0DFKLDYHOOLV,URQLHV7KH/DQJXDJHRI3UDLVHDQG%ODPH

LQ7KH3ULQFH
Erica Benner

Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 81, Number 1,

Spring 2014, pp. 61-84 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\7KH-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/sor.2014.0008

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sor/summary/v081/81.1.benner.html

Access provided by Ebsco Publishing (20 Nov 2014 05:20 GMT)

Erica Benner
Machiavellis Ironies:
The Language of Praise
and Blame in The Prince
for all their disagreements, most contemporary readers of the prince agree

on one point. Machiavellis book, they maintain, argues that politicians

often have no choice but to set aside traditional moral standards. The
basic priority of political leaders is to preserve their polity against internal and external threats. If their constituents are currently stateless or
downtrodden, they must seek to advance the interests of those people
by building them a state or bolstering their power in an existing one.
Politicians sometimes have to let the priorities of collective self-preservation override moral rules that most people take for granted as foundations of civilized, intelligently ordered life: keep your promises, avoid
violence and cruelty, dont take from others what is legitimately theirs.
However sound these precepts might be in private transactions, leaders
who insist on always observing them in the high-stakes game of politics
tend to come out losers. Winners know when to ignore conventional
restraints. They understand that their own constituents best interests
can sometimes be served only if they violate agreements, launch offensive attacks on neighbors, and use extralegal means to def lect actual or
potential rivals.
Especially since the nineteenth century, these maxims have had
many admirers. Some of them dub what they take to be Machiavellian
wisdom political realismin contrast to the idealism or moralism
of those who think that it is always regrettable, and generally harms
ones own cause, to break oaths, take advantage of others weakness in

social research Vol. 81 : No. 1 : Spring 201461

peacetime, or use unlawful violence. Most self-professed Machiavellian

Realists are nonpoliticians; in our times as in Machiavellis, few political practitioners dare admit that they subscribe to these precepts. Yet
for those who secretly do, The Prince supplies a handy rationale for
pragmatic hypocrisy. To appear to be in thrall to conventional morality while occasionally flouting it, we read in chapter 18, is essential
for political success. It is necessary to be a great pretender and dissembler like Pope Alexander VI, whose deceits succeeded at his will,
because he knew well this aspect of the world. Alexanders presentday imitators have a significant advantage over two-faced statesmen in
Machiavellis time: now they can claim to be following wise Machiavellian Realist advice, whereas earlier practitioners had no respectable
label for their pragmatic amorality.
The modern realist reading of The Prince assumes that the book
is a straightforward treatise whose various maxims and examples
Machiavelli recommends in dead earnest. If this assumption were
shown to be wrong, then todays self-proclaimed realists would be
deprived of a key intellectual pillar. On the occasion of The Princes
500th anniversary, there are good reasons to re-examine the view that
Machiavelli endorses all the Machiavellian advice he puts forward in
the book.

Early Doubts about The Princes Realism

We can start by asking whether an author with Machiavellis political
experience, deep reading of ancient histories, and sharp nose for selfserving rhetoric could seriously have believed that The Princes maxims
of strategic amorality could ever bring solid political success. In striking
contrast to modern readings, few of the books early readers claimed
that it offered realistic guidance on how to maintain political power.
On the contrary, both critics and defenders thought it self-evident that
a prince who followed Machiavellis more notorious maxims would
shoot himself in both feet. Denouncing The Princes recently deceased
author as an enemy of the human race, the English Cardinal Reginald
Pole pointed out in 1536 that any ruler imprudent enough to follow its

62social research

amoral precepts would scupper his chances of founding a strong government (Pole 1997, 27485). It seemed obvious to Pole that rulers who regularly break faith with internal and foreign allies, or who attack other
states without good cause, soon find themselves isolated and exposed to
reciprocal attacks. In rare cases where such leaders avoid plots or revolutions in their own lifetimes, their methods create a corrosive legacy
of mistrust that eventually comes back to bite their successorsand
fatally weakens their states.
Astounded by the apparent blindness and ignorance of its author, Pole concluded that The Prince was an ironic work: under color of
helping princes to power, it lured them toward self-inflicted disaster.
Other early readers agreed that Machiavelli did not seriously defend
The Princes amoral maxims but detected high-minded aims behind his
apparently ruthless advice. Alberico Gentili, an exiled Italian Protestant who taught at Oxford, argued that while appearing to instruct
the prince, Machiavelli was actually stripping him bare to reveal
the hypocritical and tyrannical ways of men who seek excessive power
(Gentili 1924, II.9). The Englishmen Francis Bacon, James Harrington,
and Henry Neville agreed that behind its morality-subverting mask,
The Prince sought to defend high moral standards in politics by exposing the hypocrisy of corrupt princes and popes. In 1762, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau claimed that Machiavellis choice of his execrable hero,
the scandalously violent Cesare Borgia, suffices to exhibit his secret
intention to criticize corrupt political standards while seeming to
commend them (Rousseau 1964, III.56).

Ambiguities and Inconsistencies

A close reading yields further reasons to suspect that The Prince may not
always speak in Machiavellis own voice. The book is riddled with ambiguities that invite readers to pause and ponder the implications of a chapter,
a passage, or a word. When Machiavelli declares in chapter 7 that Cesare
Borgia made use of every deed and did all those things that should be
done by a prudent and virtuous man, does he mean that Borgia was a
prudent and virtuous manor insinuate that his actions merely simu-

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince63

lated genuine virt? When we read in chapter 8 that Agathocles seized

and held the principality of Syracuse without any civil controversy,
should we conclude that the cause of nonresistance was the violent
usurpers popularity, or the terror his methods instilled in his subjects?
The Princes ambiguities loom even larger when we try to pick
out a few general standards for evaluating the books maxims and examples. Machiavelli is widely supposed to have held that the ends
justify the means. But what, in The Prince, are the appropriate ends
of prudent action? At times the personal greatness (grandezza), reputation (riputazione), advantage, and survival of the prince himself are all
that seem to matter for Machiavelli. At other times, he implies that a
princes desires for power can only be satisfied if he gives priority to
the stability (stabilit), security (sicurt), and well-being (bene essere) of
the generality of people (universalit) over his private ambitions. In
chapters 3 and 4, Machiavelli describesand seems to approve ofrepublican Romes ambition to dominate the free province of Greece.
Then in chapter 5 he sets out excellent reasons to respect peoples
desires to live in freedom from foreign occupation and warns princes
that they must face recurrent violent resistance if they assault that
freedom. It is hard to see how Machiavelli, or anyone else, can give
equal weight to both these ends: conquest for the sake of maximizing power on the one hand, desires for freedom on the other. And it
seems inconsistent that the same book teaches princes and empires
how to seize power over peoples who reasonably and naturally value
self-government.
Machiavellis basic standards become still harder to define
when we ask what he considers the most effective means for pursuing
princely ends. There is a deep, recurring tension between two modes
of action discussed in The Prince: one associated with steadiness and
trust (fede), the other with changeability and deceptive appearances.
At times Machiavelli insists that a princes self-preservation depends
on satisfying his subjects desires for nonarbitrary rule, transparency,
firm mutual obligations (obligo), and regular order. At other times the
most effective princely modes are said to be nontransparent, variable

64social research

in accordance with the times, and indifferent to stable expectations

on the part of subjects or allies. For example, chapter 18 tells princes
to break faith when this gives them an edge over rivals, or helps them
ascend to greatness. Yet in chapter 21 and before, Machiavelli underlines the need to make and keep firm commitments to subjects and
allieseven if this sometimes puts the prince on the losing side, and
constrains what he can do to increase his own power. More generally,
chapter 25 begins by advancing a cautious approach to dealing with
fortunes caprices by patiently building dykes and dams long before
troubles strike. This approach is linked to The Princes most obvious
practical aim: to teach readers how to construct a well-ordered, welldefended stato that has fair chances of lasting long after their deaths.
But on the very next page, Machiavelli states that its better to handle
fortune with youthful impetuosity than with an older mans caution,
and to beat her into submission rather than patiently building firm
orders to regulate her moods.

Is Pragmatic Adaptability a Machiavellian Virtue?

The usual solution to these difficulties is to treat The Princes various
standards as relative to circumstances. According to this explanation,
Machiavelli thought that some circumstances are friendly to freedom
in republics, while in other conditions principality or even tyranny has
good effects and may be the only way out of corruption. At times one
should work steadily and cautiously to forestall fortunes downturns,
at other times strike and beat her. If one looks for a general statement
of this circumstance-relative position in The Prince, the best candidate is
the claim made near the end of chapter 18 that a prince needs to have a
spirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and variations of things
command him. This claim is echoed in chapter 25, where we read that
if one would change his nature with the times and with affairs, his
fortune would not change. If variability is Machiavellis overarching
criterion of political virt, then many of The Princes apparent inconsistencies can be explained away. The only kind of virt that political agents
always need is pragmatic adaptability; the other qualities Machiavelli

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince65

associates with virtspiritedness, physical boldness, military courage,

foresight, caution, stability, respect for limits, patience, discipline, good
orders, and moral goodnessare more or less praiseworthy according to
circumstances.
But the text gives us many reasons to doubt that the ability
to change ones spirit and even ones nature is part of virt at all.
First, Machiavelli commends this abilityor seems to commend it
very late in the book. Before chapter 18, not a word was said about the
need to change ones modes, spirit, or nature. Until then, the ability
to stay firmly on ones own course, ordering and commanding ones
own forces regardless of fortunes variations, looked like the height
of virt in The Prince. The books main practical proposals call for a
virt that builds firm orders to govern, manage, or regulate (governare, maneggiare, regolare) fortune. This steadying, self-directed kind
of virt is especially needed to build civilian militias as the foundation of renewed Italian strength. Such orders need to be founded on a
self-imposed logic that makes one as independent of fortunes whims
as possible. For although no one is immune to their effects, virtuous
works can help one avoid being subject to fortunes caprices. A prince
who varies with fortunes moods or gives himself over to her command no longer regulates fortuna, but puts her in the drivers seat.
Second, even in chapter 18 and later, Machiavelli does not identify virt with the ability to change at fortunes command: he never
calls this ability virt. On the contrary, he frequently highlights the
shortcomings of those who let fortuna blow them hither and thither.
Throughout The Prince, the word variazione is a byword for fortunes
merit-blind and destabilizing oscillations. In chapter 19, variability
(varia) tops Machiavellis list of qualities that win contempt, associating it with pusillanimity, effeminacy, and irresolution, from which a
prince should guard himself as from a shoal.
Two examples of pragmatic political variation in The Prince
show why this mode is ultimately self-destructive. In chapter 16,
Machiavelli discusses politicians who court constant popularity in
matters of political economyan all-too-familiar phenomenon in our

66social research

own times, as well as his. At first they seek to be held liberal through
extravagant spending. When funds dry up, they shift gears and try
to practice frugality. This kind of varying with fortune is disastrous,
Machiavelli tells us. Since the princes initially sumptuous ways spoil
his subjects, they grow enraged against him when he changes modes
with the times. Machiavellis solution is that princes should avoid
playing the popularity game at alland avoid varying their modes of
spending. Instead a prince should always follow frugal policies, even if
this prudent mode makes some people accuse him of vicious meanness (misero). They will come around and respect him all the more
when it is seen that with his parsimony [parsimonia] his income is
enough for him, that he can defend himself from whoever makes war
upon him, and that he can undertake campaigns without burdening
the people.
The other example occurs in chapter 21, where Machiavelli rejects the argument that princes should keep their options open in foreign relations or opportunistically switch alliances in the vain desire to
win every war. The only prudent policy, he argues, is to pick clear sides
and accept common defeats as well as victories, since well-founded
trust and firm obligations between allies guarantee ones own security
more surely than efforts to side with whomever happens to look like
the winner at a given moment. Over time, advantages always accrue
to a prince who discloses himself boldly in support of one side. For
if the one he supported wins a particular war, the winner has an obligation [obligo] to you and has a contract of love for you; and men are
never so indecent as to crush you with so great an example of ingratitude. If the one he backed loses, his unwavering commitment still
pays rich dividends, since the losing power will still owe him refuge
in exchange for his past support: he helps you while he can, and you
become the companion of a fortune that can revive.
Third, right after declaring in chapter 25 that one should change
their modes with the times, Machiavelli suddenly turns around and
says that this kind of versatility is in fact impossible. No man, he
writes, may be found so prudent as to know how to accommodate

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince67

himself to this. In a famous 1506 letter he had already canvassed

and rejected the idea that human beings are capable of chameleon-like
adaptability. He starts by observing that anyone wise enough to adapt
to and understand the times and the pattern of events would always
have good fortune, or would always keep himself from bad fortune.
Such a man, indeed, would be master of the universe: and it would
come to be true that the wise man could command the stars and the
Fates. Unsurprisingly, however, such wise men cannot be found
among mere mortals. For in the first place, men are shortsighted;
in the second place, they are unable to command their own natures
(Letter to Giovan Battista Soderini, September 1321, 1506). On Machiavellis egalitarian anthropology, even the most prudent men are incapable of perfect foresight and improvised self-creation. The variation
argument therefore rests on an unrealistic view of human capabilities.
It reflects a longing for total control of circumstances that cannot be
completely controlledthough they can be managed or governed
by self-ordering virt.

Signs and Uses of Irony

If Machiavelli is not in earnest when he urges princes to vary their modes
or nature with changing fortune, why does he say that they should? In
view of The Princes rampant ambiguities, inconsistent general standards,
and questionably realistic advice, we should consider the possibility that
such statements are ironic. Ironic writers use a variety of clues or signals
to communicate judgments that differ from those they, or their narrators or characters, make explicitly. An ironist may openly praise someones outstanding achievements or character in general terms while
painting his specific actions in problematic colors, thus inviting readers
to question the judgment behind the overt praise. Eloquent silences and
misleading omissions draw readers attention to what a writer appears,
or openly claims, to pass over. Hyperbole and exaggeration, especially in
texts that usually adopt a coolly analytical tone, provoke readers to ask
whether an exaggerated claim ref lects an authors own views.

68social research

These methods of dissimulative writing form part of a rich, ancient repertoire of ironic techniques well known to educated readers
in Machiavellis day. The Roman rhetorician Quintilian had noted that
irony is a particularly useful medium for political criticism in conditions of tyranny or repression, where it is dangerous for writers to
express their views openly:
For we may speak against the tyrants in question as openly
as we please without loss of effect, provided always that
what we say is susceptible of a different interpretation,
since it is only danger to ourselves, and not offense to them,
that we have to avoid. And if the danger can be avoided
by any ambiguity of expression, the speakers cunning will
meet with universal approbation (Quintilian 1986, 6768).
But as Gentili, Bacon, and Neville observed of Machiavellis
Prince, ironic writing may have serious educative purposes. Ironic dissimulatio could be a valuable means of getting people to rethink their
current beliefs or desiresprovoking them to ask how realistic their
ambitions might be, or whether the consequences of pursuing them
might be more troublesome than theyre worth. When in The Prince
Machiavelli urges princes to court fortunes favor or follow her commands, he produces a jarring tension between these belated, ambivalent recommendations and his more convincingly reasoned advice to
work independently of fortuneestablishing ones own virtuoso ends
and refusing to lower ones standards for the sake of popularity, a record of unbroken military success, or personal grandezza. By presenting
inconsistent alternatives and subtly hinting at the problematic character of one, he invites readers to examine their merits and defects for
themselves. As many ancient and humanist writers recognized, this
type of ironic teaching can be far more persuasive than direct lectures.
A high-spirited young princes eyes might glaze over if his adviser tells
him outright to resist the temptation to lower his moral standards
for the sake of ostensibly greater things. Such middle-aged, pedestrian

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince69

advice is more likely to sink in if it comes from someone who seems

to support the princes ambitionsand who at times expresses the
princes private thoughts about how he might justify controversial
policies. Alongside arguments that mirror grandiose princely aims and
thoughts, the ironic adviser places countervailing arguments and examples that challenge impetuous readers to slow down, think harder
about the implications of pursuing their initial aims by problematic
means, and perhaps to revise their less reasonable ends.
On this reading, The Prince is not a treatise setting out the authors wisdom to be imbibed secondhand by uncritical readers. It is a
series of provocative, mind-teasing conversations with the young, the
impetuous, and men in power that seeks to improve their powers of
political judgment. Machiavelli refers to the discussions in several of
The Princes chapters as discourses (discorsi). The word suggests that
they are structured as conversations with readers, not as lectures delivered from an authorial pedestal. A discourse differs from a univocal
lecture or treatise in imitating several different voices, or expressing
different points of view canvassed by a participanthere the princely
readerwhose own judgments are still uncertain or poorly founded.
Unlike a dialogue or drama, it does not name specific discussants or
announce shifts from one view to another. In The Prince, the impression
of shifting voices or personae is created by a range of devices: shifting
pronouns (sometimes he, sometimes you for princes), hesitations
and doubts following sweepingly assured claims, contrasts between
cynical and moderate tones, or between misanthropic and philanthropic assertions in the same chapter. Like a dialogue, a discourse
typically offers weakly reasoned but boldly asserted opinions, bringing their flaws to light as discussion progresses. The flawed opinions,
however, are not necessarily renounced. The task of assessing them is
left to readers as part of the education in independent judgment that
is a basic purpose of dialogical or multivocal writing.
What readers take from discourses depends on their own aims
and dispositions. Aspiring princes in a hurry to seize power are likely
to read quickly, skimming the text for nuggets of secondhand wisdom

70social research

that they can apply to their ambitious enterprises. Since their aim is to
achieve greatness and glory, they will pounce on the most impressivesounding phrases and examples, not pausing to notice subtle warnings
or advice that they might be better off working through more modestly virtuous modes. Similarly, nonprincely readers who scour The
Prince in hopes of finding a quick fix or an unambiguous message may
pick out the boldest statements, not troubling themselves with the
caveats. If they find the books amoral advice profound or intriguing,
they will be disinclined to notice the subtle ways in which Machiavelli
subverts it and ignore the quietly prudent advice woven into other
levels of the text.

General Standards: Virt vs. Fortune

One of The Princes main ironic techniques is to introduce tensions
between particular, often shocking statements and examples, on the one
hand, and more moderate general standards on the other. Early in the
book Machiavelli sets out one overarching general standard that may be
used to evaluate all of the books diverse precepts and examples: that it
is better to acquire and hold power by means of ones own arms and
virt than by fortune and others arms. When we read in chapter 1
that all dominions are acquired either by virt or by fortune, this might
sound like a value-neutral standardeither mode will do, depending
on what works for particular princes in particular circumstances. But
in chapter 6, Machiavelli makes it clear that fortuna is much the inferior
mode; it is always better to rely on virt. Though it often appears, he
now observes, that either virt or fortune relieves many of a princes
difficulties, nonetheless, he who has relied less on fortune has maintained himself more.
Throughout The Prince, Machiavelli uses the fortuna-virt antithesis to signal indirect judgments about the prudence and praiseworthiness of actions or maxims. When he notes that fortune played
a significant role in a persons or a citys achievements, he implies
some deficiency in their quality, even when virt also played a large
roleand even when he lavishes loud words of praise on the actions

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince71

in question. At the beginning of chapter 7, Machiavelli outlines the potentially crippling disadvantages of relying on fortune for acquiring as
well as maintaining principalities. First, fortune gives princes a deceptively quick and easy ascent to power. Those who become princes with its
help have no difficulty along the path because they fly there but face
many difficulties when they are in place. Second, in concrete terms,
to rely on fortune means to depend on other, unreliable people. Someone
becomes prince by fortune when a state is given to someone either
for money or by the grace of whoever gives it. These princes therefore
rest simply on the will and fortune of whoever has given a state to
them, which are, Machiavelli points out, two very inconstant and
unstable things. Finally, states gained too quickly [subito] by anothers
grace lack roots, so that the first adverse weather eliminates them.
Governments and institutions based on fortune, then, are inherently unstable. Fortune-reliant people often produce outcomes that
look impressive for a time, but are prone to collapse at any moment. In
The Prince and all his works, Machiavelli associates fortune with variation, instability, and weak orders. By contrast, actions based on virt
confer firmness and security on their products. They do so chiefly by
imposing good ordini. Good orders and foundations (fondamenti) are
therefore always the product of virt; foundations built on fortune
are always flawed. And the main question Machiavelli asks readers to
weigh throughout The Prince is: do the general modes and particular
actions described in each chapter result in strong, lasting foundations?
The question whether they bring grandezza, altezza, and reputation is
also broached. But these things can be lost overnight if a prince lacks
strong fondamenti.
These arguments suggest not only that it is better to rely on
virt than fortune; it is also better not to rely on both at once. Some
princes might think that the ideal is to have as much fortune and virt
as possiblethat it cannot hurt to get as much help from fortune as
you can. Machiavelli disagrees. An agent may have a measure of good
fortune in acquiring a state, as chapter 6s most excellent founders Moses, Romulus, Cyrus, and Theseus had in the opportunity furnished by weak or nonexistent political orders among the people they
72social research

came to rule. But the more you rely on the fortune of finding other
people weak or divided, and take advantage of their weakness to maintain your own power, the less solidly you rely on your own virt. Those
who at first succeed with fortune and others arms may come to expect
their continued help, and work less hard than they would otherwise
have to at building durable arms of their own. Even if you happen to
have good fortune as well as virt, then, you do better to rely as much
as possible on virt alone.
Every example, precept, and policy recommended or rejected
in The Prince can be evaluated by this general, antithetical standard,
whether or not Machiavelli applies it explicitly. To take the case discussed earlier: after repeatedly advancing the generaland strongly
reasonedargument that it is better to build stable orders by your
own virt than to win with fortunes aid, Machiavelli seems to contradict this argument in chapters 18 and 25, now assertingthough
with doubts and caveatsthat one should change according to fortunes command. Perhaps he regards truly virtuoso princes as quasisuperhuman beings who, unlike most of us, have the ability to switch
their spirit or even nature according to circumstances. Or perhaps
he is using the paradox to tease readers, challenging them to choose
between two ultimately incompatible and unequally useful modes.
As for the claim in chapter 25 that fortuna favors impetuous young
men who beat her: even if she does, The Princes guiding standard implies that prudent readers should not waste their manly energies in
getting fortune on their side, since she never keeps her promises (Di
fortuna, lines 2930). They do better to rely entirely on their own virtuous resources: especially foresight, industry, and intelligent ordering
powers, tempered by an awareness of the limits of human powers to
master any situation. Some kinds of virt are more conducive to stability and safety than others. For what Machiavelli calls virt of spirit
(di animo) is especially effective for acquiring power, winning battles,
or making conquests. But his exemplars of exceedingly bold and spirited virtCesare Borgia, Agathocles, Severustend to be less skilled
at maintaining political power, or at founding a secure legacy for future generations.
The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince73

The entire Prince may be read as a series of confrontations between two kinds of prince, or two modes of princely action. One
depends on virt and his own arms. His modes are steady and
transparent, and he knows the value of trust for stable success. The
other relies largely or in considerable part on fortune and the arms
of others. His modes are variable and impetuous, and he constantly
changes his policies, promises, and allegiances to gain temporary advantage or win fair-weather friends. As I argue in Machiavellis Prince:
A New Reading (Benner 2013), the great genius of Machiavellis little
work is that it manages to sustain both possibilities throughout
leaving it up to readers to decide which mode is more efficacious, and
to judge whether they can combine them without fatally weakening
their position.

Coded Language
The Princes fortuna-virt antithesis forms the basis for a systematic,
normatively coded language that signals Machiavellis ref lective judgments throughout The Prince. Some words and phrases always have a
positive sense associated with virt, while others are always associated
with fortuna and its destabilizing, virt-eroding effects. The virt-linked
words convey praise, even when they sound low-key or inconspicuous. The fortune-linked words convey criticism, even when they sound
misleadingly enthusiastic or impressive. For example, statements that
something makes men happy (felice) sound positive, but often contain
a veiled warning: that thing might be acquired with fortunes help, but
will be hard to hold by ones own arms, and in time brings more woes
than happiness. Power acquired suddenly or quickly (subito, presto)
or easily (facilmente) is infirm and unreliable, and thus too dependent
on fortune. To insist on the greatness (grandezza) or great height
(altezza) of men or actions or the high reputation (reputazione) they
confer is to warn that what appears great and confers reputation may be
deceptiveor lacks secure foundations.
Here is a partial list of normatively coded words used in the
Prince:

74social research

Virt

Fortuna

Antitheses

free, freely (libera, liberamente) prince (principe)

people(s) (populo, populi) prince

ones own (suo/sua, proprie) others (daltri)

ordinary, order (ordinario, ordine) 

stability, stable (stabilit, stabile) variation (variazione)

caution/respect (rispetto) impetuosity (impetuosit)

extraordinary (estraordinario)

Near synonyms

citizens (cittadini) subjects (sudditi)

prudence (prudenzia) astuteness (astuzia)

effort, pains (fatica, affani) difficulty (difficult)

friendly (amico) favor (favore)

parsimony (parsimonia) miserliness (misero)

Warning words happy (felice)

[acquiring] quickly, suddenly
(subito, presto)
easy, easily (facile, facilmente)
great/ness (grande, grandezza)
high, height (alto, altezza)
rare (raro)
spirited (animoso)
idleness, idle (odio, ozioso)
enterprise (imprese)
Understated praise

ordered (ordinate)

natural (naturale)

reasonable (ragionevole)

firm (fermo)

discipline (disciplina)

knowledge, to know (cognizione, conoscere)

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince75

In Machiavellis antitheses, both terms seem merely descriptive,

or of equal value. In fact the virt-related term is positive and conveys
praise, while the fortune-linked term is negative or ambiguous. Near
synonyms seem almost interchangeable, although Machiavelli always
links one to virt and the other to fortune. They mimic the misleading
resemblance between virtues and vices found in political life, the central theme of chapters 1517. Warning words seem to express approval,
enthusiasm, or high praise, but in fact signal problematic reliance on
fortune behind good words or appearances. Understated praise words
seem merely descriptive or moderately positive, but in fact indicate
praiseworthy virt behind unassuming or neutral appearances.
Most of Machiavellis normatively coded words are drawn from
a long tradition of ancient writing passed down from early Greek writers
to Romans and humanists. Classically educated readers steeped in the
tradition would have picked up on this method of ironic writing more
quickly than readers less familiar with ancient texts. This helps to explain why it seemed clear to them that Machiavelli was dissimulating
or as Gentili (1924, III.9) put it, making all his secrets clear and revealing his secret counsels by ironic indirectionwhile modern readers
unversed in a wide range of ancient writings fail to see the pattern.

Extraordinary Greatness: King Ferdinand

The Princes treatment of Spains King Ferdinand offers a prime example
of suspiciously hyperbolic praise. Machiavelli first names Ferdinand
in chapter 21, although he mentions him at the end of chapter 18 as
a certain prince of present times who never preaches anything but
peace and faith, and is very hostile to both. Nearby passages praise Pope
Alexander VIs great efficacy in deceiving, and note that the vulgar
are so easily taken in by the appearance and outcome of a thing that
skilled deceivers often gain great reputations. Ferdinand, as we discover
in chapter 21, was supremely talented at winning esteem. Nothing,
Machiavelli observes, makes a prince so much esteemed as to carry on
great enterprises and to give rare [raro] examples of himself. Our author
piles on the superlatives to praise the Spanish kings exploits to the skies:

76social research

If you consider his actions, you will find them all very great
and some of them extraordinary [grandissima e qualcuna estraordinaria]. . . . Besides this, in order to undertake greater enterprises [imprese], always in the service of [servendosi] religion,
he turned to an act of pious cruelty [una pietoso crudelt], expelling the Marranos from his kingdom and despoiling it
[spogliando] of them; nor could there be an example more
wretched and rare [miserabile/raro] than this. . . . And so he
has always done and ordered great things [cose grande], which
have always kept the minds of his subjects in suspense and
admiration and occupied with the outcome (emphasis added).
If we judge by first appearances, we might well conclude that
Ferdinand is the very paragon of a prince who undertook bold schemes
of conquest and unification unrestrained by moral scruples and got
away with it. He did so because of his talents for preaching one thing
while doing another, and for distracting restive subjects and foreign
powers with his constant wars. Or do appearances deceive? Throughout
The Prince, the main touchstone of princely prudence is the long-term
results of a princes actions, not short-term success or present appearances of greatness. Machiavelli refrains from making direct judgments
of this kind about Ferdinands policies in The Prince. In a series of contemporary letters, however, he offered a scathingly critical analysis
of the kings extraordinary movements. Writing to Machiavelli, his
friend Francesco Vettori wondered whether Ferdinands bafflingly hyperactive maneuvers might conceal some well-thought-out strategy.
Machiavelli replies by setting out a few basic criteria for judging the
prudence of a policy before its results are fully known.
Prudent actions should aim, first of all, to establish lasting orders, not win immediate victories. But for all the suspense and admiration they aroused, Ferdinands actions had no such aims. Where
others suspected a cleverly hidden long-range plan, Machiavelli saw
hot air and dust kicked up to no substantial purpose. Second, prudent
agents avoid taking unnecessary risks. Machiavelli argues, however,

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince77

that Ferdinands aimless enterprises unnecessarily endangered all

his statesalways a reckless course of action for any man. Prudent
agents, finally, base their actions on foresightnot the short-term
kind that only sees advantages around the next corner, but an ability to assess how others will react to ones policies in the long run.
Ferdinand, Machiavelli argues, failed to consider the quite predictable
future reactions to his present breaches of faith and unnecessary aggression. However confusing his tactics might have been at first, by
now his snares are well-known and . . . have begun generating hatred
and loathing in the minds of his friends as well as his enemies.
In sum, Machiavelli sees no security for Spain resulting from
Ferdinands hectic maneuvers. He concludes unambiguously that the
king may have understood matters badly and brought them to a
worse conclusion. Ferdinands present triumphs were likely to go the
way of all victories won by fortune and not by virt: if they do not come
back to bite Ferdinand in his lifetime, they will harm his country over
time. If one examines his actions, he concludes in what would become
The Princes critical code, you will realize that the king of Spain is a
man of astuteness [astuzia] and good fortune rather than of wisdom and
prudence (Machiavelli to Vettori, April 29, 1513; emphasis added). Machiavellis astuteness is extremely ambiguous. At first blush it might
sound like a synonym for shrewd judgment or prudence. But in all his
works, Machiavelli uses it for a kind of cunning tactical opportunism
that tends to cause disorder under cover of decent causes. Thus in
chapter 9 we read that there is more foresight and more astuteness in
the great than in the people. This might seem to praise the former
until it transpires that the grandi aim only to save themselves while
seeking to oppress the people through their astuteness, a policy sure
to foment civil disorders and harm their city.
Extraordinary is one of the most alarm-ringing words in Machiavellis vocabulary. Estraordinario is always part of an antithetical
pair, opposed to ordinario: ordinary modes cause order, while extraordinary ones run against or destroy it. In The Prince, chapter 2, estraordinario is associated with vices, excess, and being hated. In later chapters

78social research

Machiavelli uses the word to describe excessive and arbitrary taxes

on the people, which make it hard for princes to maintain their state
(chapter 16); Roman emperors who depended on soldiers bought by
money and special favors, always unstable foundations of government
(chapter 19); and ill-founded hopes inspired by extraordinary miracles (chapter 26). Extraordinary actions leap from the page, as they
make a strong impression in life. Yet they are very bad at maintaining
whatever one acquires. Ferdinands extraordinarily busy modes of
action in pursuit of grandezza might make some observers marvel. But
as with the words extraordinary, great, and astute that Machiavelli
uses to describe them, first impressions may deceive.

A Lesser Example of Great Virt: Hiero of

Syracuse
Initial impressions are equally deceptive when Machiavelli discusses
more modest political virtues. At the beginning of chapter 6, The Prince
explicitly associates virt with grandezza and other, far more than ordinary qualities. No one should marvel, Machiavelli declares there, if,
in speaking as I will do of principalities that are altogether new both in
prince and in state, I cite the greatest examples. He then links prudence
to a kind of greatness that lies beyond the reach of the ordinary run of
princes. A prudent man, he proclaims, should set his sights aloft and
seek to imitate the virt of the most excellent men of all times so that
if his own virt does not reach that far, it at least has the odor of it. This
admits that many new princes, perhaps most, are likely to fall short of
their models qualities and achievements. Yet by imitating their grandezza, they can at least try to approach the highest standards of princely
excellence. They should do as prudent archers do when the place they
plan to hit appears too distant, and knowing how far the virt of their
bow carries, they set their aim much higher than the place intended
not expecting to reach such height [altezza] with their arrow, but to be
able with the aid of so high an aim to achieve their plan.
Read straight, all these superlativesgrandissimi esempli, uomini grandi, eccellentissimi, altezzamight well lead us to think that

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince79

Machiavelli is hugely impressed by greatness in princely deeds and

ambitions, and thinks that all new princes should aspire to it. Yet the
grandiose tones ring false in a work that usually avoids sweeping idealization in favor of concrete descriptions of princely actions. In its first
five chapters, moreover, The Prince said little about princely greatness
and a great deal about the infinite difficulties and rebellions that
confront every new princeeven that greatest prince of cities, Rome.
In abruptly shifting focus from these harsh, down-to-earth realities
of power to the exhortation to shoot far higher than you can possibly
reach, Machiavelli evokes a disconcerting gulf between ordinary human limits and extraordinary princely aspirations.
And as with his extreme praise for Ferdinand, the sheer density of incongruously elevated words in chapter 6 raises suspicions of
irony. The word for height, altezza, is particularly problematic in
Machiavellis and other famous Italian writings, where it is often associated with self-defeating arrogance (Latin superbia, Greek hubris), or
with excessively soaring flight that precedes a fall:
If your eyes light on what is beyond, in one panel Caesar
[Cesare] and Alexander you will see among those who were
happy [felici] while alive. . . .
Yet nevertheless the coveted harbor one of the two failed to
reach, and the other, covered with wounds, in his enemys
shadow was slain.
After this appear countless men who, that they might fall to
earth with a heavier crash, with this goddess have climbed
to the highest heights [costei altissimo].
Among these, captive, dead, and mangled, lie Cyrus and
Pompey, though Fortune carried both of them up to the
heavens. . . .
So Fortune not that a man may remain on high [in alto] carries
him up, but that as he plunges down she may delight, and as
he falls may weep (Di Fortuna, lines 160183; emphasis added).

80social research

Further suspicions are aroused by Machiavellis examples of

men who have become princes by their own virt and not by fortune. The most excellent of these, he says, are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus and the like. The lives of all these men were shrouded
in legend and therefore hard to imitate. Moses, at least, was merely
an instrument of God, and thus had advantages that no trustworthy
prince in other times could reasonably claim. Ancient accounts of the
other three, further, stress their extremely ambivalent legacies, not
just their praiseworthy achievements: their bellicose ways planted
the seeds of later, self-destructive expansionism in Persia, Athens, and
Rome, while their insatiable appetites for rule alone set their states on
a path to tyranny (Benner 2013, chap. 6).
If princes need examples to imitate, then, they might do better
to look for some whose qualities of virt are more proportionate to
their ordinary human limits. Fortunately, chapter 6s last paragraph
offers an example of this kind of virt. To such high [alti] examples
as the four just discussed, Machiavelli now adds a lesser [minore] example, that of Hiero of Syracuse. Machiavellis references to the four
eccelentissimi men bristled with superlatives, but remained frustratingly sketchy on detail. Now at last, rather than altezza, grandezza, and
happiness, we get a straightforward description of a leaders concrete
deeds and their results.
[Hiero] knew [conobbe] nothing from fortune except the opportunity: for when the Syracusans were oppressed, they
chose [elessono] him for their captain, and from there he
proved worthy [merito] to be made their prince. . . . He eliminated the old military, ordered [ordin] a new one . . . and
when he had friendships and soldiers that were his own
[sua], he could build any building on top of such a foundation. So he went through a great deal of effort to acquire
and little to maintain (emphasis added).
In contrast to many other examples discussed in The Prince, Hiero was a collaborative worker who gained power through established
The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince81

political procedures: he first acquired authority by election rather

than force or subterfuge when the Syracusans chose him as their
captain. Afterward he did not forcibly put himself at the head of introducing new orders, as Machiavelli says Romulus and the others
did, but from successful captaincy proved worthy of being made their
prince (emphasis added). Perhaps because others twice elected him
on his merits, first as their military then their political leader, Hiero
had fewer difficulties later on than men who put themselves at the
head of new orderingsince as Machiavelli said earlier in the chapter,
nothing is more difficult, doubtful, or dangerous than making oneself sole introducer.
Hieros ends also differed from those of the chapters greater
exemplars of virt. Instead of seeking to found a great empire or imperial city, he concentrated on building realistic, durable, defensive alliances for his countrys safety. Polybius (I.8) writes that unlike inferior
rulers who try to keep their options open by frequently changing sides
and breaking faith with allies, Hiero early on made a firm alliance with
the Romans and for a long time reigned securely in Syracuse, winning the friendly acclaim and good opinion of the Greeks. As we saw
earlier, The Prince in chapter 21 also underlines the great importance
of stable alliances and the imprudence of opportunistically varying
ones foreign commitments. Whereas Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus
had limitless appetites for territorial acquisition, Hiero focused his
efforts close to home. He gave priority to the urgent task of building bridges with other Greeks instead of trying to turn Syracuse into
an aggressively expansionist city. The others empires seem great because they were vast and overbearing. Hieros stato was neither. But it
brought stability and unforced unity to Syracusans and other Greeks.
And unlike the others, his actions won the unqualified praise of his
chroniclersand thus the highest glory of posterity.
The more closely we compare Machiavellis greater and lesser
models, the more Hieros modest, human-sized virt looks like the better model for ordinary human princes. Hiero went through a great
deal of effort [fatica] to acquire, Machiavelli tells us, but needed little

82social research

to maintain. The word fatica, meaning arduous effort, relates to an

agents own activity, and thus suggests virt. The word Machiavelli used
for the other princes hardships was difficult, which suggests external
obstacles to such activity. The more difficulties princes face over time,
the less virtuous their modes must be. Cyrus, Romulus, and the others faced greater difficulties after they acquired power because people
opposed their new orders and modes. Neither Machiavelli nor ancient
historians mention comparable opposition to Hiero, who took the harder road at first by showing that he deserved to be elected leader.
The chapters movement from the extraordinary virt of Cyrus
and Romulus to the ordinary virt of Hieros fatica draws princely readers from their initial, too lofty ambitions toward a mature knowledge
of what it takes to build good foundations. Hieros example presents
virt and greatness on a more appropriately human scale, with legitimate modes used to pursue more limited ends. His virt and grandezza
are less attention grabbing than the others. Hiero isnt the most famous of heroes; he did not found a sprawling new empire, impose
whatever he pleased on yielding matter, or get elevated to the rank
of demigod or prophet. He merely helped rid Syracusans of a decadent tyranny, replaced useless mercenary forces with a strong civilian
army, forged new alliances that made for stable peace, and improved
relations with other Greeks. All these achievements fall far short of
the loftiest princely ambitions. But they are easier to imitate than anything Moses, Cyrus, and the others did, or are said to have doneand
undoubtedly a more realistic model for corrupt, downtrodden Italians
in Machiavellis own time. Machiavellis calling Hiero lesser masks
a judgment that shines through in what he says about him and the
greater others: namely, that when it comes to human virt, firm
orders are worth infinitely more than grandezza.

Conclusions
If this reading is right, todays academic and political proponents
of Machiavellian Realism have a problem: their spokesman did not
expound that doctrine in earnest, but ironically exposed its fallacies.

The Language of Praise and Blame in The Prince83

Machiavellis Prince mirrors, but does not recommend, the conduct of

many apparently successful leaderstheir overblown ambitions, selfexcusing rhetoric, and indifference to the legal and moral restraints that
underpin any stable human order. Readers who imitate the greatest,
highest, most extraordinary images in the mirror might ride high on
fortunes back for a while, but eventually bring trouble to themselves
and their countrymen.
This is the deeper, arguably more realistic message behind the
books ironic mask. As many early interpreters proposed, Machiavellis
mirror of princes warns political leaders about the pitfalls that lie ahead
if they fail to check their ambitions to dominate others, at home or
abroad. And it contains lessons for ordinary citizens, exercising their
ability to see through the sophistries and seductive special pleading
that fuel harmful policies. Few teachings could be more useful today,
or at any other time.
References

Benner, Erica. 2013. Machiavellis Prince: A New Reading. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.
Gentili, Alberico. (1594) 1924. De legationibus libri tres, vols. 12. Translated
by Gordon Liang, edited by John Brown Scott. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Pole, Reginald. (1536) 1997. Apology. Selections in Cambridge Translations,
vol. 2, edited by Jill Kraye, 27486. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Polybius, 20013. The Histories vols. 16. Translated by W.R. Paton.
Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press.
Quintilian. 1986. Institutio Oratoria. Edited by H. E. Butler. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1762) 1964. Du contrat social in Oeuvres
compltes, vol. 3, 348470. Paris: Gallimard.

84social research

Copyright of Social Research is the property of New School for Social Research and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.