THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

By
Chanoch Jacobsen
Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Mananagement
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Haifa, Israel
and
Robert J. House
The Wharton School
The University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA
(Revised: Jan 26, 1999)

. . . leadership, whether personal or impersonal, makes all the difference in the way a system gets
organized. . . . Culture is what allows individual actors to stand apart from leaders, the way children
eventually weaken their attachment to caregivers."
Thomas Spence Smith, Strong Interaction, 1992, p. 197.

INTRODUCTION
Max Weber introduced the concept of charisma to account for the process by which radical
change is brought about and legitimized in societies and organizations (Weber, 1922; 1947;
1968).. Since Weber, the sociological literature on charisma has attended to the introduction and
routinization of radical change induced by charismatic leaders societies (Bendix, 1985; Dow,
1969; Eisenstadt, 1968; Friedland, 1964; Trice and Beyer, 1986). Several sociologically oriented
scholars argue that charismatic leadership can also emerge and be effective in formal, complex
organizations (Dow, 1969; Shils, 1965; Beetham, 1974; Bryman, 1992; Etzioni, 1961).
In the recent past, a body of literature complementary to the Weberian and post-Weberian
literature has emerged. Since the mid-1970's, social psychologically oriented students of
organizational behavior have sought to explain how leaders influence change in formal
organizations, recognizing the fact that formal organizations must often make major changes in
strategies, structural forms, cultures and practices in order to adapt to changing technological
demands and compete effectively with international competition. This new orientation
represents a major paradigm shift in the psychologically oriented leadership research and theory.
Attention was shifted from an emphasis on normal supervisory and managerial behavior to an
emphasis on exceptional leaders who have extraordinary effects on followers and social systems.
It was found that such leaders frequently have powerful effects on follower affective states as

3
well as improved organizational performance. Such leadership is referred to in this new genre of
theory as either charismatic (House, 1977; Conger and Kanungo, 1987), transformational (Burns,
1978; Bass, 1985), inspirational (Yukl and Van Fleet, 1982) or visionary (Bennis and Nanus,
1985; Sashkin, 1988).
Theoretically, such leaders affect followers in ways that are quantitatively greater than, and
qualitatively different from the effects specified in past theories. As of the present datemore that
one hundred empirical investigations of this new genre of theory have been conducted. These
tests have employed a wide variety of methods and have been based on widely varying samples.
With surprising consistency this new genre of leadership theory has been supported. Further, the
amount of variance in the dependent variables accounted for has consistently ranged between 12
and 50 percent, frequently in the neighborhood of 25 percent. These effects generally exceed the
variance accounted for by earlier theories which was usually 10 percent or less. (See House and
Shamir, 1993; Bass and Avolio, 1993; Lowe, Kroeck, and Sivasubramaniam 1996, and House
and Aditya, 1997, for reviews of empirical studies).
We refer to this general class of theory as the neocharismatic leadership paradigm. This
title is chosen for three reasons. First, this new genre of theory is consistent with the Weberian
conceptualization of charisma. Neocharismatic theory asserts that exceptionally effective leaders
are visionary, offer innovative solutions to major social problems, stand for nonconservative if
not radical change, generally emerge and are more effective under conditions of social stress and
crisis, and induce significant social and organizational changes which are based on ideological
values. Second, charismatic behavior (visionary, change oriented, nonconservative) is either
implicitly or explicitly a central concept in all of the theories of this paradigm. Third, the term
charisma has had an enduring and honorable tradition in the sociological literature.

4
We believe the assertions of the neocharismatic paradigm are compatible with, and
complementary to, the Weberian and post-Weberian perspectives of charismatic leadership
(Gerth and Mills, 1946; Weber, 1947; Friedland, 1964; Shils, 1965; Eisenstadt, 1968; Dow,
1969; Etzioni, 1961;Willner, 1984; Bendix, 1985; Glassman and Swatos, 1985). We also
believe that the various versions of the neocharismatic paradigm and the Weberian and postWeberian perspectives can be combined to yield a theory capable of explaining the rise and
decline, or the routinization of charismatic leadership.
In this paper we advance such a theory. We refer to the theory as the Theory of the Rise
and Decline of Charismatic Leadership, or in more abbreviated form, the Rise-Decline Theory of
Charisma. This theory includes a description of the social conditions which facilitate the
emergence and effectiveness of charismatic leaders, the behaviors and personality characteristics
that distinguish charismatic leaders from others, their psychological effects on followers, their
sociological effects on normative social arrangements of the collectives they lead, and the
process of routinization of the charismatic vision and relationship.
The literature on which we draw consists of the most frequently cited, and the most
influential writings in the sociological, political science, and psychological literatures. It is our
hope that this theory will bring some coherence to these diverse literatures by integrating the
Weberian and post-Weberian sociological and the neocharismatic psychological perspectives on
charismatic leadership. It is also our hope that this theory will provide some guidance for future
research, and that it will stimulate a broader concern with the charismatic leadership
phenomenon and its effects. In the following two sections we briefly summarize the sociological
(Weberian and post-Weberian) and the social psychological (neocharismatic) perspectives of
charismatic leadership. We then advance the Theory of the Rise and Decline of Charismatic
Leadership.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

For most of the time since Max Weber introduced the concept into modern sociology,
students of charisma have considered it within the contexts of political sociology or the
sociology of religion. Such a preoccupation is understandable, as charismatic leaders recorded in
history have tended to be either political, military, or religious leaders. Accordingly, most of the
empirical work conducted by sociologists consists of either case studies or comparative analyses
of the times and activities of persons reputed to have been charismatic leaders. (For example,
see Willner and Willner, 1984; Apter, 1968; Jones and Asnervits, 1975). As a result of this
historical orientation, the major focus has been, and remains, the social contingencies that give
rise to charismatic leadership and the process by which a leader's personal charisma is or is not
routinized into a legitimate social order (Onnen, 1987; Eisenstadt, 1968; Dow, 1969).
According to the sociological perspective charismatic leadership is born out of social
crises. Charismatic leaders emerge under conditions in which potential followers have
extraordinary need deprivation due to the existence of the crisis (Weber, 1968; Camic, 1980).
Under such conditions potential followers of emergent charismatic leaders suffer either stress,
alienation, loss of meaning in life, or feelings of impotence to deal with the crisis they face.
Although most scholars agree that crisis facilitates the emergence and effectiveness of
charismatic leaders there is some controversy as to or not social crisis is a necessary condition
for the emergence of charismatic leadership.
According to the Weberian perspective, if an individual emerges who offers a solution to
the social crisis faced by potential followers, and if that individual is seen as capable of
delivering potential followers from their "extraordinary needs," that deliverance will be
attributed to a special gift, perhaps even a gift endowed by divinity. The force of the leader's

6
personality, and the attributions of potential followers result in the emergence of the potential
leader as a charismatic leader .
The leader articulates a vision. to which followers have a right. The vision is made
ideological -by asserting that the attainment of the vision is a moral right of the follows. This
ideology, reflecting both latent and manifest values of followers, gives meaning to the lives of
followers. Charismatic visions embrace end-values such as peace, equality, freedom, honesty,
respect, human dignity, human rights, independence from domination, and individual and
collective efficacy. Such end-values are self sufficient and cannot be exchanged for pragmatic
values such as wealth or economic security. Mullin (1992) states that end-values have a
transcendent quality in that they concern that which goes beyond what can be logically explained
by self-interest alone. "The follower's response is freely given, not in exchange for any extrinsic
return, though intrinsic satisfaction may result" Mullin, 1992, p.5). ".. further, for charismatic
followers, expectancies and instrumentalities are operational only when relevant to achievement
of the end-value" (p.31). Thus charismatic leaders appeal to followers' manifest and latent endvalues, draw and communicate new conclusions concerning the existing nature of the situation,
and induce change in situation-specific norms. As a result of the behavior of the charismatic
leader, in interaction withsituational social demands, a movement is born.
The movement may endure for as long as the charismatic leader continues to provide
leadership and the movement appears to be gaining ground. Upon the demise or departure of the
leader the movement may continue or it may disband. If the vision is successfully attained, or if
the movement appears to be succeeding, however modestly, and if the leader or the leader's
immediate cadre routinize the values inherent in the vision, the movement and the collective will
likely endure (Weber, 1947; Trice and Beyer, 1986).

7
Routinization of charisma involves creation and maintenance of symbols, myths, rites,
rituals and ceremonies which reflect the values inherent in the vision. If the mission succeeds, but
routinization does not take place then the movement initiated by the leader will not endure, at least
not as initially envisioned by the leader and the early joiners. Thus, it is possible for goal
displacement to set in, and for the collective, especially if formally organized, to continue in quest
of another vision. An example of such displacement is the substitution of the United Appeals goals
for the organization which was originally founded to conduct the March of Dimes to assist victims
of polio (Sills, 1957).
Note that the sociological perspective says little about the behavior of charismatic leaders,
their personality, their interaction with their followers, or their psychological impact on followers.
The neocharismatic perspective addresses these concerns.
RECENT ADVANCES IN CHARISMATIC THEORY:
THE NEOCHARISMATIC PERSPECTIVE
In the last two decades there has been an explosion of both theoretical (House, 1977; Bass,
1985; Bennis and Nanus, 1985; Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Sashkin, 1988; Bryman, 1992;
Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993) and empirical inquiry (Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam,
1996; House and Aditya, 1998) into the charismatic leadership phenomena. Psychologically
oriented students of leadership have addressed concerns about the personality characteristics,
behavior and effects of charismatic leaders. At least 100 empirical studies have been published
since about 1980.
This more recent organizational behavior literature offers several complementary extensions
of Weberian and post-Weberian theory. First, the nature of the social conditions that induce
followers' susceptibility to charismatic influence has been given additional theoretical thought and
has been empirically investigated. Consistent with the theoretical positions of Weber and Camic
the more recent empirical studies have shown that it is under conditions of stress and uncertainty

8
that charismatic leaders emerge and are most effective (House, Spangler and Woyke, 1991; Pillai
and Meindl, 1991; House, Delbecq and Taris, 1998; Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam,
1998).
Second, in agreement with sociological interpretations, the psychologically oriented studies
have also demonstrated that charismatic leadership can emerge and be effective in secular
organizations - even rather normal business organizations (Howell and Higgins, 1990; Curphy,
1990; Hater and Bass, 1988; Howell and Avolio, 1993; Koene, Pennings and Schreuder, 1993;
Koh, Terborg and Steers, 1991; Roberts, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 1986; Waldman, Ramirez, House
and Puranam, 1999), Third, collectively, the more recent empirical investigations suggest that it is
the coincidence of an extraordinary personality with extraordinary social conditions that gives rise
to that sequence of events, leader behaviors and follower responses which we associate with
charismatic leadership (House, Spangler and Woyke, 1991; Pillai and Meindl, 1991; House,
Delbecq and Taris, 1998; Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam, 1999).
A recent summary of the empirical evidence has recently been provided by (Fiol, Harris and
House, 1999). These authors state
The theories of the neo-charismatic paradigm have been subjected to more than
one hundred empirical tests. Collectively, the empirical findings demonstrate
with surprising consistency that leaders described as charismatic,
transformational, or visionary cause followers to become highly committed to the
leaders mission, to make significant personal sacrifices in the interest of the
mission, and to perform above and beyond the call of duty. The findings also
demonstrate that such leaders have positive effects on their organizations and
followers, with effect sizes ranging from .35 to .50 for organizational
performance effects, and from .40 to .80 for effects on follower satisfaction and
organizational identification and commitment.
A recent meta-analysis by Lowe, Kroeck and Sivasubramaniam (1996) of 32
correlations between leader charisma as measured by the Bass (1985)
Multifaceted Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) and independent ratings of leader
effectiveness demonstrated a mean corrected correlation of .35. A second
meta-analysis by these authors, based on 15 correlations between charisma
and subordinates' ratings of their superiors' effectiveness, demonstrated a
corrected correlation of .81. Corrected correlations between criterion variables
and charisma were higher than corrected correlations between criterion
variables and measures of (leader) intellectual stimulation, individualized

9
consideration, contingent reward, and management by exception. The effect
sizes are usually at the lower ends of these ranges in studies that did not control
for environmental effects (Lowe et al., 1996), and at the upper ends of these
ranges under conditions of environmental threat, crisis, or uncertainty (House et
al., 1991; Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam, 1999).
Such findings have been demonstrated at several levels of analysis, including
dyads (Howell and Frost, 1989), small informal groups (Howell and Higgins,
1990; Pillai and Meindl, 1991), formal work units (Curphy, 1992; Hater and Bass,
1988), major sub-units of large complex organizations (Howell and Avolio, 1993;
Koene, Pennings and Schreuder, 1993), overall performance of complex
organizations (Koh, Terborg and Steers, 1991; Roberts, 1985; Trice and Beyer,
1986; Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam, 1999), and U.S. presidential
administrations (House et al, 1991; Simonton, 1987).
The evidence supporting this genre of theory is also derived from a wide variety
of samples, including informal leaders of task groups (Howell and Higgins,
1990), military officers (Bass, 1985), educational administrators (Koh, Terborg
and Steers, 1991), supervisors (Hater and Bass, 1988), middle managers
(Howell and Avolio, 1993), subjects in laboratory experiments (Howell and Frost,
1989), U.S. presidents (House et al., 1991), chief executive officers of Fortune
500 firms (Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam, 1999), high-level
executives of large Canadian firms (Javidan and Carl, 1997), Canadian
government agencies (Javidan and Carl, 1997), and Egyptian firms (Messallam
and House, 1997).
The evidence shows that the effects of charismatic leader behaviors are rather
widely generalizable in the United States and that they may well generalize
across cultures. For instance, studies based on the MLQ charisma scale (Bass
and Avolio, 1989) have demonstrated similar findings in India (Pereira, 1987),
Singapore (Koh, Terborg and Steers, 1991), The Netherlands (Koene et al.,
1993), China and Japan (Bass, 1997), Germany (Geyer and Steyrer, 1994), and
Canada (Javidan and Carl, 1997). Finally, a recent cross-cultural study has
shown that the leader behaviors of the neo-charismatic leadership paradigm are
universally included as prototypical behaviors of highly effective organizational
leaders, having ratings consistently above six on a seven-point scale of
attributed effectiveness for all 60 countries studied (House, Hanges, RuizQuintanilla et al, 1998).

It should also be added that the methods employed in several of the studies reviewed by Fiol
et al. (1999) are different from the methods most frequently used by sociologists in the study of
charisma. Many of the more recent studies are based on quantitative data and include longitudinal
survey field research (Hater and Bass 1988; Howell and Higgins, 1990; Koene, Pennings, and
Schreuder, 1991; Curphy, 1992; Howell and Avolio, 1993; Keller, 1992), controlled laboratory
experimentation (Howell and Frost, 1989; Pillai and Meindl, 1991; Kirkpatrick, 1992). While
quantitative analysis is the more common among the recent studies there have also been studies

10
based on more traditional sociological methods such as case study (Roberts, 1985; Roberts and
Bradley, 1988), participant observation (Roberts, 1985; Trice and Beyer, 1986; Roberts and
Bradley, 1988), and archival analyses (House et al., 1991).
In contrast to sociological treatments of charisma, the psychological literature places
increased emphasis on the generic behaviors and personality characteristics of charismatic leaders,
and sources of stress experienced by followers (House, 1977; House et al., 1991). Despite the
differences in focus and methodology, the sociological and psychological approaches do not
contradict each other. Rather, they complement one another, being concerned with different
aspects of charismatic phenomena. Weber, and those who followed his lead, generally agree that
charismatic leaders have distinctive personalities and exhibit characteristic types of behavior.
Psychologically oriented students of leadership and organizational behavior would hardly deny that
the emergence and rise of charismatic leaders, and the impact they have on their followers and
member commitment, also have significant consequences for organizational performance, structure
and change. In fact, it is the postulated impact of charismatic leaders on organizational
performance that aroused the current interest in charisma as an element of transformational
leadership in complex formal organizations (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; 1997).
A BRIEF SUMMARY OF NEOCHARISMATIC THEORY
In this section we briefly review that major assertions of the theories of the Neocharismatic
Paradigm.
Social Conditions.
Weber (l947) and Camic (1980) argue that charismatic leaders emerge in times of social
crisis, when potential followers are under severe stress from perceived threat, oppression, or
adverse economic or social conditions. As pointed out by Camic (1980), under such conditions
followers experience a significant need deprivation, a loss of subjective meaning in their lives,

11
which they believe they cannot satisfy by themselves. According to neocharismatic theory (House
and Shamir, 1993), charismatic leaders offer relief from this need deprivation by interpreting the
situation in terms of followers' needs and subjective values, and infusing movements,
organizations, or work with meaningfulness and moral purpose for those involved. There is
substantial evidence for this theoretical assertion.

Studies by Halpin (1954), Mulder and

Stemerding (1963), Mulder, Ritsema van Eck, and de Jong (1970); and Sales (1972), House et al.
(1991), Roberts (1985), and Pillai and Meindl (1991) have consistently shown that under
conditions of threat and stress followers seek and respond positively to individuals who are bold,
confident, and appear to have clear solutions to existing social problems. The latter three studies
cited deal specifically with the interaction of social stress and charismatic behavior as a predictor
of emergence, acceptance, and effectiveness of charismatic leaders.
Shamir, et al. (1993) have extended the theory by more precisely defining the social
conditions under which charismatic leaders are likely to emerge and be effective. They are
situations in which the conventional calculus of transactional leadership (either bureaucratic or
patriarchal) does not apply because they have one or more of the following four characteristics:
(i) The situation is perceived to threaten important moral values, (ii) there is an unclear and
ambiguous performance-goal accomplishment relationship, (iii) the situation is unstable, and (iv)
requires exceptional effort.
Consistent with the second and third conditions specified by Shamir et al. (1993),
Waldman et al. (1999) have shown that the effect of charismatic leadership on organizational
performance is contingent on whether or not the environment of the organization is perceived as
uncertain and unstable. Specifically, they found that in a sample of 48 large Fortune 500
organizations, charismatic leadership measured in 1989 was only weakly predictive of the
financial performance of these firms through 1993. However, when the firms were divided into

12
those perceived by the top executives to be in either uncertain or certain environments, it was
found that charisma predicted performance only for the firms facing perceived environmental
uncertainty.
Generic Charismatic Leader Behaviors.
The theories of the neo-charismatic leadership paradigm have specified a set of leader
behaviors thought to be generic to charismatic leadership. The specific leader behaviors consist
of articulation of an ideological goal and an implied set of moral values, communication of high
performance expectations of followers, demonstration of a high degree of confidence in
followers, positive presentation of self to important constituents, engaging in persuasive
communication by the use of frame alignment, emphasizing value and collective identification,
taking extraordinary risks, and making substantial personal sacrifices in the interest of the
charismatic mission (House and Shamir, 1993).
There is substantial evidence that the above theoretical leader behaviors have strong
positive effects on followers, organizations, and organizational subunits. These behaviors have
been shown to be predictive of follower performance and satisfaction in two laboratory
experiments (Howell and Frost, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1992), and in organizational performance in
five longitudinal field studies (Keller, 1992; Koene, Pennings, and Schreuder, 1991; Curphy,
1992; Howell and Avolio, 1993; Waldman et al., 1998).
The theoretical charismatic leader behaviors have been shown to be concurrently
correlated with various measures of follower satisfaction and trust (Podsakoff et al, 1990; House
et. al., 1991; Koh, Terborg and Steers, 1991; Smith, 1992), organizational citizenship behavior
(Podsakoff, et al, 1990), judgements of CEO effectiveness (Klemp and McCllelland, 1986;
House et al., 1991; House, Delbecq and Taris, 1998), effectiveness of military combat and
noncombat infantry squadrons Yukl and Van Fleet (1982), attributions of U.S. presidential

13
greatness by present day political scientists (House, Woycke, and Fodor, 1988), and objective
measures of U.S. presidential effectiveness (House et al., 1991).
Personality Characteristics
Recent psychologically oriented theory specifies a set of personality characteristics that
differentiate charismatic leaders from other leaders. According to current psychological theory
(House and Shamir, 1993), charismatic leaders are distinguished from others by possessing an
unusual capacity to experience passion, extraordinary self confidence, persistence,
determination, and optimism. These personality characteristics are theoretically required of
charismatic leaders because the visions which they articulate call for significant, if not radical,
change in the status quo. Elite members of the established social order possess substantial power
to suppress and punish those who challenge the status quo. Thus the above leader personality
characteristics are necessary to sustain charismatic leadership in the face of opposition, and
possible persecution and severe hardship. Studies by Smith (1982), House et al. (1991), Howell
and Higgins (1990) support this theoretical position.
Motives
Of particular interest is McClelland's Leader Motive Profile Theory (McClelland, 1985).
The combination of high unconscious needs for power (social influence), low need for affiliation,
and high concern for the moral use of power (impulse control) is referred to by McClelland as
the Leader Motive Profile (LMP). LMP theory asserts that this profile differentiates highly
effective leaders from others. Following is the underlying rationale for this assertion. The first
of these motives, high need for social influence is theoretically required for outstanding
leadership because such leadership requires that the leader be willing to exercise influence and
persistence in the face of opposition, and because outstanding leaders usually take upon
themselves personal responsibility for accomplishment of difficult objectives. Satisfaction

14
derived from the assertion of social influence theoretically reinforces and therefore sustains
leaders in the face of obstacles, hardship, and opposition.
The second motive specified by LMP theory, a low need for affiliation, theoretically
allows leaders to remain socially distant and emotionally unattached to their followers. Having a
high need for affiliation motivates individuals to form intimate relationships with subordinates
and thus results in less monitoring of behavior, hesitancy to use discipline when necessary, and
delegation of authority and administration of rewards on the basis of favoritism rather than
objective performance. The dysfunctions of highly affiliative relationships between leader and
followers is illustrated in President Harding's statement "It's not my enemies who cause me
problems it's my goddam friends (whom he placed in high office) I can't control." The third
motive of the leader motive profile, a strong concern for the moral use of power, is theoretically
a substantial asset to leaders because this concern is reflected in altruist behavior, personally
disciplined self control, and a strong collective, as opposed to self aggrandizing, orientation
(McClelland, 1985).
There is a small body of empirical literature relevant to LMP Theory. In a longitudinal
study of naval officers Winter (1978) found the leader motive profile was predictive of long term
success in administrative, nontechnical positions. McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) replicated
Winter's findings with predictions of success of managers sixteen years after entry level manager
motives were measured.. McClelland and Burnham (1976) found that managers of sales units in
a large firm who had leader motive profiles had significantly more satisfied employees. Further,
their employees reported that their organizational units had more supportive, risk oriented, and
motivational climates than units managed by managers who did not have the leader motive
profile.

15
While the leaders studied by these investigators were not all operationally defined as
charismatic, they clearly have some claim to unusual effectiveness, thus suggesting that the
personality characteristics that differentiate them from others may also differentiate charismatic
from noncharismatic leaders. This is precisely what was found by House et al. (1991) and
Spangler and House (1991). The former investigators found that the leader motive profiles of
chief executives were associated with CEO charismatic behaviors and followers satisfaction,
motivation, organizational commitment, and perceptions of organizational effectiveness. The
latter investigators found that the leader motive profiles of chief executives, measured at the time
of inaugeration, were predictive of U.S. presidential charisma and objective measure of
presidential effectiveness throughout their first term. Second terms were not studied.
Leader Effects
The effects of charismatic leaders can be parsimoniously classified into three categories.
First, Camic (1980) argued that charismatic leaders relieve followers from subjective experiences
of stress and alienation. Second, Bass (1985), Bennis and Nanus (1985), Tichy and Devana
(1986), and Sashkin (1988) assert that such leaders have a positive transforming effect on the
organizations that they lead as well as on their followers. More specifically, charismatic leaders
are claimed to transform the strategies, the structural form, the practices, and the culture of
organizations to fit the demands of their environments and to better achieve organizational goals.
Third, House (1977), Burns (1978), and Bass (1985) proposed that such leaders motivate
followers to transcend their own self-interests for the sake of the team, the organization or the
larger collectivity. Fourth, Burns (1978) claimed that such leaders raise followers to higher
levels of morality, to "more principled levels of judgement" (p. 455).
There is substantial evidence that charismatic leaders do indeed have the first three
effects. Longitudinal research by Bass and his associates demonstrate that charismatic leader

16
behavior is predictive of subsequent economic performance of supermarkets (Koene, Pennings,
and Schreuder, 1991), autonomous work units in an insurance company (Howell and Avolio,
1993), cost and schedule performance of research and development departments (Keller, 1992),
and measures of military squadron performance and military cadet academic performance
(Curphy, 1992).
Various measures of charismatic leader behaviors are also concurrently associated with
positive ratings of school climate and aggregate academic performance of students (Koh, Steers,
and Terborg, 1991), team performance (Bass, Avolio, Waldman and Einstein, 1988), and high
levels of effort, effectiveness, and satisfaction of followers (Curphy, 1992), political scientists
ratings of U.S. presidential greatness and charisma (House, Woycke, and Fodor, 1988), and
objective measures of U.S. presidential performance (House et al., 1991). Thus the first three
postulated effects of charismatic leaders are rather well established. Whether such leaders raise
followers to higher levels of morality, and to "more principled levels of judgement" remains to
be investigated.
Motivational Processes
Extant theories of charismatic leadership are either silent with respect to the motivational
processes by which leaders affect follower motivation, or they rest on individualistic and
hedonistic theories of motivation. Therefore they cannot account for self-sacrificial and
collectively oriented follower behavior. In this section we describe motivational processes which
we believe address these deficiencies in current theory (Shamirs, House and Arrthur, 1993).
According to Shamir et al. (1993) and House and Shamir (1993) the leader behaviors
specified above, when performed consistently and authentically by leaders, theoretically activate
seven core motivational processes on the part of followers: (I) Instilling faith in a better future
which is assumed to be a motivational and satisfying condition by articulating a highly valued

17
vision of the future and expressing confidence in the attainment of the vision, (ii) Increasing the
intrinsic valence (attraction) of effort by emphasizing the symbolic and expressive aspects fo of
the effort. (iii) increasing effort-accomplishment expectancies by enhancing followers specific
task related self efficacy and collective . efficacy perceptions. This is accomplished by
expressing high performance expectations of followers and confidence in their ability to meet
such expectations. (iv) increasing followors more general sense of self esteem and self worth.
and by emphasizing linkages between efforts and important values held by followers, (iv) (v)
increasing the intrinsic valence of goal accomplishment by linking goals to an ideological vision
which appeal to followers, (vi) creating internalized personal commitment by causing followers
to identify with the vision and the collective. This is accomplished by articulation of a value
laden vision, and by setting personal examples of the values inherent in the vision. In so doing ,
charismatic leaders increase the salience of the values and the collective, and thus encourage
internalization of the values and identification with, and commitment to, the collective, (vii)
arousing motives relevant to the persuit of the vision. Under conditions of motive arousal
individuals pursue goals more vigorously, increasingly employ self regulatory behavior such as
goal setting, calculation of risks, and use of feedback and self corrective behavior (Atkinson and
McClelland, 1948). Such behavior has been shown to facilitate goal accomplishment (Bandura,
1986).
In summary, neocharismatic perspective specifies the social conditions under which
charismatic leaders emerge and are effective, the personality characteristics and behaviors of
charismatic leaders, the kind of effects charismatic leaders have on others, and the motivational
processes by which charismatic leader behavior affects individual and collective behavior. Thus,
as we show below, the neocharismatic perspective provides essential theoretical linkages
implicated in the charismatic process that were previously lacking.

18
CONCLUSION: EXTANT THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The available empirical evidence supports earlier arguments that charismatic leaders can
and do emerge in organizational settings as well as in more macro settings such as religious and
political movements. Available evidence also supports the Weberian argument that charismatic
leadership emergence and its effectiveness is facilitated by crises and threat experienced by
potential followers. Finally, the empirical evidence provides support for the more recently
developed neocharismatic theories relevant to leadership of complex formal organizations.
Clearly, however, neither approach covers the phenomenon in its entirety, and the situation
calls for a conceptual integration. The time seems ripe to work toward the development of one
comprehensive theory to explicate not only the dynamics whereby a charismatic leader arouses
people and inspires them to special efforts and sacrifices, but also the feedback processes
between charismatic leader behavior, follower reactions, and the surrounding social structure.
By integrating macro-sociological scholarship with micro-psychological research findings we
should be able to explain the entire phenomenon more satisfactorily than heretofore. The
following section presents our attempt at such an integration.
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERS: THE GENRIC PROCESS
In this section we advance a theory that specifies the generic processes by which
charismatic leaders and movements emerge, become institutionalized and thereby stabilized, or
decline. A summary of the theoretical argument, as we have teased it out of the literature, is
shown graphically in Figure 1.
(Figure 1 about here)
Weber (1968:1111) made the point that a charismatic leader is likely to appear when social
conditions are out of the ordinary. As described above, more recently, Shamir et al. (1993) have
specified more precisely the conditions that are conducive to the emergence of charismatic

19
leadership. Following Camic (1980) we interpret the conditions of social stress articulated by
Weber (1947) and Burns (1978) to be conditions which are subjectively perceived as loss of
meaning in life by followers. The conditions suggested by Shamir et al. (1993) are interpreted as
conditions which are stressful to followers because of their threat to the subjective values held by
followers and the uncertainty faced by followers with respect to the resolution of such threat.
Although Shamir et al. do not say so explicitly, we may take it that the more of these
characteristics that are present in a situation, the more conducive will that situation be to
charismatic leadership.
The presence of these situational characteristics, however, is no guarantee that a
charismatic leader will appear. Many social situations seem to cry out for a charismatic leader
(Bendix, 1985), but of course such leaders do not appear on demand. Conversely, it is possible
that charismatic leaders may emerge in situations which show few or none of these
characteristics. Such leaders typically articulate moral, ideological, or other value implications
of a situation for a particular constituency, thereby making the socially constructed reality of that
constituency conducive to their charisma. Thus, while the objective characteristics of situational
conduciveness may make the emergence of charismatic leadership more likely, it is also possible
that charismatic leaders create conditions conducive to their emergence by articulating a vision
and values which appeal to the subjective meaning of potential followers, and making
deficiencies in the current situation salient to followers. It therefore remains an empirical
question as to whether or not objectively stressful social conditions are a necessary condition for
the emergence and effectiveness of charismatic leaders.
A charismatic personality, on the other hand, is of course a necessary condition. The
studies reviewed above show that the typical personality profile of charismatic leaders has high
scores on self-confidence and power motivation, and low scores on affiliation motivation, with

20
affiliation motivation scores lower than power motivation scores (McClelland and Burnham,
1976; McClelland and Boyatzis, 1982; McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1991; House et al. 1991).
When these situational, personality and behavioral conditions coincide (by the nature of
things, a contingency with low probability), it marks the beginning of that social interaction
process between leader, followers and the social structure, which we call charismatic leadership.
We envisage this process as having six phases. In broad outline, it follows a pattern not unlike
Smelser's (1963) process of collective behavior, which is not surprising, since collective behavior
and social movements frequently follow charismatic leaders. The following theory is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Phase I. Identification. A person with charismatic motivational dispositions, selfconfidence and communication skills perceives a situation as conducive to radical change, i.e.,
value-laden, ambiguous, unstable and requiring extraordinary efforts. Ascent to leadership
begins by articulating a vision of change and by displaying strong self-confidence, confidence in
the attainment of the vision, confidence in followers, and selfless commitment. These behaviors
arouse the motives and engage the self concepts of members of a constituency thus causing them
to want to be involved in realizing that change. The vision articulated by the potential leader is
one of a better future, to which followers have a moral right. The fact that the vision is cast in
terms of a moral right of followers makes in an ideological, as opposed to an instrumental or
pragmatic vision. Such a vision, when publicly articulated usually entails considerable personal
risk to the leader, and therefore communicates, non-verbally, willingness to sacrifice self
interests in the interest of the collectivity to whom the leader appeals.
If there are others who perceive the situation as requiring radical change, the leader's task
is made easier. In this case the subjective meaning of the situation is shared by the emergent
leader and the prospective followers. If others do not perceive the situation as requiring radical

21
change the leader begins by stressing the ideological or moral implications of the situation and
the envisioned change, and by persuading prospective followers that they have a moral right to
the attainment of the values articulated by the leader.
In either case, the vision embodies important basic values which the leader shares with a
constituency of potential followers. These shared values lead members of the constituency to
identify with the vision and recognize this person as leader. By this process, people who may
have accepted the prior situation in powerless resignation, are transformed into followers who
identify with a leader and the vision. Moreover, these early identifiers will eventually have a
contagion effect (Meindl, 1990) on others who still accept the old situation. This creates positive
feedback, so that, over time, there is an exponential growth of followers who become aware of
the situation and its alternative, identify with the leader and the vision of change. At this stage,
however, the followers merely recognize the leader and subscribe to the vision, while remaining
largely passive.
Phase II. Activity Arousal. Many insightful and articulate leaders may make people
aware of a need or an opportunity for change. A charismatic leader does not stop there, but
challenges the hitherto passive followers to bring about the change by their own exertions, and
expresses strong and unusual confidence in their ability to do so (House, 1977; Bass, 1985).
Expressions of high performance expectations coupled with strong confidence in followers'
ability and willingness to meet such expectations induces a self fulfilling prophecy which
motivates followers to meet challenges and attain objectives which they never believed they
could achieve. Thus followers are aroused from mere identification with a vision of change to its
active pursuit. Again, there is positive feedback because, as increasing numbers of followers are
aroused to activity, the leader will be reinforced to urge them on. The rate of arousal, however, is
not likely to be as fast or as intensive as the rate of identification, because there are always some

22
people who will prefer to remain on the sidelines and not become actively involved.
Consequently, the positive feedback loop connecting the self fulfilling prophecy and the actual
attainment of objectives will be lagged.
Phase III. Commitment. While some other leaders can arouse people to activity and
participation, charismatic leaders take the further step of personal role-modeling by making
public demonstrations of dedication to the cause. As the demonstrations of dedication typically
involve significant personal sacrifice, the leader is seen as courageously representing the rightful
interests of the collectivity. By such demonstration of dedication, which we refer to as role
modeling, followers become spurred on to commit themselves as well. Thus the leader's role
modeling, together with articulation of a vision, high performance expectations, and confidence
motivates followers to transcend their self-interests, and to derive intrinsic satisfaction and
autonomous reinforcement in their commitment to the common cause. This commitment results
in strong identification with the leader's vision and the collective, and transforms active
followers into a dedicated elite whose performance rises beyond expectations from normal
transactional rewards.
At this point in time charismatic leadership has reached its peak. There is a sizable body
of followers who identify with the articulated vision; some of these followers have been aroused
to active participation, and a select elite finds self-fulfillment in dedicated commitment to both
leader and cause. The leader's vision and exemplary behavior, together with the joint activities
of the newly committed followers form a collective identity, which reduces the instability and
ambiguity that characterized the situation before the charismatic leader appeared. What happens
subsequently depends again on the two factors on which the emergence of charismatic leadership
is predicated: the leader's personality and the social situation.

23
Taking the personality factor first, the manner in which the leader employs his/her
charisma depends on whether leader's power motivation is primarily socialized or personalized
(McClelland, 1975;1985). Personalized leaders have strong tendencies to be authoritarian,
exploitive of others, oriented toward win-lose problem solving and conflict resolution, and
highly self aggrandizing. If the leader's power motivation is dominantly personalized, his or her
behavior is channeled towards self-aggrandizement and personal glory (McClelland, 1976;
1985). In contrast, socialized leaders have strong tendencies to be egalitarian, nonexploitive,
oriented toward win-win problem solving and conflict resolution, and altruistic. If the leaders
motivation is primarily socialized her or his behavior is focused not on the self aggrandizement
but on the vision of change and the interests of the collective (Durkheim, 1925).1
The personalized-socialized dimension of the leader's motivation and
behavior affects the chances for routinization. As the followers' collective identity takes shape,
as organizational performance and morale improve due to their autonomous reinforcement, and
as the change becomes more widely accepted, the very success has a "metamorphic effect"
(Kipnis, 1976:168ff.) on the behavior of personalized charismatic leaders, causing them to have
illusions of grandeur and to view followers as less competent and worthy. A personalized
charismatic leader will strive to keep most of the power and credit for the change vested in
his/her own person. Such leaders will "waste" no more time and effort in acts of dedication and
self-sacrifice, but rather devote their efforts to image-building, public appearances, giving orders,
and making decisions for the collectivity. Being preoccupied with self aggrandizement the
leader will invest little time in the development of a potential successor and will share little
power with immediate followers. Consequently the leadership functions of the movement will

Both McClelland (1985) aned Loevinger (1966; 1976) postulate individual maturity models to account for
the development of socialized leadership. We do not invoke either of these models as it is not necessary to
specify the developmental process whereby individuals become socialized or personalized in order to account
for the routinization of charisma. Further, there is little empirical evidence relevant to either model.

24
remain centralized and dependent on the presence of the leader. This leadership style reduces the
likelihood of successful routinization of the charismatic vision and its values (Trice and Beyer,
1986), making the appearance of the leader and the vision a transitory episode. In addition, the
decline in committed role-modeling is bound to be observed by the followers, - passive, active
and committed, so that some of them will become disillusioned and defect. Thus the situation
will descend from the enthusiastic heights of commitment and dedication that marked the
charismatic leader's appearance and rise to power and return to its earlier level of performance.
As a result, personalized charismatic leaders are likely to resort to coercive means to maintain
follower compliance.
A leader with socialized power motivation, on the other hand, though also susceptible to
the metamorphic effect of having power (Kipnis, 1976), will from the outset share power and
responsibility with others. The leader organizes the followers and prepares for the perpetuation
of the movement as the number of committed followers increases. By establishing rituals,
ceremonies, and symbols of the vision and mission, and even possibly a cadre of potential
successors, the leader paves the way for routinization of the charismatic vision. Consequently,
any decrease in role modeling behavior will have less serious consequences for the cause. Some
of the dedicated elite may also possess charismatic leadership attributes, but with charisma or
without it, they will assume leadership positions and concern themselves with routinizing the
change.
Whether or not the efforts at routinization will make the change part of the legitimate
social structure depends on the social situation. More specifically, the effects of routinization
efforts will depend on the consonance of the vision's content with the existing power structure
(Glassman, 1985; Mintzberg, 1983). If the envisioned change clashes with the values of existing
power structure, current power holders will hardly sit by and permit the vision to become reality.

25
These power holders may be overcome, co-opted (Selznick, 1949), or neutralized by one means
or another, provided there is sufficient popular support for the change. In that case the change
becomes routinized by social coercion, as it were. If popular support cannot match the
entrenched power structure, the leader may have to become resigned to seeing the vision
thwarted. On the other hand, if the resultant popular support is stronger than the existing power
structure, it is likely to be accepted, mutatis mutandis, by current power holders and become
routinized as part of the existing social structure.
Phase IV. Disenchantment. If the vision is reasonably consonant with current power
structures, the improved performance due to intrinsically motivated autonomous reinforcement
and a dedicated management will bring a measure of regularity to the change. Even without
improved performance or support from the current power structures, if the leader mobilizes
sufficient support to overcome, co-opt, or eliminate current power holders, the new order can be
established. In either case, the transformation is routinized. With routinization, the charisma is
transferred from the leader's person to an office, in the form of formal policy, rules and
procedures and symbols, rituals and ceremonies. This may be quite intentional, as charismatic
leaders know that even they are not immortal. But those of the committed followers who have
not become leaders themselves will be affected as well, because routinization will reduce them
from a select corps d'elite to mere participants in routine activities (Selznick, 1949). In this
phase, therefore, some of the dedicated followers can be expected to become disenchanted and
either curtail their activity or defect altogether. Such an effect, though probably not intended, is
the unavoidable price of routinization.
Phase V. Depersonalization. Since fewer followers are now autonomously reinforced,
the leadership can no longer rely solely on this kind of reward to motivate performance. To
assure adequate performance nonetheless, the leader or the immediate followers begin to

26
formally define and control followers' tasks and their contingent rewards. In a word, there is a
gradual process of bureaucratization, with all the impersonality and job standardization that such
a process entails. Some of the active participants are likely to resent such regimentation, and as a
result cease to be active participants, contenting themselves with passive identification with the
cause. This process we shall call, after Merton (1957), the depersonalization of the cause.
Phase VI. Alienation. With bureaucratization, at least part of the effort that had been
previously invested in advancing the cause must now be spent on maintaining the organization as
a going concern. Thus role incumbents increasingly devote their time to immediate
organizational needs, for example the development of an administrative infrastructure, the
procurement and allocation of resources, supervision, control, issuing directives and writing
reports (Merton, 1957). For those who had identified with the original vision of change, such
preoccupations, necessary though they are, are bound to result in a perceived displacement of the
original goals as they had been set forth in the leader's vision. Followers begin to doubt whether
the organization is still pursuing these goals and whether, indeed, there is still justification for its
existence (Jacobs, 1987). Thus the ambiguity and instability which characterized the situation
initially will re-surface in a different guise. This will bring about alienation of followers from
the organization, if not indeed from the vision itself (Fromm, 1968), so that they will come to
accept the new situation much as they had accepted the old one: not because they endorse it
enthusiastically, but because they have lost hope of seeing the vision realized as they had once
imagined it would be. Thus the process has run full circle: the number of followers has declined,
the enthusiasm diminishes, and the charisma of the leader and the mission falters.
This process, like any other, takes place over time. The phases which we have outlined
indicate the sequence of events within the process. But the length of the various phases as well
as the total duration are governed by the dynamics created by multiple feedback loops that can

27
accelerate the process at various points, and retard it at others. In each particular case of
charismatic leadership, the initial situation as well as the intensity and type of the leader's
charisma will determine how long it takes for the process to evolve, and whether indeed the
charismatic vision ever becomes routinized.

CONCLUSION: THE RISE-DECLINE THEORY

The intellectual process that characterized the development of charismatic leadership
theory has come full circle. Weber introduced the notion of charisma into modern sociology in
order to explain how radical social innovations can become legitimized. Neither traditional nor
rational-legal bases of authority can legitimize radical changes because, by definition, both
depend on established precedent. The legitimacy attributed to a charismatic leader filled that gap
in Weber's theoretical scheme (Bendix, 1960:273-293). However, recognizing that charismatic
leadership, emanating as it does from a specific mortal person, must be inherently unstable,
Weber reasoned that it must become routinized in either a traditional or a bureaucratic social
order to endow the change with stability and longevity.
Much of the sociological literature on charisma since Weber has documented and analyzed
the routinization of radical changes brought about by charismatic. Then, particularly in the last
two decades, students of organizational behavior and management began to look at charisma as
an element of transformational leadership, realizing that formal organizations in the modern
world must be able to introduce and legitimize social innovations in order to survive. This led
investigators to search for characteristic traits and behaviors of charismatic leaders, and the
effects of such leadership. It was found that such effects frequently included rather powerful
effects on follower affective states as well as improved organizational performance, "beyond
expectations" from regular transactional leadership. A charismatic leader, thus it was argued,

28
will endeavor to incorporate this potential for superior performance into the organization's
management procedures, in a word, routinize the charisma. In this manner the legitimacy of
desired radical organizational changes would no longer need to depend on the unpredictable
qualities of individual charismatic leaders, but rather on legal-rational precedent.
The argument has thus returned to the point at which Weber introduced the concept.
However, the psychological literature on charisma is incomplete in two vital respects. It deals
neither with the structural conditions that affect the chances of routinization, nor with the effects
of routinization, if it occurs, on the organization's subsequent functioning. The sociological
literature is also incomplete, having attended little to the specific and critical personality
characteristics, behaviors, and motivational effects of charismatic leaders.
The theory advanced above is intended to fill these gaps. It explains not only the rise and
decline of charismatic leaders, but also the conditions that result in the routinization of the
charismatic movement. Further, the theory is consistent with the considerable empirical
evidence that has been produced by scholars of both persuasions, and helps to organize this
literature in an integrated and coherent whole. Finally, the theoretical assertions presented here
are sufficiently specific that they can be tested by either longitudinal participation observation as
illustrated by the work of Trice and Beyer (1986), longitudinal survey research as illustrated by
Koene et al. (1991) and Curphy (1992), Howell and Avolio (1993), controlled experimentation as
evidenced by the work of Howell and Frost (1989) and Pillai and Meindl (1991), or by analysis
of archival data as illustrated by House et. al. (1991), Alternatively, as we demonstrate in the
following section, the theory can be tested by comparison of empirical data with predictions
derived from a simulation model of the theory. We offer the above is theoretical synthesis of the
two literatures as a conceptual bridge, making for a more comprehensive and dynamic theory of

29
charismatic leadership. In the following section we present the simulation model and report tests
of the theory based on sixteen data sets.
A SIMULATION MODEL
We have applied the research strategy proposed by Jacobsen, Bronson, and Vekstein (1990)
to test this theory. By that strategy, we construct a computer model to simulate the theorized process
over time. The variables in the model are defined to match the theory's concepts, and the
mathematical functions which link the variables are specified to reproduce the theoretical argument.
These functions are then adjusted until the model produces outcomes postulated by the theory. In
other words, the functions are constructed so as to make the model congruent with the theory, both in
its structure as well as in its behavior. Thus the model is not a test, but only a mathematical
representation of the theory. Like any other model, so this one too simplifies a complex reality, the
"reality" in this case being the theoretical argument that seeks to account for the rise and decline of
charismatic leadership.
Once it is constructed, however, the model can be used to test the theory by comparing
empirical time series relevant to specific charismatic leaders with the simulated output. If the model
can replicate the empirical data trends from its internal dynamics, it is evidence that the theory
provides an adequate explanation of the process. The more time series and the more of the data
variance that the model can reproduce, the greater will be our confidence in the theory's empirical
adequacy. Conversely, if the model fails to reproduce the data, then the theory either needs revision
or must rejected altogether.
The modeling technique we use is known as System Dynamics, originally developed by
Forrester (1961) to analyze complex organizations and provide a basis for better policy decisions.
Having been designed especially for modeling continuous processes in social systems, it is
particularly suited to our purpose. We have already used it successfully to model and test another

30
social theory, that of patterned deviance (Jacobsen and Bronson 1995), so that we are confident of
being able to test the theory of charismatic leadership by the same strategy.
It is worth noting that, in a systems approach such as this, every variable is simultaneously
independent, dependent and intervening. The only really independent variables are the ones
exogenous to the system (underlined). A complete overview of all variables and functional
relationships is shown in Figure 2.
(Figure 2 about here)
In this section we present 16 data sets relevant to six leaders we have investigated so far:
John F. Kennedy, Theodor Herzl, Orde Wingate, Lee Iaccoca, Adolf Hitler and Mary Baker Eddy.
As a preliminary step, we draw a "causal loop" diagram (see Figure 1 on p.21) to describe the
feedbacks between the concepts which, according to the theory, account for the trends over time.
There are two major feedback loops. The first loop presented on the right side of Figure 1 starts with
the social structure's conduciveness to a charismatic change and the leader's articulation of a vision.
This leads to increase in follower identification with the vision, and from there to arousal of active
followers and commitment of an elite. The followers reinforce the leader's behavior by secondary
positive feedbacks, and together they develop a collective identity which reduces the conduciveness
of the situation. These are what may be called short-term effects.
In the second feedback loop presented on the left side of Figure 1, the aroused followers and
committed elite derive autonomous reinforcement from their activities for the cause, and thereby
improve the collectivity's performance beyond expectations. The improved performance, provided it
is consonant with the current power structure, will lead to routinization. Routinization will lead to
alienation and disenchantment of some of the committed elite. Improved performance also has a
metamorphic effect on leaders (Kipnis 1981), influencing them to devaluate the followers' efforts.
As a result identification and commitment will decline and reduce the committed elite even further.

31
The disenchantment of some followers leads to bureaucratization and depersonalization of active
followers, giving rise eventually to perceptions of goal displacement and alienation even by those
who had only passively identified with the vision and the leader.
The outcome of charismatic leadership, then, depends on the balance of these two feedback
loops and their respective speeds. These, in turn, depend (a) on the consonance of the change with
existing power structures, and (b) on the leader's susceptibility to the metamorphic effect (Howell
1988), and (c) the length of time the leader's influence is sustained, i.e., the span of the leader's
charismatic thrall.
With low consonance, there is less chance for the change to become routinized so that
conduciveness will remain fairly high. High consonance, on the other hand, will improve the
chances for routinization and thereby reduce conduciveness. In the long run, however, routinization
increases alienation which makes the situation conducive again.
Concurrently with this, however, the metamorphic effect of improved performance reduces
the leader's continued charismatic behaviors which we refer to as role modeling (to a greater or
lesser extent depending on the leader's personality) and thus reduces commitment and eventually
affects the chances for routinization and all that follows from it.
The duration of the effects of both feedback loops is limited by the gradual fading of every
leader's charisma. The thrall of the leader's charisma may be shortlived or it may extend even
beyond the leader's physical death, but in the end it too must fade away and remain a memory.
The Formal Model. To formulate these processes mathematically as a model, each
theoretical concept was quantified as a variable with a realistic metric. For example,
"bureaucratization" was quantified as the percent of the active and committed followers whose
activities are being regulated by formal rules. The theoretical concept is thus transformed into a
numerical variable with a finite range, corresponding to a measurable entity in the real world

32
(Jacobsen and Bronson 1987). All the other theoretical concepts were quantified in a similar
manner. (For the complete and documented code, see Appendix 2.)
Once all the concepts had been quantified as variables, the postulated change in each variable
was defined as a mathematical function of the variable(s) immediately preceding it in the causal
chain. To return to our example, the theory posits that bureaucratization (BUREAU) will vary
directly with the effect of routinization (ROUTINE) on the active followers. Therefore the equation
defining bureaucratization is:
BUREAU = ((ACTIVE + ELITE) * ROUTINE) + STAFF

(1)

where ACTIVE =

percent aroused followers;

ELITE = percent committed elite;
ROUTINE = percent activities that are routine;
and STAFF = the initial pct. of salaried staff (constant).
To start the simulation, the model has to be supplied with parameters which reflect the initial
situation for each test case. Obviously, the social situation which faced J. F. Kennedy in 1961
differed from the one that faced Mary Baker Eddy or Adolf Hitler in 1919. Ideally, the values of
these parameters should be empirical data, but usually at least some of them have to be estimates.
Such estimates must be based on at least documentary evidence, and they must be logically
consistent and reasonable (Jacobsen and Bronson 1995). The initial parameters for each case (see:
Appendix 1, Table 1 (all tables are presented in this appendix)) were independently estimated by the
authors on the basis of the literature (see below), with a mean divergence of 5.33 percentage points.
The estimates we actually used were the ones that gave the better trend reproduction.2 Once the

The resulting findings are not affected by the difference in estimates, both yielding very similar trend results.
We used three data sets relevant to John F. Kennedy to refine the simulation model to optimize the
reproduction of trends predicted by the model. Subsequently, the refined model was used without change to
reproduce trends in thirteen data sets relevant to five charismatic leaders.

33
model had been initialized, for each case, all subsequent values during the simulated runs are results
from the permanently fixed internal dynamics of the model.
The simulation model is tested by assessing the degre to which the model can reproduce the
empirical data. Prior to testing the model it is also necessary to further refine it based on a limited
set of empirical data. This step is similar to the use of a developmental sample by psychologists to
establish test score cutoff points. The cutoff scores are then used to predict behavior based on the
test scores of subjects. In the case of a simulation model, once it is refined with a limited set of
empirical data no further changes are made to it. The refinement is analogous to the extablishment of
cutoff scores based on the psychologists developmental sample. The model is then fit to the
empirical data to determine the amount of variance reproduced by the model. This constitutes the
empirical tests of the model, and by inference, an assessment of the validity of the theory on which it
is based. In the present research we used three sets of data relevant to John F. Kennedy to refine the
simulation model. Subsequently the refined model was used without change to reporduce trends in
thirteen data sets relevent to five additional charismatic leaders.
Since the theory is about the emergence, rise, and eventual decline of charismatic leaders,
and not about whether a given leader has charisma or not, the tests deal only with leaders whose
personality and behavior fitted our definition of charisma. In every case, the biographers either
specifically attributed charisma to those persons, or described them as leaders who
rather consistently had engaged in the charismatic behaviors specified above, irrespective of the
effectiveness or success of their mission. Thus we tested the model on leaders who were clearly
charismatic, besides being individuals for whom adequate data are available.
JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE PEACE CORPS
Senator Kennedy probably had some vision of change for the United States long before he
made his presidential campaign pledge to "get this country moving again." But the enthusiastic

34
response he received from 10,000 students in Ann Arbor on the night of October 14, 1961 (just a
month before voting day) identified a specific constituency for the vision of the Peace Corps: young,
middle class college students, hungry for a practical challenge to match their radical ideological
values. This felt hunger made them receptive to Kennedy's message, so eloquently stated in the
inaugural address: "... ask not what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your
country." The Peace Corps, in fact, was "the part of the aid effort which best expressed the spirit of
the New Frontier" (Schlesinger 1965, p.557).
The first contingent of Peace Corps volunteers, trained and ready to leave for overseas, met
with JFK at the White House eight months later. They clearly regarded him not merely as their
elected President, but personally identified with him and his vision (Wofford 1980, p.249 ff.). Clear
also was Kennedy's awareness of their commitment when he told them that they were "the most
palpable response that the country has seen to the whole spirit which I tried to suggest in my
inaugural (Rice 1985, p.303)." In terms of our theory, therefore, JFK was a charismatic leader (for a
dissenting view, see: Willner 1984, p.39). He had articulated a vision of change that had brought a
constituency to identify itself as his followers; he had aroused many of them to want to participate
actively in realizing this vision; and he had inspired an elite of Peace Corps Voluteers to personal
commitment.
JFK's subsequent actions and pronouncements showed that his charisma was not of the
personalized kind. It enthused the first Peace Corps director, Sargent Shriver, no less than the rank
and file. To him he delegated extensive powers, authorizing the budding organization's
independence from the entrenched Washington bureaucracy. As for routinization of the change, Rice
(1985, p.ix) calls the Peace Corps JFK's "most affirmative and enduring legacy," and the evidence
supports such an assessment. In 1986, the 25th anniversary of the Peace Corps was celebrated in
Washington with over 6000 former and current volunteers attending (U.S. General Accounting

35
Office 1989). On the other hand, there is also some evidence that disenchantment,
depersonalization, goal displacement and even alienation were felt by at least some of the volunteers
(Cowan 1970). We feel justified, therefore, in taking the Peace Corps as an example of JFK's
charismatic leadership, in its effects on individuals as well as on the structure of the organization.
Data and Simulations. Data relevant to J.F.Kennedy are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3.
The Annual Reports of the Peace Corps give the number of applications received each year from
1961 through 1987. On the basis of U.S. Census figures, we converted these into yearly percentages
of the relevant population, namely college graduates of that year. This series (JFK1 in Table 2)
corresponds to the model variable AROUSE. The same source also gives the annual number of
volunteers and trainees who were accepted, trained and sent overseas. These, similarly converted
into yearly population percentages (JFK2), represent the rate of commitment to the cause
(COMMIT).
The U.S. Annual Budget for the years 1963-1988 shows the number of permanent employees
currently in the Peace Corps. The ratio of this staff to the number of volunteers (JFK3) gives a
reasonable indicator of bureaucratization (BUREAU). Finally, the Peace Corps also publishes the
annual number of volunteers who terminated their commitment before the end of the normal twoyear tour of duty. This series (JFK4) gives an indirect indication of disenchantment for this period
(DISENCH).
The model was initialized to reflect JFK's charismatic personality and behavior in the social
situation of 1961, the year he took office. Some of these constants are empirical data or computed
measures from such data (e.g., for STAFF). For the rest we had to make reasonable estimates, based
on the evidence found in the literature. Thus the estimate of 75% for VISION is based on the
response JFK got from college students at Ann Arbor. Very few of them, however, realized at the
time the difficulties of their chosen mission, which justifies the low estimate (20%) of initial

36
conduciveness (INCOND). (The variable in Figure 2 and also in the simulated period is CONDUCE
(conduciveness). INCOND is the initial value of CONDUCE). The first column of Table 1
summarizes the initial values we used.
The fit between the model variables and data is shown in the plotted graphs (Fig.3). It is also
measured by the heuristic Trend Index (TI), which is the percentage of data variance reproduced by
the corresponding model variable (see: Theil 1966, p.59). JFK1, the annual population percentage of
applicants to the Peace Corps, had a TI of 86.5% with the variable AROUSE. For JFK2, the annual
population percentage of trainees sent abroad, TI was 85.7% with the model variable COMMIT.
JFK3, the annual percentage of salaried employees in the Peace Corps, gave a TI of only 62.3% with
BUREAU but, considering that there are two inflections in the data curve, the plotted graphs (see
Figure 3d) show a quite good fit. JFK4, the annual percentage of early terminations, had a TI of
81.9% with the variable DISENCH. In all, the model output shows consistent fit with the four data
sets.
(Figure 3, JFK, about here)
THEODOR HERZL AND THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION
Ever since the Roman destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and the subsequent dispersion of
the Jewish people, Jews have prayed for a return to Zion. Many individuals have actually done so
over the years, but only toward the end of the 19th century did the idea of political organization for a
mass return take hold. The founder of this organization was Theodor Herzl, a foreign correspondent
for the Viennese daily Neue Freie Presse, stationed in Paris. In 1897 he called the World Zionist
Organization into being by convening the first Zionist Congress in Basle with 196 delegates from the
world over. Ever since then the Zionist Congress has met regularly, at first each year, and then biannually except for the periods of the two World Wars.

37
There had been others who had thought and written on similar lines before him, but Herzl is
generally regarded as the creator of organized political Zionism and as the prophet who forsaw the
foundation of the State of Israel. Coming from an assimilated upper middle class Viennese family,
his Jewish identity was awakened in 1896 by the virulent anti-semitism evident in the Dreyfuss
affair. Writing under the spell of that trauma he articulated his vision in a tract Der Judenstaat, a
Jewish State that was to be legally guaranteed by international treaties. Not all Jews agreed with
Herzl at the time, and in some circles he was held as little more than yet another crackpot or worse.
But his vision and fire did rekindle the hopes of many, especially in the small impoverished shtetls of
eastern Europe, who saw in him the long-awaited Messiah. Eyewitnesses and biographers have
testified to the extraordinary personal charisma of the man (Elon 1975, p.242). He is reported to
have "often induced an almost religious awe" in his hearers (Elon 1975, p.9), and is quoted as having
"felt their souls emitting sparks whenever I strike them" (Elon 1975, p.158, from Herzl's Diary).
In the following years Herzl tirelessly and without remuneration led the Zionist Organization,
in fact spending much of his own money to finance his extensive travels for the Zionist cause. In
1904 he died of heart failure aged fourty-four, having literally worked himself to death trying to
realize his vision. Thirteen years later, the Balfour Declaration by the British government was the
first acknowledgement of the Zionist movement by a major power, and a direct product of the
organization Herzl had called into being. International recognition of Zionism culminated in 1947
when the United Nations voted for the establishment of the State of Israel.
Data and Simulations. The data relevant to the Zionist Organization are presented in Table
3 and Figure 4. One of the early actions of the first Zionist Congress was the initiation of the
"Shekel", an annual membership fee of one French franc (or its equivalent), in order to provide an
accurate record of the size of the Zionist Organization, and a basis for allocating delegates to the
congresses at the rate of one delegate for each 100 Shekel payers. Detailed accounts of the Shekels,

38
year by year and country by country, have been preserved in the Zionist Archives. (Zionisten
Kongress 1905; 8, 9 , 13, 35) In terms of the theory of charismatic leadership, purchase of the
Shekel meant that the person not only identified with Herzl's vision, but participated actively in the
Zionist Organization. The percentage of the estimated adult Jewish population each year who
bought a Shekel (HERZL1) gives a good indication of the growth of the Zionist Organization. The
model variable corresponding to HERZL1 is ACTIVE, i.e., the population percentage who are
sufficiently aroused by the leader to participate in bringing about the vision of change.
The first record of Shekel payers is for 1899, showing a total of 114,370 Shekels for the three
years up to and including 1899. At the first congress in 1897 there had been 196 delegates
(corresponding to 19,600 Shekels), while the second congress in 1898 had 360 delegates
(corresponding to 36,000 Shekels). In 1899 alone, therefore, there were already 78,370 Shekel
payers. In 1917 the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, which triggered a significant
increase in membership and a clear break in the series. We therefore ended the simulation with the
year 1918. Also, since there were regular cyclical surges of Shekel payers in "congress years",
causing considerable fluctuations in the data, we smoothed the series by exponential smoothing
(alpha=0.6, see: Huntsberger et al. 1980).
A second set of data comes from the archives of the Jewish National Fund (Juedischer
Nationalfonds 1909), which had been created by the 5th Zionist Congress in 1901 for land purchases
and settlement in Palestine. The Fund's income came entirely from voluntary contributions, large
and small. The ratio of JNF income to its overhead expenses for fund raising (again, smoothing the
more extreme fluctuations in the series), gave the second time series (HERZL2). The variable
corresponding to HERZL2 is PERFORM, that is, the ratio of the organization's output (JNF income,
in this case) to its input (JNF overheads).

39
Our estimates of the initialization values for Herzl's charisma (both data sets!) are shown in
column 2 of Table 1. Some of these initializations deserve comment. VISION may seem rather low,
but in 1896, most Jews still considered his vision utopian and unrealistic. PERSON, the percent of
the change which the leader claims to his own credit must be almost zero in this case, as there was
not a hint of self-aggrandizement in Herzl. On the contrary, he repeatedly stressed the insignificance
of his own person when compared to the overwhelming importance of the Zionist cause (Elon 1975,
pp. 144, 222). Because of the Jewish religious establishment's vociferous opposition to Zionism, we
set CONSON rather low, but religious influence was already then declining fast in the postemancipation era of central Europe, and posed no significant obstacle to the new organization.
Finally, INCOND (initial conduciveness) was given a rather low value because, despite the severe
plight of Jewry in Russia, in Central Europe and America, Jews were busy making the most of their
newly-found emancipated status and did not perceive the situation as threatening to them.
Running the model against the data of HERZL1 gave a TI of 72.2% (Figure 4), and with the
same initializations the model gave a TI value of 76.0% for HERZL2. Theodor Herzl, then, is the
second case of a charismatic leader whose influence has been adequately accounted for by the model
and thus explained by the theory.
(Figure 4, HERZL, about here)
C. ORDE WINGATE AND THE SPECIAL NIGHT SQUADS
Captain Charles Orde Wingate came to Palestine in September 1936 as an intelligence officer
of the British army. At the time the country was governed by a British administration acting under
mandate of the League of Nations. 1936 saw beginning of an Arab uprising which lasted well into
1938. Wingate's sympathies, like those of most British Army officers, lay at first with the Arab
population, but within a month of his arrival he had changed into an ardent Zionist. He contacted the
clandestine Jewish defense organization (Haganah) and, after much hesitation and scrutiny they

40
accepted him and called him "Hayedid" - The Friend. He offered his services to Dr. Chaim
Weizmann, President of the Zionist Organization, to form a Jewish Palestine Defence Force under
"suitable" British command (Sykes 1959, pp.130-1), but the letter was never answered. Undaunted,
he wrote a paper for Weizmann, "consisting of recommendations for the organization of Jewish
regular military forces" (Sykes 1959: 138).
By then, Arab unrest and sabotage had assumed major proportions. Particularly the Iraq-toHaifa (IPC) oil pipeline was under constant attack by raiders, who uncovered the pipe, shot into it at
different spots, and set fire to the gushing oil. In April of 1938 hardly a night passed without several
such incidents (Military Intelligence Summaries 1938). In May 1938 General Wavell (G.o.C.
Palestine) gave his consent to Wingate's plan of forming the Special Night Squads (S.N.S.), a small
force of Jewish volunteers with British NCOs and under Wingate's command. Officially, the mission
was to stop the Arab raiders and protect the pipeline, but Wingate trained his corps and led it into
attack of any Arab threat to Jewish settlements. The Haganah soldiers chosen to serve in the S.N.S.
saw themselves as a priviliged elite, and understandably so. Under Wingate's inspiring leadership
they received invaluable training in night fighting, military tactics and personal endurance. Wingate
had, in fact, transformed the basic character of Haganah from a defense organization into one
capable of active iniative, attack and reprisal.
The S.N.S. were extremely effective in curbing the saboteurs and in staging reprisal raids on
their points of concentration (Haining 1938, p.7). The British High Command in Palestine, however,
would accept neither Wingate's unorthodox methods nor his Zionist leanings. The successes of the
Jewish patrolmen in the S.N.S. under Wingate were officially underplayed, and a Divisional
Conference of Intelligence Officers expressed itself on January 23rd, 1939, as "generally opposed to
the dressing up of Jews as British soldiers" (Sykes 1959, p.195). Accordingly, once Arab sabotage
of the pipe-line had been brought more or less under control, Wingate was sent home to England, the

41
main S.N.S. camp was dispersed and Jews excluded from serving in the unit. This brief episode in
Wingate's distinguished career provides the background and the empirical base for our test of the
effects of his charismatic leadership. Wingate himself died five years later in an aircrash while
serving as commander of the Chindits in Burma during World War II, but the charismatic figure of
"The Friend" lives on and is revered in Israel to this day.
Wingate has been described by his biographers as an eccentric, a visionary, an enigma and a
genius (Mosley 1955, p.47; Sykes 1959, pp.539,544; Tulloch 1972). Students of military strategy,
however, as well as those under his command unhesitatingly call him charismatic (Bidwell 1973,
p.112; Akavia 1992; 1993). His personality characteristics and behavior patterns certainly were
those of a charismatic leader. He was keenly aware of his need for power, he was self-confident,
innovative and energetic, and did not care whether he was liked or not. His charisma, moreover, had
a "personalized" streak. One biographer reports him as "rude and dictatorial and insistent," and
unable to delegate authority (Mosley 1955, pp.111,136).
Convinced that he was a man with a mission (Mosley 1955, p.25), he articulated the vision of
leading a Jewish army in a situation that was highly conducive to charismatic leadership (Akavia
1968, p.57). Many of the Haganah rank-and-file at the time itched to leave the stockades of the
settlements and take the offensive, but their commanders held them back for political reasons (Sykes
1959: 113). He inspired an enthusiastic following, aroused them to activity by expressing
confidence in their fighting ability (Sykes 1959, p.147; Akavia 1968, p.44). By his own example
(Akavia 1968, p.45; Rivlin 1964, p.284) he inspired this corps d'elite to extraordinary performance
and sacrifice. On the other hand, the change he initiated was not consonant with the existing power
structure, and therefore his vision failed to become routinized. These are some of the reasons behind
the initialized values shown in Table 1, col.3.

42
Data and Simulations. The data relevant to the tests are presented in Table 4 and Figure 5.
The period to be covered in our simulations spans from the first operation of the S.N.S. in the
beginning of June 1938, to the time when Wingate was relieved of his command in October of that
year. For these 21 weeks, we shall compare data about Wingate's charismatic leadership of the
Special Night Squads with corresponding variables in our model, week by week.
The first data set, ORDE1 (Table 4), comes from Sefer Toledot Hahagana, the definitive
history of the Hagana published by Ma'arahot, the publishing house of the Israel Defense Forces.
Here we find the recruitment figures for the S.N.S., with the dates when the decisions to call upon
volunteers were taken. The data form a series of step functions, which we have left exactly as
reported (Table 4, cols. 2,3). The corresponding model variable, of course, is ELITE.
A second data set is of the number of S.N.S. actions, week by week. This was assembled
from a variety of sources. Some specific actions were mentioned in the literature (Sykes 1959;
Rivlin 1964, Akavia 1993; Elon 1975), but there is no assurance that these were all. To complete the
list and check on the accuracy of the different reports, we conducted personal interviews with four
S.N.S. veterans who had played leading roles in the squads (see footnote 3 to table 4). The number
of actions per week ranged from zero to 5, the fluctuations arising out of the changing situation in
the field, and the presence or absence of Wingate himself. We exponentially smoothed the raw data
(alpha=.5), and then computed an index (ORDE2) taking the first week of June as base (Table 4,
cols.4,5). Since there is little doubt that Wingate's physical presence directly affected the number of
actions that were undertaken, ORDE2 is represented by the model variable FADE, that is, the
gradually decreasing thrall of a leader's charisma over the activities of followers.
The plotted results are shown in Figure 5. The TI for ORDE1 is 90.3% and for ORDE2 it is
65.9%.

43
LIDO A. (LEE) IACOCCA AND THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION
Every one of the three leaders presented so far had founded and led a new organization.
Much of the current interest in charismatic leadership, however, derives from a frequently expressed
need for corporate leaders who can infuse existing organizations with a new vision. We had not yet
studied a charismatic leader who attempted to change an existing organization, either successfully or
not. It appears that Lee Iacocca of the Chrysler Corporation may be such a case with, moreover,
enough reliable data to test our theory and model.
It has been said repeatedly of Lee Iacocca that he was a charismatic leader. One biographer
described his qualities as "something greater than outstanding leadership in business," comparing
him to men like FDR, JFK, Patton and MacArthur (Wyden 1987:20). The same author writes in
another place: "The Iacocca presence stands out in any company short of De Gaulle or Churchill
(ibid. p.137)."
Lido A. Iacocca started his career in 1946, first as student engineer and then as salesman for a
Ford dealer in Pennsylvania. His successes there drawing the attention of headquarters, he was
transferred in 1956 to Detroit and made national truck marketing manager. There he quickly rose
through the ranks, ascending to the presidency of Ford in 1970. However, in July 1978 tensions
between him and Henry Ford II led to his abrupt dismissal. He was immediately wooed by many
different companies, but decided to accept Chrysler's offer, becoming president in 1979. He found
the company in deep trouble, with a loss of $160 million in the third quarter. "All through the
company," he writes in his autobiography, "people were scared and despondent" (Iacocca 1984:155).
There was "bad morale, and security leaks were showing up on the balance sheets. Owner loyalty
rates was down to 36%" (Iacocca 1985:158). Adding to the trouble was the oil crisis precipitated by
the revolution in Iran (January 1979) which affected the whole auto industry, reducing car sales to
almost half of what they had been (Iacocca 1984:185).

44
Iacocca became chairman of Chrysler's board and CEO in January 1980, and set out to
realize his vision of making Chrysler "a model corporate citizen" (Wyden 1987:331). First he
recruited a team of a dozen hand-picked, seasoned professionals to replace much of the top
management. Then, with their help, he began a campaign to turn the company around from nearbankruptcy to financial solvency and profitability. The turn-around meant a major revolution: laying
off 15,500 workers, getting the Union of United Auto Workers (UAW) to make significant wage
concessions on behalf of the remaining 125,000 employees, persuading Congress to ratify Federal
loan guarantees, and securing the actual loans from a consortium of banks. Above all, it meant
restoring public confidence, not just in Chrysler as a company, but in Chrysler cars. Iacocca
accomplished all of these. By mid-1983 that objective had been achieved. The story has been told
both by Iacocca himself (Iacocca 1984) and others (Moritz and Seaman 1981; Reich and Donahue
1985; Jeffreys 1986; Wyden 1987), and analyzed by Westley and Mintzberg (1988).
Data and Simulations. Data relevant to Iacocca's leadership are presented in Table 5 and
Figure 6. The constituency to which Iacocca appealed numbered more than 6.5 million people. It
included the car-buying public, shareholders, employees and their union, suppliers, dealers, bankers,
and last but certainly not least, the U.S. Congress and Federal Administration. Not all of these
people were equally affected by Iacocca's charisma.
The number of Chrysler shareholders decreased steadily from 211,587 in 1980 to 131,199 by
1985, that is, well after the turn-around had been accomplished (Chrysler Corporation 1980-85), so
that they certainly cannot be counted among Iacocca's following. Congress and the Administration
that ratified the loan guarantees, as well as the bankers who put up the money, did so most
reluctantly and only after much hesitation and debate. In the end they accepted Iacocca's vision to
revitalize the company, but they can hardly be called active participants in the change. At best, most

45
of them were what we call passive identifiers (IDENTIF). In any case, they made up only a small
percentage of the constituency.
The employees agreed to wage concessions not only because of the real threat of losing their
jobs, but also because Iacocca had set an example by taking one dollar for his salary that year. By
accepting the wage freeze they made a significant contribution to the cause, which puts them into the
category of active followers (ACTIVE), ex post facto if not by intent. But the decision, once it had
been made, included all employees. It is therefore difficult to say just how many of them actually
agreed with it, and so we cannot measure this category with any accuracy.
By contrast, we do know that the 5,404,616 persons who bought other makes of cars in 1980
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986) definitely did not respond to Iacocca's charisma. In the model,
therefore, they are not among the followers but in the category of ACCEPT, because they accepted
Chrysler's dismal situation. On the other hand, those members of the car buying public who invested
their money in new Chrysler cars are the committed ELITE, since clearly they acted voluntarily in
response to Iacocca's call. In the 3rd quarter of 1980 this ELITE amounted to only 13.99% of the
total constituency (935,384 cars sold), but by the end of 1985 they had almost doubled to 22.29%
(1,832,030 cars sold, see Table 5). These data, drawn from the company's Annual Reports for the
years 1980-1985, are our first time series (LIDO1), to be reproduced by the model variable ELITE.
A second series (LIDO2), also drawn from the Annual Reports, expresses Iacocca's
achievement in reorganizing the company financially. From the published figures we computed the
ratio of quarterly income from sales to production costs, which corresponds to the variable
PERFORM in our model. As may be seen in Figure 6b, despite the annual cycle of fluctuations, the
trend is clearly positive.
Our estimate of the initial values for both sets are given in Table 1 in the column headed
LIDO. The most obvious difference between Iacocca's profile and those of the previous cases is in

46
the 82% of salaried staff (STAFF). This is because Chrysler's employees are included here, and they
of course were all paid. Initial conduciveness (INCOND) is of course very high too (82%) because
Chrysler was at the time in a critical financial situation. Also, HAVEN (i.e., the time that joiners for
personal reasons can find refuge in the organization, see Note to Table 1) is very low, as very few
people would have followed Iacocca into the company at such a time in order to solve some personal
problem. The relatively high value for the duration of the leader's impact (THRALL) refers in this
case to quarters, and not to years as was the case for JFK and for HERZL. More significant is that
for COMMUN (the leader's skill of communication) the best initial value is 86% - the highest yet.
This is eminently reasonable, because so much depended in this case on just such skills. Another
telling figure is 56% for PERSON, the percent of changes which the leader claims to his own credit,
which is another way of saying how egocentric the leader is. The figure is relatively high, but
realistically so, according to Iacocca's biographers.
The plotted output for both data sets presented in Figure 6 shows a good fit of model to the
data. The Trend Index (TI) for LIDO1 (with ELITE) is 78.2, and for LIDO2 (with PERFORM) it is
76.1, reaffirming this conclusion.
ADOLF HITLER AND THE NAZI PARTY
Repugnant as it is to delve into the growth of the Nazi Party, we must test the theory and
model also on the case of Adolf Hitler because he is arguably the clearest example of charismatic
leadership within living memory. Moreover, we have considered so far only "good", or socially
desirable, charismatic leaders, i.e., those who are regarded as having helped rather than harmed their
society. But charisma per se is a value-neutral concept (Weber 1922), and its rise and decline can
manifest itself in good as well as evil persons and visions (Howell 1988). Also, Hitler is one more
example of a leader who used his charisma to change an existing organization.

47
The saga began in September 1919. Hitler was a corporal stationed in German army barracks
near Munich, where he briefed soldiers in pre-demobilization courses (Aufklaerungskommando).
Sent by his superior officer to attend and report on a meeting in Munich of the fledgling Deutsche
Arbeiter Partei (DAP), he took the floor himself during the discussion. He aroused the interest of the
party's chairman, Anton Drexler, who remarked: "Man, has he got a kisser, we could use him!"
(Nyomarkay 1967:60n). Soon thereafter he was invited to a committee meeting of the party and
rather reluctantly became a member.
Total party membership at the time was a mere 189 (Bennecke 1962:23), and Hitler was put
in charge of propaganda activities to stimulate membership. What disturbed him, however, was not
the party's small size but its democratic organization and what he called its "parliamentarism". With
his rhetorical skills he aroused a personal following, and by January 1921 had transformed the
party's democratic structure into an authoritarian movement with himself the undisputed leader of
some 2500 registered members (Maser 1967:268-77). At the first annual congress of the party (renamed NSDAP) in July of that year he confronted the official leadership with an ultimatum,
demanding complete control of the party for himself or else accepting his resignation. The leaders
capitulated, knowing that the party's growth was due to Hitler's efforts and talents, and from that day
on he was the acknowledged and sole "Fuhrer" of the party.
By November 1923 he felt strong enough to organize a coup ("Putsch") to overthrow the
government with his storm troopers (SA). The coup misfired, the party and its newspaper were
outlawed, and Hitler was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Released on parole a year later he
resumed leadership and rebuilt the party, steadily increasing his own and the party's influence
throughout the country. In the elections to the Reichstag (1933) the party came legally to power,
being the largest political party in Germany with 849,009 registered members and 37.3.% of the
votes.

48
From the start, Hitler's vision had been to restore German pride and self-respect by avenging
the defeat in World War I and the humiliation of the Versailles treaty. Since he ascribed these
misfortunes to Jewish manipulation and power mongering, a virulent anti-semitism was part of his
vision. This view of events found a ready audience. With his rare rhetorical talent and the
considerable organizational abilities of a loyal elite, he whipped up the hardships of war and its
aftermath into a wave of enthusiasm that swept him and his party into power in 1933, - and the
world into war in 1939.
Data and Simulations. Data relevant to Hitler's leadership effects are presented in Table 6
and Figure 7. Hitler's followers may be classified into voters for the party (IDENTIF), party
members (ACTIVE), and members of the Schutzstaffel (SS) who were the select ELITE. An almost
complete set of yearly figures of registered party members for the years 1919 - 1933 was found in
Manstein (1988), based on Volz (1934). (Similar data for the years after 1933 are not available.)
Converted into percentages of the adult population, these (HTLR1) are comparable to the model
variable ACTIVE.
One of the important objectives of the Nazi Party was to attract new members through its
newspaper Voelkischer Beobachter. Computing the ratio of new members entering the party each
year to the number of copies printed (Sidman 1965; Rester 1992; Noller and von Kotze 1967), we
had a second data set (HTLR2), which is directly comparable to the model variable PERFORM. A
third data set (HTLR3), the percentage of Stormtroopers (SS) in the party, corresponds to the model
variable ELITE and was gleaned from historical sources (Bennecke 1962; Longerich 1989) and the
German National Archives (Berlin Document Center 1938). Finally, from the six relevant Reichstag
election results (1919, May 1924, December 1924, 1928, 1930 and 1932), we have computed the
percentages of total votes cast for NSDAP (HTLR4), averaging and rounding them so that the

49
election years coincide with the time period of our simulation (1919-33). These data correspond to
the model variable IDENTIF. The four time series and their sources are shown in Table 6.
The column headed HTLR in Table 1 shows the initial values of the four time series. The
differences between Hitler's profile and those of the others are very telling. Hitler's motivational
profile (MOTIVES) fits almost perfectly with that postulated in the theory, which is in line with the
general judgement that he was a charismatic leader par excellence. It is also apparent in his
communication skills. His VISION, on the other hand, seemed feasible at first only to a very small
part of the population, but his quest for self-aggrandizement and power (PERSON) was higher than
that of any of the other leaders (61%). Finally, his vision was clearly not consonant with the current
power structure (.01%), since he planned and brought about the downfall of the German
government.
Another important initialization for these data sets was the exogenous table function
EXTFOR, which affects the model variable CONDUCE during the simulation. This function can
raise or lower conduciveness during the run of a simulation according to independent data. Up till
now we had had no reason to activate this function, but in this case it was clearly indicated by the
events of history. Initially in 1919, conduciveness was still only moderate (44%). The rampant
unemployment of the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, however, made the situation much more
conducive and the German masses more receptive to a charismatic leader than they might have been
in more normal times (Harvey 1993). Hitler exploited this fact to the full. We therefore computed
an index from the unemployment figures for the years 1925-1932 (Petzina 1986:38), and entered this
as a table function for EXTFOR affecting CONDUCE in those years.
The simulation runs gave consistently satisfactory results. The TI of HTLR1 (party
members) with ACTIVE was 73.25%. PERFORM, which is the ratio of organizational output to
input (see above), gave a TI of 69.19. HTLR3 (SS-members) with ELITE gave a TI of 66.27%, and

50
HTLR4 (NSDAP voters) with IDENTIF gave a TI of 85.47%. The plotted results, however (see
Figure 7), show that the model variables could not reproduce the extreme acceleration of
membership increase after 1929. One possible explanation for this is that the unemployment figures
alone do not capture all of the increase in conduciveness that actually occurred. For example, there
was great resentment among the German people of the Versailles Treaty, and there appeared to be
few alternative courses of action to remedy unemployment and social unrest. If that is the case, the
addition of further data may improve the plots.
MARY BAKER EDDY AND THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CHURCH
Although there have been many outstanding women leaders in history, some of whom were
doubtless charismatic (e.g., Joan of Arc), it is very difficult to find reliable time series of data on
their activities and influence. That is why, among the six leaders we have studied, we only have one
female, Mary Baker Eddy. Her many biographers (Cather and Milmine 1909; Dakin 1929; Powell
1930; Wilbur 1938) all attest to her charisma. Dakin (1929:159) writes of "the power that she had
shown on previous occasions of moving an audience to a high degree of emotional exaltation...", and
Cather and Milmine (1909:363) tell of her followers' "devotion to her holding them together,
inspiring them with one purpose, and enabling them to work for one end." While their assessments
of Mary Baker Eddy's personality and of Christian Science as a doctrine differ widely, they all agree
about her charismatic leadership of the movement she founded.
Mrs. Eddy's first attempt at organization was in 1875, with some 60 people in attendance.
That year appeared also the first edition of her book SCIENCE AND HEALTH. The church was
founded officially in 1879, and in 1881 the Massachusetts Metaphysical College was chartered, and
opened a year later in Boston, which was "fertile ground in those days for any new and mysterious
cult... (Dakin 1929:177)." In 1883 the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE JOURNAL was founded, followed
in 1886 by the National Christian Science Association in New York. In 1888, at the second Annual

51
Meeting in Chicago, 800 delegates and 3000 "others" attended. Dakin writes of that meeting, that
"some mysterious vital force seemed to flow out of her into the vast audience..." "... she thrilled her
hearers in words that have been described as pentecostal..." and "even the reporters were so spellbound that they forgot to take notes (pp. 202-3)."
Despite many defections, the movement continued to grow over the next decades. By 1898 it
had some 10,000 members and 40,000 in 1906. The U.S. Census of that year reports 65,717
Christian Scientists, but these included also "adherents". In 1909, the year of Mrs. Eddy's death,
Cather and Milmine (1909:417) report "less than 75,000 Christian Scientists in the world today." In
1926 there were 202,098 members in the United States, and about 250,000 the world over, "but the
number of adherents who are not members is estimated as exceeding the number who are (Dakin
1929:522n)."
Data and Simulations. Data relevant to Eddy's leadership are presented in Table 7 and
Figure 8. The Christian Science Movement does not publish any membership figures, but some of
the biographies contain data for the crucial periods. By interpolating for the missing years we
arrived at a first data set (EDDY1), which is a reasonable estimate of membership growth over the
years. A second set (EDDY2S) comes from the Christian Science Journal, wherein the names of
authorized Christian Science practitioners (healers) are listed each month. We exponentially
smoothed this data set because there were relatively large fluctuations due to exogenous factors, such
as the sudden drop in healers in the years 1904-6 due to Eddy's own precarious health. These data
for the years 1885-1910 were converted into population percentages, and they form the time series
we have tried to reproduce with the model (table 7).
To initialize the model's parameters (Table 1, col.7) we have relied on the evidence provided
in the biographies. In this profile, the one item standing out from the rest is PERSON which, at 99%
is at the upper possible limit. In this Mary Baker Eddy seems unique, but there is ample evidence.

52
The biographers agree that Mrs. Eddy was adamant in her claim to personal revelation and sole
authority, dismissing a series of her most loyal disciples and manipulating the organization to secure
her absolute control of the church and its property.
In her enormous communication skills as well as in the low credibility of her vision she was
very much like that other charismatic par excellence, Adolf Hitler. But, unlike in Hitler's case, the
initial conduciveness to her leadership and message was very low, and the thrall she had over her
followers was extremely shortlived.
With these initial parameters, the model variable COLLECT ("collective identity")
reproduced 79.7% of the variance in membership (EDDY1), and variable ACTIVE ("active
followers") reproduced 79.2% of the variance in healers (EDDY2S). Although the TI values are
satisfactory, the plotted output for COLLECT is almost linear (see Fig. 8). The reason for this is that
the situation was not particularly conducive to Eddy's message. As a result, the percentage of the
population who initially identified with the Christian Science Church was extremely low (0.1%),
never exceeding 0.22% in the whole simulated period. In the other cases COLLECT had been
initially low too, but the situation was much more conducive to charismatic leadership. Even for
HERZL, where COLLECT was 0.16% at first, it eventually rose to over 15%, and for ORDE it came
to over 67%. In short, it is not unusual for COLLECT to begin almost linearly because collective
identity increases very slowly at first and reaches a critical mass at only about 5%. In this case, it
never even came close to that, and the trend remained linear for the entire simulated period.
CONCLUSION
We have now assembled 16 empirical time series on manifestations of the charisma of six
charismatic leaders. Table 8 presents a summary of the findings based on these data sets.
(Table 8 about here)

53
As can be seen from the prior discussion and from the table, the trends predicted by the theory have
all been reproduced by the model. For the three first time-series (i.e., JFK1, JFK2 and JFK3) we still
refined the model itself to reproduce the trends better. After that, that is, for thirteen more data sets
the same model reproduced all the time series without further changes. Nine of the model's 21
variables (AROUSE, COMMIT, BUREAU, DISENCH, IDENTIF, ACTIVE, PERFORM, PERCHA,
ELITE) have been directly tested, some of them more than once. All the rest, however, were also
tested indirectly by way of the various internal feedback loops.
There can, of course, never be positive proof that a theory is correct, but one can attempt to
falsify it. If such attempts are made and fail, confidence in the theory is increased. So far, none of
the tests we have conducted has falsified either the theory or the model. On the contrary, the
multiple tests show that the model is powerful and robust. Thus we are increasingly confident that
the theory of the rise and decline of charismatic leadership is general enough to hold for other cases
of charismatic leadership as well.
(Latest revision: Janaury 261, 1999)

54
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THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. 358: 77-88.
Willner, A. R. 1984. THE SPELLBINDERS: CHARISMATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Winter, D. G., 1991. "A motivational model of leadership: predicting long-term
management success from TAT measures of power motivation and
responsibility," LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY, (in press).
Winter, D. G. 1978. "NAVY LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT COMPETENCIES;
CONVERGENCE AMONG TESTS, INTERVIEWS, AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS,
Boston: McBer and Company.
Wofford, H. 1980. OF KENNEDYS AND KINGS: MAKING SENSE OF THE SIXTIES. New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Woytinski, W. 1929. ZEHN JAHRE NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. Berlin
Wyden, P. 1987. THE UNKNOWN IACOCCA. New York: William Morrow.
Yukl, G. A. and D. D. Van Fleet. (1982). "Cross-situational, multimethod research on
military leader effectiveness," ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE, 30, 87-108.
Zionisten Kongress. 1905, 1908, 1909, 1913, 1935. VERHANDLUNGEN (PROTOCOLS). Koeln:
Juedischer Verlag.

65
APPENDIX 1
Table 1.
PROFILES OF INITIALIZED PARAMETERS FOR
John F. KENNEDY, Theodor HERZL, C. Orde WINGATE,
Lee IACOCCA, Adolf HITLER, AND Mary B. EDDY
PARAMETERS JFK HERZL ORDE LIDO HTLR EDDY
______________________________________________________________
VISION

75

18

43

63

1.2

MOTIVES

64

64

57

80

97

77

COMMUN

65

62

65

86

100

100

PERSON

40

.1

39

CONSON

80

10

INCOND

20

17.3

STAFF

20

2.0

THRALL

26

22

12

HAVEN

10

10

56

61

15

28

.01

90

82

44

1.34

82

68

35

4.0

0.1

Note: The several different data sets for each leader were all
parameters.

99

0
.5
20
reproduced with the same

VISION = the percentage of the population pct. who deem the leader's proposal of change
attractive and feasible.
MOTIVES = the percent overlap between the leader's personality profile and the theoretical
charisma profile.
COMMUN = the probability that the leader communicates high expectations and confidence
in followers.
PERSON = the percent of changes which the leader claims to his/her own credit.
CONSON = the percent of organizational rules that would remain in force after the change is
realized.
INCOND = the population percent who see the current situation as value laden, unstable,
ambiguous, and requiring exceptional effort.
STAFF = the percent of organizational positions held by salaried staff.
THRALL = duration of the leader's direct impact on followers.
HAVEN = the time that persons who joined for personal reasons can find refuge in the
organization.

66
Table 2.

FOUR TIME SERIES OF DATA ON THE PEACE CORPS;

JFK1, JFK2, JFK3, AND JFK4

YEAR GRADUATE PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT

POPULATION APPLIC. JOINERS PAID STAFF LEAVERS
(millions) (JFK1) (JFK2)
(JFK3)
(JFK4)
_________________________________________________________________
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

491
517
555
618
668

2.575
3.878
6.083
7.387
6.306

0.125
0.545
1.197
1.631
1.983

19.91
13.73
12.91
10.14
7.63

----0.141
0.399
0.574
0.793

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

715
773
872
990
1,073

5.909
4.557
3.492
2.446
1.773

2.176
1.936
1.585
1.225
0.887

7.11
7.65
8.81
9.33
10.68

0.975
0.960
0.861
0.642
0.448

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

1,148
1,224
1,280
1,321
1,316

2.307
2.451
2.628
2.283
2.185

0.616
0.563
0.574
0.609
0.533

13.26
14.14
13.10
12.30
15.27

0.286
0.239
0.258
0.290
0.226

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

1,345
1,344
1,342
1,335
1,330

1.352
1.035
1.018
1.360
1.218

0.443
0.428
0.527
0.474
0.451

17.44
17.83
14.90
16.20
16.11

0.164
0.169
0.221
0.185
0.163

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,336
1,353
1,365
1,366
1,374

1.162
1.077
1.233
1.019
1.017

0.408
0.398
0.402
0.417
0.456

16.73
14.08
14.06
13.38
12.49

0.140
0.129
0.125
0.125
0.139

1986 1,384
0.884
0.415
13.30
0.129
1987 1,388
0.741
0.376
16.74
----________________________________________________________________
Sources:
Graduate Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989.
Applications: U.S. General Accounting Office 1989, p.10.
Volunteers and Trainees: Price 1985, p.33.
U.S. General Accounting Office 1989, p.9.
Salaried Staff: U.S. Budget, 1962-1988.
Early Terminations: U.S. General Accounting Office 1989, p.11.

67
Table 3. TWO TIME SERIES OF DATA ON THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION:
HERZL1 AND HERZL2
YEAR ADULT
SHEKEL SMOOTHED
JNF
SMOOTHED
POPULATION PAYERS PERCENT INCOME/
RATIO
(millions)
(HERZL1) OVERHEADS (HERZL2)
_________________________________________________________________
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900

6.01
6.10
6.19
6.27
6.36

00.000
19,600
36,000
78,370
96,434

0.000
0.192
0.425
0.920
1.280

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

1901
1902
1903
1904
1905

6.48
6.61
6.73
6.86
6.98

96,626
91,182
92,828
92,828
92,828

1.406
1.390
1.384
1.364
1.344

1.34
5.03
7.16
7.63
7.29*

1.14
2.70
4.48
5.34
6.36

1906
1907
1908
1909
1910

7.10
7.23
7.35
7.48
7.60

67,195
97,038
76,584
106,224
71,530

1.108
1.247
1.123
1.301
1.084

6.95
9.62
6.45*
3.27
8.36

6.60
7.81
7.27
5.67
6.75

1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

7.72
7.85
7.97
8.10
8.18

104,564
87,871
129,414
45,669
99,278

1.226
1.162
1.437
0.911
1.090

10.52
6.18
3.84*
1.56
1.33

8.26
7.68
6.14
4.31
3.12

1916
8.25
67,926 0.928
1.95
2.65
1917
8.33
48,217 0.719
3.38
2.94
1918
8.40
46,458 0.618
4.52
3.57
_________________________________________________________________
*

Missing Data, interpolated linearly.

Sources:
Population estimates: Encyclopedia Judaica 1971 (5): 1495;
(13): 891.
JNF income/overheads: Berichte des Hauptburos des JNF, 1903-1921; Zionisten Kongress 1935.
Schachtel 1924: 56.
Shekels 1897-1898: Elon 1975: 259.
Shekels 1899-1919: Zionisten Kongress 1935; Boehm 1932.
1935:891-2.

68
Table 4. TWO TIME SERIES OF DATA ON THE SPECIAL NIGHT SQUADS:
ORDE1 AND ORDE2
WEEK
SNS % OF JEWISH SNS ACTIONS ACTIONS INDEX
STARTING MEMBERS1 POLICE2 (smoothed)3 SMOOTHED
(ORDE1)
(ORDE2)
_________________________________________________________________
1/6
24
.723
3
1.00
8/6
24
.723
4
1.33
15/6
24
.723
3
1.00
22/6
24
.723
3.5
1.17
29/6
120
3.617
3.25
1.08
6/7
13/7
20/7
27/7

120
120
120
264

3.617
3.617
3.617
7.957

2.63
1.81
.91
1.45

.88
.60
.30
.48

3/8
10/8
17/8
24/8
31/8

264
264
389
389
389

7.957
7.957
11.724
11.724
11.724

1.23
1.61
1.31
1.15
1.58

.41
.54
.44
.38
.53

7/9
14/9
21/9
28/9

389
489
489
789

11.724
14.738
14.738
23.780

1.29
1.64
1.82
2.91

.43
.55
.61
.97

5/10
839
25.286
1.96
.65
12/10
839
25.286
1.48
.49
19/10
839
25.286
1.24
.41
26/10
839
25.286
1.12
.37
_________________________________________________________________
Sources:
1. Sefer Toledot Hahagana (History of the Hagana), edited by Benzion Di-Nur. Tel Aviv: Maarahot
19 : 911-938.
2. Colonial Report for the Year 1938: Palestine and Transjordan. London: H.M.S.O. 1939: 1-306.
Our thanks go to Professor and Mrs. Wolfgang Rothenstein for their help in tracking down this
report.
3. Personal interviews with veterans of the SNS: Mr. Abraham Akavia, Haifa; Mr. Israel Carmi,
Haifa; Mr. Meir Davidson, Kibbutz Eilon; Mr. Shaul Dagan, Haifa. We tender our sincere thanks to
these gentlemen for their courtesy and help in reconstructing past experiences and events.

69
Table 5. TWO TIME SERIES OF DATA ON THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION:
LIDO1, AND LIDO2
YEAR QTR POPULATION % CHRYSLER
SALES/COSTS
CAR BUYERS
RATIO
(LIDO1)
(LIDO2)
________________________________________________________
1980

6,688,298
13.99
.8024
13.99
.9216

6,536,221
14.39
.8932
14.79
1.0068
15.19
.9478
15.58
.9765

5,294,848
16.26
.9658
16.94
1.0378
17.62
.9955
18.30
.9679

6,976,359
18.26
1.0294
18.21
1.0492
18.17
1.0183
18.12
1.0603

7,852,531
19.12
1.0849
20.12
1.0932
21.12
1.0374
22.11
1.1051

4
1981
2
3
4
1982
2
3
4
1983
2
3
4
1984
2
3
4
1985

1 8,218,003
22.16
1.1023
2
22.20
1.1093
3
22.55
1.0746
4
22.90
1.0409
_______________________________________________________
Sources: Annual Reports of Chrysler Corp., 1980-1985.
Statistical Abstracts of the U.S. 1986, p.598
(for Total New Cars bought).

70
Table 6.

FOUR TIME SERIES ON THE NAZI PARTY (NSDAP):

HTLR1, HTLR2, HTLR3 AND HTLR4

YEAR ADULT PCT PARTY NEW MBRS/ PCT. SS PCT. NSDAP

POPULATION MEMBERS V.B. CIRLN. MEMBERS VOTERS
(millions) (HTLR1)b (HTLR2)c (HTLR3)d (HTLR4)e
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923

45,000a
45,250
45,500
45,750
46,000a

0.0005
0.0052
0.0095
0.0179
0.1202

0.0713
0.1944
0.2120
0.3671
1.9619

.00000
.00004
.00011
.00028
.00052

0.00

1924
1925
1926
1927
1928

46,400
46,800
47,200
47,600
48,000

0.0431
0.0579
0.1049
0.1525
0.2265

1.0000
1.5816
2.0375
1.6632
2.4085

.00069
.00085
.00090
.00100
.00110

4.80

1929 48,400 0.3645

3.7616
.00120
10.5
1930 48,800 0.7971
5.4090
.03130
1931 49,200 1.6388
3.2399
.06100
1932 49,600 2.8528
5.2393
.10800
37.3
1933 50,000a 4.4473
6.3426
.20800
40.0f
_________________________________________________________________
Sources:
(a) Census figures, the rest linearly interpolated.
(b) Computed from Manstein 1988.
(c) Noller and von Kotze 1967; Rester 1992; Sidman 1965.
(d) Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP 1937;
Longerich 1989; Bennecke 1962.
(e) The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1927, 1933.
Woytinski 1929: 199.
(f) Estimated projection.
Table 7. TWO TIME SERIES OF DATA ON MARY BAKER EDDY
AND THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MOVEMENT
YEAR POP.a
Millions

Nb

1885
1886

172
(306)

MEMBERS
HEALERS
Pop.%.
Nc
Pop.%d
EDDY1
EDDY2S
_________________________________________________________________
18.0
18.5

.0010
.0018

49
84

.0003
.0004

71
1887
1888
1889

18.9
19.5
19.9

440
1600
(5162)

.0023
.0082
.0259

100
93
113

.0005
.0005
.0005

1890
1891
1892
1893
1894

20.4
20.9
21.4
21.9
22.4

8724
(7657)
(6590)
(5522)
4454

.0428
.0366
.0308
.0252
.0199

200
262
313
356
629

.0007
.0010
.0013
.0015
.0020

1895
1896
1897
1898
1899

22.9
23.3
24.4
24.4
24.9

(5841)
(7227)
(8613)
10000
(13000)

.0255
.0310
.0353
.0410
.0522

728
893
1213
2334
2482

.0027
.0032
.0040
.0062
.0086

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904

25.4
26.0
26.7
27.3
27.9

16000
(20000)
24000
(28500)
(32000)

.0630
.0769
.0899
.1026
.1147

4132
3542
4866
4028
3218

.0117
.0138
.0152
.0160
.0141

1905 28.6
(36000)
.1259
2978
.0120
1906 29.3
40011
.1366
3184
.0111
1907 29.9
43876
.1467
4017
.0118
1908 30.7
(52584)
.1713
4049
.0128
1909 31.4
(61626)
.1963
3896
.0128
1910 32.2
70000
.2174
3911
.0124
_________________________________________________________________
Sources:
a. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the U.S. 1975.
total resident population aged
20 years and over, less 40% in incompatible denominations.
b. Dakin 1929; Cather and Milmine 1909. The bracketed figures
c. The Christian Science Journal, 1885-1911.
d. Exponentially smoothed (alpha=.67).

The referent population is the

denote linear interpolations.

Table 8. FINDINGS FROM THE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE THEORY

Leader
J.F. Kennedy

Organization

Data Set
Variance

Reproduced

Peace Corps 1. Applications

86.5
2. Committed Volunteers 85.7
3. Salaried Staff
62.3
4. Early Terminators
81.9

72

Th. Herzl

World Zionist 1. Members

72.2
Organization 2. Land Purchase Budget 76.0

Orde Wingate Special Night 1. Volunteers

Squads (SNS) 2. Military Actions
L. Iaccoca

90.3
65.9

Chrysler Motor 1. New Car Buyers

Corporation 2. Quarterly Profit
76.1

Adolf Hitler

Nazi Party
1. Total Party Members
2. Annual New Members
67.1
3. SS Members
65.0
4. NSDAP Voters
85.5

78.2
73.2

M. Baker Eddy Christian

1. Members
79.7
Science Church 2. Active Healers
79.2
________________________________________________________________
Mean Reproduced Variance 76.6
===============================

73
APPENDIX 2

CHARCODE

A Model of Charismatic Leadership

SECTION I. INITIALIZATIONS (set for ORDE)
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C

INIDEN=2
Initial Identifiers (pct.)
INACT=1
Initial Active
(pct.)
IELITE=.723 Initial Elite
(pct.)
MOTIVES=57 Leader's Motives (pct.)
VISION=.43 Leader's Vision (prob.)
COMMUN=.65 Leader's Communication Skill (prob.)
PERSON=39
Leader's Personalized Charisma (pct.)
CONSON=15
Consonance with Power Structure (pct.)
INCOND=90
Structural Conducivenss (pct.)
THRALL=12
Duration of Leader's Direct Impact (Time)
HAVEN=10
Period one can shelter in ELITE (Time)
OUST=0
Ousting of Current Powerholders (flag)
IPERF=.6
Initial Output/Input (ratio)
YESCRI=0
Crisis (flag)
YESPOP=0
Popular Support (flag)
STAFF=4
Salaried Staff (pct.)
IMMUNE=.1
Followers Immune to Bureaucratization (pct.)
DELITA=2.1 Delay from IDENTIF to ACTIVE
DELATE=20
Delay from ACTIVE to ELITE
DELATI=10.3 Delay from ACTIVE to IDENTIF
DELPTR=17.6 Delay from PERFORM to ROUTINE
BEGTIME=0
Starting Time of Simulation (Time)
ENDTIME=21 Finishing Time of Simulation (Time)
SECTION II. VARIABLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

A
A
T
A
T
A
T
L
N
A
T
A

CONDUCE.K=INCOND*EXTFOR.K*COLLRF.K Strl. Conducivenss

EXTFOR.K=TABHL(TEXTFOR,TIME.K,0,5,1) Exogenous Forces
TEXTFOR=1/1/1/1/1/1
Conduciveness Multiplier
COLLRF.K=TABLE(TCOLLRF,COLLECT.K,0,100,10)
TCOLLRF=1.0/.97/.92/.83/.70/.50/.30/.17/.08/.03/.001
Collective Identity Multiplier
FADE.K=TABHL(TFADE,TIME.K,BEGTIME,BEGTIME+THRALL,THRALL/10)
TFADE=1/.97/.92/.85/.75/.65/.57/.50/.50/.50/.50
Fading of Charisma
ACCEPT.K=ACCEPT.J+DT*(ALIEN.JK-RECOG.JK)
ACCEPT=100-INIDEN-INACT-IELITE
Accepters (pct.)
CONTAG.K=1+TABLE(TCONTAG,COLLECT.K,0,100,10)
TCONTAG=0/.03/.08/.17/.3/.5/.7/.83/.92/.97/1
Contagion Multiplier
ARTIC.K=((MOTIVES/100)*(VISION/100))*FADE.K
Articulation (prob.)

74
L IDENTIF.K=IDENTIF.J+DT*(RECOG.JK-AROUSE.JK+DEPERS.JK-ALIEN.JK)
N IDENTIF=INIDEN
Identifiers (pct.)
A EXPCON.K=100*((ARTIC.K*(COMMUN/100))*ACTMUL.K*FADE.K)
Expressions of Confidence (pct.)
A ACTMUL.K=TABHL(TACTMUL,ACTIVE.K,0,100,10)
T TACTMUL=1.5/1.47/1.41/1.33/1.24/1.16/1.1/1.06/1.03/1.01/1
Multiplier from ACTIVE
A EEXPCON.K=CLIP(100,EXPCON.K,EXPCON.K,100) Safety Clip
L ACTIVE.K=ACTIVE.J+DT*^
(AROUSE.JK-COMMIT.JK+DISENCH.JK-DEPERS.JK)
N ACTIVE=INACT
Active Participants (pct.)
A ROLEMOD.K=((EEXPCON.K/100)*MODRF.K)*((100-PERSON)/100)*FADE.K
Role Modeling (prob.)
A MODRF.K=TABHL(TMODRF,PERCHA.K,0,2,.2)
T TMODRF=1/.97/.92/.85/.7/.5/.3/.15/.08/.03/.001
Reduction Factor of Metamorphic Effect A
RROLEMOD.K=CLIP(1,ROLEMOD.K,ROLEMOD.K,1)
Safety Clip
L ELITE.K=ELITE.J+DT*(COMMIT.JK-DISENCH.JK)
N ELITE=IELITE
Committed Elite (pct.)
A COLLECT.K=100-ACCEPT.K Collective Identity (pct.)
A AUTREIN.K=(ACTIVE.K/2)+ELITE.K Autonomous Reinforced (pct.) A
POPULAR.K=YESPOP*TABLE(TPOPULAR,IDENTIF.K,0,100,10)
T TPOPULAR=0/5/12/22/35/50/65/78/88/95/100 Popular Support
A AUTEFF.K=TABLE(TAUTEFF,AUTREIN.K,0,100,10)
T TAUTEFF=1/1.1/1.25/1.4/1.7/2/2.3/2.6/2.75/2.9/3
Autonomous Reinforcement Multiplier
A CRISIS.K=YESCRI*TABHL(TCRISIS,TIME.K,0,4,1)
T TCRISIS=1/1/1/1/1
Exogenous Crisis Function
A PERFORM.K=CLIP(IPERF,(IPERF+POPULAR.K)*AUTEFF.K,BEGTIME,^
TIME.K)*CLIP(CRISIS.K,1,CRISIS.K,0.5) Performance (ratio)
A PERCHA.K=PERFORM.K/IPERF Performance Change (d.less)
A PEREFF.K=TABHL(TPEREFF,PERCHA.K,.8,3,.2)
T TPEREFF=.1/1/3/8/15/30/50/70/85/92/97/100
Performance Change Multiplier
A SUPPORT.K=CLIP(COLLECT.K,PEREFF.K,OUST,.5)
Support for OUST
A ROUTINE.K=DLINF3(SUPPORT.K,DELPTR)*CONSON/100
Routinization (pct.)
A BUREAU.K=(STAFF+((ACTIVE.K+ELITE.K)*ROUTINE.K))/^
((ACTIVE.K+ELITE.K)*IMMUNE) Bureaucratization (pct.)
A DISPLAC.K=COLLECT.K*(BUREF.K/100) Goal Displacement (pct.)
A BUREF.K=TABLE(TBUREF,BUREAU.K,0,100,10)
T TBUREF=5/8/13/20/30/45/60/70/77/82/85
Bureaucratization Multiplier
SECTION III. RATES OF CHANGE
R RECOG.KL=ACCEPT.K*ARTIC.K*(CONDUCE.K/100)*CONTAG.K

75
Pct. Recognize/time
R AROUSE.KL=DELAY1((EEXPCON.K/100),DELITA)*IDENTIF.K
Pct. Aroused/time
R COMMIT.KL=DELAY1(RROLEMOD.K,DELATE)*ACTIVE.K
Pct. Committed/time
A FRINGE.K=TABHL(TFRINGE,TIME.K,BEGTIME,BEGTIME+^
HAVEN,HAVEN/10)
Lunatic Fringe (pct.)
T TFRINGE=15/14.8/14.5/14/13/11/7/3/1/.5/.2
R DISENCH.KL=(ROUTINE.K/(100-PERSON))*ELITE.K*FRINGE.K
Pct. Disenchanted/time
R DEPERS.KL=ACTIVE.K*DELAY1(DEPERF.K,DELATI)
Pct. Depersonalized/time
A DEPERF.K=TABLE(TDEPERF,BUREAU.K,0,100,10)
T TDEPERF=0/.03/.08/.17/.3/.5/.7/.83/.92/.97/1
Depersonalization Multiplier
R ALIEN.KL=(DISPLAC.K/100)*IDENTIF.K
Pct. Alienated/time
RUN SPECIFICATIONS
A TERM.K=CLIP(0,1,0,IDENTIF.K)*CLIP(0,1,0,ACTIVE.K)^
*CLIP(0,1,0,ELITE.K)
Run Termination
A LENGTH.K=CLIP(TIME.K,ENDTIME,0,TERM.K) Run Length
SAVE ACCEPT,IDENTIF,ACTIVE,ELITE,COLLECT,CONDUCE,CONTAG,EXTFOR,^
ARTIC,FADE,EEXPCON,RROLEMOD,AUTREIN,PERFORM,PERCHA,^
ROUTINE,BUREAU,DISPLAC,RECOG,AROUSE,COMMIT,DISENCH,DEPERS,^
ALIEN,FRINGE,SUPPORT,POPULAR
SPEC DT=.125,PRTPER=1,PLTPER=1,SAVPER=1