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ConstructingPoliticalLogic
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PUZZLE
DINA A. ZINNES
Departmentof Political Science
Universityof Illinois
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
431
432
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
is a democratic-nondemocratic
pair,wherethe symbol A standsfor the operator"and,"
(AI A-A2)
A- A2),
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
433
of "liveandlet live,"
[in]anatmosphere
throughcompromise
Amplifying this in Book II, he notes that"lawsare... the conditionsof civil association [and]the populacethatis subjectedto the laws ... their author"(p. 18).
Men arebornfree. They relinquishfreedomto be partof a civil society. By joining
the civil society, an individualbecomes an equalparticipantin makingits laws, thatis,
an individualbecomes a partof the decision process.Because everyoneis a partyto the
decision process, it is necessarilythe case thatunless everyone agrees on everything,
theremust be bargainingand compromiseto arriveat laws thatall can accept. As one
writeron democracyputs it, the
434
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions involved the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
Why are conflict situations in nondemocracies resolved through the use of force?
According to Goble (1946, 64),
In authoritarianstates... a decision is reachedby one or a few persons... [thepeople] are
in no sense participants... decisions [aremade]with little use of the implementsof compromise and conciliation ... a dictatorshipresolves differences and reaches decisions
throughsuppressingand liquidatingthe opposition.
There are those empowered to make the decisions, and if others disagree they are
"liquidated."
Similarly, Maoz and Russett (1993,625) argue, "The winner may take all, denying
the loser the power or opportunity to rise again."
We define the following:
A4 = all decisions made by the state are made by a small groupof elite leaders,
and propose,
(N3) A2 -> A4.
If state Yis a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
Or, alternatively,
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
435
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
We are now in a position to capture the internal conflict resolution processes of both
types of regimes. By defining
A5 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved throughbargainingand
A6 = a conflict over societal policies is resolved using force,
we state two further assumptions of the argument:
(N5) A3 -> A5.
If all decisions involve the participationof the populationand the institutionsthat represent
the population,then conflicts over societal policies are resolved throughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -> A6.
If all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.
But how do we move from the internal conflict resolution mechanism to an international conflict resolution mechanism? According to Maoz and Russett (1993, 625),
states use the conflict resolution mechanism with which they are familiar:
Normativeassumption1: States,to the extentpossible, externalizethe normsof behavior
that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and
institutions.
This suggests the following atomic propositions:
A7 = a state uses force to settle interation conflicts and
A8 = a state uses a bargainingstrategyto settle internationconflicts,
and the premise that
(N7) A6 -> A7.
If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle
internationconflicts.
A possible additional premise might be the following:
A5 -
A8.
436
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
If a state uses a bargainingstrategyto settle conflicts over societal polices, then it uses bargaining to settle internationconflicts.
However,Maoz andRussett(1993, 625) arenot satisfiedwith such a premise.Noting the qualificationin normativeassumption1, "tothe extentpossible,"they proceed
to state normativeassumption2:
The anarchicnatureof internationalpolitics implies thata clash betweendemocraticand
nondemocraticnormsis dominatedby the latterratherthanby the former.... In such a
system states put their survivalabove any othervalue.... If states come to believe that
theirapplicationof domesticallydevelopeddemocraticnormswouldendangertheirsurvival they will act in accordancewith the normsestablishedby their rival. Democratic
normscould be more easily exploited thancould nondemocraticones. Hence democracies ... shift norms when confrontedby a nondemocraticrival.
In short, survival is the sine qua non for any state, democracy or nondemocracy.
Hence, if a democracy'ssurvivalis threatened,it mustdo everythingto preserveitself.
If a democracybecomes engaged in a conflict with a nondemocracy,that the nondemocracy uses force necessarily poses a threatfor the democracy.The nondemocracy's use of force is a challenge to the democracy'ssurvival,requiringthatthe democracy abandonits predispositionto use a bargainingstrategyand adopt instead a
policy of force: the norm of force overwhelmsthe normof bargaining.We therefore
define the following:
A9 = a state's securityis threatened,
and note that states thatuse bargainingto solve societal problemscan only affordto
use bargainingto settle internationconflicts if they are not threatened:
(N8) (A5
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its security is not threatened,
then it will use bargainingto settle internationconflicts.
Or, alternately,
(N9) (A5
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis threatened,
then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
437
A7.
438
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
A9.
Combination2
(N10) (A10 " A7) -
A9.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
439
If states X and Yare in conflict and one state uses force to settle internmation
conflicts, then
the other state's securityis threatened.
(N1l)A9 -> A7.
If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle interation conflicts.
Combination 3
(N9) (A5 A A9) -> A7.
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis threatened,
then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
(N15) (AO1
^AA9)
-> -A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and a state's securityis not threatened,then force is not used
to settle interation conflict.
In other words, elimination of any of the three combinations of premises will produce exactly the same conclusions. Moreover, it can be shown that combinations 1 and
3 are equivalent, that is, that premises (N9) and (N10) together imply premises (N9)
and (N15), and vice versa. We will therefore streamline the argument for the remaining analyses by eliminating combination 1, premises (N9) and (N10), and producing
the following basic normative theory:
(N1)A1 - A3.
If stateX is a democracy,then all decisions involve the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthat representthe population.
(N2) -A2 -> A3.
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions involved the participationof the populationand
the institutionsthatrepresentthe population.
(N3) A2 -> A4.
If state Y is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
(N4) -A1 -- A4.
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
(N5) A3 -> A5.
If all decisions involve the participationof the populationand the institutionsthatrepresent
the population,then conflicts over societal policies are resolved throughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -> A6.
440
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
If all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders,then conflicts over societal policies (because they are zero sum) are resolved using force.
(N7) A6 - A7.
If a state uses force to settle conflicts over societal policies, then it uses force to settle
internationconflicts.
(N8) (A5
If a state uses bargainingto settle internalsocietal conflicts and its securityis not threatened,
then it will use bargainingto settle internationconflicts.
(NI 1)A9 -> A7.
If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle internationconflicts.
(N12) (AI0 ^A9) - A 1.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state's securityis threatened,then states X and Yuse
force to settle the conflict.
(N13) A1 - A12.
If statesX and Yuse force to settle internationconflict, then states X and Ygo to war.
(N14) (A 10 AA
-A9) -
-A7.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and a state's securityis not threatened,then force is not used
to settle internationconflict.
(N16) (AI0 A A8) -- -All.
If statesX and Yare in conflict and bargainingis used to settle internationconflicts, then
statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict.
(N17) -All
-> -A12.
If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict, then states X and Ydo not go
to war.
For clarity, we will retain the original numbering of the premises.
We can now turn to the main questions driving our analysis of this argument: does
the normative argument predict that two democracies will not go to war and predict
that a democracy and nondemocracy or two nondemocracies will go to war? Using the
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
441
rules/theoremsof the propositionalcalculusthroughthe mediumof the PropCalcsoftware, we considerthreesets of conditions.In each of these settings,it is assumedthat
we have two statesin conflict, thatis, we postulateA10 by addingit to the argument.
Thenwe considerthe situationin which the two statesaredemocracies,thatis, the first
analysis requiresfurtherpostulatingAl and -A2. If the argumentis correct,then by
adding the three assumptions,A10, Al, and -A2, we should discover that the two
states in questiondo not go to war,thatis, thatone of the conclusions (deductions)is
the following:
-A 12 = statesX and Ydo not go to war.
TABLE I
Premise
(N1) Al -> A3: If stateX is a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(N2) -A2 -> A3: If state Yis a democracy,then decisions involve the population.
(N3) A2 -> A4: If state Yis a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(N4) -A 1 -- A4: If stateX is a nondemocracy,then decisions are made by an elite.
(N5) A3 -> A5: If decisions involve the population,then conflicts over societal policies
are resolvedthroughbargaining.
(N6) A4 -- A6: If decisions are made by an elite, then conflicts over societal policies are
resolvedusing force.
(N7) A6 -> A7: If a state uses force to settle societal conflicts, then it uses force to
settle internationconflicts.
(N8) (A5 A -A9) -> A8: If a state uses bargainingin societal conflicts and its security is
not threatened,then it will bargaininternationconflicts.
(N 10) (A10 A A7) -> A9: If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state uses force to
settle internationconflicts, then a state'ssecurity is threatened.
(NI ) A9 -- A7: If a state's securityis threatened,then it will use force to settle
internationconflicts.
(N 12) (A10 A A9) -> A 11: If statesX and Yare in conflict and one state's security
is threatened,then statesX and Yuse force to settle the conflict.
(N 13) A 11 - A 12: If statesX and Yuse force to settle internationconflict, then
statesX and Ygo to war.
(N 14) (A10 ^ Al A AAlA A2) -> -A7: If states X and Yare in conflict and stateX is
a democracyand state Yis a democracy,then force is not used to settle internationconflicts.
A 1: If statesX and Yare in conflict and bargainingis used, then
(N16) (A 10 A8) - -A
statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict.
(N 17) A 1 - -> A 12: If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle internationconflict,
then statesX and Ydo not go to war.
Democ
Nondem
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
443
A3.
If state Yis a democracy,then all decisions made by the state involve the participationof the
populationand the institutionsthatrepresentthe population,
to which we add two new atomic propositions:
Al 3 = the policy decision is costly and risky,and
A 14 = the policy-makingdecision process is cumbersomeand slow,
and the new premise:
(S3) (A3
A13) -
A14.
If the decisions made by the state involve the participationof the populationand the institutions thatrepresentthe populationand the policy decision is costly and risky,then the policymaking decision process is cumbersomeand slow.
444
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
On the other hand, the authors note, "in nondemocratic societies, once the support of
the key legitimizing groups is secured the government can launch its policy with little
regard to public opinion" (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626). In other words, because the
legitimizing group is small and cohesive, the decision process, even on difficult and
costly decisions, such as war, is quick and straightforward. Thus, we can reuse additional atomic propositions and premises from the normative argument:
(S4) A2 -- A4.
If state Y is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small group of elite leaders.
(S5) -AI -> A4.
If stateX is a nondemocracy,then all decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders.
We further define the following:
A 15 = the policy-makingdecision process is rapid,
and add
(S6) A4 -> A15.
If decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then the policy-makingdecision
process is rapid.
Moreover, argue Maoz and Russett (1993, 626), in nondemocracies, "Because, in
many cases, the legitimizing groups may benefit from the use of force in foreign affairs, the leadership may feel little restraint in its dealing with other states." Although it
is not entirely clear why or how the legitimizing groups "benefit from the use of force,"
we define
A16 = the use of force in foreign affairsmay be beneficial,
and, using the above quote, postulate the following:
(S7) A4 -> A16.
If decisions are made by a small groupof elite leaders,then the use of force in foreign affairs
may be beneficial.
(S8) A16 - A7.
If the use of force in foreign affairscould be beneficial, then force will be used to settle internationalconflicts.
The other important pieces of the structural argument include the following:
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
445
The time required for a democratic state to prepare for war is far longer than for
nondemocracies.Thus, in a conflict between democracies,by the time the two states are
militarilyreadyfor war,diplomatshave the opportunityto find a nonmiltarysolution to
the conflict (Maoz and Russett, 1993, 626).
Using previously defined atomic propositions, we capture these points with the premises:
(S9) (A10
If the policy decision process is cumbersomeand slow, then bargainingis used to settle
internationconflicts.
(S11) A8 -> -AI 1.
If bargainingis used to settle internationalconflicts, then states X and Ydo not use force to
settle theirconflict.
(S12) -A11 -
-A12.
If statesX and Ydo not use force to settle theirconflict, then X and Ydo not go to war.
Moreover, Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) argue that
conflicts between a democracyand a nondemocracy... are drivenby the lack of structuralconstraintson the mobilizationandescalationprocesssof the latter.The democratic
state finds itself in a no-choice situation.Leadersare forced to find ways to circumvent
the due politicalprocess.Thus,in such a conflict, the nondemocracyimposes on the democraticpolitical system emergencyconditionsenablingthe [democratic]governmentto
rally supportratherrapidly.
This leads the authors to their second structural assumption:
Shortcutsto political mobilizationof relevantpoliticalsupportcan be accomplishedonly
in situationsthatcan be appropriatelydescribedas emergencies.
This last point is sufficiently similar to a premise in the normative argument that we
will reuse that premise here:
(S13) (A10 AA7) - A9.
If states X and Yare in conflict and force is used to settle internationconflicts, then a state's
securityis threatened,
adding the clarification:
446
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
A15) -> Al .
(S16)All ->A12.
If statesX and Yuse force to settle theirconflict, then statesX and Ygo to war.
TABLE 2
uN^~~~~~~~
1~~~Use
of StructuralPremises
Two
Democracies
Premise
Democr
Nondem
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
448
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
with the argumentfor why other dyadic combinationscan lead to war. These two
explanationsdo not share any common premises. Moreover,as soon as there is one
nondemocracy,you need no furtherinformationaboutthe otherstatein the dyad. It is
the existence of the nondemocracythatproducesthe waroutcome.This is becausethe
existence of the nondemocracyleads to a threatto the securityof the other state, and
any threatto a state's security brings into play, for whateverreason, a response of
force.
The literatureon the democratic peace has frequently alluded to the contrast
betweenthe monadicanddyadicarguments:if two democraciesdo not fight, thenhow
does one explain that democraciesare no more peaceful than nondemocracies?The
answerlies in thata monad,like a democracy,is in a dyadicenvironmentin the context
of a conflict. If a democraticstate is involved in a conflict with anotherdemocratic
state,thereis no threatanddemocraticnormscan function.But if you puta democratic
stateinto a conflict with a nondemocraticstate,the environmentis completely different. Indeed, the analyses suggest that there is no difference between a democraticnondemocraticdyad and a dyad composed of two nondemocracies.Threatexists in
both cases; hence, the prospectsfor war are the same.
This seems to suggest that we have been paying too much attentionto the democraticside of the argument.Orperhapsthe betterway to put it is thatwe have not paid
enough attentionto the nondemocraticpartof the argument.According to the argument,democraciesdo use theirbargainingnormto solve internationalcrises if theyare
permittedto do so by an absence of threatto their survival.The issue then is notjust
whethermoredemocraciesin the internationalsystem makewarless likely. The other
side of the coin is that the greaterthe numberof nondemocraciesin the system, the
greaterthe amountof threatin the system and consequentlythe higherthe likelihood
of war.Assumingthatthe numberof statesin the systemis moreor less fixed, it is obvious thatas more statesbecome democracies,fewer stateswill be nondemocracies.But
it is not sufficientto consideronly the numberof democraticstatesin the system. The
other part of the picture is that as the number of nondemocracies in the system
increases,the numberof dyads involving at least one nondemocracyincreases.From
thisperspective,for each additionalnondemocracyin the system, the numberof dyads
thatexperiencethreatincreases,therebyincreasingthe prospectsfor war.
More formally,if we define
N = numberof statesin theinternational
systemand
M = numberof nondemocracies
in theinternational
system,
then the numberof dyads involving at least one nondemocracyis given by
(M[N - M] + M[M - 1])/2 = threatlevel in the internationalsystem.
When M = 0, thatis, all the statesin the system are democracies,the threatlevel is 0,
and the probabilityof war is 0. Plottingthis functionagainstM producesFigure 1, a
parabolathatincreasesat a decreasingrate.Thus, as the numberof nondemocraciesin
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
449
N = Numberof Nations
M = Numberof Nondemocracies
D = SystemicThreat
D
D=F(M)= M(M-1) + M(N-M)
-N(N-I ) -------------------------
the system increases, holding the system size constant, the threatlevel and consequently the probabilityof war increase at a decreasingrate. This result is consistent
with the analyses of Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), although their model allows for
changes in the size of the system (N) and only examines democratic-nondemocratic
dyads as a functionof increasingthe numberof democracies.It is also consistentwith
a comparableanalysisby Cederman(2001) thatshows a decayingtrendin the conflict
propensitiesof democraticand nondemocraticdyads since the 19th century.
But what is the relationshipbetween the normativeand structuraltheories? Are
these two independent,complementary,or competing theories? There are several
ways these questions might be answered.First, as alreadynoted, the normativeand
structuraltheoriesproducevery similarresults.In both theories,thereis a disconnect
between the set of premisesthatpredictno warbetweentwo democraciesandthe premises thatlead to the conclusion of warbetween a dyad in which at least one stateis a
nondemocracy.Moreover,in both theories,the predictionof warwhen thereis at least
one democracyin the dyaduses only the informationthatone stateis a nondemocracy.
However,we can examine this questionfurtherin Figures 2 and 3, which provide
diagrammaticcomparisonsof the normative(solid arrows)and structuralarguments
(dashed arrows). Figure 2 considers two democracies, whereas Figure 3 examines
dyads involving at least one nondemocracy.Each arrowrepresentsa premiseused in
obtainingthe no-waror wardeduction.The partiallydashedarrowat the top of Figure
3 indicatesthatyou only need one of those two premises,butnotboth,in the normative
argumentinvolving at least one nondemocracy.Thus, Figures 2 and 3 illustratethe
linkages between the atomic propositions,that is, the premises, requiredto obtain
either the no-waror war conclusion for each theory.When more than a single arrow
points to (or from) an atomic proposition,the interpretationis thatit is the combined
set of atomic propositionsthatproducesthe conclusion. However,the figures do not
discriminatebetween "and"and"or."Forexample,in Figure2, all threeatomicpropositions, Al, -A2, andA10, areconnectedto -A7, butit is not clearwhethereach link is
an "and"or "or."
450
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
-A2
Al
State Y is a democracy
State X is a democracy
AIO
A3
Decisions are made^
by the population
/ 14
Decision
process is slow
-A7
Internationalconflicts
are not resolved with force
A5
-A9
Bargaining is used to
settle societal conflicts a
A state's security
is not threatened
A8
-All
States X and Y do not use force
to settle theirconflict
?
I,n I.iE
NormativeTheory
Structural Theory
-A12
States X and Y do not go to war
PEACEPUZZLE 451
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATIC
A10
-A1
A2
A4~
Decisionsaremadeby aneliete
A6
Useofc6
Societalconflicts
//
foreignaffairsi
resolved
byforce
beneficial
A7
conflicts
International
f
resolvedby force
ACAb
A state'ssecut
is threatened
A15
Thedecisionprocess
is rapid
All
>
!Y
goto
NormativeTheory
StructuralTheory
12aY
,a..r
Y go to war
States X and
-......
Normative Alternate
452
RESOLUTION
OFCONFLICT
JOURNAL
structuraltheories suggest that whenthe threatis high, costs become a lesser consideration.
4. Most importantfrom a theoreticalposition, none of the institutional-constraintsargumentshas a sufficientlywell-developedtheory... thatproducesthe [other]eight [empirical] regularitiesobserved (p. 793).
Thismay indeed suggest that these authors'theoryis superior.But before rejectingthe
normativeand/or structuraltheories,we need to explorethe extentto whichthe normative and structuraltheories are indeed distinctfromand at variance with the one being
proposed.
Thus, Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (1999) show ways in which the normativeand structuraltheoriesmightprofitablybe furtherdeveloped,buttheircritiquedoes not provide
grounds,at this stage, to rejecteither theory.
Rosato's (2003) argumentsare as follows, with my commentsagain in italics:
1. The historicalrecordindicatesthatdemocracieshave often failed to adopttheirinternal
normsof conflict resolutionin an internationalcontext(p. 588). Thereareseveralexamples of liberalstatesviolatingliberalnormsin theirconductof foreignpolicy (p. 589).
Thenormativeargumentdoes not say that democraticstates will always use their internal nonviolentconflict resolutionnorm, only that they do so vis-a-vis each other.
2. Proponentsof the democraticpeace [claim] thatdemocraciesremainat peace because
they trust and respect one another (p. 589). The available evidence suggests that
democracies do not have a powerful inclination to treateach other with trustand respect (p. 590).
Neithertrustnor respectare necessary to the constructionspresentedhere.
3. Democratic peace theoristshave tried to repairthe logic by introducing... perceptions ... availableevidence suggests, however,thatpolicymakers'personalbeliefs ...
precludecoherent ... assessmentsof regime type (p. 592).
Neither construction here incorporatesperceptions. However, Rosato's observation
does suggest that the theories could use additionalworkto explainhow two conflicting
states identifytheir respectiveregimetypes.
4. Each variantof the institutionallogic rests on the claim that democraticinstitutions
makeleadersaccountableto variousgroupsthatmay... oppose the use of force. I do not
disputethis claim but, instead,questionwhetherdemocraticleadersare more accountable thantheirautocraticcounterparts.Since we know thatdemocraciesdo not fight one
anotherandautocraciesdo fight one another,democratsmustbe more accountablethan
autocratsif accountabilityis a key mechanismin explainingthe separatepeace between
democracies.On the otherhand,if autocrats... are more accountablethandemocrats,
then there are good reasons to believe that accountabilitydoes exert the effect. ...
[A]ccountabilityis determinedby the consequences ... for adoptingan unpopularpolicy.... Losing autocratsaremorelikely to sufferseverepunishment..." (pp.593-94)
Thiscritiqueasserts that if accountabilityis the mechanismthatpreventsleadersfrom
makingthe decision to go to war,and if accountabilityis definedin termsof the consequencesfor choosing an unpopularpolicy and it can be shown thatautocratssufferfar
moreserious consequencesfrom makingunpopulardecisions thando democraticleaders, then autocratic leaders should be even more hesitant to go to war Whileconsequencesare surelya componentof "accountability"the moresignificantaspects of accountabilityare (I) the groupsto whomthe leaders are accountableand (2) the wishes
and desires of those groups.A critical characteristicof a democracyis that the leaders
are accountableto the greaterpopulationand the desires of thepopulationoppose war
Theabove critique is valid only if Rosato can show that the groups to whomautocratic
leaders are accountable oppose war.
Zinnes/ THEDEMOCRATICPEACEPUZZLE
453
CONCLUSION
Propositionalcalculus providesa mediumfor obtaininga betterunderstandingof
the normativeand structuraltheories,makingit possible to evaluatecriticisms.However,untanglingthe democraticpeace puzzle remainsa workin progress.As Bueno de
Mesquitaet al. (1999) noted 5 years ago, and is even more truenow, many new findings relatedto the democraticpeace need betterexplanation.Canthey be incorporated
into the currentlyconstructednormative/structural
arguments,or must we move to
explanationssuch as the winning coalition theory of Bueno de Mesquitaet al. or the
audiencecosts argumentpresentedby Fearon(1994)? Indeed,what,if any,is the relationshipbetween the winningcoalition argumentandthe audiencecosts explanation?
Are they competitiveor complementaryexplanations?Just as we moved from initial
democratic-peacestatisticalresults to explanationsfor them and then to critiquesof
those explanations,we now need to takethe next step andexpandandrevise the logics
to betterincorporatesuch observationsas the war initiationbehaviorand war victory
rateby democracies(Reiterand Stam 2002).
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