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WILLIAM WALTERS
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William Walters
connection to deportation. The aim is to strike at the system in terms of its
commercial vulnerability . One of the more imaginative of these is the Deportation Class project af liated with the German antiracist network, Kein Mensch
Ist Illegal,4 from which this quote comes.
What is so powerful about these tactics is how they unsettle our view of
deportation. From seeing it as merely the unpleasant branch of a refugee and
immigration system we apprehend it in a different light: as an industry. Instead
of an administrativ e procedure we are provoked into seeing it as a system which
implicates all manner of agentsnot just police and immigration of cials, but
airline executives, pilots, stewards, and other passengers. Most pointedly, we are
reminded that private companies make money from this form of suffering.
Deportation is business. Immediately one makes connections with other moments in the history of the mass-orchestrated and forced movement of people.
The history of transportation , for instance, is replete with stories of greedy
shipping companies that were contracted to ship Englands criminal class to
New South Wales. But we are also struck by the fact that deportation is political
and open to contestation. Deportation Class displaces the practice of deportation.
It enables us to recognize it in terms of other lineages of practices. In this way
it unsettles our present.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this process of rethinking and
expanding what we understand by deportation, not at the level of its popular
representation, but by subjecting the practice of deportation to historical and
genealogical analysis. Deportation has been studied in terms of internationa l law
(Goodwin-Gill, 1978; Henckaerts, 1995; Pellonpaa, 1984). It is also, increasingly, the subject of policy sciences which seek to make it more ef cient and
humane (Koser, 2000). But with a couple of notable exceptions,5 it has not been
studied as a political or historical practice, as a disciplinary tactic and an
instrument of population regulation. Caestecker is therefore correct to observe
that (w)hereas immigration and refugee policy have already been closely
scrutinized, the historical analysis of expulsion policy is still in its infancy
(Caestecker, 1998, p. 96). This is somewhat surprising since other forms of
expulsion and forced migrationsuch as ethnic cleansing (Bell-Fialkoff , 1993;
Jackson Preece, 1998; McGarry, 1998), religious expulsion (Kedar, 1996), the
transportatio n of criminals (Hughes, 1986), political exile and population transfer
(de Zayas, 1985, 1988; Rieber, 2000)have indeed been subjected to such
critical scrutiny. Perhaps it is the case that these other forms appear so draconian.
Deportation, because it remains embedded within the contemporary administrative practice of Western states, strikes us as less remarkable.
The genealogical study of deportation as a practice of power is valid and
timely not just as a means to enhance our understandin g of a relatively ignored,
but highly pertinent aspect of public policy. More broadly, this paper will make
a contributio n to the genealogical investigatio n of modern citizenship. Citizenship studies is of course now a vast eld; the area to which this study pertains
is the growing sub eld of research exploring citizenship in terms of the
citizen/alien relationship (Baubock, 1994a,b; Benhabib, 1999; Carens, 1995;
Soysal, 1994) as well as that between the citizen and other gures of alterity
(Isin, 2002). Following Benhabib (1999), we can note that these investigation s
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deportation has af nities to the international police of population . In the nal
part of the paper I consider the detention centres and other incarceral spaces that
are today a part of the deportation game, and relate them to Giorgio Agambens
(1998) thematization of the camp. Though the practice of deportation might
seem to imply abstract, inter-nationa l spaces, rather than the more intimate, lived
spaces of the city, we will see that it can be theoretically and empirically
grounded in the gure of the camp.
Forms of Expulsion
What is deportation and what might we learn about it by seeing it as a particular
form of expulsion? Immediately we need to confront a terminological question.
Goodwin-Gill begins one of the more extended treatments of the subject in
international law with the following observation: The word expulsion is
commonly used to describe that exercise of State power which secures the
removal, either voluntarily , under threat of forcible removal, or forcibly, of an
alien from the territory of a State (Goodwin-Gill, 1978, p. 201). Goodwin-Gill
notes that terminologies vary from state to state. For instance, at certain times
in its history the United States reserved the term deportation to refer strictly to
proceedings initiated at a port of entry designed to send aliens on their way after
refusal of admission. Henckaerts (1995, p. 5) notes that expulsion is more
generally used in international law, whereas deportation is more common in
municipal law. In what follows I shall be taking deportation to refer generally
to the removal of aliens by state power from the territory of that state, either
voluntarily , under threat of force, or forcibly. This is how the term is
commonly used in many countries today. By utilizing deportation in this way,
I am able to retain expulsion as a term to refer a much broader eld of practices.
This eld will encompass the forced or mandated removal of individuals and
groups from territories under the authority of political, and sometimes quasilegal and private authorities. In this way we will be able to specify deportation
as one particular type of expulsion, albeit one that now occupies a central place
in modern immigration policy.
In the following section I compare deportation, de ned as above, with other
forms of expulsion. I make no claim as to the exhaustivenes s of my list. Nor do
I want to imply these are in any way watertight or mutually exclusive categories.
The point is simply to capture something of the historical speci city of
deportation, in terms of its subjects, its characteristic forms of reason and
purpose, its social and political assumptions and methods.
Exile
Exile is the most ancient custom of all nations. These are the words chosen by
Bernardo Tanucci, minister to the King of Naples, to justif y the expulsion of the
Jesuits from the Kingdom of Naples (Delle Donne, 1970, p. 142; Kedar, 1996,
p. 172). While Tanucci may have been exaggerating for effect, we can nevertheless concede that exile is indeed an ancient practice. Exile is used against the
individual who is understood to be a member of the political community or
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camp, to reveal how bare life can become exposed. Within the camps bare life
inhabits an indeterminate zone both within and beyond the political order, where
it is placed at the mercy of sovereign power. According to Agamben, todays
global refugee crisis, coupled with the vast numbers of people involved in
clandestine work and migration, points to a growing disjunctio n between a
politics organized in terms of nation-states , and bare life. As we will see in the
second part of this paper, the camp is both a symptom and a response to this
crisis.
Corporate Expulsion
If expulsion on the basis of nationality and state membership is a relatively
recent phenomenon, expulsion on the basis of group membership is not. This is
a kind of expulsion which Kedar (1996) distinguishe s from exile on the grounds
that it involves the banishment of an entire category of subjects beyond the
physical boundaries of a political entitywhether principality , town, city state
or absolutist state. Whereas exile is typically targeted at speci c individuals , here
we encounter the expulsion of collective subjects. Without doubt, the basis that
recurs most frequently for corporate expulsion is religion. From the end of the
Middle Ages expulsion serves as a radical and important tool of governance
(Kedar, 1996, p. 174) situated along a continuum between massacre and conversion, aiming to police the religious beliefs and practices of populations . While
the religious persecution of Christians was certainly a feature of political life in
Rome, or of non-Zoroastrians in Persia, during the Middle Ages such persecution will become institutionalize d for substantial periods (Bell-Fialkoff ,
1993, p. 112). Jews were a frequent target for such expulsionsfor instance,
from England (1290), France (1306), Spain (1492), Cracow (1494) and Portugal
(1497). Similarly, in this category we should note the expulsion of Muslims from
Spain (1526) and of Moriscos (converted Muslims) (1609 14).
The fact that questions of religion and political loyalty are intertwined is clear
by the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Corporate expulsion can be seen as a
tool of state formation, occurring against the backdrop of the break-up of the
universal church. Indeed, for some observers its frequency, and concentration in
the western part of Europe is related to the fact that it goes hand in hand with
the emergence of the modern state system there (Kedar, 1996, p. 175). The
expulsion of Irish Catholics from Ulster in 1688, making land available for
settlement by English and Scottish Protestants, ts this pattern. The strategic
motive was to deny Catholic France and Spain a base for operations against
England. Similarly, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, which
prompted the ight of thousands of Protestant Huguenots from France, reveals
a certain connection between expulsion and confessiona l con ict.
Transportation
Rieber argues that as far as Western Europe is concerned, by the eighteenth
century expulsion as an of cial policy of dealing with the other, however
perceived, gave way to various forms of internal control and integration into a
state system shaped by the consolidatio n of the secular power of the national
monarch around a centralized bureaucracy and professiona l army (Rieber, 2000,
p. 5). He gives the impression that expulsion was a sort of paroxysm or
convulsion accompanying the birth of the modern state system, but that as the
latter matured, political authorities soon found other means to regulate their
populations . This argument is attractive in that it moves us away from seeing
expulsion in singular or exceptional terms, and regards it rather as belonging
to a repertoire of techniques of social regulation and, in this case, statebuilding.
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William Walters
However, the argument that expulsion waned with the consolidatio n of
modern state power in Western Europe only works when con ned to the
government of religious dissidents.9 The advantage of framing our inquiry in
terms of forms of expulsion is that we identif y other practices of expulsion which
operate in relation to different historical trajectories. There is no singular
expulsion. This is clear if we take the case of the transportatio n of convicts and
political exiles. If the emergence of a more or less settled system of states in
Western Europe would see the withering of the corporate expulsion of religious
dissidents and minorities, the external practices of colonization beyond Europe
and internal practices of social repression underpinnin g these states, saw the
opening of a political context for this different type of expulsion.
With transportatio n we encounter a form of expulsion with certain resemblances to exile. These include its use as a form of punishment for political as
well as civil crimes, its deployment to commute a death sentence, and in some
cases that it held out the possibilit y of return. But it differs in several key
respects. First, it has a strong utilitarian underpinning . Transportation combines
the tactics of exile and forced removal with the game of colonization and
economic exploitation . Spain and Portugal had attempted this as early as the
fteenth century. But England was the rst country to employ the transportatio n
of criminals in a systematic way. Rusche and Kirchheimer argue that the
Vagrancy Act of 1597 legalized deportation for the rst time. For this act stated
that such rogues as shall be thought tt not to be delivered shall be banyshed
out of this Realme and all the domynions thereof and shall be conveied to such
parttes beyond the seas as shall be at any tyme hereafter for that purpose
assigned by the Private Counsell (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939, p. 59).
Colonies like Virginia and Maryland were amongst the rst to receive Englands
poor and undesirable . But this was not to last. With the availability of an
alternative supply of forced labour in the form of slaves transported from Africa,
and with the liberation of the colonies from the Monarchy following the
American Revolution, the transportatio n of convicts to North America was soon
brought to an end. Rather, it was Australia, and especially New South Wales,
where this experiment in recycling convicts would be taken to its furthest point
(Hughes, 1986). Between 1787 and 1868, when agitation by settled free
labourers brought an end to the policy, over 80,000 convicts and political
prisoners were shipped to Australia. Yet Britain was by no means alone in
pursuing this practice, even if it did undertake it on an unparalleled scale. Until
1898 France used its colonies in New Caledonia for transportatio n purposes,
including its exiles from the Paris Commune, while French transportation of
convicts to Guiana was only nally abolished in 1937. Interesting also are the
cases of countries like Germany which, without appreciable colonies in the
nineteenth century, sought arrangements with other colonial powers for the
transportatio n of their criminals, or simply sold them as slaves. For instance,
Prussia had an agreement with Russia to accept Prussian convicts in Siberia
(Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939, pp. 123 5). In such internationa l relations of
coerced migration we hear echoes of contemporary practices like the safe third
country agreement.
272
The connection with colonization , which explains aspects of the genesis but
also, by the end of the nineteenth century, the increasing political impossibilit y
of transportation , is not the only way in which this policy differs from the
practice of exile or corporate expulsion. We should also note at this point that
transportatio n is a mass phenomenon carried out on a routine, almost bureaucratic basis. Exile was less often a mass phenomenon. More typically it targets
the in uential, or those with political prestige. It is perhaps a compromise
between the subject and the sovereign. Transportation is a mass exercise.
Spurred on by the overcrowding of gaols, and the need for forced labour, and
targeting the nameless and the faceless, we might observe that it democratizes
the practice of exile.
Population Transfer
The nal form of expulsion that I want to survey for the purposes of this
genealogy of deportation is population transfer. If corporate expulsion is a form
of expulsion that re ected the Treaty of Augsburgs principle of cujus regio ejus
religiothat the religion of the state is that of the princethen population
transfer belongs to a more recent time, an age of biopolitic s when principles of
ethnic, racial and national homogeneity have displaced or reinscribed religion as
the marker for political order.
Population transfer is the neutral, technical name which national and international experts gave to more or less planned mass movements (voluntary and
forced) of people that convulsed Europe throughout the rst half of the
twentieth century. Population transfer was a policy to address what Europe
understood as its problem of minorities. This problem was in turn the
expression of, and the obstacle to the application of the principle of nationalitie s
to the political map of Europe, especially its central and south-eastern areas
(Jackson Preece, 1998). As new national states emerged with the break-up of the
old Prussian Kingdom and the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the
phenomenon of national minorities located within the territory of other national
states became acute. The perception, especially under the circumstances of the
World Wars, was that the separatist and irredentist practices of these groups
would undermine national and international security. If the political norm was
one of self-determination for national peoples, and the idea that each state should
be a home for its people, and conversely, that each people should be
represented by a state, then population transfer was one technique fashioned to
meet this end. In this respect population transfer belongs to a series of methods
for governing the problem of minorities including minority treaties, the redrawing of borders, the staging of plebiscites, and, the most dreadful measure of
allgenocide.
An early instance of population transfer was the exchange of thousands of
minorities between Greece and Turkey, under the supervision of the League of
Nations and the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Other exchanges
involved Bulgaria (de Zayas, 1988, 1989). But World War II saw increasing use
of population transfer with Nazi Germany as one of its leading and most
murderous practitioners. Ethnic Germans were repatriated from Romania, Esto273
William Walters
nia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and many other states. At the same time, Nazi
Germany sought to cleanse itself of Jews, Slavs, and other groups that it
regarded as anti-social or sub-human through a combination of resettlement and
genocide. In the Nazi state, then, population transfer understood as a programme
of Germani cation, was taken to its apocalyptic extreme.
Yet it would be wrong to see population transfer and other forms of forced
racial adjustment as con ned to the policy of the Nazi state. While today it
might be associated with ethnic cleansing, for statespersons at the middle of the
century, population transfer was legitimated as an unpleasant but expedient and
technical means of effecting national and international order. Hence population
transfer did not end with the defeat of the Nazi regime. Under the Potsdam
Protocol the Allies sanctioned a wave of transfers that would culminate in the
removal of more than 14 million ethnic Germans from such countries as Poland,
Hungary and Czechoslavakia . I am not alarmed by the prospect of the
disentanglemen t of populations , Churchill famously commented on the Potsdam
proposals, not even by these large transferences, which are more possible in
modern conditions than they were ever before (De Zayas, 1989, p. 11). While
an academic commentary on the policy at the time could view it as an
instrument of the greatest importance in eliminating the most explosive danger
spots in Europe and securing the future peace of the Continent and the welfare
of its peoples (Schechtman, 1946, p. 24).
To take the trajectory of population transfer further would be to follow its use
in such contexts as postcolonia l nation-state formation, and Soviet communism,
but also, as a number of researchers have done, to nd its contemporary
application in the form of ethnic cleansing (Jackson Preece, 1998). As useful
as this exercise might be, it would deviate from my concern here which is the
study of the deportation of aliens. But population transfer is mentioned here to
demonstrate how expulsion, by the twentieth century, has become, in Foucaults
(1991) sense, governmental. I expand on the subject of governmentalit y below.
But here we can note that expulsion becomes governmental with population
transfer because it is now targeted at, and rationalized in terms of knowledges
of population . It is perhaps worth noting that with the early modern period,
expulsion was frequently used as a threat. It could be avoided if the subject
agreed to accept baptism, conversion, or foreswear the practice of usury.
Expulsion as population transfer operates on a biopolitica l territory where
difference is marked indelibly. Expulsion is no longer aimed at the holders of
particular beliefs or practices. Or rather, inasmuch as these are relevant considerations, it is now because they are markers of a deeper racial ethnic essence.
There is no question of conversion or assimilation since ones race is now
xed, immutable, interior. The persecution of refugees and others was, as Arendt
observed, not because of what they had done or thought, but because of what
they unchangeably wereborn into the wrong kind of race or the wrong kind
of class (Arendt, 1964, p. 294).
Preliminary Observations on Deportation
Having surveyed certain key aspects of expulsion in history, at this point we can
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nous or long-settled population s to be normal (for ethnic cleansing it still is). The
right to reside in a given territory, or its corollary, the removal of the threat of
expulsion, is an aspect of the genealogy of modern citizenship that remains
under-explored. It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest explanations as
to how citizens come to be more or less in-expulsabl e by their own governments.
But when this story is told, it will no doubt reveal that this was not a linear path
of progress but something prone to reversalno more so than with the mass
denaturalizatio n and denationalizatio n of German Jews in Nazi Germany, but
also of naturalized citizens of enemy origin in many other European countries
(Arendt, 1964, p. 279). Perhaps we will nd that the gradual strengthening of the
citizen territory link had less to do with any positive right of the citizen to
inhabit a particular land, and more to do with the acquisition by states of a
technical capacity (border controls, and so on) to refuse entry to non-citizens and
undesirables. In the broader sense it is also a consequence of former colonies and
dominions (for example, the United States and Australia) acquiring independence and state sovereignty, and thereafter refusing the status of dumping
grounds for the undesirables of the imperial centre.
The nal preliminary point to make concerns the symbolic eld which
deportation borders upon. Deportation represents a legalized form of expulsion,
and its legitimacy rests upon its administrativ e nature, and the observance of
national and international norms and laws. However, because of its proximity to
the wider eld of expulsions that I have sketched here, deportation is always
susceptible to and associable with these other practices. These other forms of
expulsion lurk in its shadows; their invocation always threatening to destabilize
its legitimacy. They are historical memories, like slavery with regard to the
contemporary politics of race, which can always be summoned by political
action. Doesnt a plane full of deportees resemble transportation ? Doesnt the
shackling and the chemical paci cation of deportees invoke the galley slaves?
Does not the clandestine way in which immigration authorities cooperate with
public and private airlines to prosecute certain deportations not resemble
human-traf cking in reversetraf cking by states and big businesses? Dont
politically-orchestrate d campaigns to deport Kurdish or Vietnamese refugees
recall the many other groups historically to be expelled within Europe? Perhaps
the contemporary deportation of aliens is invested with former practices and
historical memories in such a way that it can never be merely the deportation of
aliens.
Deportation and Forms of Power
If the rst half of this paper has situated deportation within a historical grid of
forms of expulsion, the second will locate it within a different analyticsof
forms of power and government (Barry et al., 1996; Burchell et al., 1991). This
is a second axis on which we can enhance its intelligibility . Here we will try to
see deportation in terms of wider logics of powerof sovereignty, governmentality and police. This exercise allows us to grasp something of the history of the
rationalizatio n of deportation. It will enable us to avoid the position which sees
in expulsion only the remorseless and monotonous persecution of the Other
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William Walters
but distinguishabl e ways (Dean, 1999, Chapter 1). Governmentality is used
generally to refer to governmental mentalities, the link between power and
knowledge. However, it is a second, more historically speci c use which
interests me here. Foucault uses governmentality to identify the emergence of a
distinctly novel form of re ection on, and exercise of power in modern societies.
It is connected with the discovery of a new reality, the economy, and a new
object, the population. Foucault dates this moment to the early modern period in
Western European societies. Governmentality marks the point at which political
power comes to be concerned with the wealth, health, welfare and prosperity of
the population . Sovereign power involves the exercise of authority over the
subjects of a statethe deduction of taxes, the meting out of punishments, and
the taking of life. Government, on the other hand, is marked by its concern to
optimize the forces of the population . Government does not replace other forms
of power, but rearticulates them. Hence taxation, law and punishment are
directed not primarily towards augmenting the power and glory of the sovereign,
but to promoting the ends of population . But conversely, the promotion of
population will be used to advance the sovereign power of the state, where the
latter is understood as inserted in a eld of perpetual geopolitical con ict.
The deportation of aliens needs to be situated within this eld of governmentality, and not just sovereignty. My argument is that in the course of the
nineteenth century we can speak of a governmentalization of deportation. While
I can not undertake a full account of this process, I can sketch some of the
signi cant ways it is evident in the latter part of that century. First, it is well
illustrate d in the cases of Britain and the United States by the shift that occurs
at the level of the law in terms of what kinds of subjects and problems are being
identi ed as grounds for expulsion. At the end of the eighteenth century the
practice of deportation is still concentrated around the pole of sovereign power.
Its principal targets are political enemies of the stateagitators, subversives,
revolutionaries who undermine its authority. Britains Aliens Act of 1793 was
a direct response to fears of revolution unleashed by the French Revolution. For
the rst time, Parliament sanctioned the expulsion of aliens. While this Act fell
into disuse following the Napoleonic wars, the revolutionary wave of 1848 saw
the passage of further legislation , this time the Removal of Aliens Act (Cohen,
1997, pp. 357 8). Similar in character were the United States Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798 which empowered the President to remove any aliens suspected of
treasonable or secret machinations against the government (Clark, 1931, p. 37).
To this day deportation remains an instrument to be used against those who
can be de ned as political enemies of the state. It will target foreign trade
unionists and dissidents during times of crisis, and especially during wars.
However, we can observe that by the end of the nineteenth century its targets
expand to embrace not just political, but also social enemies in the form of
various categories of socially undesirable persons. The enemies of the state
henceforth include various categories of person who are deemed to pose a threat
to its population , which is increasingly understood in racial and biopolitica l
terms, or to its economy or system of welfare provision. Hence there is Britains
Aliens act of 1903, a response to fears regarding an alien menace associated
with the in ux of Russian and Eastern European Jews. While this Act sought to
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William Walters
invention of means to identify who is a citizen and who is a foreigner. It also
presumes the administrativ e capacity to police borders. Scholars of the history of
regulation and documentation tend to con rm that World War I is a watershed
in this respect, a time when borders are systematically patrolled and passports
checked (Caestecker, 1998; Sassen, 1999; Strikwerda, 1997; Torpey, 1999). From
1914 onwards we see a proliferation of schemes to document and identif y the
alien, including identity cards, registrations with police, employer and residence
permits and passports. The non-renewal of these various permits by of cials could
henceforth operate as a means to initiate deportation. Of course, in many cases
the national identity of a person was unclear. In this case the act of deportation
also entails a practice of identi cation, as it may with the asylum process today,
a site where the identity and the proper responsibilit y for the subject must be
xed.
While I lack the space to trace other mutations within this trajectory of the
governmentalizatio n of deportation, there is one development pertaining to the
present which bears noting. In many Western countries today we see a concern
with deportation less as a mechanism for shaping the substantiv e identity or
pro le of a population , or for intervening directly in the labour market. Instead,
there is a concern with the governmental mechanism itself. Governments are
presently obsessed with the need to tighten up their deportation and repatriation
policies. One of the main reasons they give is the need to maintain the integrity
of their immigration and asylum systems. The problem identi ed is one where
lax administratio n of deportationthe failure to execute deportation orders and
actually remove the subjectmarks a particular state as a soft touch. The fear
is that asylum shoppers will then ock towards that state to pro t from its
generous terms of admission. Strictly enforced deportation policies send signals
to asylum-seekers and illegal migrants. What is being governed is not the
population in a direct manner, as it was with population transfer or the deportation
of the socially undesirable, but the governmental system. The parallel is with
neoliberal critiques of the welfare system where the governmental system is
identi ed not as a solution, but as a contributin g factor in problems of poverty
and exclusion. The call is then for welfare reform, a term that becomes
synonymous with poverty policy. This seems to t the trend that Dean calls
the governmentalizatio n of government whereby the mechanisms of government themselves are subject to problematization , scrutiny and reformation
(Dean, 1999, p. 193). When deportation rates become targets to be met by
immigration and other departments, when national and international agencies seek
to compare levels and techniques of deportation across nations and exchange
information for best practice, then it seems we have governmentalizatio n of
government.
Deportation as International Police
Thus far I have argued that we can historicize deportation in terms of a process
of governmentalization . The latter is a development in which states become
actively involved in the protection and promotion of the welfare of their
populations . But we can go beyond merely identifying deportation in terms of
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when legal experts and administrators were formulating the modern powers of
deportation. Here we nd the overlay of deportation as an instrument of police,
of routine administratio n with expulsion as an instrument to perpetuate sovereign
power:
(1) fraudulent entry into the territory, unless followed by a
sojourn there during a period of six months; (2) establishment of
domicile or residence in violation of a formal prohibition ; (3)
illness dangerous to public health; (4) mendicancy, vagabondage,
pauperism; (5) conviction in the country for offences of a certain
gravity; (6) conviction or prosecution abroad for grave extraditable offences; (7) incitement to the perpetration of grave
offences against public safety; (8) attacks in the press or otherwise against the institution s of a foreign State or sovereign or
against the institution s of a foreign State; (9) attacks or outrages
in a foreign press against the country of sojourn or its sovereign;
(10) conduct in time of war or impending war threatening the
countrys security. (Pelonpaa, 1984, p. 52)
Here is a form of power, then, which does not envisage a spontaneous order.
Unlike the classical image of immigration where actors voluntarily move in
response to push and pull factors, and more broadly, various forms of liberal
government, where the welfare of the population and social order is to be
optimized by harnessing the freedoms and the desires of individuals , and the
self-regulating mechanisms of market and population , deportation belongs to a
different rationality of rule. It employs a similar tactic to the poor law, drawing
a categorical distinctio n between those who should be granted the bene ts of
citizenship, however meagre, and those who must be managed authoritatively ,
evenly despoticly.
But deportation is more than just a form of police that operates on a national
population . Here I want to argue for a second and potentially more signi cant
dimension to the police character of deportation. It is that we should see the
deportatio n of aliens as a form of the internationa l police of population.12 Seen
from a national, or purely internal perspective deportation appears as the
exclusion and expulsion of aliens and the uninvited; it stands as an expression
of the hierarchical relationship between citizens on the one hand with full rights,
and aliens or denizens on the other, or the ways in which states discriminate
against non-citizens and outsiders. But seen from an international perspective,
deportation represents the compulsory allocation of subjects to their proper
sovereigns, or, in many instances of statelessness, to other surrogate sovereigns
(for example, the current practice of returning certain asylum-seekers to safe
third countries). In the face of patterns of international migration, deportation
serves to sustain the image of a world divided into national population s and
territories, domiciled in terms of state membership. It operates in relation to a
wider regime of practices including resettlement, voluntary return, political
asylum, temporary protection and so on, which together can be said to comprise
a global police of population . Extradition belongs to this series as well, though
extradition is in certain respects the inverse of deportationa recognition of the
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workers despite terms in their contracts that allowed them to do so, because it
was actually felt that they were a part of the societies in which they lived
(Brubaker, 1989, p. 19). However, as much as the social and legal situation of
many categories of non-national s may have improved in many European states,
it is important to recall that new projects and new subjects of expulsion and
exclusion have been constitute d in the past 20 years or so, representing a
counter-tendency to the process of de-alienage. Amidst public and political
anxieties over bogus asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants (Huysmans,
1995), there are new targets for expulsion and deportation. What is notable here
is the way that deportation is itself becoming regionalized. Multilateral arrangements under the Schengen and Dublin agreements, and now under the EUs
Amsterdam Treaty, point to tendencies for deportation and exclusion to take
place not just from national territories, but from the EUs emerging regional
area of freedom, security and justice. One of the main aims of the Dublin
Convention was to prevent multiple applications for asylum in membercountries and to put an end to asylum-shopping . In effect, member-states
operate as proxy European authorities, deciding upon and in many cases
deporting asylum-seekers from the European space. In sum, in the future, we
might expect this international police to work not only between nations, but
between regions and nations.
The Camp as a Space Beyond Citizenship
I have discussed deportation as a form of international police that seeks to divide
and distribute population on a global basis, and which presupposes the idea of
citizenship as a marker of belonging within the state system. As it stands,
however, this account of deportation as internationa l police and, more generally,
in terms of sovereign and governmental power, is seriously incomplete. For the
most controversia l and troubling forms of deportation are not usually the return
of nationals to their home states. Rather, they have involved the stateless, the
refugee, the German Jew or Russian denationalize d and stripped of citizenship,
the refugees who, in desperate circumstances, have destroyed their own citizenship papers, and today the rejected asylum-seeker. The fact is that when
deportation has featured in these cases it goes hand in hand with the camp.
Practices of deportation need to be seen in relation to a wider incarceral
archipelago of detention centres, refugee camps and zones dattente.
In this nal part of the paper I want to examine the camp. This is not just for
reasons of consistency or out of some desire for completeness, but because it
offers important insights about contemporary citizenship, sovereignty and forms
of power. Foucault is well known for his observation that: A whole history
remains to be written of spaceswhich would at the same time be a history of
powers from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the
habitat (Foucault, 1980, p. 149). What might the study of the camp contribute to such a history? Here we can return to Arendt and Agambentwo gures
who have explored the implications and consequences of the refugee for modern
political thought. A key insight that I take from Arendt is her observation of the
pervasiveness of the camp in twentieth century Europe. While the concentration
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where those without the right to have rights are exposed to indeterminate
waiting times, the risk of arbitrary treatment, and the threat of physical and
psychologica l abuse.
But in addition to de ning a space of emergency in which particular exceptional modes of treatment become normal, the camp represents a crisis of Western
politics and citizenship. It signals a sort of surplus of bare life that can no longer
be contained within the political order of nation-states : what we call camp is this
disjunction (p. 175). In the absence of a working cosmopolitan model of
citizenship, or other ways of organizing and distributin g rights, belongings , and
identities, and with the menacing growth of a politics of xenophobia and racism
that encourages publics to see the presence of refugees and aliens as threats to
their freedom, culture, and security, we have the campswe have border zones,
detention centres, holding areas, a panoply of partitions, segregations and
striations. The gure of the refugee reveals that the Rights of Man that become
ours naturally through birth, are in actual fact partial, provisional and inadequate. The camps stand as a sign of the rupture of the state people territory
complex, but also the permanently-temporar y attempt to suture it.
The dream of the perfect prison, of the school and other disciplinary spaces
was the production of a docile useful body, and a self-regulating, interiorized
citizen. However, the diagram of the camp does not presuppose a comparable,
positive kind of subjectivity . Rather, its logic is one of expedience and exemption.
It is not interested in projects of reform, so much as countering the dangerous
illegal global ows of impoverished humanity. If, following Giovanna Procacci
(1991, p. 161), the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were trans xed by
a fear of pauperism, with its dangerous uid, elusive sociality, impossible either
to control or to utilize, and if the governmental response included the great
strategies of territorial sedentarization in order to produce xed concentrations
of population (for example, anti-vagabondage laws, the poor law, and later,
public housing), then camps and deportations represent components of a contemporary sedentarization campaign which operates in relation to a local global
space. The camp delivers surplus humanity into a zone of indistinction , invoking
a near permanent state of emergency to place its subjects inde nitely on hold
on the edge of the juridical orderall so that the sovereign system of states
and its division of citizens to states can be re-established. Here surplus humanity
is caught in the cross-currents between the police and immigration authorities
and their moves to extra-judicial and arbitrary treatment, and the countermovements of the human-rights and immigrants-right s groups who protest such
forms of treatment. The camp is extraterritorial, in the sense that it can stand
outside the legal and juridical order, but also intensely territorial to the point
where the territorial regime of citizenship becomes dependent upon these
exceptions if it is to sustain the principle that all the worlds population can be
ascribed a country. Yet if the camp is quite different from the disciplinary
spaces which Foucault and others associate with modernity, it has at least one
thing in common. Like the workhouse or the prison, the camp is to be highly
symbolic; its harshness stands as a semio-technique (Dean, 1991, pp. 184 5;
Foucault, 1977, pp. 93 103) of deterrence, a signal that our immigration
systems are not a soft touch.
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set of institutions , a practice in which participants call something into being,
which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as a cognition or
imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known
(Arendt, 1977, p. 151; Tully, 1999, p. 179). As counter-intuitiv e as it seems,
perhaps we can see camps and sanctuaries as spaces not just of nomos, but the
invention of new practices of freedom and subjecthood .
Conclusion
What is the relevance of this study of deportation for our understandin g of
citizenship? First, it has observed that deportation is more than an unpleasant,
coercive aspect of immigration policy. Deportation is less a contingent feature
and more a logical and necessary consequence of the international order. It is
actually quite fundamental and immanent to the modern regime of citizenship.
If citizenship, following Hindess, can be seen not just as rights and responsibil ities exercised within a polity, but a marker of identi cation, advising state and
nonstate agencies of the particular state to which an individua l belongs, then
deportation (along with extradition and other forms of repatriation ) represents a
means by which this principle can be operationalized .
Deportation is certainly legitimated and authorized by the modern regime of
citizenshipthough we have seen in the course of this study that it is only one
of a number of ways in which expulsion has historically been rationalized. But
it is more than just a logical consequence of this regime of citizenship. To call
it a constitutiv e practice, a technology of citizenshipas I did at the outsetis
to say something else. It is to argue that deportation is actively involved in
making this world. The modern order of citizenshipin which population is
divided and distributed between territories and sovereigns, and in which rights
depend mostly on national membership within territorial politiesdoes not
reproduce itself naturally. In other words, we can see deportation like diplomacy,
economic policy, border controls, or schooling, as a practice that is constitutive
and regulative of its subjects and objects. Nothing illustrates more powerfully,
and more tragically, this sense of deportation as constitutive than the practice of
population transfer during the middle of the twentieth centurya point at
which the state is brutally harnessed to the goal of creating ethnically homogeneous nations. If this vision of the nation authorized mid-twentieth century
deportation practices (and still does with ethnic cleansing), a question I have not
resolved but which begs further research is: what kind of image of political
community is presupposed by deportation today?
But there is also a methodologica l point to be made here about how we might
study the changing content of modern citizenship. A key analytical assumption
of this paper is that it is useful to select a particular practice and follow it
over a relatively long historical period. In this way we are able to avoid some
of the pitfalls of more presentist perspectives. By comparing different forms
of expulsion it has been possible to trace signi cant shifts in the package of
rights, duties and expectations that attend citizenship. For example, we have seen
that a history of deportation offers certain insights regarding the relations
between citizenship, population and territory. A distinguishin g feature of the
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
are obliged to accept persons who are not their nationals, but who have passed through their territories in
the process of claiming asylum in other countries. At present EU states employ such agreements to oblige
postcommunis t states to shoulder responsibilities for providing asylum.
Oda (1968) The individual in international law, in: Srensen (Ed.), Manual of Public International Law,
pp. 469, 482; cited in Goodwin-Gill (1978).
A possible objection to my adaptation of police as an art of international government might be the
following: how can there be an international police in the absence of a centralized, global policing
authority? Yet as Dean and Hindess helpfully point out, although there were centralizing tendencies in
seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, the enterprise of police was not synonymous with centralized
power. For police was expected to be taken up locally and by a variety of non-state agencies (Dean and
Hindess, 1998, p. 3). Similarly, it seems reasonable to consider the international police of aliens and others
as an activity undertaken on a dispersed, only loosely-coordinate d basisby states, but by other agencies
(for example, UN agencies) as well. In an unpublishe d paper Dean has outlined the notion of a global
liberal police, a concept which informs the present idea of an international police of aliens.
See Preu (1998, p. 146), who explains that this principle was rst articulated in nineteenth century
American constitutional debates.
But compare Agamben with Gilroy (1999), who uses the concept of camp and camp mentality to
problematize formations of race and nation. Gilroy advocates diasporic culture as an alternative to that of
the camp, and calls for a politics situated between camps.
See the critical discussion of such international zones in Council of Europe (2000).
See A Practical Guide to Interventing in Airports, published by the Ile de France section of the Collectif,
at , http://www.bok.net/pajol/ouv/cae/intervention.e.html . .
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