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The haecceity theory and

perspectival limitation
Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Texas A & M University

Published online: 02 Jun 2006.

To cite this article: Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1989) The haecceity theory and
perspectival limitation, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67:3, 295-305, DOI:
10.1080/00048408912350141
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Vol. 67, No. 3; September 1989

THE HAECCEITY THEORY AND PERSPECTIVAL LIMITATION

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Impressive work has been done in recent years in attempting to understand
how self-awareness is related to other sorts of awareness. One theory of
this relation is what I shall call the haecceity theory. In spite of its many
accomplishments, I shall argue that the haecceity theory is flawed beyond
hope. This defect alone would be cause for alarm, for the haecceity theory
has its followers. However, much more than the haecceity theory is at stake;
rather an entire (and dominant) way of thinking about awareness and selfawareness must be abandoned. To begin to clarify these cursory remarks,
I turn first to the haecceity theory itself.
I. The Haecceity Theory
The haecceity theory 1 is a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, claiming
that any intentional attitude is best analysed as a two-place relation between
a person and a proposition. Each such attitude has a de dicto, de re and
de se form. The haecceity theory holds that the de dicto form of each attitude
is primary and that the other forms can be adequately explained as special
cases of the de dicto form. In particular, it claims that these forms can
be explained in terms of the de dicto form by positing that (i) each thing
has a special property, its haecceity, which is (ii) a perspectivally limited
property. A perspectivally limited property is a property some persons cannot
grasp, conceive of, or take any other intentional attitude toward. Now, all
sorts of perspectivally limited properties can be posited by a variety of theories.
For example, an implausible theory, what we might call a theory for paranoids,
might posit the existence of propositions which reflect negatively on a
particular paranoid which that paranoid cannot discover but which other
persons are trying to make true. Such a theory might posit the existence
ofperspectivally limited properties in that it may claim that these propositions
are undetectable to the paranoid because they involve properties which the
paranoid cannot grasp. The haecceity theory posits a more plausible kind
of perspectival limitation. It claims that haecceities are perspectivally limited
in that (iii) only the individual who has the haecceity in question can grasp
that haecceity.
A haecceity is an individual essence; it is the special 'thisness' that is
necessarily unique to the thing in question. As such, the haecceity theory
is committed to the metaphysical thesis of essentialism -- that at least some
t The classic expression of the haecceitytheory is by Roderick Chisholm [4]. Hector NeriCastaneda defendsa similarveiw [2, 3].
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The Haecceity Theory and Perspectival Limitation

beings have essences. The haecceity theory is more than a metaphysical

view, however, for the haecceity theory attempts to put the mataphysical
view of essentialism to work in the philosophy of mind and language. It
claims that metaphysical essences play a role in accounting for cognitive
awareness of certain aspects of reality and for the semantic force of firstperson indexicals.
In particular, the haecceity theory puts essences to work in order to explain
the special nature of de se intentional attitudes. For example, when Hume
believes de se that he is wise, he does so by believing that proposition which
would be expressed by his uttering the sentence 'I am wise.' Were he to
utter that sentence, the proposition in question would be composed of the
property of being wise and Hume's haecceity (which would be expressed
by Hume's use of the the first-person pronoun 'I'). Were Heimson to utter
the same sentence, he would express a different proposition, one including
his haecceity and not Hume's. Further, no proposition which Heimson can
believe is identical to the one Hume believes when Hume believes de se
that he is wise. If Heimson believes what is expressed by 'Hume is wise'
or 'he (Hume) is wise', Heimson does not believe the very same proposition
Hume believes when he believes what is expressed for him by the sentence
'I am wise.' Rather, when Heimson believes what is expressed for him by
the sentence 'he (Hume) is wise', Heimson believes a proposition composed
of the property of being wise and some other entity, perhaps a property,
referred to or expressed by 'he' which makes the proposition in question
similar (on some grounds which the theory must specify) but not identical
to the proposition Hume believes when he believes de se that he is wise.
Thus, according to the haecceity theory, haecceities are components of
propositions, which are the objects of belief and other intentional attitudes.
Since haecceities are perspectivally limited properties and since haecceities
are components of propositions, the haecceity theory is committed to the
existence of perspectivally limited propositions as well. A perspectivally
limited proposition is a proposition which contains a perspectivally limited
element, and thus is necessarily such that anyone capable of grasping that
proposition is capable of grasping the element in question.
The haecceity theory is a multiple proposition account of first-person
propositions. According to any multiple proposition account, when Hume
and Heimson both believe what is expressed by the sentence 'I am wise,'
they believe numerically distinct propositions. The way in which the haecceity
theory is committed to this view of first-person propositions falls out of
the account of self-individuation it gives. The haecceity theory holds that
we individuate ourselves per se (without relating ourselves to some other
object), but not directly (without apprehending some intervening concept
of ourselves): we individuate ourselves by apprehending our essence. Other
accounts of self-individuation can be maintained which can generate versions
of a multiple proposition account different from the haecceity theory. A
theory might hold that we individuate ourselves in our de se attitudes both
per se and directly. Such a theory would hold that when a de se attitude

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is held, the propositional content of that attitude consists of the person

him/herself and an open proposition of the form x is P, where x is a variable
which is 'filled' by the person in question and P is some property. 2 This
view is a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes which claims that the
de dicto form of each attitude is primary; it is not committed to essentialism
or to the haecceity theory. Alternatively, a theory might hold that we do
not individuate ourselves p e r se or directly; rather, we individuate ourselves
as the owner of some context of our experience which we individuate p e r
se and directly) Again, such a theory may give a multiple proposition account
of first-person propositions; in any case, it is not committed to essentialism
or to the haecceity theory.
II. Dyadic Theories and Perspectivally Limited Propositions
It has already been pointed out that the haecceity theory is committed to
the existence of perspectivally limited propositions. In one sense, this is a
virtue of the theory for, as dyadic theories go, the best alternatives for
developing a unified account of the intentional attitudes are committed to
the existence of perspectivally limited propositions. A dyadic theory can
take either the de dicto, de re, or de se form of each intentional attitude
as primary; to maintain the dyadic nature of the theory without making
the de dicto form of each attitude primary, a theory will have to hold that
there are de re or de se propositions (or proposition-like entities) 4 which
serve as one term in the dyadic relation which constitutes the form of each
intentional attitude. However, any theory which takes either the de re or
de se form as primary will inevitably include more in the content of a mere
de dicto attitude than is really there. For example, suppose Jim believes
de dicto that the tallest spy, whoever he or she might be, is most likely
Russian. On a theory which takes de se belief as primary, this belief must
turn out to be a variety of de se belief. Yet, clearly it is not; there is no
self-awareness of any sort implied by believing that the tallest spy is RussianP
2 Consider Russell [13].
3 Consider Chisholm [4].
4 One kind of proposition-like entity is the collection of an individual and a property. Some
views of de re attitudes claim that de re awareness is awareness of an object O and a
property P, which we might symbolise as <O,P>. This entity may not be a proposition,
but it is quite propostion-like, for it must include the predication relation between O and
P in order to capture the fact that de re awareness is different from a simple awareness
of both O and P. Once the predication relation is understood to be included in <O,P>,
the only possible reason for thinking that < O , P > is not a proposition is that propositions
cannot include individual objects. Whether this reason is a good one or not, < O , P > is,
minimally, proposition-like.
The same explanation would apply if O were replaced by some special object which
constitutes de se awareness. It is this line of thought behind the claim that any dyadic
theory must hold that each intentional attitude is best analysed as a relation between
an individual and either a proposition or a proposition-like entity.
5 Peter Markie develops a related criticism of Chisholm's Property Theory in [ 10]. Chisholm's
Property Theory is developed in [5]. My argument here is a generalisation of Markie's:
whereas he directs his criticism only against Chisholm's Property Theory, I claim the
same criticism shows that any dyadic theory which takes de se attitudes as primary is
doomed to failure.

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A de re theory does not fare much better. Such a theory will have to find
a de re proposition (or proposition-like entity), one which includes an object

of which some property is predicated, to which a belief that the tallest spy
is Russian can be reduced. 6 Ordinary objects, even the tallest spy should
there be one, will not do; for it is possible to have that belief even if the
believer is the only object which exists. A de re theorist, then, must find
some object which must exist if that belief is held in order to find some
de re proposition in terms of which to explain the de dicto belief in question.
Besides necessary objects, which obviously are not objects of which Jim
believes anything by believing that the tallest spy is Russian, there are only
two: Jim himself, and the actual world. Clearly, though, the content of Jim's
belief does not include either himself or the actual world. To claim that
Jim's belief involves the predication of a property of himself or the actual
world is to impute more to the content of the belief than is actually there.
It would seem, then, that if a dyadic theory can give a unified and adequate
account of the variety of intentional attitudes, it must do so by taking the
de dicto form of each attitude as primary. Initially, there appear two ways
to do this, and the difference appears in considering what Hume and Heimson
believe when each believes what is expressed by the sentence, 'I am wise'.
According to the single proposition theory, both Hume and Heimson believe
the same proposition; according to the mulitple proposition theory, Hume
and Heimson believe different propositons. 7
However, in fact, only the multiple proposition theory is a dyadic theory.
According to the single proposition theory, Hume and Heimson believe the
same proposition when each believes de se what is expressed by 'I am wise'.
Since each de se attitude implies a corresponding de re attitude, the single
proposition theory is committed to the claim that Hume and Heimson each
believe the same proposition when Hume believes de re of Hume (and not
of Heimson) what is expressed by 'I am wise' and Heimson believes de
re of Heimson (and not of Hume) what is expressed by 'I am wise'. Yet,
what makes Heimson's de re belief one about him and not about Hume,
and what makes Hume's belief one about Hume and not about Heimson?
The proposition itself is just as much about each as it is about the other,
for it is the very same proposition which is believed by each. Further, there
need be no difference in the context of each belief, except that one belief
is Hume's and the other is Heimson's. This contextual difference does not
explain why Hume's belief is only about Hume and Heimson's is only about
Heimson unless it is assumed that every de re belief must be about the
person who has the belief, and that assumption is clearly false.
The only available answer, as I see it, is for the single proposition theory
to maintain that Hume believes the proposition in question to be true o f
Those who accept a de re account of the intentional attitudes include Boer and Lycan
[ 1] and Davidson [6].
I borrow this terminology, and much of this discussion of the varieties of problems for
unified dyadic theories other than the haecceity theory, from Peter Markie [1 l]. Sosa
defends the Single PropositionTheory,what he calls the Theory of Perspectives,in [14].

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Hume and Heimson believes the proposition to be true o f Heimson. If this

is so, however, the single proposition theory is not a dyadic theory, for it
now explains some de re beliefs as a relation between a person, a proposition,
and an object. 8
Thus, we are left with the multiple proposition theory as the only remaining
dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, and there is a good argument
for thinking that any such theory is committed to the existence of
perspectivally limited propositions in explaining de se belief. To see this,
suppose Hume believes de se what is expressed by 'I am wise', and Heimson
believes de re of Hume what is expressed by 'he is wise'. If the multiple
proposition theory is not committed to perspectivally limited propositions,
it must be possible for Hume and Heimson to be believing the very same
proposition in the case at hand. So, let us assume that Hume and Heimson
believe the same proposition. This is impossible, though, for if it were true,
we would have no explanation why Hume would respond to a solicitation
for a wise person to step forward and Heimson would not. If persons are
in the same mental states and in the same circumstances, their behaviour
will be the same; yet, Heimson and Hume could be in the same circumstances
and would be in the same mental state (relevant to the solicitation) without
their behaviour being the same, on the hypothesis in question. (Note that
it won't do to answer this objection by saying that Heimson not only believes
what is expressed by 'he is wise', but also what is expressed by 'I am not
him'. If no propositions are perspectivally limited, Hume can believe the
same thing by believing what is expressed by 'he is not me'. Further this
point is perfectly general: any attempt on the part of a mutiple proposition
theorist to distinguish Hume's and Heimson's behaviour on the basis of some
additional mental state is bound to fail as long as it is assumed that the
content of the state not perspectivally limited.) Hence, contrary to our
hypothesis, Heimson cannot believe what Hume believes when Hume believes
what is expressed by 'I am wise', and the same argument can be used to
show that no one else can believe that proposition, either. If the multiple
proposition theory is true, it must be true in virtue of a perspectival limitation
on the propositional contents of de se attitudes.
As I claimed earlier, then, the best hope for a unified dyadic theory of
the intentional attitudes involves a commitment to perspectivally limited
propositions. All other unified dyadic theories face problems which such
theories avoid.
I believe that the haecceity theory has advantages which the other multiple
proposition theories lack which should lead a mutiple proposition theorist
to prefer it to its competitors. If I am right about this, the defect which
I shall show in the haecceity theory is especially important. I shall not,
however, go into the reasons for perferring the haecceity theory to its
alternative multiple proposition theories here, for my intention is to undermine
the haecceity theory and the argument against the haecceity theory can

8 PeterMarkie elaborates this argumentin [11].

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be generalised to these other theories as well. So any reasons for distinguishing

a m o n g multiple proposition theories will be of m i n o r significance, for, I
shall argue, they are a l l mistaken. Further, they are mistaken at the core.
As we have seen, the plausibility of a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes
involves a c o m m i t m e n t to perspectivally limited propositions. It is this feature
of the haecceity theory which cannot be sustained, and the generalisation
of this a r g u m e n t undercuts any theory which incorporates such perspectival
limitation. Let us turn first then to the a r g u m e n t against the haecceity theory.
III. T h e Haecceity Theory and a D i l e m m a
T h e d i l e m m a that the haecceity theory faces arises from the fact that it
implies that there are perspectivally limited propositions. It is not just that
the theory implies that there are such propositions, 9 but rather that haecceities
seem to be c o m p o n e n t s of certain propositions implied by the haecceity
theory which we are all able to understand. If what seems to be the case
is the case, then haecceities are not c o m p o n e n t s of perspectivally limited
propositions. If, however, appearances are deceiving and no haecceity is
a c o m p o n e n t of these propositions, the propositions in question are false,
and hence so is the haecceity theory since it implies these propositions.
Let us e x a m i n e how the d i l e m m a arises. The haecceity theory tells us
that at least each person 1 has a haecceity which is such that any proposition
of which that haecceity is a c o m p o n e n t is one that one and only one person
can grasp. That person is the one w h o has the haecceity in question. Consider,
then, Ronald Reagan. According to the haecceity theory, R e a g a n has a
haecceity, so let us call it 'R'. T h e theory implies several things about R:
that it exists, that only Reagan can grasp any propostition of which R is
a component, etc. Let us consider the second of these claims, namely the
following proposition:

(1) R has the characteristic of being such that Reagan, and only Reagan,
can grasp any proposition of which R is a component.
T h e d i l e m m a which the haecceity theory faces arises when considering any
proposition of the same kind as (1), i.e., any proposition claiming to describe
9 Boer and Lycan argue that the mere fact that the haecceity thoery includes the perspectival
propositions it does shows that the haecceity theory is false [1; pp. 441-443]; I give a
similar argument in [9; pp. 50-51]. Neither of these arguments decisively refutes any
theory committed to perspectivally limited propositions, as Markie shows in [ 11 ].
J0 An interesting question for the haecceity theory is whether everything, or only every cognitive
being capable of self-awareness, has a haecceity. If the theory opts for the former, it
is positing the existence of propositions which are not even possibly grasped by anyone,
for some things are essentially such that they have no self-awareness. If such propositions
are posited, there are other objections the haecceity theory must face. In particular, it
must face the intuition that propositions are intrinsically things capable of being believed
or having some other intentional attitude taken toward them. As far as I can tell, no
untoward consequences arise from denying haecceities (in the special sense defined in
this paper) to all but beings capable of self-awareness. Perhaps it is a happy metaphysical
coincidence that only such beings had haecceities. Or is this happy coincidence a bit of
gerrymandering that makes any success by the haecceity theory in explaining self-awareness
trivial?

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the perspectivally limited nature of any haecceity. Either the haecceity is

part of the proposition in question, or it is not. If it is part of the proposition,
then haecceities are not perspectivally limited, for we are all able to grasp
(1).
It would seem, then, that the haecceity theory is committed to the other
horn of the dilemma, that is to denying that Reagan's haecceity is a component
of (1). On this option, however, (1) is false, as I shall argue. In order to
show this, it is first important to note that, however the haecceity theory
chooses to construe the reference of 'R', it must not pretend that 'R' is only
a description of Reagan's haecceity and not a name of some property. Since,
according to the haecceity theory, there is a unique thing which is Reagan's
haecceity, we can name that thing, and that is just what 'R' is. As far as
I can tell, to insist that 'R' is a description rather than a name assumes
an implausible restriction of naming: namely, that you cannot name anything
with which you are not acquainted. The notion of acquaintance here is either
so loose that anything that we talk about is something with which we are
acquainted (in which case the haecceity theorist cannot maintain that we
are not acquainted with each other's haecceities), or else the principle is
clearly false. We can, for example, name the being in the uterus of a pregnant
woman even though we are not acquainted with it; we can even name the
earliest born baby or babies of 1995 even though no such entity has yet
been conceived.
So, the haecceity theorist cannot maintain his theory by insisting that
'R' is only a description. It would seem that 'R' should be treated as any
other linguistic device which expresses a property. When, for example, 'being
red' occurs in the predicative position, as in 'roses have the property of
being red', 'being red' expresses the property of being red and the proposition
expressed includes the property of being red. When 'being red' or 'redness'
occurs as a subject of a sentence, things do not change much: 'being red'
or 'redness' still expresses or refers to the property of being red, and the
property of being red is included in whatever proposition is expressed by
the sentence in question. Just so, it would seem that the best way to construe
'R' is to take it to either express or refer to a property, a property which
is a component of proposition (1). Since the property in question cannot
be, according to the haecceity theory, the very same property Reagan grasps
when he takes some de se attitude toward himself, the property must be
some property relevantly similar to, but not identical with, the one Reagan
grasps in taking a de se attitude toward himself.
Given this understanding of (1), however, it is not difficult to see that
(1) is false. For it then implies that there is a property, R, which by hypothesis
is not perspectivally limited (because it is not a haecceity), which has the
property of being perspectivally limited. Of course, no property which is
not perspectivally limited has the property of being perspectivally limited,
hence, on this alternative, (1) is false. Since (1) is an implication of the
haecceity theory, on this alternative, the haecceity theory is false as well.
The haecceity theorist might resort to factors regarding individuation to

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The Haecceity Theory and PerspectivalLimitation

answer this objection. He might claim that Reagan's haecceity is not

individuated per se and directly, and hence that there is some individual
concept by which Reagan's haecceity is individuated. This individual concept
is expressed by a complex description, perhaps something like 'the property
which is unique to Reagan and which is such that grasping that property
is necessary and sufficient for self-awareness on the part of Reagan I. If
Reagan's haecceity is individuated in this fashion, then the force of R in
(1) is to be explained by this individual concept: when we use 'R' to name
Reagan's haecceity, the element in the proposition in question which is
expressed by 'R' is the individual concept in question. Hence, even though
'R' may be a name and not a definite description, the propositional element
is just the sort of element which would have been expressed were it a definite
description. Finally, if an individual concept is the propositional element
expressed by 'R', no dilemma arises on the basis of (1), for all it implies
is that the property which is unique to Reagan and involved in his selfawareness is such that it is perspectivally limited.
There are several reasons for being dissatisfied with this response. The
first has to do with the motivation for replacing ordinary names with definite
descriptions. By doing so, we are able to explain away our apparent
acquaintance with remote objects, such as historical figures, by replacing
names such as 'Socrates' with predicative expressions and either variables
or perhaps logically proper names. The point of such analyses is that it
is assumed that our acquaintance with properties, which are the propositional
elements expressed by predicative expressions, is not infected by the same
perplexity that infects our apparent acquaintance with now dead or distant
individuals. If the same puzzles infect the realm of properties, it is not clear
what can be gained by replacing names with definite descriptions. Since
haecceities are properties, there would seem to be a general methodological
presumption that names for them secure their presence in the propositions
expressed.
This point can be pressed home a bit more forcefully. There are distinctions
within the realm of properties concerning the mode of access we have to
properties,just as there are distinctions within the realm of objects concerning
the mode of access we have to them. Some objects are objects of direct
awareness and some are not; some properties are objects of direct awareness
and some are not. If we impose the project of reductive analysis on all
sentences involving terms which refer to anything but objects of direct
awareness, the complications which will result will be immense for we will
have to replace all terms expressing anything of which we are not directly
aware with terms expressing things of which we are directly aware. Further,
these complications are intrinsically problematic because the project of
reductive analysis is to show what we are really thinking about when we
think about things with which we are not directly aware. The more
complicated the analysis becomes, the less plausible such an account is of
the contents of our thoughts.
There is a worse problem, however. Even if haecceities are not individuated

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per se or directly, it does not follow that they are not components of the

propositions in question. When it is granted that some individual concept

is employed in individuating any object, all that follows about the proposition
in question is that it contains the individual concept in question; nothing
at all follows about whether the object is a component of the proposition
as well. Further, in the present case of the haecceity theory, there are plausible
grounds for thinking that replacing the heacceity with the individual concept
cannot succeed. For it is an informative proposition, for any individual concept
that might be employed to individuate Reagan's haecceity, that Reagan's
haecceity is characterized by that individual concept. Yet, if the individual
concept replaces Reagan's haecceity in the proposition expressed by this
claim, we generate the uninformative claim that a certain individual concept
is characterized by that same individual concept. Hence, replacement of
haecceities by individual concepts not only does not follow from facts about
individuation, but also generates paradoxes which show that such replacement
cannot be an accurate description of what occurs.
If one must hold a dyadic theory of the intentional attitudes, a more plausible
account of the relation between individuation and the components of
propositions is the following. When an object or property is not individuated
per se or directly, some individual concept which accounts for the means
of individuation is a component of the proposition in question. The rest
of the account of the components of propositions remains unaffected: if
objects are components of some propositions, then the fact that an object
is individuated v/a an individual concept does not prevent the object from
being a propositional component; if a property is a component of some
propositions, then the mere fact that such a property is individuated via
an individual concept does not prevent that property from being a part of
the proposition in question. (I shall argue in a moment that one should
not accept a dyadic theory, and thus I do not believe this account to be
the correct account of the relation between individuation and propositional
content; all I mean to imply is that it is a better account than the one which
I put in the mouth of the haecceity theorist above.)
We can see, then, that facts about individuation do not enable the haecceity
theory to defend the view that Reagan's haecceity is not a component of
(1) or that there is not some property referred to or expressed by 'R' which
is a component of (1). However such a property is individuated, it still must
be part of (1). Yet, if such a property is a component of (1), then, whether
some individual concept should also be thought of as part of (1), the dilemma
remains for the haecceity theory. The haecceity theory implies a proposition
about each person, to the effect that that person has a perspectivally limited
haecceity, and all such propositions are false. As is obvious, if a theory
implies a false proposition, the theory is false as well.
It should be pointed out that a natural way to account for the facts about
individuation cited above takes us away from a dyadic theory. These facts
about individuation concern a distinction which can be put in a variety of
ways. The distinction may be between: conceiving of versus thinking about

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304

The Haecceity Theory and Perspectival Limitation

a property, directly grasping a property be referring to it versus indirectly

grasping a property through some description, knowledge by direct
acquaintance versus knowledge by discription. Which of these ways of
drawing the distinction is best, or whether there is one or more than one
distinction here, is not important. What is important is that these distinctions
suggest that it is one thing to have a certain propositional content to some
intentional attitude, and it is quite another thing to have come to, or accessed,
that propositional content in a certain fashion. We might come to the content
in question by employing some name which functions as a purely referential
device, or perhaps by some description; we might believe something about
Hume, using his name, which he would believe about himself only using
an indexical. We might come to believe a proposition by individuating a
property employing some individual concept where someone else may come
to believe that same propositional content by individuating that property
in some other way, either by a different individual concept by individuating
theproperty per se and directly. These points, as noted above, cannot help
the haecceity theory; instead, they lead us toward a triadic theory of belief
which holds that each intentional attitude is best analysed as a relation between
a person, a proposition, and some third thing, perhaps a route of empistemic
access to the proposition. ~
IV. Conclusion
So, the haecceity theory must be abandoned. Its theoretical commitments
include claims which imply propositions like (1). Yet, no propositions like
(1) is compatible with the haecceity theory, hence that theory must be false.
Further, if my arguments are correct, all other versions of a unified dyadic
theory of the intentional attitudes, other than the mulitple propositions theory,
are problematic as well. So, the failure of the haecceity theory signals the
end of any hope for a successful unified dyadic theory of the intentional
attitudes unless some other multiple proposition theory can be successful.
That no multiple proposition theory can be successful can be seen by
noting that a more general conclusion can also be generated from our
discussion. Any theory which claims that any proposition is limited in such
a way that not all those who are able to understand the theory are able
to grasp such propositions is subject to the same dilemma. For, presumably,
any theory making such a claim will tell us the nature of these propositions
(otherwise it is hard to imagine what role such propositions could play in
the theory). As soon as the nature of such perspectivally limited propositions
is described, some component of such propositions will be isolable which
is responsible for the perspectival limitation of the propositions in question.
When the responsible component is isolated, however, some proposition will
be implied which can be grasped by all and which contains this component
and of which perspectival limitation is predicated. As soon as such a
11

For more in a triadic theoryof intentionalattitudes,see John Perry [12] and David Kaplan
[7, 8].

Jonathan L Kvanvig

305

proposition is implied, however, the above dilemma arises which shows that
the theory in question must be false.
The general conclusion, then, is that no philosophical theory can employ
perspectivally limited propositions as part of an account of some data which
calls for explanation. Since theories which imply such propositions are the
last best hope for a unified dyadic theory, the lesson to be learned is that
we turn our attention to other theories of the intentional attitudes.~2

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Texas A & M University

Received October 1987

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12

1 wish to express my appreciation to several persons who read and commented on previous
drafts of this paper. They are: Robert Burch, Andrew Cling, Peter Markie, Hugh McCann,
and Christopher Menzel.