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Can Israel Still Scuttle the Iran Nuclear Deal?

BY AMOS HAREL-APRIL 6, 2015

Theoretically, Benjamin Netanyahu should be pleased. After all, none


of the current international action focused on Iran would have
happened without him. If he hadnt been elected as Israels prime
minister in 2009 and hadnt won elections twice more, since it
is likely that no other Israeli leader would have shown such an
obsession with Irans nuclear threat. Furthermore, no other Israeli
premier would have spent so much time, energy, and resources in
order to build a credible military threat to counter the Iranian nuclear
program.

It was this Israeli threat that persuaded President Barack Obama to launch
a worldwide sanctions campaign against Iran, which in turn brought Irans
economy to its knees. Only the financial collapse convinced Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to allow a relative moderate, Hassan
Rouhani, to run for the presidency and win the elections which in turn
paved the way for the negotiations that led to the nuclear framework deal
announced last week in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Netanyahu, of course, is in no mood to claim credit for all this. In a public


statement on Friday, April 3, the Israeli prime minister repeated his
castigation of the deal, saying that it would pose a grave danger to the
region and to the world and would threaten the very survival of the State of
Israel. But he still failed to present an outline for a better agreement,
except for raising the unlikely scenario in which Tehran would be forced to
dismantle its entire nuclear program.

While Netanyahu will no doubt continue to slam the deal before the
deadline for a final agreement in June, the reality is that he has precious
few options for affecting the outcome of the talks between Iran and the
world powers. His insistence on systematically burning all the bridges with
Washington took care of that. As a result of his own actions, Netanyahu has
reduced to a minimum Israels ability to influence a deal he believes is an
existential issue for the Jewish state.

This is all the more troubling because Netanyahu does have a point about
many of the framework agreements shortcomings. The Lausanne
agreement reminds many Israelis of the 1993 Oslo Accords, famously
described by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak as having more holes than
Swiss cheese. Key issues related to the deal still remain unresolved: It is
unclear when and how quickly the international sanctions on Iran will be
lifted, what the monitoring mechanisms for Tehrans nuclear program will
look like, and how the conflicting U.S. and Iranian accounts of the deal will
be reconciled.
Even if Iran does abandon any efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, Israel
has good reason to be concerned about the repercussions of the deal. The
Iranian economy will soon get back on track as a result of the sanctions
being lifted, giving Tehran even more resources to expand its influence in
the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, Iran will achieve international
recognition as a threshold nuclear state, even as the potential resolution of
the nuclear issue could allow it to enjoy a sort of dtente with the United
States. The first signs of this are already evident, as Washington and Tehran
appear to have partially coordinated their efforts to confront the Islamic
State in Iraq most recently, it was U.S. airstrikes and Iran-backed Shiite
militiamen who drove the jihadi group from the city of Tikrit.
But what can Netanyahu do about this now? A unilateral military strike
against Iran seems extremely unlikely that train has already left the

station. The Israeli premier has indeed considered the possibility at least
three times between 2010 and 2012, but in all cases he gave in to U.S.
pressure and the outspoken objections of his own security chiefs. Striking
now would risk arraying Israel against the joint opinion of the whole
international community, and place its alliance with the United States in
jeopardy.

There is no doubt that that the Israeli prime minister will continue to
criticize both the agreement and Obamas policies. The question is whether
he is going to back these attacks with political action. He made his case
before the U.S. Congress last month but faces serious risks if he returns
to Capitol Hill to advocate for legislation that could undermine the
negotiations. At the moment, it seems unlikely that additional sanctions
bills written by Sen. Bob Corker and a new version of legislation proposed
by Sens. Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez will be passed.

Even attempting to use Congress to sabotage the agreement could provoke


serious blowback from the White House. Netanyahu is aware of the growing
anger in Washington toward his refusal to advance the Palestinian peace
process especially after his awkward U-turns regarding the two-state
solution, before and after the recent elections. Obama may only have 21
months left in office, but he will probably be thinking of new ways to use
this time to make the Israeli premiers life miserable. One of these could be

an American decision not to veto pro-Palestinian resolutions at the U.N.


Security Council.

Netanyahu, however, does have another alternative. Obama told the New
York Timess Thomas Friedman in an article released on April 5 that he
would maintain Israels qualitative military edge in the region. If anybody
messes with Israel, America will be there, the president promised. Though
it is doubtful whether Netanyahu fully believes that he made a point of
evading a similar question on CNN he could push to hold Obama to his
word, pressuring the United States to strengthen Israels security position
across the Middle East.

Previous Israeli leaders knew how to use such statements by American


presidents in their favor.Former President George W. Bushs administration
deployed the long-range X-band radar in Israels Negev Desert to warn of
possible missile attacks from the east, for instance, while the Obama
administration spent more than $1 billion on financing Israeli development
of three different missile and rocket-intercepting systems. These steps were
perceived by Israel as rewards for good behavior especially for not
attacking Irans nuclear sites.

More carrots may be forthcoming. It is likely that this administration would

be willing to go even further, on both military assistance and intelligence


sharing, if Netanyahu decides to restrain some of his criticism over the next
several months. Israel could also use the current deal to deepen its tacit
coordination with the Saudis and other Gulf states, which share its concerns
over the nuclear threat and Irans ongoing campaign for hegemony in the
region.

For the time being, at least, the Israelis seem intent on bombarding the
international community with statements, not airstrikes. During the last
week, Israel has unveiled its fourth submarine believed, according to
Western media reports, to possess second strike nuclear capabilities
while announcing new successful trials for its Davids Sling missile defense
system. The Israel Defense Forces home front
commander discussedpossible scenarios of attacks against the Israeli
population during a regional war, while its air force chief speculated that
from a purely military standpoint, Israel could benefit from a pre-emptive
strike.

All these statements, however, only serve to disguise the fact that Israels
most important influence on the future course of events will not be in the
military arena. The challenge for Netanyahu is to collect information that
proves that Iran continues to deceive the international community
regarding both its nuclear aspirations and actions. If he fails to do that, he

will face an even more difficult task adapting to a new political reality
that he has fought tooth and nail to prevent his entire political career.

Posted by Thavam

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