Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
11 september 2001.
Kenneth Waltz nos dice que entre los Estados el estado natural es la guerra. No decimos esto en
el sentido que la guerra sea constante, sino en el sentido de que si cada Estado puede decidir por
s mismo cuando usar la fuerza, la guerra puede estallar en cualquier momento.
Comentarios y sugerencias:
C. Vernica Astrid Karam Enrquez.
Universidad Nacional Autnoma de Mxico.
www.mexicodiplomatico.org
vake_diplomatic@mexicodiplomatico.org
Aqu hace referencia a los distintos tipos de poderes, pero primero seria
conveniente entender Que es lo que hace el poder por uno?:
VICTIMA
TEMOR
VIOLENCIA O
AMENAZA
DEPENDENCIA
PROTECCIN
RETORICA
DEMANDAS
GOBIERNO
TERRORISTAS
198..
7,37
9,35
35,00
2,90
198..
7,38
8,33
33,20
s.d.
198..
7,30
6,82
25,50
2,71
1990
6,96
7,16
26,40
s.d.
199..
5,66
6,71
2,00
2,15
199..
6,10
4,17
2,00
2,01
199..
5,72
4,95
2,00
1,38
199..
5,82
4,77
1,50
1,24
200..
6,21
3,64
1,30
1,88
200..
6,10
3,94
1,25
s.d.
2008
6,00
4,73
1,25
s.d.
198..
376
198..
370
198..
370
199..
359
199..
317
199..
338
199..
321
200..
305
200..
289
200..
276
2008
276,3
ENFOQUE
UNIDAD
ESTADOS
UNIDOS
AFGANISTN
(Estado que ampara
terrorismo)
el
DE
ANLISIS
SISTEMA DE
INTERACCION
ENFRENTAMIENTO
MILITAR-TECNOLOGICO
CAPACIDADES
CAMBIO
EN EL
SISTEMA
CONCLUSIN
Al momento de realizar el trabajo hemos demarcado claramente nuestra influencia
filosfica y terica, luego emprendimos la tarea de aplicar los conceptos del marco
terico a la realidad que aconteci desde el 11 de septiembre.
driven by the domestic regimes of states, while the third level focused on the role of systemic
factors, or the effect that international anarchy was exerting on state behavior. "Anarchy" in this
context is meant not as a condition of chaos or disorder, but one in which there is no sovereign
body that governs nation-states.
Neorealism
Waltz's key contribution to the realm of political science is in the creation of neorealism (or
structural realism, as he calls it), a theory of International Relations (IR) which posits that states'
actions can often be explained by the pressures exerted on them by international competition,
which limits and constrains their choices. Neorealism thus aims to explain recurring patterns of
state behavior, such as why the relations between Sparta and Athens resembled in important
ways the relations between the US and the USSR.
Waltz argues that the world exists in a state of perpetual international anarchy. Waltz
distinguishes the anarchy of the international environment from the order of the domestic one.
In the domestic realm, all actors may appeal to, and be compelled by, a central authority - 'the
state' or 'the government' - but in the international realm, no such source of order exists. The
anarchy of international politics its lack of a central enforcer means that states must act in a
way that ensures their security above all, or else risk falling behind. This is a fundamental fact of
political life faced by democracies and dictatorships alike: except in rare cases, they cannot
count on the good will of others to help them, so they must always be ready to fend for
themselves.
Like most neorealists Waltz accepts that globalization is posing new challenges to states, but
he does not believe states are being replaced, because no other non-state actor can equal the
capabilities of the state. Waltz has suggested that globalization is a fad of the 1990s and if
anything the role of the state has expanded its functions in response to global transformations.
Neorealism was Waltz's response to what he saw as the deficiencies of classical realism.
Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, neorealism and realism share a
number of fundamental differences. The main distinction between the two theories is that
classical realism puts human nature, or the urge to dominate, at the center of its explanation for
war, while neorealism stakes no claim on human nature and argues instead that the pressures
of anarchy shape outcomes regardless of human nature or domestic regimes.
Waltz's theory, as he explicitly makes clear in "Theory of International Politics",
http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/t/theory-of-international-politics.html is not a
theory of foreign policy and does not attempt to predict or explain specific state actions, such as
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The theory explains only general principles of behavior that
govern relations between states in an anarchic international system, rather than specific
actions. These recurring principles of behavior include balancing of power (the theory was
revised by Stephan Walt, modifying the "balance of power" concept to "balance of threat"),
entering into individually sub-optimal arms races, and exercising restraint in proportion to
relative power. In Theory of International Politics (1979:6) Waltz suggests that explanation
rather than prediction is expected from a good social science theory, since social scientists
cannot run controlled experiments that give the natural sciences so much predictive power.
Since its appearance in 1979 and until the end of the Cold War neorealism was the dominant
theory of international relations. Its inability to explain the sudden and peaceful collapse of the
Soviet Union put into question Waltz's argument that bipolar systems should be more stable
than multipolar systems. Waltz has argued that stability has been misunderstood to mean
duration rather than peace, and that the bipolar system was indeed more stable in the latter
sense.
Another major criticism of neorealism (and classical realism in general) is its inability to account
for lasting great-power peace since World War II and increasing cooperation among states.
Alternative explanations that focus on the roles of institutions, norms, and domestic regimes
have continued to offer an alternative to the realist approach, although realist theories continue
to have a major influence on current work and theory.
Other critics have argued that states do not engage in balancing behavior as neorealism
predicts, and instead often prefer to bandwagon, or side with the more powerful side in an
international crisis. Waltz responds that his theory explains the actions of middle and great
powers, and that small vulnerable states indeed often bandwagon instead of balance, but that
ultimately their actions do not shape the course of international relations to a significant extent.
In Man, the State, and War, Waltz proposes a three-images view of looking at international
relations behavior. The first image was the individual and human nature; the second image the
nation-state, and the third image the international system.
E.H. Carr
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Hallett_Carr
Hans Morgenthau,
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Morgenthau
Randall Schweller
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/rschweller/
Fareed Zakaria
http://fareedzakaria.com/
William C. Wohlforth
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf
Thomas J. Christensen
http://www.princeton.edu/politics/people/bios/index.xml?netid=tchriste
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz elaborates many of the core principles of neorealist
international relations theory, adopting a structural perspective that sets him apart from earlier
(classical) realists like E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, and later giving rise to the
Neoclassical realist movement (Randall Schweller, Fareed Zakaria, William C. Wohlforth,
Thomas J. Christensen, etc.) which tries to incorporate a structural component while
emphasizing the state-society relationship that mitigates structural forces. (This book also
popularized the term bandwagoning.)
Bandwagoning.
In realist theories of international relations, bandwagoning refers to the act of weaker states joining a
stronger power or coalition within balance of power politics. The term is opposed to balancing, and unlike
balancing, is a relatively new term. Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942)
and popularized by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979) (in his work, Waltz incorrectly
attributes Stephen Van Evera with coining the term).
Bandwagoning occurs when weaker states decide that the cost of opposing a stronger power exceeds the
benefits. The stronger power may offer incentives, such as the possibility of territorial gain, trade
agreements, or protection for the weaker states, to induce weaker states to join with it.
Realism predicts that states will bandwagon rarely, only when there is no possibility of building a balancing
coalition or their geography makes balancing difficult (i.e. surrounded by enemies). Bandwagoning is
considered to be dangerous because it allows a rival state to gain power. A belief that bandwagoning
happens more frequently is sometimes considered to be implied by the theory of containment.
In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Waltz argues for the virtues of a
world with more nuclear weapon states because of their power in nuclear deterrence. Sagan
argued against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. See nuclear peace.
Awards
The Heinz Eulau Award for "Best Article" in the American Political Science Review in
1990 for Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.
The James Madison Award for "distinguished scholarly contributions to political
science" from the American Political Science Association in 1999.
References
1. "Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism" by Steven L.
Lamy.
2. "Leviathan" by Thomas Hobbes, 1651.
3. Stephen Walt, International Theories: One World, Many Theories.
4. Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories" .
5. Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Great Power Peace: Presidential Address.
6. Eliot A. Cohen, Thucydides, Really!" The American Interest.
7. Richard K. Betts, "Not With My Thucydides, You Don't," The American Interest.
8. Kishore Mahbubani, The Case Against the West, Foreign Affairs .
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14. Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century.
15. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Hans Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet (trans.). Kant:
Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991).
16. Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace.
17. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,"
International Security.
18. Andrew Mack, Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,
Coping With Crisis Working Paper Series International Peace Academy.
19. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions"
20. Alex Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It" International Organization.
21. Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in
22. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics.
23. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Border.
24. Chaim Kaufmann and Robert Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action:
Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade," International
Organization.
25. Marc Lynch, "Al-Qaeda's Constructivist Turn," Praeger Security International.
26. Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Reflections on Cultural
Relativism and its Others," American Anthropologist..
27. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? The National Interest.
28. Jeffrey D Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for A Crowded Planet.
29. Vincent Ferraro, Dependency Theory: An Introduction, in Giorgio Secondi ed., The
Development Economics Reader..
30. Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Institutions (and What This
Does and Does Not Mean ...)" in Giorgio Secondi ed., The Development Economics
Reader.
31. Jeff Sachs, "Institutions Matter, But Not For Everything" in Giorgio Secondi ed., The
Development Economics Reader.
32. William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.
33. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Communist Manifesto.
34. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 3rd Edition.
35. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.
36. Martha Crenshaw, The Strategic Logic of Terrorism; and Osama bin Laden, Speech
to the American People, in Richard Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War, 3rd Edition.
37. Scott D. Sagan, The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory,
and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, International Security Volume 18, Issue 4.
38. Paul Fussell, Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Michael Walzer and Paul Fussell,
An Exchange of Views, in Paul Fussell, ed., Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other
Essays.
39. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.
40. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man.
41. Evelyn Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John Stephens, The Impact of Economic
Development on Democracy
42. Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs (December 1997).
43. Robert Kagan, The Great Unwashed
44. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the
Democratic Peace," The National Interest.
45. Sheri Berman, "How Democracies Emerge: Lessons from Europe," Journal of
Democracy, Volume 18, Issue 1.
46. "The Debate on Sequencing," responses by Thomas Carothers, Edward Mansfield
and Jack Snyder.
47. John H. Coatsworth, "Institutions, Inequality, and Economic Growth in Latin America,"
Journal of Latin American Studie.
48. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.
49. Jeffrey G. Williamson, Five Centuries of Latin American Inequality Manuscript,
Harvard University.
50. Kenneth M. Roberts, Latin Americas Populist Revival,
51. Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005).
52. Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror.
53. Mahmood Mamdani, Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the
Political Legacy of Colonialism, Comparative Studies in Society and History.
54. Mahmood Mamdani, Lessons of Zimbabwe, London Review of Books.
55. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood, World Politics.
56. Ian Lustick, The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness"
in Historical Perspective," International Organization.
57. Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Getting the Questions Right,"
The National Interest.
58. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations".
59. Alistair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Securit.
60. Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," Foreign Affairs.
61. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs.
62. Amartya Sen, Why Democratization Is Not the Same as Westernization: Democracy
and Its Global Roots, The New Republic.
63. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization.
64. Jagdish Bhagwati, Free Trade Today.
65. Arvind Panagariya, "Miracles & Debacles: In Defense of Trade Openness".
66. Joseph Stiglitz "Social Justice and Global Trade," Far Eastern Economic Review.