COMMAND AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS

By

Colonel (Dr) Narendar Singh (Retd)

Introduction

Ever since India carried out its nuclear test in 'On May 11, 1998, Mr. Atal
Bihari Vajpayee the Prime Minister of India announced that India had conducted
three nuclear tests including a thermo nuclear one. On May 14, 1998,after a
series of blast on May 13, 1998, Mr. APJ Abdul Kalam, Bharat Ratna, Scientific
Advisor to the Defence Minister announced completion of nuclear weaponization
of India. There have been series of articles by various military and academic
thinkers and authors about the type of command and control that is suitable for
the nation, some going to the extent that India has been unable to evolve any
concept of command and control while Pakistan was quick to place its nuclear
command and control in place.

Unlike conventional concepts, of which Indian Military Commanders have

direct experience and for which defense forces have planned and trained,
operations against regional adversary either having or presumed to have nuclear
weapons would present problems that have never been directly faced and are
not yet fully understood. The first aspect that needs to be carefully understood is
that of command and control of nuclear weapons before we proceed to
operational level.

Reliable data on existing or developing systems of command and control

in emerging nuclear nations are scarce. Traditional analysis have stressed at the
capability of new arsenals, the ‘irrationality’ of certain regimes, the degree to
which new nuclear nations may support the international status quo or whether
 2

the countries in question are involved in acute conflicts.1 However, none of these
studies deal with the actual command and control of the nuclear weapons.

A more complete assessment also requires an estimate of how India’s

nuclear organization might in fact behave, particularly during a crisis. This would
depend, in turn, upon an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
command and control system. Including identification of how the weapons are
handled on a day- to- day basis and how India addresses fundamental safety
and security concerns. Command and Control are central in the United States
Nuclear Policy.2

Framework of Assessment

Command and Control has one unavoidable drawback at a level of

analysis: there is virtually no reliable information available on the command and
control as existing in the countries. Access to information about United States
and Allied Command and Control is difficult enough to come by, even for
historical studies. The solution is to develop a framework that can be evaluated
and refined for use by India.

The framework presented here is informed by insights drawn from the

United States experience. The emerging literature on United States Command
and Control is a rich source of knowledge about distinguishes characteristic of
such a system. Thus an understanding of the United State experience provides
clues on the likely evolution of Command and Control in India. The paper has
attempted to avoid the pit- falls of mirror- imaging.3 India will face special

1
For the classic treatments, see Lewis Dunn, ‘Containing Nuclear Proliferation’, Adelphi Paper, No. 263
(London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991)
2
See Desmond Bull, ‘Can Nuclear War Be Controlled’, Adelphi Paper, No. 169 (London: International Institute
of Strategic Studies, 1981); Paul Barcleen, ‘The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces’, (New Haven: Yale
University Press; 1983): Buce Blair, ‘Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat’,
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985); Scott Sagan, ‘Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security’,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
3
For instance, one simplistic model might recommend that India like other emerging Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Weapon state may mimic the United States Command and Control system. Waltz’s assertion, cited above
comes close to committing this mirror- imaging error. A simple-minded etho-centric model might assume that India
is incapable of recognizing command and control problems and unqualified to develop sophisticated command
arrangements.
 3

challenges in developing command and control systems, but these hurdles are
not radically different from one that confronted United States policy makers.
Thus, at least some of the factors that influenced the design of United States
Systems are likely to influence other nations as well.

At the heart of command and control lies the ‘always’ and ‘never’
dilemma.4 Leaders want high assurance that the weapons will always work when
directed and a similar assurance the weapons will never be used in the absence
of authorized direction. Weapons must be reliable: unlikely to fail at the moment
leaders want to use them; safe: unlikely to detonate accidentally; and secure:
resistant to efforts by unauthorized people to detonate them. 5 The dilemma
obtains for conventional forces and it applies to Nuclear Weapons because of its
vast destructive power.

Two threats are visualized in the always and never dilemma, the potential
for unwanted use and potential for decapitation. The principal threat being that
the nuclear weapon is used when not ordered by authorities. It has two primary
variants: accidental use and unauthorized use. Decapitation is the principle
threat to positive control. Refers to a successful first strike that renders the
defender’s arsenal unusable either because the attack destroys systems (or the
weapons themselves), or because the attack so disrupts command and control
that retaliation becomes infeasible.6

Thus a command and control system will employ a variety of

organizational and technical measures to deal with the given two threats. 7 It will
4
Other dilemmas and constraints intrude on Command and Control. For instance, the perverse interaction of
high technology and large organizations has affected the evolution of Command and Control in the United States.
The tendency for large organizations to rely on unwritten rules, or the proclivity for failure of high technology
systems, all shape the way command and control can be exercised. These constraints could operate in other
countries. See Peter Feaver, ‘Guarding the Guardians; Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States’,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992)
5
Peter D. Feaver, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3,
Winter 1992/93 (Cambridge: Harvard University) p. 163. The always and never formulations is useful because it
underscores the inherent tradeoffs between the forms of control. While the nomenclature of positive control and
negative control is more widely used. Also see Peter Stein and Peter D. Fever, ‘Assuring Control of Nuclear
Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links’, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 2, and (< biblio >).
6
Steinburner, John D., ‘Nuclear Decapitation’, Foreign Policy, No. 45 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 16-28.
7
For mechanics of Command and Control, see Donald Cotter, ‘Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security’, in
Carter, Steinburner and Zarket, ‘Managing Nuclear Operations’ pp. 17-75; and ‘Nuclear Weapons Safety’, Report
 4

include rules to govern how Nuclear Weapons have to be handled, in order to

minimize the chances of accidental or unauthorized use, as also to prevent loss
or theft. The command system will also include redundant communications
networks in order to assure that national leaders can maintain contact with
nuclear weapons arsenal even during a dire national crisis/ emergency.

Some measures are technical in nature and might be called the ‘hardware’
of the command and control: communications network hardened against the
Electro- magnetic pulse (EMP) interruption, code lock devices, safety design
features integral to the warhead, etc. Others measure are organizational and
administrative. These include code- management procedures, strict personnel
monitoring programs and ‘two- mans’ rules dictating that every stage in the
maintenance, deployment and use cycle require the participation of at least two
individuals. Both types of regulations, checks are required to ensure safety and
security. It is not only the equipment that will play dominant part but also
personnel who are handling it. Popular control hardware available in the world is
the Permissive Action Locks (PALs) which block unauthorized detonations. It is
only as effective as the code management system that accompanies it. It is
possible to imagine a PAL - code arrangement in which codes are posted
prominently at the outside of each weapons system; regardless of how advanced
or sophisticated the PAL hardware might be. Such practice is common in each
defense installation in India (marking of the package on the outside) would
render the PAL essentially useless.8

India will ensure protection against decapitation as also against any

accidental use. Some measures may help against one threat without adversely
affecting the other. For instance, improved safety design provides negative
control without in any way compromising any other security, measure that might

of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety, United State House of Representative Committee on Armed Services
(Washington DC; USGPO, December 1990).
8
For more on PAL’s, see Stein and Feaver, ‘Assuming Control of Nuclear Weapons’, and Feaver, ‘Guarding the
Guardians’. For more on the hardware and software of command and control, see Feevon, Peter, ‘Social Sources of
Inadvertent Use: Civil Military Relations and Black Market’, paper presented at a conference on ‘Implications of the
Dissolution of the Soviet Union for Accidental/ Inadvertent Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, in Pcunu,
Estonia, April 23-25, 1992
 5

have been affected. Keeping devices unassembled could be one measure of

security.9 Such policy, however, undermines the assurance that the weapons will
be available when needed. Assembly takes time and, if the components are to be
collected, having not been collocated ab initio, exposes the devices sub
assemblies to risks during transit. For India, this technique wouldn’t be prudent
as China threatens it and the flight time of any device launched from Tibet is just
few minutes.10

One robust and multi- tiered solution to the threat of decapitation is to

have highly survivable nuclear delivery system. Hardened, with redundant
communications between national leaders and the nuclear arsenal (preferably
including a variety of telecommunication media, such as land - wire, high
frequency radio and satellite), and reliable plans to preserve the national
leadership in even the most dire crisis/ circumstances. Such a solution however,
is very expensive. If the military capabilities of the potential enemies are great,
the expense and difficulty of this plan increases accordingly. Very likely, this
solution would be beyond the capability of the most of the countries more so of
India.11

India, hard pressed by regional adversaries, would like to adopt a cheaper

command and control solution, dispersal, and delegation of authority and ability
to use nuclear weapons. This solution however, increases the likelihood of
accidental employment of Nuclear Weapons. An aggressive junior commander
could act precipitously.

Assertive and Delegative Command

9
United States adopted this in the early days for its nuclear arsenal. The erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist
Republic did a variant of this well into 1960’s. Some analyst argues that Israel controls its arsenal this way today.
For speculation on Israeli Nuclear Command and Control, see Peter Pry, ‘Israelis Nuclear Arsenal”, (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 30.
10
Colonel Narendar Singh, ‘India’s Deadly Strategic Gambles’, Garha Chronicle (Indore), February 5, 1998.
11
For United States Command and Control set up and its cost see Bruce Blair, ‘Strategic Command and Control:
Redefining the Nuclear Threat’, (Washington, DC. Brookings, 1985), p. 282. Bruce Blair maintains that the multi
billion-dollar United States Command and Control system had severe vulnerabilities throughout most of the Cold
War.
 6

The designers of command and control system must confront the dilemma
of assertive or delegative command. The command and control system is a ‘de
facto’ resolution of the dilemma. Thus although the command and control system
is dynamic and may change with changing conditions, at any time it is biased
toward one end of the continuum or the other. Different links and components
may have different command and control system associated with them, so may
have different biases. The bias is a result of many command decisions -
administrative, technological and other - regulating how nuclear weapons are
controlled.

The distinguishing feature of a delegative12 system is the degree of

autonomy granted to the military operator who is charged with employing Nuclear
Weapons. Central leaders might still exercise overall policy guidance contained
in detailed Standing Operating Procedures (SOP’s). However, with a delegative
command system there would-be fewer physical constraints that compelled the
nuclear operators to follow the guidance. Policy coherence would depend on the
operator’s voluntary obedience. For much of the Cold War, nuclear and air
defense had a very delegative system in the United States; the weapons were in
a ready- to- go mode and local commanders even had authority to order their use
under special circumstances or conditions.13

The command and control system that reflects a bias towards

centralization is ‘assertive’. The ‘assertive’ control constrains the autonomy of
subordinate commanders. The central leadership sets overall policy goals and
then enforces compliance and coordination with intrusive measures. An assertive
command structures ensures the reliability of Nuclear Weapons operators with

12
See Feaver, ‘Guarding the Guardians’ Chapter 1 and Samuel Huntington, ‘The Soldier and the State’
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1957), pp. 80- 97. Declarative Control draws upon the notion of objective civilian
control as developed by Samuel Huntington, but is especially tailored to nuclear issues.
13
Compared to the other elements, nuclear weapons held by the navy were more declaratively controlled; navy
weapons don’t use Pal’s and compared to their land - based strategic counter- parts, naval officers enjoyed more
autonomy over nuclear operations For Command and Control in the United States Navy, see G.E. Miller, ‘Who
Needs PAL’s?’ Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, July 1988, pp. 50- 56. President Bush’s initiative to remove
nuclear weapons from operational deployment abroad surface ships, however, represented an important break with
the tradition of delegative control of the Navy.
 7

physical restrictive measures that severely constrain their autonomy of decision

and action.

Delegative systems are designed to protect against threats of preemption

and decapitation. A delegative command system would have higher likelihood of
surviving a surprise attack and directing a retaliatory strike. Such a system would
allow higher degree of autonomy at lower level and have built in measures to
assure security against loss or accidental use. Assertive systems, conversely,
are optimized to protect against an accidental or unauthorized use. The reliance
on restrictive measures and physical use control devices provides higher
assurance the weapons will not be used in an unintended fashion. Table 114
summarizes the difference between a delegative and an assertive command
system.

14
Feaver, D. Peter, ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3,
Winter 1992/ 93. p. 170- 71.
 8

Table 1: COMPARING DLEGATIVE AND ASSERTIVE COMMAND SYSTEMS

DELEGATIVE ASSERTIVE
Autonomy Relatively high autonomy given to Minimal autonomy given
lower commanders. to lower commanders.

Measures used to assure Minimal. Extensive.

obedience.
Limited Administrative measures. Wide use of
administrative and
De facto reliance upon military
physical use- control
obedience to civilians.
measures.

Military obedience to
civilians enforced by
specific measures.

Custody and Stockpile Operators given custody and Weapons not

arrangements. allowed to deploy at relatively high assembled. If
state of readiness. assembled, kept
separate from the
delivery system. If
collocated, some
physical measures to
separate control of
possession from ability
to use.

Failure Mode Fail Deadly. Fail impotent or fail-safe.

Protects against Decapitation Accidental Use.

 9

COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR INDIA

What kind of command and control system should India develop? If we

had complete access to the operational plans and the command and control-
wiring diagrams, answering the question would be relatively straightforward task.
Unfortunately this information is not available. A contingent estimation may still
be possible. One way to access the command and control system of India is to
identify and analyze the underlying factors that make one type of system
preferable to another.15

For India urgency quality of the nuclear arsenal is not essential. India has
foreclosed the option of first strike and now advocates only retaliatory strike for
which time is not of great significance.16 This factor incorporates a number of

15
The command and control system is a dynamic organization that can adapt to changing environment. At any
given moment, however, the system is a defacto solution to the always and ever dilemma. Thus the puzzle is to
explain why certain state at a particular time chooses a relatively assertive or deleagtive solution. Before advancing
the system India should adopt the ‘key factors’ hypothesis. Feaver, D. Peter and Ibid. favor this hypothesis. pp. 172
-74. The three plausible explanations given are:
(a) Primitive Capability.
(b) Adaptive Capability.
(c) Vicarious learning curve.
The primitive capability explanation is implicit in the more alarmist proliferation scenarios. Waltz writes in The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons p. 11, without giving examples, ‘Many westerners, who write fearfully about future in
which third world counties have nuclear weapons, seem to view their people in the once familiar imperial manner as
‘lesser breeds without the laws’. This hypothesis holds that new Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon powers
will be run by irresponsible despots who do not value life and therefore, do not fear accidents of Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical Weapons and their use.
The third explanations assume a learning curve on command and control. Young nuclear nations will face
different incentives and constraints from those that confronted nuclear powers. In these views, a new nuclear nation
would start with ‘weapon shock’, profoundly concerned with the capability it possess. A young nuclear power will
have a strong incentive to exercise tight assertive control. As the country gets more experience, it will tolerate a more
delegative command system.
The difference between the adaptive and the vicarious learning curve hypothesis is that the former assumes the pattern
is unyielding, and the later, that new can learn from the experience of previous proliferators.
From the experience of United States it can be observed that some sort of evolutionary pattern operates in the
development of command system.
16
Indian official in the past had often hinted how quickly they could have nuclear weapons. In 1990, Dr. P.K.
Iyengar, then head of Indian Atomic Energy Agency, said, “In how much time we make it, will depend upon on how
much time we get.’ [See ‘Collected Scientific Papers of Dr. P.K. Iyengar’; Vol. 5., Selected papers and Speeches on
Nuclear Power and Science in India’ (Bombay: Bhabha Atomic Research Center, June 1991), p. 247.] In an
interview with one of the authors in 1990, Dr. Iyengar said that India could make nuclear explosives in matter of
weeks, including manufacturing of the plutonium components or ‘pits’. [See Albright, David. Francis Berhout and
Walker, William., ‘Plutonium and Highly Enriched uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Politics’,
 10

facets including perceptions about the likelihood of war, the vulnerability of the
warheads and delivery systems, the vulnerability of the command and control
systems and the strategic rationale for the arsenal.

Table.2: COMMAND AND CONTROL AS A FUNCTION OF CIVIL MILITARY

RELATIONS AND TIME URGENCY

STABLE CIVIL MILITARY VOLATILE CIVIL- MILITARY

RELATIONS RELATIONS

Time Urgent Most delegative Peacetime: Assertive

Crisis: Delegative

Not Time Urgent. Uncertain Most Assertive.

India can consider certain steps, which would offer options to respond to a
nuclear provocation without launching retaliatory strikes or, at a minimum,
causing widespread destruction. Peacetime steps to improve command and
control may have destabilizing effects if seen by the enemy as preparations for
war. However failure to take steps may mean that, in the event of war, nuclear
use is more likely and more destructive.

This is no less true for India than it is for the five declared nuclear weapon
states. Given that minimum deterrence says little what will be deterred, or how
stability will be maintained during crisis or war, it is important for India to consider
how nuclear operations may be managed. What steps might be taken to reduce
the likely hood of loss of control, escalation and nuclear use?

Command and Control in Peacetime

(Oxford: Oxford University Press: For SIPRI, 1997), p. 265.].

 11

India appears to maintain tight control over nuclear components, ensuring

that they could not be quickly deployed. This conforms to the argument that
minimum deterrence provides stability because weapons are unassembled. 17

The armed forces do not appear to control either assembled weapon or

weapon parts. Dr. V. Arunachalam, a former senior Scientific Advisor to the
Government of India, did not state that has not been told how many nuclear
weapons India might have, nor would it be told. Nor were the defence forces told
in peacetime how nuclear weapons would-be used in war’. 18 This view finds
number of echoes. Brigadier Vijai Nair argues that integrating ‘the military into the
national nuclear strategy needs to be done with a sense of urgency’. Mr. Gujral
has commented that, while as a Foreign Minister in Mr. VP Singh’s government
of 1989- 90, he was never briefed on the status of India’s nuclear weapons.19

With the Indian Military and also probably the foreign -policy community
excluded from the peacetime nuclear chain of command, the Department of

17
Munir Ahmed Khan, 'Containing Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia’, unpublished background paper
for Joint US- Pakistan Symposium, 1- 2 June 1994, p. 11. As quoted in Jeoeck, Neil, 'Maintaining Nuclear Stability in
South Asia’, Adelphi Paper, no. 312 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 52. Pakistan’s Munir Ahmed Khan
has written that, although Pakistan has never possessed a nuclear device, ‘the government had taken the
necessary measures and precautions to ensure that no one could make or assemble one, much less go to
the stage of having a usable nuclear weapon’. Mr. Munir Khan chose his words carefully. The United States was
legally bound to stop aid if determined that Pakistan possessed a ‘Nuclear Device’. Pakistan objected to the United
States definition of possession as implied by the Pressler Amendment of 1990, which restricted aid if Pakistan crossed
the nuclear threshold:
‘ A state may possess a nuclear explosive device, and yet maintain it in unassembled form...[but] the fact that
a state does not have an assembled device would not necessarily mean that it does not possess a device
In other words, Khan implied Pakistan had manufactured weapon parts, but kept them apart or unassembled in an
effort to comply with the conditions for continued United States Aid. This is consistent with several more or less
official government statements to the effect that Pakistan possessed elements which, if put together, would become a
nuclear weapon.
Making a nuclear device was, as Khan put it, ’the line not to be crossed’. Pakistan evidently kept the components
separate, primarily for political, rather than strategic, technical or safety, reasons. This practice would ensure
command and control. This seems to be the import of Khan’s statement that Pakistan Government ensured that ‘no
one could make or assemble one’. Weapon Components may be kept separate to ensure executive control.
The nature of executive control is unclear, but with Pakistan Army exercising important role in managing
national affairs, it is likely that it also has significant responsibilities for the weapon component that have
been manufactured

18
Rosen, Stephen Peter, 'Socities and Military Power: India and Its Armies’, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1996), pp. 251- 53.
19
Nair, ‘Nuclear Proliferation’, p. 34; Sundarji, ‘Blind Men Of Hindoostan: Indo- Pak Nuclear War’, (New
Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993)
 12

Atomic Energy (DAE) presumably would retain control of weapon components.

Much as did the United States Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950’s. 20 To
ensure that fully assembled device did not fall into the wrong hands, and to avoid
extensive additional policing of the area where the weapon has been stored,
India may also keep the components separated from each other. The military
stores fusing mechanisms for conventional ordnance apart from explosives, a
similar practice may be followed in the nuclear area. The task for a terrorist- or
anyone else attempting to seize nuclear weapons- would be complicated if
separated components were held in different storage areas. Component
separation would reduce the dangers of unauthorized use.

Mr. George Fernandes, former Defence Minister while delivering D. R.

Mankekar Memorial Lecture on ‘National Security here and The Role of the
Media’, said, “While details of such a system will get some time in getting
defined, what is obvious is that such a command and control will be in the hands
of the political leadership.” He further stated that the command and control
system, “Will necessarily be exclusively its own”. Just as each of the five original
nuclear weapons states had differing systems in keeping with their respective
distinct political system.21

Nuclear Planning: Response and Warning

If as Mr. Arunachalam implies, India maintains peacetime control of

nuclear weapons by keeping components separated and/ or away from delivery
vehicles, unauthorized use is unlikely. It is not clear, however, at which point or
under what circumstances/ conditions authorized use would be allowed. The
decision to retain nuclear capabilities implies that a decision may have to be
taken authorizing or foregoing use. Decision-makers in New Delhi shouldn’t be
lulled into thinking that minimum deterrence is sufficient to prevent this situation
from arising. Even stable minimum deterrence would not prevent crises and
20
US practice has been discussed above. Also see Donald R. Cotter, ’Peacetime Operations: Safety and
Security’, in Carter et al. (eds.), Managing Nuclear Operations, pp.24- 30.
21
The Times of India News Service, ‘N- Button firmly in civilian hands: George’, The Times of India, Vol.
CLXI, No. 186, 10 August 1998.
 13

possibly conflict; thinking about nuclear planning sooner rather than later will
increase the likelihood that reason rather than panic dictates the outcome of
nuclear confrontation. India must address issues such as doctrine alternatives,
response options, alerts, early warning and intelligence.

Analyst in India believe that India is not irrational enough to use nuclear
weapons, but this is no substitute for integrating political interests with the military
means to defend them.22 Nuclear weapons are seen -even by India’s nuclear
proponents- to have only political value, but if they are treated as little more than
symbols they will not only fail to prevent war, they will also make it more costly.
Professor Barry Posen notes that because resources are scarce, ‘the most
appropriate military means should be selected to achieve the political ends in
view’.23 However, the connection between nuclear weapons in India and specific
political objectives in the event of war is not clear. It is not clear whether India
has decided on the size and mix of its stockpile, but relatively small numbers of
weapons may establish boundaries on strategic doctrines. Low number of
nuclear weapons makes an extended nuclear war unlikely, as India would have
to assume some weapons would fail, some delivery vehicles might not reach
their destination and some targets might be missed. With small numbers, India
could not expect to achieve victory with nuclear weapons alone, and a portion of
the stockpile would not be retained to terminate the war on favorable grounds.

Even after nuclear exchange Indian leaders would want to terminate the
conflict without any further use of nuclear weapons. Intra-war deterrence is
difficult to calculate as much would depend upon the damage done, the
disposition of forces in the field, the involvement of third party intermediaries and
other, unforeseen, factors. India would thus not be able to use large quantities of
nuclear weapons. An alternative strategy could be by brandishing the weapon by

22
Thapan, Lieutenant General M.L., notes that the military has not been integrated into nuclear planning in
‘Musings on defence’, Indian Defence Review, vol. 11, no. 3, July/ September 1996, pp.32- 33; John H. Sandrock,
Understanding India’s Decision - Making process with regard to Nuclear Weapons and Missile Development
(McLean, VA: Science Application International Corporation (SAIC), 15 December 1994), p. 24.
23
Posen, Barry R., 'The Sources of Military Doctrine’, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p.13.
 14

conducting a nuclear demonstration, but, depending upon the conduct of the war,
this may serve only to deplete the stockpile while escalating tension.

Given the inherent limits of the use of nuclear weapons it would help if
India considered how they might be used to achieve political objectives before
crisis forced the issue. Thinking about how to end a nuclear confrontation on the
terms that serve the national interest ought to precede conflict rather than
emerge from it.

India’s limited nuclear capabilities make it unlikely that either would plan a
pre-emptive attack. Planning a nuclear strike at the beginning of a war might be
tempting if it eliminated the other side’s decision-making apparatus. The war
would still have to be won on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. Escalation
at the out set would compromise hopes that an initial battlefield advantage would
lead to cease- fire and a diplomatic resolution- a strategy that Pakistan might
hope to adopt.

Planning a large-scale attack at the end of a war would amount to

revenge. It would amount to using the most powerful weapon when it would have
least effect in achieving the political or military objectives that may have caused
the war in the first place. If Pakistan planned to attack New Delhi in the closing
minutes of a war it was about to lose; it might make little sense for India to
retaliate against Pakistani cities. A move as morally indefensible as initial attack,
militarily inconsequential and potentially provocative or destabilizing vis- a- Vis a
third party such as China. A more nuanced response would be needed for India
to end hostilities with Pakistan, while remaining on war footing with China.

It appears unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used for preemption.

India must consider how to respond to any form of war fighting. Pakistan may
strike in the midst of the war when it fears that the tide of the battle was turning in
India’s favor and that outside help was either unavailable or would be ineffective
in achieving a cease- fire.24 Responding to tactical battlefield with counter- value
24
Media, Lieutenant Colonel Said Aware, ‘ Nuclear Ambivalence Versus a Well Defined Policy Involving
Minimum Political Fallout’, The Citadel, No. 2, 1994, pp. 55- 61; more than a decade earlier Major Farrak
AlamShah argued that ‘a limited nuclear war is a viable option and it can be contained below the strategic
threshold’, see, ‘Nuclear Hardening of Equipment’, Pakistan Army Journal, vol. 24, no. 1, Spring 1983, p. 3.
 15

nuclear attacks against cities would not further India’s strategic interests/
objectives. A limited response might be more successful to show resolve, to
respond to public pressure to retaliate, to bolster soldier’s morale, or to reverse
setbacks on the battle- fields.

To maintain control over the progress of the war and to suit the response
to the attack, India would need to consider alternative options before war broke
out. Targets could be identified in advance to ensure that they could hit and that
they could not be relocated after hostilities began. Some targets might be
selected for attack to convey resolve, but to limit the damage in order to
encourage reciprocal restraint rather than escalation. Such targets could include
the nuclear infrastructure,25 conventional military bases or forces, command
centers and economic targets. The choice would depend on the scale of the
provocation. In response to a nuclear strike, a conventional attack on an
economic target, such as a dam, could cause greater damage than a nuclear
attack against a military base. No response at all is also an option, but if these
possibilities are not evaluated prior to hostilities, the response selection during
the conflict could undermine, rather than sere, strategic objectives. Avoiding or
deferring nuclear war- planning runs the risk that war could escalate without
serving a useful political end.

India may require an alternative response option because the provocation

may be more ambiguous than a direct nuclear strike. For example, a handling or
loading accident or design flaw could cause a nuclear device to detonate. The
national commander would than need to determine that a nuclear blast on his
own territory was the result of an accident, and not by an enemy action, so as not
to respond with a retaliatory attack.

Loading a nuclear weapon on to an airplane or missile, during the crisis-

assuming it was detected - would amount to escalation,26 but would not
necessarily require a nuclear response. The intent to launch a nuclear attack
could not be ignored. Although India might want to respond to threatening
25
India and Pakistan have signed a treaty not to strike each other’s nuclear facilities.
26
It has been reported that during the crisis in 1987 Pakistan had loaded it aircraft’s with nuclear weapons.
 16

punishment, yet stop short of nuclear use. Such response would be difficult to
calibrate in the midst of crisis, particularly if it was assumed, or intelligence
indicated, that a second delivery vehicle was being prepared for attack. A nuclear
weapon might be launched, but it might fail to detonate, detonate prematurely or
land as a dud. Such an attack could not be ignored- although it might not justify
massive nuclear retaliation. Again, deciding on an appropriate response in the
heat of war would be difficult.

Perhaps the greatest advantage of a preplanned response is that they

would be subject to careful scrutiny. This might reassure the national decision-
maker that he or she need not promptly escalate regardless of the provocation. A
range of options would be useful to avoid presenting the leader with a plan that
had not been fully examined or properly analyzed. Military leaders may
scrupulously observe the separation of civilian from the military authority during
peacetime. When conflict breaks out, however, war plans may satisfy military
contingencies, but make negotiations impossible. Advance planning and
extensive inter-agency review would allow greater latitude if the time came to
decide between using nuclear weapons and/ or peacefully resolving hostilities.

These issues have almost certainly been discussed in terms of

conventional war, but they may not have been raised in anticipation of a possible
nuclear confrontation. Based on Gujral, now discussions in parliament on Admiral
Bhagwat’s episode and Arunachalam’s statement, it appears that neither the
Indian Foreign Ministry nor the uniformed military has been consulted on this
sensitive- but critical- issue.

India also faces significant demands for improved strategic and tactical
warning. At some point in crises they may decide to put nuclear forces on alert.
India would not like to begin war preparation without unambiguous information
about her opponent’s activities, due high cost of mobilization. However,
Professor Desmond Ball’s study of Indian signals intelligence (SIGINT)
capabilities suggests that India cannot rely on them to provide real time
 17

monitoring.27 Less is known about of India’s human intelligence (HUMINT)

capabilities, but HUMINT is difficult to acquire and even more difficult to assess.
National decision- makers would definitely like to verify a HUMINT warning
during crisis via technical means. In cases where SIGINT did not confirm the
HUMINT, photographic intelligence from aerial or space reconnaissance might
remove key uncertainties. Without better access to accurate and timely
intelligence, India will be operating in the dark. This increases their vulnerability
to attack and restricts their ability to assess the other side’s activities, calibrate
responses and navigate safely through crisis. One burden of acquiring nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles is that countries need to be prepared to take such
steps. Making threats without being able to monitor their effects increases the
cost of failure without increasing security.

The importance of strategic intelligence, even in a recessed or non-

weaponised nuclear confrontation, is clear, but acquiring intelligence is only the
first step. Interpreting it and resolving discrepancies between sources can be
contentious and inconclusive- particularly under crisis conditions. This degree of
intelligence synthesis and analysis is lacking in India.28

Strategic intelligence is needed to assess the damage intake event of a

limited nuclear strike and to plan an appropriate response. Damage assessment
is difficult in conventional wars. Decision needs to be reached based on a variety
of factors, including the availability of remaining forces, targets no longer
requiring firepower or manpower, which enemy positions have been taken or
threaten to breakthrough warning and communications systems are vital. If a
nuclear weapon has detonated, for deciding on a suitable response it
communications would be critical for war to with military or political objectives.

27
Ball, Desmond, ‘Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) in Pakistan’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 18, no. 2,May 1995, pp.
195- 214.
28
Raman, B., ‘Intelligence Revamp: Some Aspects’, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, vol.
126,no. 525,July/ September 1996,pp. 300- 16; Kasturi, ‘Military Intelligence in India’, pp.71- 74; Kathpalia,
'Intelligence: Problems and Possible Solutions’, pp.133-35.
 18

Command and Control in War

Command and control must be retained during hostilities to ensure that
nuclear use, if it cannot be avoided, does not become indiscriminate. Khan’s
statement about the separation of nuclear weapon component suggests that
Pakistan maintains assertive control (i.e., central leadership maintains control
over the weapons). Based on Dr. Arunachalam's statement/ comments, India
does the same.

The peacetime practice may however, meet with problems in wartime,

when India would have to consider when to delegate weapon control. Professor
Peter Feaver of Duke University noted that United Sates shifted from assertive to
delegative control as the crisis loomed.29 Although the delegative command and
control posture means that subordinate commanders are not caught unawares in
the event of war, deterrence stability depends on both sides’ leaders remaining in
firm control of their forces. India may be able to maintain control even after
delegating authority to field commanders. However, unless the nuclear capability
continues to be treated, as a political weapon after the outbreak of war military
officers would become involved, diminishing executive control. A high premium
must therefore be placed on training officers, conducting psychological screening
and protecting the command system from disruption.

Dr. Arunachalam has claimed that if New Delhi went up ‘in a mushroom
cloud’ a theatre commander would open a safe and follow the instructions for
nuclear retaliation contained therein.30 This suggests that release codes are in
place and that pre- delegation of command has taken place. Given that the
military is excluded from nuclear planning, this implies that it is prepared to follow
commands issued by civilian authority without considering the strategic or tactical
utility of the order.

Arunachalam’s statement also raises the issue of where the command

instructions are located, and how these are secured. During the crisis it would be

29
Feaver, Peter D., ‘Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations’, International Security’, vol. 17, no.
3, Winter 1992- 63, pp. 160- 87,
30
Rosen, 'Socities and Military Power', p. 252,
 19

necessary to locate and authenticate them in the absence of the political

leadership. With the defense forces barred from the strategic planning, its
authority in crisis may be challenged at field level. A command to fire nuclear
weapons could be disobeyed if a local commander were unable to confirm what
had happened at the headquarters or the fate of the political leadership. Without
a robust command and control structure, India could be caught off- guard without
recourse to authoritative decision- makers.

A further problem is the integration of the armed services. In past conflicts,

little inter-service coordination was evident.31 With the military excluded from the
decision making of strategic nuclear planning, the army and the air force would
be hard pressed to manage the ground war that included readying the nuclear
capable delivery vehicles. It would be imperative that air delivery of weapons be
closely coordinated with ground attack forces. If, the Indian ground forces
overrunning the adversaries troops and are advancing rapidly on a key city/ cities
and enemy launched a nuclear strike than India would like to be sure the
retaliatory strike does not endanger own troops.

As crisis develops, the air force in particular must be certain which

equipment to reserve for nuclear delivery. Designated aircraft must be properly
rigged to carry and release weapons and be capable of flying long distances,
with sufficient loiter capability and protection, either to be recalled or diverted to
another target. The plans cannot be formulated at the last minute after the enemy
has hit the leadership. As Indian Armed Forces are excluded from decision-
making, they may prepare delivery- related logistical detail independently- a
difficult task without the knowledge of a weapon’s dimensions, weight, tolerance
and robustness. On the other hand, civilians may plan a similar wartime
response without consulting the military. The important details may be
overlooked.

31
Mago, Colonel Kanwal, ‘Integration of the Ministry of Defence with Service Headquarters’, Journal of the
United Service Institution of India, vol. 126, no. 523, January/ March 1996, pp. 42- 55; Raman, ‘National Security
Management: Some aspects, ibid., vol. 125, no. 520, April/ June 1995, pp. 164-75; Chari, ‘Reforming the Ministry
of Defence’, Indian Defence Review, January 1991,pp. 46- 53; Dipanker Banerjee, ‘Consequences of Brasstacks’,
Journal of the United Service Institution of India’, vol. 135,n. 522, October/ December 1995, pp. 535- 38. and
now the disagreement in appointment of CDS.
 20

CONCLUSION
Maintaining firm control before war is important in convincing the enemy
that a nuclear attack would not come out of the blue. Both sides would also need
to be certain that the same control would apply throughout a crisis or war.
Unauthorized use of nuclear weapons must be prevented at all costs. Thinking
through the problems associated with nuclear management and operations
would increase the likelihood that the war does not end in a catastrophe.
Continuing to defer the issue increases the risk of a less than optimal decision
should a crisis occur. Many of these steps could be completed in the same
manner in which the India developed her nuclear capabilities. The benefits of a
partial visibility include enhanced security through the ability to threaten the
enemy and independence from the global non- proliferation.

The paper is drawn from the talk given by the author to Senior Officers of the Indian Army
(in 1989) at College of Military Engineering, Pune (nbrt1@hotmail.com).