Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Issue:
206. Baer Sr. & Co.'s Successors v. La Cia Maritima 6 Phil
215
Facts:
Plaintiff, owner of the launch Mascota, made a contract with the
Defendant by the terms of which the Defendant agreed to tow
the launch from Aparri to Manila.
While the tug is performing its contract of towing the barges the barge
regarded as part of tug, in the sense that tugs master is bound to
provide for the barges safety as well as tugs own and to avoid collis
barges or of tugs, with other vessels. But the barges in tow are by
under the control of the master of the tug to the same ext
herself, and the cargo, if any, on board of her.
Under Article 1173 (then Article 1104), the Defendant was simply boun
ordinary diligence, taking into consideration the nature of the obl
circumstances of persons, time, and place.
Issue:
Did Defendant exercise ordinary diligence? Yes.
Held:
Evidence in the case shows that the Defendant did exercise the
diligence required of it by law, there was proof that towing lines
were fastened to a post in the bow of the launch commonly
used for fastening ropes in cases of towing and even for the
purpose of fastening the launch to the wharf.
At the time the loss occurred, the towing line did not break,
but this post did, and was found fastened to the towing lines
when they were pulled on board the steamer.
Doctrine:
A vessel which undertakes a towage service is liable for the
reasonable care of the tow. That reasonable care is measured
by the dangers and hazards to which the tow is or may be
Facts:
On the 3rd day of August, 1913, plaintiff employed defendant to
tow from Guagua to Manila two cascos loaded with 2,041.80
piculs of sugar, a property of the plaintiff. On that date the
cascos left Guagua towed by the launches Tahimic and Matulin,
belonging to the defendant. When the launches, together with
their tows, arrived off the Malabon River, the patron of the
launch Matulin decided to leave the cascos in the Malabon
River. The launch Tahimic towed the cascos into the Malabon
River and the launch Matulin continued the trip to Manila. The
reason why this was done was that, at that time, the weather
was threatening, as to make it dangerous for the cascos, heavily
loaded as they were, to continue the voyage to Manila.
the season of the year and the fact that it was the period of
typhoons and strong southwest winds, and to guard the tow
accordingly. While the captain of the Matulin would not have
been responsible for an act of God by which the cascos were
lost, it was his duty to foresee what the weather was likely to
be, and to take such precautions as were necessary to protect
his tow. It was not an act of God by which the cascos were lost;
but it was the direct result of the failure of the captain of the
Matulin to meet the responsibilities which the occasion placed
on him
Issue:
W/N a vessel which undertakes a towage service is liable for the
reasonable care of the tow.
Held:
YES. That reasonable care is measured by the dangers and
hazards to which the tow is or may be exposed, which it is the
duty of the master of the tug to know and to guard against not
only by giving proper instructions for the management of the
tow, but by watching her, when in a dangerous locality, to see
that his instructions are obeyed. The duty of the tug to a tow is
a continuous one from the time service commences until it is
completed. The responsibility of the tug includes not only the
proper and safe navigation of the tug on the journey, but to
furnish safe, sound, and suitable appliances and
instrumentalities for the service to be performed. It is the duty
of the tug also to give proper instruction as to the management
of the tow, and if the locality in which the tow finds itself at any
given time is more than ordinarily dangerous, the tug is held to
a proportionately higher degree of care and skill.
Doctrine:
CARRIERS; MERCHANDISE TRANSPORTED AT RISK OF SHIPPERS;
WHEN SHIPOWNER LIABLE.Under Article 361 of the Code of
Commerce, merchandise transported in the sea by virtue of a
contract entered into between the shipper and the carrier, is
deemed transported at the risk and venture of the shipper, if
the contrary is not stipulated, and all damages suffered by the
merchandise during the transportation by reason of accident or
force majeure shall be for the account and risk of the shipper,
but the proof of these accidents is incumbent on the carrier. In
the present case, the gasoline was delivered in accordance with
the contract but defendant failed to transport it to its place of
destination, not because of accident or force majeure or cause
beyond its control, but due to the unseaworthiness of the
tugboat towing the barge carrying the gasoline, lack of
Facts:
Issue:
1.) Is Luzon Stevedoring a public utility (common carrier)? YES.
2.) Has Luzon Stevedoring proven that its failure to deliver the
gasoline to its place of destination is due to accident or force
majeure or to a cause beyond its control? NO.
Doctrine:
A tug and its owners must observe ordinary diligence in the
Held:
Facts:
Respondent L. Acuario Marketing Corp., ("Acuario") and
respondent Skyland Brokerage, Inc., ("Skyland") entered into a
time charter agreement whereby Acuario leased to Skyland its
L. Acuario II barge for use by the latter in transporting electrical
posts from Manila to Limay, Bataan. At the same time, Skyland
also entered into a separate contract with petitioner Cargolift,
for the latters tugboats to tow the aforesaid barge.
Issue:
W/N petitioner should be held liable.
Held:
YES. Thus, in the performance of its contractual obligation to
Skyland, petitioner was required to observe the due diligence of
a good father of the family. This much was held in the old but
still relevant case of Baer Senior & Co.s Successors v. La
Compania Maritima where the Court explained that a tug and its
owners must observe ordinary diligence in the performance of
its obligation under a contract of towage. The negligence of the
obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable
for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault
or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise
due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as
the nature of the obligation so demands.
Acuario spent the total sum of P97,021.20 for the repairs, and,
pursuant to the contract, sought reimbursement from Skyland,
failing which, it filed a suit before the RTC which was granted.
On appeal, it was affirmed by the CA. Skyland, in turn, filed a
Doctrine:
A common carrier is a person or corporation whose regular
business is to carry passengers or property for all persons who
may choose to employ and remunerate him. A common carrier
is a person or corporation who undertakes to carry goods or
persons for hire.
Facts:
In the months of June, July and September of 1912, the accused,
Pascual Quinajon and Eugenio Quitoriano, by means of virayes
and employees, did unload in the port of Currimao, Ilocos Norte,
5,986 sacks of rice belonging to the provincial government that
had come from Manila. The sacks were unloaded from the
steamers in which they had been shipped and carried to the
storages warehouses in which they were deposited. The
accused demanded and collected from the provincial treasurer
for the unloading of each one of the said sacks of rice 10
centavos instead of 6 centavos that they have been regularly
charging for such services of unloading of the same kind of
merchandise and under virtually the same circumstances and
conditions.
Issue:
Whether the act of collecting 10 centavos instead if the usual 6
centavos violated Act No. 98.
Held:
Yes. Act No. 98 is An Act to regulate commerce in the
Philippine islands. Its purpose is to compel common carriers to
render all persons exactly the same or analogous service for
exactly the same price, to the end that there may be no unjust
advantage or unreasonable discrimination. It applies to persons
or corporations engaged as common carriers of passengers or
property. A common carrier is a person or corporation whose
regular business is to carry passengers or property for all
persons who may choose to employ and remunerate him. A
common carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to
carry goods or persons for hire.
Doctrine:
Vessels licensed to engage in the interisland trade are common
carriers; and as to them, there is an extensive field of regulation
and control which may properly be exercised by the state
without centravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
Rights or the Constitution of the United States; and this
notwithstand ing the fact that the enforcement of such
regulations may tend to restrict their liberty, and to control the
free exercise of their discretion in the conduct of their business
to a degree and in a form and manner which would not be
tolerated under the constitutional guarantees with relation to
the private business of a private citizen.
Issue:
The nature of the business in which they are engaged as a
public employment, is such that it is clearly within the power of
the state to impose such just and reasonable regulations
thereon as in the interest of the public it may deem proper. Of
course such regulations must not have the effect of depriving
an owner of this property without due process of law, nor of
confiscating or appropriating private property without just
compensation, nor of limiting or prescribing irrevocably vested
rights or privileges lawfully acquired under a charter or
franchise.
A regulation requiring all coasting vessels licensed to engage in
the interisland trade to carry the mails and give prompt
advance notice in all cases of intended sailings in ample time to
permit dispatch of mails, and of changes of sailing hours,
(manifestly with a view to make it possible for the post-office
officials to tender mail for transportation at the last practicable
moment prior to the hour of departure) is a reasonable
regulation, made in the interests of the public, which the states
has a right to impose when it grants licenses to the vessels
affected thereby.
Held:
There is nothing in the Philippine Bill of Rights which deprived
the Philippine Government of the power to make and enforce
reasonable regulations of this nature with which it was clothed
prior to the enactment of that statute. It is contended that to
require the master of a vessel to transport the mails and to give
timely notice to the postal authorities of the hour of his
departure may in some instances cause grave loss and serious
inconvenience to her owner by preventing her departure at an
earlier hour; and that in all instances it imposes an obligation
upon the owner to render services which the Government has
no power to require in the absence of a contract, and without
just compensation.
Facts:
Joaquin de Villata is the master of SS Vizcaya of the coastwise
trade. As such captain, on 6 July 1912, when sailing from the
port of Gubat to the port of Legaspi, Philippine Islands, he failed
to notify the postmaster of the former port, in advance, of his
intended sailing, and therefore failed to carry the mails between
said ports. The Collector of Customs (JS Stanley, Acting Insular
Collector of Customs) was threatening to suspend or revoke the
license of de Villata by reason of said facts, under and by virtue
of the terms of Customs Administrative Circular 627. De Villata
filed an application for a writ of prohibition directed against the
Collector of Customs to restrain him from enforcing Customs
Administrative Circular 627 against de Villata.
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not apply
where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier
undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special
person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence
of its agent is valid.
The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from
liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void
only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is
applied. Such policy has no force where the public at large is
not involved, as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the
use of a single party. The stipulation exempting the owner from
liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public
policy and is deemed valid.
In a charter of the entire vessel, the bill of lading issued by the
master to the charterer, as shipper, is in fact and legal
contemplation merely a receipt and a document of title, not a
contract, for the contract is the charter party.
Issue:
Is the stipulation in the charter party of the owners non-liability
valid so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from
liability for loss?
Held:
YES.
Facts:
Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America (Consorcio)
shipped freight pre-paid at Peru 21,740 jute bags of Peruvian
fish meal through SS Crowborough, covered by clean B/L. The
cargo, consigned to San Miguel Brewery, Inc., now San Miguel
Corporation, and insured by Home Insurance Company, arrived
in Manila and was discharged into the lighters of Luzon
Stevedoring Company. When the cargo was delivered to
consignee San Miguel Brewery, Inc., there were shortages
Agency; As regards the goods damaged or lost during unloading, the chart
therefor, having assumed this activity under the charter party free of expe
vessel.
Facts:
Transcontinental Fertilizer Company of London chartered from
Hongkong Island Shipping Company of HK the motor vessel
named "Hongkong Island" for the shipment of 8073.35 MT
(gross) bagged urea from Novorossisk, Odessa, USSR to the
Philippines, the parties signing for this purpose a Uniform
General Charter dated August 9, 1979. Of the total shipment,
5,400.04 MT was for the account of Atlas Fertilizer as consignee,
3,400.04 to be discharged in Manila and the remaining 2,000
MT in Cebu. The goods were insured by the consignee with the
Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. for P6M against all risks.
Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. was appointed as the
charterer's agent and Macondray Company, Inc. as the owner's
agent.
Doctrine:
The responsibility for cargo loss falls on the one who agreed to perform the duty involved in
accordance with the terms of most voyage charters.A voyage charter being a private
having been rejected, the consignee then went to
carriage, the parties may freely contract respecting liability for damage These
to the claims
goods and
Union,
which
on
demand paid the total indemnity of
other matters. The basic principle is that the responsibility for cargo loss falls on the
P113,123.86
who agreed to perform the duty involved in accordance with the terms
of mostpursuant to the insurance contract. As subrogee of
the consignee, Union then filed on September 19, 1980, a
voyage charters.
10
Held:
In the cases at bar, the trial court found that 1,383 bags were
shortlanded, which could only mean that they were damaged or
lost on board the vessel before unloading of the shipment. As
the bags were in good order when received in the vessel, the
presumption is that they were damaged or lost during the
voyage as a result of their negligent improper stowage. For this
the ship owner should be held liable.
But we do agree that the period for filing the claim is one year,
in accordance with the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The oneyear period in the cases at bar should commence on October
20, 1979, when the last item was delivered to the
consignee. Union's complaint was filed against Hongkong on
September 19, 1980, but tardily against Macondray on April 20,
1981. The consequence is that the action is considered
prescribed as far as Macondray is concerned but not against its
principal, which is what matters anyway.
Issue:
Who, in this kind of charter, shall be liable for the cargo?
HK Island Co. (shipowner) liable
Macondray (local agent of HK Island) liable, but the liability
can no longer be enforced because the claim against it has
prescribed
Transcontinental (charterers principal) liable, but was not
impleaded
Maritime (charterers agent) cannot be held liable for the acts
of its known principal resulting in injury to Union.
11
Facts:
Davao Union Marketing Corp. (DMUC) contracted the services of
PKS Shipping Corporation (PKS Shipping) to transport 75,000
bags of cement valued at P3 million plus pesos to Tacloban City.
DMUC insured the goods with Phil. American General Insurance
Co. (Philamgen) for the value of the cement. Along the way the
barge carrying the cement sank resulting in the total loss of the
goods.
Doctrine:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis, and neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering
its services to the general public, i.e., the general community
or population, and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population.
The trial court dismissed the complaint after finding that the
total loss of the cargo could have been due to fortuitous event
for which the shipping company was not liable. Or if through the
negligence of the captain and crew, under the limited liability
rule under Art. 487 of the Code of Commerce, the ship owner is
still not liable if it abandoned the vessel, which it did.
12
Held:
It is a common carrier. Much of the distinction between a
common or public carrier and a private or special carrier
lies in the character of the business, such that if the
undertaking is an isolated transaction, not part of the business
or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry
the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele,
although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or
corporation providing such service could very well be just a
private carrier. x x x
But then, even as the High Court held that the PKS Shipping is a
common carrier which reversed the conclusion of the CA that it
was a private carrier, it still absolved the latter from liability. It
found that under Art. 1734 a common carrier is absolved from
any liability if the loss of goods is due, but not limited to the
following causes: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or
other natural disaster or calamity. It found that the waves were
unusually high and the winds very strong which caused the
Doctrine:
No distinction between person offering service on regular basis
and one offering service on occasional basis In referring to
Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: The above article
makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local
idiom, as a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making
any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the general public, i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
Court believed that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.
Liability arising from hijacking.To exculpate the carrier from
liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers
or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence,
or force. This is in accordance with Art.1745.
Facts:
Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise
(CIPTRADE) entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping
Agency Corp. whereby the former bound itself to haul the
latters 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal from Magallanes Drive,
Del Pan, Manila to the warehouse of Purefoods Corporation in
13
Issue:
Whether the contractual relationship between petitioner and
private respondent was carriage of Goods and not lease of
cargo truck.
Held:
1. Yes. No distinction between person offering service on regular
basis and one offering service on occasional basis.Petitioner
argues that there was only a contract of lease because they
offer their services only to a select group of people and because
the private respondents, plaintiffs in the lower court, did not
object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the
transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Regarding the
first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs.
14
Doctrine:
It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course
of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the
vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and
compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and
Facts:
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi
International Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of New York, U.S.A.,
9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the
latter shipped in bulk on 16 June 1974 aboard the cargo vessel
M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen
Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four (4) of her
holds were all presumably inspected by the charterer's
representative and found fit to take a load of urea in bulk
pursuant to par. 16 of the charter-party.
Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call on 3 July 1974, the
steel pontoon hatches were opened with the use of the vessel's
boom. Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its
steelbodied dump trucks which were parked alongside the
berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the charter-partly (which provided for
an F.I.O.S. clause). The hatches remained open throughout the
duration of the discharge.
15
Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was
covered with tarpaulin before it was transported to the
consignee's warehouse located some fifty (50) meters from the
wharf. Midway to the warehouse, the trucks were made to pass
through a weighing scale where they were individually weighed
for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the cargo. The
port area was windy, certain portions of the route to the
warehouse were sandy and the weather was variable, raining
occasionally while the discharge was in progress. The
petitioner's warehouse was made of corrugated galvanized iron
(GI) sheets, with an opening at the front where the dump trucks
entered and unloaded the fertilizer on the warehouse floor.
Tarpaulins and GI sheets were placed in-between and alongside
the trucks to contain spillages of the ferilizer.
It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo, from 5 July
to 18 July 1974 (except July 12th, 14th and 18th). A private
marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company
Inc. (CSCI), was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the
cargo shipped, by taking draft readings of the vessel prior to
and after discharge. The survey report submitted by CSCI to the
consignee (PPI) dated 19 July 1974 revealed a shortage in the
cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer
approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt. The same
results were contained in a Certificate of Shortage/Damaged
Cargo dated 18 July 1974 prepared by PPI which showed that
the cargo delivered was indeed short of 94.839 M/T and about
23 M/T were rendered unfit for commerce, having been polluted
with sand, rust and dirt.
Issue:
W/N a charter-party between a shipowner and a charterer
transform a common carrier into a private one as to negate the
16
Ruling:
It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course
of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods
indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the
vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and
compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and
therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and
control. Hardly then can we charge the charterer, a stranger to
the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo
when the charterer did not have any control of the means in
doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that
the steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the
determination of the course of the voyage and other technical
incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the
officers and crew who were screened, chosen and hired by the
shipowner.
The master of the carrying vessel, Captain Lee Tae Bo, in his
deposition taken on 19 April 1977 before the Philippine Consul
and Legal Attache in the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan,
testified that before the fertilizer was loaded, the four (4)
hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried and fumigated. After
completing the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship's holds,
the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids,
then covered with three (3) layers of serviceable tarpaulins
which were tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained close
and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of
the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without
the use of the ship's boom.
It was also shown during the trial that the hull of the vessel was
in good condition, foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the
cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the
vessel. When M/V "Sun Plum" docked at its berthing place,
representatives of the consignee boarded, and in the presence
of a representative of the shipowner, the foreman, the
stevedores, and a cargo surveyor representing CSCI, opened the
hatches and inspected the condition of the hull of the vessel.
The stevedores unloaded the cargo under the watchful eyes of
the shipmates who were overseeing the whole operation on
rotation basis.
17
Doctrine:
Contract of Affreightment vs Demise; Common Carrier:
Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the
charterer will generally be regarded as the owner for the
voyage or service stipulated. The charterer mans the vessel
with his own people and becomes the owner pro hac vice,
subject to liability to others for damages caused by negligence.
To create a demise, the owner of a vessel must completely and
exclusively relinquish possession, command and navigation
thereof to the charterer, anything short of such a complete
transfer is a contract of affreightment (time or voyage charter
party) or not a charter party at all. On the other hand a contract
of affreightment is one in which the owner of the vessel leases
part or all of its space to haul goods for others. It is a contract
for special service to be rendered by the owner of the vessel
and under such contract the general owner retains the
possession, command and navigation of the ship, the charterer
or freighter merely having use of the space in the vessel in
return for his payment of the charter hire.
In a contract of affreightment a common carrier is not
converted into a private carrier but remains as a common
carrier and still liable as such. Coastwise Lighterage, by the
contract of affreightment, was not converted into a private
carrier, but remained a common carrier and was still liable as
such.
Same; Evidence; Presumption of negligence of common
18
Facts:
Pag-asa Sales, Inc. entered into a contract to transport molasses
from the province of Negros to Manila with Coastwise
Lighterage Corporation (Coastwise), using the latters dumb
barges. The barges were towed in tandem by the tugboat MT
Marica, which is likewise owned by Coastwise.
Issue:
W/N Coastwise Lighterage was transformed into a private
carrier, by virtue of the contract of affreightment which it
entered into with the consignee, Pag-asa Sales, Inc. NO. If it
were in fact transformed into a private carrier, W/N it exercise
the ordinary diligence to which a private carrier is in turn bound.
NO.
Held:
The charter party contract is one of affreightment over the
whole vessel, rather than a demise. As such, the liability of the
shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain and crew, would
remain in the absence of stipulation. The distinction between
the two kinds of charter parties (i.e. bareboat or demise and
contract of affreightment) is more clearly set out in the case of
Puromines, Inc. vs. CA: Under the demise or bareboat charter
of the vessel, the charterer will generally be regarded as the
owner for the voyage or service stipulated. The charterer mans
the vessel with his own people and becomes the owner pro hac
vice, subject to liability to others for damages caused by
negligence. To create a demise, the owner of a vessel must
completely and exclusively relinquish possession, command and
navigation thereof to the charterer, anything short of such a
complete transfer is a contract of affreightment (time or voyage
charter party) or not a charter party at all. On the other hand a
contract of affreightment is one in which the owner of the vessel
leases part or all of its space to haul goods for others. It is a
contract for special service to be rendered by the owner of the
vessel and under such contract the general owner retains the
possession, command and navigation of the ship, the charterer
or freighter merely having use of the space in the vessel in
return for his payment of the charter hire. An owner who retains
possession of the ship though the hold is the property of the
charterer, remains liable as carrier and must answer for any
breach of duty as to the care, loading and unloading of the
cargo.
19
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