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1 Introduction
In "Dialectic and Dialetheic" (thisjournal, Vol. 53, 1989, 388-415;
hereafter, DD) I argued that a number of the more central contradictionsin the dialectics of Hegel and Marx are straightforward
logical contradictionsof the formA8c- A. In "A MaterialistCritique of
Hegel's Concept of Identityof Opposites" (thisjournal, Vol. 54, 1990,
147-166; hereafter,MC) Erwin Marquit takes issue withthe claim. He
agrees that this is so in Hegel (and even Engels). The crux of the
disagreementis whetherit is so in Marx, and more generally,in materialist dialectic. In this briefreply I will assess his arguments.These fall
into threecategories:i) general logical considerations;ii) the difference
between idealist and materialistdialectic; and iii) analyses of specific
examples. I will take these in turn.
2 General Logical Considerations
The firstargument concerns the nature of logic. Dialetheism is
ruled out by formal logic. Modern formallogic "retains the essential
contentof the [classical]law of non-contradiction"
(MC, 162); and (MC,
147) "logicianspoint out thatif one accepts a logical contradiction,any
statementcan be proved as true" (ex contradictione
quodlibet).
468
469
theseremarksignoreaspectsof modernlogic,to
Unfortunately,
to call attention.
The use of formalmethwhichmyarticlewas trying
ods providespowerfultechniquesin logic,butthesecan be appliedto
of formallogic.Consequently
thereis notjust
givenumeroussystems
one modernformallogic: thereare many.In some,the Principleof
Non-Contradiction
holds;in someitfails.Exactlythesameis trueof all
theotherprinciplesof traditional
logic,includingthe Principleof Exholds
cluded Middle and ex contradictione.
Logics where ex contradictione
are notpermissible
whenMarquitsays"logicalcontradictions
Similarly,
in theoreticalinvestigations"
(MC, 165) thisbegs the question;and,
have been toleratedin
moreover,is quitefalse.Logicalcontradictions
of
in
For
theoretical
investigations. example, Dirac'sformulation
many
conwas
5-function
of
the
the
behavior
mechanics
quite
quantum
theearlycalculuswas
butthiswasallowedtostand.Similarly,
tradictory,
behaviorof infinitesimals
based on the explicitly
(see
contradictory
Priest,et ai, 1989, 369, 374-7, 494f). Of course,thesetheorieswere
eventuallyreplaced. But the replacementof the old calculus had
(see Lakatos,1978);and in anycase,
nothingtodo withitsinconsistency
and the periodforwhichthe old
all theoriesget replacedeventually,
of scientific
calculuswas acceptedwas muchlongerthanthe half-life
therefore
theories.These generallogicalarguments
carryno weight.
470
SCIENCE f SOCIETY
3 Idealistvs. MaterialistDialectic
between
deals withthe difference
The nextsortof consideration
dialectic.The generalidea is thatidealistdialectic
idealistand materialist
is committedto dialetheismbecause of its idealism,ratherthan its
version.Marquitsumsup
dialectics.This thenlapsesin thematerialist
as follows(MC, 165):
the considerations
wasrootedin hisdialecticalidealism,in
Hegel'sneed forlogicalcontradictions
in a processof
in thought
whichtheworldunfoldsfromtheIdea as movements
dialecticalnegationfromone oppositeto another,ratherthanin thehistorical
developmentof matter,in whichthe processof diprocessof evolutionary
inessence,being
alecticalnegationunfoldsintime.Hegel'sdialectical
unfolding,
as
a
of
contradictions
the
ahistorical,
consequenceof
required acceptance logical
in every
of oppositesas an absoluteidentity
the need to regardthe identity
dialecticshas no suchneed.
respect.Materialist
471
472
SCIENCE f SOCIETY
But this does not show that there is no contradiction.For the simple
form of value is only a moment,the simplestabstraction,of the exchange process. Marx goes on to analyze others. Moreover, in reality,
thismomentnever occurs on its own. Clearly,it is alwaysaccompanied
by itsopposite. If A is exchanged forB, thenB is exchanged forA. Thus,
in reality,as opposed to a simple abstractionfromit,both commodities
are exchangorsand exchangees,and so use-valuesand exchange-values.
(This, I take it, is Ilyenkov'spoint; MC, 163.)
Nor willit help to evade contradictionby sayingthatqua exchangor
the commodityis a value, whilstqua exchangee the commodityis a
and the roles of exchangor
use-value. For real exchange is symmetrical,
and exchangee are exactlythe same role. Exchangingx fory is exactly
the same as x being exchanged fory. Thus, in the process of exchange a
commodityis a use-value and an exchange-value,as the quotation from
Marx that I gave (DD, 407) states.
It is interestingto compare the treatmentin Capitalwiththe correto theCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy.
sponding treatmentin A Contribution
Here Marx says (1971, 40; all italicsoriginal): "The commodityis a use
value, wheat, linen, diamond, machinery,etc. but as a commodityit is
simultaneouslynota use value." This is as clear a statementof a contradictionas one could get. But the nextsentencegoes on: "It would not
be a commodity,ifit were a use-value forthe owner. . . . For itsowner it
is on the contrarya non-use-value..." This might appear to imply
Marquit's distinction,except that Marx continues:
inthefirst
. . . hasstilltobecome
a use-value,
The commodity
placea use-valuefor
others.. . . The commodity
must,on theotherhand,becomea use-valueforits
sincehis meansof existenceexistoutsideit,in the use-valueof other
owner,
. . . Thus theuse-values
ofcommodities
become
use-values
people'scommodities.
of
a
mutual
by
exchange places.
Thus, Marx is clear that as exchangor it is simultaneouslya use-value
and an exchange-value. Indeed, it becomes a use-value by being an
exchange-value.
The second example concernsthe nature of bound labor. I argued
that it is both free and not-free,and thisfor a number of reasons (any
one of whichis sufficientto make the point). Let us see whetherMarquit
has any more success in applyingthe difference-in-respect
policyhere.
One considerationwhichgrounds the contradictorynatureof wage
labor, in particular,is thatthe laborersare freeto sell theirlabor-power
as theychoose; yettheyare hardlyfree,since the alternativeis starvation
and death. In what I take to be his commenton this,Marquit says (MC,
162):
473
or notentering
into
theworkers
are freeonlyinrespecttothechoiceofentering
of
oflabor,butare notfreewithrespecttothechoiceoftheconditions
a contract
laboras longas theydo nothave themeansof productionat theirdisposal.
But thisis to missthe point. It is notjust thattheyare not freeto choose
the conditionsof labor; theyare not free not to labor; because not to
labor is to die. The situation is exactly the same as that of Sartre's
occupied peoples (DD, 404), whichI have already discussed,and so will
say no more.
The situationwithrespectto the otherconsiderationwhichgrounds
the contradictioninvolved in any bound labor is more complex. The
considerationis simplythatsuch labor isforced,and thereforenot free.
However, it is labor nonetheless,and as such it is autonomous selfproduction.As Marx puts it (in partof the quotationthatMarquitomits;
DD, 408): "thisovercomingof obstaclesis in itselfa liberatingactivity."
In what I take to be his commenton this,Marquit says (MC, 161-2):
of
conditionforthecontinuation
in consciouslaboris a necessary
Participation
ofboundlabor. . . the
. . . Underconditions
humanexistence(self-realization).
discussed
one of theirmanyneeds,the self-realization
laborersare satisfying
ofotherneeds- adequatediet,housing,
above.Butwithrespecttothemeeting
rest,education,etc.- thelaborersare notfreeand cannotbe freewithoutthe
of
thedetermination
theproductoftheirlabor,including
powerto appropriate
theconditionsunderwhichtheirlaboris beingperformed.
Thus, the bound laborers are free in respect of realizing themselves,
but not free in respect of how theyeat, shelter,learn and, quite generally,labor. But this is a strange distinction.What is self-realization
(continued existence) other than eating,sleeping, learning,and all the
other material practices that make up human life? It seems to me
that unless one mystifiesself-realization,these two are exactly the
same thing.There is no differencein respect at all! So this contradiction stands too.
5 Motion
The final example that Marquit discusses is of rather a different
kind: motion. This comes fromthe dialecticsof nature ratherthan the
dialecticsof humanity.Thus considerationsfromnatural science enter.
The subject is too complex to discuss properlyhere, involvinghighly
technicalissues such as the correctinterpretationof the formalismof
quantum mechanics; so I will say only a few words.
The problem is posed by Zeno's paradox of the arrow. Both Marquit and I agree thatthe orthodox,Russellean,solutionto the problem
474
SCIENCE f SOCIETY
The University
of Queensland
Queensland,Australia
475
REFERENCES
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Collected
Papers,eds.J. Worralland G. Currie.NewYork:CambridgeUniPress.
versity
ofMotioninContinuous
and DiscreteSpaces."
Marquit,Erwin.1979."Dialectics
Science&fSociety,42, 410-425.
to the Critiqueof PoliticalEconomy.London:
Marx, Karl. 1971. A Contribution
Lawrenceand Wishart.
. 1976. Capital,Vol. I. New York:Penguin.
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Priest,Graham.1985."Inconsistencies
QuarPhilosophical
339-46.
22,
terly,
. 1987.In Contradiction.
The Hague: Nijhoff.
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1990-1991,