No.

_________
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

-----------------------------------------------------------------DR. JEFFREY D. ISAACS,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW HAMPSHIRE BOARD OF MEDICINE,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
The State Of New Hampshire Supreme Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
-----------------------------------------------------------------JEFFREY ISAACS
8 Chase Circle
Fort Washington, PA 19034
Telephone: (610) 202-1460
Email: jdi.99@dartmouth.edu
Petitioner, pro se
================================================================

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioner Jeffrey David Isaacs graduated from
medical school in 2010, ranking amongst the top
physicians in the United States on the national board
exam. The New Hampshire Board of Medicine effectively ended Petitioners medical career shortly
thereafter when it unsealed a decade old controversy
and misrepresented it as a criminal matter. Petitioner has no criminal record whatsoever, however the
Board rescinded his medical license for allegedly
omitting a subsequently acquitted charge from his
medical residency trainee license application. Said
acquitted charge is in fact a sealed and dismissed
administrative discipline at a Southern California
medical school, which dates back to 2005. This Petition seeks to reverse the severe punishment New
Hampshire executed when it resurrected this retired
controversy and terminated a new doctors vocation
just as it was to begin.
Petitioner alleges this harsh action occurred in
retaliation for his claims of gross Title IX violations
and electronic evidence destruction by senior leadership at New Hampshires Dartmouth College.
Under New Hampshire statute, the Board is
immune from any civil procedure to resolve this
matter. The license revocation itself is not subject to
any form of mandatory review. Isaacs sole means of
correcting this injustice is this petition to the highest
court in the land.

ii
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued
In reaching their determination, the Board failed
to enter into the record evidence that a) Petitioner
had been acquitted of all controversies in the Southern California matter, b) the Southern California
administrative charges were dismissed, c) the original matriculation agreement was discharged, and
furthermore d) the entire matter was sealed.
The Questions Presented are:
1) What are the implications to a state licensure board when a major university takes the uncommon step of sealing a disciplinary record and
annulling matriculation agreements?
2) In depriving petitioner of his liberty to practice medicine, and failing to meet minimal established procedural due process requirements, did the
New Hampshire Board of Medicine violate the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
3) Did New Hampshire interfere with the
Petitioner and Keck School of Medicines freedom of
contract regarding his academic records and matriculation contract, and thereby violate the substantive
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?
4) What recourse, other than this Petition, is
available when a state falsely publishes a nonexistent
criminal record on a nationally broadcast website,
under the guise of state legal proceeding civil immunity?

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ......................

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...........................................................

INTRODUCTION ................................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..............................

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ... 11

I.

New Hampshire violated the Fourteenth

Amendments Substantive Due Process Requirements in Disregarding Keck and The
Petitioners Freedom of Contract ................ 11

II.

New Hampshire Failed to Uphold Petitioners

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due
Process Rights .............................................. 12

III.

New Hampshire Interfered with the Petitioners Fifth Amendment Due Process
Rights ........................................................... 14

IV.

Sealing Isaacs Disciplinary Records Under

FERPA Amounted to Expungement Under
Federal Law; The NH Board Reprimanded
Isaacs for Adhering to A Federal Court Ordered Settlement.......................................... 15

V.

The Board of Medicine Possessed No Verifiable Evidence of the Disputed Keck Disciplinary History .......................................... 16

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
VI. Even arguendo assumption that NH didnt
need to respect a federal settlement contract,
No Evidence Was Presented that Petitioner
was guilty of professional misconduct ........ 17
CONCLUSION..................................................... 18
APPENDIX
New Hampshire Supreme Court Order filed
January 8, 2015 ............................................... App. 1
New Hampshire Board of Medicine Final Decision and Order filed March 11, 2014 ............ App. 2
Denial of Motion to Withdraw Publication of
License Revocation Email dated November
14, 2014 .......................................................... App. 13
Jeffrey D. Isaacs, MD v. Dartmouth Hitchcock
Medical Center, et al. Excerpt dated January
15, 2014 .......................................................... App. 14
Affidavit of Michael H. Payne, Esquire dated
April 30, 2012 ................................................. App. 15
Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release dated August 4, 2007 ............................ App. 18
Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release dated March 31, 2008 ........................... App. 27

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AMENDMENT V
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ..............................4, 14
AMENDMENT XIV
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ............ 5, 11, 12, 14, 18
STATUTES
20 U.S.C. 1232g Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA)....................................2, 15
28 U.S.C. 2101(c) .......................................................2
28 U.S.C. 2104 ...........................................................2
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651 ....................................2
New Hampshire RSA 329:18(a)(IV) ....................... 1, 11
NH RSA 329:17 IV(a) ...................................................1
RULES
Rule 3 of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ...........................................................................2

1
OPINIONS BELOW
The New Hampshire Board of Medicine issued an
Opinion on March 11, 2014 (App. 2). The New Hampshire Supreme Court declined review of the Opinion.
This Opinion of the Board of Medicine is not reported
elsewhere.
------------------------------------------------------------------

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The New Hampshire Board of Medicine revoked
Petitioners medical license on February 5, 2014. The
revocation was published online on March 11, 2014
(App. 2). As of todays filing, it had never been directly served upon Isaacs as required by New Hampshire
RSA 329:18(a)(IV):
Final disciplinary actions and final actions
in other adjudicatory proceedings shall be
reduced to writing and served upon the parties. Such decisions shall not be public until
they are served upon the parties.
On October 9, 2014 Petitioner filed a Motion with
the Board of Medicine to cease publication that is
non-compliant with NH RSA 329. On November 6,
2014, the Board denied the Motion (App. 13) and an
appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court was
filed on November 22nd 2014.
On January 8, 2015 the State of New Hampshire Supreme Court denied hearing the appeal.
(App. 1) NH RSA 329 grants the NH Supreme Court

2
discretionary jurisdiction over proceedings of the
Board of Medicine. However, there is no mandatory
review as of right in New Hampshire according to
Rule 3 of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
This Petition is timely filed on April 8th, 2015.
The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2101(c) and 28 U.S.C. 2104
to review this Petition. Additionally, under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651 this Court has authority
to review a State Board of Medicine order.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
20 U.S.C. 1232g Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (FERPA)
(a) Conditions for availability of funds
to educational agencies or institutions; inspection and review of education records;
specific information to be made available;
procedure for access to education records;
reasonableness of time for such access; hearings; written explanations by parents; definitions
(1)
(A) No funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents,
the parents of students who are or have been

3
in attendance at a school of such agency or at
such institution, as the case may be, the
right to inspect and review the education
records of their children. If any material or
document in the education record of a student includes information on more than one
student, the parents of one of such students
shall have the right to inspect and review
only such part of such material or document
as relates to such student or to be informed
of the specific information contained in such
part of such material. Each educational
agency or institution shall establish appropriate procedures for the granting of a request by parents for access to the education
records of their children within a reasonable
period of time, but in no case more than fortyfive days after the request has been made.
[...]
(3) For the purposes of this section the
term educational agency or institution
means any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under
any applicable program.
(4)
(A) For the purposes of this section, the
term education records means, except as
may be provided otherwise in subparagraph
(B), those records, files, documents, and other
materials which
(i) contain information directly related
to a student; and

4
(ii) are maintained by an educational
agency or institution or by a person acting
for such agency or institution.
[...]
(h)

Disciplinary records; disclosure

Nothing in this section shall prohibit an

educational agency or institution from
(1) including appropriate information in
the education record of any student concerning disciplinary action taken against such
student for conduct that posed a significant
risk to the safety or well-being of that student, other students, or other members of the
school community; or
(2) disclosing such information to teachers and school officials, including teachers
and school officials in other schools, who
have legitimate educational interests in the
behavior of the student.
Amendment V United States Constitution
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property

5
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment XIV United States Constitution
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
------------------------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION
This Petition represents a decade-long legal odyssey for one doctor to practice medicine. In November
2005, Petitioner became involved in a dispute with a
fellow classmate at a University of Southern California Keck School of Medicine Surfing Club outing in
Baja Mexico. In April 2006, Petitioner filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court for Central California, alleging that favoritism compelled the Keck
School to take excessive disciplinary action against
him in adjudicating the dispute. The classmate was
the child of an executive director of the National
Institutes of Health and White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Committee on Counterterrorism. The Dean of Keck had been promoted to the

6
deanship in 2004, after securing $40 million in funding in conjunction with the aforementioned NIH director. Discovery had yielded potentially incriminating
email metadata evidence between the Keck Dean and
the NIH Director, and Kecks Dean resigned from his
new post in 2007 for unspecified reasons.
A settlement agreement was promptly reached in
2007 between the NIH Director, the Keck Dean, and
Isaacs that sealed his disciplinary records, in exchange for dismissal of the individual defendants, i.e.,
all defendants except Keck itself. The sealing of the
records (App. 18 Paragraph 2) was the only consideration Isaacs received in his acceptance of that settlement.
A global settlement dismissing the lawsuit was
reached with Keck in 2008, in exchange acquitting
and discharging any and all agreements and controversies . . . of any nature whatsoever between Keck
and Isaacs. (App. 31 Paragraph 8). Furthermore, the
global settlement dismissed all outstanding Keck
administrative charges against Isaacs. (App. 36
Paragraph 19). Petitioner, in consultation with his
attorney, viewed the four separate clauses as together
rendering his matriculation at Keck a legal nullity.
From 2006 through 2010, Isaacs completed his
studies at international medical schools, including
the Duke/National University of Singapore, and St.
Georges London, ultimately ranking above the average neurosurgeon on the standardized and highly
competitive United States Medical Licensure Exam.

7
When Petitioner returned to the United States in
2010 to begin medical residency training, somehow
his employers were in knowledge and possession of
the sealed records from Keck. Petitioner suffered
workplace hostility and severe emotional and physical
distress from the ensuing mistreatment, and ultimately was wrongfully dismissed.
In March 2012, his residency program at Dartmouth College terminated him for failure to disclose
his disciplinary history at Keck USC. In April 2012,
the New Hampshire Board of Medicine requested
Petitioners reply with regards to his non-disclosure
of Keck. Petitioner responded promptly citing the
aforementioned settlement agreements, and did not
hear anything from the New Hampshire Board of
Medicine until eighteen months later, after he made a
Title IX complaint (see below) against Dartmouth and
the Medical Board. Concurrently in April 2012, the
American Academy of Medical Colleges carried out an
investigation of the Keck disclosure matter. The
AAMC has authority over the nationwide Electronic
Residency Application Service, or ERAS, which is
the platform for applying to nearly every residency
training program in the United States. The AAMC
reviewed the Keck Settlement Agreements. Furthermore, the AAMC contacted Keck requesting a disciplinary history; it is believed Keck did not provide
any disciplinary history to AAMC, pursuant to the
terms of the settlement agreement.
In June 2012, the AAMC exonerated Petitioner
of any wrongdoing with regards to his residency
application. Likewise, in July 2012, a New Hampshire Unemployment Tribunal similarly found that

8
Petitioner conducted himself correctly in believing his
Keck USC history had been a nullity.
In January 2014, a deposition in the United
States District Court for New Hampshire took place
with deponent Christine Finn, Petitioners Medical
Residency Program Director at Dartmouth-Hitchcock.
Finn had direct hire/fire authority over her residents,
including Petitioner Isaacs. In the deposition, Finn
stated
If ERAS has determined that it [Keck] did
not need to be listed under your educational
experience, I would accept ERASs qualification.
Despite endorsing acceptance of the outcome of
ERAS/AAMCs investigation, Finn and Dartmouth
never reversed her decision to terminate the Petitioner. To this day, five years after medical school graduation, Isaacs is unable to practice medicine.
------------------------------------------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In April 2012, the New Hampshire Board of
Medicine (the Board) first notified Petitioner Isaacs
that they were reviewing his New Hampshire medical
license application for alleged non-disclosure of his
disciplinary history at Keck USC. Isaacs promptly
replied to the Board that the matter had become
nullified, and that he had already been exonerated
by two investigations carried out by the American

9
Association of Medical Colleges and under oath by the
New Hampshire Unemployment Tribunal.
Isaacs received no further contact from the Board
of Medicine until August 2013, shortly after he made
allegations that 1) the Board of Medicine and Dartmouth College failed to investigate a Title IX complaint regarding mistreatment he suffered during his
residency, and 2) Dartmouth President Jim Yong Kim
had been negligent or directly culpable for email
evidence spoliation regarding the alleged abuse.
New Hampshire Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey Cahill telephoned Petitioner Isaacs in August
2013, claiming to represent the NH Board of Medicine. He requested documentation of all settlement
agreements with Keck USC, as well as the AAMC
investigation. Isaacs complied and transmitted all
these documents to Cahill no later than September
2013.
In February 2014, the New Hampshire Board of
Medicine revoked Isaacs professional license and
published the sealed Keck records on the Internet.
The Boards determination ignored ample evidence
Petitioner had sent to Cahill. Specifically, the Board
falsely declared that there is no provision sealing the
[Keck] records (App. 9) despite the obvious fact that
they were sealed.
Although the Board wrongly declared that the
Keck records had never been sealed, the following
footnote (App. 12) on the Boards order offered critical
insight into their deliberations:

10
1

Exhibit 2 does indicate that on June 22,

2006 Respondent appealed the decision asking
for a reversal. Exhibit 3, at paragraph 19
references the potentiality of effecting the
dismissal of all outstanding administrative
charges. There, however, is no credible evidence before this Board which suggests Respondents termination from the school was
dismissed. Further we are aware of no New
Hampshire requirement that would equate a
civil settlement to the annulment of a criminal record pursuant to RSA 651:5, X.
The Boards Order plainly acknowledged that
Paragraph 19 of the 2008 Settlement Agreement
effects the dismissal of all outstanding administrative charges. The Order then surprisingly states
there is no credible evidence the termination was
dismissed, suggesting a federal lawsuit settlement
agreement signed by a senior officer of USC is not
credible evidence, and moreover, that Isaacs innocence or guilt depends upon Kecks compliance with
the settlement agreement.
This suggests some malice of intent to the
Boards reprimand. Knowing there was no mandatory
review of their decision, and the existence statutory
immunity, they plainly acknowledged the dismissal of
outstanding administrative charges, then reprimanded Petitioner for not disclosing these dismissed administrative charges. More egregiously, the Board
characterized this as a criminal matter in stating
that they know of no New Hampshire requirement to
equate a civil settlement to annulment of a criminal

11
record. Petitioner never had a criminal record, yet
the Board chose to publish on their website a document
suggesting that he did. In reality, the NH Board has
refused to accept a pro se settlement agreement
reached in due process through the United States
District Court for Central California.
As of filing today April 8, 2015, the Board action
was published on the internet but never properly
served upon Isaacs as required by New Hampshire
RSA 329:18(a)(IV):
Final disciplinary actions and final actions
in other adjudicatory proceedings shall be
reduced to writing and served upon the parties. Such decisions shall not be public until
they are served upon the parties.
NH Assistant Attorney General Cahill resigned
shortly after this matter concluded, despite being
newly appointed to handle Board cases only one year
earlier.
------------------------------------------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

New Hampshire violated the Fourteenth

Amendments Substantive Due Process Requirements in Disregarding Keck and The
Petitioners Freedom of Contract

In 2006, Petitioner sought intervention from the

federal court system to redress unlawful or excessive
disciplinary proceedings that Keck had instituted
against him. Due process ensued through the Federal

12
Rules of Civil Procedure, and ultimately, the lawsuit
terminated in 2008 when the parties reached a settlement agreement.
Six years later, the New Hampshire Board of
Medicine actively disregarded two federal settlement
agreements between Petitioner Isaacs and the Keck
School of Medicine. In these settlement agreements,
the parties agreed that Keck would a) dismiss any
administrative charges against Isaacs, b) discharge
any contractual agreements of any nature whatsoever, including the enrollment matriculation agreement, and c) acquit Isaacs of any and all allegations
and controversies.
It seems, for what Petitioner believes to be retaliatory intent, the New Hampshire Board of Medicine
sought to deny Petitioner the benefits of the parties
freedom of contract. In doing so, New Hampshire has
violated the substantive due process requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Board of Medicine
rescinded Isaacs medical license, rather than accept
the contractual resolution he reached with Keck.
II.

New Hampshire Failed to Uphold Petitioners Fourteenth Amendment Procedural

Due Process Rights

It is well established that minimal procedural

due process must occur before a state may deprive
an individual of property or liberty. In the present
case, Petitioner provided the Board of Medicine with
ample evidence that Keck had sealed his disciplinary

13
records. In claiming there is no provision sealing the
disciplinary records, when there plainly was such
provision, they actively chose to limit procedural due
process and restrict this evidence from entering the
February 2014 hearing.
Furthermore, the February 2014 hearing proceeded during a snowstorm and Petitioner was unable to safely transit from Pennsylvania to New
Hampshire during the storm. The Board denied any
rescheduling, thus denying the basic due process
requirement of allowing verbal testimony. Similarly,
the Board denied medical accommodation of permitting a video-conferencing appearance.
Finally, the Board never served the Order upon
Isaacs, as required under NH RSA. The Board of
Medicine repeatedly demonstrated willful disregard
and/or incompetence with even the most basic due
process requirements. It is worth noting that the
Board of Medicine was disbanded by the NH legislature in 2006 for concern over its ability to conduct due
process in an unbiased manner.
The settlement agreement dismissed any administrative charges Keck made against Isaacs and
rendered the entire matter a nullity. The New Hampshire Board of Medicine even acknowledged the
dismissal of these charges, but nonetheless proceeded
to deprive Isaacs of liberty and property, namely, his
medical practice.
In denying the effects of the two federal settlement agreements and depriving Isaacs of his right to

14
livelihood, the State of New Hampshire (via the
Board of Medicine) has violated the procedural due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court erred in failing
to recognize this, and a writ of certiorari is appropriate.
III. New Hampshire Interfered with the Petitioners Fifth Amendment Due Process
Rights
In their Order revoking Isaacs license, the Board
states we are aware of no New Hampshire requirement that would equate a civil settlement [to] annulment. . . . In other words, the Board of Medicine
declared that it has no requirement to respect the due
process and outcome of the 2006 federal legal proceeding. The Board, for whatever reason, appears unhappy with the settlement language reached between
Keck and Isaacs. Even after acknowledging that
Isaacs administrative disciplinary charges had been
(or should have been) dismissed, the Board stubbornly declared it had no New Hampshire requirement
to accept the federal settlement agreement.
In sum, the State of New Hampshire actively
interfered with Isaacs Fifth Amendment due process
rights, because it has refused to accept, and apparently wishes to subvert, the consideration he received
via a federal court settlement.

15
IV. Sealing Isaacs Disciplinary Records Under
FERPA Amounted to Expungement Under
Federal Law; The NH Board Reprimanded
Isaacs for Adhering to A Federal Court Ordered Settlement
FERPA asserts that there shall be no restriction
in a schools obligation to disclose disciplinary records
to teachers and officials in other schools, who have
legitimate educational interests in the behavior of the
student. In reaching a settlement with Isaacs, Keck
specifically indicated that it would no longer release
records, absent a subpoena. In other words, USC
indicated that the contested disciplinary history
would no longer be subject to strict requirements to
release the records under appropriate circumstances.
After two years of litigation, USC determined it was
appropriate to no longer release the contested records
to entities such as AAMC or the NH Board, entities
that usually would receive disciplinary records.
In theory, Keck effectively expunged Isaacs
disciplinary records by no longer defining them as
part of his FERPA student record. The alternative is
to believe that USC/Keck risked its own accreditation
status by refusing to release disciplinary records in
compelling circumstances. In practice, Keck did not
release any disciplinary records when requested to do
so by the American Academy of Medical Colleges.
Thus, there is no ambiguity that from Kecks perspective, the disputed disciplinary actions were no longer
part of Petitioners official FERPA record.

16
The New Hampshire Board of Medicine rescinded
Isaacs license for abiding by the same logic and
behavior as Keck to comply with a federal settlement
agreement. In fact, Isaacs was under order by a
United States District Court to comply with the
settlement terms and agreement. New Hampshire
thereby deprived Petitioner of liberty and property for
merely complying with a United States District Court
order.
V.

The Board of Medicine Possessed No Verifiable Evidence of the Disputed Keck Disciplinary History

As a state licensure Board, presumably the New

Hampshire Board of Medicine could have requested
Keck to issue a current, verifiable statement regarding Petitioners academic and/or purported disciplinary history. Realizing that Keck would not do so, as
they hadnt issued any statement to the AAMC, the
Board of Medicine instead decided to rely on PACER
(Public Access to Court Electronic Records) dating
back to 2006 in the Central California district. Hence
the NH Board relied on contested and outdated legal
pleadings of which it had absolutely no privity.
By failing to offer any authenticated proof of
Petitioners history at Keck, the Board again failed to
meet basic elements of procedural due process. The
Boards use of outdated and annulled academic records found in 2006 PACER documents should not be
permitted, especially when such use of PACER clearly

17
was intended to circumvent Keck/USCs intent to seal
the records.
VI. Even arguendo assumption that NH didnt
need to respect a federal settlement contract, No Evidence Was Presented that
Petitioner was guilty of professional misconduct
The Board assumed authority to revoke Petitioners license under NH RSA 329:17 IV(a), for
instances entailing knowingly providing false information or material omission. Even if, arguendo,
the Board is not required to view the Keck disciplinary records as an expunged controversy, Petitioner
had submitted ample evidence to the Board of his
belief that four separate clauses of two distinct settlement agreements cleared his Keck record. A mistaken interpretation is far from knowingly providing
false information to the Board.
Isaacs had provided the Board with a copy of
Attorney Michael Paynes affidavit, which testified as
to Petitioners belief, after consultation with legal
counsel, that he was not required to disclose a nullity. The Board chose not to admit this evidence.
Likewise, the Board was aware that Isaacs had
testified under oath regarding this matter at a New
Hampshire Unemployment Tribunal, which ruled in
his favor. Finally, the Board was aware that AAMC
investigated this matter and ruled in Petitioners
favor. All of this evidence was never admitted into the

18
February 2014 hearing, despite email records proving
submission thereupon.
In sum, the Board cherry-picked evidence and
employed a guilty until proven innocent standard
that violated Fourteenth Amendment due process.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
As the New Hampshire ruling currently stands,
Petitioner is effectively barred from resuming his
medical practice. The impact to the country is the loss
of potentially thirty years of medical practice and
research by an individual who has demonstrated
a) his ability to succeed during four years of medical
school clerkship evaluations as well as top placement
on nationwide standardized exams, and perhaps more
difficult b) perseverance and commitment despite a
decade of legal obstacles.
In terms of resources, at least a million dollars
have been spent on federal training subsidies and
federal student loans to support Petitioners medical
career, which shall be lost should Petitioner be disqualified from the profession by the New Hampshire
board.
During the prolonged state of legal limbo involving the Petitioner, numerous venues have struggled
with the implications of a settlement agreement that
was written, in the words of Kecks attorneys, to be
intentionally vague. The seemingly unbiased American

19
Academy of Medical Colleges, as well as a New
Hampshire Unemployment Tribunal, interpreted the
settlements as clearing Petitioners record at Keck.
Dartmouth College is believed to have spent
upwards of two million dollars in legal fees since 2011
on this and related matters. They remain unsure of
how to interpret the Keck settlement Dartmouths
Director Christine Finn stated in her deposition that
she did not understand the legal meaning of the
settlement agreements, but that she agreed with
AAMCs qualifications to interpret it correctly.
The New Hampshire Board, on the other hand,
acknowledged the effects of the settlement to include
dismissing all administrative charges against Petitioner, but nonetheless proceeded to revoke Isaacs
medical license.
Absent guidance from this Honorable Court, this
matter could conceivably continue for an unspecified
continued duration. As Petitioner applies to hundreds
of medical residencies, spanning from small community hospitals to larger academic medical centers
such as that operated by Dartmouth College, there is
understandable aversion for any program to want to
involve itself, or its respective state medical board, in
a dispute well-known in medical academia to have
already cost Dartmouth years of legal wrangling and
associated tangible and intangible costs.
In terms of public policy, there is a sense that
Petitioner has been treated as a second-class citizen
for over a decade due to his pro se status. Neither

20
the compelling arguments he advanced nor the education level he attained sufficed to prevent institutions such as Dartmouth and the New Hampshire
Board from ostracizing and even retaliating against a
doctor who had a pro se status during medical
school. Thereby, this Petitioner enters his plea to this
Honorable Court to review these matters and issue
any and all writs necessary to uphold due justice.
Respectfully submitted on this 8th day of April,
2015.
DR. JEFFREY D. ISAACS
Petitioner, pro se

App. 1
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2014-0668, Appeal of Jeffrey D.
Isaacs, M.D., the court on January 8, 2015,
issued the following order:
Appeal from administrative agency is declined.
See Rule 10(1).
Under Supreme Court Rule 10, the supreme
court has discretion to decline an appeal from an
administrative agency. No appeal, however, is declined except by unanimous vote of the court with at
least three justices participating.
This matter was considered by each justice whose
name appears below. If any justice who reviewed this
case believed the appeal should have been accepted,
this case would have been accepted and scheduled for
briefing.
Declined.
Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, and Lynn, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
Distribution:
New Hampshire Board of Medicine, 13-07
Dr. Jeffrey Isaacs
Attorney General
File

App. 2
Before the
New Hampshire Board of Medicine
Concord, New Hampshire
In the Matter of:
Docket #: 13-07
Jeffrey D. Isaacs, M.D.
License No.: RT-2198
(Adjudicatory/Disciplinary Proceeding)
FINAL DECISION AND ORDER
Before the New Hampshire Board of Medicine
(Board) is an adjudicatory/disciplinary proceeding
in the matter of Jeffrey D. Isaacs, M.D. (Respondent
or Dr. Isaacs).
Background Information
(Procedural History and Motions)
The Board of Medicine (Board) granted Dr.
Isaacs a Resident Training license pursuant to N.H.
Admin. Rules Med 305.04, in May 2011. The license
was granted where the application revealed Dr.
Isaacs was pursuing post graduate training at the
Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC) in
the psychiatry residency program (Program).
In March 2012 the Board received information
from DHMC indicating that Dr. Isaacs had been
terminated from the Program where Respondent had
allegedly omitted material facts from his Application
for Training License for Residents and Graduate
Fellows and the supplement filed along with the
application. As a result of this information, the Board

App. 3
commenced an investigation to determine whether
Respondent committed professional misconduct
pursuant to RSA 329:17, VI and RSA 329:18.
The investigation revealed the following:
Between August 2005 and June 2006 Respondent
attended the Keck School of Medicine, a medical
education institution, at the University of Southern
California (USC). In February 2006 the Keck School
suspended Respondent due to behavior-related issues,
and ultimately the School expelled him. In June 2010
Respondent received a medical degree from the
American University of the Caribbean. On May 18,
2011, Respondent filed his application for training
license with the Board having been enrolled in the
Program at DHMC.
The application required Respondent to disclose
medical schools attended. Respondent listed the
American University of the Caribbean but failed to
disclose attendance at the Keck School. Additionally,
Respondent answered No to a question on the
supplement to the application which asked whether
he had ever been reprimanded, sanctioned, restricted or disciplined in any activities involving medical
education or practice.
Given the investigatory revelations the Board
found reasonable basis for commencing an adjudicatory/
disciplinary proceeding against Respondent. On
October 7, 2013 the Board issued a Notice of Hearing
(Notice) commencing a proceeding pursuant to RSA
329:18-a and N.H. Admin. R. Med 206 for February 5,

App. 4
2014 at 1:00 p.m. The purpose of the hearing was to
determine whether in May 2011 Respondent engaged
in professional misconduct by submitting false information to the Board and for failing to fully disclose all
previous medical schools attended. The Notice further
indicated that Respondent could be subjected to
disciplinary sanctions pursuant to RSA 329:17, VII.
The Notice also informed Respondent that he may be
represented by counsel at the hearing, at his own
expense; and that failure to appear may result in the
hearing being held in absentia with disciplinary
sanctions imposed without further notice or opportunity to be heard.
On January 29, 2014, at 3:14 p.m., Respondent
sent the Board via e-mail, a so-called Motion to Stay
Hearing or Appear by Teleconference. The e-mail
indicated Respondent was moving to stay the proceeding because he had pending federal litigation in
the Pennsylvania District Court. The e-mail further
indicated that Respondent entered into a settlement
agreement with USC which he alleges sealed his
disciplinary records. He further claimed that the
AAMC and NHES . . . both investigated this issue
already and agreed with [him]. He additionally
alleged that the Board failed to investigate his allegations against DHMC, including that he was defrauded, instructed to perform unnecessary [medical]
exams and abandoned as a patient.
Respondents January 29, 2014 e-mail also noted
that he was taking action against the Board for what
appears to be punitive actions against [him] and he

App. 5
requested that the Board defer to the legal authority
of the federal judiciary system and postpone [the]
hearing. Respondent also wrote that he was not able
to drive to New Hampshire for medical reasons, that
he conducted three depositions via Skype and that if
the stay was denied he requested to appear by telephone or video conference.
On February 3, 2014 hearing counsel objected to
the request. The objection indicated that Respondent
failed to comply with Board rules, in that any requests to continue or postpone are required to be filed
at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing.
Additionally, hearing counsel noted further procedural issues with the request; specifically that it did not
comply with the provisions of N.H. Admin. R. Med
204, et. seq.
The presiding officer denied the request to Stay
the proceeding, finding first that Respondent failed to
follow Board procedural regulation and for the reasons articulated in hearing counsels objection, the socalled motion should be denied. The Board found
unpersuasive the notion that the case should be
stayed because of a pending federal lawsuit in Pennsylvania. Moreover, Respondent provided no information relative to his illness. Respondent was
informed of the denial on February 3, 2014 at approximately 4:30 p.m. He subsequently forwarded another
e-mail on February 5, 2014, at approximately 6:00
a.m. indicating that a winter storm and his current
automobile situation would preclude him from attending the hearing.

App. 6
The hearing went forward as scheduled on February 5, 2014, commencing just after 1:00 p.m. Board
members present included:
Mark Sullivan, P.A.
John H. Wheeler, D.O.
Robert M. Vidaver, M.D.
Louis E. Rosenthall, M.D.
Gail Barba, Public Member
Edmund J. Waters, Jr., Public Member
Gail Barba, Public Member, served as presiding
officer. Respondent did not appear, and Attorney Jeff
Cahill appeared as hearing counsel.
Discussion and Rulings
It is first necessary to discuss Respondents
request for a stay and his decision not to attend the
hearing. Regardless of the procedural irregularities
concerning Respondents request to stay the proceeding sent via e-mail on January 29, 2014 the Board
finds substantively, the rational [sic] for the request
to be both lacking in factual detail and unpersuasive.
The issue before the Board is a narrow one. It revolves around whether Respondent violated RSA 329:17,
VI (a) by failing to disclose, in 2011 on the residency
training application and supplement, his attendance
and dismissal from the Keck School of Medicine. The
fact that Respondent named the Board in a federal
lawsuit that is currently pending is of no moment in
the determination of that issue. Moreover, pursuant
to RSA 329:17, IX, no civil action shall be maintained

App. 7
against the board with regard to any activity or
action taken in the performance of its statutory
duties. See RSA 329:17, IX. The Board thus determined it was appropriate to proceed.
The Board finds that timely notice had been
provided to the Respondent with regard to the hearing. Here, where Respondent had over four months to
prepare and attend or timely ask for a continuance,
his eleventh hour request to stay the proceeding was
without merit. Had there been some legitimate medical reason that had been articulated by the Respondent, the Board would have given that issue
consideration. Respondent, however, simply indicated
that he had medical reasons that precluded him from
driving to New Hampshire, which he then did not
reassert on February 5, 2014 when he provided notice
that he would not attend the hearing, citing instead
to weather conditions and automobile issues. Petitioner provided no reasonable grounds for continuing
the hearing, nor did he ask for reconsideration,
indicating that weather given the forecast would
prevent him from attending.
The Board opened the hearing just after 1:00
p.m. on February 5, 2014. It first entered Exhibits A
and B, Respondents e-mails dated January 29 and
February 5, as exhibits for Respondent. It also accepted Exhibits 1-3 from hearing counsel. Exhibit 1 is
Respondents 2011 NH Application for Residency
Training License; Exhibit 2 is an excerpt of a March
1, 2007 court order in Isaacs v. USC; and Exhibit 3,
the April 2008 Confidential Settlement in Isaacs v.

App. 8
USC. These exhibits along with notice of witnesses to
be presented were provided to Respondent on January 31, 2014.
Hearing counsel also presented the testimony of
Dori Lefevbre, Board Investigator. Ms. Lefevbre
testified that she was able to obtain the documents
that were marked as exhibits 2 and 3 as public records available on-line from the federal court system.
She explained that the documents reflect that Respondent was dismissed from the Keck School. In
fact, Exhibit 2, the California Federal District Court,
Central Districts Order on a Motion to Dismiss
reveals that Respondent alleged he suffered from
PTSD and an organic brain injury and in 2005 began
his studies at Keck School of Medicine. The Order
further indicates that Respondent had numerous
social problems with his classmates and engaged in
offensive messaging to a female classmate that Respondent attributes to his Bipolar II diagnosis. The
Order indicated Respondent alleged that several
defendants attempted to harm his standing at USC,
that Respondent attended a disciplinary hearing
before the Student Performance Committee where
he did not contest stalking allegations against him;
and that he was suspended and ultimately dismissed
from the school. The Order at Exhibit 2 also indicated
that Plaintiff requested that USC postpone the dismissal hearing scheduled for June 7, 2006, but that
the hearing went ahead as scheduled.
Ms. Lefevbre also testified that she obtained
Exhibit 3, as a public court record from the federal

App. 9
courts on-line system, which purportedly is the
confidential settlement agreement between Respondent and USC. The document at page 1, indicates
that Respondent understood and agreed that his
education at USC has ended irrevocably and forever
and will not be resumed again at any time in the
future.
In Exhibit A, Respondent alleges that the settlement agreement with USC clearly sealed his disciplinary records, and a subsequent agreement
annulled all contracts and acquitted all controversies
with USC. It appears this is the reason Respondent
contends he was not required to disclose the Keck
School information on his training license application.
A review, however, of Exhibit 3 indicates that it is
only information related to the lawsuit, and the
negotiation of the Settlement Agreements terms and
conditions that is confidential, along with the monetary settlement amount. There is no provision in
Exhibit 3 sealing the disciplinary records.
Exhibit 1, page 4 asks whether the applicant has
been reprimanded, sanctioned, restricted or disciplined in any activities involving medical education
. . . and Respondent certified, under penalty of
perjury that he had not, where he marked No to the
question. Whether Respondent entered into a settlement agreement does not negate the fact that he
attended a medical educational institution which
ultimately dismissed him and will never allow him to
return. The fact remains that there was discipline
and expulsion from a medical educational institution

App. 10
notwithstanding the representation that the records
have been sealed or a subsequent agreement annulled all contracts. That Respondent brought a
lawsuit against USC, which the parties settled and
where USC specifically denied liability for the claims
against it does not immunize Respondent from answering the application question truthfully.
The question on the application did not require
Respondent to divulge information regarding the
Confidential Settlement Agreement. The answer in
the license application was, however, required to be
correct. Respondent could have chosen to say, Yes
which would have likely given him an opportunity to
explain; or he could have indicated that he contends
he was wrongfully dismissed.
RSA 329:17, IV (a) reads that disciplinary action
may be taken against a licensee where the Board
finds the person has knowingly provided false information during any application for professional licensure . . . whether by making any affirmative
statement which was false at the time it was made or
by failing to disclose any fact material to the application. The Board finds that Respondent was required
to truthfully divulge an answer to question 3 on the
supplement to the application. The Board also finds
that Respondent was required to list all medical
schools attended. The application form and the supplement do not distinguish and inform the applicant
that an answer is not required if some record was
sealed or records were nullified by operation of law.

App. 11
Here, Respondent was aware that he attended
the Keck School, he was further aware that he was
sanctioned or restricted or disciplined in activities involving medical education. As such, Respondent deliberately, consciously, and with purpose of
design answered question 3 falsely. Likewise, it is a
material fact that Respondent attended a medical
school other than American University of the Caribbean. Inaccuracies in the information provided which
are false, constitute a valid basis for discipline and
license denial.
In this case, we need not take action on the
license itself since pursuant to N.H. Admin R. Med
305.04(b) training licenses are only valid for the
practice of medicine when inter alia the licensee is
practicing under the auspices of the training program. See N.H. Admin R. Med 305.04(b)(1). Here,
there was evidence that the DHMC terminated
Respondent from their Program. Accordingly, the
license is revoked as of the date of termination; as
such it was canceled by operation of law.
We, however, believe a reprimand is appropriate
in this situation. Respondent treated his time at the
Keck School as if it never occurred. He provided no
documents to suggest or provided no credible evidence regarding the dissolution of his record of attendance at the Keck School. Even where Respondent
chose not to attend the hearing, he still could have
provided documentary support for his position in
advance of the hearing. N.H. Admin. R. Med 206.09
(c). For example, he could have submitted his exhibits

App. 12
supporting the statements found in Exhibit A, but
chose instead an alternate course of action. Exhibit 3
certainly does not suggest the nullity of the sanction
or discipline, where Exhibit 2 clearly evinces Respondent was dismissed from the medical school on
1
June 13, 2006. We find this Agreement does not
insulate Respondent from having to affirmatively
disclose his attendance. As such, where we also find
the evidence submitted supports the conclusion that
Respondent knowingly made a false statement and
further failed to disclose a material fact, the license of
Dr. Isaacs is REVOKED and he is REPRIMANDED.
\*BY ORDER OF THE BOARD
Dated: 3/11/2014

/s/ Penny Taylor

Penny Taylor, Administrator
Authorized Representative
of the New Hampshire
Board of Medicine

\*Michael Barr, M.D., Board Member, recused.

1

Exhibit 2 does indicate that on June 22, 2006 Respondent

appealed the decision asking for a reversal. Exhibit 3, at paragraph 19 references the potentiality of effecting the dismissal of
all outstanding administrative charges. There, however, is no
credible evidence before this Board which suggests Respondents
termination from the school was dismissed. Further we are
aware of no New Hampshire requirement that would equate a
civil settlement to the annulment of a criminal record pursuant
to RSA 651:5, X.

App. 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

RE: Motion to Withdraw Publication of License Revocation

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Taylor, Penny
Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 2:13 PM
<Penny.Taylor@nh.gov>
To: Jeffrey D. Isaacs <jeffrey.isaacs.wg03@wharton.
upenn.edu>
Dr. Isaacs,
The New Hampshire Board of Medicine, at its November 6, 2014 meeting, voted unanimous to deny
your Motion to Withdraw Publication of License
Revocation received in this office on October 11, 2014.
Sincerely,
Penny Taylor, Administrator
NH Board of Medicine
121 South Fruit Street, Suite 301
Concord, NH 03301-2412
(603) 271-1205
Penny.Taylor@nh.gov

App. 14
Jeffrey D. Isaacs, M.D. v.
Dartmouth Hitchcock
Medical Center, et al
*

Christine Finn, M.D.

January 15, 2014
*

[297] A. Again, I cant really say to the investigative quality of it. If ERAS has determined that it
did not need to be listed under your educational
experience, I would accept ERASs qualification.
*

App. 15
Affidavit of Michael H. Payne, Esquire
I, Michael H. Payne, Esquire, being duly sworn,
hereby depose and say:
1. I am an attorney-at-law and I am duly licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Currently, I am a partner at Cohen
Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman, PC, a law firm in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
2. Previously, and during the time period from
May 2005 to April 2009, I was a partner in the law
firm of Payne Hackenbracht & Sullivan, located in
Fort Washington, Pennsylvania.
3. During that time period I represented Jeffrey
Isaacs with regard to certain matters involving the
University of Southern California (USC).
4. I have been informed, by Dr. Isaacs, that he
has received notice of an investigation of his ERAS
2012 application, and that there is a question about
whether Dr. Isaacs omitted information on his application regarding his alleged attendance at USCs
Keck School of Medicine from August 2005 to June
2006.
5. Dr. Isaacs is in a difficult position regard to
his ability to answer questions regarding the Keck
School because he became involved in a dispute with
the University that is the subject of a confidentiality
agreement.

App. 16
6. Although it is true the Dr. Isaacs was admitted to the School, his enrollment was terminated
during the first semester, without any subsequent
finding of fault by either party, and his dispute with
the University was resolved by agreement of the
parties.
7. I represented Dr. Isaacs with regard to the
negotiation of a settlement agreement which both
parties agreed was to remain confidential.
8. In view of the settlement, Dr. Isaacs correctly
determined that his attendance at the Keck School
was a nullity and that he not was not required to list
the Keck School on any application that required a
listing of prior educational institutions he attended
and that, in fact, he would be in violation of the terms
of the confidentiality agreement if he listed the Keck
School on any future application or similar document.
9. In my opinion, the purported omission by
Dr. Isaacs of any reference to the Keck School was
not intended to mislead or deceive the AAMC, but
was simply something that he was required to do by
virtue of a confidentiality agreement. In fact, it
appears that a violation of the confidentiality agreement by another party may have resulted in the
improper disclosure of information to the AAMC.
10. It is my further opinion, as the attorney who
represented Dr. Isaacs during the settlement negotiations, that he acted properly in treating any matters
associated with the Keck School as a nullity. In my

App. 17
view, he should not be penalized for abiding by the
terms of a confidentiality agreement.
I declare that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief.
Dated: 4-30-12

Sworn to and subscribed

before me this 30th day
of April , 2012.
/s/ Melinda T. Norcross
Notary Public
[Notary Stamp]

/s/ Michael H. Payne

Michael H. Payne, Esq.

App. 18
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND RELEASE
Jeffrey Isaacs (Isaacs), on the one hand, and
University of Southern California (USC), on the
other hand, have agreed to enter into this Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release (the Agreement).
1.

Dismissal With Prejudice.

Isaacs agrees that he will execute and deliver for

filing to counsel of record for USC, Robin D. Dal
Soglio of Dal Soglio & Martens LLP, the Dismissal
with Prejudice (attached hereto as Exhibit A) of
Robert Baughman, Brian E. Henderson, Peter J.
Katsufrakis and James M.H. Ball (together, the
Individual Defendants) from United States District
Court Case No. CV-06-3338 GAF (Ex). Counsel for
USC will file the Dismissal with Prejudice with the
Court.
2.

Sealing of Disciplinary Records.

In exchange for the Dismissal with Prejudice of

the Individual Defendants, referenced above, Defendant USC agrees that commencing immediately upon
the execution of this Settlement Agreement and
receipt of the signed Dismissal with Prejudice, USC
will not release or disclose Isaacs disciplinary records
to any third party, including but not limited to other
educational institutions and/or potential employers,

App. 19
unless it receives written consent from Isaacs or a
subpoena or court order.
3.

Non-Admission of Liability.

This Agreement shall not in any way be construed

as an admission by USC or any of the Individual
Defendants that they have harassed, discriminated
against or retaliated against Isaacs in any way, or
otherwise acted wrongfully with respect to Isaacs.
USC and the Individual Defendants specifically deny
that they have any liability to or have done any
wrongful acts against Isaacs.
4.

No Other or Future Lawsuits, Charges,

Claims.

With the exception of United States District

Court Case No. CV-06-3338 GAF (Ex) (the Lawsuit),
Isaacs represents that he has not filed any other
lawsuits, charges, claims for arbitration, complaints,
or appeals of any kind with any court or administrative or governmental agency against the Individual
Defendants or any other persons or entities released
herein, and he agrees that he will not file any lawsuits, charges, complaints, or appeals at any time
hereafter based on, referring to, or incorporating any
events, acts or omissions through and including the
date hereof.
If Isaacss representations in this paragraph
prove to be false, or if he violates the promises made

App. 20
in this paragraph and files a lawsuit, charge, complaint, or appeal of any kind with any court or administrative or governmental agency against the
Individual Defendants, based on any events, acts or
omissions through and including the date hereof,
Isaacs will pay for all costs and losses, including
actual attorneys fees, incurred by Defendants in
connection with said lawsuit, charge, complaint, or
appeal.
5.

Complete Release by Isaacs.

As a material inducement to USC to enter into

this Agreement, Isaacs hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives and releases all rights and
claims, known and unknown, which he may have
against each and all of the Individual Defendants and
each of their respective assigns, agents, representatives, attorneys, spouses, children and other family
members, and all persons acting by, through, under
or in concert with any of them, from the beginning of
time to the date Isaacs signs this Agreement. This
includes but is not limited to a release of all rights
and claims Isaacs may have against the Individual
Defendants under any federal or state antidiscrimination statutes, including but not limited to the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as all claims, known and
unknown, which he may have for breach of contract,
express or implied; breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; and retaliation, defamation,
conspiracy, infliction of emotional distress, invasion of

App. 21
privacy, assault, battery, misrepresentation, or any
other tort.
6.

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of

Known and Unknown Claims

Isaacs agrees that, as a condition of this Agreement, he expressly releases all rights and claims that
he does not know about, as well as those he knows
about. Thus, consistent with the terms of his release,
Isaacs expressly waives all rights under Section 1542
of the Civil Code of the State of California, which
reads as follows:
A general release does not extend to claims
which the creditor does not know or suspect
to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or
her must have materially affected his or her
settlement with the debtor.
7.

Encouragement to Consult With Attorney

Counsel for USC has strongly encouraged Isaacs

to consult with an attorney before signing this
Agreement, and Isaacs hereby acknowledges that he
has either fully consulted with an attorney prior to
signing or has knowingly and voluntarily decided not
to do so.

App. 22
8.

No Representations

The parties hereto represent and agree that no

promises, statements or inducements have been made
to them which caused them to sign this Agreement
other than those expressly stated in this Agreement.
9.

Successors

This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties

and upon their respective heirs, administrators,
representatives, executors, successors and assigns,
and shall inure to the benefit of the parties and
others released herein, their representatives, executors, successors and assigns.
10. Confidentiality of This Agreement
a. As a material inducement for USC to enter
into this Agreement, Isaacs agrees not to disclose the
negotiation, terms, or conditions of this Agreement to
anyone other than Isaacss attorneys and parents
(hereafter referred to as Isaacss Confidants) and,
even as to such a person, only if such persons agree to
honor this confidentiality requirement. Violation of
this confidentiality requirement by any of Isaacss
Confidants will be treated as a violation of this
Agreement by Isaacs.
b. This section does not prohibit disclosure of
the negotiation, terms or conditions of this Agreement
to the extent necessary legally to enforce this Agreement, nor does it prohibit disclosures to the extent

App. 23
otherwise required by law (but only if the enforcing
party notifies the other party and its attorneys of a
disclosure obligation or request within three business
days after he/it learns of it and does not actively
oppose the party taking all steps it deems to be
appropriate to prevent or limit the required disclosure).
c. If Isaacs is asked about his claims against the
Individual Defendants, and only if asked, he may
state only that the matter has been resolved.
11. Newly Discovered Facts
Isaacs acknowledges that he might hereafter
discover facts different from or in addition to those he
now knows or believes to be true with respect to a
claim or claims released herein, and he expressly
agrees to assume the risk of possible discovery of
additional or different facts, and agrees that this
Agreement shall be and remain effective in all respects regardless of such additional or different
discovered facts.
12. Voluntary Participation in This Agreement
The parties acknowledge that they have thoroughly discussed all aspects of their rights and this
Agreement with their respective attorneys, or have
knowingly and voluntary chosen not to do so, and
that they have carefully read and fully understand all

App. 24
of the provisions of this Agreement, that they have
been given a reasonable period of time to consider
signing this Agreement, and that they are voluntarily
signing this Agreement.
13. Governing Law
This Agreement is made and entered into in the
State of California and shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced and governed under the laws of said
State.
14. Further Necessary Actions
The parties agree, without further consideration,
to sign and/or cause to be signed, and to deliver to
counsel for one another, any other documents and to
take any other action as may be. necessary to fulfill
their obligations under this Agreement, including, but
not limited to, effecting the dismissal of all outstanding administrative charges.
15. Severability
Should any of the provisions in this Agreement,
other than the Release set forth in Paragraph 5, be
declared or be determined to be illegal or invalid, all
remaining parts, terms or provisions shall be valid,
and the illegal or invalid part, term or provision shall
be deemed not to be a part of this Agreement.

App. 25
16. Proper Construction
a. The language of all parts of this Agreement
shall in all cases be construed as a whole according to
its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against any of
the parties.
b. As used in this Agreement, the term or
shall be deemed to include the term and/or and the
singular or plural number shall be deemed to include
the other whenever the context so indicates or requires.
c. The paragraph headings used in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference
and shall not in any manner amplify, limit, modify or
otherwise be used in the interpretation of any of the
provisions hereof.
17. Entire Agreement
This Agreement is the entire agreement between
Isaacs and USC and fully supersedes any and all
prior agreements or understandings between the
parties pertaining to its subject matter.

App. 26
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY. THIS CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
RELEASE INCLUDES A RELEASE OF ALL
KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CLAIMS AGAINST
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.
Executed at Berwyn Pennsylvania, this 29th day
of August 2007.
By: /s/ Jeffrey D Isaacs
Jeffrey Isaacs
Executed at Los Angeles, California, this 31st
day of August 2007.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
By: /s/ Dennis F Dougherty
Dennis F. Dougherty
Senior Vice President
for Finance

App. 27
CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND MUTUAL RELEASE
The University of Southern California (USC)
and Jeffrey Isaacs (Isaacs) have agreed to enter into
this Confidential Settlement Agreement and Mutual
Release (the Agreement).
1.

Dismissal With Prejudice.

Isaacs agrees that he will execute and deliver for

filing to counsel of record for USC, Robin D. Dal
Soglio of Dal Soglio & Martens LLP, the Stipulation
of Dismissal with Prejudice (attached hereto as
Exhibit A) of USC from United States District Court
Case No. CV-06-3338 GAF (Ex). Counsel for USC will
file the Dismissal with Prejudice with the Court.
2.

No Future Application to University.

Isaacs understands and agrees that his education

at USC has ended irrevocably and forever and will
not be resumed again at any time in the future.
Isaacs further agrees that he will not apply for or
otherwise seek admission to USC or any related or
affiliated entity at any time in the future, under any
circumstances whatsoever.
3.

Non-Admission of Liability.

This Agreement shall not in any way be construed as an admission by USC that it has discriminated against or retaliated against Isaacs in any way,

App. 28
or otherwise acted wrongfully with respect to Isaacs
or any other person, or that Isaacs has any rights
whatsoever against it. USC specifically denies that it
has any liability to or has done any wrongful acts
against Isaacs or any other person.
4.

Benefits for Isaacs.

Within fourteen (14) days of USCs receipt of the

original of this Agreement signed by Isaacs and
including executed copies of Exhibits A and B, USC
will transmit to Isaacs one check made payable to
Isaacs in the gross amount of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000).
5.

Responsibility for Taxes.

Isaacs understands and acknowledges that USC

will report the payment described in paragraph 4 to
the appropriate taxing authorities as required by law.
Isaacs agrees that he is solely responsible for all tax
obligations, including, but not limited to, all payment
obligations which may arise as a consequence of this
Agreement. Isaacs further agrees promptly to pay
and to indemnify and hold USC and others released
herein harmless from and against any and all loss,
cost, damage or expense, including, without limitation, attorneys fees, interest, assessments, withholding and penalties, arising out of any dispute over
underwithholding or other tax treatment of any of the
proceeds received by Isaacs as a result of this Agreement. Isaacs further agrees not to seek or make any

App. 29
claim against USC or others released herein for any
loss, cost, damage or expense if a claim or adverse
determination is made in connection with
underwithholding or other tax treatment of any of the
proceeds of this Agreement or any portion thereof.
Isaacs understands and agrees that neither USC nor
others released herein has any duty to defend
against any claim or assertion in connection with
underwithholding or other tax treatment of the
proceeds of this settlement or any portion thereof,
and Isaacs agrees to assume full responsibility for
defending against any such claim or assertion.
6.

No Other or Future Lawsuits, Charges,

Claims for Arbitration or Complaints
of Any Nature Whatsoever.

With the exception of United States District

Court Case No. CV-06-3338 GAF (Ex), which is fully
and finally settled herein, Isaacs represents that he
has not filed any other lawsuits, charges, claims for
arbitration, complaints, or appeals of any kind with
any court or administrative or governmental agency
against USC or any other persons or entities released
herein, and he agrees that he will not file any lawsuits, charges, claims for arbitration, complaints, or
appeals at any time hereafter based on, referring to,
or incorporating any events, acts or omissions
through and including the date hereof.
If Isaacss representations in this paragraph
prove to be false, or if he violates the promises made

App. 30
in this paragraph and files a lawsuit, charge, claim
for arbitration, complaint, or appeal of any kind with
any court or administrative or governmental agency
against USC or any other persons or entities released
herein, based on any events, acts or omissions
through and including the date hereof, Isaacs will pay
for all costs and losses, including actual attorneys
fees, incurred by USC in connection with said lawsuit, charge, complaint, or appeal.
7.

Complete Release by Isaacs.

As a material inducement to USC to enter into

this Agreement, Isaacs hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives and releases all rights and
claims, known and unknown, which he may have
against USC, the Keck School of Medicine, and each
of their respective successors, assigns, agents, trustees, officers, administrators, faculty, students, current
and former employees, representatives, attorneys,
divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates (and agents, trustees,
officers, administrators, faculty, current and former
employees, representatives and attorneys of such
divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates), and Robert
Baughman and each of his family members, and all
persons acting by, through, under or in concert with
any of them (collectively, the Releasees) from the
beginning of time to the date Isaacs signs this
Agreement from any and all claims, demands, contracts, expenses, liens, covenants, debts, attorneys
fees, causes of action, damages, judgments, orders,
and liabilities (collectively Claims) of whatever kind

App. 31
or nature in law, equity, or otherwise, whether now
known or unknown, suspected, or unsuspected, and
whether or not concealed or hidden, which Isaacs now
owns or holds or had at any time heretofore owned or
held against the Releasees.
8.

Release by USC

As a material inducement to Isaacs to enter into

this Agreement, USC does hereby irrevocably and
unconditionally release, acquit and forever discharge
Isaacs from any and all charges, complaints, claims,
liabilities, obligations, promises, agreements, controversies, damages, actions, causes of action, suits,
rights, demands, grievances, costs, losses, and expenses (including attorneys fees and costs) of any
nature whatsoever, known or unknown, suspected or
unsuspected, fixed or contingent, including but not
limited to any claim for malicious institution of civil
proceedings, and abuse of process. Notwithstanding
any other provision herein, this release by the University is not intended to, and does not, release debts
unrelated to the lawsuit, including but not limited to
tuition or loans.
9.

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of

Known and Unknown Claims

Consistent with the terms of their respective

releases in paragraphs 7 and 8, Isaacs and USC
acknowledge and agree that, as a condition of this
Agreement, they expressly release all rights and

App. 32
claims that they do not know about, as well as those
they know about. Thus, consistent with the terms of
their respective releases, Isaacs and USC expressly
waive all rights under Section 1542 of the Civil Code
of the State of California, which reads as follows:
A general release does not extend to claims
which the creditor does not know or suspect
to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or
her must have materially affected his or her
settlement with the debtor.
10. Ownership of Claims
Isaacs represents and agrees that he has not
assigned or transferred, or attempted to assign or
transfer, to any person or entity, any of the claims he
is releasing in this Agreement.
11. Encouragement to Consult With Attorney
USC encourages Isaacs to consult with an attorney before signing this Agreement, and Isaacs hereby
acknowledges that he has had the opportunity to
consult with an attorney prior to signing, and has
either done so or voluntarily chosen not to do wo.
12. No Representations
The parties represent and agree that no promises, statements or inducements have been made to

App. 33
them which caused them to sign this Agreement other
than those expressly stated in this Agreement.
13. Successors
This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties
and upon their respective heirs, administrators,
representatives, executors, successors and assigns,
and shall inure to the benefit of the parties and
others released herein, their representatives, executors, successors and assigns.
14. Confidentiality of This Agreement
a. As a material inducement for USC to enter
into this Agreement, Isaacs agrees not to disclose the
negotiation, terms, conditions, or amount of this
Agreement to anyone other than Isaacss attorneys
and tax adviser (hereafter referred to as Isaacss
Confidants) and, even as to such a person, only if the
person agrees to honor this confidentiality requirement. Violation of this confidentiality requirement by
any of Isaacss Confidants will be treated as a violation of this Agreement by Isaacs.
b. This section does not prohibit Isaacss disclosure of the negotiation, terms, conditions, or amount
of this Agreement to the extent necessary legally to
enforce this Agreement, nor does it prohibit disclosures to the extent otherwise required by law (but
only if Isaacs notifies USC and its attorneys of a
disclosure obligation or request within three business

App. 34
days after he learns of it and does not actively oppose
USCs taking all steps it deems to be appropriate to
prevent or limit the required disclosure).
c. If Isaacs is asked about his claims against
USC, including breach of enrollment contract and
wrongful dismissal, and only if asked, he may state
only that the matter has been resolved. However,
the parties further agree that Isaacs is not required
to disclose this matter to anyone.
15. Damages for Isaacss Breach of Confidentiality
A breach of paragraph 14 will be deemed a material breach of this entire Agreement. Isaacs agrees to
pay USC the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000)
as liquidated damages for each violation in the event
USC obtains a judgment, ruling, award, or decision
that paragraph 14 has been violated. The parties to
this Agreement agree that this liquidated damages
provision is appropriate with regard to any breach of
paragraph 14 because: (1) paragraph 14 is essential
for the protection of USCs interests; (2) damages for
breach of paragraph 14 would be difficult to prove
with certainty; and (3) the sum of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000) per breach represents a reasonable
estimate of the harm likely to result from each such
breach.

App. 35
16. Newly Discovered Facts
Isaacs acknowledges that he might hereafter
discover facts different from or in addition to those he
now knows or believes to be true with respect to a
claim or claims released herein, and he expressly
agrees to assume the risk of possible discovery of
additional or different facts, and agrees that this
Agreement shall be and remain effective in all respects regardless of such additional or different
discovered facts.
17. Voluntary Participation in This Agreement
The parties acknowledge that they have thoroughly discussed all aspects of their rights and this
Agreement with their respective attorneys, or have
knowingly and voluntary chosen not to do so, and
that they have carefully read and fully understand all
of the provisions of this Agreement, that they have
been given a reasonable period of time to consider
signing this Agreement, and that they are voluntarily
signing this Agreement.
18. Governing Law
This Agreement is made and entered into in the
State of California and shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced and governed under the laws of said
State.

App. 36
19. Further Necessary Actions
The parties agree, without further consideration,
to sign and/or cause to be signed, and to deliver to
counsel for one another, any other documents and to
take any other action as may be necessary to fulfill
their obligations under this Agreement, including, but
not limited to, effecting the dismissal of all outstanding administrative charges.
20. Severability
Should any of the provisions in this Agreement,
other than the Release set forth in Paragraph 7, be
declared or be determined to be illegal or invalid, all
remaining parts, terms or provisions shall be valid,
and the illegal or invalid part, term or provision shall
be deemed not to be a part of this Agreement.
21. Proper Construction
a. The language of all parts of this Agreement
shall in all cases be construed as a whole according to
its fair meaning, and not strictly for or against any of
the parties.
b. As used in this Agreement, the term or
shall be deemed to include the term and/or and the
singular or plural number shall be deemed to include
the other whenever the context so indicates or requires.
c. The paragraph headings used in this Agreement are intended solely for convenience of reference

App. 37
and shall not in any manner amplify, limit, modify or
otherwise be used in the interpretation of any of the
provisions hereof.
22. Entire Agreement
This Agreement is the entire agreement between
Isaacs and USC and fully supersedes any and all
prior agreements or understandings between the
parties pertaining to its subject matter.
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY. THIS CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
MUTUAL RELEASE INCLUDES A RELEASE OF
ALL KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CLAIMS.
Executed at Saint-Jean, FRANCE this 31st day
of March 2008.
By:

Jeffrey D Isaacs
Jeffrey Isaacs

Executed at Los Angeles, California, this APR 04

2008.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
By: /s/ Dennis F Dougherty
Dennis F. Dougherty
Senior Vice President
for Finance