Aristotelian Substance and Supposits

Author(s): Marilyn McCord Adams and Richard Cross

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 79 (2005), pp.
15-72
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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ARISTOTELIAN
SUBSTANCEAND
SUPPOSITS
by MarilynMcCord Adams and RichardCross
I-Marilyn McCord Adams
WHAT'S METAPHYSICALLY SPECIAL ABOUT
SUPPOSITS? SOME MEDIEVAL VARIATIONS ON
ARISTOTELIAN SUBSTANCE1
In this paper I begin with Aristotle's Categories and
with his apparent forwarding of primary substances as metaphysically
special because somehow fundamental. I then consider how medieval
reflection on Aristotelian change led medieval Aristotelians to analyses of
primary substances that called into question how and whether they are
metaphysically special. Next, I turn to a parallel issue about supposits,
which Boethius seems in effect to identify with primary substances, and
how theological cases-the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and
of the human soul's separate survival between death and resurrection-call
into question how and to what extent supposits are metaphysically special.
I conclude with some reflections on various senses of being metaphysically
special and how they pertain to primary substances and supposits.
ABSTRACT

who take their inspirationfrom Aristotle's

Philosophers
Categories begin with the bias that there is something

metaphysically special about substance-individuals such as

Socrates and Plato, Brownie the donkey and Beulah the
cow. But it is a challenge to say just what makes them
special. A wide range of philosophical issues complicate the
picture and can make the original contention difficult to
sustain. Substance individuals-hypostases or supposits-also
loom large in Christiantheology. When Boethius turned to give
philosophical formulation to the doctrines of the Trinity-that
there are three persons in one God-and the Incarnationthat in Christ there is one person but two natures (Divine
and human)-he defined 'person' as 'an individual substance
1. I am gratefulto RobertMerrihewAdams,BrianLeftow,RichardSwinburne,and
Dory Scaltsasfor commentson an earlierversionof this paper.

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MARILYN
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of a rational nature'. Medieval Western school theologians

assigned Boethius's articulation presumptive weight, but they
also problematizedit, both from the side of philosophy and from
the side of theology. In their hands, supposits came to appear
less metaphysicallyspecial than at first they seemed.
Because the difficultiesabout primarysubstancesseem at first
to run roughly parallel to those about supposits, I hope it will
be instructiveto consider them seriatim.To achieve manageable
length, I shall refer selectively to Boethius, Bonaventure, and
Aquinas, but dwell on developments by Scotus and Ockham
more extensively.
I
What'sMetaphysicallySpecial about PrimarySubstances?
1.1. Aristotle's Analysis: In Categories, Chapter 5, Aristotle
distinguishes between primary and secondary substances.
Primary substances are substance individuals (tode ti, hoc
aliquid);they are neitherin nor said of anything;they are subjects
that are not predicable of anything in either way. Secondary
substances (species, genera and differentiae)are 'said of', while
accidents are predicated across categories and so 'exist in'. In
the Categories, secondary substances appear to be substance
kinds, and the contrast seems to be that between a concrete
individualsubstance(e.g., Socrates,Plato) and what is essentially
(e.g., man, animal, rational) or accidentally(e.g., white, builder)
predicated of it. As Porphyry later observes, Aristotle does
not pause there to probe the ontological status of predicables;
Porphyryhimself leaves it to Boethius to give classic formulation
to what became the medievalproblem of universals.But whether
Aristotle intendedthe Categoriesto be primarilyabout semantics
or ontology, one ready read finds Aristotle assertingthat primary
substances are ontologicallybasic: primary substances are what
existper se, and everythingelse has being only to the extent that it
said of or exists in them. In the Categories,Aristotle seems to say
that what primary substances enjoy over secondary substances
and the rest of the categories, is a kind of independenceof being!
Twentieth century scholarship loved to celebrate how the
Categories was not Aristotle's last word on substance. There

ARISTOTELIAN
ANDSUPPOSITS
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17

are important treatments in his Physics and Metaphysics. If

primary substance is metaphysically'opaque' in the Categories,
Aristotle's analysis of change in the Physics forces recognition
that sublunary substances as changeable are composites of
matter and form: matter is the ultimate subject of substantial
form and persists through generation and corruption as the
subject of first one substantial form and then another. In the
Metaphysics,Aristotle further develops the implications of this
conclusion. By and large, medieval commentators preferred
harmonizingover developmentalinterpretivehypotheses. Either
way, the question presses: how can primary substances be
ontologically basic if they are composed of separableparts?2
1.2. Aquinas's Account: Wrestling with this problem, Aquinas
concedes that Aristotle's theory would collapse into contradiction if prime matter and substantial form were themselves
primary substances, if each were a 'certain this' (tode ti, hoc
aliquid) in its own right.3 For Aristotle argued against the
atomists that no primary substance can be composed out of
other primary substances, because nothing composed out of
primarysubstancescan have the paradigmaticunity that belongs
to primary substances-i.e., no such composite can be per se
one. Such parts would themselves be capable of independent
existence and so would be metaphysically prior to any wholes
they composed. The wholes would owe their existence to such
parts and so would not be ontologically basic the way the
Categoriesseems to imply.
To formulate a solution, Aquinas makes distinctive use of
Aristotle's Metaphysics-IX division between act and potency.
Sublunary substances must be hylomorphic composites, for
the reasons given in Aristotle's Physics, but they are still
ontologically basic because actuality (esse) belongs primarilyto
them. Prime matter and substantial form are not so much parts
(which might suggest separableindividualthings) as constitutive
metaphysical principles. Substantial form is that throughwhich
2. Cf. WilliamOckham(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1987),
Ch.15, 663-669,for a moredetailedtreatmentof how Aquinas,Scotus,and Ockham
handlethis problem.
3. In I Physic., lect.15,n.118,59.

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MARILYN
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ADAMSANDRICHARD
CROSS

the composite receives actuality (esse). Prime matter in itself is

pure potency with no actuality of its own; it receives whatever
actuality (esse) it has through the substantial form that is
inhering in it at the moment.4 Further, Aquinas insists, the
substantial or per se unity of the composite requires that there
be at most one principle through which it receives actuality
(esse). Whatevercomes to the composite after it is actualized, is
accidental to it; it cannot be that through which the composite
comes to be absolutely speaking (receives esse simpliciter),but
only that through which it comes to be in a certain respect (esse
secundumquid).' Consequently, there is at most one substantial
form per primarysubstance thing.
1.3. Subtle and More than Subtle Critiques: Surely Aristotelian
physics requires that prime matter be in potency with respect
to the inherence of any substantial form that it does not have
and that can be naturally produced in it. But Aquinas takes a
step further when he denies that-besides and underlyingthese
potentialities-matter has an actuality of its own. He thus seems
to posit pure potentiality as a tertiumquid,an ontological status
intermediate between nihil and actuality.6 Scotus and Ockham
find this unintelligible.They contend that what has absolutelyno
actuality of its own is purumnihil, while it takes some actuality
to be the subject of something else.' They conclude that if prime
matter did not have any actuality of its own, there would be
nothing that persisted through substantial change.8 Likewise,
they reason, composite substanceswould fail to be composite if
prime matter contributednothing and all of their actuality came
through substantial form.9Again, they ask, what grounds could
there be for saying that what got all of its actuality through the
substantial form of fire at tl is the same as what gets all of its
actuality through the substantial form of air at t2?`0
4. Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c.2; Roland-Gosslein 6-10.
5. Ibid., c.6; Roland-Gosslein, 43-44.
6. Scotus, Op.Ox. II, d.12, q.l; Wad VI.670.
7. Scotus, Quaest. subtil. Metaphysicorum VII, q.5; Wad IV. 681-682; Op.Ox. II,
d.12,a.1; Wad VI. 670.
8. Ockham, Summulae Physicorum I, c.8, cc.15-16; OPh VI. 179-179; 195-199.
9. Scotus, Op.Ox. II, d.12, q.l; Wad VI. 671-672.
10. Ockham, Summulae Physicorum I, c.15,19; OPh VI. 196-197; 205-208.

ARISTOTELIAN
ANDSUPPOSITS
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19

1.4. Reified Dependents: In general, Scotus and Ockham insist

that Aristotelian change requires that the substrate of change
and the acquired or lost form be really distinct from one
another." Both substantial and qualitative change (Scotus
recognizes others) naturally involve the coming into or ceasing
from existence of the acquired or lost form, which the
substrate at some time exists without. One-way separabilitythe metaphysical possibility that X exist without Y, or the
metaphysicalpossibility that Y exist without X-is sufficientfor
real distinction.But Scotus goes on to arguefrom the proposition
'For each form that can inhere in matter, it is naturally and
metaphysically possible that matter exist without it' to the
further conclusion 'It is metaphysically possible for matter to
exist without being subject to any forms at all'-a conclusion
he thinks Aristotle himself would reject.2 Ockham argues, not
only is each material form such that matter could exist without
it, but each hunk of matter is such that a given substantial
form could exist without it.'3 Ockham does not explicitly draw
the conclusion that matter could exist without any and every
form, or substantial form without any and every matter, but
he elsewhereendorses the pattern of reasoning by which Scotus
does so.
Against Aquinas and others, Scotus and Ockham argue that
there is a pluralityof substantialforms in living things. Common
sense suggests that in death, the plant or animal body persists
through the change. In lower animals and plants, Scotus and
Ockham both posit a substantial form of corporeity and an
animating principle or soul-form. Since ex hypothesi one can
exist without the other (the body remains when the plant- or
animal-soul is no more), these substantial forms are also really
distinct from one another.14 Ockham goes further to argue for
a real distinction between sensory and intellectual souls within
human beings.'" Thus, on their analysis, a primary substance
11. Scotus, Op.Ox. II, d.12,q.1; Wad VI.671.
12. Ibid., II, d.12,q.2; Wad VI.682-683.
13. Ockham, Reportatio IV, q.13; OTh VII.275.
14. Ockham, Quodl. II, q.11; OTh IX.162-163.
15. Ockham, Quodl. II, qq.10-11; OTh IX.156-164; Rep. II, q.20; OTh V.429; Rep.
IV, q.9; OTh VII. 161. Cf. Quaest. in III Sent., q. 1; OTh VI.22. For further discussion
of Ockham's arguments about the soul, see my paper 'Ockham on the Soul: Elusive

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ADAMSANDRICHARD

such as Socrates and Plato, Beulah the cow and Brownie the
donkey, is made up of several really distinct individual thingsprime matter, the substantial form of corporeity, one or more
soul-forms-each of which has the metaphysical capacity to
exist separately from the others. No merely natural power
could actualize these capacities for separate existence, butbecause Divine power could-this looks like enough to make
the components naturally prior to the primary substances they
constitute. On Scotus'sand Ockham'saccount,primarysubstances
would owe their existence to the prime matter and substantial
form(s) that constitute them, and so would not be ontologically
basic after all!
Aristotle's Categories emphasize the contrast between substance and accidents, between primary substances that are
neither in nor said of anything, and the accidents to which they
are subject and which exist in them. Later school philosophical
theologians infer that primary substances are naturally prior
to accidents and that accidents can play no role in defining or
constituting what primarysubstancesare. In De ente et essentia,
Aquinas insists on the contrast: one cannot define accidents
without mentioning substance;and because accidents cannot be
definedexcept in referenceto something of another category, the
complete concept of essence doesn't apply to them.16 Likewise,
primary substances are individuated per se, but accidents are
individuatedby the substance in which they inhere.'7Scotus and
Ockham argue once again from the exigencies of Aristotelian
physics, as they understand it. Ockham contends that contradictories (e.g., 'Socratesis white', 'Socratesis not white') cannot
be true successively apart from the coming or ceasing to be of
some thing (res) and/or locomotion. Since not every change can
be accounted for by locomotion alone, some accidents (Ockham
thinks, some species of quality) will have to be things really
distinct from substances and substance-parts.'"In any event,
Proofs, Dialectical Persuasions,' American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (2002),
Vol. 75, 55-97.
16. Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c.6; Roland-Gosslein ed., 43.
17. Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, 1.29, a.l,ad 3um.
18. Ockham, QuodlibetaVII, q.2; OTh IX.706-708; Summa Logicae I, cc.55-56; OPh
1.179-183; Expos. Praedicam., c.14; OPh 11.124-127.

ARISTOTELIAN
ANDSUPPOSITS
SUBSTANCE

21

Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham all concede the metaphysical

possibility of accidents existing without inhering in substance,
because it seems requiredby the doctrine of transubstantiation.'9
1.5. Replacingthe Categories? By the time Scotus and Ockham
have reified not only the essential components of primary
substances but also their inherent accidents, denied that the
individuation of any depends on really distinct others, and
recognized that each could exist separately from the others at
least by Divine power, what is left of the idea that primary
substances are ontologically basic? Haven't Scotus and Ockham
rather replaced Categories-metaphysics,with an ontology of
really distinct individual things (res)?
No! There are too many ways to prove that Scotus and
Ockham were enthusiasticAristotelians. It is because their fundamental metaphysicalperspectivewas decisively shaped by the
Categoriesthat they spent so much time problematizingit, not
least in working out the implications of Aristotelian physics for
its interpretation.To say that really extant hunks of prime matter, substantialand accidental forms are alike individualthings,
whose existence independentlyof one another is metaphysically
possible, is not to say that they are alike with respectto each and
all of the properties they couldn't exist without. It belongs to
hunks of prime matter but not to substantialor accidentalforms
to have the capacity to be the ultimate subject of inherence.
Hunks of prime matter have the natural aptitude to unite with
complements of substantial forms (e.g., with corporeity and
sensory soul) to make somethingone per se (e.g., Beulah the cow
or Brownie the donkey). Some substantial forms have natural
aptitudes to complement one another (e.g., corporeity and sensory soul) in a composite to make an individual substance while
others (e.g., bovine-soul-form and donkey-soul-form; cornbody-form and bovine-soul-form)do not. By contrast, accidents
(e.g., whiteness or an act of understanding)have the capacity
to unite with complete individual substances (e.g., Socrates or
Beulah) or some of their parts (e.g., the intellectualsoul) to make
a per accidensunity (e.g. thinking Socrates or white Beulah).
19. Cf. my 'Aristotle and the Sacrament of the Altar: A Crisis in Medieval Theology,'
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 17 (1991), 195-249.

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MARILYN
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Thus, Scotus and Ockham would insist that their philosophies

do reserve a special place for primary substances. For primary
substances are complete individual beings (among sublunary
substances,composites of primematterand a full complementof
substantialforms united to make something one per se) in a way
that a corpse (primematterplus the form of corporeityminus the
dominant animating form) or a separate intellectualsoul is not.
Primary substances are in the genus substance per se, whereas
their components are in the genus substance only 'by reduction'
(i.e., only insofar as they are 'led back' to the genus of the
whole of which they are components). As per se unities, primary
substances contrast with heaps and aggregates and with merely
accidental unities. Unlike accidents and secondary substances,
Socrates does not inhere in, nor is he said of anything else.
When nature is allowed to take its course, prime matter
and material substantial forms exist only as components of
primary substances; accidents exist only insofar as they inhere
in primary substances. Thus, Scotus and Ockham still grant,
in the natural order of things, everythingthat exists here below
either is a primary substance or is a componentof a primary
substanceor inheresin primarysubstance.In the naturalorderof
things,nothinghere below wouldexist if primarysubstancesdidn't
exist. All of this can still be true even if it is metaphysically
possible for individual substance-parts and accidents to exist
separately, without actually being components of and without
actually inhering as accidents in primary substances. Scotus
and Ockham preserve these Aristotelian claims while in effect
admitting that individual substance parts are naturally prior
to their wholes. Nevertheless, the modalities have changed:
Scotus's and Ockham's primary substances hold no monopoly
on metaphysical capacity for independent existence, the way
the metaphysically opaque primary substances of Aristotle's
Categoriesseemed to do.
II
What'sMetaphysicallySpecial about Supposits?
2.1. BoethianBeginnings: In writinghis short treatiseson Trinity
and Incarnation,Boethiusdrew easily and readilyon Aristotelian

ARISTOTELIAN
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23

philosophical conceptualities.After all, Boethius's sixth century

scholarly ambition was nothing less than the transmission of
Greek philosophy to the Latin world. Before he was framed,
imprisoned, and executed as a political traitor, Boethius gave
Aristotle's Categoriesextensive coverage in works that also pass
on and develop samplingsfrom the greek commentarytradition.
While acknowledging that Aristotle wrote the Categories
with his eye on sublunary substances here below, Boethius
insists that the framework of the categories can be stretched
to apply to everything, God included.20 The doctrines of the
Trinity and Incarnationseem to requirethat person and nature
occupy distinct metaphysicalniches. Borrowing selectively from
Aristotle, Boethius explains that 'nature' can be taken three
ways:
[Dl] Nature is an internal (per se) and not accidental (per
accidens)principleof motion;21
[D2] Nature is what can act or be acted upon;22
[D3] Nature is the specific differencethat informs a thing.23
From [D3], he concludes that there are two natures in Christ
because Divine and human naturesdo not have the same specific
difference.24
Turningto 'person',Boethiusenunciateswhat becamefor later
medieval Western school theology the classic definition:
[D4] A person is an individual substance of a rational
nature.25
The road Boethius travels to [D4], suggests that he is equating
persons with primary substances and substance-natureswith
secondary substances. Thus, he explains that substances are
universal or particular; that universals (genera and species
such as human, animal, stone) are predicated of singulars,26
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Boethius, De Trinitate, c.4; PL 64, col.1252A-1253B.

Boethius, De persona et naturis duabus, c.1; PL 64, col.1341A, 1342AB.
Ibid., c.1; PL 64, col.1341A; 1341CD.
Ibid., c.1; PL 64, col.1342B.
Ibid., c.1; PL 64, col.1342BC.
Ibid., c.3; PL 64, col.1343D; c.4, col.1345C.
Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1343BC.

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MARILYNMCCORDADAMS AND RICHARDCROSS

but particulars (e.g., Cicero, Plato) are not predicated of

others.27Universal and particular have contrasting ontological
statuses: essences in universalssubsist (subsistere)and have only
possible existence; they exist as substances (substare) only in
individuals and particulars.28Individuals do not subsist but
exist as substances.29 Neither do individual substances depend
on accidents for their being; on the contrary, they enable
accidents to be by functioning as their substrate.30 These points
echo Boethius's Categories-commentarycontention that primary
substancesare the ultimatesubjectsof both secondarysubstances
and accidents and hence naturally prior to them and the sine
quibusnon of their being."3
A person is the subjectof a nature;therecannot be persons that
are not subjects of natures32-in twentieth century terminology,
there are no 'bare' particulars.Persons are substance-individuals;
persons cannot be said to be in universals.3 Persons are
substance-individuals;even if there are individuals, there are
no persons in other categories (e.g., no person of whiteness,
blackness, or magnitude).34Substance-individuals qualify as
persons only among humans, angels, and God, but not
among non-living or (cf. [D4]) non-rational substances.3"Later
scholastics drafted 'supposit' (suppositum)as the corresponding
general term to apply regardless of substance-kind (and so to
Brownie the donkey, Beulah the cow, and my pet rock as much
as to Socrates and Plato).
In his De trinitate, Boethius draws another distinctionbetween id quod est and id quo est-that contrasts primary
substances, not with universals, but with their parts (if any).
Where the primarysubstanceis a composite of matter and form,
the composite is id quodest and the form is id quo est. But neither
of the parts qualifies as an id quod est. (Once again, to say the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1343C.

Ibid., c.3; PL 64, col.1344AB.
Ibid., c.3; PL 64, col.1344BC.
Ibid., c.3; PL 64, col.1344BC.
Boethius, Categories-commentary; PL 64, col.182A-C, 183A, 187BC.
Boethius, De persona et naturis duabus, c.2; PL 64, col. 1342C.
Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1343C.
Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1343A.
Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1343B.

ARISTOTELIAN
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opposite, would violate Aristotle's dictum against the atomists

that a primarysubstance cannot be composed of other primary
substances.)In De trinitate,however, Boethius does not identify
id quodest with the ultimate or primarysubject. He reasons that
where id quod est is a simple form (e.g., the Divine essence),
it cannot be the subject of anything (because-he assumesAristotelian subjects are in potency to that of which they are
the subjects).In matter-formcomposites, matter is in potency to
and is the subject of the form. Strictly speaking, only matter is
a subject.36
2.2. Too Many Persons? So far, then, a supposit seems to be a
primarysubstance-a concrete substanceindividual(as opposed
to a universal), a complete being that is per se in the genus
of substance (as opposed to its parts), both ways substance as
opposed to accident-and thus to inherit whatever is supposed
to be metaphysicallyspecial about them. Nevertheless,medieval
Western school theologians were sharp to spot how Boethius's
definition seems to admit of counter-examples from the very
doctrines-that in God, there are three persons and one essence;
that in Christ, there is one person and two natures-he was
attempting to formulate. First, as Boethius himself argues, the
Divine essence is not only one, but numericallyunmultipliable
by nature.37Where the categories are 'stretched' to apply to
Godhead as well as sublunary substances, Divinity is not
accidentbut an ultra-substance(beyondordinarysubstance-kinds
in its inability to be subjectto accidents)";and-where 'rational'
is taken broadly to cover all kinds of intelligence-Divinity is a
rational nature. Moreover, as cosmological arguments aim to
show, the Divine essence exists per se. And, unlike the soul,
the Divine essence is complete, sufficient by itself to place the
individualit is in a (super-)substancekind. From these, it follows
that Divinity is an individualsubstanceof a rational nature. But
to count Divinity as a person over and above Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, would be to admit a quaternityin the Godheadwhich conciliar pronouncementsrule out as heretical.
36. Boethius, De trinitate, c.2; PL 64, col.1250C-1251A.
37. Ibid., c.2; PL 64, col.1250D-1251A.
38. Ibid., c.4; PL 64, col.1252A.

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MARILYNMCCORDADAMS AND RICHARDCROSS

Second, medievalWesternschool theologians were unanimous

that what Christ assumes is an individualhuman nature. (Even
though they held a variety of positions on the problem of
universals,most agreed that human nature cannot be universal
in reality but only as an object of thought.) It follows that the
assumed nature is an individual substance of a rational nature.
Yet, if it were to count as a person in its own right, there would
be two persons in Christ-the person identical with the assumed
human nature, and the eternal person Who is God the Son.
Boethius' attempted formulation would fall into the Nestorian
heresy which he is at pains to oppose.39
Notice: These two problems-unlike the difficultiesdiscussed
in Part I-arise independently of a thinker's account of the
metaphysical structureof composite substances. So long as the
Divine essence and the assumed human nature are supposed
to be concrete complete individualsubstance things that are not
supposits (something about which Aquinas agreed with Scotus
and Ockham), Boethius's definition of 'person' will seem at
best elliptical, at least incomplete, and at worst wrong. By
positing a concrete complete individual substance thing that
is a nature and not a supposit, both doctrines require us to
complicate Aristotle's bipartite division between primary and
secondary substances. Both force a further distinctionbetween
completeconcreteindividualsubstancethings that are naturesbut
not persons or supposits,and those that are persons or supposits.
In the face of the demand to explain the differencebetween
them, medieval Western school theologians drew the moral,
not that Categories-thinkingshould be abandoned, but that it
should be stretched to accomodate these cases. Already the
Aristotelian machinerysets up three contrasts:between primary
substances and sharable substance kinds, between primary substancesand substanceparts, and betweenprimarysubstancesand
inherentaccidents. School theologians turned to these for useful
analogies.
2.3. Disqualifyingthe Divine Essence: Even though the Divine
essence is concrete, numerically one and unmultipliable, it
is-like genera and species-sharable with numerically many
39. Boethius, De persona et naturis duabus, c.4; PL 64, col. 1345C.

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supposits (viz., with Father, Son and Holy Spirit).Alternatively,

even though the Divine essence is-unlike the separate soula complete substance, the Divine essence is-like the
soul--capable of combining with something (viz., with the
person-distinguishers, Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration) to
make something one per se. Either way, the Divine essence
differsfrom the Divine persons in being sharable.Thus, Richard
of St. Victor advocates replacing Boethius's definition with 'A
person is the unsharable existence of an intellectual nature.'4
Likewise, Bonaventure says that personhood requires not only
singularity and supereminent dignity (being of a rational or
intellectual nature) but also unsharability, where it is the last
that both the separate soul and the Divine essence lack.41 For
Bonaventure, this doesn't mean that the Divine essence is a
universal. For-he stipulates-universals are not only sharable
(e.g., numerically many individuals share human nature) but
numerically multipliable (e.g., human nature is numerically
multiplied in numericallydistinct individuals, so that Socrates'
humanity is numerically distinct from Plato's). By contrast,
numerically one Divine essence is shared by numerically three
Divine persons-the Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit.42 Scotus
distinguishes being sharable the way a universal is with its
inferiors, from being sharable the way a form is with that of
which it is the form. Scotus declares that Deity is sharable
both ways, indeed, necessarily sharable and necessarily shared.
The soul is necessarily sharable and temporarily (ante-mortem
and post resurrection)shared the second way. Both are thereby
disqualified from counting as persons.43 Likewise, Ockham
declares,a supposit must not only be a completebeing (sufficient
by itself to establish somethingin its genus or species)as opposed
to whateveris or can be an essential part (e.g., the separatesoul,
any substantial form, or prime matter), but also it must not be
such as to constitute anything one per se. Strictly speaking, the
Divine essence and the person-distinguishingDivine relations
40. Richardof St. Victor, De trinitateIV, c.19-22, col.944A-945CD.Cf. Scotus,
OrdinatioI, d.23,q.u;Vat V.355-56.
41. Bonaventure,Sent.111.5.2.3;Quaracchi111.136.
42. Ibid.,1.19.2.u.2;Quaracchi1.359.
43. Scotus,OrdinatioI,d.23,q.u;Vat V.357.

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MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS AND RICHARD CROSS

do not count as parts, because-given Divine simplicity and

Moreover, with
infinity-they are 'the same by identity.'44"
Ockham
essence
is Itself a
reckons
that
the
Divine
Scotus,
as
a
The
Divine
to
count
essence
fails
complete being.
supposit,
however, because It is apt to combine with something elseviz., with each of the person-distinguishingDivine relations,
Paternity, Filiation, and Spiration-to make something one
per se-viz., a Divine person, which is a supposit.45
2.4. Dealing withthe AssumedNature: Even though the assumed
human nature is a concrete complete individualsubstance thing,
its relation to its supposit can be analogized either to a quasipart or to a dependentaccident. Because what is assumed is not
an accident but an individual substancenature, Aquinas prefers
the first approach. There is one complete and perfect actuality
(esse) for one supposit. When ingested food or a successfully
transplanted organ comes to an already constituted supposit,
it does not add to but comes to share in the complete and
perfect esse of that supposit for as long as it remains a part of
that supposit. Analogously, the Divine essence is that through
which God the Son has His esse. When the individual human
nature is assumed, it comes to participate in the esse of God
the Son. Moreover, God could lay aside the assumed human
naturebut preserveit in being-in which case the assumednature
would first participatein the actuality (esse) of God the Son and
afterwardsreceive an actuality (esse) of its own, so that it would
be its own supposit. What makes the difference between the
concrete complete individualsubstancenature'sbeing a supposit
or not, is whetheror not it has its own actuality (esse) or instead
shares in the actuality (esse) of something else.
In general, Scotus and Ockham reject Aquinas's metaphysics
of actuality (esse)-sharing,insisting that every really extant thing
has an actuality (esse) of its own, no matter whether it de facto
exists separately, or combines with another to make something
one per se or per accidens, whether it is de facto independent
or depends on another as a subject or quasi-subject. Scotus
44. Ockham,QuodlibetaIV.7;OTh IX.328.
45. Ockham, Ordinatio I,d.23, q.u,a.l; OTh IV.61. Cf. Quest. in III Sent., q.1; OTh

V.4-5.

ARISTOTELIAN
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contends, Aristotelian physics requires this. For by definition,

real production involves a real effect. Real production of a
substance has something in esse simpliciter as its term; real
productionof an accident (e.g., tanness, sweetness,heat) has esse
secundumquid as its term. But the human nature of Christ is
a real effect of real production: viz., of creation by the Divine
persons and of generation by Mary His mother. So, the human
nature of Christ must have its own actual esse, indeed, its own
esse simpliciter.Otherwise,the Divine persons and Mary would
not really produce anything!4
Even on Aquinas's own terms, the part-whole analogy is especially unpromising for conceptualizing the Incarnation. For
ingested food or a successfullytransplantedorgan come to participate in the esse of the whole (the esse of the already constituted body) by virtueof the form of the whole's inheringin it. But
the Divine Word is not the kind of thing that can inhere in the
assumedhuman nature;and if it were, the result would be a confusion of natures-contrary to what is theologically required.47
Scotus and Ockham favour the second approach that finds
the assumed nature sharableand shared with the Divine person
in a way analogous to that in which form is shared with the
subject of which it is the form. Unpacking their accounts will
raise doubts about whether substance supposits are all that
metaphysicallyspecial.
III
Dependence,Independence,and Alien Supposits
3.1. Aristotelian Revisions: Scotus and Ockham took it for
granted that if Aristotle had pondered the relation between
individual substance natures and supposits, he would have
granted the necessarytruth of the following:
[TI] For each primary substance, [a] there is one and only
one secondary substance that pertains to it, and [b] it
pertains to it per se and [c] is essential to it;
46. Scotus, Op.Ox. 111.6.1.3;Wad VII.1.173.
47. Scotus, Op.Ox. 111.6.1.4; Wad VII.1.174. For a longer discussion, see my 'The
Metaphysics of the Incarnation in Some Fourteenth Century Franciscans,' in Essays
Honoring Allan B. Wolter, Franciscan Institute Publications, 1985, 21-57.

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MARILYN
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[T2] A primarysubstance (e.g., Socrates) is necessarilyreally
identical with its individual substance nature (Socrates'
humanity);

so that
[T3] Individual substance natures are numericallymultiplied
as primary substancesare numericallymultiplied,
and
[T4] Primary substances are numerically multiplied as
substance natures are (numericallyand/or specifically)
diversified.
In Boethius's estimation, adherence to the necessary truth
of the latter pair-[T3] and [T4]-produced two heresies:
Nestorius's insistence on two persons for two natures in
Christ, and Eutyches' contention that there was one nature for
one person.48It is understandable that Aristotle should have
advanced [Tl]-[T4], because his eye was on the natural world;
he did not have the theological cases in mind. As with Einstein
in relation to Newton, theoretical revision is required by new
data, albeit revision that concedes considerable truth to the old
outlook within its limited range.
So far as [TI] is concerned,Scotus and Ockhamgrant that for
each primary substance P, there is one and only one secondary
substance S such that S pertains to P per se and S is essential
to P in the contemporary sense that P couldn't exist without
S's pertaining to it. Likewise, [T2] is true with respect to that
substance kind the primary substance couldn't exist without:
e.g., Beulah the cow is really the same as her individual bovine
nature; Socrates is really the same as his individual human
nature; God the Son is really the same as the Divine essence.
But-according to Scotus and Ockham-the doctrine of the
Incarnationposits that an individual human nature-which, by
metaphysical necessity, has to be really distinct from God the
Son (contrary to [T2])-pertains to God the Son contingently
and temporarily (contrary to [Tla] and [Tic]). Relative to
48. Boethius, De persona et naturis duabus, c.4; PL 64, col.1345C; c.5; PL 64,
col. 1347BC.

ARISTOTELIAN
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the assumed individual human nature, God the Son is-as

really distinct from it-an alien supposit. How could this be
metaphysically possible? Scotus takes the lead in trying to
explain.
3.2. The Relation of Personal Union: In Quodlibet 19, Scotus
recognizes that the union of really distinct things may result
three ways: [i] from a form's informing a subject; [ii] from
aggregation;[iii]from some order.The Divine Word is not united
to an individualhuman nature the first way, because the Divine
Word is not in potency, not informable, and not an act that
informs human nature (analogous to the way whiteness informs
Socrates).The Divine Word is not united to an individualhuman
nature the second way either, because any two really distinct
things (e.g., the EmpireState Buildingand your pet dog) qualify
as an aggregate, but not just any two are such as to be united
in unity of person or supposit. Scotus concludes that the union
must be a union of order of the posterior to the prior, of the
nature with respect to the Word on which it depends. Scotus
explains that it has to be a relation of dependence,because
every non-mutual relation or relation between unequals (e.g.,
that between an accident and an individual substance) is a kind
of dependence(e.g., Socrates'whiteness depends on Socrates)or
requiresin the relatum some dependence upon that to which it
is related.49
This looks like a bad result, however, since creatures are
efficientcausally dependenton all three Divine persons the same
way, but human natureis said to be assumedby the Divine Word
alone. Scotus' response involves three theses:
[T5] The dependenceof the individualhuman nature on the
Divine Word is not causal.50
[T6] The formal ground or reason why the Word is that
on which the individual human nature depends is not
commonto the three persons."'

49. Scotus, Quodlibeta 19.5.419; cf. Op.Ox. 111.1.1.3;Wad VII.1.5.

50. Ibid., 19.7.419-20; cf. Op.Ox. 111.1.1.3;Wad VII.1.6.
51. Ibid., 19.8.420. Ockham agrees (Quest. in III Sent., q.l; OTh VI.16).

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Rather
[T7] The formal ground or reason why the Word is that
on which the individual human nature depends is the
personal or hypostatic entity of the Word-i.e., the
person qua person.52
This might look like another bad result, however, because the
Divine person-distinguishers(Paternity,Filiation, and Spiration)
are relatives, while-according to Categories-metaphysicsabsolutes (substances and qualities) don't depend on relatives
but the other way around.
Scotus's reply is that what it takes to be the term of
a dependence-relation-i.e., that on which the dependent
depends-is independence. Relations in creatures are not
independent but-like accidents generally-are aptitudinally
dependent(have a natural tendency to exist in another as in
a subject, and would do so unless obstructed), while created
substance natures are aptitudinally independent(they have a
natural tendency to independence;barring some obstacle, they
will be independent). But even if it is held that Divine persons
are distinguishedby personal relations(Scotus thinks there is a
philosophicalcase to be made for the opposite),53these relations
are nevertheless subsistent relations and so independent.When
the categories are stretched to apply to God, everything in
God--quantities, qualities, and relations-gets 'substantialized'!
Indeed, Divine persons and the Divine essence alike are so
independent that it is metaphysicallyimpossible for them to be
dependent.54

3.3. IndividualSubstanceNatures versusIndividualSupposits: In

Scotus's language, Aristotle assumes that it would be repugnant
to any primarysubstance, by virtue of the positive entity that it
is, to exist in or be said of another. If primary substances and
individual substance natures are really identical, then it would
52. Ibid., 19.10.420;Op.Ox.111.1.1.3;
Wad VII.1.6.
53. Cf. Marilyn McCord Adams, 'The Metaphysicsof the Trinity in Some
Fourteenth Century Franciscans', forthcoming Medieval Philosophy and Theology.

54. Scotus, Op.Ox. 111.1.1.4,Art.2;Wad VII.1.7.

ARISTOTELIAN
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33

be incompatible with any individual substance nature to exist

in another (the way an accident does) or be said of another
(to be essentially predicated of it), and so incompatible with
any individual substance nature to depend on another really
distinct thing as on its own supposit. On Aristotle's scheme,
alien supposition would be impossible.Thus, primarysubstances
would be the ultimate and fundamentalsubjects of the universe
in that they could not exist without being subjects, and could
not have subjectson which they depended and/or of which they
were predicated.
Scotus thinks that in general,
[T8] Repugnance to X has to be based on a positive entity.
Thus, what makes it incompatible with the Divine essence
to be divided (= numerically multiplied) is the positive
entity that the Divine essence is. Likewise, what makes it
impossible for Socrates' humanity to be numericallymultiplied,
is the positive entity that it is (on Scotus's theory, the
haecceity that is a positive entity added to sharable rational
animal). Likewise, what makes it impossible for any Divine
person to depend on another is the positive entity of Its
person-distinguishing feature (according to the then-current
theologicalmajorityreport,the relationof Paternity,Filiation, or
Spiration).
Focussing on the non-causal in/dependence that he has
identified, Scotus distinguishes three different degrees: actual
in/dependence, potential in/dependence (in/dependence is
not metaphysically incompatible with it); and aptitudinal
in/dependence (a natural inclination to in/dependence). He also
draws on the notion of obediential potency, which refers to
a creature's metaphysical capacities that go beyond natural
exigencies, inclinations, or potencies and that can be actualized
only by Divine power.
Like all Christian school theologians, Scotus has taken one
step away from the Aristotelian cosmos by insisting that
[T9] Everything other than God depends on God efficient
causally for its existence and in its functioning.

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MARILYN
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Now Scotus takes a further step away when he insists that

[T10] Every created/creatable positive entity is in obediential potency with respect to dependingnon-causally
on the Godhead."5
That is, the positive entity of a createdthing-no matterwhether
it is substance or accident, absolute or relative-is never enough
to make it incompatiblewith that created thing to depend noncausally on the Godhead. Put otherwise, potential non-causal
dependencecharacterizesevery created thing. By contrast, noncausal dependenceis incompatiblewith the thing a Divine person
is.
To appreciatethe magnitudeof this second departure,consider
how-assuming that Divine independenceis enough to sustain
as a supposit, not only each creature taken one by one, but
all creatures at once-[TI0] makes pantheism or panentheism
metaphysically possible, insofar as God could have assumed
each and every creature God created all at once."6 Scotus also
thinks-though it does not come up here but in the discussion
of transubstantiation-that
[TF11]Every created/creatable positive entity is in obediential potency with respect to not depending (noncausally) on any other creature,
even though (as in the case of eucharisticaccidents)they may be
aptitudinallydependent. Thus,
[T12] For every creatable/createdpositive thing, no matter
what its aptitudinal tendencies, it is potentially
dependent(non-causally)and potentially independent
(non-causally); neither non-causal dependence nor
non-causal independence is metaphysically incompatible with it.
To call this obediential potency is to emphasize that God alone
has the power to obstruct the natural tendency of substances to
be independentand of accidentsto be dependent;the dependence
55. Ibid., 111.1.1.7;Wad VII.1.12; 111.1.1.9-10; Wad VII.1.15-16.
56. Ibid., III.1.1.10; Wad VII.1.16.

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of a substance and/or the independence of an accident is the

obedience of the creatureto the Creator!
Important for present purposes is the fact that [TIO]/[T12]
opens metaphysicalspace for a distinction between an individual
substance nature (e.g., Socrates'human nature) and a substance
supposit (e.g., Socrates). What is the differencebetween them?
Scotus answersthat they are really the same thing, a thing that is
aptitudinallyindependent (and so not aptitudinallydependent),
a thing that-left to itself-would supposit itself, in which
case it would be actually independent (and so not actually
dependent, in the relevant sense). But when the Divine Word
assumes it, the human nature is actually dependent, although
it remains aptitudinally independent (i.e., it retains its natural
inclination to be its own supposit). Scotus concludes that what
distinguishes a person from the individual human nature is
this: an individual human nature is characterizedby a single
negation-the negation of aptitudinaldependence-but a person
is characterizedby doublenegation-the negation of aptitudinal
dependence and the negation of actual dependence. That is, an
individual human nature does not have any natural tendency to
depend on another as on a subject(hence, a single negation);it is
a person only if-in addition to not having any natural tendency
to dependence-it does not actually depend on another as on
a subject (hence, double negation).7"By contrast with created
and creatable individual substance natures, the personification
of the Divine essence involves positive entities-the persondistinguishing relations-which (a la [T8]) are incompatible
with alien supposition. This means that Divine persons are
characterizedby a triplenegation:negation of actual dependence,
negation of aptitudinal dependence, and negation of potential
dependence.
Because Richard of St. Victor defines 'person' as 'an unsharable existence of a rational nature', Scotus puts the same
point otherwise, by saying that created personificationinvolves
the negation of actual sharing, while Divine personification
implies an incompatibilitywith being shared.The Divine essence,
by contrast, is actually shared among the three Divine persons.
Indeed the positive entity that the Divine essence is, gives rise
57. Ibid., 111.1.1.9;Wad VII.1.15.

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MARILYN
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to an incompatibilitywith not being shared.Scotus adds that it is

the infinity of the Divine essence that explains why numerically
one Divine essence can be shared by numerically three Divine
persons while human nature is numericallythree in numerically
three human beings."5
3.4. Complicationsand Corrections:Ockham follows the main
lines of Scotus's account, making some adjustments and
drawing out more implications. For instance, Ockham agrees
that if complete concrete individual substance things are left
to themselves, they will 'self-supposit.' But he raises technical
objectionsto Scotus's talk of a naturalaptitudefor independence.
Ockham thinks this can't be right because a nature's active
powers incline it only to something positive, while independence
-not depending-is not anything positive. Rather because the
active powers of an individual substance nature incline it no
more to independencethan to dependence,it can be said to be in
neutralpotency with respect to each. Likewise, alien supposition
will not be violent because it won't run contraryto the individual
substance nature's active powers.59
To the contemporary analytic-philosophical ear, Scotus's
summary formula-that person adds to individual substance
nature only double negation of actual and aptitudinal
dependence-seems infelicitous, because it mixes conceptual
and/or linguistic entities (negations) with the non-linguistic,
non-conceptual entities (complete individual substance natures).
In one Reportatio passage, Ockham struggles with this by
distinguishing [i] person so far as its nominal definition (quid
nominis) is concerned from [ii] person so far as its real
definition (quid rei) is concerned. The positive part of the
nominal definition signifies a concrete individual thing (e.g.,
a complete individual human nature), and the negative part
(negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence) denominates
it. Ockham reasons that [i] person taken according to
its nominal definition does not fall in a genus per se,
because the aggregate of {A + B} does not fall in a genus
per se if one of its parts-with or without the other-falls in
58. Ibid., III.1.1.10; Wad VII.I.16.
59. Ockham, Quest. in III Sent., q.1; OTh VI.37-38; Quodlibeta IV.7; OTh IX.336.

ARISTOTELIAN
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a genus per se all by itself (if A falls in a genus per se, whether
or not it is aggregated with B, or vice versa). The aggregate
of Socrates and Xanthippe does not fall in a genus per se,
because of each of Socrates and Xanthippe falls in a genus
per se all by him/herself, independently of being coupled.
Likewise, a complete individual human nature falls in a genus
per se, whether or not it is actually independent. [ii] Person
taken insofar as its real definition is concerned, is the complete
individual substance nature that is in fact denominated by the
negation of double dependence.Once again, that nature is per se
in a genus, but the double negationconnoted by the term'person'
does not pertain to its essence." Ockham explicitly disparages
any suggestion that 'Socrates' or 'man' would supposit for
a composite of affirmation and negation on the ground that
nothing real and substantial is composed of such linguistic
and/or conceptual entities.61 It is more apt to say that 'person'
is a connotative term and that the thing that is the person is
denominated by the negation of double dependence.
In any event, Scotus' 'double negation' criterion for
personhood is not sufficient. For the Divine essence and the
person-distinguishingDivine relations lack both aptitudinal and
actual dependence;yet none of them is a person.62
3.5. Contingentlya Supposit: Ockhamcomes to the heart of our
question-what's metaphysicallyspecialabout supposits?-when
he declares that 'supposit' is a connotative term that does not
admit of a real definition(quidrei) but only a nominal definition
(quid nominis).63 With minor variations across differentworks,
Ockham offers the by-now-unsurprisinganalysis:
[D5] A supposit is [a] a complete being, that is [b]unsharable
by identity or by uniting with another to make something one per se, [c] not apt to inhere in anything, and
[d] not sustained by anything.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q. 1; OTh VI.28,30.

Ibid., q.1; OTh VI.30; cf. Summa Logicae I, c.7; OPh 1.26.
Ockham, Ordinatio I, d.23, q.u,a.l; OTh IV.64-65.
Ibid.; OTh IV.61.

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According to [D5a], the thing that is the supposit is not the kind
of thing that can be an essential part (the way substantialforms
and prime matter are), and is not in fact an integral part. [D5b]
disqualifies the Divine essence as well as separate souls. [D5c]
excludesaccidents,whetheror not they are actuallydependenton
a subject. [D5d] rules out assumed individual substance natures
that in fact depend on an alien supposit. Given [D5], he defines
'person' as follows:
[D6] A person is an intellectualsupposit.64
Given these, Ockham appeals to
[T10] Every created/creatablepositive entity is in obediential
potency with respect to dependingnon-causally on the
Godhead;
and
[T12] For every creatable/created positive thing, no matter
what its aptitudinal tendencies, it is potentially dependent (non-causally) and potentially independent
(non-causally);neithernon-causaldependencenor noncausal independence is metaphysically incompatible
with it,
Ockham infers a furthercorollary conclusion:
[Cl] For creatures/creatables,beinga suppositis contingent.
School theological consensus laid it down that numericallythe
same individual human nature could first not satisfy condition
[D5d] because assumed by the Divine Word, and then satisfy
condition [D5d] because the Divine Word laid it down. Christ's
human nature is contingently not a supposit. Like Aquinas,
Ockham instances an additional kind of case: a part of the
continuum-e.g., a volume of water or air-can fail to satisfy
condition [D5a] when it is included in a larger volume and
then satisfy condition [D5a] if it is separated off on its own.65
64. Ibid.; OTh IV.61-72; Quest. in III Sent., q.1; OTh VI.4-5, 8; Summa Logicae 1.7;
OPh 1.29; Quodlibeta IV.7; OTh IX.328, 337.
65. Ockham, Quodlibeta IV.7; OTh IX.329. Cf. Aquinas, Sent. II1.5.3.3; Parma 74A.

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39

The result is that

[C2] The propertyof being a supposit is not essential to any
creatable/createdthing, because any creatable/created
thing whatevercan exist without it.
(Ockham is willing to conclude that 'A human supposit can be
assumed' is true, even though 'A human supposit is assumed' is
contradictory;just as 'A white can be black' is true, even though
'A white is black' is impossible.66) In effect, our reflections in
Part I queried whether the things here below that are in fact
supposits (e.g., Socrates and Plato, Beulah and Brownie) are
ontologically basic. Scotus's and Ockham'smetaphysicalanalysis
of the Incarnationgo furtherto suggest that whicheverthingsare
ontologicallybasic here below,beinga suppositis essentialto none
of them!
3.6. Modes of Predication: On the Categoriesscheme,secondary
substance is supposed to be predicable of primary substance,
'man' of Socratesand 'cow' of Beulah,per se. But do the relevant
secondary substancepredicatespertainper se to alien supposits?
Does Scotus's non-efficient causal dependence relation really
license per se predication (e.g., of human being of the assuming
subject)? Scotus replies that corresponding to the distinction
between an individual substance nature and its supposit, there
will be a distinction between two senses of the per se/per
accidens predication. One way, the contrast has to do with
the content of what is predicated:per se predication predicates
substance features (e.g., 'man' predicates humanity) while per
accidenspredicationpredicatesaccidents (e.g., 'white' predicates
the quality whiteness). Another way, the per se/per accidens
division has to do with the relation of what is predicatedto the
subject:a predicate'sbelonging per se to a subject is contrasted
with any sort of existing-inanother. 'Man' is per se predicatedof
Socrates both ways, but of the Divine Word only the first way.
Thus, just as [T10]/[T12]doesn't erase but modifiesthe difference
between substance and accident, so also it doesn't eliminate but
66. Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q.1; OTh VI.40-41; Summa Logicae 111.3.33;OPh
1.716; 111-4.8;OPh 1.788; Quodlibeta IV.7; OTh IX.330-331.

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complicates the Aristotelian distinction between per se and per

accidenspredication.67
Ockhamagreesthat 'God is man' is literallytrue. Nevertheless,
he insists that-properly speaking-it is not per se in any way.
The reason is that per se propositions are necessary,while 'God
is man' is contingent.68'God can be man' is per se the second
way, because that predication is necessary,even if the predicate
is not internal but external and really distinct.69'God is man' is
not properlyspeakingper accidenseither, because 'man' signifies
a substance predicate and not an accident and so is not crosscategorial.70 But it is per accidens if all that means is that the
proposition is contingent." Again, 'God is man' is not univocal,
because univocal predication requires the predicate to signify
the whole or at least a part of what the subject signifies (e.g.,
'man is an animal'), whereas 'man' in 'God is man' connotes the
Divine supposit but principallysignifiesthe assumed nature that
is reallydistinct from the Divine supposit. But it is not equivocal
either.72Rather, 'God is man' is denominative in the broadest
sense, because 'man' signifiessomethingreallydistinct from what
'God' supposits for, and what 'man' signifies is something that
does not inherein what 'God' supposits for.73Ockhamadds that
'the Divine natureis man' is also literallytrue, becausethe Divine
natureand the Son of God are reallythe same. But it leads people
into error to say so; it is less misleading to say that the human
nature is united to the Divine Word.74
3.7. Alternative Assumers? Metaphysical revision differs from
ad hoc theoreticalpatchinginsofar as it attemptsto make the new
data systematicallyunsurprisingin a wider theoretical context.
To develop their ideas about alien assumption required school
theologians to engage in thought experiments, to pronounce
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Scotus, Op. Ox. III.7.1.7-8; Wadding VII.1.192-193.

Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q.10; OTh VI.317.
Ibid., q.10; OTh VI.335.
Ibid., q. 1; OTh VI.11; q.10; OTh VI.317.
Ibid., q.10; OTh VI.334-335.
Ibid., q.10; OTh VI.321-322.
Ibid., q.10; OTh VI.321-322.
Ibid., q.1; OTh VI.324.

ARISTOTELIAN
ANDSUPPOSITS
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41

upon the metaphysicalpossibility of cases that they were sure in

advance would never actually be. All agreed:God the Son is the
only actual alien assumer, and Christ's human nature the only
complete individual substance nature that is supposited by an
alien supposit. But furthertheoreticallight will be shed on what
it takes to be an alien assumer,by consideringwhetherthe other
Divine persons could also have been assumersof individual substance natures?and whethermore than one or all three together
could assume numericallythe same individualsubstancenature?
For Scotus, the answer to the first question is easy. For he
has identified the relation between the assumed nature and the
assumingsupposit with essentialnon-efficientcausal dependence.
The Divine persons are metaphysicallyon a par with each other,
so far as being the term of such a relation is concerned. So, yes,
the Father could assume and could have assumed; so also the
Holy Spirit.
Scotus's answer to the second question turns on his
understandingof essential non-causal dependenceas structurally
analogous to causal dependence.Where the latter is concerned,
Scotus has argued that causal over-determinationis impossible:
that it is impossible for an effect E to have two total efficient
causes A and B. For if A were the total efficient cause of E,
then E could exist even if B were left aside, and so would not
depend on B. Similarly, if B were the total efficient cause of
E. But A or B count as an efficientcause of E only if A or B
were something E couldn't exist without. Analogously, Scotus
concludes, where essential non-efficient-causal dependence is
concerned, there cannot be two things on each of which a given
thing totally depends.75
Returning to the question at hand, Scotus distinguishes two
cases: where a Divine supposit is the primary and proximate
term of the total non-efficient-causaldependence; where the
Divine essence is the primary and proximate term of the total
non-efficient-causaldependence and Divine supposits are only
mediate terms. TheFirst Case: If the primaryand proximateterm
of the total non-efficient-causaldependencerelation is supposed
to be a Divine supposit, then-since nothing can be essentially
and totally dependent on many simultaneously-the assumed
75. Scotus, Op. Ox. 111.1.2.5;Wad VII.1.37.

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MARILYNMCCORDADAMS AND RICHARDCROSS

nature cannot be simultaneouslyessentiallydependentupon and

hence assumed by numerically many Divine persons at once.
If the assumed nature essentially and totally depends on God
the Son, there is nothing left to depend-whether totally or
partially-on God the Father or God the Holy Spirit!76Modally,
the situation is as follows:
[i] For each Divine person, it is metaphysically possible
that it be that on which the created nature (primarily
and proximately)totally non-efficient-causallydepends.
[ii] 'The assumed human nature totally non-efficientcausally depends on P2 and it is metaphysically
possible that the assumed human nature (primarilyand
proximately) totally non-causally depend on P1 or P3
instead' is true. {P and pos-Q}
[iii] 'It is metaphysicallypossible that the assumed human
nature (primarilyand proximately)totally non-efficientcausally depend on P2 and on P1 and/or on P3
simultaneously'is false. {not pos (P & Q)}
Likewise, the created substance nature is in obediential potency
with respect to primaryand proximate,total non-efficient-causal
dependence on each of the three Divine persons. If this means
that the created substance nature has three distinct obediential
powers-one for dependingon the Father,another for depending
on the Son, a third for depending on the Holy Spirit-then it
follows from the nature of primary and proximate, total nonefficient-causaldependence, that it is metaphysicallyimpossible
for more than one of these obediential powers to be actualized
at once. If there is only one obediential power to be united to
each taken separately, then that power is fully actualized when
the created substance nature primarilyand proximately,totally
non-efficient-causallydepends on the Word.77Ockham rejects
this part of Scotus's argument, contending to the contrary that
causal over-determinationis possible.78
76. Ibid., 111.1.2.5;Wad VII.1.36-37.
77. Ibid., 111.1.2.7;Wad VII.1.37.
78. Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q. 1; OTh VI.18, 21; Quodlibeta I, q. 1; OTh IX.8-9.
But see Rep. II, q.12-13; OTh V.287-289; IV, q.12; OTh VII.249-250, where Ockham

takesthe oppositeposition.

ARISTOTELIAN
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43

The Second Case. It is Scotus's consideration of the second

case that deepens our doubts about whether supposits are
metaphysicallyspecial. Scotus reiterates,to assume is to be the
primary and proximate term of an essential non-efficient-causal
dependencerelation, and the metaphysicalrequirementfor being
the term of such a relation is independence.This means-Scotus
insists-that the Divine essence Itself is qualifiedto be the termof
the essential non-efficient-causaldependence relation. Although
the Divine essence is not a person but rather is sharable among
three persons, the Divine essence exists per se and subsists
per se and so is independentin the requiredsense. If the primary
and proximate term of the total non-efficient-causaldependence
relation were the Divine essence, then the assumed nature could
be said to depend on the persons-all three of them equally and
simultaneously-but mediately.79
Sometimes Scotus suggests that the Divine essence could be
the proximate term of specificallythe same non-efficient-causal
dependence relation as God the Son is term of.80 Later on in
the question, he implies that the special dependence of one
nature on another nature would be similarto that which obtains
between a nature and a person."8(Here he is eager to distinguish
the essential non-efficient-causaldependence of one nature on
another from the traditionally rejected union in nature, which
involved the metaphysical confusion of the assumed human
with the Divine essence. The latter is metaphysicallyimpossible
because of the simplicity, immutability, and incorruptibility
of the Divine nature. Doctrinally it was excluded as the
monophysite heresy.)82
Ockham responds to Scotus with revisions that furtherwiden
the range of possible assumers and thus intensify our doubts
about whether supposits are metaphysically special. For he
contests Scotus's suggestion that independenceis what qualifies
something for the role of alien assumer. The highest degree
of independence is not required, because-Ockham thinksthat belongs to the Divine essence whose independenceenjoys
79. Scotus,Op.Ox.III.1.2.6-7;Wad VII.1.37-38.
80. Ibid.,111.1.2.6;
Wad VII.1.37.
81. Ibid.,III.1.2.10;Wad VII.1.42-43.
82. Ibid.,111.1.2.10;
Wad VII.1.42-43.

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priority of origin over that of the Divine persons and Divine

person-distinguishers.Moreover, Divine persons and persondistinguishersare dependent on each other as correlatives.Yet,
everyone agrees that a Divine person is the only actual alien
assumer, and Ockham insists that either the Divine persons or
the person-distinguishingproperties could be the primary and
proximate term of the relation of assumerto assumed!83Turning
to creatures,Ockham observes that they are absolutely (efficient
causally) dependent upon God as their creator, sustainer, and
governor. Yet, he insists, God could make one created nature
depend on another created subsistentnature;Ockham'sexample
is that thereis no contradictionin God's making the (presumably
separate)soul to be the alien assumerof a body or a stone. Since
assumers do not have to be utterly independent, Ockham finds
it better to characterizethe relation between the assumed nature
and the assumer as one of 'union.'84
A little later on, Ockham returns to Scotus's second case.
After drawingthe conclusion that the Divine essence Itself could
be the primary and proximate term of the relation of union,
Ockham proceeds to reason as follows: if it were possible for
the Divine essence alone and no person to be the term of the
union, the assumednature wouldnot be personifiedeither by its
own personalityor by the personalityof another.As a matter of
necessary fact, however, it is impossible for the Divine essence
to be the primaryterm of dependencewithout the persons being
secondary terms, so that any nature assumed primarily by the
Divine essence will be personifiedafter all."8
These ruminations of Scotus and Ockham are telling twiceover. First, both draw the startlingcorollary conclusion that
[C3] Things that are not and could not be supposits can be
assumers.
For the Divine essence, the Divine person-distinguishers,and
the separatesoul can each be the primaryand proximateterm of
a relation of essential non-efficient-causaldependenceof a really
distinct individual substance nature. This means that supposits
83. Ockham, Quaest. in III Sent., q. ; OTh VI.36.

84. Ibid.,q.1;OTh VI.39.

85. Ibid., q.1; OTh VI.39.

ARISTOTELIANSUBSTANCEAND SUPPOSITS

45

are not metaphysically necessary to perform this metaphysical

job.
In the Godhead, essence, person-distinguisher,and person
are all the same by identity. Because of Divine simplicity and
infinity, no matter which is the primary and proximate term
of the dependence relation, the assumed nature will be at least
mediatelypersonified.But Ockham'sadmissionthat the soul can
be the primaryand proximate term, actually implies the second
startling conclusion that he only toys with in considering the
trinitariancase: viz.,
[C4] It is metaphysicallypossible that a complete individual
substance nature really exist without being supposited
at all.
-contrary to widespread school-theological consensus.86[C1]
and [C2] tell us that it is not essential to any creatable/created
thing to be a supposit. [C4] says that it is not essential to real
and created individual things to be suppositedat all!
God could not bring it about that the universe was free
of supposits, because the Divine essence exists necessarily and
is necessarily supposited thriceover. But there are many ways
for Scotus's and Ockham's God to make a world free of any
and all created supposits. God could make a world in which
substanceparts were never united to make a complete individual
substancenature(cf. Part I above). God could make a world with
complete individual substance natures all of which are assumed
immediatelyby a single Divine person or mediately by all three.
God could make a world with complete individual substance
naturesand make all of them non-efficient-causallydependenton
separate souls and so not supposited at all. For better or worse,
the last two scenarios would be empirically indistinguishable
from the actual world of our experience.
3.8. Primaryand ImmediateSubjectsof Action and Passion? In
his theological treatise on the Incarnation, Boethius says that
[D2] nature is what can act or be acted upon.87In summarizing
86. See, for example, Aquinas, Sent. 111.2.3;Parma 33B, who declares that no nature
has esse outside a supposit!
87. Boethius, De persona et naturis duabus, c. 1; PI 64, col. 1341A; 1341CD.

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Boethius's discussion, Aquinas corrects this:

[D2'] Nature is the principleby which a thing can act or be
acted upon.88
Aquinas explains, the Divine essence is not that which acts, but
that by which the Divine persons share one action, one will
ad extra. Aquinas assures, even Jews and Moslems who deny a
Trinity of Divine persons, think there is at least one supposit to
whom Divine creative activity is attributed.89Bonaventurebases
his argumentsfor Divine triunity on similar theses:
[T13] It belongs to a supposit, not the nature, to act through
the form;
[T14] It belongs to a person, not the nature, to produce and
be produced;
[T15] It belongs to the nature to be shared in production.
Perfect production pertains to the essence of Godhead, and in
two modes-intellect and will. But perfect production requires
the perfect product, and the perfect product would receive
all that the perfect producer is able to give. To receive all
that a Divine producer is able to give-the Divine essencethe product would have to be likewise Divine. But producer
and product are really distinct. Since the Divine essence is
necessarilynumericallyunmultipliable,the really distinct Divine
producerand Divine product cannot be numericallytwo Divine
essences. The only alternative is for them to be numerically
two supposits. Moreover, the two modes of Divine production
are ordered to one another: willing presupposes thought, and
so production by will, production by thought. It follows that
Godhead must be suppositedin threepersons-two productsand
two producers;an unproducedproducer, a produced producer,
and an unproducingproduct-each and all sharing numerically
the same essence, given and receivedwithout loss to the giver(s)."
88. Aquinas, Sent. III, d.5,q.1; Parma 68AB. Cf. Summa Theologica I, q.29,a.1,ad
4um.
89. Even more clearly stated by John Bassolis, Sent. I, d.26,q. 1-2, f. CLIra.
90. Bonaventure, De Mysterio Trinitatis, q.2,a.2; Quaracchi V.65-67; cf. Sent. 1.9.2;
Quaracchi I. 182-183; Sent. I.19.2.u.2; Quaracchi 1.358-359; 1.34.1.1; Quaracchi I. 188.

ANDSUPPOSITS
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47

Yet, neither Aquinas nor Bonaventure91 can consistently hold

that only supposits act and suffer. Separate souls are capable
of thought and choice, but they are not supposits. Aquinas
famously flirts with the idea that even conjoined souls are the
subjects of some actions, when he reasons that the intellectual
soul has an activity that the body cannot share and so exists
per se because it functions per se.92 He says this, even though
he elsewhere pays his respects to Aristotle's warning that it
is more proper not to say that the soul acts, but rather the
composite of which the soul is a part.93 The human soul and
its matter unite to make something one per se, and still there is a
philosophicallygroundedimpulse to say that the soul is an agent
of some actions rather than the composite. But the assumed
individual human nature is a concrete thing really distinct from
and only contingently supposited by the Divine Word; being
assumed does nothing to change its active and passive causal
powers and tendencies. Because of its union with the Divine
Word, all acknowledge, there is a communicatioidiomatum.But
that in itself makes it look as if the properties, including the
actions and passions, pertain to the assumed nature (or its parts)
as an immediate and proximate subject, and get transferredto
the alien supposit as a remote subject.
Scotus' critique of Anselm's argument for the conditional
necessity of a God-man depends on this understanding.Anselm
contends that satisfaction must be proportionate to guilt. Since
guilt is proportionate to the worthiness of the offended party
and God is a being a greater than which cannot be conceived,
immeasurable satisfaction is owed. But only God can do or
be anything immeasurablyworthy, and only Adam's race can
rightfully pay the debt it owes. Anselm concludes, the problem
can be solved only if the same individualis both Divine (and so
able to pay) and human (and so in a position to pay rightfully).
Scotus counters that the saving acts (voluntary obedience to
the death) and passions (sufferingdeath by crucifixion)are acts
and passions of the human nature. The human nature, its
acts and passions, are all finite; being assumed by the Divine
91. Bonaventure, Sent. 111.5.2.1;Quaracchi III.130-131.
92. Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q.75,a.2,c.
93. E.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q.29,a.1, ad 5um; q.76,a.l,c.

48

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CROSS
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ADAMSANDRICHARD

Word doesn't change them from finite to infinite! Therefore,

none is immeasurably worthy, and none can constitute the
metaphysically commensurate satisfaction that Anselm's plot
requires.94

IV
Supposits, Whetheror How MetaphysicallySpecial? Scotus and
Ockham diligently dischargetheir responsibilityto work out the
metaphysical implications of doctrines central to the Christian
faith. By the time they have finished treating the Trinity and
Incarnation,however, the status of being a supposit looks like a
metaphysicallysuperficialfeature of things here below. Nothing
creatable or created is essentially a supposit; rather anything
creatable or created could exist without being a supposit.
Ockham further implies that nothing creatable or created is
essentially supposited in the sense that anything creatable or
created could exist without being supposited. Nor is there any
metaphysicaljob over which creatableor created supposits have
a monopoly. For Scotus and Ockham, many of the things
that in fact qualify as supposits--complete individual substance
natures-are composites of really distinct things-matter and
complements of substantial forms-that are naturally prior to
and in that sense more independent than the supposit itself. Is
this a metaphysicalrevolutionthat thoroughlyuproots supposits
from any special place in the way things are?
No, not exactly. But this answer can't be clarified without
pausing to be more precise about what 'ontologically basic'
94. Scotus, Op. Ox. 111.20.7.8; Wadding VII.429; cf. 19.7.4 & 7; Wadding
VII.413,418. The textual picture in Ockham is muddier. In Quaest. in III Sent., q.10,
Ockham reasons in such a way as to presuppose that the immediate subject of action
and passion predicates is the assumed human nature (OTh VI.322-323, 350). He
explicitly asserts as much in Quaest. in I Sent., d.5,q.1 (OTh 111.37), where he goes
on to say that the philosophers never endorse the thesis that the actions belong to
supposits; rather their view is that actions belong to singular things, because only
singular things are real (OTh 111.47). In Quaest. in I Sent., q.1, Ockham seems to
take the opposite stance (OTh VI.24, 32; cf. Quaest. in III Sent., q.1; OTh VI.14).
In Summa Logicae 1.7-8 (OPh 1.23-34) and Quodlibeta V, q.ll (OTh IX.523-528),
Ockham observes that where non-assumed created individual substance natures are
concerned, individual substance nature and supposit are really the same, so that there
is no question of predicates pertaining to the one prior to the other. Space limitations
prevent a more detailed consideration of these texts.

ARISTOTELIAN
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49

means. Our examination of the Categories-metaphysicsof some

medieval Aristotelians equivocates among two or three senses.
First,
[D7] F's are ontologically basic if and only if [a] the
existence of F's is essentiallyindependentof everything
else, and [b] everythingelse in the ontology essentially
depends on F's for their existence.
But Scotus makes it explicit that 'dependence' and 'independence' are themselves ambiguous between causal and
non-causal.
[D7'] F's are ontologically basic if and only if [a] the
existence of F's is efficient causally independent of
everythingelse, and [b] everythingelse in the ontology
is efficientcausally dependent on F's.
[D7"] F's are ontologically basic if and only if [a] the
existence of F's is non-causally independent of
everything else (doesn't/couldn't depend on anything
else as a subject),and [b]everythingelse is non-causally
dependenton F's (depends on F's as subjectsor quasisubjects).
If the reference is [D7'] to efficient causal in/dependence,
then God alone, the Divine persons, are ontologically basic,
because every creature is essentially efficient-causallydependent
upon the Trinity, while the Trinity exist by the necessity
of the Divine nature, and are essentially incapable of any
efficient causal dependence at all. If [D7"] 'dependence' and
'independence'refer to non-causal dependence, Aristotle wants
to say that accidents and secondary substances depend on
primary substances in the sense of being predicated of them,
while primary substances are their non-predicable subjects.
Aristotle thought that primary substances could not depend
in this way but were the fundamental subjects of the
universe and so counted them ontologically basic in that
sense!
Alternatively,
[D8] F's are ontologically basic if and only if F's are
among the fundamental metaphysical building blocks

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CROSS
MARILYN
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ADAMSANDRICHARD
out of which non-fundamentalitems in the ontology
are constructed.

In this sense, Ockham believes that individual things (res)substances and qualities, prime matter and substantial and
qualitative forms-are ontologically basic. Arguably, the early
Scotus believes that formalities-in contemporary terminology,
unsharable and sharable properties-are ontologically basic,
even though common natures and haecceities cannot really
exist separately, but can really exist only in individual things
(res) in suitable combinations with each other. Part I of this
paper dwells on the fact that for none of Aquinas, Scotus,
and Ockham can primary substances of sublunary species be
ontologically basic in sense [D8], becausematerialsubstancesare
themselvescomposites of more fundamentalbuilding blocks (for
Aquinas principlesthat are distinct in reason, for Scotus distinct
formalities, for Scotus and Ockham really distinct individual
things).
Boethius's discussion reflects another Aristotelian reason
why neither primary substances nor supposits can be ontologically basic in sense [D8]. For he contrasts primary
substances/supposits with their parts or constituents, insisting
that primarysubstances/suppositsare not that out of which any
per se unities can be made; only per accidensunities can be composed of many primary substances/supposits. Many individual
cows make an aggregate, a herd of cows. But if an individual
cow were composed of many primarysubstances/supposits-the
way ancient atomism implied-it would not have the per se
unity that Categories-metaphysicsdemands.
Certainly, medieval school theology could not countenance
any notion that God is a fundamental metaphysical building
block. Despite Divine simplicity and infinity, early Scotus
distinguishesa plurality of formalitieswithin the Divine essence
(viz., the essential absolute perfections) and within each Divine
person (viz., the Divine essence and the person-distinguisher).
Formalitiesremainontologically basic in sense [D8]. By contrast,
it is because of Divine simplicity and infinity, that Scotus joins
other school theologians in denying that Godhead can enter into
composition with anythingelse. BecauseGodhead is entirelyfree
of potentiality,It cannot enter into act-potencycomposition with

ARISTOTELIAN
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ANDSUPPOSITS

51

anything in such a way as to become a constituent (a formal or

material cause) of any creature.
The metaphysicalsurprisesof Part II arise around [D7], with
Scotus's contention that the Divine persons and/or the Divine
essence could be the (mediate or immediate)subject/supposit of
any and all creatable things. (Scotus insists that this claim does
not compromise Divine freedom from potentiality, becauseunlike the inherence of an accidental form in a substance, or
the existence of substantialform in prime matter-essential nonefficientcausal dependencedoes not imply any potentiality in its
term.) Scotus and Ockham understood Aristotle to believe both
that primarysubstancescannot exist without being subjects;and
the positive entity that a primary substance is is incompatible
with its being in or said of or in any way predicable of
anything else. Scotus changes the modalities: creatable and
created individual substance natures not only can be subjects;
the positive entity that they are includes a natural aptitude to be
subjects. For the most part (Christ's human nature is the only
exception), created individualsubstancenaturesare subjectsand
not predicatedof another as their subject. But-Scotus insiststhere is nothing about the positive entity that creatableindividual
substance natures are, that makes it impossible for them to be
subjected to and predicated of something else. For Scotus and
Ockham, it is the Divine supposits that are supposits necessarily;
the positive entities by which the Divine persons are supposited
makes it impossible for the Divine persons to be sustained by or
be predicableof anything else.
Put otherwise, Scotus's and Ockham's reflections force a
further distinction in [D7b], depending on whether 'essential
in/dependence' is taken for [D7b.i] 'necessary in/dependence',
or [D7b.ii] 'has a natural aptitude for in/dependence' (Scotus)
or 'has in/dependence as a natural default' (Ockham). Only
the Divine essence and the Divine supposits are ontologically
basic in the sense [D7b.i] that It/They exist necessarily and
independently of anything else, and everything else necessarily
depends [D7'] efficient causally on the Divine essence/Divine
persons for its existence and can depend [D7"] on them as on
a subject. Createdindividual substancenatures are ontologically
basic only in sense [D7b.ii] of having independenceas a natural
aptitude or natural default and of being that on which other

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MARILYNMCCORDADAMS AND RICHARDCROSS

creatables have dependence as a natural aptitude or a natural

default.
Overall, here as in Part I, we are still in an Aristotelian
universe,but some of the things that were necessaryhave become
Divinely obstructablenatural aptitudes or defaults. Not always,
but for the most part things are and function the way Aristotle
would have predicted. The change in the modalities does not
make supposits that much less common de facto. Among things
here below, only the eucharistic accidents in fact violate the
Aristotelian dictum that whateveris, either is a suppositor is in
or said of one. The change in modalities does mean, however,
that the same things as exist now could exist even if there
were no created supposits. And so the Divine essence and/or
Divine supposits have replaced creatable primary substances as
the fundamentalsubjects of the universe.

ARISTOTELIANSUBSTANCE AND
SUPPOSITS

by MarilynMcCord Adams and RichardCross

II--Richard Cross

RELATIONS,UNIVERSALS,AND THEABUSE
OF TROPES
Scotus'sbelief that any createdsubstancecan dependon the
divineessenceand/or divinepersonsas a subjectrequireshim to abandon
the plausibleAristotelianprinciplethat thereis no merelyrelationalchange.
I argue that Scotus's various counterexamplesto the principlecan be
rebutted.For reasonsrelatedto those that arisein Scotus'sfailed attempt
to refutethe principle,the principlealso entails that propertiescannot be
universals.
ABSTRACT

I
Relational Changes.As he himself spots, there are

Merely
various consequences of Scotus's belief that

Only the Divine essence and the Divine suppositsare

ontologically basic in the sense...that It/They exist
necessarilyand independentlyof anythingelse, and everything
else necessarilydepends...efficiently causally on the Divine

essence/Divine
personsfor its existenceand can depend...on
themas a subject.

Or, more succinctly, that 'the Divine essence and/or Divine

supposits have replaced creatable primary substances as the
fundamental subjects of the universe.' Basically, a supposit is
a complete being that is neither instantiated or exemplified
by another, nor inherent in another. On Scotus's account, no
created substance is essentially a supposit. The consequence
pinpointed by Scotus that I want to explore in this paper is
that a very plausible Aristotelian principle has to be rejected.
According to this principle, there can be no change merely in

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MARILYN
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ADAMSANDRICHARD

the category of relation;' in the neat if inelegant scholastic tag,

'In ad aliquid non est motus nec mutatio':
(M) For any x and any y, if x begins to be related in some
way to y, then if there is no change intrinsic to x there
is a change intrinsic to y, and if there is no change
intrinsic to y then there is a change intrinsic to x.
An intrinsic change is a change in the intrinsic properties of a
thing, and an intrinsic property is-using the basic elements of
the account proposed by David Lewis and Rae Langton, and
accepting much of the rest too-roughly one that belongs to
somethingat time t independentlyof that thing's accompaniment
or loneliness at t, where something is accompanied if and only
if it coexists with a contingent object wholly distinct from itself,
and lonely if it fails to do so.2 'Intrinsic',thus defined, is not the
contradictoryof 'relational':there are intrinsicrelations between
the parts of a complex thing. But even with these definitions,
the scope of (M) need not be understood to include only whole
things; there can be relations between parts or constituents of
a thing that are intrinsic to the thing but not to the parts or
constituents, and I shall exploit this in what follows. For this
reason, it seems to me that (M) is a clearer and more helpful
principlethan one to the effect that there is no relationalchange
without a qualitative change. If qualities are real, then there
are relations between them and their subjects, and qualitative
changes thus require us to explicate the nature of the relational
change between the qualities and their subjects. Allowing the
scope of (M) to include parts and other constituents of things
might seem too permissive. But the point about intrinsicity, as
thus defined, is not that an intrinsic property is a property of
a thing that is discrete; it is merely that whether the thing has
the propertydoes not depend on what accompaniesit. Parts and
properties might themselves have intrinsic properties, provided
that they have these properties independentlyof their status as
parts or propertiesof some largerthing. (I assumethat properties
1. Aristotle,Phys. 5.1 (225b11-13).The principleis usefullydiscussedfrom a hist-

orical perspective in Mark G. Henninger, Relations.: Medieval Theories 1250-1325

(Oxford:ClarendonPress1989),8-10.
2. See David Lewis and Rae Langton, 'Defining Intrinsic', Philosophyand

Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), 333-45 (see particularly pp. 333-5).

ARISTOTELIANSUBSTANCEAND SUPPOSITS

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are distinct if they do not overlap in intension or (as we might

say) content. It is thus possible that two properties of one and
the same substance are distinct.)3
On (M), if two things come to be related to each other
differently, then there is a change intrinsic to at least one
of the two things. One of the things must change in a way
extrinsic to the relation between them. It is this change that
explains the change in relation. I find (M) prima facie an
overwhelmingly plausible principle, though there are various
philosophical counterexamples known both to Scotus and to
more modem metaphysicians.To see why the principlehas been
felt (by Aristotle, among others) to be so plausible, ask the
following questions: How could two things change in the way
they are related to each other without changing in any other
way? How could there be a change in relation that does not
supervene on some intrinsic change?4The plausibility of (M),
then, rests on the intuitions that real changes requiresome kind
of ontology, and that relations do not seem to be sufficiently
real to provide this ontology. Given these intuitions, it seems
to me that a response to any of the counterexamplesto (M)
would need to be markedly implausible in order to outweigh a
commitmentto (M). (M) commands a high price;I hope to show
that although there is some price to be paid for denying (M), it
is not high enough to defeat (M).
As Scotus noticed, (M) relates directly to the belief that only
divine persons are fundamentalsubjectsin the universe.Suppose
a particularizedhuman natureceases to be a propertyof a divine
person, or indeed that a pre-existent human nature becomes a
propertyof a divine person. Theremust be some change, intrinsic
either to the nature or to the person, in virtue of which this new

3. I takeit that 'distinct'hereis numericallydistinct.To makethis thoughtplausible,

considera theorythat identifiespropertiesas universals.Any universalhas numerical
identityin every exemplificationof it: the whitenessof this egg is (numerically)
identicalwith the whitenessof that egg. The variousuniversalsexemplifiedby one
substancemust thereforebe numericallydistinct,else everysubstancewill exemplify
everyuniversal.As I will note below,it is for a relatedreasonwrongto thinkof the
relationof compresenceas a kind of identity.(Compresenceis not transitive.)
4. 'Change'has to be construedin a way sufficientlybroadto includebeginningand
ceasingto be, for reasonsthat will becomeclearbelow.For now, I shalljust assume
that this is a varietyof change.

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state of affairs obtains.5 As far as I know, the first person to

raise the Aristotelian objection in this context was Richard of
Middleton, a Franciscantheologian writingin the 1280s.Richard
replies that the relevant change is simply that the divine person
wills it to be the case that he is disjoint from (or joined to) the
particularizednature.6 But this does not look to be the right
kind of response. The kind of account we need here is not
fundamentallygoing to be an account of a causal process. The
divine person may well will himself to be (for example) disjoint
from the nature, but on the face of it bringingthis state of affairs
about requiresthat he bring about somefurther change either in
himself or in the human nature.What is to be explainedis a state
of affairs S, and if the only distinctive feature of S is a relation
(e.g. of being disjoint), an appeal to the causal power that brings
about S will not be sufficientto explain how S can come to be.
Some furtherontology is required.
Scotus simply rejectsthe Aristotelianprinciple,though he does
not do so merely on the basis of the theological counterexample
that is the subject of Professor Adams's paper. One way to
motivate (M) is by accepting what Keith Campbell labels
'foundationism'. Foundations are monadic properties upon
which relations supervene, such that 'for all relational facts
there are corresponding foundational facts, and in every case
the relational facts call for no ontology beyond that involved
in the foundational facts themselves." Foundationism looks to
me true, not only intuitively but also for (among other reasons)
considerationsof parsimony. It is for this reason that (M) looks
so plausible to me. Among Scotus's immediate predecessors,
Henry of Ghent is the most important foundationist, and Henry
is Scotus's target in his arguments against (M).8 As Campbell
notes, 'Foundationismis committed to the slogan "No relational
differences without qualitative differences"or "There are no

5. For the objection,see Duns Scotus,Ord.3.1.1, n. 12 (Wadding,VII, 16).

6. See my The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus

(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2002), 134.
7. Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars,PhilosophicalTheory (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell1990),101.
8. See Henninger,Relations, 52-6 (for Henry's position), 87-97 (for Scotus's
critique).

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merely relational differences".'9Scotus exploits a philosophical

counterexampleto (M) to argue against foundationism,namely,
motion (change of position or of distance between two bodies).
And he buttresses this counterexample by considering two
further cases: causation, and inherence. Let me take these one
by one.
(1) On a relational theory of space, a change in distance
between two bodies is nothing other than a change in relation
between the two bodies, and on a substantivaltheory of space,
a change in distance includes a change in relation to space.
Scotus persistently points to this case as one of a number of
counterexamples to (M). As he sees it, space is reducible to
relations (of containing/being contained) between bodies, and
a change in such relations does not require any other intrinsic
change.'0 Scotus's solution makes clear that, as he sees it, what
motivates (M) is precisely the thought that real change requires
some ontology. The solution is that relations are in some sense
things, or (in another way of talking that Scotus also uses),
that every relation involves something inherent in the things
related, but yet distinct from every qualitative property." What
distinguishesrelations from monadic propertiesis that relations
intrinsicallyinvolve some referenceto something else. Relations
are not intrinsic, as defined above, since they are not had by a
thing independentlyof the accompanimentor loneliness of that
thing. But they are nevertheless as real as intrinsic properties.
We might call these 'relation-universals',or, since Scotus does
not believe that there are universals in anything other than
a sense rather different from that in which people understand
them today, 'relation-tropes'(since Scotus certainly thinks that
there are individualizedproperties of things, that relations are
such properties,and that relationsinvolve no furtherontological
commitments-since the reference to something else, intrinsic
to a relation, is just a 'mode' of the relation-trope).Whatever
we make of relation-tropes,I think it is clear that what Scotus
9. Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 113.

10. Scotus,Ord.3.1.1, n. 15 (Wadding,VII, 23).

11. Scotus, Ord. 2.1.5, n. 207 (Vatican,VII, 104-5); see also nn. 195 and 234-5
(Vatican,VII, 98, 117-18);for the inherenceof such relations,see the discussionin
Henninger,Relations,89-92.

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has in mind is that relations involve ontological commitment,

and to some category of thing other than substance or monadic
property.
(2) Scotus buttresses his attack on (M) by appealing to
causation. Causal relations requirespatial proximity. But spatial
proximity is itself irreducibly relational, and if (M) were the
case, it would not be possible for there to be changes in
spatial relations. There would thereforebe no changes in causal
relations-which is manifestly false.12 We could extend Scotus's
argument to include causal relations between material beings
and immaterialones such as Gods or Cartesiansouls-and thus
causal relations that do not involve spatial ones. This would
provide a second counterexampleto (M). We suppose that Gods
and Cartesian souls, if they exist at all, have the power to
move material things around the universe, at least subject to
certain physical constraints (and perhaps not subject to such
constraints).But if (M) is true, it is not possible for this to occur.
(3) Scotus's third case has to do with composition from parts
and/or properties. If (M) is true, then there cannot be merely
relational changes between the parts or properties of a thing.
But it seems that there are, since previously disjoint parts can
be united, and conjoint parts disunited.'3And on the medieval
doctrine of transubstantiation,a propertycan be separatedfrom
its substancewithout any change intrinsicto the substanceor to
the property.'4
II
In Defence of (M). It seems to me that Scotus is wrong to
reject (M). And if I am right about this, then it is not possible
to follow Scotus in holding that everything other than the
divine essence/divine persons 'necessarilydepends.., efficiently
causally on the Divine essence/Divine persons for its existence
and can depend... on them as a subject', at least in the way
12. Ibid., n. 210 (Vatican, VII, 105-6).
13. Ibid., n. 209 (Vatican, VII, 105).
14. Ibid., n. 208 (Vatican, VII, 105). As usually understood, transubstantiation
involves the destruction of a substance but not of the accidents that inhered in the
substance, so Scotus's example here is somewhat unusual even by medieval lights.

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outlined in Professor Adams's paper. But Scotus's counterexample to (M) is formidable.Let me take the three argumentsin
turn. (1) Central is the local motion argument,not only because
it furnishes the main counterexample (and perhaps the only
one), but also because it seems to make the fewest controversial
presuppositions.My suggestionis that it is simply wrong to think
of motion as merely relational, and I offer in defence of this
the case of a universe that consists merely and entirely of one
sphere, rotating (let us say) about its own axis. Could someone
who accepts both a relational view of space and that motion
is entirely relational distinguish between this universe and one
which consists merely and entirely of one non-rotating sphere?
I doubt it. Clearly such a person cannot appeal to a change in
relation between the parts of the sphere and the parts of space.
Neither can she appeal to a change in relation between the parts
of the sphereand each other, becausethere is no such change. So
it seems hard to see what sense such a person could give to the
notion of the parts of the sphere occupying differentpositions.'"
She would probably claim that the distinction between rotation
and non-rotation in such a case is simply unintelligible. The
sphere, in short, is neither in motion nor at rest; these concepts
simply have no application in the case at hand. What can I say?
It does not seem so to me, and I suspect that modal intuitions
ought to be given the benefit of the doubt here. Of course,
the very intelligibility of the scenario I am describing might
lead us to infer that a substantivalistaccount of space is true,
and indeed necessarily true: any universe containing material
objects includes some kind of substantival space. For in this
case the rotation of the sphere simply consists in the relations
that persisting parts of the sphere have to persisting parts of
space. But it is not obviously true that any universe containing
material objects includes some kind of substantival space, even
if some such universesdo.
My proposal-which is neutralon the question of substantival
or relational accounts of space-is that motion is an intrinsic
15. If she could, then she'd be home and dry. She could give an account of the
motionsimplyby appealingto the relationsbetweenpositions(of parts)and times,
or betweenfacts about positions of parts at differenttimes. But the notion of a
differencein positionheredoes not seem intelligible.

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non-relational property. I add 'non-relational' because-using

the example of the sphere rotating about its own axis-my
proposal will entail that motion is an intrinsicpropertynot only
of the sphere, but also of any and all of the parts of the sphere.
This sphere is lonely, and its motion is had by it irrespective
of its accompaniment or loneliness. No part of the sphere is
lonely, but the motion of the parts is had by them irrespective
of their accompaniment.What we have to say is that the sphere
(or at least any of its parts) has a particular velocity, and that
this velocity is an intrinsic and non-relational property. And
if this is true of the motion of a lone sphere, it is presumably
true of the motion of any material object in any possible world,
includingthose worlds that contain other many materialobjects,
or substantival space. But what would it mean for a velocity to
be an intrinsic and non-relationalproperty?It seems to me that
it would be hard to improve on a suggestion recently made by
Bigelow and Pargetter.They argue that it is possible to attribute
a vector to a moving body at a time, and this vector is construed
not as merely a description of where an object has been or will be,
but as an intrinsic property of an object at a particular instant.
In addition to the... second-order property of having various

positionsat varioustimes,thereis thefirst-order...propertyof

the object at each time."6

Accounting for the magnitude and direction of such a vector

is not straightforward.As Bigelow and Pargetternote, relational
accounts of velocity make it easy 'to account for the magnitude
and direction of a vector... . If a velocity vector simply reflects
a pattern of positions for a body across time.., then magnitude
and direction emerge immediatelyfrom the relevant temporally
extended pattern."' Reversing the explanatory order, Bigelow
and Pargettersuggest that relativevelocities on a spinningsphere
are establishedin termsof the differentmagnitudesand directions
of the velocities of points on the sphere. These relativevelocities
are generatedby the non-relationalvelocities, and it is stipulated
16. John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, 'Vectors and Change', British Journalfor
the Philosophy of Science, 40 (1989), 289-306 (p. 290).
17. Ibid., 298.

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that 'theproperties,velocities, stand in proportionto one another

if and only if the correspondingrelations,relativevelocities, stand
in that proportion',"'where these proportions hold both for
magnitude and direction. What does the explaining is that both
the properties and the relations are supposed to be universals,
and that there are velocity universals not only for all actual
velocities but for all possible velocities too. (I'll have some more
to say about this below.) This is only half an explanation,
however, because while it can explain how there is uniformity
between different velocities and relative velocities, it does not
exactly explain how it is that the relativevelocities superveneon
the velocities in the first place. Given supervenience,it explains
uniformity;but it does not explain supervenienceas such.
So there is at least one outstanding problem here: if motion
is an intrinsic and non-relational property, what is it that
guarantees that relational facts properly map onto the intrinsic
velocity? How could the velocity be responsible for securing a
body's occupancy of the later places that it comes to occupy?
It may be that this will just be a basic fact, and perhaps no
more puzzling than the way in which any relational property
supervenes on a non-relational one. What makes it true that
Theaetetusis taller than Socratesarejust the non-relationalfacts
that Theaetetus has the height that he has, and Socrates the
height that he has. I take it that this relationship is broadly
logically necessary:given that Socrates has the height he does,
and Theaetetus the height that he has, it is not possible that
Theaetetus fail to be taller than Socrates. This supervenienceis
not a contingent or nomological matter. I suggest that it is a
logically necessary fact, and one that could be just basic and
unexplained,that relational velocities supervenein the way that
they do on non-relationalvelocities.
But there is a further problem too, perhaps more severe. I
have been proposing that the relative motion of two bodies
is explained by their intrinsic velocities. But these velocities
can be uniform, and in this case it still seems as though we
have a counterexampleto (M). Suppose, for example, that two
bodies move in translational motion with uniform but different
velocities. There is continuous change in the relative distance
18. Ibid., 304.

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of these two bodies, even though the intrinsic velocities remain

constant ex hypothesi.There thus seems to be no intrinsicchange
groundingthe relationalchange.'9But this is not quite right. The
whole point of having an intrinsic velocity is that anything that
has such a velocity is (intrinsically)changing:it is movingeven if
it is not moving relativeto anything else, and even if its velocity
is uniform.20
(2) Causationis easy, at least if we stick with Scotus's account.
Changes in causal relations between material substances are
explained by their relations of spatial proximity, and these
relations are ultimatelyexplainedby intrinsicvelocities. Changes
in causal relations between (e.g.) Cartesiansouls and bodies are
explained by such souls giving intrinsic velocities to the bodies
or to the parts of the bodies.
(3) Perhaps the most interestingcase is the possibility of two
parts or tropes becoming disjoint with no intrinsic change in
either one of them. This is the abuse that I wish to prevent here,
and will devote the next section of my paper to this task.

III
The Abuse of Tropes. Scotus's reification of relations, and the
rejection of (M), which motivates this reification,is seen by him
as a necessary condition for his theological speculations about
a possible life-story of Christ's human nature. The speculation
consists in two collections of tropes becoming disjoint with
no intrinsic change in either one of them. The case is exactly
analogous to that of any two tropes becoming disjoint with no
intrinsic change in either of them, so I will for simplicity'ssake
focus on this easier case.
There are basically two sorts of trope theories. The first treats
whole substances simply as complexes of tropes, along with the
19. I owe this objection to Oliver Pooley.
20. In the case of a rotating sphere the velocity of any part is, of course, constantly
changing as the part changes direction. The case of a lonely sphere in translational
motion is rather harder. My instinct is to say that motion just is a (species of) change.
Following a different line of thought, it would be possible to claim that the sphere has
(non-relational) motion even though it is not changing-in which case (M) would
need to be modified somewhat. This position would still be significantly different
from that of someone who claimed that the only kinds of velocities there are, are
relative velocities.

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relations between these tropes. The relevant bundling relation is

compresence:
An unanalysable,
non-transitive
relationwhich
symmetrical,
holdsbetweensome,butnotall,pairsof properties.... A 'comis thena classof properties
eachmember
of
plexof compresence'
whichis compresent
comwitheachothermember.A complete
is onewherethereexistsno furtherproperty
plexof compresence
whichis compresent
witheachmemberof the class.Particulars
arethenidentified
withcompletecomplexes
of compresence.2'
Intrinsic changes in substances are parasitic on, and explained
by, relational changes in tropes-changes in their compresence
relations. On (M), these changes must themselves be explained
by changes intrinsic to the tropes. But tropes are not things
that are capable of intrinsic changes other than beginning and
ceasing to be. Changes in the universe are entirely explained by
the production and destruction of tropes. Two tropes cannot
become separate from each other and both survive. One can
be destroyed, and the other survive. This is a change more
than just relational between the two tropes, since one of the
tropes is destroyed altogether. So too a substance could lose
a particularizedproperty by that property's being destroyed.
I suppose a trope could lose its substance (as in the medieval
Eucharistic doctrine of transubstantiation);but this might for
other reasons be considered an abuse. It could be argued that
the domain of (M) should be restrictedto substances, and not
include tropes. But I can see no reason why we should accept
this restriction of the scope of (M). If our universe includes
tropes, and the relations between them, then (M) should apply.
For what motivates (M) is the need for some kind of ontology,
and merely relational changes, whatever the relata, don't seem
to include such ontology. If (as we can agree) tropes are not
the sorts of thing that can change intrinsically, then so much
the worse for tropes: the motivation for (M) is as strong in the
case of tropes as it is for substances. Equally, relations between
tropes may well be intrinsic to substances. But they are not
21. D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism.
Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), 90.

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intrinsicto at least some of the tropes, since at least some of the

tropes can exist independentlyof the existence of others in the
complex, and since if the medievals are right about the doctrine
of transubstantiation,perhaps any non-relational property can
exist independentlyof any other.
The second sort of trope theory combines tropes with some
sort of substrate or non-qualitativeparticular-a haecceity. On
this second theory, theremay be (though there need not be) some
direct relation betweenthe various tropes, but therecertainlywill
be some kind of relation between the tropes and the substratelet us call it 'inherence'. But on (M), changes in inherence
relations must be explained by changes intrinsic either to the
tropes or to the substrates.And (again) the only sort of change
that therecould be is beginningand ceasing to be. For a substrate
to change in any other way is for it to gain or lose a trope; tropes
are just particularizedcontents, and do not change in any way
at all other than by beginning and ceasing to be.
Scotus's strategy for dealing with his theological speculations
at this point was to posit what I am calling 'relation-tropes'something which he believes to follow from the question of
changes in distance between two bodies too. There are some
advantages to Scotus's approach. He can provide a global
explanation of changes in distance even on a purely relational
view of space. Changes in distance can be accounted for in
terms of the production and destruction of relation-tropes:for
example, the production of a relation-trope of being-ten-milesdistant-from(it matters not whether we think two such tropes
are required,one in each relatum,or whether one relation-trope
can be compresent in more than one complex of tropes, where
the complexes are distinguished by their monadic properties).
There are various problems with this view, and I am not sure
the extent to which they can be overcome. Perhaps the most
pressing Scotus himself was aware of. The argument goes back
at least to medievalIslamic theological speculation,and famously
crops up again in absolute idealists such as F. H. Bradley.22
If relations are real in the way that properties are, then, like
22. On this, see J. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation, and Induction.:Three Essays in
the History of Thought (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1965), 89-91, and
Henninger, Relations, 9-10.

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properties, they inhere in their substances. But inherence is

a relation, and thus will itself need to inhere-and so on,
ad infinitum. The same objection, of course, will work for
compresence too. Scotus's response is that a relation just is,
or somehow includes, its own inherence. And his reason for
this is that the relation cannot exist without its inherence-there
obviously cannot be free-floatingrelations, even if there could be
free-floatingqualitiesor quantities.23Afortiori, then, inherenceand likewise compresence-is a sui generis kind of property,
one whose inherence is just itself, or whose compresence with
compresent tropes is just its unifying them in a relation of
compresence.
This reply looks somewhat unsatisfactory to me. What
Scotus means is that a relation-unlike non-essential monadic
properties-has a non-relationaltie to its subject. It is tied to its
subject, but not in a way that involves a (further)relation. Still,
on a view that makes relations as real as monadic properties,
this looks somewhat arbitrary.Scotus draws his conclusion on
the grounds that there cannot be free-floating relations. But
presumably what is significant is the degree of reality that
Scotus wants to ascribe to relations-relations must be real
enough to account for the ontology involved in real merely
relational change of the kind excluded by (M). And I find it
hard to envisage how there could be relational ties between
some properties, and non-relational ties between others, given
that in the various cases the tying has the same result and is
between equally real relata. It is worth noting that Bradleytype objections have pushed some modern philosophers in a
direction very similar to that taken by Scotus, but generalized
to cover all properties, not just relations. The position is that
there are non-relationalties between things and their properties.
I will returnto this in the next section. For now, my conclusion
is that if we accept a trope theory, we will need to think of
changes in substances as explained in terms of the production
and destructionof tropes. I leave the natureof the tie betweenthe
tropes an open question. (I certainlydo not have to be committed
to relation-tropes, and I can certainly postulate non-relational
ties between tropes. If foundationism is true, there is in fact no
23. See Henninger,Relations,89-93.

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distinction to be made between relationaland non-relationalties,

and what a foundationist might call a 'relationaltie' could well
be labelled a 'non-relationaltie' by a non-foundationist.)

IV
Universalsand Compresence.What I have tried to show thus
far is that the theological argument propounded by Scotus
and Ockham amounts to an abuse: specifically, an abuse of
particularizedpropertiesor tropes. It is not that a particularized
human nature cannot exist independently;it is, rather, that it
is not possible for it to come to exist independently without
paying a high price in terms of a plausible theory of relations.
But all of this has a metaphysical consequence far wider than
the theological context with which we began. As Scotus and
Ockham see things, the world of things is fundamentallya world
of particularizedproperties or tropes, tied together in various
different ways. One obvious response to their position is to
urge that there are not tropes at all. Properties are, we could
argue, irreduciblyuniversal.Human nature, likewise, would be a
universal,and on this view it makes no sense to think of human
nature as somehow existing as a particular but yet separated
from the particularsthat exemplify it. Claiming that the Divine
essence and/or supposits are the only fundamental subjects of
the universe, as understood by Scotus and Ockham, would be,
on the view (rejectedby Scotus and Ockham)that propertiesare
irreduciblyuniversal, rank confusion.
Still, there are various ways of developing the view that
propertiesare universal.On one well-knownversion, particulars
are just bundles of universals.These universalsare tied together
by compresence. On a view like this, the second person of
the Trinity will include in his bundle, temporarily, human
nature. Human nature will be a sub-bundle of the whole, as
it were. Could this sub-bundle be hived off from the remaining
constituents of the bundle? Not if (M) is true. But the truth
of (M) has a wider consequence than this. For could even
one constituent of a bundle be hived off from the remaining
constituents?Not at all if (M) is true. But on standard bundle
theories where the constituents are universals,this must happen
all the time. For take any bundle {F, G, H... } of such

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universals.There is no thought that any of F, G, or H necessarily

ceases when the bundle ceases. On the contrary, we might
expect F, G, and H to survive the cessation of the bundle. But
the only changes when bundles cease are changes in relations
of compresence. And on (M) such a change is impossible.
Compresenceis a relation which is defined entirely in terms of
its relata-the universals,not the particulars.
We could perhaps posit a variation on this bundle theory,
according to which particularsare supervenienton the bundle
of universals.In such a case, we might think, we can explain the
changes in compresencein terms not merely of the universalsbut
also of the supervenientparticulars.And these changes are intrinsicto the particulars.Supervenienceis a dependencerelation,
however, and the things that supervene are parasitic on, and
posterior to, the constituents on which they supervene.And the
things on which particularssuperveneare bundles of universals:
universalsrelatedby compresence.So this proposed solution violates the requiredcausal ordering,wherethe configurationof universalsexplainsthe identity of the particular.An intrinsicchange
in a particularis dependenton a prior, merely relationalchange,
between the universals. It is tempting to think of universals
being slowly moved around:the universalcomes to exist in some
sense where I am. Indeed, some defenders of universals hold
that universalsare where their bearersare. But if spatial location
is merely relational, we should rightly think the same of the
location of universals.(Perhapswe could claim that what locates
a universalis its relation to other universals;or perhapswe could
simply give universalsspatial locations, and define these in terms
of relations to other particulars-bodies, for example.) I argued
above that motion is a species of change, and that bodies could
just be in motion. Is there an analogue for universals?Could universalsjust be in motion, such that this motion is intrinsicto the
universals, not relative?I doubt it, because for a body to be in
motion is for it to have a vector. This is a state of affairssubject
to physical laws, and it is hard to think of a analogous metaphysical laws to which supposedly moving universals could be
subject to. (The same point would hold for tropes too, mutatis
mutandis.)
Another version of the view that properties are universals
holds that there are fundamentally two categories of thing,

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universalsand particulars-haecceities-and that particularsare

tied to universals by means of some kind of relation (e.g. of
exemplification).This theory is vulnerable to (M) as well. For
suppose I cease to exemplify whiteness. Both I and whiteness
continue to exist. The only change is in the relation of exemplification. Of course, a change in the relation between me and
whiteness is a paradigmcase of a change intrinsicto me. If this
change has to be definedwholly in terms of the relation between
(e.g.) me and whiteness,then (M) excludes every intrinsicchange
whatsoever--even on the assumption that there are universals
and haecceities. Suppose there were some other intrinsicchange
in me. This change cannot be in the universal,since the point of
universalsis that they are items that are fundamentallycontent,
and their content of course is supposed to remain the same: if
it didn't, then they couldn't perform the role in the type/token
distinction that their advocates want them to. But the change
cannot be in the haecceity. Even if we overlook the fact that a
haecceity is supposed to be a bare particular, and posit that
there can be a change intrinsic to the haecceity, a change that
explains how it comes to exemplify the universal, then we are
still left with a problem. For exemplifyingthe universalF-ness is
supposed to be the truth-makerfor the haecceity'sbeing F. But
why wouldn't the intrinsicchange in the haecceity that explains
how it comes to exemplify the universal itself be sufficient
for the haecceity's being F? Suppose this intrinsic change
is not sufficient,then we can ask whether the intrinsicchange in
the haecceity involves a universal or a new particularproperty
or trope. Not the former;but if the latter, then we have a trope
that looks sufficient to explain being F-and why not simply
claim that it is a trope of F and have done with it?
Aristotelianssuch as Scotus would urge that I am not identical
with a haecceity but with a haecceity along with some of
my properties-my kind-essentialproperties. But this makes no
differenceto the objection.All that the Aristoteliangains here is a
stipulationthat there are some ways in which I am unchangeable.
But what is relevant here are the ways in which I can change.
On (M), there are no such ways at all, given that such alleged
changes are simply relational.
As I mentioned above, some thinkers posit that it is wrong
to think of there being a relation between a particularand the

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universalsit exemplifies.Strawson,for example,speaks of a 'nonrelational tie' in this context, and Armstrong wants to deny
that there are relations between particularsand universals.24The
intuition behind (M) is that changes requiresome ontology; the
point of non-relationalties is (among other things) to get rid of
any ontology from the tie itself-thus Strawson explicitly cites
Bradley'sargumentin this context as showing that links such as
instantiation are not to be construed as ordinary relations.25So
from the point of view of the argument I am developing here,
claiming that the ties are non-relational is just the wrong thing
to say if we want to accept real universals.For the less inclined
we are to reify relations (and afortiori ties such as instantiation),
the more our chosen ontology will have to contend with (M).
Another objection to my argument relies on the assumption,
happily made by thinkers who accept universals, that relations
are universals: polyadic universals. For both compresence and
exemplification are relations, and (it could be argued) these
relations could simply begin to supervene on a collection of
universals, or on a haecceity and a universal, without any
change in the universals or the haecceity. I'm not sure I see
how they could, unless one of these non-relational constituents
is changed. But nothing intrinsic to a haecceity changes, and
likewise nothing intrinsic to a universal changes, for reasons
already outlined. Equally, the relation's beginning to supervene
on the non-relational constituents cannot involve a change in
the relation, for the relation itself is a universal, and we don't
suppose that universalscan change. (What would such a change
be? A change in content? But that's absurd.) In the absence of
any such change, it's hard to see what could explain the fact that
the universalsbegin to be compresent, or to be exemplifiedby a
24. See P. F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London:
Methuen 1959), 167-78; Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, 108-11. Scotus, who

(as is wellknown)inventedhaecceities,agreesthatis not possibleto speakin termsof

relationsbetweena haecceityand the kind-essential
propertiesthat it instantiates.He
speaks,in somewhatunfortunateterminology,of a realidentitybetweenthe haecceity
and its kind-essentialproperties,contrastedwith a formaldistinctionbetweenthem.
But his intentionis to posit a distinctionbetweenhaecceityand its properties,and
to deny that this distinctionis such that thereneed to be relation-tropestying the
haecceityand the propertiestogether:ArmstrongbrieflydiscussesScotus'sview in
Nominalism and Realism, 109-10.
25. Strawson, Individuals, 167.

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haecceity. If you say some causal fact about the world explains
this, I ask you just what that causal fact will be, if not reducibleto
a fact about the distributionof universalsin the world. But that
distribution, the presence or absence of compresence relations
between given universals, is precisely what we're trying to
explain.
If I am right, then given (M) there cannot be universals.More
strictly, there cannot be universals that can begin or cease to
be compresent with other universals,or that can begin or cease
to be exemplified by substances. I indicated above that one
reason for accepting (M) is parsimony. It might be thought that
positing universals along with real relations (and thus denying
(M)) is more parsimoniousthan positing tropes. In the end there
is a fine balance here. For reasons just outlined, the relations
between universalscannot be universals.And if foundationismis
false then relations must be (as Scotus supposes) something like
tropes. So someone committed both to (M) and to universals
has to accept monadic universals and relation-tropes. On an
exemplification theory of universals, whenever a universal is
exemplified by a particular there will be a relation-trope tying
the universal and the particular-and one for each universal
exemplified. So on an exemplification theory there will be at
least as many relation-tropes as there are monadic tropes on
a trope theory. On a compresence theory, there will be at
least one relation-trope for each particular. A natural way of
understandingrelation-tropesis to suppose that there are exactly
as many relation-tropesas there are relata in a relation. In this
case, there will be as many relation tropes on an exemplification
theory as there are monadic tropes on a trope theory. Not
only this, the universalist will be committed both to tropes
and to universals, and so will accept more kinds of thing
too. So (M) coupled with my version of trope theory is more
parsimonious.
On the view I am advocating, causal relations between
substances supervene on changes intrinsic to these substances.
These intrinsic changes consist in changes in relations between
tropes (of being or not being compresent). These relational
changes between tropes supervene on changes intrinsic to the
tropes-namely, beginning and ceasing. Typically, such changes
are caused by similarchanges in other substances.This relational

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change between the two substancessuperveneson the change in

the causing substance (a change intrinsic both to the substance
and to one or more of its tropes). Thus the beginning or ceasing
of one trope in one substancecauses the beginning or ceasing of
some other trope in the other substance, and this causal
relationshipbetween the tropes is result of an intrinsicchange in
the tropes of the causing substance-the (causing) relationship
is not the basic fact.
Does this denial of universalsnot underminethe explanatory
force claimed by Bigelow and Pargetterfor their non-relational
velocities, requiring (as they do) that there are real universal
relations between such velocities? It seems to me that it does,
in which case we should opt for a fall-back position and claim
that the consistent mapping of relational velocities onto nonrelational ones is just a basic, logically necessary, fact. Perhaps
there are relation-tropes, as Scotus suggests, and we could
allow that these tropes do the relevant explanatory work
provided that we think trope theories in general don't leave
unexplained things that theories of universals can explain.
Suppose, perhaps for some of the reasons I outlined above,
that we don't accept relation-tropes. Can it really be that it
is a logically necessary fact that changes in position map onto
intrinsic velocities as they do? It is after all easy to imagine
someone intelligibly denying the basicality of the supervenience
of relational velocities on non-relational ones. I suppose we'd
need an account of this superveniencethat made it unintelligible
to suppose that a pair of non-relational velocities could exist
without just the relations to each other that they actually have.
Perhaps Bigelow and Pargetterprovide this; in which case their
account offers a description of the superveniencerelation that
brings out the logical impossibility of the relation being other
than it is.
Overall, it seems to me that pressing the Aristotelian
objection to Scotus's theological speculation has some farreachingphilosophicalconsequences.Given (M), substancescan
neither be nor include universals(other than in the case that the
universal is a fixed and unchanging feature of the substance),
and some other theory must be true-perhaps a form of trope
theory, or perhaps some theory that denies that there are real
propertiesat all and makes all propertiessimply linguistic items.

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Perhapswe might want to explore the possibilitythat the relation

of instantiationshould be thought of as in some way profoundly
differentfrom a relation between things or items in the universe,
howsoever small and minimal these items are held to be. But
whatever our view of non-relational ties, we will need to make
sure that we do not fall foul of (M).26

26. Thanks to Brian Leftow and Oliver Pooley for detailed comments on an earlier
draft of this paper, and to Christopher Shields for helping to get me started.