Foreign paliey, gloholfZlIfiO/1

aI/ri FPA

79

Throughout
tbis book wc havc ernphasizcd
1hal fon:ign paliey is an
aCLvity t'hat has rclativc autonomy,
deriving [ro111 the roles ar lhe
decision makcrs, burcaucratie
politics OI' the stHte itsclf. Argu<:Ibly, as
[In activity situated on the <.:'usp between the domcslic and extclllill
envirorunents,
foreign policy will !lave a formalivc
effect 011 lhe
activities
occurring
across the domcstic~international-global
llCXtlS.
Tn this context, the gap in contemporary
IR thcory, framed by the

Foreign policy, globalization

and the study of foreign
policy analysis

nmtual theoretical and conceptua! neglecr 01' FPA and GT, is dcar1y
significant.
Tile, ajm of ths t..:hapier i5 noL to tr)' to dose this gap, but {O achicve

or

lnlro<1l1ctioll
Althollgh lhe tcnn 'globalization'
has bcen in academic use since lhe
1970s,. no serious atlempts
were made to theorizc it ulltil tlle late
1980s. Thesc attcm]~ts developed into a stimulating
debate, comprising
wha1 Held et til., 10 thctr 11l't1uclltial work Global TrclIIsjorrn{llions,
tcrlll globa.lizatiol1 theory (GT).I ExaminJtion
af what we deem to
br. lhe bcst.kllOWIl works, and most popular lorums 011 glob::llizalion.
rC"G1Js lha! ll)l'cign polie)) -- lhe Sllm of the extemal l'el:~lions under~
luklT1 by [111illCicpcn(lcn( aetO!' (usu;:]lIy a slalc) as pari' of intcmationa!
1,'clill.I0I1S -" is. virl'I1:-1Jly, l'xc.JuJr:cI [ronl GT.~ Similarly,
as discllssed
in
t.he Illtn,)liuctloll
to t.ills book, SlUQCllts af FPA usually exclude GT
from its miltrix'. In om view, lhe. mutual excJusion af FPA :md GT is
robJem1:lLic. Forcign
poliey is seell usually
as the quintcsscntial
'bO\lUdary'
<lclivlty,
at the interface
between
the domcstic
and the
C'XtCl11111 spheres. \~ThiJc these sphcrcs have never becn completely
sl~IXU'Ll'(;, thc bouncltlry
bet',Vecll them scems to bave becomc more
poJ'ous ,IS ti rcsu!l' 01' globa]izalion
- (I 11711Iiidinu'lIsiono! conlcs/ed
jJl'On':,s ,Ilar iJ1l!oll'cS (/li ilJcI'e([sing
embeddillg
jJ()/ifiaJ!,
l7liliwrI',
('(:OIlfJJllil',
Jociol, mui ndrlll'Ol (leI/P/fies
i71 polific(ll!y ulli/lcd
(quCls'i)
globClI sphaes 0./ ({cfil'ify.

oI

Ther(: ,Ire JllUllCroUS llIHnifcslatians

af this trend, For example, sincc
lhe L'nd of WWll, stalcs have become gradual1y more embedded
in a
p~cth?ra af m~ltilateral,
global political insttutions
and military orga.
l1lZntlOn~; 'natIOnal' economies
increasingly
are implantcd
1nto global
t;cuIlUnllL: arenas such as trade anti financc; and the information
tcchnology revolutlon has llHiclc it very difficult ror statcs lo control infor*
marloll.
Tbis embedding
has becn forcefully
illustratcd
in lhe
COllll'lWcrsy
(\f'

d:lssiflcd

surwunding

lhe

dissl..~J1jillillion

ar 11\1ndreds

dipJo1\1~\tic c<lhk~ ()n lhe \VikiLcaks

websitc,

~lnd

tlious:lnc!s

the more modest aim

deriving from GT a conccplualizalion
01' Ibe
possib1c ro1c/s tbat fareign poJicy plays in lhe contcxt aC globalization.
In our vicw, this would seem an csscntiaJ first stcp towaros facililating
a broader debate lhat brngs together GT anel FPA. lt IS lo be hoped

that such 'ln cneounter could lcad lhe adherenls to bOlh bodies of Ji1~
craturc reworking some kcy cancerts in light of what we would suggcsl
is lhe l11utually L:onstitutive impact af globa!izalllln
Hnel forcigll policy.
For examplc,
within FPA the literaturc
011 C!ccision m~lking HJlJ
bllreaucratic
polllics assumes, if unwittingly, that lhe slal'c is ~lbOlllldcd
cntity. \Vl1ilst globalizulion
cloes not cntail an unnlvclling ol' lhe ::;latc

Crom above

il

sovereignty'

anel authority

does suggcst,

115

we 5h311 SCC, th::lt statcs are poolillg

to a grcatcr

c1egree than bcforc. This

lheir
mC.lllS

l1mt c1ccision making anel bureaucralic

politics Hfe not mcrely loentrel
at lhe levei Df the nalional cxecutivc, bul in some cases are embedclecl
within global po.1itical framcworks. Referring to lh~ classifications
idcntific.d in Chapter
5, \ve \VauleI suggest tha1 quasi- llld clustc1'ed
stales are more cxposccl 10 this dynamic thall I:1re institllt.ional slalcs,
A lharongh cX<lmina1ion
af lhese implicalions
is bCYOlld lhe scopc of
this chaptcr, but wc hope lha1 QUI' conceptioll
o[ thc rolc/s 01' forcigll
paliey in lhe conTcxt of globalzation
conslitll1Cs a eoncrele CfJlllTibuLion lowards a debate thal \vi11 engage wilh 1hese issues.

Thc fIrst great dehate

for foreign polic)'
Hypel'globalists

I'S.

011

glohalization: implicntian,

global sceptics

This sectiOl~ explores how thc kcy approachcs

in GT - hyperglobalist,
global.sccptic
and transformationalisl
theses.- c0I1CCp1\wJize thc causes,
(-imcfmmc anel impnct on the slale af globa.\izatioll,4 This discussioll is
gcared tO\:vards asccrtaining how ~111d1.0\\'hat cxtcnt l\lese lheses 1111ght
account for fon:igll poliey in conditlons
oI' globrllizalioll.

80

Foreign policy, globalization

and FPA

Foreign policy, globalizalion and FPA

IVe begin by examining the hyperglobalisl lhesis. This sehool of
thought emerged within a sccllnrio of two processes that sccmcd to
sweep the 1V0rld in the late 1980s and early 1990,: the revolution in
information tcchnologies, and the triumph af capitalisrn and a liberal
dcmocmcy ovcr rival political-econornic modcls, for examplc, Fascism
and Communism.' According to the byperglobalisl lhesis, lhe emergenee of a single glohal market, above ali other faetors, propels globalization. Corrcspondingly, globalization is canccived af as 'a new era in
IVhich peoples everywhere are inereasingly subject to the disciplines of
lhe global market place'. 6
From lhis vantngc point globali7.ution js secn as having a significant
npacl 011 the slate. John Gray, for instance, contends thal as a rcsult
of globalizatioll 'nation-slalcs find thcll1sclves in an unfamiliar envir.
onment in wruch lhe behaviour of global market forces is decrcasing!y
predictabJc or eontrollable'.' This, he argucs, reduccs the Jeverage af
sovereign nation-states. Other hypcrglabalists, such as Kenichi Ohmae,
hold even more extreme convictjons that 'economic globalization is
eonslructing new forms of social organization thal are supplanling, or
that lViUeventllalJy supplant, traditional nation-statc as the primary
economic and political units af world socicty'.8
By inference, the assertions made by the hyperglobalist thesis
rcgarding lhe nature anel .scopc af globalization, its causes and its
impact on the stalc, havc dramatic implications for fareign policy.
Forcign policy, a quinlcssentially politic.-11 activity, is rendcred cXlin.
guished by teehoology and the emerging single market global eeonomy.
Thus, FPA, with its emphasis on lhe relative aulonomy of forcign
policy, is rendered incompatiblc with the hyperglobalisl thesis, which
1V0uldappear to reinforcc the mutual exclllsivity of FPA and GT.
The controvcrsial argumcnts of the hyperglobalist thesis gencrated a
wavc af criticaI wrilings, One of lhe most farecfu] critiques came [rom
wh;.I{came to bc known <lS the global.sccptic thesis.9 The global-sceptic
thcsis scts ou! (Q critique a kcy hypcrglobalist argumenl that the
P()sl..CW world hcnduetl l IltW cpoch in human history driven by the
lagic of a single market global cconomy and the information technology rcvolution. To this end, global sceptics compare cconomic data
from lhe late ninetccnth and twcnticth centurics, for examplc, labour
mobility across the globe, convergence of the worId cqpomy arollnd a
singlc currcncy and freedom of trade. Based On this cOInparison
thcy cancllldc thal lhe late twcntieth ccntury does not represcnt a fundamcnlully ncw era in lhe glabalization
af the economy. They
contcnd that, in some respccts, the late ninctcenlh-century
world
cconomy was more globalized than the Inter twentieth.century

81

econamy and that the formcr representeu a new cpoch in lcrms af the
elfeclS generated by new technologies; the invenlions of the telegraph,
the stcamboat and stcam lrains in lhe late ninetccnth ccntury are
identified as having generated similar if nOl greatcr social, cconomic
and politieal elfeets to those. produeed by lhe 1T revolutioll.
If globalization does not, as the hyperglohalists argue, represen! a
nelV era, then what does il reflect? Global scepties contend that
the hyperglobalisl depiction of globalizatiOI1 is a myth desiglled to
advanee the nstitutionalization of the nco.libcral cconomic project.1O
They argue that this bas resulted in lhe discourse surrounding globalization bcing frarned by the assumption Ihat the process has incv.
tablc conscqucnces., whieh states ignore at their peril. Glob:tl secplics
are espccially erilical of the hyperglobalist argument Ihat the logic
of the global singlc IJHlrkel is dictaling Lhe winners and losers
amang statcs.
What are the implications of nn alternativc sccptic account for
intemational politics - and particularly forcign policy? Global sccptics
argue that what hyperglobalists call globalization is in facl an intensified phase in lhe iotemalionalization
of the world's pOlVerfuI states
and lhcir economies. lntemationalization
like glabalization,
refers
to a growing interdependence bctween statcs, bUl intcrnatiollulizatian
assumes statcs continue to be discrete national units wilh clearly
dernarcated and mutually exclusive borders of vjolcncc.11 Borders 01'
violence rneans that borders are nOl merely administrativc divisions,
but boundarics across which conllicl may emerge. Through this prism
the statc is conceivcd as entircly atherwisc than in relrcat. lt is states,
partieularly the most powerful states, thal define the scope and nature
of globalization, rather than vice versa. In faet, the sccpties arguc thal
eonlemporary inlemationalization
reflects the political distribulion of
powcr arnong stronger and weak'Cr':'itltes.
Conceptualizing the post.CW era as a form of intcrnariollulization
rather tluln elnh~lizllion cntails ~ diffcrcnl llotion of forcign policy
than lhe hyperglobalist thesis. In conlrast to lhe hypcrglobalist
account, fareign policy is nor extinguishcd by the uncontralled economic-technological
forces driving gJobalization. lnstcad, by dint af its
bcing a kcy state aL:livily, foreign poliey is at the heart af an esscntially
state~driven process of internationalizatioll.
Wilhin trus frarnework
FPA would play a central role in explaining holV foreign policy making
and its implerncntation affect eontemporary intemationali7.ation.
At firsl glance this idea might seem compeJling. However, lhe globalsceptic account exhibits a number af weakncsses lhal wauld secm to
undel'mine its core argurnent. First, lbe contcnlion lhal in rerms 01' the
l

82

Foreigll po/ic.r. g!ohali::(lfioll

(/lu! FPA

FOl'eign policy, g/oba/iz(lrioJl

global ccon01l1Y ~Ind tcchnologiral

innovatioll the lale nineteenth
and
lale twcnticlh
centurics
are .lndamcnmlJy
similar, is predicalcd
on
an ~xtreme Eurocc.ntric vic\V. r;or lhe global south, these periods are
J"lot c0111parablc, Jn the late llinClcc~;tb ccntury
n;uch ai' the gl?bal
south was lllldcr European c\ornillrtrion. HowcvL:r, Slllce lhe end oi lhe
C\V counlrl(;:s comprsing
Lhe g10bal ::;outb, for examplc, lndia, lwvc
bccomc l'or1111dable playcrs in lhe world economy
anel intcrllalional
polltics. Thus, the c1aim thaL for c.:ountrir;;:s in (l1c global sO.\Jt~)the. late
ninctccnL'h flntl twcnticth centuries rcprcscnt a sOl1lc\vhar sJtnllar slluatiOIl is completely

flawcd.

St.~colH.i.rhe .global-sceptie iJccounl \\'ollJd secm to understlte the

ckgrce to wbich the tnmsnational
environment
surrounding
slalt::s h<l5
becomc de.tlser and more conl()Ie-x ...Thc scopc and nature of non-ststc
::\c'Wrs .- I'rom NGOs r\.nd MNCs, lo lcrrorist groups, diasporas
and

lhe cllvlronmcnt,

to global markcls - prescnls 10 statcs <1nunprecc-

cnvironrnenr.l2
The globa1 sccptic
account,
ho\\'cver, undcreslil1'l.atcs tbis shirl, providing I:lll inaccunne conceplit'l1
oI' !.!lobalizaljll, jts C,I\JSCS anel the possible implications
for

c!enleel])' densl;; anel compl('x

fo~'elgll p~)licy.J[ does nol seclll lIseful, lhcrefore, for FPA lo ad~pt
ulobaI4sL'Cpli\..' proPOSitiOllS
::IS lhc basis fuI' an examinatian
af forclgn
plllic-y iH COllclitions 01" globalizationlintcmationalization.
Adoptillg
(l sceplic position could rcsult in FPA, similar to the globnl.sceptic
HCC01Ull. adopling a11 cssential1y Eurocentrie. view and undcrstating
rec~n1' c.haJlges IH the tHll1snatiol1al cnvirOllmcnt.
The transformationalist

thesis: towanls

thjrd way'!

The vic\\'s wilbin lhe global-sccptic

rh(:sis hiWC proITJpred studenls af
globalizaOll
lO revisit lhe dc.:b;l,tc. resulling
in a thircl strand
CocLlscd
(iH tllC first l:!,reat debate in elobalizfll'JOn: tllC transformaliuna!lsl Ulesis.
Thc tfall;fo~mationali$l
the~is crtically scruLinizcs lhe debrltc betwce-n
lhe hypcrglobalists
anti global sceptics 011 globalization,
its cau~cs and
,imlX\Ct. As \-\lC mcnLioned in the introcluction
to this book, by th(: end
of tl1e '1990s th.is scrut'iny bad ddincel lhe contours
of the 111's1' grcat

de bale 011 globalizRtioll and placccl lhe lUlIlsformalionalist

thesis at. t'he
rorcl'ront of WlWL cl1l~rgecl as GT lJ Thcre are. tbrcc claims \.lndeI'.
pil1l1il1g lhe tral1SfOrnl~ltional5t accounl' whjch are pcrtincllt to. thc
disCll~;sion here. V.,.'c c.\,unilll~ e.1cb in tllrll to clarify thcir implicaLJon$
\()r th;:: ~lcti\'ity 01' rorcign

policy in r,.;OIH.litions of globHli2<l1101l.

The lrans!ormat1onalist
lhcsis challcnges
lhe vicw that globalizntion is ali cconomics-drivcn
procc.ss anel proposcs nslead thGt it is
drivcn by ;1 fundamenta.l
shin in the spario-ternporal
constirution

Df 111.1man socictics.

anti FPA

For cXl:lmple, Held el <:11.define globnliz<llion

8.1
as ';]

process (Dl' set af processes) w.hidl cmbodies a transformalion

in lhe
spllial organisation
af social rclatlons and transactioJts
- Hssc,ssed in
tcrms of lllcir cxtensity, inlcll,sily, velocity anel impacl - gt.:ncratlng
tnlllSL'OnLinclllal OI' interregiollal i10ws anel networks of activily, illtcraet.iol1 anel the cxercisc af power'. 1-1Scholtc, in turn, pcrccives globaJi.
zation
as 'dctcITitorialization',
ar the growlh of 'supralcrritorial'

rclations

amoJIg

peoplc.15

Schltc

cmphasizcs

Lhat globtllizatioll

'refers to a far-rcaching
change
in lhe naturc
af sorial spar,.;c'.l
As .noted earlier wilh rcfcrcncc lo Rosenberg's work, transfoJ'mationalists <trgLl~ that the shifl in lhe organization
of t.ime and sp:lce
has bccn so profound
that it 11<lS revcaled a retrospcctivc
and basic
lacuna in thc elassical, tcrritorillly grollnded tradition 01' social lllcory,
which rcquircs <1 ncw, post~classicnl
soci:-tJ theory to bc dt.:velopc.d,
in whtch lhe categories
space and limc assume c,cntra!, expiln:1.l0ry
roles. 17

ar

Baseei

OIl

this spatio.lemporal

c:onccplinn

of globaliz,HioJl

nncl its

causes, lhe transfonnationalisllhcsis

provides an aC:COLln\ rlthc illlpacl
af globalization
on lhe stare. Trallsformationalists
Slrcss lhe: t'hangcs
prompted
by globalizatioll.
oul :cognize the stalC'S cnpacily (o adapl
in lhe face af these chlllges anti do not forcscc a c1isappcarancc 01'
the state fmm the. various glol;ill arenas in which it opcrales. Thcy
cmphasize
also that, alt"hollgh ~not emirely control1cd,
gJobalization
is slrongly politicizeel anel i5 state rcgl.lIated.18 Transformtlliona!isLs
prcfer to cliscuss lhe trcnus gcncralcu
by globalizatioll
in 1erms oI' (l
Ir<:tm.,[orJ1l<llon or lhe state sllcb lhat 'ils pO\VCl'S, t'Oles anel f\.lnCl,\)n~
are rcarllclllnt.cd, rcconstitutcd
anel rc-embeddecl at the inlcrScl'lillll De
globaliziog
and rcginalizing
nelworks and s)'stcms'. \0 Thus. they do
nOl SUpp0rl lhe mmincnt dcmisr. 01' the staLe suggcs(cd by lhe hypLrglobalisls. Nor do lhey accepl the global-sceptic
"ie", lhal lhe role oI"
st:'lles in the glob.1 arena has rcmained esscntially unchangcd.
Rall1cr,

thc transfonnCltionalist
spacc.,

globalzation

thesis suggests
is redenning

tl1at, in reorganizing

lime anel

the territorial
basis undcrpinnng
the political urder af the sovcrcign llnlion~slate, anel its correspollc1ing \Vestphfllian intcm<.llion[ll
order, C,'.ompclJing stalcs lo tnlllSJOrm
and adap1.2rl
Although
tbe transfonnatiollHlisl
ilCCollnt 01" the jmp<-Icl f globalzation 011 lhe state is more lluanccd ihan the hypergJobalist
and global~
secptic {ht~scs, ir does not hclp lO c:xplain Corcign poliey in conditiolls
of globaliz(jtion.
The prob1cm lies in the fact that similar to the
hyperglobalist
thesis lhe lransrormarionalisl
approach conccives of thc
statc
as
externaI
anel
countcr-positioned
10
contemporary

84

Foreign poUcy. globaUzaliol1 and FPA

Foreign poJicy, g/oba/izatioll and FPA

globalization. Also, foreign policy, as a key state aclivity and as a

major embodiment of the state in lhe global arena, is rcndercd externaI
and counterpoised to gIobalization. Furthermore, lhe olltological prim<lcy tha1 the transformationalist thesis attributes to time and spacc
rcnders foreign policy subordinated in some essential way to lhe logic
prcscribed by the spatio-temporal processes driving globalization. In
onlological terros, tbis fonnulation is prob1crnatic: it implie,<; that most
government political aclion not aimcd at hantcssing globalization 15
doomcd to faiI. !l suggests also that tradilional forcign policy, which
tends to assume the primacy Df lhe poltical, is subsilll1ed by spatiotemporal processes and is barely rclcvant. Hencc, the lransformation.
alist thesis is somewhat fatalistic about the prospects for the political
Jnlnagcment of globalization and underestimates the degree of choice
open to govemmenls.21 It foUows fram lhis that, vicwed through
lhe rrnusformationahsl pnsm, loreign policy and the sludy of FPA
have virtually no role in lhe debate over globaIizatiOl1.
This perception is reinforccd by !low the transformationalist
thesis
conccives of the relatiollship bctween globalizat.ion anel nternational
politics - understood as the intcractions among state actors, across
state boundaries, that havc a specific palitical contcnt and character.
The transformationalist thesis converges around the assumption that,
at some historical juncturcs, most notably the late nnetcenth century,
globalization and international politics \Vere mutually constitutive. For
instance, Hcld ct aI. arguc lhat 'the rapidly devcloping empircs af
Britain and of other European statcs \Vere the mast powerful agcnts af
globalization'.22 However, the transformationalist thesis suggests that
internalional politics ane! globalization after the age af empire are
aL odds beca use the cconomic and spatia-temporal transformations
gcnerated by globalization corrorle the contemporary territorial~based
intenlalional system of states. Thus, Rosenau nrgues that global.
izatio.n iallows peoples, informatio1l1 norms, practiccs, and institutions,
1.0 move about ablivious to ar despitc boundaries'.23 The trans!ormutiomt1ists arguc furtJcl
lh<tl ontcmparary
'nun.tcrritoriaJ
globalization gencratcs a transformation that is replacing the \\'est.
phalian intcrnational order with a multi~layercd system
global
governance in which sub.state, inter~state, supra~state and private
go\'cruanee bodies opera te simultancously, bcyond the confines 01'
statcs'.24 In these aecounts, internaliona! politics (fte~' 'th~ age' of
cmpire), predicated 011 the lcrrit.orial1y based intcl"national system
of statcs, is subsumed hy ncm-territorial globalization. Farcign po.licy,
a constllutivc elcment wiLhin international politics,' is perceivcd in
sln1i'Jar tenns.

ar

A mutually constituti,e
for foreign policy

(hesis of globalizatioll:

85

implicaOons

So far, the first great debate 011 globalization ooes not seem to COn~
tribute tq the conccptualization of the possiblc mieIs oC foreign poJicy
in the context of globalization. The hyperglobalist thesis implics thar
foreign policy 1S extinguished by economic anel technological forces.
The transformationalist thesis suggcsts that the state - anel by cxtcnsion foreign policy - is compellcd to change according to the ,logic
prescribed by a radical transformation in the organization af time and
spacc. If globalization werc to bc understood as generating thcsc typcs
of conditions, it would be conccived as rcndering forcign policy insig~
nificant, leaving little room for FPA to contributc to our understanding
of global processes.
We reject this suggcstion. In the remainder af this chapler we
rchearse an argument that should constitutc a fourth thesis of globali~
zation: the mutually constitutive thesis. This thcsis builds 011 t:he body
of knowledge drawn on in Chapter .I to dcvelop the notion of the
clustered state.25 Based on a thrcc-pronged critique of the hypcrglobalist and, transformationalist
theses, we argue that this Iiterature
constitutes the foundation for a mutually constitutive thesis af globali~
zation. We explain this tllcsis with Lhe aim af deriving thc passiblc
role/s af foreign policy in the context of globalization.
A firsl critique is that the transformationalist
lnel hypcrglobalist
theses attribute ontological primacy to spatio.temporal and to cco~
nomic elements respeetively, in conceptualizing globalization and its
causes. In contrast, a neo.Weberian view of the mutually constitutive
thesis is not concerncd with cstablishing ontological primacy, but con~
siders globa1ization as a l11ulti-centric, multidimensional and dialectical
proccss constituted by poli tical a.ncl military factors alongside other
elements - economic, technological, cological, social, etc. A neo.
Weberian ontology, by denying primacy to any one elemcnt, allows
rvn;;j~1I

puliL:Y lu bt.: L:ulll;civt.:u

(1~ Ullt.: alllollg

scvl:ral

Ull~tilUl..:nl:SuI'

globalization.26
A second criticism concerns the conccptualizalion af the relationship
betwcen globalization and the statc. Hyperglobalists sec globalization
rendering the state increasingly irrelevant whilst transformalionalists
take the :more modcratc view that globalization compels states to
transformo Thus, the hyperglobalist and transrormationalist
theses
converge around the assumption that the stalc is externaI Hnd counter~
positioned to eontemporary globali~ation. This conccptualization is
rejected by the mutually constitutivc thesis. Shaw, for insl.ance, argues

~(1

Fon'igl1

fJOhi')', .~/Jh(/fi;:(tfiOrl

(//ul FPA

Foreign polie)', g/o/J{lIi:{lliolJ

l"ba! 'glob8liz1Lioll do~s nul ulldcrminc

lhe .stat.c bm inclucles the
trallsf~nnation
01' St'iltc rrms. lt is bOLh predieated
011 and pr?cluccs
sueh transformations'.:?7
This elaim encapsulates
the perceptlOn
p.:lobalization-statc
reh'\tions in the mutually
consLilutive Lhesis of
~lobaliz8.tion. "Ir considers that globalizatioD is botl: prc~icated on aIld
produccs {ransformations
within the statc, in a rclatlonshlp that renclers
(hc two l11utuallv cOlIstitutivc.:?1I
'T'his concc.p;alizatil,11
is pertincl1t lO our discussiuu bccallsc most
f1CCCILJnt;; or rOJ'cign
l,n]icy l\:cognizc t.lwt 11 is driven central1y by lhe

or

SWll\2<J

CorrcspoJ1clillgly.

ir the rci(ltionship

bctwccn

global.ization

anel

!he state is mutlln.lly conslilutive,

thcl1 /o/'eign pn!fcy and glob(l/izalion

are ({Iso mUTually
COllsfi/llfil'c.
As an embodiment
01' slatc activity,
foreign policy ean bc conceivtd .....
as a key site Df statcs' political actioIls
whilst rcspanding
to the challcnges
and opportunities
prescnted
by
globalization,
Israel and Egypt offer intcresling examples
h,ow statcs
miglH make use of foreign paliey in the (;ontcxt af globalizatlOl1. Both
sl.\tcs carried out a dnunatic
shirt in thcir lraditional
foreign paliey,

?f

partJy with th~ ail11 (lI' llsinB the shifl to embcd tbeir counlries'
cl'llllomics

in globlil

sphcrc~;

or aClJvitks.

ln

national

Ih.: l~Clse CJC Egypl,

lhe

del'isioll to sign anel rnaHn.in jts 1971) pe<.\cc agrcemcnl \vith Israel,
cnding threc dccades ar 1Josti1ily anct nvc \vars, was incxtricably linkcd
to the aim a[ opcning up Egypt's economy through the injitah refrms.
Sincc then, Egypr's cconomy has relied more than in the past on for.
cign sources of incornc, ror instance, US and foreign aid, tourism and
'"(['Qwing levcls of forcign c1ircct investment.
Israel's dccision to engagc
~1 lbe Oslo Proccss \\11th tbe Palesline t,iberatioll OrB:(111izatioll, an~r

lhre:c dccaelcs of mutual

jJcnce process

ngntion,

WtlS incxtricably

cxhibils

a similar lagic. Jnitiating the

Lhe Israel i econ.
fJ(Hticularly in crcating the polilical

linkc,d Wilh cmbcddillg

Oll1Y in global sphercs of activlY,

c0nditons
that allo\\'ccj Jsraeli comp;lnics
lO penelmlt: cllIcagng
markcts in Asia.:w
The third critique witbin the mutnally consritutive
approach
lhe
hypcrglobalist
anel translormationalist
thescs relates to thcir conceptlH~lization of th<: relntionship
,?ctwccn intemntional
politics .and

or

globalzation,
As nOled abovc, the hYl)Crglobalist and transformntJOn.
,di.sl lhcscs concede lhal d1.1ring lhe age of ernpire, global1zntlOl1 anel
intcrIl,Hional politics \\'cr~ nluluaJly cOlls\"ilutlve. HowcveJ', t)le a<.1vcl1t'
l)!' llo11-tcrrirorial

glob.\lizuLion

cOlllller.posiLions

tb~se clcments,

The

11l11LUallvCOllsLitllLive {\tc'sis of !.dobalizatioLl pro poses a different wny to

\lndcrsl;nJ
the interrelat.ionsl;ip
betwccn globalization
JIld inwl11ational politics. Namcly, sincc the age ar empire,3] ro the C\V, to lh~
glokll 'war on tcrror/~' intcl'national
politics has had a c1ialectical efrect

{fluI FPA

87

Df contributing
sLmuitaneLLsly lo globalizillioll
<lnd fragmclllHtion,
Since lhe hypcrglobafist
[Ind transformationaJisl
theses roem 011 t'1le
fragmenting
cffcct.s gcnerated by internationa!
politics, we wou1d highlight t.hcir constit\ltivc

role in globalizatioll

anel thc pluce oi' forcigll

policy in this process, We [aeus on the CW, beca use therein Jie thc
SOllrces 01' contcmporary
globaJization
and wilhn it lhe formativc role
of foreign polcy.
In Chaplcr 5 wc sugge,sted that the illLra.syslL'.lllic dynamics undn.
pinniJlg lhe C\V gave birth lO a polilienl, mi!itrll:Y, ccoJwrnic aliei kgaJ

instittltional
framC'work
agglomcmtion
eOllst.innes

thnl unc1erpins thc wcsl. Ths in~ritLl1ionnl

w11nt \VC tCl'm a global c)ustcr. SlaH':s C0111.
are describcd as clustcred swtes, The emergCl1cc or

prising thc grouping

lhe global cluster and thc political-military
forces driving this process
are at the heart of our nccount
af how international
politics t1J1d
globalization
are Illlltually constitutive,
cspecialJy in lerms of cxpbining the shift fram inlernalionalizatioIl
to globalizatioll.

As alrcndy cicscribed, internationalizalion

presumes llwt whlc social
I'clatiolls expand sti\l'es r~11lain discrcll.' IlatoJ1nl llJlits wilbin dCilrly
dernarcntecl anel lllllluatJy
r.:xclusivc borclcrs of ViO!CIlCC, In tb~se tcrJ1"Js,
lhe no1.ion of internationa'fization
eSpOllSl'S lhe di."ects gcncnll'ed by
lhe cxpansion
of socitl.! relatiol1s to the global scaJc dllring lhe consolidation
of Europcan
cmpires. This period, as 3lready no[cd, witnesscd an expansion in social rclations such that hypcrglohalists
and
transformationalists
consider
it the starling poinl of contcmporary,
non-tcrritorial
globalization,
Thc
mutually
constilutiw
thcsis
of global.izntion
etnphasizt:s
politieal-militarist
processes anel challcngcs
lhe vicw thal the il~C or'
empire \vas a I'orm 01' Ilon-tcrritnrinl
globnlizalioJJ
1\:-,: M,i.lIlll .and
others observe, the proc('ss of imperial cOllsolidallon was nccompHnicd
by tlle llaturaliZaton
oI' civil soeieties nto nation-sLalcs, 'cagcti by siatc
sovercignty
and
boundnries'.
Correspondingly,
an inter-imperial
order emerged in whic.:h eC/cll Ellropean
nntioll-stnte
empire was itsclf
a world arder exhibiling
its own allthority
slructurc,
trade regime,
dominant
languagc and culture,33 Thus the hyperglobalisls
and lrami.
1

Jormatiallalists
social

rel:llions

might arguc

that during

tlle consoJic1ation

af cmpircs.

miglll

have bccome
globaL Howevcr,
3S "cagcd',
'border~power-contain.ing'j
nalion-slatc-empin.',
forms, operating withi:n
an inter-imperial
arder, slatcs rcmained
d.iscrete, bOl"clcrcd n<lljoll~d
1.Inits, This lllcans tba! thc cxpansion
or social relations during the age
af empirc eouid not have becn more than internationaJization.
For globalizatioll
to emerge a chal1ge in lhe poli fica/ stl'llCll/re
oI'
social rcla1.ions was required,
Such a shift entnils erosion
the

ar

88 Foreigll poliey, globalizatioll alld Fi' A

national discrc(cness af stalcs sc:::parntcd by lhe demarcalcd and
mulually cxclusive borders Df violence lhat charactcrizcd lhe nalion.
stntc-cmpirc fOfm and its corresponding international arder. Thc
graduul replacemenl of lhe inler-slale impelial arder by lhc global
cJ-ush.:rgcncratcd thal eroding cIfcct. The cmcrgcncc af this institurional framcwork promptcd states voluntarily - ir partially - to
poal (heir so\'crcignly and use political force," at leasl in the externai
spllcre, la form .a raft af intcrnational poltical and military institu(jons. This workcd to climinatc lhe bordcl's af violence betwecn statcs
and promptcd a pooling and coordination af authorily and lhe use af
political force in a range af international institutions, So much SO, that
statcs cllgaged in what lkenberry and Deudncy Tcfer to as 'security
co-binding' ar an 'attempt to tic one allot}ler down by locking each
olher into jm;titutians that mutually constrain one another'.34 In the
proccss of lhis crosion of slalC boundarics, states wcrc "uncaged' (to
paraphrasc Mann), and drivcn to rcducing lhe 'statizalion' of their
cconomies, societics and cultures.
As a result of the changing intcrnational political stnIcture, the
expansion of social relations to a global seale through lhe activities of
privatc, sub-stale and supra-state entities, was tak~g place within an
allcrcd intcrnational political context. The previolls borders af violcnce
belwccn componcl1t states wcre climinnted, no n:t of internalional
politically intcgratcd institulions was cstablished, and an interlacking
gcopolitieal and economic eontcxt bound a core &roup of eapitalist
libl:ral-dcmocratic statcs. Under lhese conditiolls, ,\1\1] unJikc the pcriod
of imperial consolidalion, the cxpansion of social rclations was not
condilioned by a jJolilically fragmenled, inlernalio".,1 polilical framework. lnstead, social rclations cxpan~cd within a politically unified
sphere genernled by lhe global clusler nf 'tales. The lerm 'unified
political sphcre' does not suggest that this realm was frec of political
prC'sure. For inslance, lhe facl lhat a Ji\lralily nf slales compriscd this
sphcrc gcneratcd some frictiolls. Diffcr~nces in lhe wesc over lhe US
\'\'or wilh Vicmnm and its involvemcllt iJi lhe J973 Arab-Israeli war are
(wo cxamples.
However, lhe global c1mler is gencrally regarded as heing politically
unificd given lhe pooling of sovereignty, the climination of borders af
violcnce alld the instatement of a global laycr of intcmational instituo
lions. LIis againsllhis polilical-mililary buckdrop lhal lhe key finding of
the transfarmationalist thcsis - lhat the cxtcnsity, intensity and impact
of globnlizaiton incrca<:;ensincc the cnel af \VWJl- neecls to bc understoad, This cxpansion af social rclalions within an altcred political
spacc crcatcd lhe conditions for the risc af contcmporary glabalization.

Foreigll polie)', globalizatioll alld FPA

89

Within th.is vicw, the rise of contemporary globalization lakes on a

diIferent characler lO lhal dcpiclcd by lhe hyperglobalist and lransformationalist theses. Spatio.lcmporal and cconomic-tcchnolagical
processes are not lhe key driving forces af the risc of conlcmporary
globalization.
lt is thc politico.mililary
processes lIndcrpinning the
emergence of lhe global clusler lhal lie aI lhe heart of conlemporary processes of globalizalion. In lhis accounl lhe significance of
[oreign policy is ils conlribulion lo defining the inlerfaee between
intemational politics and globalization. A core group of liberal, capilalisl and democralie stales Iies aI lhe hearl of lhe global cluslel'. As
Mann and others argue, lhe," slales were uniled in lerms of their
global jnterests, and similar in lerms af their capitalisl anel nntion-statc
structures, anel thcir trade anel invcstmcnt with cach olheI" dominalcd
lhe world economy,

:'111
af whih c.rcated a brold cOl1scnslIlIl

fOllndntion

for ncgotiations over internalional arrangemcnts.l~

Under the pretext of modernizmion and dcvelopment and, later,
promotion of dcmocracy, western stales t1sed foreign policy to produce
and sustain liberal spaccs,3G Liberal space meanl expandng cconomic
and lo a lesser extenl political libcralism, with the purpose af crcating
demacratic subjects, and institutions to admiJster them. In this respcct
foreign poLicy convergence within lhe core af lhe global cluster, around
mainlaining political.military pooling and cxpansion af liberal SPlCCS,
providcd the ncccssary political-military
conditions to slIst,.lin lhe
global c1uster Clnd lhe rcslIltant risc of contcmporary gl(lbi11Jzall~ill.
By lhe samc Jogic, contcmporary globali7.ation rcinforccs the forc,lgn
policy stance of political.mililary
integration within the wcst anel the
cxpansion af liberal spaccs.
Conclusion

This chapler examined globalizalion lheory in lerms of lhe rolels .cf

foreign policy in lhe conlexl of globalizalion. The key Iheses compnsing lhe first greal de bule on globalizalion are unhelpful. Thc assumplion in lhe global.sccptic aCCOllnl lha!. conte.mp?rary g~oballzallan
is rnerc1y an advanccd fann af intcrtH\tiol1Clll':-uttonsuf'lcrs fr?n1 ;'1
Eurocentric bias and also understatcs lhe denslty and complexlly af
the global environrncnt in lhe first decade of the twcIlty-fir,st ~clltury.
The hyperglobalist and lransformation~lisl Ihescs of globahzahon ~re
similarly not helpful. They rendcr forelgn pohcy respecllvely as m,~gnificant ar subordinated to lhe economic-technologlcal
and spa~lOtemporal forces they identify as undcrpinning g~ob.al~ation. F?rclg~
policy, cssentially a political activity, is rendcred lllslgmficant. Smcc lt

00

FureiIU' j!(i/icy.

glo/.Julizfltiofl

(/I,eI F'P 1:1

FOl'cign

atlonJs almost no significllncc to forcign poli(,;y in lhe contcxt af glohaliz<ltion, GT in its currcnt form leaves linle roam for FPA to COll.
lribmc lo our undcl'standing
of global processes tnd the roJe/s foreign
polir.y rnight play in th<::111.
Qur proposcd
mutually cOllstitutive thesis af globalizatian,
on the
nther hand, opens a ncw agenda for foreign paliey, globalization
and
lhe sludy ar FPI\, \Ye cio nol conccivc cconnmic.tcchnological
or
spatio-tclllputal
fon.:cs as kt.:y rat:tors pl'olnpting
the risc oI" globa1izaliun. In fact, our approach
is prcdicuted 011 the assumplion
that it is
unhelpful lO assign ontological
primacy to any onc [','lctOL lnstead, wc
cl1lplo)'cd a neo-\Veberian onlology, strcssing the plurality of factors
Gonstituting
globalization.
Through
this prislll, wc conceive af 1he
causes anel irnpact 01' globaliztiflll'
samewhat
dilTcrcnUy ft'OlD how
the hypcrglobalists anel transformationrt]ists

envisage this phcnomcnon.

Cilobali7illion,
the state, and by cxtcnsion
forcign palie)', are nol
cOllJlter~positioned.
Rather, there is lllutually canstitulivc
relationship
bct\vcen glt)lJaliz,llion, thc statc fllHJ LOfl2ign policy, In addition, thc

Lxpan;;ion

01' social J'clalions

does not <lccounl ror the rise (I[

alol1c

C011lcm]1rlll'Y glbalizaliul1
anel ils impact.
Rather, it is lhe C0I1I1C/"gence bct\Vccn the exp~lJ1sion oI' socinl rel<1tiol1s - economic,
cullural

l(~chnologiC:81 -- and lhe consolidation

ar a political1y unir-icd global
cl\.l~ner during tl1e C\\I lhat gives risc lO contemp0l'ary
globalization
anel ils impacl. In other words thc cxpnnson or social rclations has to
be accompanied by a change in lhe politica] strllclUrc of social reja.
tions for globalization to emerge.
From

lhi~ V(lntnee point,

f()l'cign

policy

:{ppenrs to have lwo for1ll-

nrive t:oJes in the contex( oI' globallzatioll.

First, it constitutcs a kcy sitc
ror po'Jilical aClioll slaws mighl use to scizc lhe opport1.lnities unel meet
lhe t:h,lllengcs
OI iJllclll,lliulla!

po~cd by glbaliz:llion.
poliljcS

il.

shapcs

Srconc1,

l11C interface

ilS

a formativc

activity

bclwCCll lntematiol1al

po!itics and globalizalioll.

Wr h(1\' sllo'vvn t'll,l't lhe core libern.l states
cOl'npri:sing the global dustcr [)ursuecl a cohcrcllt and consislent forcign
policy stauce lhat provcd crucial in crcating the conditions
sustaining
the global cluster anel cllabling the rise of contcmparary globalization
1l11c1jlS liber:lI.capitalist
imprint. Adlllittcdly', an cxaminatioll
01' how
I'ofcign palie)' ill1paclcd 0'11 gJobalizalin in lhe cOlltcxl 01' the global
\\';).r on tI..'rror migln sho\V lbat it gencrated a rn.ther diffen::nl cffret.
Nevcnheless,
wc hopc \VC h;wc convcycd that ignoring foreign palie)'
rcsults in pai-lia] 8l'COlll1\S l)f 11O\\' globalizalioll
and intcrnational
j)olidcs inlcl'<.\ct.

111placing

fi-.ll"cign paliey

ductiol1 of COnlGlllporary

al. lhe core of llH: productian

globalization,

lhe mutually

anel repro-

constitl1ve

thesis

policy,

globalizrllioll

al/d FPA

91

of gJobaliz:\tion has kcy implications

for FPA. Tlu-ough lhis prism,
globalization
emerges as a proccss lhal involvcs a ll1uch gn'atcr c.legrcc
of lnrman agency lhal1 the altcrnal.lve lhcscs af globalizalion
woultl
acknowleclge. \Vith hllman agency affarded a grcater role in globaliza.

tioa, employing

FPA

and its insights

.011the processes af d~cisioll

of 1he causes nnd Impncl

~~ making wallld enh81lCe our understand1l1g

af glbalizalioll.

The tnutually constltutivc

lhesis of globalizatioll
also 11[13a COI1ceptuai impJicarion for FPA. Several notiol1s in FPA ~ from dcc1sion
11l8king, through burcaucratic
poiitics, to nations of thc externaI
cnvironmcnt

- are infol'll1cd (if implicitly)

by thc fl-ssumption

thflt thc

a boundcJ cntllv, or COLlrsc. as Chaptcrs 4 and 5 silow, FIJA

bounclary betw~en the donl~stic and externaI environments as
but tlle state is conceived of as a bounded aetor, ~vh~ch~s this,
has dcrnonstratcd, is {ar (rom thc case. 'fhe ehmlll:111011 01
af violcncc within tlle global cluster, the pooling 01'sm'crcignty
and authority,
ilnel tbc crc8tion of ti global laycr of sl.ltc il1stilUli()ll~,
suggests lhal slalcs aflcelcd by globalization are bccami.ng incr~asingly
embedded
in global spberes of aClivitics. Arguably, lhls COl1st'llutcs fi
statc is
sees the
porous,
chaptcr
borders

context

di1lerent

froJ1l

thal

oblaining

when

lhe core

arcas

af FPA

investigntion \Vcre formulatec1 c1uring thc CV/. Thcl'cforc, FP;\ should

rccan~idcr some of its key conecplions and aJap!' thcm to un cnvironment alIectcd by the conditions of globalization. Lastly, FPA has much
to contribute to the empirical stlldy af foreign policy in thc cantcxt or
O'lobalization
::lS a.rticulated
by the mutl.lul conslitutivc
l'h(;sis. This
~escal'ch agenda coule.! include sLlch thC111CSas thc irnpact of global.iJ.:at10n 011 thc forcign policy of particular slates how statcs llSC foreign
l

polie)' as a political sitc of action to capture lhe opportunities

and sei?.!::
Lhe challellgcs
g!oh<llizflt.ioll prcsent.s. anti the role 01' forcign polil'y.in

shaping thc score <1nd llaturc of globnlizatiol1.