Military Art and Science

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ON CONTEMPORARY WARFARE:
SHORT REVIEW OF SPECIFIC CONCEPTS
ValericCRUCERU
valcruc1@gmail.com
CarolINationalDefenseUniversity,Bucharest,Romania

A BSTRACT
We witness a tendency of warfare to migrate from a
conventional, towards a complex asymmetrical expression. Some
contemporary concepts show the change of approach from the
physical destruction of war targets, to the erosion of enemys power
and will, and the control/support of population, by the employment of
a large array of capabilities. The compound warfare concept means the
combination of asymmetric and conventional approaches, where forces
operate under a unified command, in order to achieve strategic synergy.
The unrestricted warfare concept is based on the innovative employment
of an unlimited number of military and non-military measures, from all
environments (ground/air/sea/space/cyber-space), by a multidimensional
coordination of governmental, non-governmental, international and
private actors, in order to attain the political objectives. The hybrid war is
caused by a hybrid threat, a blend of military and non-military assets and
operations, terrorism, guerrilla tactics, criminality and cyber attacks.
The hybrid war materializes the convergence of opponents, methods and
assets, the fusion of threats and the fusion of capabilities, in a blurred
operational environment.

KEYWORDS: warfare, irregular warfare, compound warfare, unrestricted

warfare,hybridwar
1. Introduction
th
Up to the second half of the 20
century the warfare was expressed mainly by
an almost pure military confrontation, known
as conventional/classical/regular warfare.
This type of warfare originates from modern
times Europe as the expression of wars
conducted within a framework of conventions
and depicts the operations of regular,
legitimate, recognized state armies. In this
respect, Andre Beaufre considered that
classical warfare exploits the technical
dimensions and geographical features of

states, being the struggle of a specialized

branch of society [1].
th
The second half of the 20 century
witnessed a tendency of warfare to migrate
towards
a
complex
asymmetrical/
unconventional/irregular expression. The
asymmetric warfare refers mainly to the
disparity between the parties in conflict,
and not to a specific operational approach;
it describes a phenomenon in which the
resources of two belligerents differ in
essence and in the struggle, interact and
attempt
to
exploit
each
others
characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles

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often involve strategies and tactics of

unconventional warfare, the weaker
combatants attempting to use strategy to
offset deficiencies in quantity or quality [2].
The unconventional warfare is
defined as activities conducted to enable a
resistance movement or insurgency to
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government
or occupying power by operating through
or with an underground, auxiliary, and
guerrilla force in a denied area [3].
For irregular warfare the definition states:
A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant population(s). Irregular
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric
approaches, though it may employ the full
range of military and other capacities, in
order to erode an adversarys power,
influence, and will [4].
So we have a blend of warfare amongst
the people, because the asymmetrical warfare
is related to unconventional warfare, while
irregular warfare is based on asymmetric
approaches. From the above mentioned
definitions we can notice that the
contemporary warfare is not anymore just a
military confrontation among regular,
legitimate belligerents, but one which does
not abide by conventions, waged by other
belligerent entities, under different forms of
manifestation, and centered on population.
While
the
conventional/regular
warfare aims at the physical destruction of
war targets, the other type of warfare looks
for the erosion of enemys power and will,
change of behavior, control/support of
population, by employing a large array of
military and non-military capabilities.
In this respect, many specialists understand
the conflict beyond the Clausewitzs
teachings and support M artin van Crevelds
concept of non-trinitarian war. The concept
was introduced in 1991, by his work The
Transformation of War, which stresses that
belligerent factions will employ all
available assets in order to fulfill their
objectives, without thinking that some of

these are not recognized as military forces

or traditional methods [5]. We will see from
the presentation of the following concepts
that the contemporary warfare is a
phenomenon of an increased complexity,
demanding a combination of military and
non-military capacities and capabilities, as
regular and irregular forces, lethal and nonlethal assets, and economic, diplomatic,
informational and military actions.
2. The Compound Warfare Concept
This concept was proposed by an
American team led by Thomas Huber, in
Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot.
Although the book has nine chapters I will
concentrate my analysis on the first chapter,
because it presents the theoretical ideas
which give substance to the above
mentioned concept. The compound warfare
stands for the simultaneous use of a
regular or main force and an irregular or
guerrilla force against an enemy. In other
words, the compound warfare operator
increases his military leverage by applying
both conventional and unconventional force
at the same time [6].
The author underlines that compound
warfare generally applies when a small/ weak
nation state is being partially occupied by a
great power. After the spreading of the enemy
forces over the occupied territory, the
belligerent that has lost a part of its territory
can initiate and wage the compound warfare.
Firstly, the irregular formations can provide
many advantages to the regular forces. They:
send accurate intelligence to friendly forces,
at the same time affecting the enemys
intelligence system; provide food and fulfill
other supply demands of regular forces, at the
same time interdicting the enemys main
routes of supply; provide human resources for
the main forces, both for combat missions
and other activities, during the key moments
of the operations. In a summary, irregular
formations amplify the effort of regular
forces, at the same time affecting the
operational potential of the enemy.

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Secondly, regular forces can give a
strong support to local irregular formations.
The pressure from the regular troops
compels the enemy to withdraw and
redeploy some of its forces outside the
areas where guerrillas operate, leaving
room for an extended freedom of action of
the last ones. Regular forces provide
combat equipment and specialized training
to guerrillas and sometimes even strategic
intelligence in order to direct their actions
towards the support of the overall effort. All
these complementing interactions between
regular and irregular forces give substance to
the compound warfare concept, seen as a
construct in which the whole represents more
than the sum of the parts [7].
The real compound warfare manifest
itself when separate or complementary
operations executed by regular and irregular
forces are coordinated at the strategic level;
the simultaneous fight under a unified
command and control, in order to achieve a
common objective constitutes the essence
of compound warfare. The compound
warfare becomes decisive when is
fortified. This aspect does not ask for
supplementary troops, means or strong
defensive position, but for an enhanced
capability of the own forces to avoid
somehow the destructive strikes of the
enemy. The diplomatic efforts, the
alliances, the particular employment of the
terrain features and existing technology,
coupled with agility can contribute to
fortification. In Hubers opinion the
fortified compound warfare demands the
existence of four elements, which could
sustain the weak state whose forces are in a
defensive posture: a regular/main force; an
irregular/guerrilla force; sanctuaries for the
survival of regular forces; un ally
represented by a great power [8].
It is obvious that in compound
warfare belligerents have a high operational
potential, due to the multiple capabilities of
the composing elements. The multiple
effects which appear at the tactical and

233
operational levels are generated by the
ability of belligerents to take advantage of
the most effective asset or method, to be
employed at the right time, in the right
place. M ore than that, by extending the
tactical capabilities for full spectrum
missions, the belligerents are able to
diversify the nature of threat, in accordance
with their existing forces and assets.
The classical example of compound
warfare viewed as a model for
understanding the strategic synergy is the
Vietnam War. The operations amongst
people of irregular forces (Viet Cong) and
the operations of North Vietnamese regular
forces in South Vietnam, under a unified
command, combined the unconventional/
asymmetric and conventional approaches,
in order to extract strategic benefits. So
compound warfare is directly related to the
achievement of the strategic synergy!
3. The Unrestricted Warfare Concept
This concept was developed in
Unrestricted Warfare, a work of two
colonels of Peoples Liberation Army,
published at an official printing house, in
the People Republic of China PRC, in
February 1999. The above mentioned book
reviews the global security phenomenon
after the Gulf War (1991) and proposes a
different approach for a future conflict,
bringing forward a multitude of principles,
strategies and tactics which are to be
employed by developing countries (like PRC)
in order to compensate for the military
weaknesses, when confronted with USA
along a high-tech war. Although the book is
full of substance we will concentrate on
presenting the main ideas, revealed in
Preface, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
We find out that the Gulf War was a
crucial event that contributed in a decisive
way to the transformation of our world,
everything looking different after January 17,
1991. A perfect model of the contemporary
conventional conflict, that war proved the
supremacy of USA in traditional military

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capabilities, inviting everybody to think if it

would be feasible to defy the Americans,
having in mind a conventional defence. The
Chinese experts stressed that the American
potential forced state and non-state actors to
concoct a genuine approach, based on the
combined
employment
of
political,
economic, cultural, diplomatic, ethnic and
religious assets, as the main effort,
complemented only, by their limited military
assets. War has been influenced by the
transformation of contemporary societies, the
terrorist, financial and cyber-attacks being as
destructive as the military attacks [9].
Due to the influence of markets and
modern technology over peoples lives, the
future warfare will take shape under nontraditional and blurred forms, marked by a
possible reduction of military violence, and
an increase of political, economic and
technological violence. As a result, the
principles of war will not refer anymore to
the employment of armed forces to defeat
the enemys will, but to the employment
of all lethal and non-lethal assets, including
armed and unarmed, military and nonmilitary force to compel the enemy to
accept our interests [10]. This complex
security environment, filled with non-state
actors and operations other than military
ones gives war a possibility to go beyond
borders, and to become a phenomenon
without limits. In this kind of war all assets
are prepared, information is abundant,
battle field extends everywhere, while the
limits between war and non-war, military
and non-military will be destroyed [11].
Chapter 7 Ten Thousand Methods
Combined as One: Combinations That
Transcend Boundaries underlines the need
for flexibility and innovation; unrestricted
stands for a blurred battlefield which blends
all psychological, ethical, traditional,
technical and scientific aspects of human
communities. Unrestricted warfare means
firstly to overcome the old ideology, and
secondly to go beyond physical borders and
select particular assets, even of an extreme

nature. It also means that the combination of

all resources represents the key to success;
when the national security is threaten, is not a
good idea to think first at selecting military
assets to confront the aggressor, but to diffuse
the crisis by employing the supra-national
combinations of power. The globalization,
the internationalization of domestic policies,
the existence of extended information
networks, the fast technological development,
the increasing number of cultural conflicts
and the strengthening on non-state
organizations will impose supra-national
combinations in the equation of future
conflicts [12].
In the last chapter we learn that the
principles of unrestricted warfare are: omnidirectionality (demands from planner and
fighter to pay attention to everything, using
a full mental vision); synchrony (means to
conduct operations over different spaces,
during the same period of time); limited
objectives (ask for the establishment of a
balance, so the objectives will be smaller
than the measures); unlimited measures
(refers to the existence of more and more
assets and methods of employment);
asymmetry (means to avoid symmetry in
thinking
and
operating);
minimal
consumption (the combination of effects
can lead to smaller consumptions);
multidimensional
coordination
(selfexplanatory); adjustment and control of the
entire process (due the dynamics of this
kind of warfare, everything has to be
adjusted and controlled in a flexible and
creative way) [13].
In essence, the concept of unrestricted
warfare is based on the innovative
employment of an unlimited number of
measures (military and non-military), from
all directions (inside or outside of a
state/human group), from the ground/air/
sea/space/cyber-space, by a multidimensional
coordination of a multitude of governmental,
non-governmental, international and private
actors.

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4. The Hybrid War Concept
During the last decades we have
witnessed an important trend within the
security phenomenon at regional level, state
and non-state actors trying to promote their
interests by avoiding the conventional
military confrontation with USA and other
powers. These actors take advantage of
globalization and IT revolution to develop
complex capabilities of a military and nonmilitary nature, and to come up with
innovative operational approaches that take the
opponents by surprise. Their manifestation
generates the hybrid war!
The hybrid war concept has surfaced
within the American military thinking of
the last decade, with Frank G. Hoffman and
James N. M attis as its best promoters. They
started the endeavour in 2005 by publishing
the article Future Warfare: The Rise of
Hybrid Wars, which defines in broad terms,
the hybrid threat and the hybrid war. In
their opinion, state and non-state actors try
to develop new capacities and capabilities
(technological combinations and unexpected
tactics), in order to get strategic advantages,
while avoiding a direct military confrontation
with the US forces; that is the hybrid threat,
a blend of military and non-military assets
and operations, terrorism, guerrilla tactics,
criminality and cyber attacks that can affect
the security interests of the USA and other
allies. The hybrid opponent wants to act in
many domains and cumulate the tactical
effects, gain the support of media and
orchestrate information operations, in order
to erode his enemys will to continue a
complex confrontation. This new type of
opponent compels the Americans and their
allies to deal simultaneously with a large
array of threats, to operate successfully
against different enemies, during complex
and blurred conflicts, encompassing
military and non-military domains; that is
the essence of the hybrid war [14].
In 2007 Frank G. Hoffman published
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of
Hybrid Wars, considered to be the

235
cornerstone of the new concept. In this
book the author underlines that the possible
opponents to US and other powers adapt
their strategies and operational postures in a
continuous way, creating a complex
typological mixture, which is difficult to
categorize and defeat. The main challenge
will come from state and non-state actors
that choose to employ technologies and
tactics which are best suited for their own
geography and culture. It is believed that
the future war will materialize the
convergence of opponents, methods and assets,
into multi-mode or hybrid confrontations.
During the hybrid confrontation the opponents
will exploit the access to modern military
capabilities in order to support insurgent,
terrorist and criminal movements, as well as
the intervention of some states which are able
to combine high-tech military capabilities,
with terrorist actions and cyber warfare
operations, against economic and financial
targets [15].
Hezbollah portrays the hybrid
opponent, a political and military
movement which displays a mixture of
conventional and irregular capabilities,
complemented by terrorism and criminal
disorder. In fact, in hybrid war the
opponents seek victory by the fusion of
irregular tactics and the most lethal means
available, in order to attack and attain their
political objectives [16].
Other American authors have brought
their contribution to the development of the
hybrid war concept, taking into account the
importance of population. It is stressed that
st
the 21 century war will be a hybrid one, a
confrontation where the Americans project
all elements of the national power, in a
continuum of military and non-military
operations, in order to influence or stabilize
weak states, and prevent them from
becoming safe havens for insurgents,
terrorists and criminals [17]. The hybrid
war might take shape by a combination of
symmetric and asymmetric conflicts, where
the intervention forces conduct traditional

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military operations against enemy targets,

while operating decisively and simultaneously
to attain the control of the indigenous
population, through stability operations [18].
5. Conclusions
We conclude our scientific endeavour
by stating that contemporary warfare has
evolved because the technology has
changed the societies, and the societies
have changed their perceptions. The
analysis of the combined/unrestricted/
hybrid warfare concepts makes us believe
that the contemporary war is more complex,
dynamic, interconnected and volatile than

ever. The belligerents adapt and change,

combine and improvise in order to extract
full benefits from multi-domain operations.
Gradually, the battlefield will extend
everywhere, with the active participation of
the population.
The warfare has ceased to express a
pure military matter and is moving towards
a holistic expression where all military,
political, economic, informational capabilities
are employed to obtain strategic effects. We
will see the full spectrum confrontations,
meaning the fusion of threats and the fusion
of capabilities!

REFERENCES
1. Andre Beaufre, La guerre revolutionnaire, (Paris: Fayard, 1972), 5.
2. Robert Tomes, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, in Parameters (US Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks PA, Spring, 2004), 3.
3. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
(Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 18, 2011), II-9.
4. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of M ilitary and
Associated Terms (Washington, DC: November 15, 2012), 159.
5. M artin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: The Free Press, 1991),
Chapter II, 45-62.
6. Thomas M . Huber, General Editor, Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot, (U S Army
Command & General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth Kansas,
2002), 1.
7. Ibidem, 2.
8. Ibidem, 3-4.
9. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: Peoples Liberation
Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), I 1-4.
10. Ibidem, I-5.
11. Ibidem, 8.
12. Ibidem, 195-196, 200.
13. Ibidem, 226-236.
14. James N. M attis and Frank Hoffman, Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,
Proceedings Magazine, (U S Naval Institute, November 2005): 2.
st
15. Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,
(Arlington Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December, 2007), 26-27.
16. Ibidem, 29.
17. Colonel M argaret S. Bond, United States Army Reserve, Hybrid War: A New
Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States, (Strategy Research Project, US Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle PA, M arch 30, 2007), 4.
18. Colonel John J. M cCuen, USA, Retired, Hybrid Wars, Military Review, (M archApril 2008, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas): 107-108.
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