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FACTS:
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the
petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and
partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the
petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner
presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between
the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their
effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has
the burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of
Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the
Order of Battle. As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its
investigation as rather shallow and conducted haphazardly.
PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to
conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to
the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
ANSWER: Yes.
Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and
our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the
PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and
to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their
duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more
meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following
directives:
DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate
investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the
Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo
REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to make available and
to provide copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all
documents and records in their possession and as the Commission
on Human Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph
T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the
Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the
investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the
Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous
submissions to the Commission on Human Rights, including such
records as the Commission on Human Rights may require, pursuant
to the authority granted under this Resolution;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance
to the Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to
the authority granted under this Resolution;
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to
President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.
SO VS TACLA
FACTS:
David E. So (So) filed a petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo before Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. So
filed this on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande
So meanwhile filed petition before the Supreme Court for the issuance
of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo claiming life-threatening
circumstances surrounding his daughters confinement at the NCMH.
Such which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated
her constitutional rights against solitary detention and her right to the
assistance of counsel.
The OSG thereafter filed a Motion to Admit Reply and a Reply where
the OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been
rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case
for Qualified Theft against Guisande.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
No.
Yes.
The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or
threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases
should be illegal or unlawful.
On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the
general purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition
for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a
supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate
opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.
Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat. Notwithstanding,
Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the nonbailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and
190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for being moot and
academic.
AMPATUAN VS MACARAIG
FACTS:
Hence the petition for habeas corpus.
Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the release of her husband, Police Officer
I Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). The petitioner alleged that on
14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan, who was then assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station, was asked by the Chief of Police to
report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have
been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The
writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person
is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.
ANSWER: No.
DISPOSITIVE:
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.
Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to
the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a
person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for
habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is
filed, the petition should be dismissed.
FACTS:
PERTINENT ISSUES:
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo
subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their
existing peti tion as amparo petition.
ANSWER:
No.
1.
xxx
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO
PETITION
xxx
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.
FERIA VS CA
Facts: Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May
21, 1981, up to present by reason of his conviction of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of
United States Peace Corps Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some 12 years later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed
the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer
cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements,
namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and
Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case,
including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the
inquiries made by counsel of feria, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further
MONCUPA VS ENRILE
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in
law, remained undiminished up to the present. The
Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for
violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner
was excluded from the charge under the Revised AntiSubversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is
significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have
not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail
were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas
corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents
for such a conclusion are not wanting.
ANSWER: Yes
deviation from the legal norms calls for the termination of the
imprisonment.
It can be said that the accused obtained justice ultimately but at too
high a cost. Had the case been terminated promptly as the law
requires, he would have been set free much sooner. In the traditional
sense, the right to a speedy trial cannot be invoked after the
termination of the proceedings. Nor is mandamus the only appropriate
remedy for a decision to be rendered if the statutory period set forth
by law had been exceeded. There could be cases where the writ of
liberty would, in the language of Justice Malcolm be the most
efficacious remedy. The judgment of acquittal, long overdue,
reinforces such an approach.
DISPOSITIVE:
of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The
doctrine established
in Barcelon and Montenegro was
subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had
the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul
the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings
were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closeddoor sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by
the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the
petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a
massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the
government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously
decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
MERALCO VS LIM
FACTS:
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus for being
moot and academic. The Supreme Court likewise required Judge
Tago M. Bantuas to explain within fifteen (15) days the delay in
rendering the decision of the case.
LANSANG VS GARCIA
Cherry Lim:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in
1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that
there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently,
Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation
and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension
The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an
appeal with Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice- President and Head of
MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the
matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to
a denial of due process. She likewise claimed the grueling travel from
her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation
of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
ANSWER: No.
The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to
privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty, and security The
habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life,
liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari. The
assailed decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside.
CASTILLO VS CA
FACTS:
On 03 March 2008, respondents herein filed for a Respectful MotionPetition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data alleging that despite the
permanent injunction, petitioners entered the property and arrested
the respondents when they attempted to resist the entry.
The RTC of Malolos granted the petition for amparo and habeas data
as the respondents has sufficiently proven that the petitioners
committed acts subjecting the former to bodily harm, mental torture,
degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of
the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not the remedies of amparo and habeas data are proper
in cases involving property disputes without a showing of a
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents right to life, liberty and security.
Whether or not the privilege of amparo may still be granted despite
the dismissal of the case for qualified theft against Guisande.
ANSWER:
No
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
The remedy of amparo can only be invoked to protect the right to life,
liberty, and security Under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty, and security although the writs cover not only
actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. As was held in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal
killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal
of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law.
It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and
security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in
contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with
the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in
fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil,
criminal and administrative charges.
The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the
act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or
threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases
should be illegal or unlawful.
On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the
general purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition
for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where
such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to
which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accuseds own
choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a
supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was
procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate
opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial.
Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat. Notwithstanding,
Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the nonbailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court granted the Supreme Court granted the petition
for review on certiorari. Accordingly, the 04 March 2008 Order of the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan is declared null and void, and its 28 March
2008 Decision is reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court likewise
dismissed Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008.
FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a
complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that
the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data
requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the
petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation
before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the fishing expedition that this Court in the course of drafting
the Rule on habeas data had in mind in defining what the purpose of a
writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
PETITION DENIED.