1

THE MICROECONOMICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EMPIRICAL

EVIDENCE FROM MEDELLN*
Por:
Jorge Barrientos Ph.D, Carlos Molina, Daniel Salinas M.Sc.
Department of Economics
University of Antioquia
August, 2013

Resumen: este artculo indaga por los determinantes socioeconmicos de la violencia en

el hogar. Para tal fin se considera que las decisiones microeconmicas tomadas por
agentes al interior del hogar, sobre el consumo de ciertos bienes o la imposicin de
alternativas sobre decisiones que deben ser colectivas, generan externalidades negativas o
deriva en conflictos que se traducen en eventos de violencia intrafamilar. Desde el punto
de vista terico el trabajo muestra como las decisiones tomadas por un individuo afectador
disminuye el bienestar de la vctima. Empricamente, usando modelos de eleccin discreta,
la evidencia sugiere que factores como el consumo de alcohol o el ocio incrementan la
probabilidad de eventos de violencia intrafamilar.
Palabras clave: violencia intrafamiliar, decisiones, externalidades, conflicto, victima,
afectador, modelo de eleccin discreta, efecto marginal

Abstract: This paper seeks to investigate the determinants of domestic violence. To that
end, we consider that many intra-household choices (on matters of consumption or choices
among a set of alternatives when taken by individuals) generate negative externalities and
conflict, which then may cause instances of domestic violence. From a theoretical point of
view, this paper shows how the choices of the assailant have negative impacts on victims
welfare. In addition, by performing discrete choice models, we show that socioeconomic
factors such as alcohol consumption and leisure among others increase the probability of
domestic violence events.
Key words: domestic violence, choices, externalities, conflict, victim, assailant, discrete
choice model, marginal effect

This work was financially supported by the Committee for Research-CODI, University of Antioquia, for our recognition
committee. All technical error or interpretations are responsibility of the authors. This paper was presented at IX Simposio
Nacional de Microeconoma, hosted by Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Bogot) and Universidad Externado.

Corresponding author: Jorge Barrientos, jbarr.udea@gmail.com; Daniel Salinas, jdsalinas@udea.edu.co, Carlos Molina,
carlosmolinaguerra@gmail.com. Applied Microeconomics Group-GMA, Department of Economics, University of
Antioquia.

I.

Introduction

The Colombian Constitution of 1991, Article 42, recognizes the importance of the family as
the fundamental unit of society and states that "... domestic violence, in any form, is
destructive to its harmony and unity, and shall be punished according to law." Despite the
frequent violation of this fundamental article, domestic violence (DV) has been a recent
interest phenomenon of social scientists and thus little studied in Colombia.

Violence is a problem that affects and is reflected in many aspects of society. It can be seen
in the deterioration of the general welfare of the population which is what elicits most
concern. For this reason, prevention of violence has been one of the main policy objectives
of many nations around the world. According to the World Health Organization (WHO)
approximately 1.6 million people die annually as a result of violence.

The World Health Organization has defined violence as "the intentional use of physical
force or power, either by act or threat, against oneself, another person or a group or
community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death,
psychological harm, developmental disorders, disturbances,

or deprivations. We

recognize that violence can affect not only private individuals but also entire communities,
that is why, it is considered a public health problem [World Report on Violence and Health:
Summary (2002)].

Violence can be classified in two types: domestic violence (DV) or social violence (SV).
So, DV occurs among individuals belonging to the same family. This type of violence
usually occurs within the home and for that reason is less visible. SV occurs between
individuals who are not related and usually occurs in public places. For this reason, it has a
greater chance of being observed and reported to the authorities; see Buvinic, et al (1999).

As a research topic DV deserves particular attention. Since there are a relatively large
number of studies and statistics for SV, the difficulty in observing DV complicates the
analysis of its causes and consequences to affected households. DV can be classified

3
according to the nature of aggression as: i) physical violence, when a family member
physically assaults another ii) sexual violence, when a household member forces another
household member into some kind of non-consensual sexual contact iii) psychological
violence is more difficult to observe and occurs when an individual is the victim of insults,
threats, or humiliation by another family member, see Buvinic, et al (1999).

Violence against household members, women (spouses) and especially against children is a
worldwide problem. But so far, the absence of reliable statistics has been the main obstacle
to a proper diagnosis of the extent of domestic violence. Although popular belief is that
domestic violence is unique to developing countries, such as those in Latin America, the
empirical evidence suggests that developed countries have also been affected by this
problem.

According to the researchers Tjaden and Thoennes (1998) of the National Institute of
Justice and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, respectively, about 25% of
American women had been physically abused by their partners. Studies in Latin America
show that between 10 and 30 percent of women have suffered physical violence at the
hands of their partners, while between 30 and 70 percent have been the victims of
psychological abuse. (Comprehensive statistics can be found in Buvinic, et. al. (1999).)

In the case of child abuse, although data are scarce, an occurrence as high as the incidence
of abuse for adult women has been found. For example, Larrain and Bascua (2008) show
that in about 83% of Bolivian households physical punishment of children by adults is
prevalent. In contrast to this in Colombia, Caicedo (2005) notes that in 2002, 6% of women
under 17 who were attacked were pregnant, in most cases the evidence suggests that the
assailant was a person close to the victim (spouse, parent, step parent, brother,
acquaintance).

In Medellin, a concern over DV has led to the development of programs and policies aimed
at its prevention and eradication. In fact, Medellins Development Plan for 2008-2011,
"Solidarity and Competitive Medellin", in its "Child, Adolescent and Family" section

4
states, in strategic line 2 its purpose to "... intercede in the family from an approach that
seeks to prevent and promote with a systematic understanding of the family and the social
dynamic, to shape it to prevent domestic violence and promote within these communities
protective factors against this kind of violence ..... ".

The numbers in Medellin, for example, are clear, between January and April 2007, Child
Protective Services reported 3,587 cases of child abuse, of which 42.8% were children
between 0 and 9 years old, 31.8% were between 10 and 14 and 25.2% between 15 and 17.
The attackers in most cases were: the father (36.2%), followed by the mother (26.3%) and
other relatives or friends (37.4%).

According to Medellin Como Vamos Program (2013), it was reported that cases of domestic
violence in Medellin rose annually to about 224 per hundred thousand inhabitants between
2009 and 2012 (rates per 100.000 inhabitants). The number of child victims of domestic
violence decreased from 26 cases per hundred thousand in 2009 to 13 cases in 2012.

The main problem has been to identify the magnitude of DV, to determine its causes,
consequences and characteristics. While the factors behind this phenomenon are difficult to
identify and therefore to analyze, many authors, Aizer (2010) among others, show that
gender wage gaps promote these kinds of problems. His work shows that between 1990 and
2003, a reduction in the gender wage gap explained almost 10% of the reduction in
domestic violence. This finding supports the economic theory of household bargaining
whereby increases in women's relative wages (relative to men) rise their bargaining power
and reduce levels of violence.

Based on this, we present a study that firstly aims at introducing the standard
microeconomic structure in order to analyze how the decisions of household members may
affect the welfare of others. These decisions may be seen as negative externalities (because
of the consumption of goods such as alcohol or tobacco) or because of unilateral decisions
that eventually must be collective decisions of the family.

5
Second, this paper investigates and identifies the socioeconomic determinants of domestic
violence in the city of Medellin. In order to achieve this, we analyze how the
socioeconomic characteristics of a household, such as gender and education of the
household head, and level of overcrowding, alcohol consumption, among others, can affect
the probability that violence will occur.

The methodological approach to the empirical study of domestic violence can be carried
out by evaluating the response of domestic violence, conditional on a set of observable
characteristics of both the household and its head. It is expected that the results of this
analysis can contribute to the development of public policies aimed at improving the
welfare of the population in the city.

II.

Empirical and theoretical literature

From an economic perspective, there are two aspects of the analysis of the determinants of
domestic violence that deserve recognition. First, there is no single theoretical framework
to address the modeling of the economic determinants of domestic violence. Second, the
existing information for the empirical analysis of these determinants is relatively scarce,
though there some databases like National Demographic and Health Survey (2010) ENDS10 and Medellin Quality of Life Survey of 2008-ECVMED08.

From an economic analysis, studies of the determinants and consequences of DV can be

divided into two groups. The first one bases its analysis of violence on the idea that a
rational assailant, it means, taking to account the benefits and costs of a violent act; this
approach has been challenged by the fact that some attacks may not be premeditated.
However, it is thought that people in general, except those with drastic conditions with
primary or irascible behavior, act coldheartedly.

In a context where there is a lack of cooperation, strategic behavior is also part of the varied
structure used to explain violence within the home. In this context, it is assumed that certain
household members enjoy decision-making power by using violence as a tool. This

6
violence can be related to other characteristics of the individual such as, education,
employment status or the number of the children. A study conducted in Connecticut
(U.S.A) during the 1990s by Nou and Timmins (2005), finds that unemployment, average
family income, race, and age are statistically significant variables in explaining domestic
violence.

In the Colombian case Colombia, Sanchez and Ribero (2004) found that about 33% of the
women were psychologically abused and 19.4% were beaten by their partners, these
numbers are close to the average reported in other Latin American studies. Violence against
children, according to the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare, ICBF by its spanish
name, shows that in 2010 there were 45,295 complaints of abuse, of which 47% were for
physical abuse and 10% for psychological abuse.

Caicedo (2005) finds that in 2000 there were 228 daily cases of domestic violence in
Colombia, that is, 10 per hour, and that there were 14,421 reports of alleged sexual abuse of
which there were six women for every man, meaning that more than 83% of the victims
were women. Ojeda (2008), who shows evidence of violence against women and children
in Colombia, found that a greater percentage of physical, verbal and sexual abuse is found
in Bogota and the Eastern region (adding to the latter the Pacific region) while the Atlantic
region has the lowest levels of domestic violence.

Gaviria and Velez (2001) and Rubiano et.al (2003) found that idiosyncrasies, poverty, and
poor education are among the determining factors that explain domestic violence in
Colombia. But on the other hand, it is expected that DV has a direct effect on the wellbeing and quality of life of households in terms of health, education, nutrition and
economic stability (Salas (2005), Sanchez and Ribero (2004), Institute Colombian Family
Welfare)

The second group of studies in the determinants of domestic violence focuses on the
intergenerational transmission of violence, i.e. a dynamic context in which violence is
repeated by later generations. Works by Huesmann et. al. (1984) and Widom (1989) note

7
that children who are the victims of violence can transmit it to the next generation. In this
sense, children who were abused have a greater probability of becoming abusers.

A study by Bowlus and Seitz (2002) found, first, that domestic violence is an important
factor leading to divorce. Women who are battered are much more likely to divorce than
non-abused women. Second, that if men witnessed violence as children, the likelihood of
them abusing their wives increased by 34.8%. The authors argue that this finding highlights
the importance of the intergenerational effects of domestic violence.

III.

Theoretical framework

From a theoretical standpoint, we consider that the problem can be stated as follows:
suppose that a household consists of two individuals the victim (V) and abuser (A). Agents
have access to a set of consumer goods and/or decisions within the household. Let
be the consumption set of household . A typical element of
vector

), where

and

decision about consuming good

is the two-dimensional

represents good 1 and 2. Suppose further that the

can increase the probability of an episode of domestic

violence. As an example of this type of good we have the decision to consume alcohol,
cigarettes, or leisure (which reduces labor supply).

To understand the means of

household

it is necessary to note that conflicts occur when an agent in

takes a unilateral decision, either to consume a specific good which causes

negative externality or an agreed upon decision such as where to send the children to
school or where to shop. It is clear that the unilateral decision of an agent is based on his
preference system and/or personal beliefs regardless of the preferences of others. It is
precisely each of the decisions made within the household which support the view that
consume and in what proportion do.

8
In this way, the problem of those individuals belonging to household can be presented as
follows:
(

where

(1)

is the probability of an event of violence within household. Note that the victims

utility function reflects the fact that some decisions taken by the assailant have a negative
effect on the victims welfare, it means that:

In this way, the household is seen as a space in which individuals interact and make
decisions, and these are adopted according to their ability to bargaining and impose them
within the limits imposed by their coexistence. This metaphor of intra-household
negotiations shows how decisions independently taken by individuals tend to be
interrelated to other agents and why the preferences for goods or alternatives of
consumption of the individuals in the household tend to differ.

In the previous model, there are two assumptions worth explaining. First, each individual
has an independent income (which in some cases may be zero), which creates two possible
situations, that each individual has their own income or that only the head of household
receives an income and assigns part of said income to meet the needs of the other
household member. The second is an assumption that simplifies and facilitates the results.
It is based on the idea that only the decisions of one member (and not both) affect the
welfare of others and this is basically because, in general, family violence occurs
unilaterally.

It is important to note that this transfer of income is exogenous; this is not a decision variable, and it means
that the potential victim (and other household members) are under responsibility (or care) of the potential
perpetrator.

Seen from another perspective, the home can be understood as a place of strategic
interactions where externalities are likely, and where most members are sometimes unable
to organize to correct these failures; especially because the limits to property rights, privacy
and/or decisions are undefined. And in case of reaching cohabitation agreements, these are
often violated by the counterpart. This makes it very difficult to design a compensation
mechanism based on the information disclosed.

Formally, the solution to the household problem posed above is given by the set of choices
that each individual develops and whose sole purpose is to maximize their satisfaction.
Standard microeconomic theory indicates that this occurs when the marginal rates of
substitution of agents, in this case abuser and victim, are equal:

(2)
Thus the solution to the optimization problem yields the following decisions of
individuals:
(

)
(

(3)

Given the initial conditions, the system of equations (3) allows the maximization of the
respective utility functions and that the optimal level of satisfaction given by the indirect
utility function be found, whose general representation takes the following form:
(
(

See final annex

)
)=

)
)

(4)

10
Where it is assumed that there is a negative relationship between the optimal level of
demand of

good by the abuser, and the indirect utility of the victim.

Meanwhile, the optimal approach to the problem of the household is the usual one and is
given by:
(

)
(

)
(5)

Where

is the endowment of household

., whose solution maximizes the welfare

of the household. The last two restrictions to which the optimization problem is subject
represent the possible set of household consumption. In this case the solution to the
problem of efficiency suggests the following result:

(6)

With strict equality only if the utility of the victim is not affected by the abuser
consumption

, that is, if it happens that

. This solution is clearly different from

the equilibrium solution of problem (1). The previous shows that both results ((4) and (6))
are not equivalent, and that in the absence of any incentives within the household, there
may be differences that do not allow for efficient compatibility of decisions. If our goal is
to achieve the efficient situation from a situation of equilibrium, this requires that the
as a proportion of

increase. This occurs when

increases,

decreases or both happen simultaneously. That is, that someone relents on their claims to
the decision in question.

For any of these to come about, it is essential that the demand of the abuser over
decrease, which would reflect the fact that the demand for the good which causes a negative
externality is corrected and increase the consumption of the good that does not generate
involvement ( ). However, the household by itself is not able to replicate this situation and
it is necessary to use instruments and incentives to solve the problem.

11
A Cobb-Douglas example

Consider the Cobb-Douglas case. Let

and it is positive otherwise (a high

be a constant that equals 0 if there is no conflict

means that some decisions taken by the assailant have

negative effect on the victims welfare, and a low value of

indicates that such effects are

ameliorated).

The problem of the individual at household can be posed the following way:
(

[(

) (

It is worth noting that

) (

)[(

) (

reflects the costs of the familiar conflicts. Then, in absence of

divergence of opinions among individuals, the value of

should be close to zero, if so the

maximization problem becomes the standard utility maximization problem. In this case,
indirect utility for both agents take the form:

( ) (
(

( ) (

)
)

Note that expected value formula can be expressed as:

{[

] (

12
From the last equation is evident the negative relation between the proportion of consumed
(

of x2 as the victims rent

of

) respect to (

) and her indirect utility. Note that by taking derivative

) has negative sign, it is:

(
(

)
)

On the one hand, note that the relation between these variables becomes stronger when ,
and the assailants rent increases (his power inside household). On the other hand, the
relation decreasing with

. The interpretation of this last result is so simple: if assailant

faces a high cost in consumption of x2, he will respond by diminishing the consumption of
. Note that efficient solution in this case we can show that:
(

)
(

Because of

we get that

. This means that

or

, so we have the same solutions mentioned above.

This solution shows that some social issues are important to consider (as the divergence of
interests), so it becomes important to know the optimal situation that takes into account
these factors and demonstrates the need of some incentives for agents to reach this situation
at home. The idea is to characterize an efficient point at home when making decisions about
alternatives.

Coase (1960) pointed out that if property rights over the decisions of the agents are well
defined and transaction costs are zero, the efficiency will be replicated by the market. In
this particular case the situation is not replicated because property rights over the decisions
of the agents are not assigned correctly. It requires the introduction of an institution that
creates incentives to achieve the appropriate situation and solves the problems that cause
subsequent problems of violence.

13

One way to generate such incentives is to establish a high cost to the problems of violence
generated by the assailant. A second option is to reduce the incentives of those who rise to
the damage. Theoretically, this option is to assign property rights in favor of the victim and
thus give him bargaining power on the decisions that are made at home.

IV.

Empirical methodology

A. Assumptions

The family is a set of relational nets where decisions can lead to tensions and conflicts.
Conflicts arise when an individual at home

takes a unilateral decision based on his

preference system and/or personal beliefs. Conflicts also arise when an individual causes a
negative externality, such as when he chooses to smoke or drink alcohol.

Let

and

the household utility from taking decision on the alternative c and d, such

utilities disclose which provides more utility but not the utility level. Therefore, when an
individual at household

thinks that alternative

household, he will be more convinced that

over d. Let

>

is better than d for himself and for

. In consequence, he will try to impose c

be an indicator of the utility that would have any household by taking any

consumption decision or taking any alternative, c for example over the d one. So,

just

tells us if the corresponding alternative provides more utility than other one.

We consider that if an individual imposes a decision that affects the household, then this is
equivalent to specifying that
individual). Let

. (Forcing household utility becomes that of the

be a binary variable that takes the value 1 if there are events of violence

(we mean observable events) and takes the value 0 otherwise, and let
household socioeconomic characteristics.

be a set of

14
Let

the probability that

believes that c is better alternative than d, i.e,

. Clearly, if everyone in the household

>

, then

is close to zero. On the other

hand, if a household member has the strongly believe that

believe that

>

and there are others who

(

, then impose the alternative c on d imply that

).

Once an alternative (on a decision) has been imposed, it is because the individual tries to
replace household utility for his utility.

In consequence we can identify the utilities of decision as a linear combination of the

household characteristics plus a random error, so we have:

(6)

Then, it is easy to verify that:

(

(7)

Note that if there is strong disagreement within the household, by imposing negative
(

externalities in consumption, we get that

).

B. Empirical strategy

The assumptions above indicate what should be the empirical strategy. Therefore
econometric analysis in this section is given by the following specification:

(8)

where D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if in the household i there are events of violence
and equals 0 in otherwise. Equation (8) defines a linear regression of
household characteristics denoted by
estimated and

on a set of

; the parameter is a k-dimensional vector to be

is an (stochastic) error term, satisfying (

Then the expected value of D conditioned on

and constant variance.

is defined by the equation:

15

(9)

where F is the underlying cumulative distribution function. So, the estimated parameter
gives us the impact of covariates

on the probability of occurrence of an event of violence

at household .

This methodology is similar to that proposed by Ribero and Chaux, (2004) where different
models are constructed using independent variable characteristics of the woman, the
couple, age, education, number of children, number of marriages, age at first sexual
intercourse, income, race, duration of last marriage, number of people per room, among
others. They conclude that the variables that are associated with a greater likelihood of
abuse in the household are: the number of children and alcohol consumption (both
spouses), age and the first sexual intercourse.

C. Descriptive statistics and empirical results

First, we describe the sample used in the econometric analysis. Second, we estimate the
probability that some socio-demographic characteristics influence domestic violence. We
estimate such probabilities by performing using ordinary least squares on equation (9)
(Probit methodology provides similar results). The statistical information used is contained
in the ECVMED2008, which provides information on more than 20.000 households
(approximately 80.000 people) and explores aspects such as the state of housing, education,
social security, income, expenditure, employment and, of course, aspects of domestic
violence .

16
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the main variables used in this study.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Average

Standard. Dev.

Total expenditure (+)

Variables

960

Alta

Overcrowding

0.82

0.57

Schooling of Household head

8.3

4.7

Size of Household

3.9

1.7

Reported events of violence (%)

0.10

----------

Gender of Household head (%)

0.38

----------

Household head employed (%)

0.6

----------

Household head unemployed (%)

0.04

----------

Household head Inactive (%)

0.36

----------

Alcohol consumption up to drunkenness ( % of households)

0.45

----------

Alcohol consumption ( % of households)

0.15

----------

Cigarette Consumption ( % of households)

0.18

----------

Single Household Head (%)

0.17

----------

Married Household Head (%)

0.42

----------

Widowed Household Head (%)

0.14

----------

Divorced Household Head (%)

0.10

----------

Living common law (%)

0.17

----------

Stratum (++) 1 (%)

0.10

----------

Stratum 2 (%)

0.36

----------

Stratum 3 (%)

0.30

----------

Stratum 4 (%)

0.11

----------

Stratum 5 (%)

0.08

----------

Stratum 6 (%)

0.04

----------

Observations

21000

(+) Thousands of Colombian Pesos/COP

(++) In Colombia the most of household are classified in socioeconomic strata. For instance, a poor
household is classified like stratum one (1) and the richest one is classified in stratum six (6). A middleclass household used to be classified in stratum four (4).
Own calculations

According to the sample, 10% of households reported having experienced at least one
episode of violence, this is a non-insignificant fact since it means approximately 2300
households, indeed, we must keep in mind that it is highly likely that many of them do not
reported episodes for many reasons, including the fear of stigmatization.

17
Households in the sample on average have 4 members, although the variance is high,
implying that there are households with a large number of members and single person
households. What is surprising is that average education of household head is 8.3 years
(high school incomplete), which is low, considering that in this sample a household head is,
on average, 36 years old.

Regarding the labor status of head of household, 36% is idle, 4% are unemployed and 60%
are occupied or employed, formally and informally. Studies like Sanchez and Riveros
(2004) indicate that unemployment is a variable that largely explains episodes of violence,
which is reasonable if one considers that leisure time is usually associated with home and
the unemployment. It is also important to note that in a country like Colombia prolonged
unemployment affects the income and hence poverty.

A contribution of this work is the inclusion of variables that strongly encourage domestic
violence phenomena such as alcohol and cigarettes. The 45% of households reported that
they normally consume alcohol but 15% consume up to total drunkenness; 18% of
respondents reported using cigarettes, and 5% of households consume as much alcohol
binge cigarettes is expect this type of behavior generates violence.

Regarding the marital status of the household head, 10% reported being separated or
divorced, 14% of the heads are widowed, 17% reported being single and the rest reported
being living in common law. In principle there would be no sociological reasons to suspect
that in households where the head is widowed are less likely to have episodes of violence
that prevails homes where divorce. According to the sample, 10% of households belong to
stratum 1, 36% to 2, 30% to 3, 11% of households surveyed belongs to stratum 4, 12% is
distributed between strata 5 and 6.

D. The effect of socioeconomic characteristics on the Domestic Violence

Tables 2 and 3 in this section show the results of estimating model (9) to several alternative
specifications. Each specification estimates the conditional mean using a linear probability

18
model (LPM) and a non-linear probability model (Probit). The results indicate a negative
relationship between events of violence and socioeconomic status. According to the
empirical exercise, this probability is at least 10 percentage points higher in the stratum 1
than in stratum 6.

Households where the household head is male, are more prone to domestic violence, they
have 3.2% more likely to report violence than those households where the head is female.
Overcrowding, defined as the number of people per household and per room, listed as one
of the risk factors for calm at home. The estimated parameter tells us that an increase in 1
person per room represents a 2% increase in the likelihood of violence.
Table 2
Linear Probability Model
Probability of events of violence and household characteristics

Covariates

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Schooling of Household head

-0.0046**

-0.003**

-0.0007(+)

-0.000825**

-0.0003*

-0.00003(+)

Gender of Household head

0.038**

0.042**

0.034**

Household head unemployed (%)

0.078**

0.075**

0.068**

Household head Inactive (%)

-0.02**

-0.02**

-0.011**

Overcrowding

0.022**

0.017**

Alcohol consumption up to drunkenness

0.058**

0.059**

Cigarette Consumption

0.02**

0.019**

Age of Household head

Expenditure

-0.006**

Single Household Head (%)

-0.032**

Widowed Household Head (%)

-0.066**

Living common law (%)

-0.046**

Stratum 2

-0.045**

-0.032**

Stratum 3

-0.045**

-0.033**

Stratum 4

-0.95**

-0.062**

Stratum 5

-0.135**

-0.095**

Stratum 6

-0.143**

-0.101**

Number of observation
+

( ) non statistical significant

(*) : statistical significant at 5%
(**) : statistical significant at 1%
Own calculation

21000

21000

21000

19
Alcohol consumption shows a significant influence on the likelihood of violent incidents,
which is not surprising, given the well-known effects of alcohol on the behavior of
individuals. It is important to note that households who reported taking liquor up to
drunkenness have at least 6% more probability to get episodes of violence than those who
reported moderate alcohol consumption. Also, households that reported consumption of
cigarettes have a 2% more likely than those without usual consumption.

When asked by the employment status of the household head, we find that households
where the household head is unemployed show a 6% higher probability of having violence
than in households where the head is employed. This result is consistent with the evidence
showed in the work made by Sanchez and Ribero (2004). Households where the head is
down, have a 1.2% lower probability of events of violence than households where the
household head is busy.

Both chief education spending as total household spending, appear as variables that reduce
the likelihood of violent events. On the one hand, more educated heads have tended to have
a more educated relatives and household, so that the incidence not only through
socioeconomic stratum but directly. On the other hand, if you take the total expenditure as a
measure of welfares household, then the result of the regression would imply that
households where access to a basic basket is not a widespread problem are less likely to
face family conflicts.
Table 3
Marginal effects: Probit Models
Probability of events of violence and household characteristics
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

-0.004**

-0.0039**

-0.0039(+)

-0.00084**

-0.0004**

-0.0004(+)

Gender of Household head

0.037**

0.041**

0.031**

Household head unemployed (%)

0.07**

0.066**

0.056**

Household head Inactive (%)

-0.02**

-0.019**

-0.011*

Overcrowding

0.017**

0.015**

Alcohol consumption up to drunkenness

0.056**

0.052**

Cigarette Consumption

0.018**

0.017**

Covariates
Schooling of Household head
Age of Household head

20
Expenditure

-0.005*

Single Household Head (%)

-0.025**

Widowed Household Head (%)

-0.05**

Living common law (%)

-0.041**

Stratum 2

-0.035**

-0.023**

Stratum 3

-0.037**

-0.024**

Stratum 4

-0.068**

-0.048**

Stratum 5

-0.096**

-0.081**

Stratum 6

-0.097**

-0.095**

Number of observation

21000

21000

21000

( ) non statistical significant

(*) : statistical significant at 5%
(**) : statistical significant at 1%
Own calculation

Households where the marital status of the household head is married have a 5% greater
chance of violent events than those where the household head is in union. The
socioeconomic households 5 and 6 show 8.2% lower probability of events of violence that
stratum 1 households and those in stratum 4 have 5.1% less likelihood of violent events.

Unemployment is a major risk factor, but alcohol is not less. Table 4 shows the difference
between the household in stratum 1 and stratum 6, respect to both alcohol consumption and
violence, conditioned to alcohol consumption. Around 15% of households in stratum 1
reported drinking up to drunkenness, from which half (about 7.2%) have had episodes of
domestic violence. In contrast, 9% of households in stratum 6 we report drinking up to
drunkenness and from these only 6% have had episodes of domestic violence.

Table 4
Domestic violence and alcohol drinking by socioeconomic extreme-stratum
p(alcohol cons.)
p(DV/alcohol cons.)
p(DV)
(a)
(b)
a*b
14.9
7.1
1.0
Stratum 1
9.1
6.1
0.5
Stratum 6
Own calculation

The difference in the incidence of domestic violence is given by the difference between the
products of the two probabilities calculated. That is, is twice as likely to occur violence in

21
stratum 1 than occur in stratum 6, conditional on both strata consume alcohol. In other
words, alcohol consumption in households in stratum 1 is the trigger for violence events.

V.

Conclusions and future research

This work is aimed at exploring empirically the causes and consequences of domestic
violence. In the first instance, the results above suggest the existence of quite appreciable
differences in episodes of domestic violence between social strata. Second, the variables
associated with unemployment, alcohol and cigarettes have a significant effect on
increasing the probability of generating violence. In contrast, total spending decreases this
likelihood.

There are potentially some endogeneity problems because the variable VD can be
correlated with the error term omitted variable, which would require a method of
instrumental variables to correct this problem.

What follows then is to try to estimate what would be the effect of domestic violence on
household expenditure variables, including spending on food. This requires specifying an
empirical model of the type:

Where

is the total expenditure of household i, with the associated problem that the

expenditure is a censored variable, which would require better modeling by performing a

Tobit model.

This methodology was also proposed by Ribero and Chaux, (2004) to measure the cost of
DV in Colombia, especially the effects it has on the welfare of households. In this case the
authors use independent variables such as income, unemployment, health and nutrition.

22

Annexed (Solution to the maximization problem)

Conditions on the marginal rates of substitution-MRS

1. Competitive equilibrium
a. The victims problem
(

Let the langrangian function given by:

(

The first order conditions are given by:

Equating the multipliers, we have to:

Given that the term on the left is the ratio of marginal utilities, the above equality can be
written as:

b. The assailants problem

(

23

Let the langrangian function in this case given by:

(

The first order conditions are given by:

Equating the multipliers, we get:

Given that the term on the left is the ratio of marginal utilities, the above equality can be
written as:

c. Equilibrium condition
Since each agent maximizes his welfare when their respective marginal rate of substitution
equals the price ratio, which is the same for both, must be satisfied on the balance that both
marginal rates of substitution are equal, i.e,:

24
2. Efficient equilibrium
The Paretos problem
We have to determine the Pareto-efficient allocation in the following way:
(

The optimization problem is to determine the point which maximizes the utility of the
victim subject to a given level of satisfaction of the assailant and compliance with the
conditions of assignment (endowments)

Let LE the lagrange function corresponding to the problem

(

The first order conditions are given by:

Equating (and manipulating) lagrange multipliers we get:

By replacing the multipliers ratios we have:

25

Or in terms of the MRS:

Where:

It is positive if we keep in mind that the derivative in the numerator is negative, whereas he
derivative in the denominator is positive. In other words, the inequality states that the
efficient should be characterized by the condition:

26

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