

the

petition, respondent Martels explained that

they made such alternative offer because
"the processing of the papers for the
Tagaytay

property

met

with

some

delay."22 In short, respondent Martels failed

to make good on their promise in 1998 to
settle SENCORs liability through dacion en
pago. The circumstances the DOJ cited as
proof

of

the

compromise

agreements

alleged implementation were nothing but

steps preparatory to the actual payment of
SENCORs overdue contributions.

In

sum,

we

hold

that

any

payment

respondent Martels would have made to

petitioner (and it appears that pending this
petition, respondent Martels partially paid
SENCORs liability) only affects their civil, if
any, but not their criminal liability for
violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation
to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended.
As noted in the Resolution dated 28
February

2001

of

the

Pasay

City

Prosecutors Office, respondent Martels do

not dispute SENCORs non-remittance of
contributions

from

February

1991

to

October 2000. Thus, the existence of

probable

cause

against

respondent

Martels, SENCORs directors,23 is beyond

doubt.

Prosecutors Findings Not Conclusive

In

dismissing

petitioners

petition,

the

Court of Appeals held:

[T]his Court has no power to determine
whether

probable

cause

to

warrant

prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he

determination of whether or not probable
cause exists to warrant the prosecution in
court of [respondent Martels] should be
consigned

and

entrusted

to

the

Department of Justice as reviewer of the

findings of the public prosecutor x x x.
In this Petition, We are being asked to
assume the function of Public Prosecutor
by determining whether probable cause
exists or not. Such is a function that this

Court should not be called upon to perform

x x x.24
This is a misstatement of the law. This
Court and the Court of Appeals possess the
power to review findings of prosecutors in
preliminary

investigations.25 Although

policy considerations call for the widest

latitude of deference to the prosecutors
findings,26 courts should never shirk from
exercising

their

circumstances
whether

the

power,

warrant,

when
to

prosecutors

the

determine

findings

are

supported by the facts, or as in this case,

by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as
prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary,
exercising

their

mandate

under

the

Constitution,
remedial

relevant

rules

to

statutes,

settle

cases

and
and

controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this

Courts review power ensures that, on the
one

hand,

probable

criminals

are

prosecuted27 and, on the other hand, the

innocent

are

spared

from

baseless

we GRANT the

petition.

prosecution.28
WHEREFORE,
We SET

ASIDE the

Decision

dated

17

October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May

2003

of

the

Court

of

Appeals.

We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28

February

2001

Prosecutors Office.
SO ORDERED.

of

the

Pasay

City

G.R. Nos. 165510-33

July 28,

2006
BENJAMIN

("KOKOY")

T.

ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON.

SIMEON

V.

MARCELO,

in

his

official capacity as the Ombudsman,

and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration1 assailing

the

Decision

dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive

portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner claims that the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion
in

recommending

the

filing

of

24

informations against him for violation of

Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
that the Ombudsman cannot revive the
aforementioned
previously
Sandiganbayan

cases
dismissed
in

its

which

were

by

the

Resolution

of

February 10, 2004; that the defense of

prescription may be raised even for the

first time on appeal and thus there is no
necessity for the presentation of evidence
thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this
Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal
Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the
Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 0423185704-231860

pending

before

the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the

ground of prescription.
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues
that the dismissal of the informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not
mean

that

petitioner

was

thereafter

exempt from criminal prosecution; that

new informations may be filed by the

Ombudsman should it find probable cause

in

the

conduct

investigation;

that

complaint

of

its

the

with

preliminary

filing

the

of

the

Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

in 1987 and the filing of the information
with

the

Sandiganbayan

in

1989

interrupted the prescriptive period; that

the absence of the petitioner from the
Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
interrupted the aforesaid period based on
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For

its

part,

the

PCGG

avers

in

its

Comment4 that, in accordance with the

1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or
theOmbudsman

Act

of

1989, the

Omdudsman need not wait for a new

complaint with a new docket number for it
to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that
considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act
No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of
Prescription For Violations Penalized By
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin
To

Run,

are

silent

as

to

whether

prescription should begin to run when the

offender is absent from the Philippines, the
Revised Penal Code, which answers the
same in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether
the preliminary investigation conducted by

the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos.

13406-13429

was

nullity;

and

(2)

whether the offenses for which petitioner

are being charged have already prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our
ruling in the assailed Decision that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 1340613429 is a valid proceeding despite the
previous

dismissal

Sandiganbayan

thereof
in

its

by

the

Minute

Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which

reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs.
BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ

Considering

that

the

Decision

of

the

Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos.

143618-41,

entitled

Romualdez

vs.

Sandiganbayan

"Benjamin
The

(First

Kokoy

Honorable

Division,

et

al.)"

promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and

set aside the orders issued by this Court on
June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied
the

accuseds

informations

in

motion
these

to

quash

cases;

that

the
in

particular the above-mentioned Decision

ruled that the herein informations may be
quashed because the officer who filed the
same had no authority to do so; and that
the said Decision has become final and
executory on November 29, 2002, these

cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these

cases be sent to the archives.
The

aforesaid

dismissal

was

effected

pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.

Sandiganbayan6 where petitioner assailed
the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 8,
2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
which

denied

his

Motion

to

Quash,

terminated the preliminary investigation

conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero
and set his arraignment for violations of
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26,
2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the
aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we
held that:

In the case at bar, the flaw in the

information is not a mere remediable
defect

of

form,

as

in Pecho

v.

Sandiganbayan where the wording of the

certification in the information was found
inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where
the required certification was absent. Here,
the

informations

were

filed

by

an

unauthorized party. The defect cannot be

cured

even

preliminary

by

conducting

investigation.

An

another
invalid

information is no information at all and

cannot

be

the

basis

for

criminal

proceedings.8
In

effect,

we

upheld

in Romualdez

Sandiganbayan9 petitioners

Motion

v.
to

Quash

and

directed

the

dismissal

of

Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because

the

informations

were

filed

by

an

unauthorized party, hence void.

In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable.
Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to
quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception.

An

order

sustaining

the

motion to quash is not a bar to another

prosecution for the same offense unless
the motion was based on the grounds
specified in section 3(g) and (i)10 of this
Rule.

An order sustaining a motion to quash on

grounds other than extinction of criminal
liability

or

double

jeopardy

does

not

preclude the filing of another information

for a crime constituting the same facts.
Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of
Appeals11 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and
sufficient complaint or information in the
former

prosecution.

If,

therefore,

the

complaint or information was insufficient

because it was so defective in form or
substance that the conviction upon it could
not have been sustained, its dismissal
without the consent of the accused cannot
be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority

to file the information, the dismissal of the

first information would not be a bar in
petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x
x.12
Be

that

as

it

investigation

may,

the

preliminary

conducted

by

the

Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a

violation

of

petitioners

right

to

be

informed of the charges against him. It is

of no moment that the cases investigated
by the Ombudsman bore the same docket
numbers

as

those

already

been

cases

which

have

by

the

dismissed

Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos.

13406-13429.
stated:

As

we

have

previously

The assignment of a docket number is an

internal

matter

designed

for

efficient

record keeping. It is usually written in the

Docket

Record

in

sequential

order

corresponding to the date and time of filing

a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the
docket numbers of the dismissed cases
was merely for reference. In fact, after the
new informations were filed, new docket
numbers

were

assigned, i.e., Criminal

Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13

Besides, regardless of the docket numbers,
the Ombudsman conducted the abovereferred preliminary investigation pursuant
to

our

Decision

in Romualdez

v.

Sandiganbayan14 when

we

categorically

declared therein that:

The Sandiganbayan also committed grave
abuse

of

terminated

discretion
the

when

it

reinvestigation

abruptly
being

conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should

be recalled that our directive in G.R. No.
105248 for the holding of a preliminary
investigation was based on our ruling that
the right to a preliminary investigation is a
substantive, rather than a procedural right.
Petitioners right was violated when the
preliminary investigation of the charges
against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It
bears stressing that our directive should be

strictly complied with in order to achieve

its objective of affording petitioner his right
to due process.15
Anent the issue on the prescription of the
offenses charged, we should first resolve
the question of whether this Court may
validly take cognizance of and resolve the
aforementioned issue considering that as
we have said in the assailed Decision, "this
case has never progressed beyond the
filing

of

the

informations

against

the

petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent

that evidence be gathered through trial on
the

merits

offense

to

determine

charged

whether

has

the

already

prescribed."17 We reconsider our

stance

and shall rule in the affirmative.

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides
that the accused may, at any time before
he enters his plea, move to quash the
complaint and information18 on the ground
that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,19 which ground includes the
defense of prescription considering that
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerates prescription as one of those
grounds which totally extinguishes criminal
liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a
trial on the merits of a criminal case, the
accused can very well invoke the defense
of prescription.

Thus, the question is whether or not the

offenses charged in the subject criminal
cases have prescribed? We held in the case
of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the
offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription
for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the

time

the

prescriptive

period

was

interrupted.21
Petitioner is being charged with violations
of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to
file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities
for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure
as

Ambassador

Extraordinary

and

Plenipotentiary and for the period 19631966

during

his

tenure

as

Technical

Assistant in the Department of Foreign

Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all
offenses punishable therein shall prescribe
in

15

years.

Significantly,

this

Court

already declared in the case of People v.

Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the
amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on
March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for
offenses punishable under the said statute
was

only

ten

(10)

years.

The

longer

prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as

provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as

amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply
in this case for the reason that the
amendment, not being favorable to the
accused

(herein

private

respondent),

cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence,

the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or
ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by
the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15,
1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years.
On the other hand, for offenses allegedly
committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the
same shall prescribe in 15 years.

As to when these two periods begin to run,

reference is made to Act No. 3326 which
governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined by and penalized under
special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326
provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings

are

instituted

against

the

guilty person, and shall begin to run again

if

the

proceedings

are

dismissed

for

reasons not constituting jeopardy.

In

the

case

construed

the

of People

v.

Duque,24 we

aforequoted

provision,

specifically the rule on the running of the

prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation
and

punishment"

may

be

either

disregarded as surplusage or should be

deemed preceded by the word "until."
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of
the law; and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof;"

or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at
the

time,

from

the

discovery

thereof

and until institution of judicial proceedings

for

its

investigation

and

punishment."

(Emphasis supplied)25
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive
period of the offenses herein began to run
from the discovery thereof or on May 8,
1987, which is the date of the complaint
filed

by

the

former

Solicitor

General

Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner

with the PCGG.

In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Desierto26 this Court already took note
that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No.
3019 committed prior to the February 1986
EDSA Revolution that ousted President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the
government as the aggrieved party could
not have known of the violations at the
time the questioned transactions were
made. Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992

after an exhaustive investigation by the

Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.27
However, both respondents in the instant
case aver that, applying Article 91 of the
Revised
absence

Penal
of

Code

the

suppletorily,

petitioner

from

the
the

Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000

prevented the prescriptive period for the
alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously
silent as to whether the absence of the
offender from the Philippines bars the
running of the prescriptive period. The
silence of the law can only be interpreted

to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did

not intend such an interruption of the
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of
Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in
fact a legislative gap caused by such an
omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof,
because a legislative lacuna cannot be
filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may
not, in the guise of the interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include
therein

situations

not

provided

nor

intended by the lawmakers. An omission at

the

time

of

the

enactment,

whether

careless or calculated, cannot be judicially

supplied however after later wisdom may

recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they
think the legislature would have supplied if
its

attention

has

been

called

to

the

omission.28
The only matter left to be resolved is
whether the filing of the complaint with the
PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the
informations with the Sandiganbayan to
initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in
1989

interrupted

the

running

of

the

prescriptive period such that when the

Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his

counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the

offenses have already prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person." However, there is no
such proceeding instituted against the
petitioner to warrant the tolling of the
prescriptive

periods

of

the

offenses

charged against him.

In Romualdez
Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner

v.
averred

that

PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or

grave abuse of discretion in conducting a
preliminary

investigation

of

cases

not

falling within its competence.30 This Court,

in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the

case to remove the possibility of any
misunderstanding as to the course which it
wishes

petitioners

cases

in

the

Sandiganbayan to take"31declared invalid

the preliminary investigation conducted by
the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez

(of

failure

to

file

annual

statements of assets and liabilities), for

lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.32
In Romualdez

v.

Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner

assailed

the

validity of the informations filed with the

Sandiganbayan

in

Criminal

Case

Nos.

13406-13429 considering that the same

were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In

granting petitioners plea, this Court held,

thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be
cured by conducting another preliminary
investigation. An invalid information is no
information at all and cannot be the basis
for criminal proceedings.34
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings
initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez
in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG
with

the

Sandiganbayan

in

1989

is

judicially settled. In contemplation of the

law, no proceedings exist that could have
merited the suspension of the prescriptive
periods.

Besides, the only proceeding that could

interrupt the running of prescription is that
which is filed or initiated by the offended
party before the appropriate body or office.
Thus,

in

the

case

of People

v.

Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing

of the complaint with the municipal mayor
for purposes of preliminary investigation
had the effect of suspending the period of
prescription.

Similarly,

in

the

case

of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that

the filing of a complaint against a public
officer with the Ombudsman tolled the
running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint
was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG.

Thus, the same could not have interrupted

the running of the prescriptive periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr.
Justice Carpio contends that the offenses
charged against the petitioner could not
have prescribed because the latter was
absent from the Philippines from 1986 to
April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive
period did not run from the time of
discovery on May 8, 1987, citing Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "[t]he term of prescription should not
run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that

Article 10 of the same Code makes Article

91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws],
unless the latter should x x x provide the
contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91 to
that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the
prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA
3019, before and after its amendment,
should run only after petitioner returned to
this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the
special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC
applies suppletorily, as the Court has held
in a long line of decisions since 1934,
starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the
Court

has

applied

suppletorily

various

provisions of the RPC to resolve cases

where the special laws are silent on the
matters

in

issue.

The

law

on

the

applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus

well-settled, with the latest reiteration
made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v.
People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the
possible effects of the ruling of the Majority
Opinion and argues that
The accused should not have the sole
discretion

of

preventing

his

own

prosecution by the simple expedient of

escaping from the States jurisdiction. x x x
An accused cannot acquire legal immunity

by

being

fugitive

from

the

States

jurisdiction. x x x.
To

allow

an

prosecution

accused
by

simply

to

prevent
leaving

his
this

jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of

criminal justice in favor of the accused to
the detriment of the States ability to
investigate and prosecute crimes. In this
age of cheap and accessible global travel,
this Court should not encourage individuals
facing

investigation

or

prosecution

for

violation of special laws to leave Philippine

jurisdiction

to

sit-out

abroad

the

prescriptive period. The majority opinion

unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for
such anomalous practice.

With all due respect, we beg to disagree.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART.

10. Offenses

not

subject

to

the

provisions of this Code. Offenses which

are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the
latter should specially provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to
hastily conclude that a special law such as
RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the
Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As
it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his
Dissenting Opinion that

There is no gap in the law. Where the

special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC
applies suppletorily, as the Court has held
in a long line of decisions since 1934,
starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the
Court

has

applied

suppletorily

various

provisions of the RPC to resolve cases

where the special laws are silent on the
matters

in

issue.

The

law

on

the

applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus

well-settled, with the latest reiteration
made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v.
People.
However, it must be pointed out that the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10

thereof, finds relevance only when the

provisions of the special law are silent on a
particular matteras evident from the cases
cited and relied upon in the Dissenting
Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this
Court, before ruling that the subsidiary
penalty under Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code may be applied in cases of
violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special
law did not contain any provision that the
defendant

can

subsidiary

imprisonment

insolvency.

be

sentenced
in

case

with
of

In

the

case

of

People

v.

Li

Wai

Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on

the service of sentences provided in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of
the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of RA No. 6425 orThe
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering
the lack of similar rules under the special
law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the
Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
Revised Penal Code to define the words
"principal,"
"accessories"
the Migrant

"accomplices"
under
Workers

RA

No.
and

and
8042

or

Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not

defined therein although it referred to the

same terms in enumerating the persons
liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No.
3019 on the question of whether or not the
absence

of

the

accused

from

the

Philippines prevents or tolls the running of

the prescriptive period is more apparent
than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019
in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect
as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3
thereof

categorically

defines

"special

acts" as "acts defining and penalizing

violations of the law not included in
the Penal Code".

Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc

Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,40 this Court was categorical in
ruling that
The law on prescription of offenses is found
in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code for offenses punishable thereunder.
For those penalized under special laws, Act
No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the
prescription shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation

and

punishment. The

running

of

shall

be

the

prescriptive
interrupted

period
when

proceedings are instituted against the

guilty person, and shall begin to run
again

if

the

proceedings

are

dismissed for reasons not constituting

jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No.
3326 did not provide that the absence of
the accused from the Philippines prevents
the running of the prescriptive period.
Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did
not consider the absence of the accused
from the Philippines as a hindrance to the
running

of

the

prescriptive

period.Expressio

unius

est

exclusio

alterius. To elaborate, Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory

construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. This rule is expressed
in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its
terms,

is

expressly

limited

to

certain

matters, it may not, by interpretation or

construction, be extended to others. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified
enumerations

in

statute

had

the

intention been not to restrict its meaning

and to confine its terms to those expressly

mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the
accuseds absence from the Philippines as
a

ground

for

the

interruption

of

the

prescriptive period in special laws, the

same could have been expressly provided
in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No.
8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where
the legislature made its intention clear and
was thus categorical that
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of
any

Provision

of

this

Code

All

violations of any provision of this Code

shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Prescription shall begin to run from the day

of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings

are

instituted

against

the

guilty persons and shall begin to run again

if

the

proceedings

are

dismissed

for

reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The term of prescription shall not run
when the offender is absent from the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called

"gap" in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No.

3326

governs

the

operation

of

the

prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No.

3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
can and shall still be applied in cases
where the accused is absent from the
Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of
the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the
Revised

Penal

Code

makes

the

Code

suppletory to special laws, however, Act

No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of
"special law" as contemplated and used in
Article 10 of the RPC.

In

the

case

of United

States

v.

Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to

interpret

the

term

"special

laws"

mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code

of the Philippines, which is now Article 10
of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to
penal laws that punish acts not defined
and penalized by the Penal Code of the
Philippines. Thus
This contention makes it necessary to
define "special laws," as that phrase is
used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does
this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in
the

Penal

Code

(article

7)

have

the

meaning applied to the phrase "special

laws," as the same is generally used? x x x

It is confidently contended that the phrase

"leyes especiales," as used in the Penal
Code (article 7) is not used with this
general signification: In fact, said phrase
may refer not to a special law as above
defined, but to a general law. A careful
reading of said article 7 clearly indicates
that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not
used to signify "special laws" in the general
signification of that phrase. The article, it
will be noted, simply says, in effect, that
when a crime is made punishable under
some other law than the Penal Code, it (the
crime) is not subject to the provisions of
said code.43

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and

Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019,
the same result would obtain. A conflict will
arise

from

the

contemporaneous

application of the two laws. The Revised

Penal

Code

absence

of

explicitly
the

states

accused

that
from

the
the

Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling

of the prescriptive period while Act No.
3326 does not. In such a situation, Act No.
3326 must prevail over Article 91 because
it specifically and directly applies to special
laws while the Revised Penal Code shall
apply to special laws only suppletorily and
only when the latter do not provide the
contrary.

Indeed,

elementary

rules

of

statutory construction dictate that special

legal provisions must prevail over general

ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios
reservations about the effects of ruling that
the absence of the accused from the
Philippines shall not suspend the running
of

the

prescriptive

period.

Our

duty,

however, is only to interpret the law. To go

beyond that and to question the wisdom or
effects of the law is certainly beyond our
constitutionally

mandated

duty.

As

we

have already explained

Even on the assumption that there is in
fact a legislative gap caused by such an
omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof,

because a legislative lacuna cannot be

filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may
not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated,
cannot be judicially supplied however after
later

wisdom

may

recommend

the

inclusion. Courts are not authorized to

insert into the law what they think should
be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature

would

have

supplied

if

its

attention has been called to the omission.44

Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the
liberal interpretation of the statute of

limitations in favor of the accused only

relates

to

the

following

issues: (1)

retroactive or prospective application of

laws

providing

or

extending

the

prescriptive period; (2) the determination

of the nature of the felony committed vis-vis the applicable prescriptive period;
and

(3)

the

prescriptive

reckoning

period

of

when

the

runs. Therefore,

the

aforementioned principle cannot be utilized

to

support

the

Majority

Opinions

conclusion that the prescriptive period in a

special law continues to run while the
accused is abroad.
We

take

proposition.

exception

to

the

foregoing

We believe that a liberal interpretation of

the law on prescription in criminal cases
equally provides the authority for the rule
that the prescriptive period runs while the
accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction.
The nature of the law on prescription of
penal statutes supports this conclusion. In
the old but still relevant case of People v.
Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed
the rationale behind and the nature of
prescription of penal offenses
"We should at first observe that a mistake
is sometimes made in applying to statutes
of

limitation

construction

in
that

criminal
has

been

suits
given

the
to

statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two

classes

of

essentially

statutes,
different.

In

however,

are

civil

the

suits

statute is interposed by the legislature as

an

impartial

arbiter

between

two

contending parties. In the construction of

the

statute,

therefore,

there

is

no

intendment to be made in favor of either

party. Neither grants the right to the other;
there is therefore no grantor against whom
the ordinary presumptions, of construction
are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a
statute of limitation is granted by the
State. Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be
no longer the subject of prosecution.' The
statute is not a statute of process, to

be scantily and grudgingly applied,

but an amnesty, declaring that after a
certain time oblivion shall be cast
over the offence; that the offender
shall be at liberty to return to his
country, and resume his immunities as
a citizen and that from henceforth he
may cease to preserve the proofs of
his innocence, for the proofs of his
guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally
construed in favor of the defendant, not
only because such liberality of construction
belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace,
but because the very existence of the
statute, is a recognition and notification by
the legislature of the fact that time, while it

gradually wears out proofs of innocence,

has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be
remembered

that

delay

in

instituting

prosecutions is not only productive of

expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion,
even by mere natural lapse of memory, of
testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that
statutes,

enforcing

such

promptitude

should be vigorously maintained. They are

not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact
vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to

secure for criminal trials the best evidence

that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should
deny petitioner the benefits accruing from
the liberal construction of prescriptive laws
on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates
from the liberality of the State. Any bar to
or cause of interruption in the operation of
prescriptive

periods

cannot

simply

be

implied nor derived by mere implication.

Any diminution of this endowment must be
directly and expressly sanctioned by the
source itself, the State. Any doubt on this
matter must be resolved in favor of the
grantee thereof, the accused.

The

foregoing

conclusion

is

logical

considering the nature of the laws on

prescription. The exceptions to the running
of or the causes for the interruption of the
prescriptive periods may and should not be
easily implied. The prescriptive period may
only be prevented from operating or may
only

be

tolled

for

reasons

explicitly

provided by the law.

In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we
ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of
cases, that in the interpretation of the law
on prescription of crimes, that which is
more favorable to the accused is to be
adopted. The said legal principle takes into

account

the

nature

of

the

law

on

prescription of crimes which is an act of

amnesty and liberality on the part of the
state in favor of the offender. In the case
of People

v.

Moran,

this

Court

amply

discussed the nature of the statute of

limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not statute of process, to be
scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain
time

oblivion

shall

be

cast

over

the

offense; that the offender shall be at

liberty to return to his country, and resume
his immunities as a citizen; and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the
proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of

his guilt are blotted out. Hence, it is that

statues of limitation are to be liberally
construed in favor of the defendant, not
only because such liberality of construction
belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace,
but because the very existence of the
statute is a recognition and notification by
the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence,
has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt.47
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10and-15-year prescriptive periods in the
instant case, were not interrupted by any
event from the time they began to run on

May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the

alleged

offenses

committed

for

years

petitioner

the

by

the

1963-1982

prescribed 10 years from May 8, 1987 or

on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the
alleged

offenses

committed

for

years

petitioner

the

by

the

1983-1985

prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or

on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special
Prosecutor

initiated

the

preliminary

investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 1340613429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the

petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit,
the alleged offenses subject therein have
already prescribed. Indeed, the State has

lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the

offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos.
28031-28049

pending

before

the

Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 0423185704-231860

pending

before

the

Regional Trial Court of Manila.

WHEREFORE,
petitioners

premises

Motion

for

considered,

Reconsideration

is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 2803128049 pending before the Sandiganbayan

and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704231860 pending before the Regional Trial
Court

of

Manila

ordered DISMISSED.
August 13, 1992

are

all

hereby

G.R. No. 100285

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-

appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera
and

Monsod

appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Law

Office

for

accused-

Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged

with and convicted of violating Section 38
in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as
amended, known as The Labor Code of the
Philippines.

The

charge

of

illegal

recruitment was set out in the information

in the following terms:

That on or about and/or sometime in

January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused well
knowing

that

authorized

by

he
the

is

not
proper

licensed

nor

government

agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of

workers for placement abroad, did then

and

there

wilfully,

unlawfully

and

feloniously recruit Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin

Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan, Norma Francisco,
Elmo Alcaraz and Marcelino Desepida as
workers

abroad

exacted

and

actually

received money from the above-named

victims, to their damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.[[1]]

The evidence in chief of the prosecution

consisted principally of the testimony of
the following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo
Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma
Francisco.

Their

testimonies

were

summarized in the trial court's decision as

follows:

. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin

Ulat) was invited by the accused to his
house
accused

in

Calamba,
informed

Laguna.

him

that

Thereat
he

was

recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and

that he was interested in getting (sic) him.
Accused likewise presented to him that he
(accused) was a licensed recruiter (TSN, 22
Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him
to secure his birth certificate, an NBI
clearance and medical certificate. He was
able to secure an NBI clearance which he
showed

to

the

accused.

The

latter

thereafter told him that he would secure

the rest of his papers like passport, visa
and medical certificate for him and for this,
accused asked him to prepare the amount
of P20,000.00. He did not have that
money,

so

he

mortgaged

his

lot

for

P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused,

Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave this
amount to the accused who assured him
that he would be able to leave within two
months. The accused did not issue a
receipt for that amount despite his request.
He did not persist in asking the accused
because he trusted him, accused coming
from an affluent family and a member of a
well-known

Catholic

organization,

the

"Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9).

However, accused failed to employ him at

Saudi Arabia within two months despite
repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money but
accused

failed.

Finally,

he

decided,

together with the other complainants, to

file a complaint against accused before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA). . . .

Elmo

Alcaraz,

Marcelino

Desepida

and

Norma Francisco individually testified to

the following: sometime also in January
1986, they went to the house of accused
for work abroad as the latter had earlier
told them that he was recruiting workers

for the Saudi Arabia. The accused asked

money to process their papers. Alcaraz was
able to give the accused on 22 February
1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the
accused failed to issue him a receipt and
he did not persist in asking for it because
he trusted the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov.
1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give
the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount
of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which
the

accused

did

not

issue

receipt

although he promised to issue one the next

day. However, the following day, when he
reminded the accused of the receipt, he
refused saying that he (Desepida) should
trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to
give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February

1986

in

the

presence

of

the

other

applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But,

the accused again failed to issue a receipt
despite demand. She was told by the
accused to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However,
the accused failed to return their money
notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided
to file a complaint with the POEA against
the accused. There, they executed a joint
affidavit (Exh. "A").[[2]]

During the trial, Duque denied the charges.

He controverted the allegation that he had
recruited

complainants

for

overseas

employment. He also denied that he had

received any monies in consideration of

promised

employment.

However,

he

acknowledged that his house had served

as a meeting place for a certain Delfin and
one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the
persons who had promised complainants,
work abroad.

On the basis of the positive identification

by

private

complainants

of

appellant

Duque as the person they had talked to for

placement abroad, the person who had
collected fees from them and who had
received information from them needed for
arranging their departure for abroad, the
trial court concluded that accused Duque
was primarily responsible for promising

placement

and

inducing

private

complainants to part with their money. The

prosecution also submitted a certification
from the licensing branch of the Philippine
Overseas

Employment

Administration

("POEA") stating that no records existed

whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a
license or authority to recruit for overseas
employment. The dispositive part of the
decision reads:

Wherefore, this Court finds the accused

guilty

beyond

reasonable

doubt,

[of]

violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39

of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the Labor
Code

of

the

Philippines,

and

hereby

sentences

the

accused

to

suffer

the

penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of

P100,000.00

without

subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency and to

indemnify the offended parties: Agustin
Ulat the amount of P20,000.00; Marcelino
Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; Norma
Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and
Elmo Alcaraz the amount of P3,000.00 and
the cost of suit.[[3]]

Before this Court, appellant Duque raises

only one (1) issue: that of prescription of
the criminal offense for which he was
convicted.

The recruitment of persons for overseas

employment

without

the

necessary

recruiting permit or authority form the

POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by
the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a
special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to
Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290
of the Labor Code provides, in relevant
part, that:

Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this

Code and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three
(3) years.

xxx xxx xxx

The Labor Code, however, does not contain

any provisions on the mode of computation
of the three-year prescriptive period it
established.

The Solicitor General states, and we agree

with him, that Act No. 3326 , as amended,
entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and
to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the

applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No.

3326, as amended, reads as follows:

Section 2: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Prescription shall begin to run from the day

of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the
time,

from

the

discovery

thereof

and

institution of judicial proceedings for its

investigation and punishment.

Examination of the abovequoted Section 2

shows that there are two (2) rules for
determining

the

beginning

of

the

prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the

commission

of

the

violation,

if

such

commission be known; and (b) if the

commission of the violation was not known
at the time, then from discovery thereof
and institution of judicial proceedings for
investigation and punishment. Appellant
Duque

contends

that

the

prescriptive

period in the case at bar commenced from

the

time

money

in

consideration

of

promises for overseas employment was

parted with by complainants. Duque thus
contends

that

the

prescriptive

period

began to run sometime in January 1986.

The information was, however, filed by the

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna
on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4)
years later. Duque concludes that the
offense

of

illegal

recruitment

had

accordingly prescribed by May 1990.

We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the

Labor Code as amended reads as follows:

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any

recruitment
prohibited

activities,
practices

including

enumerated

the
under

Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by

non-licensees or non-holders of authority

shall be deemed illegal and punishable

under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry
of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement

officer

may

initiate

complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by

a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic
sabotage

and

shall

be

penalized

in

accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed

by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three

(3)

or

more

persons

conspiring

and/or confederating with one another in

carrying

out

any

unlawful

or

illegal

transaction, enterprise or scheme defined

under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment

or his duly authorized representatives shall
have the power to cause the arrest and
detention of such non-license or non-holder
of authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of

job-seekers. The Minister shall order the

search of the office or premises and
seizure

of

documents,

paraphernalia,

properties and other implements used in

illegal

recruitment

activities

and

the

closure of companies, establishments and

entities

found

recruitment

of

to

be

engaged

workers

for

in

the

overseas

employment, without having been licensed

or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that illegal recruitment has

two

(2)

basic

elements,

to

wit:

(a)

recruitment activities as listed in Articles

38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and (b) the
lack of the necessary license or authority

from the POEA to engage in such activities.

Recruitment for overseas employment is
not

in

itself

necessarily

immoral

or

unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license

or permit that renders such recruitment
activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack
of necessary permit or authority, while
certainly known to appellant Duque back in
January 1986, was not known to private
complainants at that time. Indeed, private
complainants discovered that appellant did
not possess such authority or permit only
when they went to the offices of the POEA
for the purpose of filing a claim for return
of

the

money

appellant

they

Duque.

had

Since

delivered

good

faith

to
is

always presumed, the complainants were

entitled to assume the appellant Duque

was

acting

presented

in

good

himself

as

faith
a

when

he

recruiter

for

overseas placement. Even if it be assumed

arguendo that ordinary prudence required
that

person

seeking

overseas

employment ought to check the authority

or status of persons pretending to be
authorized or to speak for a recruitment or
placement agency, the offended parties'
failure to do so did not start the running of
the prescriptive period. In the nature of
things, acts made criminal by special laws
are frequently not immoral or obviously
criminal in themselves; for this reason, the
applicable statute requires that if the
violation of the special law is not known at

the time, then prescription begins to run

only

from

the

discovery

thereof,

i.e.,

discovery of the unlawful nature of the

constitutive act or acts.

Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act

No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal
reading of Section 2 appears to suggest
that two (2) elements must coincide for the
beginning of the running of the prescriptive
period: first, the element of discovery of
the commission of the violation of the
special law; and second, the "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment." It is then argued by
appellant that because the co-existence of

these two (2) requirements is necessary

under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the
relevant prescriptive period would never
begin to run.

Here appellant has a point. However, it

should be noted, firstly, that the literal
reading that appellant suggests, does not
benefit

appellant,

for

the

prescriptive

period in the case at bar had not in any

case been exhausted since prosecution of
appellant commenced only a few months
after the POEA and the complainants had
discovered
governmental

that

appellant

authority

to

had
recruit

no
for

overseas work and was merely pretending

to

recruit

employment

workers
and

to

for

overseas

receive

money

therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even

attempt to locate employment abroad for
complainants. Secondly, we do not think
there is any real need for such a literal
reading of Section 2. As is well-known,
initiation of proceedings for preliminary
investigation of the offense normally marks
the

interruption

prescription.
literal

of

Under

reading,

the

the

period

appellant

of

Duque's

prescription

period

would both begin and be interrupted by

the same occurrence; the net effect would
be that the prescription period would not
have

effectively

begun,

having

been

rendered academic by the simultaneous

interruption of that same period. A statute

providing

for

prescription

of

defined

criminal offenses is more than a statute of

repose and constitutes an act of grace by
which the State, after the lapse of a certain
period of time, surrenders its sovereign
power to prosecute the criminal act. A
statute on prescription of crimes is an act
of liberality on the part of the State in favor
of the offender.[[5]] The applicable wellknown principles of statutory interpretation
are that statutes must be construed in
such a way as to give effect to the
intention of the legislative authority,[[6]]
and so as to give a sensible meaning to the
language of the statute and thus avoid
nonsensical

or

absurd

results,[[7]]

departing to the extent unavoidable from

the

literal

language

of

the

statute.

Appellant's literal reading would make

nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.

In our view, the phrase "institution of

judicial proceedings for its investigation
and

punishment"

may

be

either

disregarded as surplusage or should be

deemed preceded by the word "until."
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day

of the commission of the violation of the

law; and if the same be not known at the

time, from the discovery thereof;

or as:

Prescription shall begin to run from the day

of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and until
institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. (Emphasis
supplied)

We believe and so hold that the applicable

prescriptive period in the case at bar

began to run from the time the recruitment

activities

of

appellant

Duque

were

ascertained by the complainants and by

the POEA to have been carried out without
any

license

government.

or
The

authority
discovery

from

the

by

the

complainants and by the POEA was, as a

practical matter, simultaneous in character
and occurred sometime in December 1989
when the complainants went to the POEA
with the complaint for recovery of the
placement fees and expenses they had
paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA,
acting upon that complaint, discovered and
informed the private complainants that
Duque had operated as a recruiter without
the

essential

government

license

or

authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal

recruitment had not prescribed when the
complaint was filed with the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when
the information was filed in court in May
1990.

It is relevant to note that the same result

would be reached by giving supplemental
effect to provisions of the Revised Penal
Code in the application of Article 290 of the
Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code reads as follows:

Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of

offenses. - The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint
commence

or
to

information,
run

again

and

shall

when

such

proceedings terminate without the accused

being

convicted

or

acquitted,

or

are

unjustifiably stopped for any reason not

imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when

the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-quoted Article 91, the

prescriptive

period

in

respect

of

the

offense of illegal recruitment began to run

on the date of discovery thereof by the
private complainants and the authorities
concerned (POEA) sometime in December
1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990
when the affidavit-sworn complaint was
filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990
when the criminal information was filed in
court by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Laguna. Once more, the appellant's
defense of prescription must fail.

Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as

amended, the penalty of life imprisonment
is properly imposable where the illegal
recruitment is committed "in large scale,"
i.e., where it is "committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a
group." 10 In the case at bar, private
complainants are more than three (3) in
number. Moreover, appellant Duque had
represented

to

the

public

at

large,

including private complainants, that he

was a licensed

recruiter. 11 Duque's house served as his

business office and he asked the private
complainants to see him in his house. 12

There, complainants were "briefed" as to

the requirements for overseas employment
before their supposed departure and were
each required to secure a clearance from
the National Bureau of Investigation. 13
Considerable sums were collected from
each of the complainants supposedly to
"facilitate" the processing of passports,
medical certificates and other working
papers. 14 Complainants were, in addition,
shown documents which purported to be
job

placement

orders.

This

organized

modus operandi was repeated in respect of

each of the complainants and presumably
in respect of other persons who were
similarly victimized by appellant. There is
no question that the recruitment activities

of Duque were organized and "large scale"

in nature. 15

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction

rendered by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that
the penalty properly imposable and hereby
imposed is life imprisonment and not
reclusion

perpetua.

Costs

against

appellant.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

FRANCISCA

TALARO,*

GREGORIO

TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO,

RENATO

RAMOS,

RAYMUNDO

RODOLFO

ZAMORA**

DUZON,***

and

LOLITO

ADVIENTO,

RENATO

AQUINO,
Accused.

NORBERTO

(JUN)

RAMOS and LOLITO AQUINO,

Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 175781

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,****

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:
March 20, 2012
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on December, 15, 2005, in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in
relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the
Rules of Court.

The CA affirmed with

modification the judgment rendered by the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38 of
Lingayen,

Pangasinan,

accused-appellants

thereby
Norberto

finding
(Jun)

Adviento, Renato Ramos and Lolito Aquino,

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of Murder and sentencing them to
death,

but

acquitting

accused

Rodolfo

Duzon.

Accused-appellants were charged

before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
with

the

crime

of

murder

under

an

Information reading as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of

April

1994,

in

Municipality

of

the

Poblacion

Laoac,

of

the

Province

of

Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with each other,

with intent to kill, and with treachery, and

evident premeditation, in consideration of
a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN
ALIPIO, with a handgun hitting the latter in
the different parts of his body and the
wounds being mortal caused directly the
death

of

said

MELVIN

ALIPIO,

to

the

damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal

Code.[2]

The testimonies of prosecution

witnesses showed the sequence of events

shortly before and after the killing of victim

Melvin Alipio to be as follows.

Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of

Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca
Talaro.

In the morning of April 24, 1994,

when Zamora went home for breakfast

after

driving

his

tricycle,

he

found

Francisca Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato

Atong

Ramos,

and

Norberto

Jun

Adviento conversing among themselves

under

santol

tree

in

front

of

his

(Zamora's) house. He went near the group

to find out what they were talking about
and he learned that his aunt, Francisca
Talaro, was transacting with the other three
accused-appellants for the killing of Atty.

Melvin Alipio.

He was merely a meter

away from the group so he heard the

group's conversation.

He learned that

Francisca Talaro would give the three

accused-appellants an advance payment of
P30,000.00 and then another P30,000.00
after Atty. Melvin Alipio is killed, with said
last payment to be delivered in Barangay
(Brgy.)

Bactad.

The

three

accused-

appellants then nodded their heads in

agreement.

After learning of the group's

plan, Zamora got scared and stayed away

from the group, but three days after that
meeting in front of his house, he was asked
by Francisca Talaro to drive her and her
husband Gregorio to Brgy. Bactad.

The

Talaro spouses alighted at a place in Brgy.

Bactad, while Zamora stayed in his tricycle

and merely waited for them. He assumed
that the couple delivered the payment of
P30,000.00 to someone in Brgy. Bactad.[3]

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino,

when

questioned

during

preliminary

investigation, admitted that he and coaccused

Renato

Ramos

conducted

surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon

of April 25, 1994.[4]

Around 6 o'clock in the morning of

April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo
Duzon was at the parking area in the
poblacion

of

Urdaneta

waiting

for

passengers,

when

accused-appellant

Renato Ramos approached him. Accusedappellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo

Duzon P200.00 for the latter to drive
Ramos' motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to
take

some

onions

and

turnips

there.

Duzon agreed, so after bringing his own

tricycle home to his house in Bactad,
Urdaneta,

he

then

drove

Ramos'

motorcycle to the poblacion of Urdaneta.

At the poblacion, Ramos bought a basket
where he placed the onions and turnips.
Ramos then told Duzon to drive the
motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed
by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house
along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and
talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon

later came to know as accused-appellant

Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that
after coming from Laoac, Duzon should
leave the motorcycle at that house on
Garcia Street with Lolito Aquino.
and

Duzon then proceeded

Ramos

to Laoac,

stopping at a gas station where they fueled

up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at
the gas station and, taking along the
basket

of

onions

and

turnips,

walked

towards Guardian Angel Hospital (the clinic

owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after
Ramos
gunshots

alighted,
coming

Duzon
from

heard

the

west,

three
and

moments later, he saw Ramos, who was

coming toward him, being chased by
another man.

When Ramos got to the

motorcycle,

he

ordered

Duzon

to

immediately drive away, and poked a gun

at Duzon's back.

Ramos then instructed

Duzon as to the route they should take

until they reached Urdaneta where Ramos
alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to
bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street,
leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him
(Ramos) again at the poblacion where he
(Duzon) will be paid P200.00 for his
services.

Duzon did as he was told, but

when he met with Ramos at the poblacion

and asked for the P200.00, Ramos got mad
and shouted invectives at him. A few days
later, he again ran into Ramos who warned
him to keep his silence, threatening to kill
him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about

the killing.

Accused-appellant Norberto

(Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to

reveal to anyone whatever he knows about
the crime. That was why Duzon decided to
keep quiet.

Later, however, he revealed

the

to

matter

Duzon,

who

his

brother,

accompanied

Victoriano

him

to

the

Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office

in Urdaneta so he could give his statement.
He

executed

affidavits,

assisted

by

lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office

(PAO), attesting to what he knew about the
crime, in his desire to be a state witness.
[5]

Witness Rene Balanga, who was the

helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and Dr.

Lina Alipio, was cleaning the windows at

the clinic of Dr. Alipio around 8 o'clock in
the morning of April 26, 1994.

He heard

three gunshots coming from the garage of

the clinic, which was around ten meters
away from where he was.

Immediately

after the gunshots, he saw a man quickly

walking

out

from

the

garage,

going

towards the main gate, but he was not able

to clearly see the face of the man.

He

merely observed that the man was around

5'4

to

5'5

in

height,

medium-built,

wearing a blue jacket and faded maong

(denim) pants. He ran towards the garage
and there, he saw Atty. Melvin Alipio lying
dead. He then chased after the man so he
could identify him better but he did not

succeed in doing so because the driver of

the motorcycle that the gunman was
boarding was already drawing something
out

from

motorcycle.

the

rear

portion

of

the

After the assailant sped off,

Balanga went to the police station in Laoac

to report the crime and give his statement
before the CIS. Sometime later, at the CIS
Office, he identified Rodolfo Duzon as the
driver of the motorcycle used by the
gunman to get away.[6]

Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo,

whose son was confined at the clinic, was
sitting at a bench in the garage of the
clinic on the morning of April 26, 1994.
Two other women who were looking for

Atty. Alipio also sat at the bench with him

after he told them that Atty. Alipio was still
having his breakfast. After a few minutes,
a man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and
also sat at the bench.

Thereafter, Atty.

Alipio came out to the garage and talked to

the two women. When Atty. Alipio finished
talking to them, the man sitting with them
on the bench suddenly stood up and shot
Atty. Alipio three times.

Atty. Alipio was

merely one meter away from the assailant

when the latter shot him.
shooting,

the

assailant

After the

walked

away.

Hidalgo then saw the helper at the clinic,

Reny Balanga, run after the assailant, but
the latter had whistled to his companion
who was waiting on his motorcycle and the

two were able to speed away aboard said

vehicle.

Hidalgo identified the assailant

from a picture[7] shown to him.[8]

The

picture was that of Renato Ramos.[9]

A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio

had been killed, Zamora was in the parking
lot in Sta. Maria Norte in Binalonan, when
accused-appellant Aquino approached him
and told him to remind Francisca Talaro
that she still has to pay him (Aquino)
P10,000.00.
told

his

Zamora then immediately

uncle

Gregorio

Talaro

about

Aquino's message and the very next day,

Gregorio went to Zamora's house with the
P10,000.00. Gregorio could no longer wait
for Aquino so he just left the money with

Zamora, instructing him to hand it over to

Aquino when the latter arrives. Later that
day, Zamora saw Aquino so he told him
(Aquino) to just get the money from his
house.

About three weeks later, Aquino

again went to Zamora's house, this time

saying he needs another P5,000.00 just in
case he needs to escape.

Zamora then

contacted Francisca Talaro and conveyed

Aquino's message to her.

The following

day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's

house and left the P3,000.00 for Aquino.
That afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino
to just pick up the money from his house.
Zamora observed that Aquino seemed
happy enough with the P3,000.00 he
received.[10]

Zamora said that he thinks the

Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the
latter was not able to comply with his
contractual obligations to the Talaros to
complete the construction of a building.
Dr. Lina Alipio, the wife of the victim Atty.
Melvin Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the
victim entered into an agreement with
Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for
the construction of a building, but the
construction was not finished within the
agreed one-year period because of the
sudden rise of prices for materials.

Atty.

Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional payment

so he could finish construction, but the
latter refused to pay more.

Dr. Alipio

stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and

Rodolfo agreed that Atty. Alipio would
return all the money he received from
Rodolfo and the whole property would, in
turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio.

Atty.

Alipio was unable to return the money

despite several demands made by Rodolfo,
and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason
why the Talaros had her husband killed.
Dr.

Alipio

further

testified

on

matters

regarding expenses for the wake and

burial, and the earnings of her husband.
[11]

Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the

autopsy on the victim and stated that three
slugs were taken from the body of the

victim, and the cause of death was internal

hemorrhage.[12]

Police officers testified

on how they conducted the investigation,

stating that accused-appellant Aquino and
Zamora's statements were taken in the
presence of their respective lawyers. They
maintain that no bodily harm was inflicted
on the accused-appellants while they were
being investigated.[13]

On the other hand, accused-appellant

Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken by
CIS men without a warrant of arrest; that
he was mauled by police authorities while
under detention, but could not undergo a
medical check-up due to fear from threats
that

he

would

be

killed

by

police

authorities if he did so; that he was

assisted by a PAO lawyer when he made
his confession, but he did not read the
contents of the document, Sgt. Tomelden
just ordered him to sign the same;

that

the PAO lawyer is not his own choice; that

he does not know Rodolfo Duzon and
Raymundo Zamora; and that he was not
present at the meeting held in Raymundo
Zamora's yard.

He admitted, however,

that the motorcycle used by the gunman

belongs to him; and that he first agreed to
be

state

witness

because

he

was

promised to be paid P20,000.00 and that

he

would

be

placed

protection program.[14]

in

the

witness

Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun)

Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He
claimed that he was not present during the
April 24, 1994 meeting held to plan the
killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said date
and

time,

he

was

in

the

house

of

Congressman Amadito Perez, for whom he

works

as

driver-messenger,

and

that

morning, he also drove the Congressman's

family to church to hear mass. On April 26,
1994, he also reported for work at the
house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock
in the morning until 5 o'clock in the
afternoon.

He likewise denied personally

knowing any of his co-accused except for

Duzon whose face is familiar to him.[15]

After trial, the RTC rendered

judgment as follows:

Wherefore, in the light of all the

considerations discussed above, this court
hereby

finds

and

holds

the

accused

Francisca Talaro, Norberto (Jun) Adviento,

Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito
Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder defined and penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised

Penal

Code

as

amended

by

Republic Act No. 7659 and conformable

thereto, pursuant to law, hereby imposes
on each of the accused the death penalty
and to pay proportionately the costs of the
proceedings.

The court further orders the

accused to indemnify, jointly and severally,
the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P83,000.00

as

P100,000.00
P50,000.00

as
as

actual

damages;

moral

damages;

death

indemnity;

P10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to

their private prosecutor and P2,400,000.00
as loss in the earning capacity of the
deceased without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.

Taking into consideration that

accused Francisca Talaro is already 75
years old, the death penalty meted upon
her

shall

be

commuted

to

reclusion

perpetua

with

the

accessory

penalties

provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal

Code.

And considering that the evidence

adduced by the prosecution against the
accused Gregorio Talaro is not sufficient to
sustain his conviction of the offense filed
against him, the court hereby declares
accused Gregorio Talaro not guilty.

The

court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora

acquitted of the offense filed against him.

Let an order of arrest be issued

against

accused

Renato

Ramos

who

escaped from jail during the pendency of

this case, to be served by the NBI, CIC and

PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED.[16]

The case was then brought to this

Court for automatic review in view of the
penalty of death imposed on accusedappellants. However, in accordance with
the ruling in People v. Mateo,[17] and the
amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of
Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules
on

Criminal

transferred

this

Procedure,
case

intermediate review.

to

the
the

Court
CA

for

On December 15, 2005, the CA

rendered

its

Decision,

the

dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the

foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan
in Criminal Case No. U-8239, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant
ACQUITTED

Rodolfo

Duzon

is

on reasonable doubt and his

release is hereby ordered unless he is

being held for some other legal cause.

Further, in lieu of the awards made

by the trial court in favor of the heirs of

deceased

Atty.

Melvin

Alipio,

accused-

appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and

severally, the heirs of the victim the
following amounts:

(1) P25,000.00 as

temperate damages; (2) P75,000.00 as

civil indemnity; (3) P50,000.00 as moral
damages;

and

(4)

P25,000.00

as

exemplary damages;

SO ORDERED.[18]

The case is now before this Court on

automatic review.

The prosecution opted

not to file a supplemental brief with this

Court.
and

Accused-appellants Lolito Aquino

Renato

Ramos

jointly

filed

their

supplemental brief where it is argued that

the two should be acquitted because (1)
the prosecution evidence is insufficient to
prove that Lolito Aquino was part of the
conspiracy to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio; and
(2) the identity of Renato Ramos was never
established.

Accused-appellant Noberto

(Jun) Adviento argued in his Appellant's

Brief

filed

with

the

CA,

that

the

prosecution's evidence is insufficient to

establish conspiracy, and there are no
aggravating circumstances to justify the
imposition of the death penalty.

The Court agrees with the CA's

conclusion that the evidence on record

proves

beyond

reasonable

doubt

that

accused-appellants Lolito Aquino, Renato

Ramos,

and

Norberto

(Jun)

Adviento,

together with Francisca Talaro, conspired to

kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.

Murder under Article 248 of the

Revised Penal Code is defined as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide

or

infanticide,

attended

by

circumstances such as treachery or evident

premeditation. The presence of any one of
the circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a
killing as murder.[19]

In People v. Sanchez,[20] the Court

held that [t]he essence of treachery is the
sudden attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to
the aggressor. There can be no cavil that
the evidence on record shows treachery in
the killing of Atty. Alipio, thus qualifying the
crime as murder. The assailant, identified
as accused-appellant Renato Ramos, just
suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very
close distance, without any provocation
from said unarmed victim, who was then
just conversing with some other people.

There is also evident premeditation

because the evidence shows that a couple
of days before the actual shooting of Atty.
Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw and
heard accused-appellants Norberto (Jun)
Adviento,

Renato

Ramos,

and

Lolito

Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and

coming to an agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.

Pitted against the prosecution

evidence, accused-appellants' only defense
is that the evidence is insufficient to prove
they are part of the
conspiracy to commit the murder.

Said

defense is sorely wanting when pitted

against the prosecution evidence.

In People v. Bautista,[21] the Court

reiterated

the

hornbook

principle

of

conspiracy, to wit:

Conspiracy exists when two or

more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Where all the accused
acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, and it is shown
by such acts that they had the same
purpose or common design and were
united

in

its

execution,

conspiracy

is

sufficiently established. It must be shown

that all participants performed specific acts
which such closeness and coordination as

to indicate a common purpose or design to

commit the felony.

xxxx

Each conspirator is responsible for

everything done by his confederates which
follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though it was
not intended as part of the original design.
x x x[22] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the existence of a

conspiracy has been established by the
testimony of Raymundo Zamora, positively

identifying all three accused-appellants as

the ones he saw and heard transacting
with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to
kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of
P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino
as the one who demanded and received
part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had
been killed.

The credibility of Raymundo

Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by

Lolito Aquino's admission[23] that he and
Renato

Ramos

even

conducted

surveillance on the victim a day before

Renato Ramos carried out the shooting,
and that the motorcycle used as a getaway
vehicle belonged to him.

Rodolfo Duzon

also pointed to Renato Ramos as the

gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos

and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the ones

who threatened to kill him if he talks to
anyone about the shooting. All the proven
circumstances point to the conclusion that
accused-appellants acted in concert to
assure the success of the execution of the
crime; hence, the existence of a conspiracy
is firmly established.

Lolito Aquino's admission, and

accused-appellants' positive identification
of Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon
cannot be belied by accused-appellants'
mere

denial.

It

is

established

jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot

prevail

over

the

witness'

positive

identification of the accused-appellants.

[24]
not

Moreover, accused-appellants could

give

any

plausible

reason

why

Raymundo Zamora would testify falsely

against them. In People v. Molina,[25] the
Court expounded, thus:

In light of the positive

identification

of

appellant

by

the

prosecution witnesses and since no ill

motive on their part or on that of their
families was shown that could have made
either of them institute the case against
the appellant and falsely implicate him in a
serious

crime

appellant's

he

defense

necessarily fail.

did
of

not
alibi

commit,
must

It is settled in this

jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being

inherently weak, cannot prevail over the

clear and positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x
x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino

claimed

he

merely

admitted

his

participation in the crime out of fear of the

police

authorities

who

allegedly

manhandled him, however, the trial court

did not find his story convincing. The trial
court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses

and

their

testimonies

is

conclusive on this Court as it is the trial

court which had the opportunity to closely
observe the demeanor of witnesses.[27]

The Court again explained the rationale for

this principle in Molina,[28] to wit:

As oft repeated by this Court, the

trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled
to the highest respect because it is more
competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity

to

observe

the

witnesses'

demeanor and deportment on the stand,

and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies. The trial judge therefore can
better determine if such witnesses were
telling the truth, being in the ideal position
to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further,
factual findings of the trial court as regards
its assessment of the witnesses' credibility

are entitled to great weight and respect by

this Court, particularly when the Court of
Appeals affirms the said findings, and will
not be disturbed absent any showing that
the trial court overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case.[29]

The Court cannot find anything on record

to justify deviation from said rule.

Accused-appellant Renato Ramos

insisted that he was not properly identified
in open court, and considering that there
are so many persons named Renato
Ramos, then there can be some confusion

regarding his identity. There is no truth to

this claim. Ramos was properly identified
in open court by Raymundo Zamora, as
one

of

the

men

he

saw

and

heard

transacting with Francisca Talaro for the

killing of Atty. Alipio.[30] Hence, there can
be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is
being convicted for the murder of Atty.
Alipio.

Another strong indication of Lolito

Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the
fact that they escaped from detention
while the case was pending with the trial
court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison
on December 20, 1994,[31]

while Lolito

Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.[32] It has

been repeatedly held that flight betrays a

desire

to

evade

responsibility

and

is,

therefore, a strong indication of guilt.[33]

Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn
their conviction.

Nevertheless, this Court must modify

the penalty imposed on accused-appellants
Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and
Renato Ramos.

In People v. Tinsay,[34]

the Court explained that:

On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No.
9346

(R.A.

9346),

entitled

An

Act

Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty

in the Philippines, took effect. Pertinent
provisions thereof provide as follows:

Section 1. The imposition of the

penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly,
Thousand

Republic

One

Act

Hundred

No.

Eight

Seventy-Seven

(R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the

Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection
is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
7659) otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law and all other laws, executive
orders and decrees insofar as they impose
the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

Section 2. In lieu of the death

penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a)

the penalty of reclusion

perpetua, when the law violated makes use

of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

xxxx

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of

offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No.

4103,

otherwise

known

as

the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

It

has

also

Quiachon

been

that

held

R.A.

in

No.

People
9346

vs.
has

retroactive effect, to wit:

The aforequoted provision of R.A.

No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant
to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia
sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal
laws which are favorable to accused are
given retroactive effect.

This principle is

embodied under Article 22 of the Revised

Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a

felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as

this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

However, appellant is not eligible

for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346 provides that persons convicted of
offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of the law,
shall not be eligible for parole.

Hence, in accordance with the

foregoing,

appellant

should

only

be

sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua

without eligibility for parole.[35]

The awards for damages also need to

be

modified.

In

People

v.

Alberto

Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,[36] the Court

held that in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death but reduced to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No.
9346, the award of moral damages should
be

increased

from

P50,000.00

to

P75,000.00, while the award for exemplary

damages, in view of the presence of

aggravating

circumstances,

should

be

P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death imposed on accusedappellants

is

REDUCED

to

reclusion

perpetua without possibility of parole in

accordance

with

R.A.

No.

9346;

and

INCREASING the award of moral damages

from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, and the
award

of

exemplary

damages

from

P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The rest of the

award of the Court of Appeals is hereby
maintained.

G.R. No. 177960

January 29,

2009
JEFFREY

RESO

DAYAP, Petitioner,

vs.
PRETZY-LOU
SENDIONG,

SENDIONG,
ELVIE

SY

GENESA

and

DEXIE

DURAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a petition for review 1 on
certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August
2006 and Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
01179

entitled, Pretzy-Lou

P.

Sendiong,

Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie

Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and
Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an
Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the
Provincial

Prosecutors

Office,

Sibulan,

Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner

Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of
Reckless

Imprudence

resulting

to

Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries,

and Damage to Property. The pertinent
portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening
of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog,
Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, did then

and

there,

feloniously

willfully,
drive

in

unlawfully

and

reckless

and

imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo

truck with plate number ULP-955, color
blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut
shell, registered in the name of Ruben
Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a
Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379
driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was
with two female passengers, namely: Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R.
Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on
the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and
extensive damage to the above-mentioned

Colt Galant which is registered in the name

of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St.,
Dumaguete City, to the damage of the
heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong
and the other two offended parties abovementioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal
Trial

Court

(MTC)

of

Sibulan,

Negros

Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he

pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
On 17 January 2005, respondents PretzyLou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and
Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of
court

to

file

an

amended

information.6 They

sought

to

add

the

allegation of abandonment of the victims

by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10wheeler

cargo

truck

abandoned

the

victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R.

Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he
was only extracted from the car by the bystanders."7
On

21

January

2005,

however,

the

Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus

Motion praying that the motion to amend
the

information

be

considered

withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC

granted the withdrawal and the motion to
amend was considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded.

Respondents testified for the prosecution.
After the prosecution had rested its case,
petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer
to evidence which was granted. Petitioner
filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15
April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he is criminally liable for reckless
imprudence, to which respondents filed a
Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC
granted
petitioner

the
of

imprudence.

demurrer
the
The

and

crime
MTC

of

found

acquitted
reckless
that

the

evidence presented by respondents failed

to

establish

the

allegations

in

the

Information. Pertinent portions of the order

state:
An examination of the allegations in the
information and comparing the same with
the evidence presented by the prosecution
would reveal that the evidence presented
has not established said allegations. The
facts and circumstances constituting the
allegations charged have not been proven.
It is elementary in the rules of evidence
that a party must prove his own affirmative
allegations.
xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution
can this Court find that it was the accused

who committed the crime as charged. Its

witnesses

have

never

identified

the

accused as the one who has committed the

crime. The prosecution never bothered to
establish if indeed it was the accused who
committed the crime or asked questions
which would have proved the elements of
the crime. The prosecution did not even
establish if indeed it was the accused who
was driving the truck at the time of the
incident. The Court simply cannot find any
evidence which would prove that a crime
has been committed and that the accused
is the person responsible for it. There was
no evidence on the allegation of the death
of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no
death

certificate

that

was

offered

in

evidence. The alleged less serious physical

injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and
Elvie Sy were not also proven as no
medical certificate was presented to state
the same nor was a doctor presented to
establish

such

injuries.

The

alleged

damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not

established in any manner as no witness
ever

testified

on

this

aspect

and

no

documentary evidence was also presented

to state the damage. The prosecution
therefore failed to establish if indeed it was
the accused who was responsible for the
death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the
injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy,
including the damage to the Colt Galant.
The mother of the victim testified only on

the expenses she incurred and the shock

she and her family have suffered as a
result of the incident. But sad to say, she
could not also pinpoint if it was the
accused who committed the crime and be
held responsible for it. This Court could
only

say

practically

that

the

prosecution

has

bungled this case from its

inception.
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on
the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence]
conclusively show that the swerving of
vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of
vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate
cause of the accident. The court again is

inclined to agree with this argument of the

defense. It has looked carefully into the
sketch of the accident as indicated in the
police blotter and can only conclude that
the logical explanation of the accident is
that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of
vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner
fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a
picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its
damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s
ramming into the rear left portion of
vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of
vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and
pulled out together with their axle. The
cutting of the differential guide cause[d]
the entire housing connecting the tires to
the truck body to collapse, thus causing

vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve

towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this
accident that caused the swerving, not of
[sic] any negligent act of the accused.
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the
prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact
of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the
elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove these two things.
When the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden of establishing the guilt of the

accused, an accused need not even offer

evidence in his behalf.
xxxx
WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

demurrer is granted and the accused

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond
posted for his temporary liberty is also
hereby cancelled and ordered released to
the

accused

or

his

duly

authorized

representative.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the
MTCs dismissal of the case was done

without considering the evidence adduced

by the prosecution. Respondents added
that the MTC failed to observe the manner
the trial of the case should proceed as
provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil
liability of the accused in spite of the
evidence presented. The case was raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the
RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but
ordered the remand of the case to the MTC
for further proceedings on the civil aspect
of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs
recital of every fact in arriving at its

conclusions disproved the allegation that it

failed to consider the evidence presented
by

the

prosecution.

The

records

also

demonstrated that the MTC conducted the

trial of the case in the manner dictated by
Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,
except

that

the

defense

no

longer

presented its evidence after the MTC gave

due course to the accuseds demurrer to
evidence, the filing of which is allowed
under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however
agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the
accuseds civil liability, especially since the
judgment of acquittal did not include a
declaration that the facts from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus,
the RTC declared that the aspect of civil

liability was not passed upon and resolved

to remand the issue to the MTC. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the
Municipal

Trial

Court

of

Sibulan

on

accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case

is REMANDED to the court of origin or its
successor for further proceedings on the
civil aspect of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Both

parties

filed

their

motions

for

reconsideration of the RTC order, but these

were denied for lack of merit in the
order17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents

then

filed

petition

for

review with the Court of Appeals under

Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
01179. The appellate court subsequently
rendered

the

assailed

decision

and

resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that

there being no proof of the total value of
the properties damaged, the criminal case
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and
the proceedings before the MTC are
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate
court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of
the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled
that in complex crimes involving reckless
imprudence

resulting

in

homicide

or

physical injuries and damage to property,

the

jurisdiction

of

the

court

to

take

cognizance of the case is determined by

the fine imposable for the damage to
property

resulting

from

the

reckless

imprudence, not by the corresponding

penalty for the physical injuries charged. It
also found support in Sec. 36 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and
the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure,
which govern the summary procedure in
first-level
damage

courts
to

in

property

offenses
through

involving
criminal

negligence where the imposable fine does

not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no
proof of the total value of the property
damaged and respondents were claiming
the

amount

of P1,500,000.00

as

civil

damages, the case falls within the RTCs

jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the
Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment

premises

is

hereby

considered,

rendered

by

Us

REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32,
Negros Oriental for proper disposition of
the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that
jurisdiction over the case is determined by
the allegations in the information, and that
neither

the

1991

Rule

on

Summary

Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the

basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the
case.

However,

the

Court

of

Appeals

denied the motion for reconsideration for

lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25
April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the RTC
that has proper jurisdiction considering
that the information alleged a willful,
unlawful,

felonious

killing

as

well

as

abandonment of the victims.

In

the

present

petitioner

argues

petition
that

for

the

review,

MTC

had

jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for

reckless
enactment

imprudence,
of

Republic

owing
Act

to
(R.A.)

the
No.

7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-

level courts on offenses involving damage

to property through criminal negligence.
He asserts that the RTC could not have
acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a
legally unfiled and officially withdrawn
amended
abandonment.

information

alleging

Respondents

are

also

faulted for challenging the MTCs order

acquitting petitioner through a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of
an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The

petition

has

merit.

It

should

be

granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction

over the offense charged pertained to the

RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with
the case on the basis of the Information
dated

29

December

2004

charging

petitioner only with the complex crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to homicide,
less serious physical injuries and damage
to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner
should have been charged with the same
offense

but

circumstance

aggravated
of

victims.

It

however

that

by

abandonment

appears

from

respondents

the

of

the
the

records

attempt

to

amend the information by charging the

aggravated offense was unsuccessful as

the

MTC

had

Prosecutors

approved

motion

to

the

Provincial

withdraw

their

motion to amend the information. The

information filed before the trial court had
remained unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is
deemed to have been charged only with
the

offense

Information

alleged
without

in
any

the

original

aggravating

circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in
its

maximum

period

toprision

correccional in its medium period. When

such reckless imprudence the use of a
motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a
person attended the same article imposes
upon the defendant the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
The offense with which petitioner was
charged is reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, less serious physical injuries and
damage to property, a complex crime.
Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent
act results in two or more grave or less
grave

felonies,

committed.24 Article

complex
48

of

the

crime

is

Revised

Penal Code provides that when the single

act constitutes two or more grave or less

grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks
of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition
of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions
punishable by law" committed either by
means

of

(culpa).25 Thus,

deceit

(dolo)

the

penalty

or

fault

imposable

upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty,

is prision correccional in its medium period
(2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months
and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that

the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.26 When this
case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 had already been amended by R.A. No.
7691.

R.A.

No.

7691

extended

the

jurisdiction of the first-level courts over

criminal

cases

punishable

to

with

include

all

offenses

imprisonment

not

exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the

amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties
including those for civil liability. It explicitly

states "that in offenses involving damage

to property through criminal negligence,
they

shall

have

exclusive

original

jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal

cases for reckless
imprudence

punishable

with prision

correccional in its medium and maximum

periods should fall within the jurisdiction of
the

MTC

and

not

the

RTC.

Clearly,

therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the

same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did
not have original jurisdiction over the
criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of
Sibulan,

Negros

Oriental

had

properly

taken cognizance of the case and the

proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted

petitioners

demurrer

to

evidence

and

acquitted him of the offense on the ground

of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer
to evidence in criminal cases, such as the
one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal
of the case on the merits, tantamount to
an

acquittal

of

the

accused."28 Such

dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of

demurrer

to

evidence

may

not

be

appealed, for to do so would be to place

the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while

the

dismissal

order

consequent

to

demurrer to evidence is not subject to

appeal, the same is still reviewable but
only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the
factual findings of the trial court are
conclusive upon the reviewing court, and
the only legal basis to reverse and set
aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer
to evidence is by a clear showing that the
trial

court, in acquitting the accused,

committed

grave

abuse

of

discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

or a denial of due process, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the

RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that
the MTC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the case and failing to consider
the

evidence

of

the

prosecution

in

resolving the same, and in allegedly failing

to

follow

the

proper

procedure

as

mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC

correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint. The MTCs conclusions were
based on facts diligently recited in the
order thereby disproving that the MTC
failed to consider the evidence presented
by the prosecution. The records also show
that

the

MTC

correctly

followed

the

procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of

Appeals erred in ordering the remand of
the case of the matter of civil liability for
the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on
directing the remand of the case to the RTC
for further proceedings on the civil aspect,
as well as with the RTC in directing a
similar remand to the MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against
him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of

evidence is required; (b) the court declares

that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon
the

crime

acquitted.
based

31

on

of

which

However,
delict

the
the

may

accused
civil
be

is

action
deemed

extinguished if there is a finding on the

final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist32 or where
the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.33
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the
accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence

on the civil aspect of the case unless the

court also declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did
not

exist.34 This

is

because

when

the

accused files a demurrer to evidence, he

has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The
only evidence on record is the evidence for
the prosecution. What the trial court should
do is issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused, and set the case
for continuation of trial for the accused to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to
adduce

evidence

by

way

of

rebuttal.

Thereafter, the court shall render judgment

on the civil aspect of the case.35
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports
the conclusion that the acquittal was based
on the findings that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist and that petitioner did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to
him; hence, petitioners civil liability has
been extinguished by his acquittal. It
should be noted that the MTC categorically
stated that it cannot find any evidence
which would prove that a crime had been
committed and that accused was the
person responsible for it. It added that the
prosecution failed to establish that it was

petitioner who committed the crime as

charged

since

its

witnesses

never

identified petitioner as the one who was

driving the cargo truck at the time of the
incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that
the proximate cause of the accident is the
damage to the rear portion of the truck
caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant
into the rear left portion of the cargo truck
and not the reckless driving of the truck by
petitioner,
petitioner

clearly
is

not

establishing
guilty

of

that

reckless

imprudence. Consequently, there is no

more need to remand the case to the trial
court for proceedings on the civil aspect of
the case, since petitioners acquittal has
extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August
2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005
of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 301604 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of
the offense charged therein is REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. RAGA
MAMANTAK

and

SARAPIDA
LIKAD

TAURAK, Accused-appellants.

SARAPIDA

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable
of feeling pity or compassion for others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger
deep in her heart when she lost her twoyear old son, Christopher, two weeks
before Christmas on December 13, 1999.
And again upon being reunited with him
some 16 months later when he could
neither recognize her nor remember who
he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for
this cruel and agonizing separation of

mother and child be punished to the full

extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999,
Teresa went with Christopher and her elder
sister Zenaida to a McDonald's outlet in the
KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila.
Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant
table while Zenaida proceeded to order
their food. Shortly after Teresa took her
seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the
counter. Barely had Christopher gone from
his mother's sight when she realized that
he had disappeared. She and her sister
frantically

looked

for

him

inside

and

outside the premises of the fastfood outlet,

to no avail. As their continued search for

the child was futile, they reported him

missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several
TV and radio stations to inform the public
of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for
help and information. Despite the publicity,
however, Teresa received no word about
Christopher's

whereabouts.

Worse,

pranksters were gleefully having a field

day aggravating her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a
call from a woman who sounded like a
muslim. The caller claimed to have custody
of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in
exchange for the boy.

On March 27, 2001, the same muslimsounding woman called and instructed
Teresa to get a recent photo of her son
from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim
Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough,
when Teresa went there, someone gave
her a recent picture of Christopher. She
then contacted the mysterious woman
through the cellphone number the latter
had previously given her. When the woman
instructed her to immediately board a ship
for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she
had not raised the ransom money yet.
They then agreed to conduct the pay off in
the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang's
Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential

Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
A team was formed and Police Officer
(PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act
as Teresa's niece.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa
left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April
7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and
proceeded

to

the

designated

meeting

place.rbl rl l lbrr
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3
Palafox were waiting at Pitang's Carinderia,
two

women

came.

They

were

Raga

Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida

Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and
PO3 Palafox and asked who they were

waiting for. Teresa replied that they were

waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name
written at the back of the picture she
received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She
showed the photo to Mamantak who stated
that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato
if the latter was already in Kapatagan.
Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly
the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near
Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them
that she had Christopher. Taurak asked
Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her
but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed
to leave Mamantak with them while she
fetched Christopher.

Several hours later, in the afternoon of the

same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa
that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant.
She asked Teresa to go with her but the
latter insisted on their agreement that the
boy be handed over at the carinderia.
Taurak relented, left and came back after
several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and
embraced him. However, the child was
unmoved. He no longer recognized nor
understood her for he could only speak in
the muslim dialect. When asked who he
was, the boy gave a muslim name with
"Taurak" as surname.

Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa

and demanded the ransom money. She
answered that her niece had it and pointed
to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and
PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was
parked outside, under Taurak's watchful
eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox
handed the ransom money to Mamantak.
At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the preagreed signal and the PAOCTF team then
closed in and arrested Mamantak and
Taurak.
Christopher

relearned

Tagalog

after

month and gradually began to forget the

incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost
lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was

kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third

child.

The

child,

born

very

sickly,

eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were
charged withkidnapping for ransom under
the following Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo,
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable
accused

Court,
conspiring,

the

above-named

confederating

and

mutually helping one another and grouping

themselves together, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
carry

away

and

deprive

Christopher

Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty

against his will for the purpose of extorting

ransom as in fact a demand for ransom

was made as a condition for his release
amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice
of Christopher Basario in said amount and
such other amount as maybe awarded to
him under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective
evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied
the charges against them. Taurak testified
that at the time and date of the alleged
kidnapping, she was peddling wares in

Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw

Christopher wandering about aimlessly,
she talked to him but he did not seem to
understand her. She took the boy under
her care and waited for someone to come
for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00
p.m., she brought the boy home with her
to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took
the boy to the nearest police outpost but
no one was there so they just brought the
boy to their stall. They opted to keep the
boy until his parents could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the
child

to

Maganding,

Sultan

Kumander,

Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa

contacted her and asked for Christopher's

picture for confirmation. It was at this point
that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitang's
Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte
on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy
at first as a precautionary measure. Only
after confirming that Teresa was the boy's
mother did she relinquish custody to her.
However, she was shocked when members
of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She
protested because she was innocent. There
were no charges against her nor was there
a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak's
testimony. She claimed that she was at
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December

13, 1999. At that time, she did not know

the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was
in Manila and whom she had not seen for
some time. They met again on April 7,
2001 at Pitang's Carinderia but only by
chance. She happened to be there when
Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later,
Taurak

talked

returning

after

to

her
a

and

few

then
hours

left,
with

Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the

first time. Taurak told her that she had
found the boy and was returning him to his
mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia
all the while, waiting for her ride home at
4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF
members suddenly arrested her and her

sister as she had not committed any crime

and there was no warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of
the parties, the trial court rendered a
decision2on November 30, 2004 finding
Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding
TAURAK

both

accused

LIKAD

SARAPIDA

and

accused

RAGA

SARAPIDA

[MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and
both are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty

of RECLUSION

PERPETUA.

Both

accused are hereby jointly and severally

ordered to pay the Christopher Basario

represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa

Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00
as moral damages. With costs against the
accused.
Both accused are given credit for the
preventive imprisonment undergone by
them during the pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.3
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the
Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated
March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled
that the trial court erred in not considering
the demand forP30,000 as a demand for
ransom. Such circumstance required the
imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the

appellate court affirmed the conviction of

Taurak and Mamantak with modification
amending

the

penalty

from reclusion

perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13,

Rule 124 as amended by Administrative
Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court
certified

the

case

to

this

Court

and

accordingly ordered the elevation of the

records.6
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a
modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. - Any private individual who

shall kidnap or detain another, or in any

other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall

suffer

the

penalty

of reclusion

perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2.

If

it

shall

have

been

committed

simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained
shall be a minor, except when the accused

is any of the parents, female or a public

officer.
The penalty shall be death where the
kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts,

the

maximum

penalty

shall

imposed.
The crime has the following elements:

be

(1) the offender is a private individual; not

either of the parents of the victim7 or a
public officer who has a duty under the law
to detain a person;8
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of
the following circumstances is present: (a)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made or (d) the person

kidnapped or detained is a minor, female

or a public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained
for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration

of

his

detention

becomes

inconsequential. The crime is qualified and

becomes punishable by death even if none
of

the

circumstances

mentioned

in

paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the

Revised Penal Code is present.9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is
the

actual

deprivation

of

the

victim's

liberty coupled with the intent of the

accused to effect it.10 It includes not only

the imprisonment of a person but also the

deprivation of his liberty in whatever form
and for whatever length of time.11 And
liberty is not limited to mere physical
restraint but embraces one's right to enjoy
his God-given faculties subject only to such
restraints

necessary

for

the

common

Christopher

suddenly

welfare.12
The

two-year-old

disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was

recovered only after almost 16 months
from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them
private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte. During the entire time the boy
was kept away from his mother, he was
certainly deprived or restrained of his

liberty. He had no means, opportunity or

capacity to leave appellants' custody and
return to his family on his own. He had no
choice but to stay with total strangers, go
with them to a far away place and learn a
culture and dialect alien to him. At such a
very tender age, he was deprived of the
liberty to enjoy the company and care of
his family, specially his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her
control and custody and even brought him
to

Lanao

del

Norte.

She

demanded P30,000 in exchange for his

return to his mother. On the other hand,
Mamantak's actions (e.g., her presence in
the carinderia and her acceptance of the

ransom) showed without doubt that she

was aiding her sister and was acting in
concert with her. These were the identical
factual findings of both the trial and
appellate courts. There is no reason to
disturb

them

as

they

are

sufficiently

supported by evidence.
Taurak's

story

that

she

merely

gave

Christopher refuge was incredible. It was

like the apocryphal tale of a man accused
of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that
he saw a piece of rope and brought it home
not knowing that there was a cow tied to
the other end. She never even tried to
bring the boy to the proper authorities or
surrender him to the Department of Social

Welfare and Development's social workers

in her barangay or in the city hall at any
time during the 16 months he was with
her. And how could Teresa have initiated
her phone conversations with Taurak when
they were total strangers to each other?
cralawred
Similarly, Mamantak's account that she
was

at

Pitang's

Carinderia

only

by

coincidence and that it was only there that

she first saw Christopher invites nothing
but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses on her role in
arranging for the payment of ransom and
the release of the kidnap victim (e.g.,
confirming

the

identity

of

Teresa

and

demanding

and

receiving

the

ransom

money) showed otherwise. The evidence

clearly established that Mamantak was a
principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself. 13 The
trial and appellate courts correctly ruled
that

the

statements

Mamantak

did

not

of

Taurak

deserve

and

credence.

Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,

including its assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses and the probative weight
thereof,

are

accorded

great,

if

not

conclusive, value when affirmed by the

Court of Appeals.14

The

Court

demand

of

Appeals

for P30,000

circumstance

which

considered

as

the

qualifying

necessitated

the

imposition of the death penalty. On the

other hand, the trial court deemed the
amount as too measly, compared to what
must have been actually spent for the care
and subsistence of Christopher for almost
two years. It therefore treated the amount
not as ransom but as a reimbursement of
expenses incurred for taking care of the
child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it
reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom

means

money,

price

or

consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person that will

release him from captivity.15 No specific

form of ransom is required to consummate
the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long
as the ransom is intended as a bargaining
chip

in

exchange

for

the

victim's

freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for

the ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of P30,000 was
demanded as a condition for the release of
Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly considered it as a
demand for ransom.
One final point of law. While the penalty for
kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other
person under Article 267 of the Revised

Penal

Code17is

death,

RA

934618 has

banned the death penalty and reduced all

death

sentences

perpetua without

toreclusion

eligibility

for

parole.

Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty

imposed

on

appellants

from

death

to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for

parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the
award

of P50,000

civil

indemnity19 was

proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,20 the

award

of P50,00021 moral

increased

toP200,000

damages

considering

is
the

minority of Christopher. Moreover, since

the crime was attended by a demand for
ransom,

and

by

way

of

example

or

correction,

Christopher

is

entitled

toP100,000 exemplary damages.22

WHEREFORE,
hereby DENIED.

the
The

appeal
March

31,

is
2006

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C.

No.

00729

is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and
Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom for which
they are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole. They are further ordered to pay,
jointly

and

severally, P50,000

indemnity, P200,000

moral

civil

damages

and P100,000 exemplary damages to their

young victim Christopher Basario.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165732

December 14,

2006
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
and

ADMER

PAJARILLO, petitioners,

vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN
LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO,
VON

LARRIE

TANGCO

TANGCO,

and

TANGCO, respondent.

VIEN

VIVIEN

LARI

LAURIZ

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before

us

is

petition

for

review

on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security

Agency,

Inc.

Pajarillo

(Safeguard)

(Pajarillo)

and

assailing

Admer
the

Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the

Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m.,
Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to
Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City, to renew her time deposit per advise

of the bank's cashier as she would sign a

specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed
firearm holder with corresponding permit
to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who
was stationed outside the bank, and pulled
out her firearm from her bag to deposit the
same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo
shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting

her

in

the

abdomen

instantly

causing her death.

Lauro

Tangco,

together

with

Evangeline's
his

six

minor

husband,
children

(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case
of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as

Criminal

Case

assigned

to

No.

Branch

0-97-73806
78.

and

Respondents

reserved their right to file a separate civil

action in the said criminal case. The RTC of
Quezon

City

subsequently

convicted

Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated

January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA,
the

RTC

decision

modification

as

to

was

affirmed

the

penalty

with
in

Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of

Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile,

on

January

14,

1998,

respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273,

Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages
against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline

and

against

Safeguard

for

failing to observe the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent the damage
committed

by

its

security

guard.

Respondents prayed for actual, moral and

exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the
material allegations in the complaint and
alleged

that

Safeguard

exercised

the

diligence of a good father of a family in the

selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's

death

was

not

due

to

Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted

only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a
compulsory

counterclaim

damages and attorney's fees.

for

moral

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10,

2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of
Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants
Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to
pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND
FOUR

HUNDRED

THIRTY

PESOS

(P157,430.00), as actual damages

2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
death indemnity;

3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as

moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The RTC found respondents to be entitled

to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim
that he merely acted in self-defense. It
gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim
that Evangeline was seen roaming around

the area prior to the shooting incident

since Pajarillo had not made such report to
the head office and the police authorities.
The RTC further ruled that being the guard
on duty, the situation demanded that he
should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline
for him to ascertain the matter instead of
shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had
already been convicted of Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he
also failed to proffer proof negating liability
in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer
of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable
with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be

conceded that Safeguard had perhaps

exercised care in the selection of its
employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there
was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision
of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence
simply showed that it required its guards to
attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the
law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions
designed for the protection of persons and
property, for the guidance of their servants
and employees, but also the duty to see to
it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to

the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with

the

modification

that

Safeguard

Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this

case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of
the

Revised

Penal

Code.

No

pronouncement as to costs.9
In

finding

that

Safeguard

is

only

subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the

applicable provisions are not Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil

liability arising from felonies under the

Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had
been found guilty of Homicide in a final
and executory judgment and is said to be
serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must
be

adjudged

civilly

liable

under

the

provisions of Article 100 of the Revised

Penal

Code

since

the

civil

liability

recoverable in the criminal action is one

solely dependent upon conviction, because
said

liability

arises

from

the

offense

charged and no other; that this is also the

civil liability that is deemed extinguished
with the extinction of the penal liability
with a pronouncement that the fact from
which the civil action might proceed does
not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising

from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence

of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees
is

inapplicable

and

irrelevant

in

civil

liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto;

that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the liability of an employer
for the civil liability of their employees is
only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners

filed

their

Motion

for

Reconsideration which the CA denied in a

Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the following assignment
of errors, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely

erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to
respondents for the payment of damages
and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred when it applied Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard

solidarily

[sic]

liable

with

petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of

damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in failing to find that petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised
due

diligence

supervision

of

in

the

selection

its

employees,

and

hence,

should be excused from any liability.10

The issues for resolution are whether (1)

Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be
held solidarily liable for the damages
awarded to respondents.
Safeguard

insists

damages

by

that

the

respondents

claim
is

for

based

on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of

the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is
jointly

and

severally

with

Pajarillo.

However, since it has established that it

had

exercised

due

diligence

in

the

selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it

should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA
correctly held that respondents, in filing a

separate civil action against petitioners are

limited to the recovery of damages arising
from a crime or delict, in which case the
liability of Safeguard as employer under
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision
of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of
Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for
damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions.

When

criminal

action

is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery

of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and

2176

of

the

Civil

Code

of

the

Philippines arising from the same act or

omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a
separate civil action and in fact filed the
same on January 14, 1998.

The CA found that the source of damages

in the instant case must be the crime of
homicide, for which he had already been
found

guilty

of

and

serving

sentence

thereof, thus must be governed by the

Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to
another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those
(a) not arising from an act or omission
complained

of

felony, e.g., culpa contractual

as

a
or

obligations arising from law under Article

31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles

32

and

34, and culpa

aquiliana under Article 2176 of the

Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party
is

granted

right

to

file

an

action

independent and distinct from the criminal

action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that
the

offended

damages

twice

party
for

cannot
the

same

recover
act

or

omission or under both causes.13

It is important to determine the nature of
respondents' cause of action. The nature of

a cause of action is determined by the

facts

alleged

constituting

the

in

the

cause

complaint
of

as

action.14 The

purpose of an action or suit and the law to

govern it is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint
read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was
the guard assigned and posted in the
Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City,

who

was

employed

and

under

employment of Safeguard Security Agency,

Inc. hence there is employer-employee

relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed
to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage to herein
plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon
seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her
firearm out of her bag, suddenly without
exercising necessary caution/care, and in
idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun,
fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M.
Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx

16. That defendants, being employer and

the employee are jointly and severally
liable for the death of Evangeline M.
Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint
shows that the latter are invoking their
right

to

recover

damages

against

Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility

for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of
shooting

and

killing

Evangeline

under

Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the

damage

done.

Such

fault

or

negligence, if there is no pre-existing

contractual relation between the parties is

called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to
acts

or

omissions

negligence.

In Dulay

resulting
v.

Court

from
of

Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Article

2176

covers

not

only

acts

committed with negligence, but also acts

which are voluntary and intentional. As far
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill
(77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already
held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligence," covers not only

acts "not punishable by law" but also

acts criminal in character, whether
intentional

and

voluntary

or

negligent. Consequently, a separate civil

action

lies

against

the

offender

in

criminal act, whether or not he is criminally

prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the

Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil

liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged
has

not

happened

or

has

not

been

committed by the accused. Briefly stated,

We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by
law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was
not derived from the criminal liability of
Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based
on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is
separate and distinct from the civil liability

arising from crime.18 The source of the

obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
case

is

a quasi-delict not

an

act

or

omission punishable by law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where
the issue involved was whether the civil
action

filed

by

plaintiff-appellants

is

founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we

held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an
action based on a crime in view of the
reservation made by the offended party in
the

criminal

case

(Criminal

Case

No.

92944), also pending before the court, to

file a separate civil action. Said the trial
court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted

this

action

defendant

on

the

Pontino's

assumption
negligence

in

that
the

accident of May 10, 1969 constituted

a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal
Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While
that

case

was

pending,

the

offended

parties reserved the right to institute a

separate civil action. If, in a criminal case,
the right to file a separate civil action for
damages is reserved, such civil action is to
be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case

cited by the trial court is inapplicable to
the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or
his heirs has the choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal

Code

and

an

action

for quasi-

delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil

Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
hold the employer solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the
diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by

appellant was an action for damages based
on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal
case to file an independent civil action
did not preclude them from choosing
to

file

civil

action

for quasi-

delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)

Although the judgment in the criminal case
finding

Pajarillo

guilty

of

Homicide

is

already final and executory, such judgment

has no relevance or importance to this
case.21 It

would

have

been

entirely

different if respondents' cause of action

was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case the CA is correct in finding

Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable

pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the
complaint, respondents' cause of action is
based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the
master or the employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in
the supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners

to prove that they exercised the diligence

of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether
Pajarillo

was

negligent

in

shooting

Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature.
Whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact, which, as a general rule,
we cannot pass upon in a petition for
review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is
limited

to

reviewing

errors

of

law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial

court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. The established exceptions are: (1)

when the inference made is manifestly

mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is
contrary

to

the

admissions

of

both

appellant and appellee; (7) when the

findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (8) when the CA manifestly
overlooked

certain

relevant

facts

not

disputed by the parties and which, if

properly

considered,

would

justify

different conclusion; and (9) when the

findings of fact of the CA are premised on
the

absence

of

evidence

and

are

contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the
case fails to show any cogent reason for us
to deviate from the factual finding of the
trial court and affirmed by the CA that
petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence
in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that
Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank
was to renew her time deposit.25On the
other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline
drew a gun from her bag and aimed the

same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he

shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline
aimed the gun at him at a distance of
about one meter or one arm's length26he
stepped backward, loaded the chamber of
his gun and shot her.27 It is however
unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could
still make such movements if indeed the
gun was already pointed at him. Any
movement

could

have

prompted

Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his
action in shooting Evangeline on his mere
apprehension that Evangeline will stage a
bank robbery. However, such claim is

befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo

testified that prior to the incident, he saw
Evangeline roaming under the fly over
which was about 10 meters away from the
bank28 and saw her talking to a man
thereat;29 that she left the man under the
fly-over,

crossed

the

street

and

approached the bank. However, except for

the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records
do not show that indeed Evangeline was
seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank
and

acting

suspiciously

prior

to

the

shooting incident. In fact, there is no

evidence that Pajarillo called the attention
of his head guard or the bank's branch
manager regarding his concerns or that he
reported the same to the police authorities

whose outpost is just about 15 meters from

the bank.
Moreover,

if

Evangeline

was

already

roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could

have already apprised herself that Pajarillo,
who was posted outside the bank, was
armed with a shotgun; that there were two
guards

inside

the

bank30manning

the

entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible

that if she really had a companion, she
would leave him under the fly-over which is
10 meters far from the bank and stage a
bank robbery all by herself without a backup. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at
Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the

bank as there were guards manning the

entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself
such

as the common experience and

observation of mankind can approve as

probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her
gun before entering the bank and was

actually in the act of pulling her gun from

her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly
shot

her,

finds

support

from

the

contentions raised in petitioners' petition

for review where they argued that when
Evangeline approached the bank, she was
seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and
petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset
by fear and perceived the act as a
dangerous threat, shot and killed the
deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act
of drawing a gun is a threatening act,
regardless of whether or not the gun was
intended to be used against petitioner
Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in
the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw
Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her

purse was suddenly very real and the

former merely reacted out of pure selfpreservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on
the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's
claim of self-defense cannot be accepted
specially

when

uncorroborated
competent
testimony

such

claim

by

any

evidence

other

which

was

even

was

separate
than

his

doubtful.

Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline

will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has
no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the
alleged threat of bank robbery was just a
figment of Pajarillo's imagination which

caused

such

unfounded

unlawful

aggression on his part.

Petitioners

argue

that

Evangeline

was

guilty of contributory negligence. Although

she was a licensed firearm holder, she had
no business bringing the gun in such
establishment where people would react
instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had
Evangeline been prudent, she could have
warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun
and did not conduct herself with suspicion
by roaming outside the vicinity of the
bank; that she should not have held the
gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to

substantiate his claim that Evangeline was
seen roaming outside the vicinity of the
bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. Evangeline's death was
merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in
shooting her on his imagined threat that
Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be
jointly held liable since it had adequately
shown that it had exercised the diligence
required in the selection and supervision of
its employees. It claims that it had required
the guards to undergo the necessary
training

and

to

submit

the

requisite

qualifications and credentials which even

the RTC found to have been complied with;

that the RTC erroneously found that it did
not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard
further claims that it conducts monitoring
of the activities of its personnel, wherein
supervisors are assigned to routinely check
the activities of the security guards which
include among others, whether or not they
are in their proper post and with proper
equipment, as well as regular evaluations
of the employees' performances; that the
fact

that

contrary

Pajarillo
to

loaded

Safeguard's

his

firearm

operating

procedure is not sufficient basis to say that

Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to

say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing

to it that the procedures and policies were
not properly implemented by reason of one
unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those

of

persons

for

whom

one

is

responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their

assigned tasks, even though the former

are

not

engaged

in

any

business

or

industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article
shall

cease

when

the

persons

herein

mentioned prove that they observed all the

diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is
primarily and solidarily liable for the quasidelict committed by the former. Safeguard
is

presumed

to

be

negligent

in

the

selection and supervision of his employee

by operation of law. This presumption may
be overcome only by satisfactorily showing

that the employer exercised the care and

the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
In the selection of prospective employees,
employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and
service records.35 On the other hand, due
diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules
and

regulations

for

the

guidance

of

employees and the issuance of proper

instructions intended for the protection of
the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary

disciplinary measures upon employees in

case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure

the

indispensable

performance
to

the

of

business

acts
of

and

beneficial to their employer. To this, we add

that actual implementation and monitoring
of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the
employer,

acting

through

dependable

supervisors who should regularly report on

their supervisory functions.36 To establish
these factors in a trial involving the issue
of

vicarious

submit

liability,

concrete

documentary evidence.

employers
proof,

must

including

We agree with the RTC's finding that

Safeguard had exercised the diligence in
the selection of Pajarillo since the record
shows

that

psychological

Pajarillo
and

underwent

neuro-psychiatric

evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de

Porres
ideations

Center
were

where
noted,

no

psychoses

submitted

certification on the Pre-licensing training

course for security guards, as well as
police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard
fell short of the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee, particularly
Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard
presented Capt. James Camero, its Director

for

Operations,

who

testified

on

the

issuance of company rules and regulations,

such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will
Be

Assigned

To

Banks,37 Weapons

Training,38 Safeguard
Marksmanship

Training

Center

Training

Lesson

Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it
had also been established during Camero's
cross-examination that Pajarillo was not
aware

of

such

rules

regulations.41 Notwithstanding

and

Camero's

clarification on his re-direct examination

that these company rules and regulations
are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of
the

instructors

during

classroom

instructions and not necessary to give

students copy of the same,42 the records

do not show that Pajarillo had attended

such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there
was adequate training and continuous
evaluation

of

the

security

guard's

performance. Pajarillo had only attended

an in-service training on March 1, 1997
conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first
assignment as security guard of Safeguard,
which was in collaboration with Safeguard.
It was established that the concept of such
training

was

purely

on

security

of

equipments to be guarded and protection

of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after
Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had

ever conducted further training of Pajarillo

when he was later assigned to guard a
bank which has a different nature of
business with that of Toyota. In fact,
Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a
bank is different from being on duty in a
factory since a bank is a very sensitive
area.44
Moreover,

considering

his

reactions

to

Evangeline's act of just depositing her

firearm

for

safekeeping, i.e.,

of

immediately shooting her, confirms that

there was no training or seminar given on
how to handle bank clients and on human
psychology.

Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to

show that there were inspectors who go
around the bank two times a day to see
the daily performance of the security
guards assigned therein, there was no
record

ever

presented

of

such

daily

inspections. In fact, if there was really such

inspection made, the alleged suspicious
act of Evangeline could have been taken
noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we
find that the award of actual damages in
the amount P157,430.00 which were the
expenses

incurred

by

respondents

in

connection with the burial of Evangeline

were supported by receipts. The award

of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the

death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article
2206 of the Civil Code provides that the
spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descendants

and

ascendants

of

the

deceased may demand moral damages for

mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased. Moral damages are awarded
to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante;thus it must

be

proportionate

inflicted.45 The

to

intensity

the
of

suffering
the

pain

experienced by the relatives of the victim

is proportionate to the intensity of affection
for him and bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to
their

moral

suffering

caused

by

Evangeline's death was so sudden causing

respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a
mother to six children who were all minors
at the time of her death. In People v.
Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million
pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a
seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered.
In Metro

Manila

Transit

Corporation

v.

Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded

the amount of one million pesos as moral
damages to the parents of a third year
high school student and who was also their
youngest child who died in a vehicular
accident since the girl's death left a void in
their

lives.

respondents
amount

of

Hence,
are
one

we

also

hold

that

the

to

the

pesos

as

entitled

million

Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of

her husband and minor children as they
were deprived of her love and care by her
untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P300,000.00.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,

exemplary damages are imposed by way of

example or correction for the public good,
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.49 It is awarded
as

deterrent

to

socially

deleterious

actions. Inquasi-delict, exemplary damages

may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code,
attorney's fees may be recovered when, as
in the instant case, exemplary damages
are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award
of

attorney's

fees

in

the

amount

of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE,

the

petition

for

review

is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16,

2004

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that

the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard
Security

Agency,

is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under

2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.

Inc.
Article