Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Author(s): Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky

Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 725-740
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles

and Comparative
Institutions
Informal
Politics:A ResearchAgenda

Helmke
andStevenLevitsky
Gretchen

Mainstream
focuses
onformal
research
onpolitical
institutions
rules.
Yetinmany
informal
contexts,
instiprimarily
comparative
andlegislative
norms
from
bureaucratic
toclientelism
andpatrimonialism,
tutions,
shapeevenmorestrongly
political
ranging
behavior
whofailtoconsider
these
informal
rules
ofthegameriskmissing
andoutcomes.
Scholars
ofthemostimportant
many
Inthis
incentives
that
behavior.
article
wedevelop
a framework
forstudying
informal
andconstraints
underlie
institutions
political
andintegrating
them
intocomparative
institutional
Theframework
isbasedona typology
offour
offormalanalysis.
patterns
informal
andsubstitutive.
Wethen
twoissues
institutional
interaction:
explore
complementary,
accommodating,
largely
competing,
intheliterature
onthissubject:
thereasons
andmechanisms
behind
theemergence
ofinformal
andthenature
institutions,
ignored
oftheir
andchange.
weconsider
inresearch
oninformal
issues
ofidentification,
institutions,
stability
Finally,
challenges
including
andcomparison.
measurement,

verthe lasttwo decades,institutional

analysishas
become a centralfocus in comparativepolitics.
Fueled by a wave of institutional
changein the
andpostcommunist
scholars
fromdiverse
worlds,
developing
research
traditions
havestudiedhowconstitutional
design,
electoralsystems,
and otherformalinstitutional
arrangementsaffect
Thesestudpoliticaland economicoutcomes.1
ies haveproducedimportant
theoretical
advances.
a growing
on LatinAmerNevertheless,
bodyofresearch
and Asia5 suggests
ica,2postcommunist
Eurasia,3Africa,4
Gretchen
Helmkeis assistant
science
at
professor
ofpolitical
the University
Rochester
Her
(hlmk@mail.
rochester.edu).
of
bookCourtsUnderConstraints:
and
Generals,
Judges,
inArgentina,
Presidents
willbepublished
UnibyCambridge
Press.StevenLevitsky
is associate
versity
professor
ofgovernmentat HarvardUniversity
harvard.
edu).
(levitsky@wcfia.
He is theauthorof Transforming
Labor-BasedParties
in LatinAmerica:Argentine
Peronismin Comparative
and is currently
a bookon competitive
Perspective
writing
authoritarian
in thepost-ColdWarera.The
regimes
authors
thanktheWeatherhead
Center
forInternational
at HarvardUniversity
and theKellogg
Institute
Affairs
for
International
Studiesat theUniversity
Notre
Damefor
of
oninformal
institutions.
The
generously
sponsoring
conferences
authors
alsogratefully
comments
acknowledge
fromJorge
Anna Grzymala-Busse,
DennisGalvan,Goran
Dominguez,
LisaMartin,HillelSoifer,
JackKnight,
Hyden,
Benjamin
Maria Victoria
Smith,SusanStokes,
Murillo,and Kurt
as wellas three
reviewers
and the
Weyland,
anonymous
editors
on Politics.
of Perspectives

thatmany"rulesof thegame"thatstructure
politicallife
are informal--created,
and enforcedoutcommunicated,
side of officially
sanctionedchannels.6Examplesabound.
Fordecades,Mexicanpresidents
wereselectednotaccordtheelectorallaw,or party
ingto rulesin theConstitution,
butrather
viathededazo("bigfinger")-anunwritstatutes,
tencode thatgavethesitting
therightto choose
president
his successor,
candidate
the
specified
pool, and prohibited
candidates
from
potential
openlyseekingthejob.7InJapan,
the"strict
butunwritten
rules"ofAmakudari
from
("descent
which
state
bureaucrats
are
heaven"),through
retiring
awardedtop positionsin privatecorporations,
have surviveddecadesof administrative
In CentralAsia,
reform.8
clan-basednormshave "becomethe rulesof the game,"
whiletheconstitutional
structures
createdafterthecollapse
of the SovietUnion are "increasingly
... inconsequential."' And in muchofthedeveloping
and postcommunist
of clientelism,
and patrimoniworld,patterns
corruption,
alismcoexistwith(andoftensubvert)
newdemocratic,
market,and stateinstitutions.10
Attentionto informal
institutions
is by no meansnew
to politicalscience. Earlierstudiesof "prismaticsoci13
"economiesof affection,"
eties,""1"moraleconomies,,"12
and
consociclientelism,15
legalpluralism,14
corruption,16
as well as on government-business
relations
ationalism,17
in Japan,18
in
the
Soviet
and
the
blat
"folkways"
Union,"19
oftheU.S. Senate20highlighted
theimportance
ofunwritten rules.Nevertheless,
informalruleshave remainedat
themargins
oftheinstitutionalist
turnin comparative
politics.Indeed,muchcurrent
literature
assumesthatactors'
incentivesand expectations
are shaped primarily,
if not
formal
rules.
Such
a
narrow
focus
can
be
exclusively,
by
December 2004 1 Vol. 2/No.4

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

725

Articles

Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
Informal

foritrisksmissingmuchofwhatdrivespolitproblematic,
ical behaviorand can hinderefforts
to explainimportant
politicalphenomena.21
This articlebroadensthescope of comparative
research
on politicalinstitutions
the
foundation
for
a sysbylaying
tematicanalysisof informal
rules.Our motivation
is simple: good institutional
analysisrequiresrigorousattention
to both formaland informalrules.Carefulattentionto
informal
institutions
is criticalto understanding
theincentivesthatenableand constrain
behavior.
Political
political
actorsrespondto a mix of formaland informalincenand in some instances,informal
incentives
tives,22
trump
the formalones. In postwarItaly,forexample,normsof
were"morepowerful
thanthelawsof thestate:
corruption
the lattercould be violatedwithimpunity,
whileanyone
who challenged
theconventions
oftheillicitmarket
would
meetwithcertainpunishment."23
examTo takea different

to vote by local brokers,such electionsare won not by

butbythosewiththelargest
ideologicalcandidates
political
machine.32
Informal
institutions
alsoshapeformalinstitutional
outcomes in a lessvisibleway: by creatingor strengthening
incentivesto complywithformalrules.In otherwords,
thatis widely
theymaydo theenablingand constraining
toformal
attributed
Since
the
Federalist
institutions.33
Papers,
scholarshaverecognized
thatthenormsunderlying
formal
institutions
The stability
matter.
oftheUnitedStates'presidentialdemocracyis not onlya productof theruleslaid
out in theConstitution,
butis alsorootedin informal
rules
(such as graciouslosing,the underuseof certainformal
andbipartisan
consensus
on critical
issues)that
prerogatives,
formalchecksand balancesfromdeteriorating
into
prevent
severeconflict
the
branches
of
among
government.
Thesearehardlyisolatedexamples.Informal
rulesshape
Brazilian
statelawprohibits
formal
in
institutional
outcomes
areas
as
such
ple,although
extra-judicial
legislative
informal
rulesandprocedures
withinthepublic
executions,
campolitics,34
judicial politics,35partyorganization,36
enable
even
and
officers
adminfinance,37
security
federalism,39
apparatus
encourage
police
paign
public
regime
change,38
to engagein suchkilling.24
Thus officers
whokillsuspected istration,40
and statebuilding.41
violentcriminalsknowtheywill be protectedfromprosa largebutdisparatebodyof scholartogether
Bringing
ecutionandpossibly
rewarded
witha promotion
orbonus.25 ship,we developa research
agendaaimedat incorporating
In suchcases,a strictanalysisoftheformalruleswouldbe
informal
intothetheoretical
institutions
toolkits
usedbystuthe
insufficient
to
understand
incentives
dents
of
In
the
section
first
we clarify
woefully
driving
comparative
politics.42
behavior.
theconceptofinformal
it
institution,
distinguishingnotonly
of informal
rulesis also oftencriticalto
Consideration
fromthatofformal
butalsofromotherinformal
institution,
institutional
outcomes.Informal
structures
informal
behavexplaining
shape
phenomena,includingweakinstitutions,
in important
of formalinstitutions
the performance
and
ioralregularities,
informal
andculture.In the
organizations,
oftenunexpectedways.For example,executive-legislative secondsectionwe examinehowformaland informal
rules
in termsof
interact.
relationscannotalwaysbe explainedstrictly
Lauth,43
Expandingon theworkofHans-Joachim
institution:
comconstitutional
amongfourtypesofinformal
design.Neopatrimonialnormspermitting wedistinguish
state
control
over
institutions
and
substitutive.
in
plementary,
competing,
unregulated
presidential
accommodating,
sectionsaredevotedto issuesofinforAfricaand LatinAmericaoftenyielda degreeof executive The thirdand fourth
and change--questions
dominancethat farexceedsa presidents'constitutional malinstitutional
emergence
largely
in
also
limit
we discuss
institutions
recent
research.
Informal
may
Finally,
authority.26
presiden- ignored
comparative
institutialpower.In constitutional
terms,Chile possesses"oneof
specificchallengesrelatedto researchon informal
in
world."27
due
such
as
of
and
the
issues
to
themostpowerful
tions,
identification,
Yet,
measurement,
presidencies
conthatencouraged
executive
a setofinformal
institutions
comparison.
A fewcaveatsare in order.Althoughtheterminformal
Chileanpresidents
sultationand powersharing,
systematithe
institution
constitutional
their
underused
during
encompassesa wide rangeof social (e.g., the
cally
prerogatives
in
ortherulesofdating)andeconomic(e.g.,black
as
an
a
was
cited
Chile
handshake,
1990s;28consequently,
exception
we areconcernedonlywithpolitical
dominance.29
markets)institutions,
bypresidential
regioncharacterized
ofelectoral rulesof thegame.We restrict
also mediatetheeffects
institutions
Informal
our analysisto themodern
oflaw is nearlyuniversal.
Before
rules.For example,Costa Rica'sproportional
representa- period,whencodification
betweenformaland informal
thisperiod,our distinction
reelection
offerno
tion systemand ban on congressional
rulesis less meaningful.
to perform
forlegislators
serformalincentive
Finally,althoughwe drawon a
constituency
broadrangeof cases,the exampleswe citeare illustrative
vice.Yet Costa Rican legislators
routinely
engagein such
"disactivitiesin responseto informal,party-sponsored
only,notcomprehensive.
In theareaofcandidateselection,
and blacklisting.30
tricts"
thatbecausecommitted
studiesin theUnitedStatessuggest
Are
Institutions
in primaries,
votersare morelikelyto participate
primary WhatInformal
Are
(and
Not)
polarizing
systemsencouragetheelectionof ideologically
has beenappliedto a dizzyinstitution
where The terminformal
Yetina contextofpervasive
candidates.31
clientelism,
is limitedlargelyto peopleinduced
ing arrayof phenomena,includingpersonalnetworks,44
participation
primary
726

Perspectiveson Politics

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or ignored.Yetformalinsticlans and mafias,47

civilsociclientelism,45
paperarewidelycircumvented
corruption,46
tutionalweaknessdoes not necessarily
oflegislative,
and a variety
traditional
culture,49
implythepresence
judiety,48
ofinformal
institutions.
It maybe thatno stableorbinding
norms.We proposea moreprecisecial,and bureaucratic
Forexample,in hissemofinformal
institution. rules-formalor informal-exist.
and analytically
useful-definition
GuillermoO'Donnell
inalarticleon delegative
ofinformal
It shouldcaptureas muchoftheuniverse
rules
democracy,
as possible,but it mustbe narrowenoughto distinguish arguedthatin muchofLatinAmerica,theformalrulesof
areweaklyinstitutionalized.58
informal representative
informalrules fromother,noninstitutional,
In
democracy
checks
on
executive
the
absence
of
institutionalized
power,
phenomena.
behavior
widenedconthescopeofpermissible
of institutions
We beginwitha standarddefinition
as
presidential
whichresultedin substantial
thatstruc- siderably,
abuse of executive
rulesandprocedures
(bothformaland informal)
In
O'Donnell
and
how
turesocialinteraction
actors'
work,
authority. subsequent
highlighted
byconstraining enabling
informal
How
to
formal
and
such
as
between
inforclientelism,
institutions,
behavior.50
particularistic
distinguish
underminedthe effectiveness
of representative
malinstitutions
lessclear.Somescholarsequate
instituis,however,
O'Donnell's
work
with culturaltraditions.51
Others
to
two
distinct
informalinstitutions
of
patterns
points
tions.59
formal
institutional
weakness
that
should
not
be
a
state-societal
state
conflated.
distinction,
employ
agencies
treating
rulesas formal,
and state-enforced
and therulesand orga- Clientelismand abusesofexecutive
bothdepart
authority
is an informal
nizationswithincivilsocietyas informal.52
Stillothersdisfromformalrules,but whereastheformer
betweeninformal
thelatteris bestunderstood
as noninstitutional
norms,whichareself-enforcing, institution,
tinguish
and formalrules,whichareenforced
often behavior.
bya thirdparty,
thestate.53
institutions
mustbe distinguished
from
Second,informal
Each conceptualization
failsto captureimportant
infor- otherinformalbehavioralregularities.
Not all patterned
malinstitutions.
Forexample,
someinformal
insti- behavioris rule-boundor rootedin sharedexpectations
although
tutionsare undoubtedlyrooted in culturaltraditions, about others'behavior.60
Behavioralregularities
maybe a
norms
to
illicit
of
of
a
of
incentives.
To
cite
an
many--from
legislative
patterns party product variety
exampleoffered
finance-havelittleto do withculture.With respectto
Daniel
in
one's
hat
churchis an
Brinks,61removing
by
thestate-societal
institutions
within
the
informal
whereas
one's
coatin a resdistinction,
institution,
many
removing
state(frombureaucratic
normsto corruption)
arealsoinfor- taurantis simplya behavioralregularity.
In thelattercase,
butit
mal,54whiletherulesgoverning
manynonstateorganiza- leavingone'scoaton maybringphysicaldiscomfort,
tions (such as corporationsand political partiesand
is notexpectedto trigger
socialdisapproval
or sanction.To
arewidelyconsideredto be formal.Finally, be considered
an informal
a behavioral
institution,
corporations)
regularthe
definition
is
ruleor guideline,the
useful, itymustrespondto an established
although self-enforcing
analytically
it failsto accountforthefactthatinformal
rulesmaybe
violationof whichgenerates
some kindof externalsancenforced
is clearlyinfor(forexample,byclanand mafiabosses), tion.To takeanotherexample,publicgraft
externally
evenby thestateitself(i.e., organizedstatecorruption).55 mal behavior,but onlysome patternsof graftshouldbe
We employa fourth
insti- consideredinstitutional.
Where graftis enforcedfrom
approach.We defineinformal
tutionsas sociallysharedrules,usuallyunwritten,
thatare
above,62orwhereit is rootedin widelysharedexpectations
and enforced
outside
sanc- amongcitizens
andpublicofficials
created,
communicated,
togo along
(anda refusal
ofofficially
tionedchannels.56
institutions
are
rules
risks
costs),63
By contrast,
formal
important
incurring
corruption
mayindeed
andprocedures
thatarecreated,
andenforced be an institution.
where
is
neither
extercommunicated,
contrast,
By
graft
channels
as
official.
This
includes
nor
sanctioned
in
rooted
shared
but
widelyaccepted
through
nally
expectations, is
stateinstitutions
and
a
rather
to
low
sector
salaries
and ineffec(courts,legislatures,
bureaucracies)
response
public
state-enforced
rules(constitutions,
but
tiveenforcement,
itmaybe bestcharacterized
as a behavior
laws,regulations),
also whatRobertC. Ellicksoncalls"organization
rules,"or
pattern.
theofficial
rulesthatgovernorganizations
suchas corporainstitutions
shouldbe distinguished
from
Third,informal
tions,politicalparties,and interest
informalorganizations.
groups.57
Althoughscholarsoftenincorpobetweenformaland informalinstitu- rateorganizations
into theirdefinition
of institution,64
it
Distinguishing
is onlyhalftheconceptualtask."Informal is useful,following
tions,however,
DouglassNorth,to separatethepolitinstitution"
is oftentreatedas a residualcategory,
in the
ical actors (or "players")fromthe rules theyfollow.65
sensethatit can be appliedto virtually
anybehaviorthat Justas formalorganizations
(such as politicalpartiesor
fromformalrules,informal
departsfrom,or is notaccountedforby,thewritten-down unions)maybe distinguished
rules.To avoidthispitfall,
we mustsaymoreaboutwhatan
organizations(clans, mafias) should be distinguished
informal
institution
is not.
institutions.
informal
rulesmay
Nevertheless,
frominformal
Fourdistinctions
areworthnoting.First,informal
insti- be embeddedwithintheseorganizations,
and just as fortutions
shouldbe distinguished
from
weakinstitutions.
mal politicalorganizations
are studiedunderthe rubric
Many
formalinstitutions
areineffective,
of "institutionalism,"
in thatrulesthatexiston
clans, mafias,and otherinformal
December2004 I Vol.2/No.4 727

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Articles

Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
Informal

structuresmay be usefully Figure1

ofinformal
institutions
incorporated into informal A typology
institutional
analysis.
we return
to thedisformal
Effective
Ineffective
formal
Finally,
Outcomes
institutions
institutions
tinction
between
informal
institutions
andthebroaderconcept
Substitutive
Convergent
Complementary
ofculture.Culturemayhelpto
and
institutions,
Divergent
Accommodating
shapeinformal
Competing
thefrontier
betweenthetwois
a criticalareaforresearch.66
In
ourview,however,
thebestway
tion noncompliance.
Whereformalrulesand procedures
to pursuethisagenda is to cast informalinstitutions
in
are
actors
believe
theprobability
ofenforcement
narrowtermsbydefining
in
informal
institution
ineffective,
relatively
terms
ofsharedexpectations
rather
thansharedvalues.Shared (and hencetheexpectedcostofviolation)willbe low.
These two dimensionsproducethe fourfoldtypology
mayor maynotbe rootedin broadersocietal
expectations
betweensharedvaluesand shared shownin figure1.The typeslocatedin theupperleft(comvalues.67Distinguishing
and lowerright(competing)cellscorrespond
toanalyzepotential
allowsfuture
scholars
causal
plementary)
expectations
to
the
"functional"
and "dysfunctional"
informal
between
culture
and
such
institutions,
typesthatpredomrelationships
in
inate
of
The
much
the
literature.
alsoyieldstwo
orundermine
as whether
societalvaluesreinforce
typology
particular
noveltypes(accommodating
thatallowus
andsubstitutive)
informal
institutions.
to makesenseofother,lessfamiliar
institutional
patterns.

FourTypesof Informal
Institution

Formaland informalinstitutions
interactin a varietyof
In
a
this
we
aimedat capsection, develop typology
ways.
of formalCharacterizations
turingtheserelationships.68
tendto fallintoone of
informal
institutional
relationships
One camptreatsinfortwosharplycontrasting
categories.
or problemsolving,in that
as functional,
mal institutions
and
ofsocialinteraction
theyprovidesolutionsto problems
or perforwhich enhancethe efficiency
coordination,69
A secondcamptreatsinformanceofformalinstitutions.70
or problemcreating.
as dysfunctional,
mal institutions
are said to
and patrimonialism
Clientelism,corruption,
offormaldemocratic,
theperformance
undermine
market,
and stateinstitutions.71
However,recentstudiessuggesta
morecomplexpicturethanenvisionedbyeithercamp,in
or substitute
at timesreinforce
institutions
whichinformal
to
undermine.
institutions
fortheformal
theyappear
our typologyis based on
To capturethesedifferences,
is thedegreetowhichformaland
The first
twodimensions.
The distinction
outcomesconverge.
institutional
informal
rulesproducesa substaninformal
hereiswhether
following
resultfromthatexpectedfroma
tivelysimilaror different
strictand exclusiveadherenceto formalrules.Wherefoldifferent
ruleleads to a substantively
lowingtheinformal
institutions
outcome,formaland informal
diverge.Where
formal
the two outcomesare not substantively
different,
institutions
and informal
converge.
oftherelevant
The seconddimensionis theeffectiveness
thatis, the extentto whichrulesand
formalinstitutions,
thatexiston paperareenforcedand complied
procedures
conformalinstitutions
Effective
within practice.72
actually
strainorenablepoliticalactors'choices.Actorsbelievethat
willsancthatofficial
authorities
thereis a highprobability
728

Complementary
informalinstitutions
The leftsideof thefigure
to informal
institucorresponds
formalinstitutions,
such
tionsthatcoexistwitheffective
thatactorsexpectthattherulesthatexiston paperwillbe
formal
The upperleftcornercombineseffective
enforced.
whatLauthcalls
rulesand convergent
outcomes,producing
"fill
Suchinstitutions
informal
institutions.73
complementary
with
in gaps"eitherby addressing
not
dealt
contingencies
in theformalrulesor byfacilitating
thepursuitofindividThese
framework.
ual goalswithintheformalinstitutional
informalinstitutions
oftenenhanceefficiency.
Examples
and operating
includethemyriadnorms,routines,
procewithin
duresthatease decisionmakingand coordination
and judicialnorms(such as the opinion
bureaucracies,74
and the"Ruleof Four")thatfaciliprocedures
assignment
tatetheworkoftheU.S. SupremeCourt.75
institutions
informal
mayalso serveas a
Complementary
for
formal
foundation
institutions,
creatingor strengthenrulesthatmightotherformal
with
to comply
ingincentives
havelinkedthe
scholars
on paper.76
Thus
wiseexistmerely
to
a
oftheU.S. Constitution complementary
effectiveness
Likeandexpectations
setofsharedbeliefs
amongcitizens.77
ofSingapore's
wise,theefficiency
postcolonialbureaucracy
thoseofIndoofwhichresembled
(theformalorganization
to underlynesiaand thePhilippines)has beenattributed
RuralChinese
and discipline.78
ing normsof meritocracy
aremorelikelytoprovidepublicgoods
villagegovernments
normsofsocialobligationgenwherethereexistinformal
In
in local templeassociations.79
eratedby membership
exist
do notmerely
institutions
each case,informal
alongformalones, but ratherplay a key role in
side effective
theformalrulesofthegame.
makingeffective

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Accommodating
informalinstitutions
The lowerleftcorneroffigure1,whichcombineseffective
formalinstitutions
and divergent
to
outcomes,corresponds
informal
These
informal
institutions.
instiaccommodating
tutionscreateincentives
to behavein waysthatalterthe
substantive
effects
offormalrules,butwithoutdirectly
viocontradict
thespirit,
butnottheletter,
of
latingthem;they
theformalrules.Accommodating
informal
institutions
are
oftencreatedbyactorswho dislikeoutcomesgenerated
by
theformalrulesbutareunableto changeor openlyviolate
thoserules.Assuch,theyoftenhelptoreconcile
theseactors'
interestswith the existingformalinstitutional
arrangements.Hence,althoughaccommodating
informal
institutionsmaynot be efficiency
theymayenhance
enhancing,
thestability
offormalinstitutions
bydampeningdemands
forchange.
Chile'sexecutive-legislative
mechanisms
are
power-sharing
a clearexample.Leadersof theDemocraticConcertation
an "exaggeratedly
inherited
anda
presidential
system"
strong
electoral
that
ran
counter
to
their
majoritarian
system
goalof
a
broad
the
coalition."s
maintaining
multiparty
Lacking legislativestrength
to amendthe1980 Constitution,
Concermechanisms
ofinterparty
and
taci6nelitescreatedinformal
consultation
aimed
at
its
executive-legislative
counteracting
effects.
Thesepower-sharing
"enhanced
coaliarrangements
tionaltrust"
ina formal
constitutional
thatotherwise
setting
forcooperation."81
"provided
veryfewincentives
Dutchconsociational
practices
mayalsobe characterized
as accommodating.
The Netherlands'post-1917democunwritten
rules"of
racywas based on a set of "informal,
eliteaccommodation
and powersharing,
includingextensiveconsultation
in policymaking,mutualvetopower,and
theproportional
allocationofgovernment
jobsamongpolitical parties.82
vioAlthoughthesecartel-like
arrangements
latedthe democraticspiritof the Dutch constitution
(by
thepowerofthevote),theyreducedclassand relilimiting
giousconflict,
thereby
enhancingdemocratic
stability.83
informal
rulesalsoemerged
withinstate
Accommodating
socialist
institutions
intheSovietUnion.Becausestrict
adherenceto theformalrulesgoverning
Sovietpoliticaland economiclifedid notallowenterprises
to fulfill
statetargets
or
permitindividualsto meetbasic needs,a set of informal
knownas blat-emergedinwhichindinorms-commonly
vidualsmetthesegoalsthroughpersonalnetworks.84
Not
and
workers,
strictly
illegal,blatenabledfactory
managers,
bureaucrats
to "finda way aroundformalprocedures.""85
to fulfill
statetargets
and individuals
Byhelpingenterprises
to obtainessentialgoodsand services,
thisinformal
system
ofexchange
wascritical
tothesurvival
oftheSovietsystem.86

whichenablesactorsto ignoreor violatethem.

enforced,
The cellin thelowerrightcornercombinesineffective
formal rulesand divergent
outcomes,producingcompeting
informal
institutions.
Theseinformal
institutions
structure
incentives
in waysthatare incompatible
withthe formal
rules:to followone rule,actorsmustviolateanother.Particularistic
informal
institutions
suchas clientelism,
patriclanpolitics,
andcorruption
areamongthemost
monialism,
familiarexamples.87
Thus postwarItaliancorruption
was
embeddedin "alternative
norms"underwhichactorscould
violatecertainstatelaws"with
whereasthose
impunity,"'88
who adheredto thelaw "metwithcertainpunishment."89
institutions
areoftenfoundinpostCompetinginformal
colonialcontexts
inwhichformal
institutions
wereimposed
on indigenousrulesand authority
structures.
In postcolonialGhana,civilservants
wereofficially
instructed
to follow
therulesofthepublicbureaucracy,
butas RobertPricefound,
mostbelievedtheywouldpaya significant
socialcost(such
as a lossofstandingin thecommunity)
iftheyignoredkinshipgroupnormsthatobligedthemtoprovide
jobsandother
favorsto theirfamilies
and villages.90
scholarsof
Similarly,
havearguedthattheimposition
ofEuropean
legalpluralism
created
oflegalobligation."91
systems
legalsystems
"multiple
Becausethesesystems
"embodied
different
and
very
principles
adherence
to
custom
law
at
times
procedures,"92
requireda
violationofstatelaw (andviceversa).

Substitutive
informalinstitutions
the
whichcombinesineffective
Finally, upperrightcorner,
formalinstitutions
and compatibleoutcomes,corresponds
to substitutive
informal
Likecomplementary
institutions.93
substitutive
informal
institutions
areemployed
institutions,
withformalrules
byactorswho seekoutcomescompatible
andprocedures.
Likecompeting
institutions,
however,
they
existin environments
whereformalrulesarenotroutinely
enforced.
informal
institutions
achieve
Hence,substitutive
whatformal
institutions
weredesigned,
butfailed,
toachieve.
Substitutive
institutions
tendtoemerge
wherestatestructuresare weak or lack authority.
During Mexico'sprotracted
democratic
formal
institutions
ofelectoral
transition,
resolution
as
the
electoral
(such
courts)lackedcreddispute
ibilityand werefrequently
bypassed.In thiscontext,officialsofthenationalgovernment
andtheopposition
National
ActionPartyresolvedpostelection
disputesthroughinformal concertacesiones,
or "gentleman's
Conagreements.'"94"
thusservedas a "waystation"forgovernment
certacesiones
and oppositionelitesuntilformalinstitutions
of electoral
becamecredible.95
In ruralnorthern
disputeresolution
Peru,
wherestateweaknessresultedin inadequatepoliceprotectionand ineffective
courtsduringthelate 1970s,citizens
Competinginformalinstitutions
createdinformal
rondascampesinas
(self-defense
patrols)to
On therightsideof figure1 we findinformal
institutions defendtheircommunities
and rondaassemblies(informal
thatcoexistwith ineffective
formalinstitutions.
In such
In ruralChina, some
courts)to resolvelocal disputes.96'"
formal
rulesand proceduresare not systematically local officials
cases,
to raise
compensateforthestate'sincapacity
December2004 I Vol.2/No.4 729

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Articles I Informal
Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
revenueand providepublicgoodsbymobilizingresources words,why,giventheexistence
ofa setofformalrulesand
and
"substitutassociations,
do
actors
chooseto createinformechanisms,
through
temple lineage
thereby
rule-making
the
use
of
these
informal
institutions
for
...
formal
mal
rules?
on
the
ing
previoussection,we see three
Building
institutional
channels
of
motivations.
political
publicgoodsprovisions."97 general
Taken together,
thesefourtypessuggestthatinformal
rulesbecauseformalinstituFirst,actorscreateinformal
institutions
cannotbe classified
insimpledichotomous
tions
are
Formalrulessetgeneralparameters
(funcincomplete.104
tionalversusdysfunctional)
terms.Althoughsubstitutive forbehavior,
buttheycannotcoverall contingencies.
Coninformalinstitutions
such as concertacesiones
and rondas sequently,
actorsoperating
withina particular
formalinstisubvertformalrulesand procedures,
tutionalcontext,such as bureaucracies
and legislatures,
campesinas
theymay
achieve
results
thatexpeditetheirworkor
(resolution
conflict,
help
ofpostelectoral
pubdevelopnormsand procedures
lic security)thatthe formalrulesfailedto achieve.And
addressproblemsnotanticipated
byformalrules.105
informal
institutions
suchas coninstitutions
Second,informal
althoughaccommodating
maybea "secondbest"stratsociationalism
violatethe spiritof the formalrules,they egyforactorswhoprefer,
butcannotachieve,a formal
instioutcomes(democratic
thatareviewed tutionalsolution.'06In some cases,actorssimplylack the
maygenerate
stability)
as broadlybeneficial.
It remains
an openquestion,however, powerto changetheformalrules.Thus post-Pinochet
elites
whetheraccommodating
and substitutive
institutions
can
inChilecreated
informal
because
power-sharing
arrangements
contribute
tothedevelopment
ofmoreeffectiveforma/lstructo rewrite
the 1980 Contheylackedthepoliticalstrength
stitution.107
tures,or whetherthey"crowdout" suchdevelopment
Soviet
workers
and
(by
Similarly,
managersopted
ofblatinpartbecausetheywereunableto
quellingdemandsforformalinstitutional
changeor creat- fortheinformality
linkedto thepreserva- reform
or do awaywithstatesocialistinstitutions.
ing newactors,skills,and interests
tionoftheinformal
The
two
sections
A
broader
statement
of thismotivation,
elaboratedby
lay
rules).98 following
a foundation
foraddressing
suchquestions.
Carol Mershon,is thatactorscreateinformal
institutions
whentheydeemit lesscostlythancreating
formalinstitutionsto theirliking.108In postwarItaly,ChristianDemoInstitutions
Originsof Informal
craticleaderswho soughtto keep the communistand
To date,muchempirical
literature
on informal
institutions
neofascist
partiesoutofpowerfounditeasierto developan
has neglectedquestionsofwhyand how suchinstitutions
"formula"
to excludethosepartiesfromgoverning
informal
ofentrenched
informal
insti- coalitionsthan
Analyses
emerge.99
competing
to pushthroughparliament
a majoritarian
tutionssuchas customlaw,clientelism,
andpatrimonialism
electoral
aimedatstrengthening
system
largemoderatepartakethemas historical
frequently
givens,or partofa static
Costa
useofinformal
ties.'09
leaders'
Rican
Similarly,
party
culturallandscape,rarelyaskingwhytheyemergedin the
devicesto inducelegislators
to engagein constituency
serfirstplace.As a result,theyoftenunderstate
thedegreeto
vice may have been easierthan overturning
the ban on
whichinformal
institutions
aremodified,
adapted,or even
reelection.10
legislative
reinvented
overtime.100
Meanwhile,manyexistingexplamayalso be a secondInventinginformalinstitutions
nations(particularly
studiesof complementary
institubeststrategy
whereformalinstitutions
existon paperbut
a majorpitfall
ofearlyfunctionalist
accounts
tions)confront
in practice.In thecase of substitutive
areineffective
inforofinforofformalinstitutions:
theyexplaintheemergence
mal institutions,
forexample,actorscreateinformal
strucin termsoftheirpurported
effects
malinstitutions
primarily
turesnotbecausetheydisliketheformalrules,butbecause
the
without
efficiency
identifying the
(e.g.,
gainstheyyield),
rules-and rule-making
existing
processes-lackcrediForexample,
themechanisms
bywhichtheyarecreated.101
Thus
Mexican
oppositionleadersengagedin concertnorms bility.
manyearlyrational-choice
analysestreatedinformal
acesiones
duringthe 1990s becausetheydid not viewthe
as efficient
solutionsto problemsof cycling,information,
electoralcourtsas credible,and Peruvianvillagers
formal
suchexplanations
orcollective
mayparAlthough
action.102
createdrondascampesinas
becausethestatejudicialsystem
the
of
institutions
once
tiallyexplain persistence informal
failedto enforcetheruleoflaw.
ifnotmisleading,
forgenestablished,
theyareinsufficient,
A thirdmotivation
is
forcreatinginformal
institutions
In
this
secabout
institutional
emergence.
eratingtheories
the pursuitof goals not consideredpubliclyacceptable.
tion we seek to move beyond staticand functionalist
informal
instiBecausetheyarerelatively
inconspicuous,1ll
ofinformal
accounts,arguingthatcompelling
explanations
tutionsallowactorsto pursueactivities-ranging
fromthe
institutions
mustnot onlyask whyactorscreateinformal
to the illegal-that are unlikelyto stand the
rules,butalsoexaminehowactorscreateand communicate unpopular
test
of
Even wherebribery,
scrutiny.
patrimonialpublic
thoserules.
norms
arewidelyaccepted,prevailing
ism,andvote-buying
of universalism
preventtheirlegalization.Norms of lax
WhyInformalInstitutions?
enforcement-whatthe Dutch call gedogen-provide
institutions
that
We focusourdiscussionhereon informal
anotherexample.112
softdruguse,and euthaProstitution,
In other nasia (or abortionin predominantly
Catholiccountries)
structures.103
areendogenous
toformal
institutional
730

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The informal
are legallyproscribedbut widelytolerated.
in Brazilmay
executions
procedures
enablingextrajudicial
also be explainedin theseterms.113
Informalinstitutions
mayalso be createdin pursuitof
that
are
not
internationally
acceptable.For example,
goals
thegeopoliticalchangesproducedbytheend of theCold
War raisedthe externalcost of maintaining
openly(e.g.,
or Leninistone party)authoritarian
military
regimesduring the 1990s,whichled manyautocraticelitesto adopt
formaldemocratic
institutions.
To maintainpowerin this
newinternational
in countries
autocrats
likeBelacontext,
rus,Kazakhstan,
Kenya,Peru,Russia,Ukraine,and Zimbabwe resortedto informalmechanisms
of coercionand
fromuseofparamilitary
control,ranging
thugsto elaborate
ofvotebuying,fraud,co-optation,
systems
espionage,and
blackmail."4
institutions
is
whyactorscreateinformal
Understanding
sufficient
to explainhowtheyareestablished.
not,however,
does notbyitselfexplainhowtheneedfor
Incompleteness
additionalrulestranslates
intotheircreation(or,forthat
rather
thanformal,
rulesareadopted).
matter,
informal,
why
informal
institutions
are
a
second-best
Where
why
strategy,
areactorswho lackthecapacityto changetheformalrules
nevertheless
able to establishand enforceinformalones?
And whereactorssharecertainillicitgoals,how are they
able to establishmechanismsthateffectively
circumvent
theformalrules?In short,to avoidthefunctionalist
trap,it
is essentialto examinethemechanisms
bywhichinformal
institutions
areestablished.

out of elite-level
interaction
(Mexico'sconcertacestrategic
In
other
instances
clientelism,
siones).
blat)
(corruption,
informal
rulesemergeoutofa decentralized
processinvolving a muchlargernumberof actors.In eitherprocess,we
mechanisms
ofemergence
in termsoffocal
mayunderstand
or bargaining.120
Alterpoints,118repeatedinteraction,"'119
informalinstitutional
creationmaybe a historinatively,
structures
arean
callycontingent
processinwhichinformal
unintendedproductof particularconflictsand compromises.For example,Amakudari
as a makeshift
originated
officials
byJapaneseministry
strategy
seekingto reconcile
withpostwarrealiprewarnormsof lifetime
employment
ties of resourcescarcityand strictsenioritysystems.121
take
may ultimately
Althoughsuch informalinstitutions
on functions
thatare perceivedas efficient
or beneficial,
thesefunctions
oftenhavelittleto do withtheirorigins.
of
the
institutions
mustalso
Analyses
originsofinformal
accountforhowtheyarecommunicated
and learnedin the
absenceofwritten
downrulesand publicenforcement.
In
some cases,informalinstitutionalization
appearsto be a
processofsociallearning
widelyobservedinstances
through
oftrialand error.
The Mexicandedazowasinstitutionalized
a "processoflearningbyexample,"as PRI leaders
through
who broketheinformal
rulesduringthe 1940sand 1950s
suffered
whilethose
politicaldefeatand marginalization,
whoplayedbytherules"wererewarded
withbetter
posts."'122
who brokethe
Similarly,
postwarItalianprimeministers
informal
rulethatgavepartiestherightto namegovernmentministers
"sawtheirgovernments
meetrapidends."
Theirsuccessorsquickly"learnedthelesson,"and by the
decisionsbypartyand
mid-1950s,"theruleof negotiated
How Informal
Institutions
are Created
factionleadershad beenhammered
out."'23
and Communicated
Socialnetworks
andpolitical
organizations
mayalsotransThe construction
ofinformal
institutions
differs
mit
informal
rules.
Thus
the
norms
of
Amakudari
were
markedly
fromformalrule-making
Whereas
formal
rules
diffused
social
networks
that
linked
universities,
processes.
through
are createdthroughofficialchannels(such as executives statebureaucracies,
and privatecorporations,124
and inforand legislatures)
and communicated
and enforced
withinthePeruvian
andUkrainian
statescombystate malnetworks
rulesare
municatedthe rules of corruptionand blackmailthat
agencies(suchas thepoliceand courts),informal
and enforcedoutsideof public
created,communicated,
sustainedautocratic
regimesduringthe 1990s.125Political
channels,and usuallyoutsideofthepubliceye.The actors partiesalso carryinformalrules.Partiescommunicated
who createand enforcethemmaydenyhavingdone so.
in Chile,theNetherlands,
and
power-sharing
arrangements
Hence,theiroriginsare oftenunclear.115
enforced
thesystem
of
postwarItaly;126partyorganizations
becauseofthesedifferences,
scholars
shouldtake
Precisely
kickbacks
andbribery
in Italy;127andcompeting
localparty
theprocessof informal
acrossnorthern
rule-making
seriously
by identify- leadersspreadrondascampesinas
Peru.128
and interests
behindthecreation
ingtheactors,coalitions,
In sum, movingbeyondfunctionalist
accountsentails
ofinformal
rules.To theextentthattheserulesarecreated identifying
the relevant
actorsand interests
behindinforin a contextin whichpowerand resourcesare unevenly mal institutions,
the
which
informal
specifying processby
distributed,
theycan be expectedto producewinnersand
rulesarecreated,
and showinghowthoserulesarecommuJackKnight,'17scholarsshould
nicatedto otheractorsin sucha mannerthattheyevolve
losers."16Thus, following
be sensitiveto underlying
intosetsofsharedexpectations.
processesof conflictand coercion,ratherthanassumepurecoordination.
Processesof informalinstitutional
emergencevary.In
Institutional
somecases,theprocessis "topdown";informal
institutions Informal
Change
maybe a productofelitedesignand imposition(theMexInformal
institutions
areoftencharacterized
as highlyresisicandedazo,Dutchconsociationalism),
ortheymayemerge tantto change,possessing
a "tenacioussurvival
ability."129
December2004 I Vol.2/No.4 731
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Articles I Informal
Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
When changeoccurs,it is expectedto be slowand increLauth,forexample,arguesthatbecauseinformental.130
mal rules "do not possess a centerwhich directsand
co-ordinates
theiractions,"informal
institutional
changeis
to
be
an
Yet
likely
"extremely
process.131 informal
lengthy"
institutionsdo change-and oftenquite quickly.The
centuries-old
Chinesepracticeoffoot-binding
disappeared
withina generation,132
and manyoftheinformal
rulesthat
Mexicanelitepoliticsformuchofthetwentieth
structured
thededazo)collapsedquicklyduringthe
century
(including
late 1990s.133
Severalsourcesmaygeneratethe impetusforinformal
institutional
sourceisformalinstichange.One important
tutionalchange.The impactofformalrulechangesshould
not, of course,be overstated;
manyinformalinstitutions
haveprovedresilient
evenin thefaceoflarge-scale
legalor
reform.134
to the extentthat
administrative
Nevertheless,
of
formalinstitutional
changealtersthecostsand benefits
an
informal
it
can
serve
as
to
rules,
adhering particular
institutional
forinformal
catalyst
change.
important
here.
institutional
Twotypesofformal
changearerelevant
ParticuThe firstis changein formalinstitutional
design.
thatare endogenousto forinstitutions
larlyforinformal
mal structures,
a changein thedesignof theformalrules
torelatedinforandbenefits
ofadhering
affect
the
costs
may
institutional
mal rules,whichcan producerapidinformal
informal
instituIn
the
of
case
complementary
change.
formal
rules
the
relevant
tions,forexample,modifying
may
institution
changethenatureofthegapsthattheinformal
had beendesignedto address,whichmaycreateincentives
foractorsto modifyor abandon the informalrule.The
in theHouse ofRep1974 BillofRightsofSubcommittees
a
resentatives
sharp
"produced
changein formalrulesthat
135
structures."
committee
overrodepreviousinformal
Informalinstitutional
changemayalso be a productof
In
or effectiveness.
in
formal
institutional
strength
changes
of formal
such cases,changesin thelevelof enforcement
instirulesalterthecostsand benefits
adheringto informal
forthoserules.For
tutionsthatcompetewithor substitute
institutions
informal
example,compliancewithcompeting
of the
becomesmorecostlywithincreasedenforcement
formalrules,and at some point,thesecostswill induce
actors to abandon the informalinstitution.Thus the
increased
bytheMani Pulite
triggered
judicialenforcement
networksin Italy;'36
weakenedcorruption
investigations
state
the tightcontrolsimposedby the postrevolutionary
normsin MaoistChina;137
weakenedtraditional
gift-giving
weakened
ofcivilrights
enforcement
and federal
legislation
JimCrowpracticesin theSouth.
Increasedformalinstitutionaleffectiveness
may also
When thecrediinstitutions.
informal
weakensubstitutive
isenhanced,
structures
formal
ineffective
bilityofpreviously
instituthebenefits
associatedwiththeuse of substitutive
tothepointoftheirdispenstionsmaydiminish,
potentially
of Mexico's
ability.For example,the increasedcredibility
732

electoralcourtsoverthe courseof the 1990s reducedthe

incentiveof oppositionleadersto workthroughinformal
138and theincreased
effectiveness
ofPeru's
concertacesiones,
and
to
the
led
publicsecurity judicialsystems
collapseof
and
ronda
assemblies.139
rondas
many
campesinas
Othersourcesof informal
institutional
changelie outsidetheformalinstitutional
context.Forscholarswhoview
informal
institutions
as a productofculture,
inforprimarily
mal institutional
in
is
rooted
the
evoluchange
primarily
tion of societalvalues.'40Becausesuch shiftstendto be
ofinformal
institutional
glacialin pace,thispattern
change
will be slow and incremental.
We mightunderstand
the
erosionoftraditional
orkinship-based
ofauthority
patterns
in Europein theseterms.
Informalinstitutions
mayalso changeas thestatusquo
conditionsthatsustainthemchange.' 1 Developments
in
of
the externalenvironment
maychangethe distribution
a
those
and
resources
within
community,
power
weakening
actorswho benefitfroma particular
informalinstitution
andstrengthening
thosewhoseektochangeit.ThusMexico's
electoralenvironment
competitive
duringthe
increasingly
vis-a-vis
local PRI leadersand activists
1990sstrengthened
whichallowedthemto contestand
thenationalleadership,
In theNetherdismantlethededazosystem.142
eventually
in
decline
a
class
and
lands, long-term
religiousidentities
new
that
challengedthe consociastrengthened parties
tionalrulesof thegameand inducedestablished
partiesto
electorates
abandonthem.143
The growthof middle-class
erodesthebasesof clientelism
by reducingvoters'depenofselectivematerial
denceon thedistribution
goods.'44In
thesecases,informal
institutional
changetendsto be increto
mental,as actorsgraduallyreorienttheirexpectations
reflect
underlying
changesin theirand others'bargaining
power.
toolsmaybe neededtoexplainsomerapid
Otheranalytic
informalinstitutional
changeor collapse.Tippingmodels
Thesemodelssuggestthatifa suffione suchtool.145
offer
of actorsbecomeconvinced
number
cientlylargeenough
thata newand betteralternative
exists,and ifa mechanism
a
existsthroughwhichto coordinateactors'expectations,
shiftfromone set of normsto anothermay occurquite
rapidly.GerryMackie arguesthatthe moveto end foot
marbindingin China hingedon creatingan alternative
whohad
thatallowedsonsto marry
daughters
riagemarket
naturalfeet,thereby
escapingconventional
inferiority.'46
instituthesesourcesof informal
Figure2 summarizes
institutions
informal
tionalchange.As thefigure
suggests,
withrespectto boththesourceand the
varyconsiderably
accommopaceofchange.Whereassome(complementary,
to changesin formalinstitudating)arehighlysusceptible
tional design,others(substitutive,
competing)are more
likelyto be affectedby changesin formalinstitutional
Withrespectto thepace ofchange,culturalevostrength.
lutionis likelyto produceincremental
change,butformal
aroundan alternative
institutional
changeor coordination

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8
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institutions
into mainstream
comparaBringinginformal
tiveinstitutional
chalanalysisposesa newsetof research
A
issue
is
and
informal
identifying measuring
lenges. major
In formalinstitutional
institutions.
analysis,thistask is
formal
institutions
are
Because
relatively
straightforward.
written
down
and
communicated
and
sancofficially
usually
and measurement
oftenrequires
tioned,theiridentification
ofparticular
littleknowledge
cases,whichfacilitates
large-n
informal
institutions
is morechalcomparison.
Identifying
can tellus whether
constitution
it has
lenging.A country's
a presidential
or parliamentary
but
systemofgovernment,
of clientelism
it cannottellus aboutthe pervasiveness
or
networks.
kinship
One wayof identifying
informal
institutions
is to look
forinstancesin whichsimilarformalrulesproducedifferentoutcomesand thenattribute
thedifference
to informal
the
of
this
institutions.'47
Although logic
approachis clear,
it reducesinformal
institutions
to a residualcategory
and
risksconflating
informal
institutions
andweakinstitutions.
An alternative
isto identify
stablepatterns
ofbehavstrategy
ior thatdo not correspond
to formalrules.However,this
all behavioral
approachrunstheriskoftreating
regularities
as informal
institutions.
At a minimum,
efforts
to identify
informal
institutions
shouldanswerthreebasicquestions.148
First,whatarethe
abouttheactualconstraints
actors'sharedexpectations
they
face?Onlybyexamining
actors'mutualunderstanding
ofthe
rulescan one distinguish
betweeninformal
behaviorpatternsandinformal
institutions.
Second,whatisthecommurulesapply?Whereasthedomain
nitytowhichtheinformal
of a formalinstitution
is oftendelineatedbylawsor other
thedomainofinformal
rulesisoftenmoredifficult
statutes,
todiscern.
The relevant
a nation,
community
maybeavillage,
anethnicorreligious
or
an
such
as
a politgroup,
organization
icalparty,
or
state
In
some
cases,the
bureaucracy.
legislature,
relevant
is
a
the
boundaries
ofwhich
elite,
community political
areoftenblurry.
rulesenforced?
If
Third,howareinformal
informal
behavioris rule-bound,
thenviolationsmusttrigmechagerexternalsanction.Unlikeformalenforcement
nisms(police,courts),informal
mechanisms
are
sanctioning
oftensubtle,hidden,andevenillegal.Theymayrangefrom
hostileremarks,
andotherdisplays
ofsocial
gossip,ostracism,
to extrajudicial
disapproval
violence.149
the sharedexpectationsand enforcement
Identifying
mechanisms
thatsustaininformal
institutions
is a challengin mostcasessubstantial
ing task,requiring
knowledgeof
thecommunity
withinwhichtheinformal
institutions
are
embedded.Hencethereis probably
no substitute
forintensivefieldwork
ininformal
institutional
Indeedmost
analysis.
December2004 j Vol.2/No.4 733

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Articles I Informal
Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
studiesof informalinstitutions
take the formof either
abstracttheory(N=O0)or inductivecasestudies(N= 1).150
Case studiesprovideessentialbuildingblocksforcomparison and theorybuilding.However,a moregeneralbodyof
willrequirescholarsto incorporate
othermethodsas
theory
well.
One suchmethodis rigorous
small-ncomparison.
Withcase
to contextthatcharacterizes
out losingthesensitivity
of
studies,small-nanalysescan beginto identify
patterns
institutional
informal
institutional
formal-informal
effects,
institutional
and informal
interaction,
change.For examCollins's
Kathleen
studyof threeCentral
ple,
comparative
between
Asianstatesenabledhertoexaminetheinteraction
formalregimetypes.'51Simiclan networks
and different
behaviorin
larly,Scott Desposato'sanalysisof legislative
fiveBrazilianstateswith varyingdegreesof clientelism
affects
thefuncallowedhim to considerhow clientelism
withsimilarformalstructures.152
tioningoflegislatures
on informayalsoproveusefulinresearch
Large-nsurveys
malinstitutions.
Surveyresearch
maycaptureactors'expectationsand beliefsabout the "actual"rulesof the game.
to distinguish
betweenconventional
Here it is important
towardparticular
or
that
values
attitudes
surveys
capture
institutions(e.g., the World Values Survey)and those
designedto capturesociallysharedbeliefsaboutconstraints
isSusanStokes's
thatindividuals
face.Anexampleofthelatter
inArgenof
of
informal
institutions
accountability
analysis
in
the
existence
to
data
demonstrate
which
uses
tina,
survey
some partsof the countryof sharedcitizenexpectations
thatvoterswill punishpoliticianswho behavedishonestbe
mayinitially
surveys
ly.153
Althoughexpectations-based
of informal
limitedto identifying
institutions,
theymight
be usedto generateand testcausalclaims.
eventually

islativerules?'56In comparative
politics,theissueof how
informalinstitutions
sustainor reinforce-asopposedto
undermineor distort-formalones has not been well
researched.
Wheninstitutions
we often
function
effectively,
assumethatthe formalrulesare drivingactors'behavior.
Yetin somecases,underlying
informal
normsdo muchof
theenablingand constraining
to theforthatwe attribute
mal rules.
aboutthe
Second,we need to theorizemorerigorously
about
of
institutions
and
informal
particularly
emergence
themechanisms
which
informal
rules
are
created,
through
andlearned.Someseemingly
communicated,
age-oldinformal institutions
recent
arein reality
relatively
reconfigurations(or reinventions);
thisfactmakestheissuesoforigins
all themorecompelling.157
thesourcesofinforThird,we needto betterunderstand
mal institutional
and change.One questionnot
stability
of informal
addressedin thisarticleis thatof codification
rules.In someinstances,
stateactorsopttolegalizeinformal
thatare perceivedto competewithor underinstitutions
"conLatinAmerican
mineformal
rules.Several
governments
them
stitutionalized"
aspectsof indigenouslaw (granting
constitutional
status)duringthe 1990s in an effortto
in Argenenhancecompliancewithstatelaw.'58Similarly,
CarlosMenem'suse
to regulatePresident
tina,in an effort
included
decreeauthority,
ofextraconstitutional
legislators
a provisionforexecutivedecreesin the 1994 Constitution.159We need to knowmoreaboutwhatinducesstate
institutions.
thanopposeinformal
actorstoformalize
rather
is
institutions
research
on
informal
Comparative
politics
stillat an incipientstage.Advancesare likelyon several
fronts,
rangingfromabstractformalmodelingto ethnowillcome
New insights
graphicstudiesto surveyresearch.
ecoof disciplines,
froma variety
includinganthropology,
and politicalpsychology.
Hence,it
nomics,law,sociology,
Conclusion
research
a broadandpluralistic
isessential
topromote
agenda
and
acrossdisciplines,
thatencourages
fertilization
methods,
SinceJamesMarchandJohanP.Olsendeclaredthat"a new
rules
in
informal
which
of
areas
Given
the
research
hasappearedinpolitical
institutionalism
range
regions.
science,"154
thatpolititis essential
matter
Yet
andorganizations
has advancedconsiderably.
on politicalinstitutions
politically,
rules
of
the
the
real
take
scientists
ical
has
focused
literature
becausethecomparative
seriouslygame
pripolitics
or not.
intoparchment
whether
it risksmissingmanyof the
theyarewritten
marilyon formalinstitutions,
behavthatunderlie
andconstraints
"real"incentives
political
Notes
havebeen
ofinstitutions
ior.Indeed,rational-choice
analyses
see Carey
attentionto formalrules"and
criticizedforan "excessive
1 Foran excellent
surveyofthisliterature,
2000.
informal
established
to firmly
attention
"insufficient
prac2 Taylor1992; Hartlyn1994; O'Donnell 1996; Siaveticesand 'institutions.'"
55
lis 1997; Starn1999; Van Cott 2000; Levitsky
2001;
forincorporatWe havesoughtto providea framework
EisenBrinks
2003a;
2002;
2003;
Helmke
institutional
Levitsky
analysis.
ing informalrulesinto mainstream
stadt2003.
we seekto
on institutions,
theliterature
Farfromrejecting
3 Clarke1995; Ledeneva1998; Bir6cz2000; Easter
and ultibroadenand extendit,withthegoal of refining,
2000; Sil 2001; Collins2002a, 2003; GrzymalaWe seesevframework.
itstheoretical
matelystrengthening,
BusseandJonesLuong2002; Way2002; Gel'man
eralareasforfutureresearch.
First,we mustpositand test
2003.
rulesshapeformalinstituabouthow informal
hypotheses
4 Dia 1996; Sandbrookand Oelbaum 1999; Hyden
tional outcomes.For example,how do clientelismand
2002; Lindberg2003; Galvan2004.
and legofelectoral
networks
mediatetheeffects
patronage
734

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5 Yang1994; Hamilton-Hart
2000; Wang2000;
Gobel 2001; Tsai 2001, 2004; Colignonand Usui
2003.
6 Forgeneralanalysesof informal
see
institutions,
North1990; Knight1992; O'Donnell 1996; Lauth
2000.
7 Langston2003.
8 Colignonand Usui 2003.
9 Collins2002b, 23, 30.
10 O'Donnell 1996; Lauth2000; Birocz 2000; Gbbel
2001; Lindberg2003.
11 Riggs1964.
12 Scott1976.
13 Hyden1980.
14 Hooker 1975; Griffiths
1986.
15 Scott1972; Lemarchand1972;
16 Scott1969; Waterbury
1978.
1973; Rose-Ackerman
17 Lijphart1975.
18 Johnson1974, 1982.
19 Bauer,Inkeles,and Kluckhohn1956; Berliner1957.
20 Matthews1959.
21 O'Donnell 1996; Weyland2002.
22 North1990.
23 Della Portaand Vannucci1999, 15.
24 Brinks2003a, 2003b.
25 Brinks2003b.
26 O'Donnell 1994; Hartlyn1994; Sandbrookand Oelbaum 1999.
27 Siavelis2002a, 81.
28 Siavelis2002b.
29 O'Donnell 1994.
30 Taylor1992.
31 Wrightand Berkman1986.
32 Levitsky
2001; 2003.
33 Stokes2003.
34 Mershon1994; Desposato2003.
35 Helmke2002; Van Cott2003; BillChavez2004.
36 Freidenberg
and Levitsky
2002; Langston2003; Levitsky2003.
37 Della Portaand Vannucci1999; Samuels2003.
38 Collins2002a, 2002b; Ottaway2003.
39 Way2002.
40 Della Portaand Vannucci1999; Hamilton-Hart
2000; Colignonand Usui 2003.
41 Darden2002; Grzymala-Busse
andJonesLuong
2002; Tsai 2004.
42 Forotherefforts
in thisdirection,
see Lauth2000
and Pasottiand Rothstein
2002.
43 Lauth2000.
44 Wang2000.
45 O'Donnell 1996; Lauth2000.
46 Biriacz2000; Darden2002.
47 Lauth2000; Collins2002a; Collins2003.
48 Boussard2000; Manor2001.
49 Dia 1996; Pejovich1999.

50 See North1990; Knight1992; Carey2000.

51 Dia 1996; Pejovich1999. Pejovichdefinesinformal
institutions
as "traditions,
customs,moralvalues,reliand
all
other
normsofbehaviorthat
beliefs,
gious
havepassedthetestoftime.. . . Thus,informal
institutionsarethepartofa community's
that
heritage
we call culture"(p. 166).
52 Boussard2000; Manor2001; Tsai 2002.
53 Knight1992; Calvert1995.
54 Hamilton-Hart
andJones2000; Grzymala-Busse
and
Usui
2003.
Luong2002; Colignon
55 Waterbury
1973; Darden2002; Langston2003.
56 Thisdefinition
borrows
fromBrinks2003a andisconsistentwithNorth1990; O'Donnell 1996; Carey
institu2000; and Lauth2000. We treatinformal
tionsand normssynonymously.
However,norms
havebeendefinedin a variety
ofways,and somecondo notincludeexternal
enforceceptualizations
ment.See Elster1989.
57 Ellickson1991, 31.
58 O'Donnell 1994.
59 O'Donnell 1996.
60 See Hart 1961; Knight1992.
61 Brinks2003a.
62 Waterbury
1973; Darden2002.
63 Manion 1996; Della Portaand Vannucci1999.
64 See Huntington1968.
65 North1990.
66 North1990; Galvan2004.
67 Forexample,someindigenous
institutions
in Latin
Americadrawon culturaltraditions
butothersdo
not.See Yrigoyen
Fajardo2000; Van Cott2003.
68 Lauth2000 distinguishes
amongthreetypesofformalinformal
institutional
relationships:
complementary,
and conflicting.
He does notelabosubstitutive,
rateon thesetypes,however.
69 Ullman-Margalit
1978; Axelrod1986.
70 Weingast1979; Weingastand Marshall1988; March
and Olsen 1989.
71 O'Donnell 1996; Biricz 2000; Lauth2000; Collins
2002a.
72 Byeffectiveness,
we do notmeanefficiency.
History
is littered
withexamplesofinefficient
institutions
thatnevertheless
effectively
shapedactors'expectations(North1990).
73 Lauth2000.
74 Marchand Olsen 1989.
75 Maltzmanand Wahlbeck1996; Epsteinand Knight
1997.
76 Stokes2003.
77 North,Summerhill,
and Weingast,
2000.
78 Hamilton-Hart
2000.
79 Tsai 2004.
80 Siavelis2002b, 10-11.
81 Ibid.,21.
December2004 1 Vol.2/No.4 735

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Articles I Informal
Institutions
and Comparative
Politics
82 Lijphart1975, 122-38.
83 Ibid.
84 Bauer,Inkeles,and Kluckhohn1956; Berliner1957;
Ledeneva1998.
85 Ledeneva1998,43, 1.
86 Berliner
orpersonal
rela1957;Ledeneva1998. Guanxi,
maintained
and
bygiftgiving reciprocal
tionships
China.See
favors,
playeda similarrolein post-Maoist
Yang 1994.
87 O'Donnell 1996; Birocz 2000; Lauth2000; Collins
to O'Donnell
2003. According
2002a,2003; Lindberg
normsare"antagonistic
(1996, 40), particularistic
tooneofthemainaspectsofthefullinstitutional
packroles
age ofpolyarchy....Individualsperforming
in politicaland stateinstitutions
aresupposedto be
motives
butbyuninot
byparticularistic
guided
to someversionofthepublic
versalistic
orientations
is pervasive,
this
good.... Whereparticularism
notionis weaker,lesswidelyheld,and seldom
enforced."
88 Della Portaand Vannucci1999, 146, 15.
89 Ibid., 15, 122.
90 Price1975.
91 Hooker 1975, 2; also Griffiths
1986; Merry1988.
92 Merry1988, 869.
93 Lauth2000.
2003.
94 Eisenstadt
2002; Eisenstadt
2002.
95 Eisenstadt
96 Starn1999.
97 Tsai 2001, 16.
98 Wang2000; Tsai 2001.
institutional
99 The questionofinformal
emergence
withinforhas beenthesubjectofa largeliterature
See Schotter1981; Knight
mal politicaltheory.
1992; Calvert1995.
100 Forexample,someindigenousinstitutions
widely
arein factrecentcreations
viewedas "traditional"
See Starn1999;
drawon earliertraditions.
thatmerely
Van Cott 2000, 2003; Galvan2004.
101 Fora critique,see Knight1992.
normsby
102 See, forexample,earlyworkon legislative
and
Weingast1981; WeinWeingast1979; Shepsle
Marshall
1988.
gastand
institutions
103 Manyinformal
emergeendogenously
Actorscrefromformalinstitutional
arrangements.
to subvert,mitigatethe
ate themin an effort
offoreffects
for,orenhancetheefficiency
of,substitute
institumal institutions.
However,otherinformal
of formalinstitutional
tionsdevelopindependently
in responseto conditionsthatare
structures,
theformal
instito (andfrequently
unrelated
pre-date)
tutionalcontext.Formalinstitutions
maythenbe
builton the foundationof theseinformalinstituinformal
tions(actorsmayformalize
pre-existing
formal
rulesor use themas thebasesfordesigning
736

ones),or theymaybe createdwithouttakingpreinformal

structures
intoaccount(as occurred
existing
withmanycolonialinstitutions).
104 Johnson2002.
105 Marchand Olsen 1989; Nelsonand Winter1982;
Weingast1979; Weingastand Marshall1988.
106 We thankSusanStokesforsuggesting
thispoint.
Siavelis
2002b.
107
108 Mershon1994.
109 Ibid.
110 Taylor1992.
111 Mershon1994, 50.
112 Van Oenen 2001.
113 Brinks2003a.
114 Darden2002; Levitsky
andWay2002; Schedler
2002; Ottaway2003.
115 See, forexample,Starn'saccountof thedisputedoriginsof therondacampesinasin Peru(1999, 36-69)
and Ledeneva's(1998) analysisoftheoriginsof
blatin theSovietUnion.
116 Knight1992.
117 Ibid.
118 Schelling1960.
119 Sugden1986; Schotter1981; and Calvert1995.
120 Knight1992
121 Johnson1974; Colignonand Usui 2003. Similarly,
normsof restraint
and flexibility
withinJapan'ssecurityforceshavebeentracedto theintensesocioin theaftermath
ofWorldWarII
politicalconflicts
(Katzenstein
1996).
122 Langston2003, 14-16.
123 Mershon1994, 67-68.
124 Colignonand Usui 2003.
125 Darden2002; MorenoOcampo 2002.
126 Siavelis2002b; Lijphart1975; Mershon1994.
127 Della Portaand Vannucci1999, 93-124.
128 Starn1999.
129 North1990,45; See also Dia 1996; O'Donnell
1996; Pejovich1999; Collins2002b.
130 North1990; Lauth2000.
131 Lauth2000, 24-25.
132 Mackie 1996.
133 Langston2003.
134 Dia 1996; O'Donnell 1996; Pejovich1999.Forexamfordecadesdespitemultipersisted
ple,Amakudari
aimedatitseradication
reforms
(Colignon
plelegislative
and Usui 2003, 43-49); clanpoliticsin Central
Asiasurvived
theriseandfalloftheSovietUnion(Colnormssurlins2002a, 2002b); andmanySoviet-era
fromstatesocialismto a
vivedRussia'stransition
marketeconomy(Clarke1995; Sil 2001).
135 North1990, 88.
136 Della Portaand Vannucci1999.
137 Yang 1994.
2002.
138 Eisenstadt

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