Article I Province of

North
Territory Cotabato
vs Govt of
the
Phils
Peace
Panel

The relationship between the Central Government and the

Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility
An association is formed when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic
model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while
maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between
integration and independence.
In international practice, the "associated state"
arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full
independence. Examples of states that have passed
through the status of associated states as a transitional
phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become
independent states.
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which
are consistent with the international legal concept of

association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to

enter into economic and trade relations with foreign
countries, the commitment of the Central Government to
ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in
the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate
in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing
of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM
and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S.
government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,
that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is

recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous
region recognized in the Constitution.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with

other states.
Prof Merlin
Magallona
vs Ermita

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys

Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III,
not to Delineate Philippine Territory
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss)
of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long
negotiations among UN members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States graduated authority over a limited span of waters
and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as

geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the

maritime zones and continental shelf.
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and
the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in
the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
shelf (Article 77).
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in
the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire territory through occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on
the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones

and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features

are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to
Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines
Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046
and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the
basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location
of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and
thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum
length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522,
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the
baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of
petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory
renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG,
assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square

nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is

similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary,
RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,
increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering
its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic
zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies
outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA
9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines
continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas
over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty
and
jurisdiction
shall
be
determined as Regime of Islands under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as
constituted under Presidential Decree

No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de
Scarborough Shoal.

Masinloc,

also

known

as

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires
that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical
miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed
sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
loped around them from the nearest basepoint will

inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the

general configuration of the archipelago.
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew
exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of
basepoints using current maps.
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over
the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s]
of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine
States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS
III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions
of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of
islands, whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its
failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in

North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446,

which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for
drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of
the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago
as provided in this Act is without prejudice to
the delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the
Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under
Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters
under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms

subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to

necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining
unimpeded,
expeditious
international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political
branches of the Philippine government, in the competent
discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.
Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea-lanes
passage are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law
norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and
conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.
No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without
risking retaliatory measures from the international

community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic
waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser
footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage
rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a
concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their
right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty.
More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as
one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate
islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the
waters between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under
UNCLOS III.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the

Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a
maritime delineation binds the international community
since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III.
If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
Art IV Section 1
Citizens Who
are
hip
Filipino
Citizens
Tecson vs
COMELEC

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou

could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has

seen first light (born on Aug. 20, 1939), confers citizenship

to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless
of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(Nationality of the mother is not an issue because FPJ was
born of Filipino father)
Section 1
Who
are
Filipino
Citizens
In
Re:
Admission
to the Bar
of Vicente
Ching

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose
who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of 1935 are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did

not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine

citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that
the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
Election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining
the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of majority.
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964,
was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he

reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention

to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the
age of majority."
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that
can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case,
Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and,
as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
Section 5 Dual
Allegiance
Mercado vs
Manzano

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The

former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our

Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of

citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country
such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the
latters country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by

law.
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
Maquiling
vs
COMELEC

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or

just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he
absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and

fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and that he

divests himself of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America.
Such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by
using his US passport.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country, which granted the citizenship.
Article
VI

Section 25
(5)

Augmentati
on Power

Cross-borderaugmentations from
prohibited by the Constitution

savings

were

By providing that the President, the President of the

Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the

CrossBorder
Transfer of
Funds
Araullo vs
Aquino

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the

Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to
augment any item in the GAA "for their respective
offices," Section 25(5) has delineated borders between
their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office
are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in
the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items.
Thus, we call such transfers of funds cross-border
transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section
25(5) refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the
President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to
the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief
Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to
their respective Chairpersons.
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to
P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were transferred
under the DAP respectively to the COA and the House of
Representatives. Those transfers of funds, constituted
cross-border augmentations for being from the Executive

to the COA and the House of Representatives.

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that
the President "made available" to the "Commission on
Elections the savings of his department upon [its] request
for funds" This was another instance of a cross-border
augmentation.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other nonExecutive agencies (i.e., the House of Representatives,
COA and COMELEC).
Nondelegability
of
Legislative
Power

Belgica vs
Ochoa

The
congressional
pork
barrel
system
is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this

includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of
referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability
of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising

it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.

Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the
power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA
is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionallygiven power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But

with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of

the house of representatives, whats happening is that a
congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government meddles with the
affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the
State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy.
Article
VII
Executiv
e

Section 16Power
of
Appointme
nt

Under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are

removed from the list of officers that needed confirmation
from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the
four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

Sarmiento
vs Mison

Heads of the Executive Departments;

Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls;
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or
Naval Captain; and
Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance

where the appointment made by the President that

requires approval from the COA and the following
instances are those which does not require approval from
COA:
1. All other Officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
3. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
Section 18

Callingout Power
David
Arroyo

vs

1st Provision: Calling out power - by virtue of the power

vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon
the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion.
This involves
ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond

the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or

ultra vires.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more
than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used
to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial
Law can be done.
Its use for any other purpose is a
perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires.
(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised
by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there
is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is
not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise
of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.

IBP
vs
Zamora

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court,
thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's
wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces.
There is a clear textual commitment under the
Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the

necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18,

Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers
of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

Article
Section 1
VIII
- Power
of
Judiciary Judicial
Review
Definition
of Political
Question
Tanada vs

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of

all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.
Political questions are those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.

Cuenco
Section 1
Power
of
Judicial
Review

Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat

has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge.

1st Type of
Political
Question
(Ex: Recall)
Evardone
vs
COMELEC
Section 1
Power
of
Judicial
Review

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a

justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. The Court further
held that:

1st Type of
Political
Question
(Ex: People

the people have accepted the Aquino government which

is in effective control of the entire country;
it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law

Power)

Lawyers
League for
a
Better
Phils
vs
Aquino

a de jure government; and

Section 1
Power
of
Judicial
Review

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a

Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. to support their
thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy
of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they
present a political question.

1st Type of
Political
Question
(Ex: People
Power)

Estrada vs
Desierto

the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy

of the new government.

A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that

they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
government of former President Aquino was the result
of a successful revolution by the sovereign people,
albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom
Constitution declared that the Aquino government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, as amended." It is familiar learning

that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful

revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for
that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional
loop.
In
checkered
contrast,
the
government
of
respondent
Arroyo
is
not
revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at
the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.
In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve
and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the
presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People
Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves
the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government
for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and

the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and

the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions.
Section 1
Power
of
Judicial
Review
2nd
Type
of Political
Question
(Ex: Calling
Out Power)
IBP vs
Zamora

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court,
thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's
wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling
out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner
to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis.
The

President

as

Commander-in-Chief

has

vast

intelligence network to gather information, some of which

may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives
and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched
when we consider the present situation in Mindanao,
where the insurgency problem could spill over the other
parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be
unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a
temporary restraining order every time it is
exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest
upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless

the petitioner can show that the exercise of such
discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of
judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this
Court.
Section 1
Power
of
Judicial
Review
2nd
Type
of Political
Question
(Ex:
Foreign
Relations)
Vinuya vs
Exec
Secretary

It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign

relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the
political'--departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
The question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not
to the courts but to the political branches. In this case,
the Executive Department has already decided that it is to
the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question.

Article
XVI

Section 3
Doctrine of
State
Immunity

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the

doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the
State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Arigo
Swift

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

vs

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent,
now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law
of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by
the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine,
such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of
every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission
to such society, the state is automatically obligated to
comply with these principles in its relations with other
states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state
immunity is based on the justification given by Justice

Holmes that there can be no legal right against the

authority which makes the law on which the right
depends. In the case of the foreign state sought to be
impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would unduly vex the peace of nations.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. In such a situation, the state may move to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a

State from being sued in the courts of another State

without the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive
rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to
acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in
his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in
their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official

capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial
actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.
Article
Lambino vs
XVII
COMELEC
Amend
ments
and
Revision
s

The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution
Disallowing
Revision
through
Initiatives
A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision.
In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions
to the Constitution.
Article XVII of the Constitution

provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or
A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2.
Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a peoples initiative.
The question is, does the Lambino Groups
initiative constitute an amendment or revision of

the Constitution? If the Lambino Groups initiative

constitutes a revision, then the present petition
should be dismissed for being outside the scope of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-andbalances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved.
Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally
affects only the specific provision being amended.
Courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative
test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks
whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety
of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions. The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider

the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects
of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Groups
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a
total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered
an amendment and not a revision.
For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years

is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change

reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies
from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not
a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change
is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word
of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and
not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word republican with monarchic or theocratic in
Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls
the entire structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific
change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending
on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects
the structure of government, the carefully crafted system
of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological
basis of the existing Constitution.