Testament of Something

Review: The Testament of the Other: Abraham and Torok's Failed Expiation of Ghosts
Author(s): Christopher Lane

Reviewed work(s): The Shell and the Kernel. Vol. 1 by Nicolas Abraham ; Maria Torok ;
Nicholas T. Rand , Questions Freud: Du devenir de la psychanalyse by Nicholas Rand ; Maria
Torok , Questions to Freudian Psychoanalysis: Dream Interpretation, Reality, Fantasy by
Nicholas Rand ; Maria Torok
Source: Diacritics, Vol. 27, No. 4, (Winter, 1997), pp. 3-29
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566259
Accessed: 07/04/2008 01:55
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We enable the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
http://www.jstor.org
THE
TESTAMENTOF
OTHER
ABRAHAMAND TOROK'S
FAILEDEXPIATIONOF GHOSTS
THE
LANE
CHRISTOPHER
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok. THE SHELLAND THE KERNEL.Vol. 1. Ed.,
trans., and intro. Nicholas T. Rand. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994.
Nicholas Rand and Maria Torok. QUESTIONSA FREUD:DU DEVENIR DE LA
PSYCHANALYSE.Paris: Belles Lettres-Archimbaud,
1995.
. "QUESTIONSTO FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS:DREAM INTERPRETATION,REALITY,FANTASY."Trans.Rand.CriticalInquiry19.3 (1993): 56794. ["QFP"]
Trulythe universeis full of ghosts, not sheeted churchyardspectres, but the

inextinguishableand immortalelementsof life, which, having once been, can
never die, thoughthey blend and change and change againfor ever.
-H. RiderHaggard,King Solomon'sMines
Whathauntsare not the dead, but the gaps left withinus by the secrets of
others.
-Nicolas Abrahamand MariaTorok, The Shell and the Kernel
1. Prologue
Nicolas Abrahamand Maria Torok may be best known for advancing a theory of
transgenerationalhaunting.According to this theory,repressedsecrets are passed from
one generation to the next if they are "encrypted"as unprocessed and traumatic
information.Before Abraham'sdeath in 1975, he and Torok saw their analytic role as
reparative:Encouragingtheir analysands to mourn repressed secrets, they hoped to
transformtheir analysands'perspectiveson family history.
AbrahamandTorokquickly becameknownfor expandingFreud'semphasison the
subject'sconflictingdesiresandidentifications.From1968on, whenAbrahampublished
"L'ecorceet le noyau"("TheShell andthe Kernel")as an extendedreview of Laplanche
and Pontalis's TheLanguage of Psychoanalysis,he andTorokpublishedtheirclaims in
cheerfuldefianceof Freudianorthodoxy,acquiringa reputationin France-and, later,in
Englandand the United States-for shatteringsuch "doctrinaire"elements of psychoFortheiradviceandcommentary
onanearlierdraft,
I thankJonathan
and
Culler,JasonFriedman,
IalsothankJudithFeherGurewich
andDavidMarriottfor
Timothy
Murray.
invitingmetopresent
shorterversionsof thispaperat HarvardUniversity
andtheUniversity
of London.
diacritics / winter 1997
diacritics 27.4: 3-29
analysisas theOedipuscomplex anddeathdrive,penis envy, andtheprimalscene, as well

as for criticizingLacan'salleged strangleholdon psychoanalysisin Franceandmuch of
Europe.'AfterpublishingL'corce et le noyau(1987), a collectionof theiressays (many
coauthored),and a radically new interpretationof Freud's patient "the Wolf Man,"
Cryptonymie:Le verbier de l'homme aux loups (1976; trans. The WolfMan's Magic
Word:A Cryptonomy),AbrahamandTorokwere championedin Europeandthe United
Statesby theoristsdelightedto see a "poststructuralist"
critiqueof FreudianandLacanian
Abraham
and
Torok's
work
received almost comparable
psychoanalysis. Ironically,
to
from
denounce
Freud's
"unscientific"precepts.
analyticalphilosopherseager
support
Now thatthefirstvolumeof AbrahamandTorok'sessays hasappearedin translation,
non-Francophonereaders have an opportunityto assess what Abrahamand Torok
contributedto psychoanalysisandto revisitthe debatesthey stagedwithFreudandLacan
in the 1970s and-posthumously for Abraham-in the '80s. Reviewing this collection is
not a simple task, however, because its conceptualinterestsare so diverse and because
Torok's coauthoredwork with Abrahamdiffers radicallyfrom the essays and book she
publishedrecentlywith Nicholas Rand,editorandtranslatorof TheShell and theKernel.
Rand's interventionsconfirm Torok's latest arguments but they also, occasionally,
misleadinglyframethe olderworkin termsof the new. Readersmay thereforesee Rand's
editorial notes and introductionas guides to how he and Torok now view Torok's
collaboration with Abraham.We can only speculate whether Abrahamwould have
interpretedthe collaborationthe same way.2
How does Abrahamand Torok's account of psychic "encryptment"differ from
Freud's model of repression?Assessing their revision of Freud's metapsychological
project,AbrahamandTorokdeclare,"Itwould be presumptuousindeedto allege thatwe
have reachedour goal. Yet it would be false modesty to deny our suspicion thatwe are
finally enteringan open road"[140].3EchoingFreud'sconvictionthatin dreamshe had
discovered "the royal road to the unconscious," Abrahamand Torok encourage a
comparativereadingof their psychoanalytic"road"and Freud's.The following essay
undertakesthis reading,but it also speculateson what Freud'sand Lacan'semphasison
1. To grasp the complex, turbulentexchanges betweenAbrahamand Lacan, one must read
Roudinesco'sJacquesLacan&Co., esp. 597-601. Accordingto Roudinesco,Abraham'sHusserlian
project of phenomenologicalpsychology took a "path[that] was uniquein the French historyof
psychoanalysis.It was 'alien' in all senses of the word to Frenchphenomenology.Thatwas why
Abraham... cultivated an ignorance of Lacan's work, and when he discovered the master's
discourseat Sainte-Anne,he was repelledby thehypnoticnatureof Lacan's relationto his students.
ascentraltopsychoanalysis"
Inbrief,hedidnotregardLacan'sre-elaborations
[598;myemphasis].
This difficulty about conceptual debts and acknowledgmentobviously was compounded by
Abraham's "bizarre"treatmentby the Societe Psychanalytiquede Paris (wherehe hadpreviously
undergonetraining),when his application,in 1975, to become an adheringmemberwas rejected
[597-98, 601]. Thesituationworsenedafter Lacan's "astonished"and "aggressed"responseto
thepublicationsuccess of Abrahamand Torok'sCryptonymie:Le verbierde l'homme aux loups
(1976) [600]. In a commentarypublished in Oricar? [14 (1978): 8-9], Lacan registered his
"surprise"andirritationthatDerrida "suppliedthis lexiconwithaferventandenthusiasticpreface
['Fors']" [Lacan, qtd. in Roudinesco6001.
2. In correspondencewith me, which I reproducewith his permission,Rand distinguished
Abrahamand Torok'sclinical differenceswith Freudfrom his own intellectualargumentswith
Freud: "Itis perhapsI, morethanAbrahamand Torokthemselves,whostresstheirdifferenceswith
Freud. In an earlier versionof the introduction,I had includeda sentencewhichdesignatedthem
as 'unfreudianFreudians.' The double edge there is significant." For elaboration of Rand's
argument,see "Family"as well as his collaborationswith Torok:"TheSecretof Psychoanalysis,"
"Apropos de travaux, "Questionsa ... M. Toroket N. Rand," and Questionsa Freud.
3. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequentreferences are to The Shell and the Kernel,
vol. 1.
4
psychic difficulty adds to Abrahamand Torok's theory of transgenerationalhaunting.

Since AbrahamandTorokask, "Whoamongus is not battlingwith spectersthatimplore
Heavenanddemandof us theirdue, while we arebeholdento themforourown salvation?"
[139-40], I shallclaim-following Kamuf[42]-that AbrahamandTorokdramatizenot
only the "specter"of Freud'slegacy but a pressing,politicalquestionaboutour abilityto
rid ourselves of the past.
2. The Termsof a Cure

The Shell and the Kernel does not simply wrestle with the reign of "FrenchFreud";
Abrahamand Torok's diverse essays presenta model of consciousness, language, and
symptom formation radically different from most continental and poststructuralist
accounts of subjectivity. Abraham differs slightly from Torok in his claims about
psychoanalysis's capacity to resolve psychic conflicts, but both analysts ultimately
presentpsychoanalysisas a curativeprofession,in which the analysandis able-with the
analyst'sprompting-to "retrieve"blocked dimensionsof consciousness [16-17]. Concluding their 1975 essay "The Lost Object-Me," Abrahamand Torok write, "We ...
hope that... thetreasureswhich lie buriedin cryptswill become thedelightof theirowner
and can be made to work for the benefit of us all" [156].
AbrahamandTorokdo not disputethe fact of psychic trauma,butthey differin their
approachto treatmentfrom Freud,who ultimatelyconsideredpsychoanalysis"interminable,"due in partto his realization,as Tim Dean put it recently,that"thereis something
fundamentallyincurablein being human"[116]. While arguingthatpsychoanalysiscan
alleviate a patient's suffering, Freud was careful to state that psychoanalysis cannot
resolve basic ontological difficulties facing all humans.When discussing the effect of
psychoanalysison analysands,for instance,he spoke of "transforming[their]hysterical
misery into common unhappiness"[Studies 305]. His rationalefor encouraging this
substitutionwas simply that "with a mental life that has been restoredto health,"his
analysandswould "be betterarmedagainstthatunhappiness"[305].
By contrast,AbrahamandTorokconsiderpsychoanalysismoreinfluentialin aiding
an individual'swell-being.4Rand'sassessmentof this positionin his introductionto The
Shell and the Kernel seems to me quite accurate: "Abrahamand Torok view the
unintelligibilitythey encounterin theirpatientsas psychicallymotivateddisturbancesof
meaning, as instances of psychic aphasia. . .. Searching for the means to retrieve
signification,AbrahamandTorokuncoverpsychic mechanismswhose aim seems to be
to disarray,even to annulthe expressive power of language"[17]. While Abrahamand
Torok suggest that psychoanalysis enhances a dimension of control preexisting the
specific difficultiesleadingsubjectsto treatment[140, 156], FreudandLacanrefutethese
claims, arguinginsteadthatthe subjectis never ultimately"incontrol"of itself and that
the ego can foster internalunity only by evisceratingthe unconscious.
In advancingthese claims, Lacanianpsychoanalysishighlightsconcerns aboutthe
adequacy of desire, which the patient's enunciated demand alternatelyconveys and
obscures.Lacanalso insisted, counterintuitively,thatdistinguishingbetween desire and
demandis a fundamentalprincipleof treatment:
For a long timenowpsychoanalystshave given up answeringwhenquestioned
in this way,for they have ceased to question themselvesabout theirpatients'
4. In Randand Torok'slatest work as we 'll see, an intoleranceforpsychoanalyticdiscussion
castration
could almost be considered their primarymotivation.See Questions a Freud,esp.
of
279-80.
desires: they reduce these desires to their demands,which makes the task of
converting them into their own that much easier. Isn't that the reasonable
way?-it is certainlythe one they have adopted.
But sometimesdesire is not to be conjuredaway, but appears ... at the
centre of the stage, all too visibly, on thefestive board.... ["Direction"262]
Whenputthis way, the searchfor a "cure"fostersa panaceathatmay be moredistressing
thanthe symptom,given its ensuingpromiseof resolving psychic conflicts. Pushingfor
this "resolution"may also encouragethe analystto readpatients'fantasiesliterallyand
coercively-insofar as theyreproducethe analyst's.Lacanwas contemptuousaboutsuch
therapy,seeing its wish to reinstatethe ego as complicit in the analysand'sdenial of
unconscious conflicts, and thus as entirelycounterto the principlesof psychoanalysis:
"Whatnobilityof soul we displaywhenwe revealthatwe ourselvesaremadeof the same
clay as those we mould!Now that'sa naughtythingto say. Butit's hardlyenoughforthose
at whom it is aimed, when people now go about proclaiming, under the bannerof
psychoanalysis, that they are striving for 'an emotional re-educationof the patient"'
["Direction"226].5
Radically downplaying Freud's and Lacan's claims about intrapsychicconflict,
AbrahamandTorokcreditthe ego witha basic capacityfor coherencewhile representing
sexuality (and the drives) as entirely amenable to consciousness. As we'll see, this
emphasison egoic coherencetakes Abrahamand Torokbeyondthe purviewof psychoanalysis and into the realm of psychology. At such moments, Abraham'stheoretical
differenceswith Torok(and implicitlywith Rand)articulatewhat I shall call a fault line
runningthroughoutTheShell and the Kernel.
This faultline appearswheneverAbrahamandTorokdiscuss theirpatients'testimonies andfantasies.Since speechinadequatelyrepresentsthe sexualdimensionof fantasy,
theanalysand's testimony,while one of themostcompellingformsforexpressingpsychic
distress, is also a profoundlyunreliableindicator of what is wrong. To obviate this
problem,Freudstressedthe importanceof interpretingparapraxes-slips of the tongue
and bungled actions-betraying the subject in the act of speech and action. At such
moments,he claimed,one "hears"egoic resistanceand unconsciousdesire,the analyst's
difficulttaskbeing to distinguishone fromthe other["Analysis"224-25,235]. Whilethe
"talkingcure" thereforeremains a compelling metaphorfor psychoanalysis (without
speech, for instance, the subjectcannot symbolize trauma),the analyst cannot simply
accept or believe that speech is an unequivocaltestamentof a patient'swell-being.
We can put Freud's thesis a little differently:empiricismis unreliablein psychoanalysisfor theprecisereasonthattreatmentis possible. If psychicchangeis to occur,the
psyche must necessarilybe unreliable.The corollaryof this argumentis not difficult to
discern: if the ego and speech were reliable indicatorsof psychic distress, one could
administerself-help with encouragingpep talks, leaving psychic resistanceandconflict
entirely unexamined. Beyond this relatively obvious point lies a drama about the
"evidence"of distress,the "cause"of what is wrong, and the "principle"of how best to
treatthese factors,all of whichconflict with the ego's resistance;such resistanceprotects
the ego from what it finds unbearableand repugnant,but at an immense internalcost:
"Symptomsinvolve suffering,"Freudstressed,"and[this fact] almost invariablydominates a partof the patient's social behaviour"[Three 166]. Since this behaviormay be
neithervisible nor self-evident,JacquelineRose's importantclaim bearsrepeating:We
cannot"deducefrom the externaltrappingsof normalityor conformityin a womanthat
all is in fact well" [92]. Were this ambiguity about appearancesmissing, patients
5. Lacanis quotingthefirstreportof theInternational
whichmetin 1958at the
Symposium,
invitationof theSocieteFranfaisede Psychanalyse,
6.
publishedin Lapsychanalyse
6
presumablycould be persuadedto modify theirbehavior,basedon the rationalexplanation thatit is causing them-and perhapsothers-harm.
MariaToroktouches on this problemin "Storyof Fear:The Symptomsof Phobiathe Returnof the Repressedor the Returnof the Phantom?"(1975), an essay engaging
unconscious fantasy, though her perspectiveis quite differentfrom Rose's. She asks,
"Whyshriekin fear when somebodywantsto show you a pictureyou couldjust as easily
shut your eyes to?" [180]. Torok's partialdilemmain answeringthis questionemerges
when she elaborateson the psychic paradoxesof "penisenvy": "Whatbenefit does the
male derive from subjectingto his masterythe very being throughwhom he could both
understandand be understoodhimself?"[71-72]. ForTorok,the questionis not simply
rhetoricalandthuseasily dismissed;she usefullyframesthisquestionas a needto theorize
aspectsof fantasydefeatingsexualequality.6However,we soonreachtheterrainon which
psychoanalysis confounds political justice and logical solutions to sexual inequality:
"Ourtask is to display the advantagesresulting, for both men and women, from the
institutionalinequalityof the sexes, at least as far as this obtainsin the areaavailableto
psychoanalyticstudy, that is, within the affective realm"[70].
This task is commendable, but it yields only those advantages "available"to
consciousness ratherthan those unable to enter "theaffective realm."Losing patience
with psychic resistanceand anticipatinga conclusive answer,Torok seems unwillingto
allow her question's enigma to raise relatedconcerns aboutunconscious fantasy-for
instance,aboutwhetherpleasureand enjoymentare self-explanatoryor entirelyconsistent with the subject's well-being. She establishesa "conclusive"propositionthatcloses
down this discussion: "Self-to-self revelation throughthe opposite sex would be the
realizationof ourhumanity,andthis is whateludes nearlyall of us" [72]. Torokdoes not
presentthis elusiveness as the best lesson psychoanalysiscan teach us. By arguingthat
it "eludesnearlyall of us,"she presentsthisrealizationas psychoanalysis'sdauntingaim.
Given this proposition's repeatedfailure and manifest heterosexism (it insists on
"revelationthroughthe opposite sex"), we can proposethatthe elements missing here,
which mitigateagainsthumanity's"realization,"arethe sameones thatRanddeprivesof
conceptual resonance in his introductionto The Shell and the Kernel-namely, "the
Oedipuscomplex, the deathdrive,penis envy, the primalscene"[5]. It is not alwaysclear
thatAbraham(and the early Torok)would rejectall of these elements, but we can agree
withRandthatwhathauntsTheShellandtheKernelarethoseenigmas-which Randcalls
the "enemiesof life" [7, 15, 22]-to which Abrahamand Torokrarelygive conceptual
sanction:thetroublingvicissitudesof enjoyment,unconsciousfantasy,drives,andsexual
identity that defeat rational explanation and empirical certitude. To give only one
example, which in some measure"answers"both Torok's question about unconscious
pleasurein sexual inequalityand the statement"nearlyall of us," consider this passage
from her 1959 essay, "Fantasy:An Attempt to Define Its Structureand Operation":
"sexualintercourseaccomplishesthe unionof two narcissisticallycompleteandgenitally
complementarybeings. No doubt this conviction, which happensto be my own, has a
numberof latentmeaningsas well. I am quitepreparedto admitthis, with the stipulation
that these meanings will not be brandedunconsciousfantasies"[33]. Why this stipulation? We can hazardthat it allows Torok to distinguishher argumentabout fantasy's
amenablerelationto consciousnessfromFreud'saccountof dreams,memory,andfantasy
in TheInterpretationofDreams (1900) andThePsychopathologyof EverydayLife (1907
[1901]). Departingradicallyfrom Freud-and, as a consequence,eclipsing his conceptualdistinctionbetweenreverieandwish-fulfillment["Creative"146-49]-Torok claims
that"wecan speakof fantasyas a wakingdream"[34]. Fromthis assertion,it is relatively
easy for her to support fantasy's apparentlysociable and utilitarianprinciples, its
6. Forelaborationon thispoint,see Murray25-64. esp.40 and52-53.
"operationalvalue":"Fantasyis expressive of an attemptat workingthrougha problem

and is combinedwith a desire for collaboration.. ." [36].
Whatcontributesto this limited understandingof psychic satisfactionin TheShell
and the Kernel-and thus to the collection's fraughtrelationto Freudand Lacan-is
Torok'slaterwillingness to reincorporatethose aspectsof psychic life thatRandexcises
in his introduction.While eagerto cure "penisenvy,"Torok'sessay on this phenomenon
meditatesat lengthon its psychic significance.And while RanddownplaysAbrahamand
Torok's interest in the primal scene, Torok's essay emphasizes this phenomenon's
continuedpsychic relevance:"Whatdo we discoveron the way to orgasm?The powerto
fantasize our identity with our parentsand the power to picture ourselves in all the
positions of the primal Scene, in accordance with the various levels at which it is
apprehended"[50].
ConsideringTorok's claims that"sexualintercourseaccomplishesthe unionof two
narcissisticallycomplete and genitally complementarybeings" [33], we must question
whetherthe infant's fantasmaticadditionto this scenarionot only interruptsthe alleged
"union"of these "two... beings"butjeopardizesthe possibilityof theirbeing "complete
and ... complementary."By acknowledgingthe "cut"thatsexualityinauguratesfor all
"dyads"(notjust heterosexualones), Freudremarkedto Wilhelm Fliess in 1899: "I am
accustomingmyself to regardingeverysexualactas aneventbetweenfourindividuals"a figurehe laterexpandedto six [Ego 33nl]. Lacanalso critiquedassumptionsof psychic
unity: "In persuadingthe other that he has that which may complementus, we assure
ourselvesof being able to continueto misunderstandpreciselywhatwe lack"[Four 133].
Let us place these argumentsalongsideTorok's essay on "'penisenvy,"' which she
describes "as a stopgap invented to camouflage a desire, as an artificiallyconstructed
obstacle thrownin the way of our becoming one with ourselves ... 'Penis envy' will
disappearby itself the momentthe painful state of lack responsiblefor it has ceased to
exist. ... So vital a lack cannot be natural;it must be the effect of deprivationor
renunciation"[44-45]. Besides the remarkableclaims made for psychoanalysishere,
Torok's assumptionaboutunifiedidentitybegs a questionaboutthepreciseagentcreating
the symptom's "construct[ion]"and "disappear[ance]."
3. Therapyvs. Psychoanalysis;or, The Ego and the Id
As the above example illustrates, Abraham and Torok's "advance"on Freud and
"renewal"of psychoanalysis foreclose on the unconscious-and reinstatethe egoprecisely when intrapsychicconflicts are most in need of interpretation.For instance,
Torok writes that "the removal of repressionbrings with it strength,self-esteem, and
especially confidencein one's power and becoming"[52; originalemphasis].However,
AbrahamandTorok's intricateaccountof egoic cryptsdoes not adequatelyexplainwhy
the ego wardsoff those aspectsof unconsciousdrivesit cannotintrojectinto consciousness. This problemwith introjectionoccurs not because such drives representa "family
secret"of sharedpainandtrauma,butbecause,by theirverynature,thesedrivescan never
be conscious. 'There is nothingin the id thatcould be comparedwith negation,"Freud
insisted.'There is nothingin theid thatcorrespondsto theideaof time"["Dissection"74];
"it may be said of the id thatit is totallynon-moral,of the ego thatit strivesto be moral"
[Ego 54]. With Freud's stress on the ego and id's impossible relation, given their
"mutuallyopposingforces"["Resistances"218], we can appreciatewhy he describedthe
ego not as unified or comfortablewith sexuality, but as "the actual seat of anxiety,"
desperateto maintainhomeostasisat any price [Ego 57].7Arguably,this representsthe
7.ThispassageinTheEgoandtheIdis worthquotingat length:"Threatened
bydangersfrom
threedirections,[the ego] developstheflight-reflexby withdrawing
its owncathexisfrom the
8
"kernel"of AbrahamandTorok'sdifferenceswithFreud:While they see theunconscious

as an aberrationdesigned for remediation,for Freud the unconscious is irrevocably
"alien"and antipatheticto conscious thought.8
Considering the psychic value of "introjection"("intro-jection:casting inside")
[111], a term,as I shall show, of greatvalue andconceptualimportancefor Abrahamand
Torok,the latterwrites:"Introjectiondoes not tendtowardcompensation,butgrowth.By
broadeningandenrichingthe ego, introjectionseeks to introduceinto it the unconscious,
nameless, or repressedlibido" [113]. Are these adjectivesreally synonyms?Following
Torok, we must infer that "introjection"overrides both the "preservative"status of
repression,which for AbrahamandTorokis responsiblefor "endocrypticidentification"
[142], and the psychic difference between unconscious and conscious systems, whose
"communication"in Freud'swork is immeasurablystrained.9Randis again accuratein
claiming that Abrahamand Torok "demote the sexual instinct from its characteristic
Freudianstatus as the principal causative agent in psychopathology. For them, . . .
psychosexualityis the functionof a largerwhole, thecontinuousactivityof self-creation"
[11].
The conceptualimplicationsof AbrahamandTorok'srevision appearin Abraham's
formative essay, "The Shell and the Kernel: The Scope and Originalityof Freudian
Psychoanalysis" (1967). Yet despite this essay's numerous invocations of Freud's
metapsychology,Abrahamgives few citationsof Freud'sargumentand fewer explanations for his conceptualrevisions. He asks us simply to believe, for example, that "The
pansexualismof Freudis the anasemicpansexualismof the Kernel"[89]. However, in
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) and, later, in 'Two Encyclopadia
Articles"(1923 [1922]), Freuddistancedhis work frompansexualismbecauseit substitutes voluntarismfor resistanceand defense-formation.Noting how critics of psychoanalysismistakeresistancefor the very analyticproceduresinterpretingit, Freudadded:
"Itis a mistaketo accuse psycho-analysisof 'pan-sexualism'andto allege thatit derives
all mental occurrencesfrom sexuality and traces them all back to it. On the contrary,
psycho-analysis has from the very first distinguishedthe sexual instincts from others
which it has provisionally termed 'ego instincts"' ["Encyclopaedia"251-52; see also
Three 134 and "Resistances"218].
DisregardingFreud's caveat, Abrahamproposes that "therehad to be [in Freud's
work]a relationof homology [between]the zones andthe sources... [of] erotogenicity"
[88], suchthat"itis by virtueof thiscorrespondencebetweenthe Envelopeandthe Kernel
[Abraham'sreformulationof the ego andid, respectively]thatFreudlocalizedthe source
of sexual drives in the somaticzones... thatis, the ones originatingin the Kernel"[88].
In his ThreeEssays, however,andespecially in "InstinctsandTheirVicissitudes,"Freud
carefully theorized variations among the drives' "source,""pressure,""object,"and
"aim" in order to disband assumptionsabout their equivalence [Three 135-36, 148;
"Instincts"122-23]. He theorizedthe astonishingabsence of correspondenceamongthe
menacingperception orfrom the similarly regardedprocess in the id, and emittingit as anxiety.
... Whatit is thattheego fearsfromtheexternalandfromthelibidinaldangercannotbe specified;

we knowthatthefear is ofbeing overwhelmedorannihilated,butit cannotbe graspedanalytically"
LEgo57; my emphasis].AfterFreud's allegory of psychical identity[see note 9], we can see why
Reich and Marcusebelieved that the liberationof sexualitywouldprecipitatepolitical emancipation; however,Freud's above qualifierdeprives us of this conceptualsatisfaction.
8. Freud's referencesto the "alien"and "foreign"dimensionsofpsychic life recurthroughout
his Paperson Metapsychology("Instinctsand Their Vicissitudes," "Repression,""TheUnconscious," "A Metapsychological Supplementto the Theory of Dreams," and "Mourningand
Melancholia") and in his lecture "Dissection of the Psychical Personality"; see also Derrida,
"Me" 12.
9. I referto "Resistanceand Repression," in whichFreudallegorizes intrapsychicconflictas
individualsjostling each other in an entrancehall [295].
drives' constitutive, partial,and resultantforms, concluding that by representingthe

drives'propensityto abreactthroughvarious(andnot self-evident)"objects"and"aims,"
psychoanalysisin fact differsfrombiologistic and culturallydeterminativeformulations
of sexual desire andbehavior[Three135-36; "Instincts"140]. Freudinsistedas early as
1895: "All contrivancesof a biological naturehave limits to their efficiency, beyond
which they fail" [Project306]. It is reasonableto deducethatpsychoanalysisemergedin
responseto this failure.
WhichFreudis Abrahamprofferinghere?Only in rareandnaive momentsdid Freud
characterizetheunconscious,in AbrahamandTorok's words,as "thegenuinedepository
of whatis now nameless"[ 128]-a Gothic conceptionof locked space quiteincommensuratewith Freud'sformulationsin "Repression"(1915) and"TheUnconscious"(1915),
in which he discarded the idea of a depository as conceptually at odds with his
understandingof the unconscious. Arguably, this is the radical lesson of Freud's
abandonedPapers on Metapsychology(1915)-abandoned because Freud began to
grasp, and thus to reformulate,the psychic significance of external events.'0For this
reason,Lacanlatercharacterizedthe unconsciousas a scar,bladder,and knot [Four 22,
131], claiming thatthis structureinfluences all aspects of psychic life while refutingan
organicisttraditionthatlikens the unconsciousto the "fruit"of being:
The Freudian unconscioushas nothing to do with the so-called forms of the
unconsciousthatprecededit,not to say accompaniedit, andwhichstill surround
it today.... Freud's unconscious is not at all the romantic unconscious of
imaginativecreation.... To all theseforms of unconscious,ever more or less
linkedto someobscurewill regardedas primordial,to somethingpreconscious,
what Freud opposes is the revelationthat at the level of the unconsciousthere
is something at all points homologous with what occurs at the level of the
subject-this thing speaks andfunctions in a way quite as elaborate as at the
level of the conscious,whichthusloses whatseemedto be itsprivilege. I amwell
aware of the resistancesthat this simple remarkcan still provoke, thoughit is
evident in everythingthat Freud wrote. [Four 24]
Considering Lacan's caveat, what do Abraham's substitutions of "Shell" and
"Kernel"for "ego"and "id"borrowfrom-and add to-Freud's work? [Derrida,"Me"
7]. To whatdo they also respondin Lacan's?Abraham'smetaphorof the Shell connotes
an objectwith a largeopenrimwithdrawingintoconvex andinaccessiblerecesses.While
this object's shapeis intriguing,Abrahamimplies thatthe Shell's open rim is sufficient
to "hear"and "receive" whatever "mysterious messages" the Kernel emits; unless
repressed elements such as family secrets stand in the way, the drive reaches its
destinationin consciousness [86-87; see also Rashkin43]. This is especially truewhen
the Envelope substitutesfor the Shell in Abraham'saccount,for an envelope is designed
to enclose its messages-even to "seal" and "entomb"them [18, 16]. However, this
"sealed-offpsychicplace,a cryptin theego" [ 141] does not accordwith Abraham'sgrasp
of the unconscious's "designify[ing]"tendencies [84] to "disclose... what it encloses"
[80] and his and Torok's careful study of the way drives can displace into subsidiary
"crypts"[107-38]. Notingalso the "specifictensionthatarisesbetweenthe Envelopeand
the Kernel" [95], Abrahamimplies that we cannot detach the ego's "seal" from its
accompanying"leaks."Our problemderives simply from Abraham'sassumptionthat
these leaks are exceptional-that they indicate only a temporaryfailure in psychic
functioning:"Justas drives translateorganic demandsinto the languageof the Uncon10. See Freud,Beyond: "thesexual instinctsare . . . peculiarlyresistantto external
influences"[40].
10
scious, so it [the psychic Envelope]utilizes the vehicle of affect or fantasyto move into
the realmof the Conscious" [91].
4. "Allthat is buried is not dead"'

Several years before "L'ecorceet le noyau"first appearedin print,Lacanremarked:"It
is not the soul, eithermortalor immortal,which has been with us for so long, nor some
shade,some double, some phantom,noreven some supposedpsycho-sphericalshell, the
locus of the defences and othersuch simplifiednotions. It is the subjectwho is calledthere is only he, therefore,who can be chosen" [Four 47].12 Derridaalso touched on
Abrahamand Torok's relatedproblemwith seals and leaks in "Fors,"an essay whose
title's semantic richnessrefutesentirelythe idea of harmoniousinteriority:'3
Caulkedor padded along its innerpartition, with cement or concrete on the
other side, the cryptic safe protects from the outside the very secret of its
clandestine inclusion or its internalexclusions.Is this strange space hermetically sealed? Thefact thatone mustalways answeryes and no to this question
thatI am deferringherewill havealreadybeenapparentfromthe topographical
structureof the crypt,on its highestlevel of generality:Thecryptcan constitute
its secret only by means of its division, itsfracture. "I" can save an innersafe
only by putting it inside "myself,"beside(s) myself, outside. [xiv; original
emphases]
Even in the most stringent"encryptment,"Derridacontends,a sign can leak its psychic
meaning.To this extent, whatdoes Abraham'sEnvelopeor Shell addto Freud'saccount
of the ego, which is never an astute listener? Freud conceives of this "sycophantic,
opportunistand lying ... frontiercreature"with a "cap of hearing (Horkappe)"worn
haphazardly"onone side only.... It mightbe saidto wearit awry"[Ego 56, 25; see fig. 1].
He remindsus here thatwhile the drive may reachits destination,it cannotbe assuredof
conscious abreaction;the "leak"underscoresa basiccaesuradistinguishingconsciousand
unconscioussystems. Freuddidnotendorseorganicistnotionsof theunconscious,a point
Lacan underscoredby formulatingthe unconscious as a permanentpsychic structure
[Four 22, 24-25]. ForAbrahamandTorok,however,this Kernel(noyau)precipitatesin
their writing a remarkablenumber of "organic"images [87], whose principaleffect
reorientsthe unconsciousfrom "chaos"and "lack"in Freudand Lacan,respectively,to
assumptionsof harmonyand plenitude.We have alreadyseen Torok's assumptionthat
11. Schreiner 97.
12. Itappears thatLacanwas respondingtoAbrahamand Torok'stypologyof the "phantom"
and "shell" before it appeared in print; this problem of chronology is perhaps explainedby the
circulation of texts or ideas several years before they were published. I am following Rand's
editorialnote that "'L'ecorce et le noyau' was writtenin 1967 [and publishedin Critiquein 1968]
as an extendedreviewofLaplancheand Pontalis's Vocabulairede la psychanalyse"whileLacan's
inTheFourFundamental
aredatedFebruary
remarks
5, 1964[Shell
Conceptsof Psycho-Analysis
75].
13. As BarbaraJohnson remarksin her translator'snote to Derrida's essay, "theword fors
in French, derivedfrom the Latin foris ('outside, outdoors'), is an archaic preposition meaning
'exceptfor, barring, save.' In addition, fors is the plural of the word for, which, in the French
expression le for int6rieur1designates the inner heart, 'the tribunal of conscience,' subjective
interiority.The word fors thus 'means'both interiorityand exteriority,a spatialproblematicthat
will be developedat great lengthhere in connectionwiththe 'crypt'"[Johnsonin Derrida, "Fors"
xi-xiin]. For a Lacanianaccount of this phenomenonas "extimacy," see Miller.
11
the symptombelies thepsyche's propento resolutionandself-restitution[44.-............ -sity

...
45], but The Shell and the Kerel is
^
..iL
... ................:
replete with referencesto "introjection"
as "thecontinualprocessof self-fashioning throughthe fructificationof change"
[14]; as a "psychic process that allows
humanbeings to continueto live harmoniously in spite of instability, devastation, war, and upheaval"[14]; and as a
situation encouragingthe "psyche ...
finally [to] makefruitfuluse of the natural gift of sexual pleasure"[10-11]. If
psychic life "consistsof the pursuitof its
own harmoniousprogress"[22], howcan also begin to see why this
Fig. 1. The Ego and the Id (1923), Standard ever, we
"harmony"representsintrapsychicanEdition 19: 24.
tagonismandrepressionas the "enemies
of life" [22]. At issue here is a mythopoeticdepiction of the unconscious,which in The
Shelland theKernelservesas the Kernelof organicpleasure.InFreud'swork,by contrast,
since the unconscious radically destroys the ego's chances of happiness, the ego
conceives of sexualityas its "enemy."In its intoleranceof sexualenjoyment,whichtakes
the psychic organism "beyondthe pleasure principle"and towardjouissance, the ego
ultimatelyis responsiblefor generatinga "war"againstthe libido's psychic promptings.
Abraham'sorganicreferencesto "the [birth]... of the symbol, where the innumerable forms of civilization disintegrate,originate,and bloom" [97]-references he later
acknowledgesare"alltoo rhapsodic"[97]-are antipsychoanalytic;theybelongto a form
of psychology that, as Joel Fineman observes, "can only understanddesire ... as an
impulseor a pulsion towardthe good" [82-83]. This organicismis partlyresponsiblefor
anastonishingelision in "TheMeaningof 'PenisEnvy' in Women,"in whichTorokshifts
from describing "a genuinely psychoanalyticapproach"[44] to advocating treatment
through"analytictherapy"[53]. The conceptual-but, above all, ontological-distinction between "analysis"and "therapy"is best graspedby their respectiveetymologies:
"Analysis"(Gr. analusis, formedon analuein) denotes a loosening andradicalundoing,
while "therapy"(Gr.therapeutike)is boundirrevocablyto the "artof healing"[Hoad 15,
490; see also Shell 250]. Placing this second, cathartictraditionalongside Freud's 1937
account of analysis "terminableand interminable,"we must ask whethertherapycan
bring the subject to an adequate and satisfactory mourning, for it promotes egoic
consolation over the difficult interpretationof unconscious drives and the painstaking
analysis of psychic dissociations.
This tension between analysis and therapy, which correspondsconceptually to
Abrahamand Torok's paradigmshift from the unconsciousto the ego, prevailsthroughout The Shell and the Kernel,hauntingthe authors'"rhapsodic"organicism[97] as the
subsidiarymeaning of "Kernel"(noyau). Ratherthan endorsingAbrahamand Torok's
"fructificationof change" [14], however, this aspect of noyau designates a type of
organicismthatresistssymbolizationby conveying the "stone"of a fruit-the indeterminatecenteron which its flesh grows. Ultimately,we may be closest to Zizek's formulation
of the "hardkernelof theReal"preciselywhenAbrahamandTorokanticipate"harmony"
between sexuality and identity [Zilek 47]. Lackingthe absolute solace of symbolic and
imaginaryidentifications,subjectivity,as Zizekremindsus, cannotescape the traumaof
this "hard kernel" [47]. This is perhaps the strongest retort to theorists wanting to
downplay the "tension"between "the Envelope and the Kernel"[Shell 95]. As Lacan
12
argued,"Do we say this in orderto explain the difficultyof the desire?No, ratherto say
thatthe desire is constitutedby difficulty" ["Direction"268].
5. Incorporationand Introjection;or, Freud vs. Ferenczi

Do Abrahamand Torok therefore advance psychoanalyticformulationsand "extend"
Freudinto territoryhe could neitherforesee norfully elaborate?To answerthis question,
This term
we mustcarefullyconsiderAbrahamandTorok'sconceptionof "introjection."
is central to their project, which follows Karl Abraham'sand Ferenczi's distinction
betweenintrojectionandincorporation[Ferenczi36-37]. AbrahamandTorokclaim that
Freud'sschematicdifferentiationbetweenmourningandmelancholiafails to makeclear
why a tremendousupsurgein libido may accompany(and sometimesdisarmand upset)
patientsritualizingthe loss or deathof loved ones. Afterthe workof KarlAbraham(who
took Freud'sadvice in suspendingthis inquiry)andFerenczi(who did not), a conceptual
gap opens here regardingthe subject's affective difficulty in mourning.Abrahamand
Torok's work properlyemerges from within the wake of this conceptualdifficulty (not,
as Randcontends,as thistheory'ssingularformulation[ 102]),14for theyinterpretthis gap
as a significantsplitbetweenintrojection(pace Ferenczi)andidentification(pace Freud).
Between these psychic principles, Abrahamand Torok argue, lies an unformulated
problem about the guilt surroundingsexual desire that can rigidify and coalesce as a
psychic "crypt"if the subjectis neitherawareof-nor willing to accept-the proximity
between sexuality and mourning.
But what if this distinction-so central to Abrahamand Torok's work-is not
psychicallyas rigid as they propose?Whatif it is in fact untenable?As Derridaobserves
in "Fors,""Introjection/incorporation:
Everythingis played out on the borderlinethat
divides and opposes the two terms.Fromone safe, the other;from one inside, the other;
one withinthe other;andthe same outside the other"[xvi]. And he indicatesthe fragility
of this binary:"Likethe conceptualboundaryline, the topographicaldividerseparating
introjectionfrom incorporationis rigorousin principle,but in fact does not rule out all
sortsof originalcompromises"[xvii-xviii; originalemphases;see also Derrida"Me"7].
Following these remarks,we note Derrida'sinterpretivegenerosityas he summarizes
Abrahamand Torok's hermeneuticprecepts:
Certainreaders(the quick-wittedtype) will perhaps be surprisednot tofind in
the style of The Magic Word any of the prevalent mannerismsof this or that
French discourse today: withinthepsychoanalyticagora, outside it, or in that
intermediaryzone thatexpandsso rapidly.Neitherin its mostexposedsimplicity, its serenity (for example, we knowthat we are lookingfor somethingfrom
which nothingwill turnus away), and its smile (I knowthepatient smile of the
authors, their indulgent,pitiless, and trulyanalytic luciditybefore all kinds of
dogmatism,banality, theoretical boastfulness,and conformity,the search for
cheap thrills. "Hey,come on, what, or whom, is he afraid of? Whatdoes he
want? Whatis he tryingto do to us now?"), nor in the elliptical refinementof
andTorokare
14. "Despitetheirattribution
of theconcept'spaternityto Ferenczi,Abraham
the genuine creators of the concept of introjection in the very broad sense they intend. The
distinctiondrawnbyAbrahamand Torokbetweenintrojectionand incorporationhas no precedent
withinpsychoanalyticthought,either in the depthand scope of the distinctionor in its theoretical
consequences and clinical differences" [102]. Randmay be correct to argue that Abrahamand
Torok'sconceptualdistinctionbetweenthese termsinaugurateda new shift-and perhaps rift-in
psychoanalyticthought,but his claim about this term's origins eclipses Freud's use of "introjection" in 1915 and 1920, and of "incorporation" in "Mourningand Melancholia" [1917 (1915)].
13
the most daring subtlety does this "style" resemble anything that a French
readercouldexpectto recognizeofaprogramhe wouldfindreassuring.["Fors"
5
XXV]
Derridateasingly reproachesAbrahamand Torokfor trying to disbandresistancesand

psychic opacity in orderto reachthe "kernel"of mystery-"Hey, come on... Whatdoes
he want?"-while notingthatthis endeavoris not "reassuring"preciselywhen Abraham
and Torok most want it to be [see Kamuf 32-33]. With his backhandedcompliment
Derridasays thatAbrahamandTorok,whenmost in searchof certainty,merelyenactthe
ego's ruseof tryingnot to know. As they arguein "TheTopographyof Reality:Sketching
a Metapsychologyof Secrets"(1971), 'The cryptis therewith its fine lock, but whereis
the key to open it?" [159]. Once this key is found, no otherdifficulty seems to beset the
meaningan analystcan attributeto psychic drives:"Thisheavy architecture[of the tomb
or crypt] will graduallybe shaken and will disappearin the course of the patient's
prolongedpresenceon the couch, since it will appearbit by bit that,for lack of a lawsuit,
the walls of denial have become obsolete" [161].
While Abrahamand Torok distinguishclearly between introjection'scapacity to
give us pleasure,growth,andexpansion,andincorporation'sconstrainingandenfeebling
principles,Derrida'sinsistenceon theconceptualfragilityof thisbinaryoverwhelmstheir
argument.It is satisfying to distinguishabsolutelybetween introjectionand incorporation-representing each, respectively, as life and death-but the caesuradividing consciousness andthe unconscious,a gap thatarisesin analysisas thejouissancebindingthe
subjectto its symptom,disturbsthe distinction.Grapplingwith life's tautologicalrelation
to death,for instance,Freudadduced:"Theemergenceof life would thusbe the cause of
thecontinuanceof life andalso atthe sametimeof the strivingtowardsdeath;andlife itself
would be a conflict and compromisebetween these two trends"[Ego 40-41].
Whatarethe implicationsof Freud'spoint?One is thatthe ego considersintrojection
an "enemyof life," ratherthana sign of benigngrowthand harmony,becauseit disrupts
the ego's homeostatic aims. Seemingly absurd-because counterintuitive-this point
considerspsychic "growth"almostas traumaticfor the ego as arethe "negative"conflicts
it represses. In The Ego and the Id, for instance, Freudcalls the ego a "constitutional
monarch"[55], thus advancing his argumentagainst "His Majesty the Ego" in "On
Narcissism: An Introduction"(1914) [91nl]. The corollary to this emphasis is that
incorporation(thatis, the wish to absorbanddevour,ratherthanentomb)is not the ego's
"exceptional"tendency but-as Freudunderstood-its governing precept, a point on
which he elaboratesat some length in his 1895 Project [see 368-69].16 In his lectureon
resistanceandrepression,too, Freudaskedus to considerthis nonpathologicalaspectof
the ego:
How . .. do we accountfor our observationthat the patientfights with such
energy against the removal of his symptomsand the setting of his mental
processes on a normal course? We tell ourselves that we have succeeded in
discoveringpowerfulforces here which oppose any alterationof the patient's
condition;they mustbe the same ones which in thepast broughtthis condition
about. ["Resistance"293]
15. Yet,on pp. xl andxli, Derridastartsto questionthis hermeneuticprinciple,clarifyinghow

much interpretationin Abrahamand Torok'stext rests on linguisticand translatedassociations
that "seemto breakdown"[xli]. For clarificationof Derrida's quitegenerousreadingofAbraham
and Torok-a "generosity"we rarelyfind in his readings of Freud-see Roudinesco600.
16. I am drawinghere on Leo Bersani's invaluablereadingof Freud's workin The Freudian
Body,esp.38-39.
14
Freudquestionedsimple causalityand self-evident answersin this lecture,calling both

"crudeandincorrect"[296]. Suchprinciplesareinadequateforpsychoanalysis,he claims,
because although"repression... is the preconditionfor the constructionof symptoms
... it is also somethingto which we know nothing similar"[294; my emphasis].
Freudtheorizedrepression'sasymmetricalrelationto consciousnessonly by declinand "hydraulic"models of repressionand symptom formation["Paths"
evidential
ing
362, 367]; he realized that psychoanalysisis not behavioralbecause repressionhas no
obvious or logical relation to empirical circumstances. Realizing too that fantasy's
relationto materialevents is vagarious,Freuddid not cast introjectionandincorporation
into a rigid binary;psychic fantasywas for him contingenton interpretationsof reality
and, at the same time, susceptible to fixations of that interpretation.For comparable
reasons,Derridaaddressestheease by whichincorporationin AbrahamandTorok's work
conceptually "bleeds" into introjection, and vice versa, rendering the psyche more
permeable-if no less symptomatic-than AbrahamandTorokwould have us believe.17
InapproachingAbrahamandTorok'softensimplisticcorrelationbetweenintrojection
and life and between incorporationand death, we must not only questionwhethertheir
theory of preservativerepressionproperlyinauguratesencryptmentwithin the ego, but
indicatewhy they end up reproducingFreud's 1915 accountof full andpartialrepression.
In "TheTopographyof Reality,"AbrahamandTorokadvancethe following distinctions:
To use less metaphoricallanguage we shall call the tomband its lock preservative repression,setting it offfromthe constitutiverepressionthatis particularly
apparent in hysteria and generally called dynamic repression. The essential
differencebetweenthe twotypesof repressionis thatin hysteria,thedesire,born
of prohibition,seeks a way out throughdetours andfinds it throughsymbolic
fulfillment;whereasforthecryptophore,an alreadyfulfilleddesire lies buriedequally incapableof rising or of disintegrating.Nothingcan undothe consummation of the desire or efface its memory.[159; originalemphases]
Abraham and Torok's divergence from Freud hinges in this passage on the term
"preservativerepression," which allegedly inaugurates "endocrypticidentification"
[ 142]. Yet thispassageraisesmorequestionsthanit answers:if "preservativerepression"
representsthe buryingof "analreadyfulfilled desire,"how-strictly speaking-can this
desirebe fulfilled,frozen,andlatercapableof enteringconsciousness?Indeed,if "nothing
can undo the consummationof the desire or efface its memory,"as AbrahamandTorok
insist, how can we explainthe relativeease by which theyrepeatedlyfind the "key"to this
psychic disclosure, thus aiding their patients' psychic growth? At issue here is not a
quibbleover minorterms:since AbrahamandTorok's workon "endocrypticidentification"aims entirelyto rewriteFreud's 1915 accountof repression,we must follow their
argumentclosely.
Freudconsideredrepressionnot "preservative"butdynamic.Afterdelineatingthree
stages of repression-"primal repression,"the constructionof a "fixation,"and the
creation of "after-pressure"(Nachdrdngen) ["Repression"148]-Freud argued that
"repressiondoes not hinderthe instinctualrepresentativefromcontinuingto exist in the
17.AsI havearguedelsewhere,thequestionthatpsychoanalysis
posesfor Derrida-inways
the roleofjouissanceand
thathe cannotsimplydismissas conceptuallyincoherent-concerns
as Derrida
To
this
divided
itself
reject
against
proposition,
implacably
resistanceforasubjectivity
on "unreason"
is to riska conceptualforeclosure
hasacknowledged,
["LetUs"3-4]; to thiswe
mustalso add the ontologicalramifications
impossiblemastery,and delirium
of voluntarism,
thereis notspace
and
106-07
109,
98-100,
"Beyond" 114].Unfortunately,
[Lane,"Philosophy"
hereto assesshowtheseramifications
impacton Derrida'sconceptionof psychicresistancein
Resistancesde la psychanalyse.
15
unconscious, from organizing itself further,putting out derivatives and establishing

connections. Repression in fact interferes only with the relation of the instinctual
representativeto one psychical system,namely,to that of the conscious" ["Repression"
149; my emphasis]. Hence Freudians consider the term "preservativerepression"
oxymoronic:what is repressedcannot be preserved unless we conceive of the unconscious in egoic terms.
This topographicaland economic dilemmaemerges when Torokinterpretssexual
conflictin herpatients:"In... these cases,"she writes,"repressionnotonly separates,but
also has to preserve carefully, althoughin the unconscious, the wish the ego can only
representas an 'exquisite corpse' lying somewhereinside it" [118; originalemphasis].
Seven years later,however, Abrahamand Torokwrite that"endocrypticidentification"
producesa "sealed-offpsychic place, a cryptin theego" [141;my emphasis],anargument
reformulatingFreud's topographicalclaims about repression. Can the unconscious
preserve,though, or the ego encrypt withoutrepression-that is, withoutengaging the
unconscious? In maintainingthat the unconscious preserves the crypt while the ego
representsit, Toroktakes us back to Freud'sopeningremarksin "Repression"and "The
Dissection of the Psychical Personality,"where he arguesthat the unconsciouscannot
repressbecause it does not understandnegation.Recall: "Thereis nothingin the id that
could be comparedwith negation.... There is nothingin the id thatcorrespondsto the
ideaof time"["Dissection"74]. Forthis reason,Freudrepresentsrepressionas stemming
partlyfrom that aspect of the ego called the "preconscious,"a term he coined in 1896
[Project 363n2]. If the ego were aware that the preconsciouswas repressingdrives (a
psychic tautology), it could affirm this if challengedby an analystor therapist.Freud
realized,however, thatpatientsnecessarilyare ignorantof repression,a fact explaining
boththeirprofounddifficulty in retrieving"buried"psychic materialandthe reasonthis
material'sreintroductionto consciousness generallyis so traumatic.
In theireffort to move repression"beyond"Freud'sparadigm,AbrahamandTorok
not only empty the termof all psychic meaningandvalue, but advancean argumentthat
is conceptuallyincoherent.Although such "renewals"of psychoanalysisaid Abraham
and Torok in reconceptualizingsexuality as a "treasure"amenableto consciousness,
representingsexuality as a life force the ego fundamentallyenjoys, psychoanalysis
properlybegan when Freudrejectedsuch notions.For Freud,the libido is an intractable
difficultyfor consciousnessbecause it sharesan intimaterelationwitheros andthe death
drive.As we've seen, Freudgraspedthis problemwhen he encounteredpatientsseeking
reprievefrom sufferingwho nonetheless refusedto relinquishthe veryfactors making
themill ["Resistance"293]. In TheEgo and theId, too, Freudinsisted:"Thereis no doubt
that there is something in these people that sets itself against their recovery, and its
approachis dreadedas thoughit were a danger"[49]. The rest of my essay explores the
repercussionsof Freud'sclaim.
6. Splittingthe Ego
To demonstratehow Freud and Lacan offer us valuable conceptual alternativesto
AbrahamandTorok'saccountof "endocrypticidentification"[142], we mustnow revisit
Freud'sargumentsabout"archaicheritage,"egoic "splitting,"the role of incorporation
in mourning,thecentralityof the deathdrive,andthefunctionof "screenmemories."Such
historicalandconceptualexcavationswill illustratepreciselywhatis at stakein Abraham
and Torok's debatewith Freud.
Freud'sinterestin transgenerationalconflicts certainlydoes not prevailin all of his
work,butnoris this interestabsent;it wouldbe wrongto assumethatAbrahamandTorok
formulatedthis approach.When addressingneuroses in children,for example, Freud
16
notes: "Thereare ways more directthaninheritanceby which neuroticparentscan hand

theirdisorderon to theirchildren"[Three224]. Elaboratingon this point,Lacandetailed
a form of censorship in 1953 anticipating Abraham and Torok's demand for
transgenerationalhauntingandtransmission,thoughwithoutrenderingthisphenomenon
exceptionalor pathological:
The unconscious is that chapter of my history that is markedby a blank or
occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be
rediscovered;usually it has already been writtendown elsewhere.Namely:
-in monuments:this is my body [...
-in archival documents:these are my childhoodmemories[.. .]
-in semantic evolution[...]
-in traditions,too, and even in the legendswhich,in a heroicizedform,bearmy
history;
-and, lastly, in the traces that are inevitablypreserved by the distortions
necessitatedby the linkingof the adulteratedchapterto the chapterssurrounding it, andwhosemeaningwill be re-establishedbymyexegesis. ["Function"50]
Forgood reason,Lacanwrote"rediscovered"(or,to translatemoreaccurately,"refound"
["laverite peutetreretrouvee"-"Fonction" 136]), not (as AbrahamandToroksuggest)
"recovered."Lacan is alluding to Freud's famous remarkin his Three Essays on the
Theoryof Sexuality(1905) that"[t]hefindingof anobjectis in facta refindingof it"[222].
More important,Lacan"refinds"in his list whatFreuddetailedabout"archaicheritage"
in TheInterpretationof Dreams [549]; consciousnessas a "body-ego"in TheEgo and the
Id [27]; andchildhoodmemoriesin a crucialchapterof ThePsychopathologyof Everyday
Life[SE6: 43-52]. Inthislast text,Freuddiscussedthepossibilitythat"screenmemories"
re-presentaspectsof the pastthatconsciousnesshas displacedandpartiallydistorted,but
withoutthese aspects undergoingrepression.Althoughthese memoriescan be recalled,
they are not simply preserved:theirrecollectionis in fact part of their composition.
These "screenmemories"-which Lacancalls "archivaldocuments"-are but one
aspectof Freud'sworkdemonstratinghow events andaffect can be "interred"in the ego
withoutabreactionor repression,ideas with obvious presciencefor AbrahamandTorok.
In "Splittingof the Ego in the Processof Defence"(1940), Freudoutlinedtoo how theego
may attemptto satisfy mutually exclusive choices. Once accustomedto accepting "a
powerfulinstinctualdemand,"the ego, Freudwrote,must "decideeitherto recognizethe
realdanger,give way to it andrenouncethe instinctualsatisfaction,or to disavow reality
andmake itself believe thatthereis no reasonfor fear, so thatit may be able to retainthe
satisfaction. Thus there is a conflict between the demand by the instinct and the
prohibition by reality" [275]. Yet as Freud noted, a third course may emerge, a
development of tremendous conceptual value in this discussion of "dynamic"and
"preservative"repression:
Butinfact thechild takesneithercourse, or ratherhe takesbothsimultaneously,
which comes to the same thing. He replies to the conflict with two contrary
reactions,both of whichare valid and effective.On the one hand,with the help
of certain mechanismshe rejects realityand refuses to accept anyprohibition;
on the other hand, in the same breathhe recognizes the dangerof reality,takes
over thefear of that danger as a pathological symptomand tries subsequently
to divest himself of thefear. It must be confessed that this is a very ingenious
solutionof thedifficulty.Both of theparties to thedisputeobtaintheirshare: the
instinct is allowed to retain its satisfaction and proper respect is shown to
reality.Buteverythinghas to bepaidfor in one way or another,and thissuccess
17
is achievedat theprice of a riftin the ego whichneverheals butwhichincreases

as time goes on. [275-76]
By acknowledging the "price of [this] rift," Freud anticipatedAbrahamand Torok's
emphasison intra-egoicconflict; he gave us in 1940 a coherentaccountof self-splitting
thatassistedAbrahamandTorok'srelatedpropositionin the 1960sand'70s. In the above
example, Freud likens egoic splitting to fetishism because splitting serves the partial
acknowledgmentof realitywithoutresultingimmediatelyin masculinecastration:"[the
boy] createda substitutefor the penis whichhe missed in females-that is to say, a fetish.
In so doing, it is truethathe haddisavowedreality,buthe hadsavedhis own penis"[277].
Since the boy laterdevelops anxietyabouthis toes being touched,Freudnotes wryly that
"in all the to and fro between disavowal and acknowledgement,it was nevertheless
castration that found the clearer expression. .. ." [278; ellipsis in original]. Freud
illustratesherethepressureinformingthis splittingandthe mechanism'ssusceptibilityto
failure,creatinga pervasivedimensionof anxietythatis remarkablysimilarto Abraham
and Torok's accountof their patients'diverse symptomatology.
Freudnotes immediatelythat"splitting"altershis conceptionof egoic homeostasis,
a fact Rand and Torok recently ignore when addressingFreud's alleged resistance to
rethinkinghis metapsychologicalclaims ["QFP"574]. What is valuableabout Freud's
revision, however, is less his or our difficulty in being able to retain splitting and
homeostasis thanthe chance to catch the ego tryingagain to downplaythe rift between
two incommensurateprinciples: "The whole process seems so strange to us," Freud
avows, "becausewe takefor grantedthe syntheticnatureof the processesof the ego. But
we are clearly at fault on this. The syntheticfunction of the ego, though it is of such
extraordinaryimportance,is subject to particularconditions and is liable to a whole
numberof disturbances"["Splitting"276; my emphasis].
Strictlyspeaking,Freud'sclaim thatan ego can simultaneously"split"and aim for
homeostasisis not contradictory.Indeed,in TheEgo and the Id Freudbegan to consider
homeostasismerelythe ego's aim or ideal, whose inevitabledefaultleads it towardselfreproach,anxiety, and guilt [56-58]. Since the ego answers to threedifferent sources,
however, we can appreciatewhy Lacanwould laterconsidermeconnaissancecentralto
its sustainingillusions ["Mirror"6]. SummarizingLacan's move, Rose recognizes that
thisconceptualshiftrepresentsnot anego which is "'notnecessarilycoherent,'butanego
which is 'necessarilynot coherent"'[93].
We can adoptthese insights when reading"MourningandMelancholia"(writtenin
1915, but published in 1917), anotherof Freud's essays with profoundrelevance for
Abrahamand Torok'sproject.In this essay, as Toroknotes in "TheIllness of Mourning
and the Fantasyof the Exquisite Corpse"(1968), FreudacknowledgesKarlAbraham,
OttoRank,andKarlLandauerfor consideringthe volatile andcontradictoryprinciplesof
psychic mourning.However,Torokis curiouslyimprecisein attributingFreud'saccount
to "introjection,"a term Ferenczi coined in 1909:18"[Freud]equates introjectionwith
identification.Moreover,Freudequates introjectionwith the recovery of investments
placed eitherin a lost object (the ego becomes whatit cannotleave) or in an inaccessible
ideal object (the ego sets itself the ideal of becomingwhat it cannotyet be).... We will
'doesnotoccurinthispaper,thoughFreudhad
18.Stracheyexplains:"Theterm'introjection
papers[i.e.,
alreadyusedit, in a differentconnection,in thefirst of thesemetapsychological
in the
above.Whenhe returnedto thetopicof identification,
'Instinctsand TheirVicissitudes']
at several
chapterof his GroupPsychologyreferredto in thetext,he usedtheword'introjection'
writings[i.e., Beyondthe
points,andit reappears,thoughnotveryfrequently,in his subsequent
PleasurePrinciple(1920)]"["Mourning"
241nl; myemphasis].
18
see thatcompletelydifferentideas inspiredFerenczi's concept[of introjection]"[ 112;my

emphasis].
While accuratelysummarizingFreud'soverall argument,Torok,with some advantage to herself, misnames Freud's term for this argument:Freud equates the ego's
identificationswith "incorporation,"not "introjection,"arguingthat "the ego wants to
incorporate[the]objectintoitself' ["Mourning"249]. Torok'ssubstitutionassistsherand
Abraham(and, later, Rand) in claiming that their conceptualdebts are to Ferenczi,not
Freud [112], and that the two analysts differ radically in their understandingof this
concept. Yet in 1915, Freudhad alreadydistinguished-as Ferencziproperlyhad notbetween "introjection"(in "Instinctsand Their Vicissitudes")and "incorporation"(in
"MourningandMelancholia").The closest Ferenczigets to thisdistinctionis in "Introjection"[48-49], andhe acknowledgesFreudhere (andthroughouthis article)for aidingall
of his formulations.If we correct Torok's mistake and read Freud's argumentas he
presentedit-with incorporationprovingcentralto theego's identificationsandintrojection playingan extensive role in bothgrouppsychology andFreud'sdistinctionbetween
the "reality-ego"and "pleasure-ego"["Instincts"136], a precursorto his 1940 argument
about egoic splitting, we would diminish many of Freud's alleged differences with
Ferenczi.We would also find in Freud'sargumenta notablerapportbetweenmelancholia
and the object's mnemonic "interment"in the ego, which might lead us to theorize
"encryptment"in a radicallynew way-that is, in termsof jouissance, as I show below.
In claiming that "[i]ntrojectiondoes not tend towardcompensation,but growth"
[113], Torokargueswith Freud,who allegedly made introjectiona compensatoryaspect
of mourning.Since Freudattributedsuchcompensationto "incorporation,"
however,his
argumentin fact is very close to Abrahamand Torok's claims about "encryptment":
We have elsewhere shown that identificationis a preliminarystage of objectchoice, that it is the first way-and one that is expressed in an ambivalent
fashion-in whichthe ego picks outan object.Theego wantsto incorporatethis
object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalisticphase of
libidinaldevelopmentin which it is, it wants to do so by devouringit. ["Mourning" 249-50]
Freudexplainsherenot only how psychic splittingcan occur,given the ego's inabilityto
incorporateand devour an object, but why retainingthe object's image affordsthe ego
such satisfaction.This clarifies a problem we encounteredearlier. In melancholia,he
writes,
thefree libido was not displacedon to anotherobject;it was withdrawninto the
ego. There,however,it was not employedin any unspecifiedway, butservedto
establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the
shadowof the objectfell uponthe ego, and the lattercould henceforthbejudged
by a special agency, as thoughit were an object,theforsakenobject.In this way
an object-losswas transformedintoan ego-loss andtheconflictbetweentheego
and the lovedperson into a cleavage betweenthe criticalactivityof the ego and
the ego as altered by identification.[249; originalemphasis]
Despite Torok'seffort to distinguishbetweenFreudandFerenczi,Freudin 1915-17
clearly gives us a complicated account of "incorporation"that emphasizes both the
resilience of this phenomenon (its centrality for identification)and its unconscious
satisfaction.To illustratethis argument,we must considerone of Torok's examples of
"incorporation"-the"illness"of mourningthatstronglyresembles,butfor herpurposes
mustalso differfrom,Freud'saccountof melancholia.19
Torokmentionsa womanwhose
19
mother'sdeathleads,in themother'swords,to "carnalsensations"[qtd.in Shell 109].She

avows, "I'veneverunderstoodhow somethinglike thatcould have happenedto me; I've
neverforgivenmyself..., buta giddy song coursedthroughmy mindandwouldn'tleave
me. It continuedduringthe entirevigil. I triedon the blackveil like a bridepreparingfor
the big day" [109].
The difficulty in using the woman's words to convey "incorporation"as both an
"illnessof mourning"and as distinctfrom Freud'sformulationof incorporation-melancholia derives from her consciousness of the drive, though she can neitherexplain nor
acceptits meaning.The exampledemonstratesthatthe womanmustpretendnot to know
the reasonfor herjoy for fear thatit would overwhelmher as guilt. Her compromiseis
neitherrepressionnor symptomformation;nor does it resemble Abrahamand Torok's
in the strictsense of the term.Hercompromiseis closerto Freud's
idea of "encryptment"
accountof melancholiaandLacan's formulationof"lajouissancede 1'Autre,"theOther's
jouissance [Encore 13], for it relatesto a satisfactionthatis joyful preciselybecauseit is
denied-or stolen from-another. Such extreme and "inappropriate"
joy poses a diffiher
that
it
for
this
to
believe
caused
her
mother's
death.
woman, leading
culty
to
confirm
Freud
considered
We can use this example
central
why
"incorporation"
to melancholic identificationand warding off loss ["Mourning"249]. He gives us an
accountof identificationmotivatedby the ego's denial of alienation,yet contingenton
unconsciousfantasiesof absorbingandcontainingdifferentobjects.The pointfor Freud
is thatthese processesarerepletewith ambivalence;they arenot, as AbrahamandTorok
contend,benignand indicativeof "growth."In developing this point, Freudillustratesa
crucial development for psychoanalysis-the death drive-which forever alteredhis
understandingof consciousness and sexuality.
Freudasks us to considera psychicparadoxin melancholia,in whichthe "ego's selflove ... [appears]so immense"alongsidea "vast... amountof narcissisticlibido which
we see liberatedin the fear thatemerges as a threatto life, thatwe cannotconceive how
that ego can consent to its own destruction" ["Mourning"252; my emphasis]. His
discussionbindsthe"mania"andfleetingtriumphof melancholiawiththeego's difficulty
in retainingand"absorbing"those imagoes andideals with which it strugglesto identify.
Freud'sinitialclaim emergessuccinctly:identificationis inseparablefromambivalence;
it is nota simpleorpainlessdecisiontheego makesforits own good.20We arethusjustified
in claiming thatFreuddid in fact considera relationbetween mourningandincreasesin
libido. However,melancholiaalso aidedhis understandingof the deathdrive,one of the
primaryfactors separatinghis work from ego-based argumentsabout treatmentand
reparation.In 1915, Freudgraspedthat when encounteringblocked grief, "theego can
consent to its own destruction"["Mourning"252], a principleinforminghis accountof
self-directedtraumain Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). This realizationdirectly
19. CompareFreud's accountof melancholicincorporationwithAbrahamand Torok's-the
two are not easily distinguished:"Incorporationresults from those losses that for some reason
as such"[Shell130;originalemphasis].
cannotbe acknowledged
20. Freud: "Inmelancholia,... countless separate struggles are carried on over the object,
in whichhate and love contendwitheach other; the one seeks to detach the libidofrom the object,
the other to maintainthisposition of the libido against the assault. Thelocation of these separate
strugglescannotbe assigned to any systembut the Ucs., the region of the memory-tracesof things
(as contrastedwith word-cathexes).... Just as mourningimpels the ego to give up the object by
declaring the object to be dead and offeringthe ego the inducementof continuingto live, so does
each single struggle of ambivalenceloosen thefixation of the libido to the object by disparaging
it, denigratingit and even as it were killing it. It is possiblefor the process in the Ucs. to come to
an end, eitherafter thefury has spent itself or after the object has been abandonedas valueless..
.. Theego may enjoy in this the satisfactionof knowingitself as the betterof the two, as superior
to the object" ["Mourning"256-57; original emphases].
20
influences our reading of Abrahamand Torok, for in adopting Ferenczi's "benign"

definitionof "introjection,"they correspondinglyexcise psychic negativityand misrepresentthe real etiology of trauma.
In softening Abrahamand Torok's psychic antinomybetween incorporationand
introjection,we regain a discourseaboutresistance,repetition,and symptomformation
that distinguishes psychoanalysis from its ego-based counterparts-psychology and
psychiatry.Further,in realigningthe effect of repressionwith the unconscious,and the
symptomwith repression'sfailure,we returnwith Freudand Lacanto a vital discussion
aboutthe drives' fate aftertheirfull or partialdissociationfromeach repressedsignifier.
This argument'svalue lies in returningus to Freud's and Lacan's accountsof the war
between"mutuallyopposing"psychic systems ["Resistances"218]-accounts thatgrasp
the full and traumaticvicissitudes of unconsciouslife andjouissance.
7. Memoryand Veracity
Turningnow to Randand Torok's 1993 essay, "Questionsto FreudianPsychoanalysis:
Dream Interpretation,Reality, Fantasy,"I hope not only to show why they revised
Abrahamand Torok's earlierwork, but to illustratethe critical trajectoryof Rand and
Torok's presentcollaboration.As Rand avows in his introductionto The Shell and the
Kernel,"By now I see myself as a continuerratherthanas a studentanddisseminatorof
[Abrahamand Torok's] work"[4].
RandandTorok's recentessay is a close readingof Freud'sInterpretationofDreams,
his 1899 paper"ScreenMemories"and an importantchapterof his Psychopathologyof
EverydayLife,"ChildhoodMemoriesandScreenMemories"(1907 [ 1901]). Inboththese
texts, Freudinterpretsmemoriesthatarenot forgottenor repressedbut areassociatively
linkedwith insignificantremindersin such a way thatthe subject"refinds"the memory's
"original"content.As an actof mnemonicrevision,this"refinding"differsradicallyfrom
Abrahamand Torok's account of egoic encryptment.Freud's two essays elaborateon
differentarguments,but theirsharedpremise is memory's astonishingunreliability.21
At the end of "ScreenMemories,"Freudquestions"whetherwe have any memories
at allfromourchildhood:memoriesrelatingto ourchildhoodmay be all thatwe possess"
["Screen"322; original emphases]. In this way, he seems to reject historicalveracity,
thoughin fact he merely concludesthatmemorycan distortpast events. RandandTorok
follow these argumentsclosely, butwhentranslatingFreud'sGermanphrase"eineReihe
vonMotiven,denendieAbsichthistorischerTreuefernliegt..." ["UberDeckerinnerungen"
488], Rand modifies James Strachey's translationto representFreudas claiming that
"'historicaltruthis the least of our concerns"' [qtd.in "QFP"586]. The position of the
dative pluraldenen afterMotivenrendersthis translationquite incorrect:The "objectof
historical truth"refers unequivocallyto "a series [or number]of motives." Strachey's
translationin StandardEdition makes clear why consciousness is the distortingagent,
denying us access to a pure and perfecthistory;the originalis not recoverablewithout
alteration.This, then, is how Freud'sstatementshouldread:"Anda numberof motives,
with no concernfor historical accuracy, had a part in forming them [i.e., childhood
memories], as well as in the selection of the memoriesthemselves"["Screen"322; my
emphasis].
Rand's mistranslationsuggests why critics of psychoanalysis often hold Freud
21. Onecangraspthecurrentstakesof thisunreliability

byreadingFrederickCrewset al. 's
TheMemoryWars:Freud'sLegacyin Dispute,a bookto whichthissectionof myessayimplicitly
responds.
21
responsible for distorting elements of consciousness; in this example, however, the

distortionis the critic's alone. Randpresents"ScreenMemories"as the "dramatization
of [an] internaldebate [in Freud'swork and correspondence... that]ragesbetween the
authenticityof infantilerecollectionsand the role of sexual fantasies"["QFP"586]. As
Stracheynotes, however, Freud's presentationof an autobiographicalexample in this
essay as objective is responsible for "ratherundeservedlyovershadow[ing]. . . the
intrinsic interest of this paper"["Screen"302]. Indeed, the autobiographicalelement
allows us to read the paper as a self-interview-not as an instance of conceptual
schizophrenia,as Rand and Torokclaim-in which Freudposes two differentperspectives in a way thatrendersneither satisfactory.For me, the interestof this essay is that
Freudcould advancehis argumentonly by relinquishingthe assumptionthatchildhood
memoriesareconscious;the argumentdevelops incisively once Freudentertainsthe role
of unconscious influence, substitution,and distortion. Thus by the end of "Screen
Memories," he represents not only memory but consciousness and subjectivity as
organizedby anticipationand deferredaction-that is, by Nachtraglichkeit:"A screen
memorymay be describedas 'retrogressive'or as having 'pushedforward'accordingas
the one chronological relation or the other holds between the screen and the thing
screened-off.. ." "i.e., accordingto whetherthe displacementhas been in a backwardor
forwarddirection"["Screen"320, 320n].
When introducing The Shell and the Kernel, Rand overlooks this principle of
Nachtrdglichkeitor "deferredaction"; he argues that "Freudiantheories rely on the
concept of latency: beside an emotion expressed, behind a symptommanifested,there
lurks a contrary,repressed emotion" [18]. To highlight the repercussionsof Rand's
mistake here, I have underscoredFreud's argumentsagainst latency in "Repression"
partlyto differentiatehis work from AbrahamandTorok's repeateduse of this concept
in theiressays. Given Rand'scharacterizationof Freud,it is easy to see how Abrahamand
Torokappearto "enlargeuponor redirectthe Freudiandefinitionof personalidentityas
beset by unconscious conflicts, desires, and fantasies"[18]. In claiming that they also
"explorethe mentallandscapesof submergedfamily secrets ... in which, for example,
actualevents are treatedas if they had never occurred"[18], Randeclipses how Freud's
1899 and 1907 essays on memorywere designed to interpretpreciselythis problematic.
Moreto thepoint,his andTorok'sessay partlyrecognizesthiscomplexityin Freud'searly
writingbutdismisses Freud'sconflictedrelationto fantasyandtheevent:"Freudends the
century vacillating;he continues the tussle between truthand falsehood, between the
genuine recollection and the fantasy of childhood scenes" ["QFP"587]. It should not
surpriseus thatthis "tussle"manifestsitself yet againas a tensionbetweenconsciousness
andthe unconscious.Regardingoneiricstates,RandandTorokthereforeargue:"Dreams
are in partincomprehensibleto dreamers,hence the need to interpretthem, to find their
latentmeaning,and to make this availableto dreamers,allowing themaccess to hitherto
unreachableregions of theirown psyches, therebypermittingthem to controltheirown
houses" [573].
In light of these claims, we can see why Randwouldcharacterizethe "broadestaim"
of The Shell and the Kernel (and indeed his own understandingof the "Renewals of
Psychoanalysis,"the title he gives his introductionto this collection) as an attempt"to
restorethe lines of communicationwith those intimaterecesses of the mindthathave for
one reasonor anotherbeen denied expression"[4]. The problemremainsthatRandand
Torokproducea psychic andinterpretivevoluntarismwhenproposingthat"idiomsneed
to be adaptedto what patients are trying to express throughthem" ["QFP"578]. "If
psychoanalysishas any authorityat all,"they contend,"inouropinionit derivesfromthe
willingness of psychoanalysis to welcome people into their own personalcreations"
["QFP"577]. Forthis reason,Randand Torokrepresentalienationas a temporaryeffect
of sufferingandloss, not a traumaticcause precipitatinga fragileandconflictedidentity
22
that uses fantasy to conceal this trauma:"The freedom to fantasize is crucial in the
formation of the self in childhood and remains an integral part of the harmonious
functioningof the adultpsyche-that is our conviction"[592-93].
With this emphasis on psychic harmony,Rand and Torok's therapeuticapproach
relies on testamentandempiricalevidence abouttraumaanddistress.As we've seen with
Rose's help, suchperspectivesconsiderthe unconsciousin functionalistways, advancing
a formof ego psychology thatis by definitionantipsychoanalytic.Thus Randintroduces
The Shell and the Kernelwith the following caveat:"Theoriesneed to be abandonedor
revampedif inconsistentwith the actuallife experienceof patientsor the facts of a text"
[1]. Although Freudallowed his clinical experience to modify some of his conceptual
claims,therearecrucialdifferencesbetweenFreud'sandRandandTorok's undertakings.
Besides the treacheryinherentin determiningmore thanthe most rudimentary"factsof
a text"-a treacheryaccompanyingevery interpretiveact, whetherliteraryor psychicthe ambiguousandunsettlingexperienceof analysisdemonstratesthatempiricismis the
least reliableof psychic theories.This is whatFreudgraspedof the deathdrivein Beyond
thePleasure Principle andwhatRandandTorokcuriouslyoverlookwhenpresentingthe
following questions to Freudianpsychoanalysis:
Is what patients say about their childhood experiences true orfalse? Freud's
dilemma,as we see it, consisted in his being unwillingand perhaps unable to
determinethe real orfantasizedstatusof hispatients' accounts. Theresultis an
odd dilemma:Freud does not seem to knowwith certaintywhat he is working
on as an analyst-truth or lies, traumasorfantasies. The most highlyevolved
stage of that question-raised, whether directly or indirectly, with almost
inexorablepersistence between 1896 and 1932-is less than satisfying:Freud
responds with a non liquet, there is doubt, it is never quite clear or certain.
["QFP"579-80]
By presentingFreud'sdilemmain this way-as a binarybetweentruthandfalsehoodon
whose answer his work and reputationultimately hinges-Rand and Torok miss the
answer to their question: "Freud'sdilemma ... consisted in his being unwilling and
perhaps unable to determine the real or fantasized status of his patients' account."
Personal and generic resistances coalesce here, making anything less than certainty
appearto disqualify Freud'sinquiry.Freud's "colophonof doubt,"however, is exactly
whatdistinguishedpsychoanalysisfromits psychologicalcounterparts:Thediscoveryof
the unconscious necessarily obstructedall furtherpsychic certainty[Lacan,Four 44].
Thuswhen analyzingtheproposition"l am not sure,Idoubt,"Lacanremarked:"Itis here
thatFreudlays all his stress-doubt is the supportof his certainty"[Four 35].
Lateracknowledgingthatthis problemof fantasyand realitypreoccupiedFreud"Inspiteof whathe hadhopedandwhathe subsequentlysaid,Freudwas notatpeace with
this problem.. ." ["QFP"587]-Rand and Torokdo not simply accuse him (as Jeffrey
Masson has) of conceptual complacency or of a type of subterfuge amounting to
patriarchaltyranny.Instead,theircomplaintaboutFreud'srelativeunease with his own
argumentsuggests to them a personaldeficiency behind Freud's failureto producethe
answerhe announcedmore confidently in his earlierwork:
Whatastonishes us most is thefact that the considerabletheoreticaladvances
of Freudian thought at the start of the twentieth century should not have
succeeded in neutralizingthe questionof truthandfalsehood in Freud's mind.
Thelight he shed on infantilesexuality,the role of the stages of instinctualand
libidinal developmentin the neuroses, thepathogenic importanceof repressed
unconsciousfantasies,as relatedinparticularto the Oedipuscomplex-all the
23
new theories, which in the eyes of nearly everyonedefinedthe quintessenceof

psychoanalysis,failed to satisfyFreud. Theseelaborationsfailedto quietin him
the turmoilof the choice between truthandfalsehood. ["QFP"587]
Strangely,this passage representsthe "kernel"of Rand and Torok's objections to
"classicalFreudianpsychoanalysis"["QFP"587], thoughthe objectionsdo not conclude
withthe objectat whichtheyarefirstleveled. The passagebegins withanaccountof what
in Freud'searlyworkis most valuable-both for psychoanalysisand,we mightinfer,for
Randand Torok:the "discovery"of infantile sexuality, the idea of repression,and the
Oedipuscomplex.Afterall, theseelementsprevailin modifiedformthroughoutTheShell
and the Kernel.But Freud'srefusalentirelyto disbanda binaryhis own workdiscredited
is not a personalor even conceptualfailing. His refusal insteadillustratesthe complex,
ambiguousstakesof fantasy,testimony,seduction,andevents (realandimagined).Such
factorsintensifyensuingquestionsabouttruthandfalsehood,demandingthatwe modify
our perspectiveon psychic reality.We cannotalso state convincingly thatFreudwas at
fault for realizing that these factors do not "neutraliz[e]... the question of truthand
falsehood";such claims are beside the point.
Similarcomplaintsrecurin Questionsa Freud:Du devenirde la psychanalyse,Rand
andTorok's recentbook.HereRandandTorokofferanelaboratereadingof Freud's1906
accountof WilhelmJensen's Gradivaand of the role "transmission"plays in the history
of psychoanalysis. Yet in attempting to resolve complex psychoanalytic concerns,
Questionsa Freud consistentlytracespsychoanalyticenigmas back to Freud'slife and
even childhood[see esp. part4]. The book is intolerantof speculationand doubt,but its
allegianceto psychobiographyfoundersprecisely on the intentionalfallacy: attributing
all conceptual incoherencesand psychic difficulties to Freud's life obviously proves
impossible. Nonetheless, it seems disingenuousthat Rand and Torok would conclude
their book by implying that Freud's project somehow arose and went awry due to his
intolerancefor speculationand doubt:
NousavonsquestionneFreudparceque lapsychanalysenousparaitevoluersur
des voies contraires. Nous avons voulu apporter une reponse a la question:
Pourquoidans la penseefreudienneI'inspirationd 'extraordinaireouverturese
heurte-t-ellesi souvent et commepar fatalite a des pratiques de fermeture?
L'ambitiond'ouverture,I'espoir de tout comprendre-dans le domainede la
psyche'et au-deli, pour le bien et le bien-etrede l'humanite-ont anime'Freud
toutau long de sa vie.... Maispouvons-nouslui donnernotreadhesionentiere
lorsqu'il ferme ce qu'il tentait-en bravant maintes resistances-d'ouvrir?
[279]
Wehave questionedFreudbecausepsychoanalysisseems to us to have evolved
along contrarypaths. We have aimed to respond to the question: Why in
Freudianthoughtdoes the astonishing inspirationof gaps or openingsconflict
so often-indeed, almostinevitably-with the habitof closing thingsdown? The
aspiration to open things up, the hope of understandingeverything-in and
beyond the psychic field and for the good and well-being of all humanitymotivatedFreud his entire life.... But can we adhere to him entirelywhen he
closes down precisely what he tried-while defying repeated opposition-to
open? [my trans.]
How does this statement-alternately generousto and criticalof Freud-correspond to
Rand and Torok's "astonish[ment]"at Freud's precise dissatisfaction with his early
theories?SurelyRandandTorok's carefulenumerationof Freud'sconceptualrevisions
24
demonstratesboth a lack of rigidityin Freud'sargumentand his willingness to interpret

the repercussionsof the unconscious,a factorthey strangelyoverlookabove andreframe
in most of their book.
What makes these argumentsso curious,finally, is Rand's gratitudethat Abraham
andTorok"attempt... attimesto smoothoveraspectsof Freud's theories"wheneverthey
seem contradictoryor poorly formulated [Shell 76n]; Rand himself, as we've seen,
perceivesanalysisas helpingpatients"continueto live harmoniously,"suchthat"fruitful
use [is made]of thenaturalgift of sexualpleasure"while the "enemiesof life"areproperly
overcome [14, 10-11, 22]. As I arguedearlier,this gesture not only aims to organize
factors Freudinsisted were structurallyinsoluble,but forecloses on the very apparatus
thatcould begin to analyze the resultingtrauma.
AlthoughRandandTorokobjectto Freud's dissatisfactionwith his earlytheoriesof
sexuality,fantasy,andthe event, Freud'slaterworkalightedon a conceptdemonstrating
the inadequacyof an evidentialreality/fantasysplit-the death drive. Freudapparently
had to smuggle the ensuing conceptual difficulty into his argument,in the form of a
hauntingdoubt thatinterruptshis "official"confidence:"Whetherwe adhereto them or
not, Freud's maturetheories clearly lay claim to a level of cohesiveness and universal
validity that would not [sic] longer require a return to the question of truth versus
falsehood. Nobody but Freudrequiresit" ["QFP"587].
There are two objections to Freudhere, which aren't entirely congruent:his false
claims about psychic consistency and his immediatedissatisfactionwith these claims.
The first is again difficult to reconcile with Randand Torok's citationfrom Freud'sAn
AutobiographicalStudy(1925), which they use to demonstratehis conceptualvacillations.As Freudavows, "Beforegoing furtherintothequestionof infantilesexualityI must
mention an error into which I fell for a while and which might well have had fatal
consequencesfor the whole of my work"[33-34, qtd.in "QFP"582]-the errorconcerns
his willingness to believe his patients'accountsof infantileseduction.Theissue thatRand
and Torok highlight, however, is not simply Freud's uncertaintyabout the truth or
falsehood of infantile seduction,but Freud's ability to endorse his patients'testimony,
since the stakes of analysis (both practicaland theoretical)hinge on this psychic and
evidential interpretation.As Freud wrote in 1907, in a statementquestioningneither
infantile fantasy nor "actualhistory"but the speech giving credibilityto both: "If the
memories that a person has retainedare subjectedto an analytic enquiry,it is easy to
establishthatthere is no guaranteeof theiraccuracy"["Childhood"46-47; my emphasis].
Once Freudalightedon the vicissitudesof this testimony-given all of its informing
factorsof distortion,condensation,projection,partialrepression,andNachtraglichkeitpsychoanalysis could not continue simply by accepting or rejecting what patients
announcedas fact. Indeed,Rand and Torok ironicallydemonstratethis in theircareful
transcriptionof Freud'sworkon infantilefantasyand seduction;the oscillationwe see in
Freud'swork illustratesneitherthe invalidityof fantasyand seductionnorthe inevitable
need to prioritizeone at the other'sexpense. Freud'soscillationdirectsa questioninstead
at the meaningand importanceattachedto bothregistersthatpsychoanalysiscan broach
but-for obvious reasons-cannot easily resolve. Given theirextensive knowledge and
experienceof psychoanalysisas a professorandanalyst,respectively,whatis surprising
aboutRandand Torok'srecentworkis its willingness to overlook the obvious point that
Freud'scentraldilemmain the 1900s concernedboththe truthandfiction of hispatients'
claims.
Since doubt and uncertaintyare prerequisitesfor all psychoanalyticinquiry,Rand
and Torok's second objection-that "nobody but Freud requires . . . a definitive
answer"-is wholly disingenuous.Why should this signify Freud's errorand not his
integrity?Rand and Torok's argumentis also difficult to square with Freud's careful
25
admissionsof doubtin his laterwork, andRandandTorok'searlierargumentthatFreud

kept working at these issues precisely because they troubledhim. Withoutconsidering
these obvious counterpoints,Rand and Torok resume their argumentabout Freud's
dissatisfaction:"From1897 on, Freudshackledhimself with the questionof truthversus
falsehood withoutever examiningits ultimatesense or his own reasonsfor the interrogation" ["QFP" 588; my emphasis]. Rand and Torok's previous argument shows
precisely the reverse: Freud consistently examined his reasons for this interrogation.
Indeed,psychoanalysisandhis patients'well-beinghingedon theanswerto nothingless.
Arguably,this demonstratesthatFreudmanagedto separatehis workfromhis followers'
limited understandingof it.
WhatRandandTorokimply aboutFreud'sconceptualdoubtthey do not rigorously
interpretin his laterwork(as opposed to his contemporaneousletters),where it prevails
to an remarkabledegree, particularlyin Three Essays' footnotes and in Beyond the
Pleasure Principle. Randand Torok attributethis conceptualdoubtto Freud's alleged
pride and/orisolation: "Forwant of a friendperhaps,to whom he could regularlyand
immediatelycommunicatehis clinical andtheoreticalsecondthoughts..." ["QFP"587].
Thisdeductionis ratherabsurdandmanyhavecritiquedits biographicalassumptions[see
for instance Davidson]. Claiming that Freud's intoleranceof equivocationin his work
compelledthis factorto returnas an "insidious... haunting"[587] clearssome space for
Rand and Torok's theory of revenance, which Freud formulatedin "The 'Uncanny"'
(1919), but this proposition in fact ignores the self-acknowledgeddoubts surfacing
throughoutFreud'searlyandlaterwork(we quotedsome of these doubtsearlier);it also
turns psychoanalysis into a study of certainty,in which any "doubt"registers as an
immediateconceptualdisaster.
To all of Rand and Torok's objections-"Freudian psychoanalysisappearsto us
threatenedfrom within"; "we have perceived internal rifts runningthrough Freud's
system of thought";"we are temptedto say thatFreudianpsychoanalysisis divided and
self-contradictory";"Freudiantheory fracturesin its very core" ["QFP"568-69]-we
can only respond,of course. And how could it be otherwise?How could any psychoanalytic principlenot be contradictorywhen the subjectis foundeduponthis contradiction?
Freudmakes this point, using almost the same words, when he avows thathis principal
hypothesisin the 1895 Project "suffersunderan internalcontradiction"[369]; psychoanalysis,as I earlierremarked,could almostbe said to begin withthisadmission.In Rand
andTorok'swork,on theotherhand,resolvingequivocationrecurswithgreaterurgency:
Randbegins from a premiseof "harmoniousprogress"in analysis[Shell 21-22], when
Freuddoes not.
It surprises me that Rand and Torok overlook the axiomatic tension between
conscious andunconscioussystems in Freud's work.Fortheynote,in a mannerthattakes
us beyond those who argue (as FrederickCrews does) that Freudpatternedthe unconscious afterhis own failures:"Theproblemreaches well beyond the theoreticalcontradiction.... The psychic realm has its own laws, wholly unknownto other domains"
["QFP"575,580]. Yet we obviously don'tneedto acceptthatthis"beyond"leadsto either
biography's unquestionableveracity or the partialerrorsand falsehoods surfacing in
analytictreatment.In this respect,I agreethat"aninternaldemonof sortsis at workhere
... [whose] compassof individualparadoxes... form[s]a networkof mutuallyexclusive
methodologicaldualitieswithinFreudianthought"[569]. InrevisitingFreud'sarguments
in TheEgo and the Id, "Resistanceand Repression,"and "Mourningand Melancholia,"
however, my aim has been simply to demonstrateboth the inevitabilityof this "demon"
and the recurrenceof paradoxin any theory that tries to account for it. Beyond this
relativelybanalpoint,I wouldaddthatFreud's conceptualoscillationsmirrorthispsychic
turbulenceonly insofar as his early work plays out the dramaof allegiance between
psychology (an accountof the ego) andpsychoanalysis(a theoryof the unconscious)by
26
renderinga resolutionof this dramavirtuallyimpossible.
8. Beyond Evidence ... to Doubt and Trauma

In concludingthis essay, I proposethatFreudformulatedin 1899-and, later,in 1901a set of questions about memory and the psychic representationof events that would
forevertransformour understandingof reality,time, and history.In chapterfour of The
Psychopathologyof EverydayLife, he argued:
This general principle would assert that when the reproducingfunction [of
memory]fails or goes astray, the occurrence [of this error] points,far more
frequently than we suspect, to interferenceby a tendentiousfactor-that is, by
a purpose whichfavours one memorywhile strivingto workagainst another..
. This suggests that there are conditionsfor remembering(in the sense of
conscious reproducing)of a quitespecial kind,which have evadedrecognition
by us up to now. ["Childhood"45-46; originalemphasis]
Centralto my readingof Freudis a conviction thatthe recurrenceof questions,doubts,
and revisions in his writing is itself profoundly psychoanalytic;psychoanalysis by
definitioncannotproduceconditionsof certainty.Forthisreason,I haveemphasizedhow
Abraham's,Torok's, and Rand's pursuitof resolutionand harmonydetractsfrom their
psychic investigation.In "Renewalsof Psychoanalysis,"for instance,Randremarkson
AbrahamandTorok's difficultieswith Freud'slegacy: "intenton... exploringever more
avenuesof sympatheticunderstanding... they struggle,sometimesunwittingly,to shake
off the varioustheorieshandeddown to them"[Shell 1]. Inadvertentlyperhaps,Rand's
image representsFreud (and surely Lacan) as an unwantedlegacy that Abrahamand
Torok also want to "shakeoff--even as a "crypt"they cannotintroject[Kamuf42].
Throughoutthis essay I have arguedthatAbraham's,Torok's,andRand'saccounts
of subjectivityand sexualityeitherignoreor repressthe very psychic factorsthattakeus
away from "sympatheticunderstanding."Strongly pronouncedin Rand and Torok's
recent work, such attemptsare liable to reproducethe forms of coercion and psychic
violence thatLacandenouncedin 'The Directionof the Treatmentand the Principlesof
Its Power" (1958). Lacan's criticisms, cited earlier, indicate why he emphasizes not
"recovery"but ratherwhat cannot be lost and properlymourned;hence Lacan'sbaleful
assessment that subjectivityis unableto restoreitself or face the pressingturmoilof its
eventual demise.
Instead of leading to quietism and ahistoricism-of which many critics accuse
psychoanalysis-Lacan takesus in theoppositedirection,towardaninquiringskepticism
and an irreverenceso extensive it can seem intolerablyextreme:"Suchis the frightthat
seizes man when he unveils the face of his power thathe turnsaway from it even in the
very act of laying its featuresbare.So it has been with psychoanalysis"["Function"34].
As Lacanargues,however,we nonethelesscontinueto demandthatwitnessesprovideus
with testimonials,however sullied the result. The Otherstill speaks. Can we heed this
speech without also demandingunquestionableveracity?
WORKSCITED
and
MariaTorok.
TheWolfMan'sMagic Word:A Cryptonomy.Trans.
Abraham,Nicolas,
Nicholas T. Rand.Minneapolis:U of MinnesotaP, 1986. Trans.of Cryptonymie:Le
verbierde l'hommeaux loups. Paris:AubierFlammarion,1976.
Bersani, Leo. The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art. New York:ColumbiaUP,
27
1986.
Crews,Frederick,et al. TheMemoryWars:Freud's Legacy in Dispute.New York:New
York Review, 1995.
Davidson, Arnold."Assaulton Freud."LondonReview of Books 5-19 July 1984: 9.
Dean, Tim. "ThePsychoanalysisof AIDS." October63 (1993): 83-116.
Derrida,Jacques. "Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abrahamand MariaTorok."
1977. Trans.BarbaraJohnson.Forewordto AbrahamandTorok,WolfMan'sMagic
Wordxi-xlviii.
. "LetUs not Forget-Psychoanalysis." OxfordLiteraryReview 12.1-2 (1990): 37.
. "Me-Psychoanalysis: An Introductionto the Translationof 'The Shell and the
Kernel' by Nicolas Abraham."Trans.RichardKlein. Diacritics 9.1 (1979): 4-12.
. Resistancesde la psychanalyse. Paris:Galilee, 1996.
Ferenczi,Saindor."IntrojectionandTransference."1909. First Contributionsto PsychoAnalysis. Trans.ErnestJones. London:Hogarth,1952. 35-93.
Fineman,Joel. "TheSoundof O in Othello:The Real of the Tragedyof Desire."October
45 (1988): 77-96.
Freud,Sigmund."AnalysisTerminableand Interminable."1937. SE 23: 211-53.
. An AutobiographicalStudy. 1925 (1924). SE 20: 1-74.
. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 1920. SE 18: 1-64.
. "ChildhoodMemoriesandScreenMemories."ThePsychopathologyof Everyday
Life. 1907 (1901). SE 6: 43-52.
. "CreativeWritersand Day-Dreaming."1908 (1907). SE 9: 143-53.
. "TheDissection of the Psychical Personality."1933. SE 22: 57-80.
. The Ego and the Id. 1923. SE 19: 1-66.
. "Instinctsand Their Vicissitudes." 1915. SE 14: 10940.
. The Interpretationof Dreams. 1900. SE 5: 339-686.
. "AMetapsychologicalSupplementto theTheoryof Dreams."1917 (1915). SE 14:
217-37.
. "Mourningand Melancholia."1917 (1915). SE 14: 237-60.
. "OnNarcissism:An Introduction."1914. SE 14: 69-102.
. "ThePathsto the Formationof Symptoms."1916-17 (1915-17). SE 16: 358-77.
. Projectfor a ScientificPsychology. 1950 (1895). SE 1: 283-397.
. "Repression."1915. SE 14: 141-58.
. "Resistanceand Repression."1916-17 (1915-17). SE 16: 286-357.
. "Resistancesto Psycho-Analysis."1925 (1924). SE 19: 213-24.
. "ScreenMemories."1899. SE 3: 300-22.
. "Splittingof the Ego in the Process of Defence." 1940. SE 23: 275-78.
. TheStandardEditionof the CompletePsychological Worksof SigmundFreud.Ed.
and trans.James Strachey.24 vols. London:Hogarth,1953-74. [SE]
. Studieson Hysteria. 1893. SE 2: 1-335.
. ThreeEssays on the Theoryof Sexuality. 1905. SE 7: 135-72.
. "Two Encyclopedia Articles." 1923 (1922). SE 18: 235-59.
."UberDeckerinnerungen."1899. GesammelteSchriftenvonSigmundFreud.Vol.
1. Leipzig: Interationaler PsychoanalytischerVerlag, 1928. 465-88.
. "The 'Uncanny."'1919. SE 17: 217-56.
."The Unconscious." 1915. SE 14: 159-209.
Haggard,H. Rider.King Solomon's Mines. 1885. Oxford:OxfordUP, 1989.
Hoad,T. F., ed. TheConciseOxfordDictionaryofEnglishEtymology.Oxford:Clarendon,
1986.
Kamuf,Peggy. "Abraham'sWake."Diacritics 9.1 (1979): 32-43.
Lacan,Jacques."TheDirectionof the Treatmentandthe Principlesof Its Power."1958.
28
Ecrits: A Selection 226-80.

. Ecrits:A Selection. New York:Norton, 1977.
. TheFour FundamentalConceptsof Psycho-Analysis.1973 (1964). Ed. JacquesAlain Miller. Trans.Alan Sheridan.New York: Norton, 1978.
. "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis." 1953.
Ecrits:A Selection 30-113. Trans.of "Fonctionet champde la paroleet du langue
en psychanalyse."Ecrits I. Paris:Seuil, 1966. 111-208.
"The Mirror Stage As Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed in
PsychoanalyticExperience."1949. Ecrits:A Selection 1-7.
Le Seminaire,livre XX: Encore. Paris:Seuil, 1975.
. "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian
Unconscious." 1960. Ecrits:A Selection 292-325.
Lane, Christopher."Beyond the Social Principle:Psychoanalysisand RadicalDemocracy."JPCS:JournalforthePsychoanalysisof Cultureand Society 1.1 (1996): 10521.
. "Philosophyof the Unconscious:Vacillatingon the Scene of Writingin Freud's
Project."Prose Studies 17.2 (1994): 98-129.
Miller, Jacques-Alain."Extimite."Prose Studies 11.3 (1988): 121-31.
Murray,Timothy. Like a Film: Ideological Fantasy on Screen, Camera,and Canvas.
New York:Routledge, 1993.
Rand, Nicholas. "A propos des travaux de N. Abrahamet M. Torok: Entretiende
MarcianneBlevis avec Nicholas Rand."Patio 4 (1985): 171-81.
."Family Romanceor Family History?PsychoanalysisandDramaticInventionin
Nicolas Abraham's'The Phantomof Hamlet."Diacritics 18.3 (1988): 20-30.
Rand,Nicholas, and MariaTorok."Questionsa... M. Toroket N. Rand:Les fantomes
de l'inconscient."Propos present6set recueillis par PatrickConrath.Journal des
psychologues 82 (nov. 1990): 14-18.
. "The Secret of Psychoanalysis:History Reads Theory." Critical Inquiry 13.2
(1987): 278-86.
Rashkin, Esther. "Tools for a New Psychoanalytic LiteraryCriticism:The Work of
Abrahamand Torok."Diacritics 18.3 (1988): 31-52.
Rose, Jacqueline.Sexualityin the Field of Vision.London:Verso, 1986.
Roudinesco, Elisabeth.Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France,
1925-1985. Trans.Jeffrey Mehlman.Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990.
Schreiner,Olive. The Story of an AfricanFarm. 1883. Oxford:OxfordUP, 1992.
Zizek, Slavoj. TheSublimeObjectof Ideology. New York:Verso, 1988.
29

Testament of Something

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Testament of Something

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Review: The Testament of the Other: Abraham and Torok's Failed Expiation of Ghosts

Author(s): Christopher Lane

Trulythe universeis full of ghosts, not sheeted churchyardspectres, but the

diacritics 27.4: 3-29

analysisas theOedipuscomplex anddeathdrive,penis envy, andtheprimalscene, as well

psychic difficulty adds to Abrahamand Torok's theory of transgenerationalhaunting.

2. The Termsof a Cure

diacritics / winter 1997

"operationalvalue":"Fantasyis expressive of an attemptat workingthrougha problem

"kernel"of AbrahamandTorok'sdifferenceswithFreud:While they see theunconscious

... Whatit is thattheego fearsfromtheexternalandfromthelibidinaldangercannotbe specified;

diacritics / winter 1997

drives' constitutive, partial,and resultantforms, concluding that by representingthe

4. "Allthat is buried is not dead"'

diacritics / winter 1997

the symptombelies thepsyche's propento resolutionandself-restitution[44.-............ -sity

5. Incorporationand Introjection;or, Freud vs. Ferenczi

diacritics / winter 1997

Derridateasingly reproachesAbrahamand Torokfor trying to disbandresistancesand

15. Yet,on pp. xl andxli, Derridastartsto questionthis hermeneuticprinciple,clarifyinghow

Freudquestionedsimple causalityand self-evident answersin this lecture,calling both

unconscious, from organizing itself further,putting out derivatives and establishing

notes: "Thereare ways more directthaninheritanceby which neuroticparentscan hand

is achievedat theprice of a riftin the ego whichneverheals butwhichincreases

see thatcompletelydifferentideas inspiredFerenczi's concept[of introjection]"[ 112;my

mother'sdeathleads,in themother'swords,to "carnalsensations"[qtd.in Shell 109].She

influences our reading of Abrahamand Torok, for in adopting Ferenczi's "benign"

21. Onecangraspthecurrentstakesof thisunreliability

responsible for distorting elements of consciousness; in this example, however, the

new theories, which in the eyes of nearly everyonedefinedthe quintessenceof

demonstratesboth a lack of rigidityin Freud'sargumentand his willingness to interpret

admissionsof doubtin his laterwork, andRandandTorok'searlierargumentthatFreud

renderinga resolutionof this dramavirtuallyimpossible.

8. Beyond Evidence ... to Doubt and Trauma

Ecrits: A Selection 226-80.

diacritics / winter 1997

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi