The Hijaz, Abdulhamid II and Amir Hussein's Secret Dealings with the British, 1877-80

Author(s): . Tufan Buzpinar

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 99-123
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Hijaz, AbdulhamidII and AmirHussein's

Secret Dealingswith the British, 1877-80
$. TUFAN

BUZPINAR

The vilayet of the Hijaz enjoyed a unique religious significance, as the

birthplace of Islam, the site of the two Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina,
and the object of the annual hajj pilgrimage by Muslims from around the
world. Its possession was of great importance to the religious legitimacy
of the Ottoman Sultans, who since assuming sovereignty over the Hijaz in
1517 had styled themselves 'Servant of the Two Holy Places' (Khadim alHaramayn al-Sharifayn). Above all, the possession of the Hijaz underpinned their claim to be considered Caliphs as well as Sultans, and thereby
guaranteed the loyalty of their Muslim subjects. As Abdulhamid noted:
what is desired is the endurance of the state. This depends on four
things: first, protection of our religion,Islam; second, endurance of
the Ottoman dynasty; third, preservation of Mecca and Medina and
finally keeping Istanbul as our capital.'
Furthermore, the fact that the Hijaz had religious significance for nonOttoman as well as Ottoman Muslims, and that thousandsof non-Ottomans
visited it on the annual hajj, served to raise the Sultan-Caliph's prestige
among Muslims throughout the world, and offered him an opportunity to
spread his influence and the notions of Muslim solidarity and unity
generally characterized as 'pan-Islamism', among non-Ottoman Muslims.
The role of the Hijaz in the cause of pan-Islamism was discussed in an
anonymous article in the Tercuman-i Hakikat in 1881.2The author, who
mentions that he lived in the Hijaz for more than seven years, and was
well acquainted with pilgrims from every part of the Muslim world,
suggested that Mecca should be used as a distribution centre for panIslamic books and pamphlets. This, he argued, could easily be achieved
through a pan-Islamic society, the headquarters of which would be in
Istanbul. Even before the publication of this article in a semi-official
newspaper, the Ottoman authorities had made attempts to use the Holy
Cities for propaganda purposes. In late 1877 the Grand Vizier Ethem
Paa was instructed by Abdulhamid to send several hundred copies of a
book by Ibn Nuhas Mashari'al-'Ashwaq ila Masari al-'Ishaq (The Paths of
Longing to the Battleground of Lovers [of God]) and an anonymous
pamphlet called Mushir al-Gharam (Guide to the love [of God]) to the
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1, January 1995, pp.99-123
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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100

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Hijazfor distributionamongthatyear'spilgrims.The factthatthe bookis

a detailedexpositionof jihad (holy war) in Islamwould explainin itself
why the Sultanhad orderedits distributionin the Hijaz. Although the
pamphlethas not been traced,it could be concludedthat the authorities
hadfoundthe contentsof bothpublicationssatisfactoryforthe purposeof
enlistingMuslimsupport.3
However, the Hijaz'sinternationalsignificanceas a centre for world
Muslimscarriedrisksas well as benefitsfor the Ottomangovernment.It
attractedthe attentionof foreignpowersand,aboveall, of thoseEuropean
powerswhose colonialexpansionhad broughtthemsubstantialnumbers
of Muslimsubjects:Britain, France, Russia and Holland. All of these
countriessent large numbersof Muslimpilgrimsto Mecca and held the
Ottomangovernmentresponsiblefor theirwelfare.The Ottomangovernment was preparedto accepttheir interestin the pilgrimsas legitimate
and co-operatedwith the powersin draftingregulationsgoverningtransport, hygieneandothermattersaffectingpilgrimsin the Hijaz.However,
the Ottomangovernmentwasinevitablyconcernedlest thisinterestin the
welfare of the pilgrims develop into an attempt to exercise political
influencein the Hijaz.Fromtime to timeit felt obligedto complainabout
the attemptsof the Europeanconsulsin Jeddato meddlein hajj affairs,4
and, as will be seen, it had some reasonto fear that Britainin particular
might attempt to underminethe loyalty of the Amirs of Mecca upon
whose co-operationthe maintenanceof Ottomanauthorityin the Hijaz
depended.
Yet if the religiousimportanceof the Hijaz is set aside, the vilayet
exhibited none of the characteristicsof the Ottoman Empire's 'inner
circle'of provinces- those provinceswhichhadbeen fullyintegratedinto
the centralizedadministrativeand militarysystem developed since the
1830s.5It was remote from the capital, poor and thinly populated.No
censushadbeen takenthere,butthe bestguessis thatthe totalpopulation
of three major cities, Jedda, Mecca and Medina, was a little more
than 100,000.6This populationwas almostentirelyMuslimand Arabicspeaking:the only exceptionswere a numberof non-ArabMuslimswho
residedin the Holy Citiesof MeccaandMedina,anda few foreigntraders
and consulsestablishedin Jedda, the vilayet'smainport. The Hijaz had
no particularstrategicimportance:at the beginningof Abdulhamid's
reigntherewere nc morethana few hundredregulartroopsin the entire
Hijaz, and their numbernever rose above a few thousand.There is no
evidence that the provincewas regardedin Istanbulas a candidatefor
economic development. Financially,it was a burden upon the central
government.For example, in 1884-85 the total income of the province
was 25,518,905 kuru, of which only 1,533,934 kuru, came from locally

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

101

raisedrevenue.In effect, the centralgovernmentwas obligedto dispurse

largeannualsubsidiesto the Hijaz,one thirdof whichwasdrawnfromthe
revenuesof the Ministryof Pious Foundationsand the remainderfrom
the FinanceMinistry.Thesesubsidiessupportedthe localadministration,
police and armedforces, but in additionthey covereddonations,salaries
and allowancespaidto Hijazinotables,sumspaidto bedouinchiefsas an
incentiveto desistfromraiding,fundsfor the purchaseof food andbasic
commoditiesfor the population,andmoniesdevotedto the upkeepof the
Holy places. One third of the subsidies were allocated to the surres,
donationspaidannuallyforthe benefitof the HolyCities,the hajjcaravan,
and the bedouinchiefswho controlledthe caravanroute.7
Governmentauthorityin the Hijaz was weak, at least if authorityis
interpretedin the Tanzimatsense as centralizedadministrativecontrol.
The provincefurnishedno conscriptsandfew taxes, andlawsandregulations issued from Istanbulwere by no means fully implementedthere.
Variousfactorsaccountedfor this. In the firstplace, the Hijazwas not a
settled region. Much of its populationhad a tribal organization,many
being nomadicbedouinswho lived at least partlyby raiding.Fightsand
disorderswere not infrequent,and law andorderwas precariousoutside
the chief towns. Regrettablylittle is known about the complex tribal
politics of the region, but these undoubtedlyinfluenced the central
government'swillingnessto tolerate a form of dual power in the Hijaz,
underwhichthe authorityof its own officialswas qualifiedby that of the
indigenousAmirsof Mecca.In the secondplace, the Hijazwaspoor:the
vilayetlackedthe financialresourcesto sustainan efficientadministration
and a large garrision.Finally, the strong religiousconservatismof the
Hijaz's population, reinforced by the province's dependence on the
annualhajj, distancedit somewhatfromthe Ottomangovernment.From
the start, the Hijazis displayed considerableantagonismtowards the
Tanzimat
reforms,andinthe 1850stheAmirof MeccaSharifAbdulmuttalib
had led an unsuccessfulrevolt againstthem, allegingthat the Ottoman
governmentwas adoptingChristianways. In general,the centralgovernmentseemsto haveshiedawayfrominnovationsin the Hijaz;it is striking
thatthe authoritieschose to collecttaxesfromthe wealthiertribesaround
Medinaunderthe traditionalreligiousnamezekat(legal alms).8
The Ottoman governmentoperated a unique system of dual authority
in the Hijaz. Like other provinces,the Hijaz was administrativelysubordinatedto a Vali who served as the Sultan'srepresentativeand was
appointedand recallableby the centralgovernment.But in practice,the
Vali was obliged to share authoritywith the Amir of Mecca, who was

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102

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

similarly considered to be the Sultan's representative, and was selected by

the Sultanfrom amongthe Sharifs,the descendantsof the Prophetwho

resided in Mecca. The institutionof the Amirate predatedthe Hijaz's
submissionto Ottomanrule in 1517, and had been maintainedthrough
three centuriesof Ottomanrule and the briefperiodof Egyptianrule in
the Hijazin the 1830s.Fromthe 1830sonwards,however,it becamethe
custom to select the Amirs from only two Sharifianfamilies, the rival
houses of Zawi Zaid and Zawi Awn. This practicehad been initiated
duringthe periodof Egyptianrule,buthadno formallegalbasis:as late as
1880 some Ottoman statesmen took the view that the Sultan was not
obliged to limit his choice to the Zaids and the Awns, but was free to
select a memberof anySharifianfamily.But the realitywasthatthe Zaids
and the Awns were the two most powerfulfamilies, and the practiceof
conferringthe Amirate on either was a useful means of pursuingthe
politicsof 'divideandrule', andlimitingthe powerof both. The problem
was that the rivalrybetween the Zaids and the Awns was a permanent
sourceof tension and conflictin the Hijaz, and this in turncreateddifficulties for the Valis and for the centralgovernment.Both familieshad
their local clients and tribalsupporters,and the reigningAmir, whether
Zaid or Awn, woulduse every availablemeansto curbthe influenceand
underminethe incomeof the rivalhouse. Valisfoundit difficultto maintaingood relationswithbothfamilies,andfoundthemselveseasilydrawn
into local conflicts. As will be seen, Abdulhamidwas more than once
obligedto recallValis who had fallen foul of the Amirs.
To complicate matters further, the prerogativesand duties of the
Amirswerenowhereformallydefinedandtherewasno cleardemarcation
between the authorityof the Amir and that of the Vali. By custom, the
Amirsmaintainedtheirown smallmilitaryforce, calledal-Bisha,consisting of approximately500men, andemployedtheirown militaryaides-decamp. They employedsecretariesto correspondin Arabicand Turkish,
appointeddeputiesto serve them in Jeddaand other townsin the Hijaz,
and certain subordinateofficials who dealt with financial,judicialand
religiousmatters.Theyalso enjoyedrightsof adjudicationin certainlegal
disputes,especiallythose betweenpilgrimsand local bedouins.9
From the availableevidenceit may be inferredthat in Abdulhamid's
reigncentralgovernmenttook the view that the Amir'sdutieswere first,
andto supportandto spread
to remainloyalto the OttomanSultan-Caliph
his influencein the Hijaz;second, to ensure the safety and propertyof
pilgrimsandmerchants;andfinally,to distributethe surresandothergifts
and subsidiessent to the Hijaz, and to do so justly. The extent of the
Amir'sother powersand obligationswas left unclear.Indeed, it was not
even certainwhetherhis authorityextendedto the wholeHijazor whether

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

103

it was confinedto Mecca and its immediateenvirons.In certaincircumstancesthe centralgovernmentwasinclinedto the latterview:forexample,
it statedthat the jurisdictionof the chief Kadiof Meccawas co-extensive
with that of the Amir, but added that this consisted of Mecca and its
dependentvillages. But on the other hand the centralgovernmentwas
willingto acceptthat the Amir'sde facto influenceextendedfar beyond
Mecca,andwas quitehappyto use thisinfluencefor its own purposes,for
example, in subjugatingtroublesome tribal sheikhs elsewhere in the
Hijaz.Indeed, Abdulhamidin particularappearsto have believedthatit
was the Amir'sdutyto spreadthe influenceandauthorityof the Ottoman
state amongthe bedouinsof the Hijaz.0
The powersof the Valiwerescarcelybetterdefined.In theory,the Vali
wasthe Sultan'srepresentative,empoweredto directandsuperviseallsubordinateOttomanofficials:the Kaymakams,Miidirs,Shaykhulharams,
officialsof the Prophet'smosque in Medina, and the Muhafiz,garrison
commanderof Medina. But he was not allowed to appoint, dismissor
transferthese officialson his own authority.Nor did he have any clear
authorityoverthe Amir,thoughthe Valiswereinstructedin generalterms
to watchover the Amirsand ensurethey actedwithinreasonablelimitsa vague enoughprovision,whichcoveredeverythingfrom abusesof the
populationto acts of treason againstthe OttomanEmpire. In practice,
the mainduty of the Vali, like that of the Amir, was to upholdOttoman
authorityin the Hijaz, and to protect the honour and prestige of the
Ottoman Sultan-Caliphin the eyes of the Muslimsof the world - the
pilgrimswho came on the annualhajj,andthe Indian,CentralAsian and
JavaneseMuslimswho choose to settle in Mecca for religiousreasons.
Practically,thismeantassuringthe securityof the annualpilgrimcaravans
and protectingpilgrimsfrom disease and other misfortunes.It may be
noted that the only formal regulation promulgatedby the Ottoman
governmentin respectof the Hijazwas one concerningthe pilgrimage:it
coveredsuchmattersas the transportand hygieneof pilgrims.1"
Given the lack of institutionalarrangements,the achievementof the
Ottoman government'sobjectives in the Hijaz depended upon close
co-operationbetween the Valis and the Amirs, a point whichthe Porte
repeatedly impressed upon the Valis. In practice, however, this cooperationwas rarelyforthcoming.Eitherthe Vali dominatedthe Amir,
or the Amir dominatedthe Vali. In either case the aggrievedpartywas
loud in his complaintsto Istanbuland in demandsfor the dismissalof his
opponent. Personalitiesand connectionsdecided who dominated:'The
decidingfactorin the valis' successor failurein maintainingtheirpower
dependedto a greatextent on the weaknessor the strengthof character
of either the Vali or the sharif and the support each possessed at

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104

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

In generalit was the Valiswho werethe losers. Central

Constantinople'.12
governmentwas far more willing to remove a Vali than to dismissan
Amir, chiefly, it appears, because of a reluctanceto offend either the
Zaidsor the Awns. Onlywhen an Amir'sloyaltyto the OttomanEmpire
had been broughtinto questionwas the Sultanwillingto act, as in 1880,
when he transferredthe Amirate from the Awns to the Zaids, and in
1882,when he restoredit to the Awns.
Given all this, it mightreasonablybe askedwhy the Ottomangovernment toleratedthe Amirate and why it did not establishthe Vali as the
sole authority,or at least produce a clear definition of the respective
powersof the Amirandthe Vali. In 1882the ValiOsmanNuriPaapointed
out that conflictsbetween Valis and Amirswere inevitableas long as the
powersof the Amirs remainedundefined,but it appearsthat his appeal
for a clearregulationof the issueremainedunanswered.13Themoreradical
solutionof abolishingthe Amirate, andgivingall powerto the Vali, was
canvassedby some of the Sultan'sMinistersand militaryadvisersin the
mid-1890s.Abdulhamid'sresponsewas revealing:he arguedthat in the
absence of the Amirate the Ottomangovernmentwould be obliged to
maintainpermanentlya full ArmyCorpsin the Hijazin orderto maintain
orderand its own authority.14Abdulhamidhad no love for the Amirate,
nor, as will be seen, for the Amirs, but he recognizedthat they offered
him a formof governmenton the cheap. His sole concernwasto keep the
Amirs loyal. This could be achievedby deprivingthem of pretextsand
opportunitiesfor disloyalty.On the one hand,conflictshadto be avoided
where possible and obstructiveValis were removed;on the other, the
Sultan could graduallybuild up his garrisonin the Hijaz, introducing
smallnumbersof additionaltroopson harmlesspretextsandin a manner
calculated not to raise fears. Each newly-appointedVali or military
commanderbrought with him a small addition to the Hijaz garrison,
making it progressivelymore difficult for the Amirs to contemplate
revolt. The troopswere followedby the telegraph:a line betweenJedda
and Mecca was established in May 1882. Ultimately, they would be
followed by the railway.Abdulhamidgovernedthe Hijazin accordance
with the 'characterand disposition'of its inhabitants;but in the longer
termhe soughtto impose centralizationby stealth.
In late 1877 the Hijaz was effectively under the control of the Amir,
HusseinPaa.HusseinPaa,then presidentof the civilservicedivisionof
the Councilof State in Istanbul,had been appointedto the Amiratein
July 1877 after the death of the Amir AbdullahPaa,of the same Awn
family.'5By that time the prestige and the popularityof the Amiratein
general,andof the Awnfamilyin particular,wereto someextentrestored.

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

105

Thiswas due to almosttwo decadesof successfultenureby the late Amir

Abdullah Papa, whose mild and co-operativecharacterleft a positive
impressionon the Ottomanauthoritiesin Istanbul:hence the decisionto
appointhis brotherHusseinPaato the Amirate.16
By the time he becameAmir of Mecca,HusseinPaawas alreadywell
knownin Istanbul,thanksto his servicein highgovernmentoffices,which
includeda periodas a memberof the Councilof State.17
Withina monthof
his appointmentto the Amirate,he wasawardedthe orderof the Murassa,
firstclass.18
Thusequippedwithimperialfavour,andwithfamiliaritywith
high-rankingOttoman statesmen, together with the inheritedprestige
and popularityof the amirateand of his family, Hussein Paawas in a
good positionto impose his authorityover the whole Hijaz.
He lost no time in doing so. Withina few monthsof his appointment,
Hussein Paa, backed by his brotherAwnurrefiq,the defterdarof the
Hijaz Ahmed Majid, and some other high rankingofficialsin the area,
had requestedthe removalof the Vali TakiyeddinPaafor alleged misdeeds. The Councilof Ministersacceptedthe Amir'srequest.Takiyeddin
Paawas recalledto Istanbul;Halit Pasa, a senatorin the upperchamber
of the parliament(Ayan), was appointedVali in his place.19Knowing
what had happened to his predecessor,Halit Paachose co-operation
ratherthan confrontationwith the Amir, at the expense of leavingthe
initiativeto the latter.
Hussein Paa soon showed himself to be an extremely clever and
ambitiousman, who dared to pursue a bold but delicate policy in the
Hijaz.Whileoutwardlypresentinghimselfas a loyalAmirwho protected
Ottomaninterests,HusseinPaasecretlyworkedto undermineOttoman
authorityby spreadinganti-Ottomanviews, and by collaboratingwith
foreignrepresentatives,chieflywith the British.Indeed after seeing the
dispatchesfrom the Britishconsul Zohrab,one gets the impressionthat
the ambitiousAmirsuccededin influencingnot onlythe Ottomanofficials
in the area,butBritishofficialsatJeddaaswell. In the followingpagesthe
Amir'ssuccessin this respectwill be explainedin detail.
There is no reason to believe that Hussein Papa'ssecret disloyaltyto
the Sultan'sgovernmentand his attemptsto cultivatethe Britishwere
groundedin particulargrievancesagainstOttomanrule in the Hijaz. As
alreadyindicated,his relationswiththe Ottomangovernmentweregood,
andhe was permittedandeven encouragedto exerciseconsiderablelocal
authority.Rather, the groundsfor his disloyaltyappearto have been in
part personalambition,but also a belief, not uncommonamongsenior
Ottomanfunctionaries,that the OttomanEmpire'sprospectsof survival
were questionable. From his position at the centre of governmentin
Istanbul,he had personallywitnessedthe protractedseries of upheavals
and crises, domesticand foreign,whichhad culminatedin the disastrous

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106

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

war with Russia which broke out in April 1877, shortlybefore his own
appointmentto the amirate.Doubtless he was better able than manyin
the Hijazto appreciatethe potentialconsequencesof the war'soutcomea massivemilitarydefeatandenormouslosses of territorywhichleft many
informedstatesmen anticipatingthe OttomanEmpire'searly collapse;
hence, in all probability,his decisionto cultivatethe supportof a foreign
power, namelyBritain.
OutwardlyHusseinPaaremainedloyal to the Ottomangovernment
andthe initialimpressionhe madeat Meccawaspositive.It seemsthathis
overt actionswere aimedat givingthe idea that his interestsin the Hijaz
were identicalwith those of the OttomanEmpire. He appearsto have
succeededin this. There is no evidenceto suggestthat Abdulhamidand
the Porte questionedthe Amir'sloyaltyuntillate 1879,when the British
Ambassador,SirHenryLayard,afterreturningfroma visitto Syria,had
an audiencewiththe Sultanandtold himthatwhilein Syriahe hadlearned
of the existenceof an anti-Caliphatesecretsocietyin the Hijaz,the aimof
whichwas to establishan Arab government.20
Soon after his arrivalin Mecca, Hussein Paamade a call for volunteers for the Ottomanarmy,whichwas then at warwith Russia.2"
Within
a shortperiodhe successfullyestablishedsmoothrelationswith the Vali
of the Hijaz, Halit Paa, and with the Muhafizof Medina, SabriPaa.
Both these officialsoften soughtthe Amir'sapprovalandsupportin their
dealingswith the tribes and in their handlingof hajjaffairs.The Amir,
finding co-operation with the Turkish authorities a useful means of
extendinghis own influence, acted with them. Suchwas the case with a
disputewhicharosewith the ShammariSheikhMuhammadIbn Rashid,
in 1878, over the question of the affiliationof the Khaybaritribes and
protectionof the hajj caravansfrom bedouin attacksbetween Medina
and Mecca.
The Muhafizof Medina,SabriPaa,complainedto the Amir and the
Vali that some of the tribeslivingin Khaybarhad not paid zekatfor two
years and had asked the Shaykhof Shammarto protectthem from the
Ottomans. The Amir Hussein Paa, together with the Vali and the
Muhafiz,wrote letters to Ibn Rashid. In his letter of 3 Cemaziyelevvel
1295/6 May 1878 Hussein Paa warned Ibn Rashid that Khaybarwas
attachedto Medina,andthereforethe zekatof the areawas to be paidto
that city. The Amir added that he was informedthat some of the tribes
living within the boundariesof Khaybarhad sought asylum with Ibn
Rashid.'If this was true', the Amir continued,'it was yourdutyto refuse
them and send them backto Khaybar'.22
In the responsewhich he addressedon 7 Cemaziyelahir1295/9 June
1878to the Amir, the Vali andthe Muhafiz,IbnRashiddeniedthatanyof

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

107

the tribes of Khaybarhad been shelteredby him and declaredthat the

Shammarishad always been loyal to the Ottomans and fulfilled their
dutiesin the JabalShammararea. Ibn Rashidaddedthat the Anaze and
othertribesin Khaybarhadnothingto do withthe Shammaris,who could
be neitherfor nor againstthose tribes. He added that since those tribes
hadbeen broughtunderthe controlof the Ottomanstate, hispredecessors
had not been able to penetrateinto that area.23
Ibn Rashid'svague responsesatisfiednone of the partiesconcerned.
Accordingto Sabri Paa, Ibn Rashid was telling one thing and doing
another.The Muhafizthoughtthat the only means to end Ibn Rashid's
misdeedsand to make him pay the outstandingzekatwas to take some
strong action: he asked the Amir'sconsent for a plan to intimidatethe
Shammarisheikh by sending military units from several directions:
Baghdad,Basraand Medina.24
There were severalobstaclesto such a militaryexpedition.First, the
authorityto mountsuchan expeditionwasbeyondthe powerof the Amir
andthe Vali. Thismeantthattheyhadto referthe proposalto the Sublime
Porte, and in the absence of an efficientcommunicationsnetworksuch
correspondencenaturallytook quite a time. Therewas also the question
of the local climate.Thiswas suchthat militaryoperationswere possible
for a limitedperiodonly, mostlyin winter.Furthermore,sucha military
actionwas inexpedientfromthe financialpointof view. Accordingto the
estimatesof the authoritiesin the Hijaz, the money that they hoped to
obtainin taxesfromthe tribesunderthe controlof Ibn Rashidwouldnot
have paid the cost of the proposedexpedition.
Despite these objections, the Vali and the Amir jointly proposedto
the Sublime Porte a plan for militaryaction against MuhammadIbn
Rashid. Accordingto the plan, forces of anti-Shammaritribes such as
would be used, in addiUtaibah,25
Sabiigh,26
Bagoom,27and Bilhaarith,28
tion to regulartroops from Medina and Mecca and local troops called
Aakil, who were recruitedfrom central Arabia and served as cavalry
guardsandmessengerson the Medina-YanbuandMedina-Meccaroads.
The aim of the expedition,as explainedin their despatch,was either to
subjugateIbn Rashid or to remove him from his post as sheikh of the
Shammarisand installone of his brothers.29
The Porte's response to the proposalreflected the difficultieswhich
exercisedthe authoritiesin Istanbul.It noted thatbecauseof the delayin
communicationsthe hot weatherhad alreadyarrived,and thereforethe
time for sucha militaryexpeditionhad been missed:
For such reasons . . . the question of punishing [the Shammari

shaykh]would be decidedon later aftercorrespondingwith [you].

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108

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Forthe timebeingwhatis neededis to makenecessarypreparations

anduse peacefulmeanssuchas advisingthem[to obey the Ottoman
government]in orderto preventbrigandages.30
Another area where the Amir Hussein used his influence to protect
Ottomaninterestsdirectlyor indirectlywasthe heartof the Hijaz;namely
the areabetweenMeccaandMedina.The securityof thispartof the Hijaz
was absolutelyessentialfor hajjobservanceandfor transportationof the
annualsurre, presents and basic commodities.Thereforeit was in the
interestsof the local authorities,as well as those in Istanbul,to ensure
that the hajjroutes between the two holy cities were protectedand that
annualsubsidiesto the Hijazisweredulydistributed.Failureto distribute
the latternot only causedbedouinraidson the pilgrimcaravansbut also
threatenedpublicsecurityin the Hijaz.
The 1878-79hajjseasonoffereda cleardemonstrationof the problem.
At the time when the Syrianhajjcaravan,togetherwith other pilgrims,
had gathered in Medina, the Muhafizof the city Sabri Paa received
of the Bedouinsof
intelligencethat sheikhHuzeyfe, Shayhulmeshayikh
Medina, and sheikhFahd, the leader of the Fadlatribe,31were going to
attack the pilgrimson their way to Mecca. The Muhafizrespondedby
and
changingthe pilgrims'route from Tariqal-Sultanito Tariqal-Fari'32
escortedthemwithregulartroopsfromDamascusto MeccaandMedina.
Despite this, the pilgrimswere attackedby the followersof the aforementionedsheikhsat a place calledMadraj.33
Fortunatelyfor the authoritiesand the pilgrims,the Bedouins were
defeated by the escortingtroops, backedby additionalforces sent from
Medina. According to Sabri Paa, at the end of fierce fightingwhich
lasted for about half an hour the Bedouinshad lost more than 50 killed
and over 150 wounded.The troopshad lost seven killed and 10 slightly
None the less the authoritiesremainedwarylest the Bedouins
injured.34
seek revenge by mountingfurtherattacksand took a numberof extraAs a result,the pilgrimswere able to travel
ordinarysecuritymeasures.35
safely in the Hijaz and to return to their countries.36In addition the
authoritieswere able to bring stocks of commercialgoods, which had
been waitingfor some time at Yanbu',up to Medina.37
Thislastmeasurewasimportant,sinceone of the authorities'principal
methods of deterringBedouin raids on the pilgrimswas to distribute
annualpresentsandbasiccommoditiessuchas corn,riceandwheatto the
Bedouin tribes, before and duringthe hajjceremonies.The distribution
was organizedin Rabighby the Vali and the Amir'slocal representative
Abdullah Paa, while they were escortingthe pilgrimsfrom Mecca to
Not thatthismethodof pacificationguaranteedsuccess:sheikh
Medina.38

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

109

Huzeyfe, who had participatedin the attackon the pilgrimcaravan,had

in fact been given his annualshare before the pilgrimsdepartedfrom
Medina.39
With the exceptionof the above incident,the hajjseason of 1878-79
passedpeacefully,but this did not meanthat enduringsecurityhadbeen
achieved in the Hijaz. The authoritiesstill feared that the peace was
temporary,and that unless raidingBedouins were punishedseverely,
they would continue to threatenlaw and order in the area. As a result
both the Vali and the Amir askedIstanbulfor permissionto use military
The Council
forceto subjugatethe Bedouintribesinvolvedin the attack.40
of Ministersexpressedfullsupportfor thisproposalanddrewthe Sultan's
attentionto a long-termdanger:theystatedthatif shaykhslikeMuhammad
ibn Rashidand Huzeyfe were permittedto behave in the way they did,
they wouldgain the supportof other tribes,and cause a seriousproblem
The
like that posed by the Wahhabisat the beginningof the century.41
Council of Ministers'recommendationwas presentedto the Sultanon
25 April 1879. Abdulhamid'sresponseto some extent reflectshis policy
towardsthe tribalelementsin the Hijaz.He declinedto endorsethe use of
militaryforceandarguedthatuntilsuchtimeasconditionswerefavourable
for a militaryexpedition,presents,decorationsandothermeansof peaceful persuasionshouldbe used instead.42
Specifically,he noted that there
were only two understrengthbattalions(Tabur)in Mecca and Medina,
eachof 300soldiers.Thiswashardlyenoughto keep the mainroutessafe,
let alone subjugatetribes in the interior.Moreover,if the troops were
sent into the interior, the caravanroutes would be left without any
protectionwhile a good half of the troopswere likelyto perishas a result
of the harshclimateand terrainto whichthey wouldbe exposed.43
The Sultandid not rule out a militaryexpeditionin the future,but he
warnedthatthiswouldrequirecarefulplanningandpreparation,andthe
appointmentof an able commander:
To achievesuch a goal Ferik(General)Halit Paashouldbe called
to the militaryoffice [sic]to benefitfromhis knowledgeof the area,
and in the lightof his (Halit Paa's)experienceandobservations,a
plan shouldbe workedout and accordinglypreparationsshouldbe
completed. When all of them are completed,not to face any difficulty and get the benefit of facilitatingconditions, a favourable
season should be chosen for sendingthe armyunits. Because hot
weatheris dominating[the life] in the Hijaznow, it is not expedient
to send soldiers after this time. Therefore the matter should be
decidedin the futurein accordancewith the needs of the time."
Yet at preciselythistime,whenthe Sultanandhisministerswereconsidering

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

the Amir's proposal to strengthen Ottoman authority in the Hijaz through

military action, the Amir himself was secretly making his first overtures to
the British. As far as can be discerned, the immediate stimulus for this
approach was not a local matter concerning the Hijaz, but rather the war
which had broken out in late 1878 between the government of British
India and the ruling Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali.
The first professional consul of the British government at Jedda,
J. Zohrab, entered into his duties on 1 March 1879.45After less than two
weeks, on 12 March 1879, he received a secret message from the Amir
Hussein Paa offering to act as an 'intermediary'between the Afghans and
the British. The message was conveyed by Zohrab's dragomanYusuf Kudzi
Efendi.46Hussein Paa told Kudzi that prior to the war in Afghanistan he
had received a letter from the Amir of that country, Sher Ali, who had
asked him whether the Indian Muslims would be justified in taking up
arms against the British to support Afghanistan, seeing that the government of India ill-used and oppressed the Muslims. The Amir added that
he had replied that 'England was humane and just in her rule over
Hindustan . .. [therefore] he could not credit assertions to the contrary'.47
In his message Hussein Paa cleverly prepared the ground for British
apprehension by saying that:
the state of Mussulman feeling in India, throughout Asia and in
Egypt is such that a slight event might create wars and raise revolt in
all Muhammadan countries. Suspicion, mistrust, doubt, and irritation have taken deep roots in the hearts of the Mussulmans and
these sentiments can only be gradually eradicated and confidence
restored by the exercise of great prudence and delicacy and by
avoiding any and every measure which might excite fanaticism.48
Against the background of such a supposed state of Muslim feeling the
Amir further stated that 'he would be happy to give his aid to [the British
government] in any question in which his sacred position may be of any
use, so long as such aid will not prejudice the Sultan'. As for the Afghan
Amir, Sher Ali, Hussein Paa suggested that in order to pacify him, Sher
Ali's son Yakub Khan and other chiefs in Afghanistan should be used. If
the British government entered into a dialogue, the Amir 'offers to act as
intermediary, not officially but privately as if of his own accord'.49
Hussein Paa's timing was not right. Sher Ali had died earlier in 1879,
and the British government was about to resolve peacefully its differences with the new Afghan Amir, Yakub Khan. However, the British
authorities appreciated Hussein Papa's offer and foresaw that his cooperation might prove valuable in the future. Both the Foreign Office and
India Office agreed that 'it might possibly be turned to account at some

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

111

futuretime'.50ConsulZohrabwasinstructedto informthe Amirof Mecca

that the British government 'highly appreciate the friendly feelings
towardsthem . .. and that shouldoccasionthereafterarisefor profiting
by it, they will not forget that His Highness did . . . express his wish to

renderthem such assistance'.51

The Amir's offer had indeed come as a relief to the ForeignOffice.
Thiswas a timewhenmanyBritishdiplomatsandofficialsin the Ottoman
Empire,as well as in India,were worriedaboutwaningBritishinfluence
amongthe Muslimsand the possibilityof anti-Britishpropagandaby the
Sultan-Caliph.At the same time, however, it was argued that British
influencecouldbe revivedif the governmenttook appropriatemeasures.
One of them, as suggestedby E. Malet, Secretaryto the BritishEmbassy
in Istanbul,was the acquisitionof the sympathiesof the Amirsof Mecca,
along with the establishmentof friendlyrelations with the ulema, the
paymentof subsidiesto the Turkishpress, or possiblythe settingup of a
Turkishpaperownedby the Britishbutmanagedby Muslims.52
In replyto
Malet's suggestion,the ForeignOffice noted that 'a friendlyfeeling on
his [the Amir of Mecca'spart]may fairlybe regardedas proved'by his
offer 'to act as intermediarybetween us and the chiefs of Afganistan'.
As for the questionof the press, 'it may be remarkedthat a contribution
from Indian revenues has for some time past been made towardsthe
al-Jawaib,an Arabic newspaperof considerableinfluencepublishedin
Constantinople'. 53

Thisinitialapproachto the Britishwasfollowedby HusseinPaa'sfirst

attempt to restrict the power of the Vali of the Hijaz. The issue in
questionwas the Vali'splace of residence.Unlike the Amir, who resided
at Mecca,the Valiwasfree to resideeitherin Meccaor in Jeddaor in Taif.
As conceived in the capital, this freedom of movement was intended
primarilyto place the Vali in a betterpositionto watchover local affairs,
and possiblyto deter the Amir from any adventureagainstthe Ottoman
government.In an effortto changethisrule, HusseinPaafirstspreadthe
idea that the properresidenceof the Vali was Jedda, and that the Valis'
preferencefor livingin the interiorwas promptedby nothingmore than
desirefortheirowncomfort.The logicwasclear.Sincethe governmentof
the interiorand its purelyMuslimpopulationwas in the handsof an able
administrator,namelyHusseinPaa,whatwere the duties of the Vali in
Mecca? On the other hand, the presence of the Vali in Jedda was
absolutely necessary, for Jedda was the chief commercialport of the
Hijaz and the foreignconsulateswere locatedin that city. Thereforethe
residenceof the Vali ought to be permanentlyfixed there. Suchwas the
view expressedby the Amirto Zohrab,who promptlyrecommendedit to
the Britishambassadorin Istanbul.54

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112

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

The death of the Vali, Halit Paa, in early June 187955presented a

perfectopportunityfor the Amirto expresshis views regardingthe Vali's
residenceto the governmentin Istanbul.His telegramon the subjectbore
a strikingresemblanceto those expressedby Zohrab:
Jiddais in a sensitivepositionanda firstharbourof the Red Sea and
there aremanyconsulsthere, largeships,mostlyforeign,come and
go; and so there would be many benefits if, instead of the Vali
residingin Meccaand Taif, Jiddawere to be the vilayetcentre.56
The proposalwas discussedin June 1879 at the Council of Ministers,
whichconcluded,however,that 'accordingto the requirementsthe Vali
The
was free to choose Mecca, Taif or Jiddaas his place of residence'.57
Vali
of
the
the
next
be
Councilalso proposedthatNashidPaa appointed
Hijaz.58The Amir kept a low profilefor the remainderof the summerof
1879and nothingwas heardfromhim untilthe firstweek of December.
He even delayedhis responseto the letter of appreciationsent to him by
the BritishForeignOffice on 7 August.
It wasthe outbreakof a secondAnglo-Afghanwar,in earlySeptember
1879,whichpromptedthe Amirto renewcontactwiththe BritishConsul
at Jedda. Through Yusuf Kudzi and Hasan Jahur, a British Indian subject

whoin May1880becameactingconsulat Jedda,he sentZohraba message

announcinghis oppositionto the Sultanand to Russia:
The Sultan no longer possessed that unboundedallegiance and
venerationwhich his exalted position and his sacred characteras
Khalifdemanded.People askedwhythey shouldrespectandobey a
manwho couldbe dethronedby the fetwa of an inferiorthe shaykh
al-Islamandwhy they shouldveneratehim as the representativeof
the Prophetwhen the same decreecoulddeprivehimof thatsacred
power and character.[So] he can not be undisputedsovereignand
his rightto representthe Prophetis not divine.Thereforeopposition
to him is not wrong. . .59
The Amir concludedhis messageby reiteratinghis readinessto help the
British cause whenever and whereverit might be needed. 'Under any
circumstances',he assuredthe Dragoman,'Englandmay dependon me
to do all in my powerto furtherher wishes'.6
Barelytwo weeks later, the Amirsent a letterto Zohrabthankinghim
and the Britishgovernmentfor their friendlyfeelings towardshim. The
Amir statedthat:
It has given me the greatestpleasureand feelingof gratitudeto see
that the Ministersof Her Majesty'sgovernmentregardme with

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ABDULHAMID

II, AMIR HUSSEIN

AND THE BRITISH

113

friendship.. . it is well knownthat my best wishesandendeavours

are devoted to the interests of H.I.M's government.And I will
always use my influence in advancingthose interests not only
privatelybut also when I can do so publicly.6"
The Amiraddeda note askingthe Britishconsulto sendhimin confidence
a personto discussthe questionof Afghanistan.On receivingthe letter,
Zohrabsent his dragoman,Yusuf Kudzi,with instructions'justto listen
to whatthe Amir may have to say but to make no comment'.62
The Amir'soverturescoincidedwith a spate of reportsof risingantiOttomanfeeling in the Hijaz. The Britishconsulateheardrumoursof a
secretsociety in Mecca,whose memberswere said to be dissatisfiedwith
the result of the war with Russia. Its memberswere reportedto have
seriouslydiscussedwithdrawingfrom the Sultanthe title of head of the
Muslims.63
ConsulZohrabwas continuouslysuppliedwithinformationto
the effect that Ottomanrule in the Hijaz was weak and that the political
conditionof the Empirewas so unstablethat it might soon give rise to
difficultiesin the Hijaz. Zohrab was 'secretly advised by the highest
authorityin the province to request that a British ship of war may be
stationed[in the Hijaz] while certainpoliticalquestionswere being discussed at Constantinople'.64
Acting on this advice Zohrab requested
H. Burness, commanderof the British Red Sea squadron,to take the
necessarysteps. In addition, several influentialArabs asked Zohrabif
they could become Britishsubjects.What is more interestingis the fact
that an unnamedArab of highstandingtold Zohrabthat 'the time probably was very near when Englandwould be asked by the ecclesiastical
authoritiesof the Hijazto assumethe controlof all the piousfoundations
[Awkaf] in Turkey as the revenues accruingfrom them are grossly
misappropriated'.65

In the event, Englandwas not askedby the ecclesiasticalauthoritiesof

the Hijazto assumethe controlof the piousfoundationsbutwasrequested
to accepta generousoffer by the Amir of Meccato ease its difficultiesin
Afghanistan.As indicatedearlier, in January1880Zohrabhad sent his
dragoman,Kudzi, to Mecca where he held several interviewswith the
Amir. RegardingAfghanistan,the Amir blamedthe Afghan chieftains
for the currenttroublesand accusedthem of usingthe fanaticalclansfor
theirown interests.He anticipatedthatthe taskof pacifyingAfghanistan
wouldbe long anddifficult,'ifthe religiousfeelingsof the peoplewerenot
authoritativelyappealed to'.66He offered to send two emissaries to
Afghanistan.One of them was to be one of his own people, the other
would be HassanKhan, an Afghanwho was said to have been sent on a
missionto Istanbulandto Meccaby SherAli beforethe warin Afghanistan

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114

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

started.These emissarieswere to be accompaniedby a trustworthysecret

agent of the Indiangovernment,so that no doubtwouldariseas to their
The Amir addedthat the emissarieswere to be
sincerityand rectitude.67
furnishedwith letters to the Afghan chieftains and the people in the
followingsense:
The Mussulmanreligionrequiresfor its supportthe aid andprotection of England . .. without [which]. . . the followers of Muhammad

will soon have to struggleagainstforceswhichwill be beyondtheir

power to resist . . . therefore all Mussulmans [were] to look upon

Englandas a firmfriendand able protectorandany Muhammadan

opposingher policy or takingup arms againsther, he [the Amir]
declareshim to be an opponentof the faith.68
Zohrab seemed eager to accept the offer. He immediatelywent to
Cairo and from there informed Salisburyby telegram of the Amir's
offer.69In a supportingdespatchon 9 January1880,Zohrabdepictedthe
Amir as 'the spiritual'head of the Muslimsand assertedthat 'the Sultan
as Caliphholds as regardsthe faith what may be termed "the temporal
power"'.Therefore'anykind of adviceor counseloffered by the Sultan
will and must be regardedby those for whom it is intendedas biasedby
politicalleanings. .. andmustlose muchof its powerandvalue',whereas
'whateveris said by the GrandSherif[wouldbe] regardedas emanating
Zohrabaddedthathe wasassured
fromthe truespiritualhead of Islam'.70
of the Amir'sgoodwill,andthatthe Amirwouldrunanyriskin supporting
Britishpolicy,whateverit mightbe, 'ifhe believedhe wouldbe supported
andprotected'.7"
Writingprivatelyto his friendMrAlston, Zohrabwas even bolder:
The time appearsto have arrivedwhen Englandmust cease temporisingwith Turkey... we are boundto seize everymeans[and]
everyweaponwhichwill give us firmgroundto act on andestablish
our authority over Mussulmans . .. Such a weapon, I believe, we

now have to our hand in the Hijaz of the Grand Sharif. If we

establishan influenceby a kindof protectoratein the Hijaz, we will
be able to governthe whole Muhammedanworld.72
Zohrabenvisageda 'tributarystate' in the Hijaz. HusseinPaawould
be the headof the thisstate andwouldbe protectedby the Britishgovernment against any attack by the Ottoman Empire. It is naturalto ask
whetherthis revolutionaryprogrammeproposedby Zohrabhad in fact
been directlysuggestedby the AmirHusseinPaa.Zohrabadmittedthat
it was not, but emphasizedthathis own viewsreflectedthe impressionhe
had got frompeople with whomhe had conversedevery now and then.73

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

115

Be that as it may, there was a furtherreasonfor Zohrab'sextremism:

Hussein Paahad convincedhim beyond any doubt that the Sultanhad
concludeda secret alliancewith RussiaagainstEngland.74
The Amirhad
no
but
had
assured
the
consul
that
he
this
given details,
reportedalliance
had'createdthroughoutArabiaandSyriasurprise,discontentandexcitement'.75The Amir addedthat he had seen numerouslettersfromvarious
parts of Arabia and Syria, which expressedanger and frustration,and
showed that 'the Arabs of the two countries (Syria and Arabia) were
determinedto oppose any alliancewhich went againstthe interestsof
England and France'.76Convincedthat England could work with the
Amir, Zohrabproposed,as a firststep, to recognizethe Amir's'goodwill
towardsEnglandand . .. the serviceshe has renderedin variouswaysto
Britishsubjectsby conferringon him the Starof India'.77
Zohrabwasnot the Amir'sonlychannel.He hadalsosent anunnamed
Arab to Layardwith the suggestionthat the Britishgovernment'should
avail themselves of the religious authorityand prestige of the Grand
Sharifin Afghanistan'.The unnamedArab advisedthe Britishgovernmentto askthe Amir 'to send a representativeor an agentto thatcountry
[Afghanistan]to induceits Mussulmanpopulationto enter into friendly
relationswithEnglandandpromoteBritishpolicy'.78
AfterseeingZohrab's
his
own
informant
'had been made
despatches,Layardconcludedthat
with
His
and
have
authorizedto
views
been
Highness'
may
acquainted
communicate to [him]'.79

However, Layard'sresponse was more cautious and sceptical than

Zohrab's.He attachedmore importanceto the Sultanthanto the Amir,
and was wary of encouragingthe Sultan'ssuspicionsof Britishdesigns
upon the Hijaz. Layardwarnedhis governmentthat Zohrab'sadviceto
confer the Star of Indiaupon the Amir 'shouldnot be adoptedwithout
and addedthat 'we mustbe on our guardin
very matureconsideration'80
accepting all that the Sharif says . . . and acting upon it, unless we are

preparedto breakwiththe Sultanaltogether'.81The Ambassadorrecommendedthat Zohrabshouldbe 'warnedto be very prudentand cautious

in his communicationswith the Sharif'.82
However, Layard'swarningscame too late to prevent some British
action. Upon receivingZohrab'sfirsttelegramof 8 January,the Foreign
Office had communicatedits substanceto the IndiaOffice, whichin turn
referredit to the Viceroyin India. Despite initialhesitation,the viceroy
accepted the offer, with one serious reservation:'The influenceof the
grand sharif might be advantageouslyexerted by letter and agent in
Afganistanagainstfanaticsas proposed,but it verymuchdependson the
character,capacityand good faithof the agent.'83
This decisionwas then communicatedto Zohrabin Cairo,andhe was

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116

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

given authorityto arrangewith the Amir to send the proposed agents

to India.84
TherefollowedcommunicationsbetweenZohrab, the ForeignOffice
andthe governmentof Indiaas to the identityandcharacterof the agents,
as well as their expenses and transportation.85
Zohrab immediately
returnedto JeddaandsentKudzito Meccato informthe Amirthathisoffer
had been accepted.The Amirwas delightedand at once beganpreparations. He held meetingswithKudziandHasanJohur,andthenwithsome
of the ulemaof Mecca.Accordingto the accountgivenby Kudzi,whowas
presentat two meetingswiththe ulema, the questionof Afghanistanwas
discussed: the Afghans were blamed for the current troubles, while
England was praised as just and generous towardsthe Afghans. The
dragomanalso hadan interviewwithone of the mostprominentulemaof
Mecca, SayedAhmed Dahlan, the ShafiiKadiof Mecca. SayyidDahlan
joinedhiscolleaguesin condemningthe Afghans,andsaidthattheir'duty
was to acceptthe termsthatwere offeredto them [bythe British]'.86
Backedby the ulemaand encouragedby the Britishacceptanceof his
offer, the Amirdecidedto come to Jeddato have a finalwordwithconsul
Zohrab.87
Meanwhilehe hadchangedhis mindaboutone of the proposed
Hassan
Khan, on the groundsthat he was intimatelyconnected
agents,
with the Turks. The Amir reasonedthat he might be influencedby the
apparentlyhostilefeelingsof the SultantowardsEngland,andso actwith
less sincerityandenergythanwasdesired.Instead,NahimMollaNawab,
an Indianwho held the position of doctor of Religious Law in Mecca,
shouldbe sent to Afghanistan.88
Whilethe preparationsfor the missionwere going aheadin the Hijaz,
LordLytton,the Viceroyof India,wasstillexpressingstrongreservations
aboutthe mission,andaskingfor moreinformationaboutthe agents.The
viceroyindicatedquite clearlythat 'Zohrab'sknowledgeof the questions
involved . . . [was] imperfect' but despite lack of information about the

agents, 'if you [the Secretaryof State for India]are satisfied,the agents
can communicateon arrivalin Bombaywith F. Souter, the police comissioner'.89

In the event, no furtherinformationwas needed because the whole

affairhadsuddenlybecome an academicissuethanksto the assassination
of the Amir. The assassinationitselfremainsone of the manymysteriesin
the historyof the Hijaz. It appearsthat the Amirmadehis finalpreparations for the missionto Afghanistan,and left for Jeddaon 13 March1880
underthe pretextof visitingthe rebuiltportandrestoredcastlethere, and
of discussingwith the Vali some issues relatedto Bedouinaffairs.90
On 14 March, the Amir, accompaniedby the director (Miudufir)
of
Harem-i Sharif Ahmed Efendi and some dignitaries of Mecca, and

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

117

escorted by his aides-de-campand his own soldiers, entered Jedda and

proceeded towards the residence of his representative,Omer Nasif
Efendi. As he approachedthe residence, an elderly man dressed as a
dervishmade a move as if to kiss the Amir'shand, and stabbedhimwith
a rustyknife just below the heart. The initialimpressionof the doctors
who carriedout an operationon the Amir was that the woundwas not
seriousand that he wouldsoon recover.But he died of internalbleeding
the followingmorning.91
The Amir'ssuddendeathleavesmanyquestionsunanswered.Nothing
is knownaboutthe finalwordingof the Amir'slettersor the finalchoice
of agents. Why did the Amir wish to see the Britishconsul in person at
Jedda? The assassinationis equally mysterious.Was it because of the
Afghanmissionthatthe Amirwaskilled?Wasit simplybecausethe Amir
made no secret of his pro-Britishstance on the Anglo-Afghanwar? Or
was it the work of the rivalfamily Zawi Zaid in collaborationwith the
Ottoman government?It is easy to multiply these questions, but to
providea plausibleanswerto anyof themseems to be inconceivableuntil
furtherevidenceis discovered.
Duringthe interrogationof the Amir'sassassin,SeyfeddinfromKabul,
none of the questionsrelated to the killingwas satisfactorilyanswered.
Despite attemptsby the specialMejlisconvenedto conductthe trialof the
assassin, and composed of members of the mejlisi temyiz (council of

appeal) and dignitaries of Mecca, including Hussein Paa's brother

Abdullah Paa, the acting Amir, the assassin refused to answer any
questions.He simplysaid, 'I daredto commitsucha crime.I havenothing
to say to anybody.I know the punishmentI deserveandI am waitingfor
it.'92Realizingthat theireffortswere fruitless,and that the healthof the
assassinwas deterioratingrapidly,the Mejlis unanimouslypronounced
its verdictthat the assassinwas to be publiclyexecuted in the centre of
Mecca.93

Investigationrevealed that the assassinhad been living in Meccafor

severalyearsandwasreportedto havemadeseveralunsuccessfulattempts
to see the Amir in his office. It was also discoveredthat the assassinhad
left Mecca shortlyafter the Amir's departurefor Jedda, and caughtup
with the latter'sconvoy, where he was seen walkingaroundthe Amir's
tent.94None the less, these factsraisemorequestionsthananswers.They
hint quite stronglythat the action was premeditatedand that personal
grievancesmight have played a role in it, but neither gives any clear
indicationsabout the assassinnor supportthe claim that Hussein'spredecessorin the amirate,AbdullahPaa,'hadkilledthe assassin'sbrother,
whichinvokedhis revenge'.95
One cannotclosethisepisodewithoutaskingtwointerrelatedquestions:

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

how far did the Porte andthe Sultanknowwhatwaspassingbetweenthe

Britishgovernmentand the Amir of Mecca?Were they involvedin the
assassinationof the Amir?The availableevidence does not enable us to
assesshowmuchthe Ottomanauthoritiesknewaboutthe Amir'sdealings
with the British. Layardpresumedthat the communicationsbetween
Zohrab and the Amir had reached the Sultan throughthe Vali of the
But the Ottomandocuments,includingreports
Hijaz, RaidNaidPasa.96
by the Vali of the Hijazon the assassination,do not containeven a slight
indicationthat the Ottomanauthoritiesknew about the Amir'sdealings
with the British authorities.97
That the Sultan strongly suspected that
somethingwas being organizedseems to be substantiallytrue. Layard
reportedon 12March1880thathe hadheardon trustworthyauthoritythat
the Sultanwas 'undersome apprehensionsas to the communications. . .
between [the Britishgovernmentand the Amir]and had even expressed
an intentionof removinghim [the Amir]fromhis office'.98
The Britishthemselvescould only speculateas to the reasonsfor the
Amir's assassination.The fact that there were manyAfghansin Mecca,
and that the Amir had made no secret of his strongdisapprovalof the
attitudeof the Afghans,led Zohrabto speculatethat 'the murdermight
be the result of vengeanceon accountof havingopenly condemnedthe
conductof the Afghans'.' Layardsuspectedthat Abdulmuttalibof Beni
Zaid, whose son had gone to Jedda about three months earlier, was
behindthe assassination.1
Malet, in Cairo,suspectedthat the assassination was the result of an understandingat Istanbul.His reasonwas that
Schlumberger,an attacheat the FrenchEmbassywhowason a tourof the
Arab provinces,had told Malet that while he was in SyriaMidhatPaa
had informedhim that the Amir 'hadbeen murderedby an Afghansent
fromAfghanistanfor that purposebecauseit was knownthat the Grand
Sharifwas about to send personsto Afghanistanto supportthe British
Malet took this informationas strongevidenceof involvement
cause'.01
by the authoritiesin the capital,whence MidhatPapahad somehowgot
windof it."10
At thisjunctureit mightbe appropriateto askwhatthe Sultanthought
about the relationsbetween high rankingOttomanofficialsin the Hijaz
and foreign representatives.Was he suspiciousof the officialswho had
good relationswith the British consul? Abdulhamidnever wanted his
officialsto displayan anti-foreignattitude,not necessarilybecausehe was
happy with the other powers but because he was anxious to minimize
foreigninterventionin the internalaffairsof the Empire.Any moveagainst
foreignnationals,let alone foreignrepresentatives,was most likelyto be
a subjectof complaintby the representativeof the countriesconcerned.
Sincethere are numerousexamplesof this, sufficeit to say for the sake of

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ABDULHAMIDII, AMIR HUSSEINAND THE BRITISH

119

the presentargumentthatthe kaymakamof Jedda,Ali Bey, wasremoved

from his office chieflybecausehe failed to establishgood relationswith
No wonder that the Valis of this period took
the consuls in that city.103
to
be
on
care
good terms with the foreign representatives,
special
with
the
British
consuls.04
especially
and the Porte felt quite uneasyabout the
it
the
Sultan
was
then
Why
Amir'srelationswith the British?Upon his returnfrom a visit to Syria,
Layardwarnedthe Sultanthat there existed a secret society in Arabia,
one of the aimsof whichwasto overthrowthe Sultanhimself.The newsof
such a society was first reportedby Zohrab on 6 August 1879 and was
confirmedlater by Midhat Paa during Layard'svisit to Syria late in
September 1879.105Whether the society existed, which is quite doubtful,

or not is not the main point. The fact that the Sultanwas seriouslydisturbedby the newsis veryimportant.Whatthe Sultansuspectedwasthat
there mightbe a dissatisfiedgroupin Arabiawhichwas endeavouringto
establishan Arabgovernment:he respondedby takinga decisionto send
a specialenvoy to Arabiato inquireinto the matter.However,beforethe
special envoy had completedhis inquiriesand returnedto Istanbul,the
Sultanreceived an interestingletter from an unidentifiedperson in the
Hijaz, whom he fully trusted.Accordingto the Sultan,the letter stated
that two Englishmencame from London to visit the Amir; and that the
lattertook them to the SayyidIshakcastle in Meccawherethey stayeda
few days duringwhich secret meetingswere held. Upon examiningthe
letterthe Sultanconcludedthatalthoughdetailsof the meetingscouldnot
be known, it was beyond any doubt that the participantsintended to
establish'an Arab governmentin oppositionto the Caliphate'.He asked
the Porteto preventthisschemebyappointingeitherSharifAbdulmuttalib
But
of Zawi Zaid or AwnurrefikPaaof Zawi Awn to the Amirate.106
HusseinPaa'ssecretdealingswith the Britishdestroyedany chanceof a
memberof his family(ZawiAwn) beingappointedas his successor:hence
the appointmentof SharifAbdulmuttalibto the Amirateof Mecca.
NOTES
This article is undertaken on the research done for a Ph.D thesis written under the supervision of Dr F.A.K. Yasamee of the University of Manchester, to whom my thanks are due.
My thanks are also due to the Centre For Islamic Studies in Istanbul for a generous grant
which enabled me to complete this paper.
1. Atilla Cetin and Ramazan Yildiz, Sultan Ikinci Abdiilhamid Han: Devlet ve Memleket
Gori4lerim, (Istanbul, 1976), pp. 166-7.
2. Tercuman-iHakikat, No.780,30 Kanun-i Sani 1881, p.2-3.
3. Babakanlik Osmanh Arsivi, Irade Dahiliye (hereafter referred to as BOA ID),
No.61904, 22 December 1877. The book is on jihad in Islam and consists of twenty

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120

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

chapters,each concentratingon a differentaspectof it. It wasfirstpublishedin Bulaq

in Egyptin 1826andrepublishedin 1857in the sameplace. Abridgementof the same
book was publishedby Muhammadal-Alimat Bulaqin 1873.Facedwith enormous
difficultiescreatedby the late warwithRussia,the Ottomanauthoritiesbeganthinking
of usingpan-Islamicnotionsto lessen the burdensof the war. It was at then that the
Vali of the Hijaz, TakiyeddinPapaon his returnto Istanbulpresentedthe aforementionedbook to the GrandVizier,EthemPaa,andsuggestedthatit couldbe used
for that purpose.Upon acceptingthe idea, Ethem Paapresenteda copy to Sultan
AbdulhamidII andrequestedan imperialiradeto purchaseabout300copies,eachfor
about20 Ottomankurus.The iradewasgrantedandthe cost waspaidby the Ministry
of Finance.
4. BOA irade Meclis-iMahsus(hereafterreferredto as IMM)No.3071,2 Safer1297/16
January1880;19 Safer1297/2February1880;For the pilgrimreglementof 1880see,
PublicRecordOffice, ForeignOfficeRecords(hereafterreferredto as FO) 78/3158,
Burrelto Goschen,Jedda,2 August1880.Bab-iAli EvrakOdasiVilayetGelen-Giden
Serisi Hicaz Gelen-GidenDefteri No.307, Evrak No.3, 11 Rebiyulevvel1294/27
March1877.
5. BOA Yildiz Esas Evraki(hereafterreferredto as YEE) 18/94-25/94/44,an undated
on the Arabprovincesof the Empire.
memorandum
6. W. Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and the State in Arabia (Columbus, 1984), p. 17.

7. W. Ochsenwald,'OttomanSubsidiesto the Hijaz, 1877- 1886',Internatinal

Journalof
Middle East Studies, Vol.6 (1975), pp.301-3.

8. The EnglishtravellerJ.F. Keane, who stayed in the Hijaz duringthe hajj performancesof 1877-78,mentionsthatthe Turksas the rulingpowerweredislikedby some
of the Meccansbecausethey (the Turks)adoptedEuropeancostumeandintroduced
such Christianinnovationsas forks and chairs. See J.F. Keane, Six MonthsIn the
1295/17June1878.
Hijaz(London,1887),p.71;BOA IMMNo.2896,15Cemaziyelahir

9. Ochsenwald, Religion and Society, pp.6-7.

10. BOA YEE 27/1311/14/75,15Rebiyulahir1297/28March1880Imperialiradeappointing Abdulmuttalibto the Amirate;I.H. Uzunqarilih,Mekke-iMiikerremeEmirleri

(Ankara,1972),p.29-30.
11. BOA SadaretResmi MaruzatEvraki (hereafterreferredto as Y/A Resmi) 7/29,
2 Ramazan1297/8August1880;IMMNo.3071,2 and19Safer1297.
12. Saleh Muhammad Al-Amr, The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule 1869-1914 (Riyadh, 1978),

p.75.
13. BOA YEE 31/991/103/88,OsmanNurito the Palace,3 Rebiyulahir1299/23February
1882.
14. Rifat U,(arol, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Papa: Bir Osmanli Palasi ve Donemi (Istanbul,

1976), p.269; Butrus Abu-Manneh,SultanAbdulhamidand the Sharifsof Mecca

1880-1900 Asian and African Studies, Vol.9 (1973), p.5.

15. BOA ID 61290,10Recep 1294/22July1877.AmirHusseinarrivedin Meccain August

1877. A.Z. Dahlan, Khulasat al-Kalam fi Bayan Umara al-Bayt al-Haram (Cairo

1305/1887),p.327.
16. BOA YEE 31/991/103/88,OsmanPaato BesimBey, 23February1882.
17. I.H. Uzunqarilll, Mekke-i Miikerreme, p.138.

18. BOA I.D. 61351,28Recep 1294/10August1877.

19. BOA I.D. 61595,29 Ramazan1294/October1877.Soon afterhis arrivalin the Hijaz,
Halit Paacomplainedthat his salary25.000Ottomankuruwas less thanthat of his
counterparts.Thereforethe Councilof Ministersraisedhis salaryto 32.500Ottoman
kurus,leavingmany other vilayetsbehindincludingSyria,the salaryof whichwas
30.000Ottomankurus.See, BOA IMMNo.2660,14Sevval1294/October1877.
20. Uzuncarsili, Mekke-i Miikerreme, p. 139.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Keane,op. cit., p. 149.

BOA IMM.No.2896,SabriPapato the Amirof Shammar,6 May1878.
BOA IMM.No.2896,IbnRashidto the Amirof Mecca,9 June1878.
BOA IMMNo.2896, 15Cemaziyelahir1295/27June1878.SabriPasato HusseinPapa.

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

121

25. UmarRizaKahhala,Mu'jamQaba'ilal-Arab(Damascus,1949),II, p.752.

26. Ibid.,pp.500-2.
27. Ibid.,I, p.89.
28. Ibid.,p.102.
29. BOA IMM No.2896, 11 Recep 1295/12July 1878. Halit and HusseinPasas to the
Porte.

30. BOA IMM No.2896, dispatchto the Vali of the Hijaz and the Amir of Mecca,
14Ramazan1295/12September1878.
31. SheikhHuzeyfewas the leaderof the Samidattribewhichhad900 memberswhereas
the Fadlatribeof sheikhFahdhad800members.Both tribeswerelivingin Fuqraand
Ruhganmountains.See HijazSalnamesi,1301/1883,p.56.
32. For a detaileddescriptionof the roadsused betweenMeccaand Medinaduringthe
III (MiratiiCezireti'l-Arab),
periodunderstudysee, EyiipSabri,Miratii'l-Harameyn,
(Istanbul,1306/1889),pp.223-34.
33. BOA IMMNo.2896,26 Zilkaade1295/23November1878SabriPapato HusseinPaa.
councilof Medina,7 Zilhicce
34. BOA IMMNo.2896memorandum
by the administrative
1295/4December1878.
35. Ibid.,HalitPapato the Porte,17Rebiyulahir1296/11April1879.
36. BOA ID No.63415,24 Muharrem1296/21January1879.The numberof pilgrimswas
statedto be between80,000and90,000.
37. BOA IMMNo.2896,HalitPaato the Porte,17Rebiyulahir1296/11April1879.
38. Ibid., copy of the report preparedby the Vali Halit Paa and Abdullah Pasa,
14Muharrem1296/10January1879.
39. BOA IMMNo.2896,26 Zilkaade1295/23November1878SabriPasato HusseinPasa
andmemorandum
council,7 Zilhicce1295/4December1878.
by the administrative
40. Ibid.,HalitPasato the Porte,17Rebiyulahir1296/11April1879.
41. Ibid.
42. GurreCemaziyelewel1296/23April1879.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. FO 78/3017,Beytsto Salisbury,Jedda,1 March1879andZohrabto Salisbury,Jedda,
March1879. The previousconsulswere involvedin commerceand were thoughtto
havehadcompromisedtheirposition,andforthisreasonconsulBeytsandvice-consul
Wyldewereremovedfromoffice. Thereis numerouscorrespondenceon thisquestion
in FO78/3017.
46. Yusuf KudziEfendi was a BritishMuslimfrom a familyof high standingin India.
Kudzispoke severalEuropeanand AsiaticlanguagesincludingArabic,Englishand
German.He had been attachedto the Britishconsulatein Jeddafor severalyears
duringwhichhe wason intimatetermswiththe Amirof Mecca.He wasalso engaged
in trade. FO 78/3017,reporton the consulateat Jeddain consularNo.63, in early
October1879.
47. India Office Libraryand Records,Home Correspondence(hereafterreferredto as
IOR) L/P&S/3/267,Zohrabto Salisbury,Secret& Confidential,Seperate,12 March
1879.
48. IOR L/P&S/3/267,Zohrabto Salisbury,Secret& Confidential,Seperate,12 March
1879.
49. IOR L/P&S/3/267,Zohrabto Salisbury,Secret& Confidential,Seperate,12 March
1879.Shuklastatesthatthe BritishConsulin Jedda,J. Zohrab,'firstsoughtthe grand
sharifs help in the Anglo-Afghanconflict'and that 'Zohrabpersuadedthe grand
sharifto senda missionto Afghanistanto impressuponthe amirthe advantagesof the
Britishfriendship'.Howeverno evidencehas so far been foundto supportthis view.
On the contrary,several documentsin the Public Record Office and India Office
Libraryand Recordsshowquiteclearlythatthe initialmovecamefromthe Amirnot
fromthe British.Ram LakhanShukla,Britain,Indiaand the TurkishEmpire18531882(New Delhi, 1973),pp.188-9. It shouldbe notedhere thatSherAli, the Afghan
Amir, died nearlythree weeks before the date on which HusseinPaashowed his

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122

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

willingnessto act as intermediarybetweenSherAli and otherAfghanchieftainsand

the Britishgovernment.Forthe developmentsin Afghanistansee W.K.Fraser-Tytler,
Afghanistan:A Studyof PoliticalDevelopmentsin Centraland SouthernAsia (third
edition, London, 1967),pp.137-50;G.P. Tate, TheKingdomof Afghanistan:A HistoricalSketch(Bombay,Calcutta,1911),pp.173-9; M. Saray,AfganistanVe Turkler
(Istanbul,1984),pp. 45-70.
50. IOLR L/P&S/3/558,ForeignOffice to India Office, 14 April 1879;India Office to
ForeignOffice25 July1879.
51. FO 195/1251,ForeignOfficeto ZohrabNo.1, Secret,7 August1879.
52. IORL/P&S/3/406,Maletto SalisburyNo.375,Therapia4 May1879.
53. Ibid.,ForeignOfficeto IndiaOffice31May1879.
54. FO 195/1251Zohrabto Layard,12May1879.
55. FO 195/1251,Zohrabto LayardNo.21, Jedda,7 June 1879.In this despatchZohrab
praisesHalit Pasa for his endless efforts to improvethe conditionsof the vilayet.
However,he also admitsthatsuchan efforthaswon HalitPapano friendsamongthe
rulingclasses'to whomdisorderproveslucrative'.
56. BOA IMMNo.2948,26Mayis1295/7June1879.
57. Ibid.,4 Recep 1296/25June1879.
58. Ibid;FO 195/1251,Zohrabto LayardNo.30, 6 August1879.
59. FO78/2988,Zohrabto Salisbury,Jedda,8 December1879.
60. Ibid.
61. FO78/2988,Sharifof Meccato Zohrab,3 Muharrem1297/18December1879.
62. FO 78/2899, Zohrab to Salisbury , Political, Secret, Confidential, Jedda, 22 December

1879.
63. FO78/2899,Zohrabto SalisburyNo.1, Confidential&Political,Jedda,6 August1879.
64. FO 78/2899, Zohrabto CommanderBurness, Most secret & Confidential,Jedda,
6 December1879.
65. FO78/2899,Zohrabto Salisbury,22 December1879.
66. FO78/3131,Zohrabto Salisbury,Mostsecret,Cairo,9 January1880.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. CabinetPapers(CAB) 37/1Vol.I. No.3, 1880Maletto SalisburyNo.5, secret,Cairo,
8 January1880.
70. FO 78/3131,Zohrabto Salisbury,Cairo,9 January1880.
71. Ibid.
72. FO 78/3131,Zohrabto Alston, Private,Cairo,12January1880.Zohrabwritesin the
introductorysectionof the letterthathe [Alston]can showthe letterto anyonein the
governmentwhomhe thinksappropriate.
73. FO78/3131,Zohrabto Alston,Private,Cairo,12January1880.
74. Ibid. SalisburyrequestedLayardto find out whetherthere existed a secret treaty
between the OttomanEmpireand Russia, as was stronglyaffirmedby the Amir of
Mecca.Layardrespondedthat as far as he was able to judge no suchtreatydid exist
FO 78/3072,Salisbury
to Layard,No.36, 29 January1880;IOR/L/P&S/3/161,
Layard
to Salisbury,No.1829 February1880.
75. FO78/2988,Zohrabto Salisbury,8 December1879.
76. Ibid.
77. FO78/2988,Zohrabto Alston, 12January1880.
78. IOR L/P&S/3/161,Layardto SalisburyNo. 182, secret, Constantinople,9 February
1880.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.Layardwasalreadytold by the SultanthatEnglandhadaccusedhimof attemptingto annexthe Hijaz.ThereforeLayardstatedthat'anyspecialmarkof favourshown
to the amirby the Britishgovernmentwouldat once leadthe sultanto suspectthatan
hostileto himexistedbetweenus'.
understanding
81. Layardto Salisbury11 February1880, LayardPapers, BritishLibraryManuscript
Section,Add. 3913/f16.

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ABDULHAMID II, AMIR HUSSEIN AND THE BRITISH

123

82. IOR L/P&S/3/246,Layardto SalisburyNo. 302, secret, Constantinople,12 March

1880.

83. L/P&S/3/701880,The Viceroyto the Secretaryof Statefor India,27 Janury1880see

alsothe Secretaryof StateforIndiato the Viceroy,12January1880;the Viceroyto the
Sec. of State for India, 17 January1880;the Secretaryof State to the Viceroy, 17
January1880.
84. IORL/P&S/3/76,Salisburyto Malet,No.15,29 January1880.
85. IOR L/P&S/3/87,Zohrabto Salisbury,Cairo,2 February1880;FO to IndiaOffice,
3 February1880;L/P&S/3/97,Salisburyto Malet,No.21,5 February1880;L/P&S/3/136,
the Sec. of Statefor Indiato the Viceroy,20 February1880;FO 78/3168the Secretary
of State for Indiato the Viceroy,5 February1880;the Viceroyto the Sec. of State,
replyto the 5th, 17February1880;the Sec. of Stateto the Viceroy,20 February1880;
TheViceroyto the Sec. of State,28 February1880.
86. IORL/P&S/3/198,Zohrabto Salisbury,Secret& Seperate,28 February1880.
87. FO427/97,No.29, Zohrabto SalisburyNo. 1, Political,Jedda,16March1880.
88. IORL/P&S/3/198,Zohrabto Salisbury,28February1880.
89. L/P&S/3/163,The Viceroy to the Sec. of State for India, 28 February1880. The
viceroy'sview was communicatedto Zohrabon 11 March.The despatchto the latter
states that 'beforeany instructionscan be given to you [Zohrab]with regardto the
directionsto be givento the agents. . . it willbe necessarythatyou shouldreporthome
all the informationyou canobtainas to theircharacterandantecedentsandespecially
if Afghansareselectedby His Highness',FO 78/3131,Salisburyto Zohrab,Tel. No.2,
11March1880;Salisburyto Zohrab,mostsecret,No.3, 11March1880.
90. BOA YEE/30/114/51/78,
A reporton the assassinationof the Amirof Meccaprepared
by the Vali of the Hijaz, Rasid Nasid Pasa, 18 Rebiyulevvel 1298/19 February 1881.

91. Ibid.;FO424/97Zohrabto SalisburyNo. 1, Political,Jedda,16March1880.

92. BOA Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki (Y/A Hususi) 165/119, Abdullah Pasa to the
Vali, 10 Rebiyulahir 1297/23 March 1880; BOA YEE 30/114/51/78.
93. BOA Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evraki (Y/A Hususi) 165/119. Memorandum by the
mejlis on the interrogation of the assassin, 10 Rebiyulahir 1297/23 March 1880.
94. BOA YEE 30/114/51/78.
95. Amr, op. cit., p.205.
96. IOR L/P&S/3/234, Layard to Salisbury, Tel. No. 136 Constantinople, 24 March 1880;
FO424/97 No. 113, Layardto SalisburyNo.344 Secret, Constantinople, 26 March 1880.
97. BOA YEE, 30/114/51/78.
98. IOR L/P&S/3/246, Layard to Salisbury, No.302, 12 March 1880.
99. FO 195/1313, Zohrab to Layard No.3, Political, Jedda, 22 March 1880.
100. L/P&S/3/234, Layard to Salisbury, No.136, 24 March 1880; FO 424/97 Layard to
Salisbury, No.344, 26 March 1880.
101. L/P&S/3/246, From Malet, No.68, Cairo, 3 April 1880.
102. L/P&S/3/392, Malet to Salisbury, No. 153, Political & secret, Cairo, 8 April 1880.
103. BOA IMM No.3012, 23 Ramazan 1296/12 September 1879; Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi
Amedi Kalemi Defterleri (A.AMD), Meclis-i Mahsus Aynen Kayit Defteri, No.222,
25 Ramazan 1296; Consul Zohrab complained about Ali Bey's misdeeds and asked
Layard to achieve his removal from Jedda. FO 78/2988 Zohrab to Salisbury, No.52,
Consular, Jedda, 6 August 1879. For Zohrab's despatch on Ali Bey's removal see FO
78/2988, Zohrab to Salisbury, No.58, 22 September 1879.
104. For Zohrab's praising comments on the Valis see FO 195/ 1251, Zohrab to Layard
No.21, Jedda, 7 June 1879; FO 78/3017, Zohrab to Salisbury, No.65, Jedda, 24 October
1879; FO 78/3130, Zohrab to Salisbury, Secret & Political, Jedda, 7 April 1880.
105. FO 424/91, Layard to Salisbury, No.882, secret, Therapia, 15 October 1879; FO
78/2988, Zohrab to Salisbury, No. 1, confidential and political, Jedda, 6 August 1879.
106. Uzunqarsili, Mekke-i Muikerreme,p. 139. The Sultan's memorandum on the subject is
fully reproduced by Uzunqarsili.

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