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PROTECT-PSC
Safety Function Blocks
Table of contents
Linke
d
1 General
2 Safety information
4
2.1
Hardware
2.2
Software
2.3
3.1
Emergency Stop FB
3.1.1
Application
3.1.2 Features
3.2
Guard Locking FB
11
3.2.1 Application
11
3.2.2 Features
11
11
12
13
3.3
Guard Locking FB
(guard monitoring with spring force interlocking device)
15
3.3.1 Application
15
3.3.2 Features
15
15
17
18
3.4
Enable Switch FB
19
3.4.1 Application
19
3.4.2 Features
19
19
21
22
23
24
3.5
3.5.1 Application
25
25
3.5.2 Features
25
26
27
28
29
30
Table of contents
Linke
d
3Protected ELAN functional modules within
the PROTECT-PSCsw library function
(continued)
3.6
Sequential Muting FB
31
3.6.1 Application
31
3.6.2 Features
31
31
32
34
35
3.7
Parallel Muting FB
37
3.7.1
Application
37
3.7.2 Features
37
37
38
39
40
3.8
Flip-Flop FBs
41
3.8.1 Application
41
3.8.2 Features
41
42
44
45
46
47
3.9
48
3.9.1 Application
48
3.9.2 Features
48
48
49
50
3.10
51
3.10.1 Application
51
3.10.2 Features
51
51
52
53
General
1 General
The functional blocks described in this document (also referred to below as FB or FBs)
are deployed in the library function of the
PROTECT-PSCsw programming software
used to program the PROTECT-PSC safety
control system in operating mode 3.
A precise description of the PROTECT-PSC
safety control system, the PROTECT-PSCsw
programming software and incorporation
of the library function into this software can
be found in the PROTECT-PSC instruction
manual.
Safety information
2 Safety information
2.2 Software
All FBs described below support the programmer of the PROTECT-PSCsw programming software to prepare a program for the
PROTECT-PSC safety control system that
satisfies the requirements of Performance
Level e in accordance with EN ISO 13849-1
or SIL 3 in accordance with EN IEC 62061.
NB: All FBs serve to support the creation of
a program. The functions programmed in the
FBs are based on the ladder diagram (LD)
graphic programming language in accordance with EN IEC 61131-3 and can also be
individually replicated in PROTECT-PSCsw
using discrete LD programming. The FBs
represent just one possibility for creating the
function described.
The programmer himself must bring about
additional constraints within the overall program. An example here is the incorporation
of the feedback loop as an additional RESET
condition (or for the auto reset condition).
All functional modules from the Elan PSC
Library are protected, i.e. they cannot be
changed by the programmer. Protected FBs
are labelled protected or geschtzt (in
a German programming environment) and
have date and seal identifier (checksum).
The programmer has the possibility starting
from software version PROTECT-PSCsw
V1.2R01 to protect the FBs he has created
himself using a password. This is done by
selecting and actuating the Settings for
FB protection button from the Properties
screen after the FB has been saved and then
entering a name and password in the Setting FB protection screen (see Figure 2-1).
2.3 Features of the PROTECT-PSCsw
Due to the special programming structure
of PROTECT-PSCsw, the inputs, outputs
or flags used are evaluated with respect to
safety and labelled with an S (assessed
as safe) or U (assessed as unsafe). This
labelling is primarily based on the assessment of the input signals which are only assessed to be safe if they represent a safe
1 or safe 0.
Name
Description
IN1
OUT1
Output safe 1:
On flag; for further use
OUT2
Output safe 0:
On flag; for further use
The True_False FB precedes the respective safe FBs in the programming examples
in Chapter 3.1 to 3.7.
3.1.1 Application
The Emergency Stop FB is used to monitor
emergency stop control devices.
Emergency stop control devices are generally incorporated in the safety circuit of
a machine or system and have special
significance as part of the machine and
system control. The safe function and rapid
accessibility of emergency stop control
devices can have a crucial effect on the lives
of people and the degree of personal injury
in the event of a disturbance or accident
or on the extent of damage to a machine in
case of a fault.
New requirements apply to the operating
mode of these control devices with the
coming into force of the new harmonised
European standard EN ISO 13850 on functional aspects and principles for design for
emergency stop equipment.
All emergency stop control devices from
SCHMERSAL or ELAN satisfy the requirements of this standard. The Emergency
Stop FB described in this chapter helps
to implement these requirements into the
PROTECT-PSC safety control system.
Name
Description
IN1
S_EStopIn
Safety request:
TRUE: emergency stop not actuated
FALSE: emergency stop actuated
IN2
S_StartReset
Power on reset:
TRUE: emergency stop not actuated
FALSE: emergency stop actuated
IN3
S_AutoReset
Automatic reset:
TRUE: automatic reset (input IN4 without function)
FALSE: manual reset (input IN4 active)
IN4
Reset
Reset:
TRUE: with edge change low high
Otherwise false
OUT1
S_EStopOut
OUT2
Error
Error message:
TRUE: error (error reset function)
FALSE: no error (reset function OK)
3.1.4 Connection example: Emergency stop with monitored reset (rising or falling
edge)
Description
An emergency stop control device and a reset button are connected to the PROTECTPSC-CPU-MON module as shown.
Desired function: Emergency stop with
monitored reset with
a) rising edge (see example program 1) or
b) trailing edge (see example program 2)
After a program start or after resetting the
emergency stop control device, the condition (referred to in subsequent example
programs as M0000 flag) required to
continue the overall program is provided a)
by actuating or b) by releasing the reset button. The M000 flag is therefore integrated
in the overall program accordingly.
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
Fig. 3-4: PROTECT-PSCsw programming environment example program a: True_False and Emergency Stop FBs
b) Emergency stop with monitored reset (trailing edge, see 3.1.4) through integration of the Emergency Stop function block in
the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
Fig. 3-5: PROTECT-PSCsw programming environment example program b: True_False and Emergency Stop FBs
10
3.2.1 Application
The Guard Monitoring FB is used during
the monitoring of guards that are secured by
safety switching elements such as position
switches with fixed or separate actuators,
AOPDs (safety light barriers, safety light
curtains, safety laser scanners) and tactile
safety equipment such as safety edges,
safety mats etc.
Name
Description
IN1
G_SW_1
Safety requirement 1:
TRUE: 1st contact guard monitoring closed
FALSE: 1st contact guard monitoring not closed
IN2
G_SW_2
Safety requirement 2
TRUE: 2nd contact guard monitoring closed
FALSE: 2nd contact guard monitoring not closed
NB: In the case of single channelled monitoring IN2 and
IN3 are wired to the same contact.
IN3
Auto_ Res
Automatic reset:
TRUE: automatic reset (input IN5 without function)
FALSE: manual reset (input IN5 active)
IN4
Start_Res
Power on reset:
TRUE: reset after power on (autostart after power on)
FALSE: no reset after power on (reset must be actuated
after power on)
IN5
Reset
Reset:
TRUE: during edge change low high;
Otherwise FALSE
OUT1
G_Monitor
OUT2
Error
Error report:
TRUE: fault reset function or time window IN1, IN2 >5s
FALSE: no error
11
3.2.4 Connection example: Guard monitoring with monitored reset (rising edge) or
with autoreset
Description
Guard monitoring contacts and a reset
button are connected to the PROTECT-PSCCPU-MON module as shown.
Desired function: Guard monitoring with
a) monitored reset with rising edge (see
example program 1) or
b) autostart, without reset button (see example program 2)
After a program start or following resetting
of guard monitoring, the condition (referred
to in subsequent example programs as
M0000 flag) required to continue the overall program is provided a) by actuating the
reset button or b) without the reset button.
The M000 flag is therefore integrated in
the overall program accordingly.
12
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-8: PROTECT-PSCsw programming environment example program a: True_False and GuardMonitoring FBs
13
b) Guard monitoring with automatic reset (see 3.2.4) through integration of the Guard Monitoring function block in the ladder
diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
Fig. 3-9: PROTECT-PSCsw programming environment example program b: True_False and GuardMonitoring FBs
14
3.3.1 Application
The Guard Locking FB is used during the
monitoring of interlocking devices on guards
that are locked with spring force and opened
by feeding current to the solenoid coil.
NB:
a) For the monitoring of interlocking devices
at guard doors which are locked using
magnetic force the GuardLocking FB
can be used, too. In this case the signal
OUT2 must be inverted. In fault case the
guard is unlocked
b) Physical suitability in connection with the
PROTECT-PSC safety control system is
the prerequisite for connecting the abovementioned safety switching elements.
Application-related features, in particular
requirements of standards for specific
products (the so-called C standards) are
not taken into consideration in this documentation.
3.3.2 Features
The Guard Locking FB has been created
on the basis of programming guidelines from
PLCopen, the organisation for the industrial
control technology field. This programming structure is described in Chapter 6.12
Safety Guard Interlocking with locking
of the document PLCopen Technical
Committee 5 Safety Software Technical
Specification, Part 1: Concepts and Function
Blocks dated 31.01.2006.
15
Name
Description
IN1
S_Active
IN2
G_Monitor
Monitoring of actuator:
TRUE: guard closed
FALSE: guard not closed
IN3
G_Lock
Monitoring of magnet:
TRUE: magnet contact locked
FALSE: magnet contact unlocked
IN4
Reset
Reset:
FALSE TRUE: reset (>OUT1)
IN5
Unlock_R
Request unlocking:
TRUE: unlocking requested
FALSE: no unlocking requested
NB: During IN5 = TRUE IN1 must be TRUE.
IN6
Start_Res
Power-On reset:
TRUE: reset after power on (Autostart after Power on)
FALSE: no reset after power on (reset IN4 must be actuated after power on)
IN7
Auto_Res
Automatic reset:
TRUE: automatic reset (input IN4 without function)
FALSE: manual reset (input IN4 with function)
OUT1
Locked
(safe signal for further
processing)
OUT2
Unlocked
OUT3
Error
Error:
TRUE: error (fault: reset function)
FALSE: no error (reset function OK)
16
Description
The connecting contacts of a spring force
interlocking device (actuator contact, magnet contact, control coil), button to request
unlocking and a contact for an additional
condition for unlocking are connected to
the PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON module as
shown.
Desired function: monitoring of actuator
and magnet contacts and unlocking of the
actuator.
Monitoring of the actuator and magnet contacts must take place immediately when the
program starts. The unlocking of the guard
is only possible if a further condition has
been satisfied (e.g. signal motor zero speed).
17
3.3.5 Example program: Guard monitoring with automatic reset (see 3.3.4) through integration of the Guard Locking function
block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-12: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program: True_False and GuardLocking FBs
18
3.4.1 Application
The Enable Switch FB is used for monitoring a three-step enable switch which is not
actuated in Position (Pos) 1, is in mid-position in Pos2 and is pressed down completely
in Pos3. Enabling mode should be effected
when Pos2 is pressed. Pos3 of the enable
switch initiates a shutdown of the function,
which, depending on the selected condition,
either is resetted manually by pressing the
reset button or automatically.
19
Name
Description
IN1
S_Active
IN2
S_EnabSw1
IN3
S_EnabSw2
IN4
S_AutoRes
Auto reset; after switching enable switch Pos3 Pos2 Pos1 or Pos2 after power on;
further operation without actuation of reset switch:
TRUE: auto reset
False: no auto reset
IN5
Reset
Reset; after switching enable switch Pos3 Pos2 Pos1 or Pos2 after power on;
further operation only after actuating the reset switch:
FALSE TRUE: reset
OUT1
S_Enable
(safe signal for further
processing)
OUT2
ErrorOut
20
Description
The connecting contacts of a three-step
enable switch with NC-NO contacts, a reset
button and an additional condition (e.g. contact of operating mode selector switch) are
connected to the PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON
module as shown.
The 3-step enable switch (e.g. ZSD1, ZSD2,
DTAN from SCHMERSAL/ELAN) has the following positions (Pos):
Pos1 (not actuated): NC contact closed
and NO contact open;
Pos2 (middle position): NC contact closed
and NO contact closed;
Pos3 (pushed down): NC contact open
and NO contact closed
Desired functions:
Additional condition (operating mode
selector switch): enabling mode is only
possible when the corresponding operating mode is selected.
Enabling mode: the enable switch is
switched from Pos1 to Pos2 after program
start. Enabling mode can then be implemented.
Error: Enable switch is switched from Pos3
to Pos2 or is on Pos2 when the program
starts. Enabling mode is not possible.
Reset: resetting the error. Enabling mode
can then be implemented again.
21
3.4.5 Example program 1: Enabling mode with 3-step enable switch (NC/NO contacts), additional condition (operating mode selector switch) and reset button (see 3.4.4) through integration of the Enable Switch function block in the ladder diagram of the
PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-15: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program 1: True_False and EnableSwitch FBs
22
Description
The connecting contacts of a three-step enable switch with 2 NO contacts, a reset button and an additional condition (e.g. contact
from operating mode selector switch) are
connected to the PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON
module as shown.
The 3-step enable switch has the following
positions (Pos):
Pos1 (not actuated): both NO contacts are
open;
Pos2 (middle position): both NO contacts
are closed;
Pos3 (pushed down): both NO contacts
are open.
Desired functions:
Additional condition (operating mode
selector switch): enabling mode is only
possible when the corresponding operating mode has been selected.
Enabling mode: the enable switch is
switched from Pos1 to Pos2 after program
start. Enabling mode can be implemented.
Error: enable switch is on Pos2 when the
program starts. Enabling mode is not
possible.
Reset: resetting the error. Enabling mode
can then be implemented again.
23
3.4.7 Example program 2: Enabling mode with 3-step enable switch (2 NO contacts), additional condition (operating mode selector switch) and reset button (see 3.4.6) through integration of the Enable Switch function block in the ladder diagram of the
PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-17: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program 2: True_False and EnableSwitch FBs
24
3.5.1 Application
The Two_Hand_safe_4sensors FB is used
in the monitoring of two-handed start solutions (THS).
A THS is usually understood to refer to a
protective device that requires the simultaneous use of both hands for its actuation in
order to initiate and maintain operation of
a machine as long as a hazard exists. The
fixed location means that the operator is
kept outside the danger area.
Generally all safety-related requirements
stipulated in EN 574 must be complied with.
Safety using a two-handed start solution as
location fixing protective device basically
only protects the person who actuates the
actuating elements of the two-handed start
solution.
Adequate protection is only achieved if
there is sufficient distance between the start
device and the hazardous movement.
The distance can be calculated in accordance with EN 999 as follows:
S [mm] = 1,600 [mm/s] tN [s] + 250 [mm]
S = Distance from two-handed start solution to the first hazardous movement.
tN = Time the overall system continues
running after completion of the start
command.
250 mm should be applied as additional distance if the actuating elements of the THS
can be actuated such that one hand may be
closer to the danger point than the start button. The actuation can be 250 mm closer to
the hazard area than the result indicated by
the above equation if protective hoods are
mounted around the start button.
The actuating elements of the THS or the
start console should be tightly assembled to
an area with sufficient space.
If the actuating elements of the THS are
not in a fixed place, other measures must
be deployed to ensure that the minimum
distance is maintained, e.g. using a spacer
(see EN574 Ch. 9).
Attention is directed to the manipulation safe
arrangement of the actuating elements, e.g.
using actuating elements covered by the
protective hood (see EN 574 Ch. 8).
There must be labelling for the actuation of
actuating elements which describes the type
of THS solution (e.g. EN 574 Type IIIC).
A check must be performed to ensure the
system is working correctly after installing the hardware and software and before
releasing the two-handed start solution.
3.5.2 Features
The module complies with the functionalities
in accordance with EN 574 Type IIIC if wiring
corresponds to Example 1 in Chapter 3.5.4.
25
Name
Description
IN1
NO_1
IN2
NC_1
(B-contact)
IN3
NO_2
IN4
NC_2
(B-contact)
IN5
S_No-EDM
IN6
Feed_Loop
OUT1
OUT1
OUT2
OUT2
OUT3
diagnose
26
Description
The operating elements of a 2-handed operation solution with NC-NO contacts and the
feedback loop (NC contacts of the actuated
contactors) are connected to the PROTECTPSC-CPU-MON module as shown.
Operation of the operating elements causes
the NO contact to close and the NC contact
to open.
Desired function
Only if the feedback loop is closed and both
two-handed operating elements are actuated simultaneously (within 500 ms) are the
output signals OUT1 and OUT2 of the
Two_Hand_safe_4sensors FB active until
at least one operating element is released.
27
3.5.5 Example program 1: Monitoring of 2-handed operation and feedback loop (see 3.5.5) through integration of the Two_Hand_
safe_4sensors function block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-20: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program 1: True_False and Two_hand_safe_4sensors FBs
28
Description
The operating elements of a 2-handed operation with NC-NO contacts without feedback loop are connected to the PROTECTPSC-CPU-MON module as shown.
Actuation of the operating elements causes
the NO contact to close and the NC contact
to open.
Desired function
Only if both two-handed operating elements
are actuated simultaneously (within 500ms)
are the output signals OUT1 and OUT2
of the Two_Hand_safe_4sensors FB active until at least one operating element is
released.
29
3.5.7 Example program 2: Monitoring of 2-handed operation without feedback loop (see 3.5.6) through integration of the Two_
Hand_safe_4sensors function block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to library takes place
Program start
End of program
Fig. 3-22: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program 2: True_False and Two_hand_safe_4sensors FBs
30
3.6.1 Application
The Seq_Muting function block represents
the function for sequential muting.
The principle is based on the reliable bridging of electro-sensitive protective equipment
(ESPE). Here it is ensured that the series
(sequentially) arranged sensors realise a
defined sequence of signal status changes
(see Figure 3-18). The first faulty signal
status change of a muting sensor results in
interruption of the ESPE bridging. No special
safety sensors are required for the sensors.
The mechanical arrangement of the two
reflection light barriers (muting sensors)
must guarantee that no people are able to
enter the danger area during muting or can
themselves trigger muting.
The Seq_Muting FB can be used within
PROTECT-PSC up to SIL 3 in accordance
with EN IEC 61508, PL e in accordance with
EN ISO 13849-1 and SC 4 in accordance
with EN 954-1 when using electro-sensitive
protective equipment in accordance with
Type 4 to EN 61496-1:2004 and under consideration of the specifications set out here.
31
Name
Description
IN1
Sensor1
IN2
Sensor2
IN3
Sensor3
IN4
Sensor4
IN5
AOPD1
IN6
AOPD2
IN7
ErrorQuit (only
possible if all sensors are free)
Error acknowledgement:
TRUE: where edge change high low
Otherwise FALSE
IN8
Override1 (NO
contact: see Ch.
3.6.2.1; point 7.)
IN9
Override2 (NC
contact: see Ch.
3.6.2.1; point 7.)
IN10
IN11
EDM: Connection
of feedback loop
Tab. 3-7: Description of I/Os of Seq_Muting FB (1), continuation see Table 3-6 (next page)
Left: Fig. 3-24: Seq_Muting FB (1), continuation see Fig. 3-25 page 33
Description of Safety Function Blocks PROTECT-PSC | Version 1.1
32
Name
Description
IN12
M_lamp_in
IN13
Mute_lamp
(disable)
OUT1
OUT1
OUT2
OUT2
OUT3
Mut_Lamp
OUT4
diagnose
General fault:
TRUE: signal sequence inputs IN1 IN6 not correct.
FALSE: signal sequence inputs IN1 IN6 correct.
OUT5
DiagCode1
Position fault:
TRUE: no position occupied
FALSE: position occupied
OUT6
DiagCode2
OUT7
DiagCode3
OUT8
DiagCode4
Sensor fault:
TRUE: sensor sequence not OK
FALSE: sensor sequence OK
OUT9
DiagCode5
OUT10
DiagCode6
AOPD fault:
TRUE: AOPD not OK
FALSE: AOPD OK
Left: Fig. 3-25: Seq_Muting FB (2), continued from Fig. 3-24 page 32
Description of Safety Function Blocks PROTECT-PSC | Version 1.1
33
Fig. 3-26: Connection of PSC-CPU-MON and PSC-S-IN-LC for example program 3.6.6
Description
A safety light barrier, the four position
switches Sensor 1, Sensor 2, Sensor 3 and Sensor 4 with NO contacts,
a feedback loop with two NC contacts in
series, a 2-channelled key switch override
with break contact/make contact function,
an ErrorQuit button to acknowledge errors
and a muting lamp are connected to the
PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON and PROTECTPSC-S-IN-LC modules as shown.
Desired function
Sequential muting as described in 3.6.3. In
addition with display using a muting indicator and monitoring of the feedback loop and
lamp current.
NB: The muting lamp shown in Figure 3-25
corresponds to the input and output characteristics of the PROTECT-PSC in terms of its
current and voltage characteristic curve.
34
3.6.6 Example program: Monitoring of sequential muting, feedback loop and lamp current (see 3.6.5) through integration of the
Seq_Muting function block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
View of the programming environment
Comment
Link to the library takes place
Program start
Fig. 3-27: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program: True_False and Seq_Muting FB (1)
35
3.6.6 Example program: Monitoring of sequential muting, feedback loop and lamp current (see 3.6.5) through integration of the
Seq_Muting function block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw (continued)
View of the programming environment
Comment
Wiring of the Seq_Muting function block (continued):
IN10: If monitoring of feedback loop is desired, wire IN10 with
safe 0, otherwise with safe 1.
IN11: If monitoring of feedback loop is desired, wire IN11 with
input series connection of NC contacts of the actuated contactors (here: contact I009). Otherwise do not connect.
IN12: If monitoring of the muting lamp is desired, wire IN12 with
0V contact of the muting lamp (here: contact I012); otherwise do
not connect.
IN13: If monitoring of the muting lamp is desired wire IN13 with
safe 0. Otherwise wire with safe 1.
OUT10: Diagnosis output; see Table 3 6 for description; output
(here: M009) for further use.
End of program
Fig. 3-28: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program True_False and Seq_Muting FBs (2)
36
3.7.1 Application
The Muting_2Sensors function block represents the function for parallel muting.
The principle relies on the reliable bridging
of electro-sensitive protective equipment
(ESPE) using two fixed wired sensors, usually reflection light barriers. Muting is used
for the transportation of material from a safe
area to a danger area. Here an ESPE is run
through without disconnection taking place.
The mechanical arrangement of the two
reflection light barriers (muting sensors)
must guarantee that no people are able to
enter the danger area during muting or can
themselves trigger muting.
The Muting_2Sensors FB can be used
within PROTECT-PSC up to SIL 3 in accordance with EN IEC 61508, PL e in accordance
with EN ISO 13849-1 and SC 4 in accordance with EN 954-1 when using electro-sensitive protective equipment in accordance
with Type 4 to EN 61496-1:2004 and under
consideration of the specifications set out
here.
NB: ESPE of Type 2 in accordance with
EN 61496-1:2004 likewise functions on the
muting module. The safety integrity is not
present here, however. The periodical testing of the Type 2 ESPE system is not supported by the Muting_2Sensors FB.
3.7.2 Features
Parallel muting in both movement directions
Possibility to actuate a muting indicator
(LED or light bulb)
Option of monitoring the muting indicator
for interruption (lamp monitoring)
Simple diagnosis
The Muting_2Sensors FB has been created on the basis of programming guidelines
from PLCopen, the organisation for the
industrial control technology field. This programming structure is described in Chapter
6.16 Parallel Muting with 2 Sensors of the
document PLCopen Technical Committee
5 Safety Software Technical Specification, Part 1: Concepts and Function Blocks
dated 31.01.2006.
37
Input/
output
Name
Description
IN1
S_AOPD_IN
IN2
S_Mut_S11
Muting sensor 1 with make contact function; e.g. reflection light barrier 1:
TRUE: reflection light barrier 1 energised
FALSE: reflection light barrier 1 not energised
IN3
S_Mut_S12
Muting sensor 2 with make contact function; e.g. reflection light barrier 2:
TRUE: reflection light barrier 2 energised
FALSE: reflection light barrier 2 not energised
IN4
S_MUT_LAM
IN5
Mut_Enab
Muting enable:
TRUE: muting possible
FALSE: muting not possible
IN6
S_Start_R
Power on reset:
TRUE: reset after power on (auto start after power on)
FALSE: no reset after power on (reset must be actuated
after power on)
IN7
Reset
Reset:
TRUE: where edge change low high
Otherwise FALSE
OUT1
Ready
FB initialised:
TRUE after switching on (power on) or after reset on
PSC-CPU-MON
OUT2
S_AOPD_O
Safety output:
TRUE: AOPD on IN1 free or muting active
FALSE: AOPD on IN1 not free and muting not active
OUT3
S_Mut_Ak
OUT4
Error
Error indicator:
TRUE: IN1 or OUT3 is TRUE
FALSE: IN1 and OUT3 is FALSE
38
Fig. 3-31: Connection of PSC-CPU-MON and PSC-S-IN-LC for example program 3.7.6
Description
A safety light barrier, two reflection light barriers, a feedback loop with two NC contacts
in series, a reset button for error acknowledgement and a muting and error lamp are
connected to the PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON
and PROTECT-PSC-S-IN-LC modules as
shown.
Desired function
Parallel muting as described under 3.7.3.
Additionally with muting and error lamp
indicator.
NB: The lamps represented in Figure 3-31
correspond to the output characteristics of
the PROTECT-PSC in terms of their current
and voltage characteristic curve.
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3.7.6 Example program: Monitoring of parallel muting and feedback loop (see 3.7.5) through integration of the Muting_2Sensors
function block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
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Comment
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Program start
Fig. 3-32: Programming environment PROTECT-PSCsw example program: True_False and Muting_2Sensors FBs
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3.8.1 Application
A flip-flop, also known as a bistable trigger
circuit, is generally understood as circuitry
that can take two stable states and save
these.
3.8.2 Features
Of all the possible flip flop permutations,
only the following types will be considered
here:
R-S flip-flop with priority
R-S flip-flop without priority
D flip-flop with evaluation on falling edge
D flip-flop with evaluation on rising edge
An RS flip-flop is the simplest kind of state
actuated flip-flop. The output Q is set to high
with a high signal on the Set input (S) and
reset to low with a high signal on the Reset
input (R). Here the output (NOT-Q) is always
complementary to (runs counter to) output
Q.
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Input/output
Name
Description
IN1
Set
Set input:
TRUE: high signal
FALSE: low signal
IN2
Reset
OUT1
Bistable state:
TRUE: after high signal to IN1
FALSE: after high signal to IN2
OUT2
Qnot
Bistable state:
TRUE: after high signal to IN2
FALSE: after high signal to IN1
3.8.3.2 FB RS_FlipFlop_no_prio
Input/output
Name
Description
IN1
Set
Set input:
TRUE: high signal
FALSE: low signal
IN2
Reset
Reset input:
TRUE: high signal
FALSE: low signal
OUT1
Bistable state:
TRUE: (after high signal to IN1) or (after high signal to IN1
and IN2 )
FALSE: after high signal to In2
OUT2
Qnot
Bistable state:
TRUE: (after high signal to In1) or (after high signal to IN1
and IN2)
FALSE: after high signal to IN1
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Name
Description
IN1
IN2
Clock
Clock input:
TRUE: falling edge
FALSE: no falling edge
OUT1
Bistable state:
TRUE: next falling edge to IN2 after high signal to IN1
FALSE: always after power on; then next falling edge to IN2
after low signal to IN1
3.8.3.4 FB D_FlipFlop_risingEdge
Input/output
Name
Description
IN1
IN2
Clock
Clock input:
TRUE: falling edge
FALSE: no falling edge
OUT1
Bistable state:
TRUE: next rising edge to IN2 after high signal to IN1
FALSE: always after power on; then next rising edge to IN2
after low signal to IN1
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Description
Two buttons and two lamps are connected
to the PROTECT-PSC-CPU-MON module as
shown.
Desired function
The direction of the conveyor belt is set to
forwards by actuating button 1. This is
safely displayed by lamp 1. The direction of
the conveyor belt is set to backwards by
actuating button 2. This is safely indicated
by lamp 2. Simultaneous actuation of buttons 1 and 2 is not defined. The preferred
direction of forwards should be provided
for this event.
NB: The lamps shown in Figure 3-39 represent the output characteristics of the PROTECTPSC in terms of their current and voltage characteristic curve.
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Comment
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Program start
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Description
A reflection light barrier, a clock and a contactor are connected to the PROTECT-PSCCPU-MON module as shown.
Desired function
When the reflection light barrier has been energised the connected contactor should be
activated at the moment when a rising edge is present on the clock. If the reflection light
barrier has not been energised the contactor should be turned off at this time if there is
similarly a rising edge on the clock.
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Comment
Link to the library takes place
Program start
End of program
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3.9.1 Application
The Turn_off_delay_R FB can be used in
all applications in which a retriggerable drop
off delayed time is desired (generally termed
a Stop1 function), depending on the input
condition. Retriggerable means, that the
drop off delayed time starts again, if during
the run of the delayed time the input condition is reset and set again.
Category 1 STOP in accordance with EN
60204-1 Section 9.2.2: Controlled stop
by interrupting the power supply to the
actuator level if, for example, the hazardous
movement has been brought to a standstill
(= time-delayed shut-down of the power
supply).
Example: the controller enable of an electronic drive is shut down immediately using
an enable with STOP category 0 and the
power contactor only after the operational
braking time of the motor (= STOP category1).
3.9.2 Features
The following syntax applies in order to
design drop off delay times flexibly for every
programmer:
The Turn_off_delay_R FB is always preceded by a time function (Tx) in which the
desired shut-down delay is defined. This
time function is wired with the output signal
Out2 (Sig_off_T) from the FB. Tx serves as
the input signal for IN1 from the FB (see
example program).
Input/
output
Name
Description
IN1
Timer
IN2
Signal
Monitoring contact:
TRUE FALSE: start delay time
FALSE: monitoring contact not active
OUT1
Sig_Stop1
OUT2
Sig_off_T
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3.9.4 Connection example: After the actuation of an emergency stop control device
two connected contactors are only to be drop off after 5 s delay.
Description
An emergency stop control device and two
contactors are connected to the PROTECTPSC-CPU-MON module as shown.
Desired function
After actuating the emergency stop control device both contactors should drop off after
expiry of 5 s, retriggerable. This means that the connected contactors do not drop off if the
emergency stop is reset before expiry of the 5 s. A new actuating of the emergency stop
control device starts the drop off delay time of 5 s for the connected contactors again.
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3.9.5 Example program: Drop off delay, retriggerable (see 3.9.4) through integration of the Turn_off_delay_R function block in
the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
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Comment
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Program start
End of program
50
3.10 Turn off delay NR FB (drop off delayed, not retriggerable) (1)
3.10.1 Application
The Turn_off_delay_R FB can be used in
all applications in which a not retriggerable
drop off delayed time is desired (generally
termed a Stop 1 function), depending on the
input condition. Not retriggerable means,
that the drop off delayed time has to be
finished, before to actuate it again.
Name
Description
IN1
TimerNR
IN2
Signal
Monitoring contact:
TRUE FALSE: start delay time
FALSE: monitoring contact not active
OUT1
OutStop1
Output Stop 1:
TRUE: monitoring contact to IN1 active or delay time not
expired
FALSE: monitoring contact to IN1 not active or delay
time expired
OUT2
OutStop0
Output Stop 0:
TRUE = IN2 active
False = IN2 not active
OUT3
I_Timer
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3.10 Turn off delay NR FB (drop off delayed, not retriggerable) (2)
3.10.4 Connection example with Time_delay FB: After the actuation of an emergency stop control device two connected contactors are only to be drop off after 5 s
delay.
Description
An emergency stop control device and two
contactors are connected to the PROTECTPSC-CPU-MON module as shown.
Desired function
After actuating the emergency stop control device both contactors should drop off after
expiry of 5s, not retriggerable. It means, that a new start of the drop off delay time can be
executed again after the expiry of the preset time (here: 5 s). So the set time elapses without
change.
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3.10 Turn off delay NR FB (drop off delayed, not retriggerable) (3)
3.10.5 Example program: drop off delay, not retriggerable (see 3.10.4), through integration of the Turn_off_delay_NR function
block in the ladder diagram of the PROTECT PSCsw
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Comment
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Program start
End of program
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