Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,

Volume 5, Number 1, 2003

Approaches to political violence and terrorism in

former Yugoslavia1
FLORIAN BIEBER
No other part of Europe has seen a greater degree of violence in the past
decade than former Yugoslavia. The wars and violence leading to the death of
more than 200,000 people were primarily motivated by ethnic nationalism. This
ethnic violence was simultaneously deeply political in the sense that it was
committed with political goals in mindsuch as the creation of homogeneous
nation-states or maintaining political powerand organized by political
forcesparties and governments.2
As most conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have been described as wars
the usefulness of the term political violence is not apparent at first sight. At
closer examination, however, one can note that before, during and after the
wars, political violence took place in most regions of former Yugoslavia. How
to distinguish war from political violence? Wars are marked by high intensity,
both in terms of the number of participants, as well as in terms of the number
of victims. Some scholars have used the somewhat arbitrary, yet necessary,
threshold of 1000 victims to consider a violent conflict a war.3 Political violence
on the other hand can describe a much broader range of violence, claiming far
fewer lives and coexisting with an overall state of peace.4 In fact, most civil
wars, including the ones in former Yugoslavia, have been preceded by low-intensity political violence. In many cases, the wars are inconceivable without a
considerable degree of political violence first. Developing a better understanding of political violence thus appears imperative in explaining the escalation of
ethnic violence into wars.
This will be discussed below. In the first instance, we need to distinguish
between different categories of political violence, particularly between terrorism and political violence perpetrated by guerilla groups and paramilitary
formations. The term terrorism has become a much-used label since 11
September 2001. In former Yugoslavia, terrorism had been already heavily
1
This article is based on a study written in the framework of a project of the Forum for Ethnic
Relations, Belgrade with the funding of the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, New York on Terrorism
and Ethnic Conflicts: Experience of the Western Balkans.
2
M. J. Esman, Ethnic Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY and London, 1994, pp. 2648.
3
M. E. Brown, Ethnic and internal conflicts. Causes and implications, in C. A. Crocker et al. (eds),
Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, United States Institute of Peace Press,
Washington, 2001, p. 212.
4
Mary Kaldor actually largely describes political violence when distinguishing new from old
wars. See M. Kaldor, New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, CA, 1999.

ISSN 1461-3190 print/ISSN 1469-963X online/03/01003913 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1461319032000062642

40 Florian Bieber
used throughout the 1990s by political elites to either describe the opponents
on the other side of the ethnic divideoften employed to describe a whole
nationor to portray threats in general against the respective nation. As a term
with strong normative connotations and a history of misuse, terrorism has to
be firmly placed into relationship with other forms of political violence.
Terrorism will thus be examined as one form of political violence and distinguished from other, often more common, types of political violence.
This paper seeks to develop a framework for understanding political
violence in former Yugoslavia. In particular, it will examine the role of
terrorism during the past decade as a form of political violence and argues that
contrary to frequent pronouncements by political actors in the region, terrorism
has only been a marginal phenomenon, constituting merely a small segment of
political violence, in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Instead, other forms
of political violence have been substantially more prevalent and are more likely
to pose a threat to the stability of the region than terrorism.
Distinguishing political violence and terrorism in former Yugoslavia
While the overall number of instances of terrorism have been low in former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, especially if compared with other types of political
violence, it is worth attempting to develop a conceptual matrix in which
terrorism and other forms of politically motivated violence in Southeastern
Europe can be understood.
When examining terrorism and political violence in Southeastern Europe,
we can exclude some categories, which might be applicable elsewhere, but are
uncommon in the Balkans.5 Firstly, most political violence and terrorism have
been motivated by ethnicity and/or national identity. Related one can find
elements of religious fundamentalism and racism, but both are mostly connected to nationally motivated political violence. Other motivators, such as leftwing ideology, have been marginal or non-existent in political violence of
recent years. We need to distinguish furthermore internal from transnational
political violence. Although nationalist movements are often active across state
borders, they are not international, as their activities are confined to their area
of residence (or claim).6 The only significant type of internationally active
terrorism has been by Islamic fundamentalist groups, possibly linked to AlQaida. These groups have carried out or planned only a few terrorist acts in the
region itself.7 Their targets have mostly not been connected to the countries
themselves, but rather representations of the USA. As such, they constitute a
largely foreign group targeting other non-domestic actors. Countries where this
5

For a broader typology of terrorism, see P. Wilkinson, The strategic implications of terrorism,
in M. L. Sondhi (ed.), Terrorism & Political Violence. A Sourcebook, Har-Anand, New Delhi, 2000.
6
This stands in contrast to some Ustase emigre terrorist groups, which were active in the 1970s
in attacking Yugoslav representations in North America and Western Europe. See M. Glamocak,
Koncepcije velike Hrvatske i velike Srbije u politickoj emigraciji, Rujno, Uzice, 1997, pp. 111123. Although
occasionally commentators feared the re-emergence of this type of political violence, it did not
materialize. See D. Hedl, Croatian extremist threat, IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, 8 September 2000.
7
Including a car bomb in front of the police station in Rijeka, Croatia planted by Al-gama al-islamiya
over the alleged arrest of one of the groups leaders; the planned attacks against US interests in Bosnia
in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Data from Forum for Ethnic Relations, Terrorism and ethnic
conflicts: experience of the western Balkans, Belgrade, 2002.

Political violence and terrorism 41

threat exists, especially Bosnia, are thus only involved as a consequence of the
war and weakness of state authority.
Primarily, we have to take into account three types of criteria in the
categorization. Firstly, the relationship to the government, secondly the readiness to use violence (and degree) and the nature of the violence employed. The
taxonomy given in Table 1 is not a rigid framework in which to conceptualize
political violence, but should rather serve as a compass to understand different
types of political violence.
If we first examine the readiness to use violence, we have to distinguish the
rhetoric of violence from the actual use of violence and define an intermediary
step of rhetoric of violence combined with sporadic violence.
The rhetoric of violence, although not constituting an act of violence, merits
inclusion here, as the incitement to violence has been a key component of the
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, as has been the case with most other conflicts
which include aspects of ethnicity.8 The group advocating violence might not
itself engage in it, but will usually not try to distance itself from acts committed
under its ideology. In the case of Southeastern Europe, extreme nationalist
political parties and groups qualify for this category. In Serbia the Serbian
Radical Party (SRS) and the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ), both with links to
paramilitary formations during the Bosnia and Kosovo war, openly advocated
the use of force against other nations in Yugoslavia and in neighboring states.9
In Croatia the Croatian Party of Right (HPS) falls into the same group. Also in
cases such as Macedonia, where a full-scale war in 2001 was narrowly averted,
some parties, including the governing party at the time, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary OrganizationDemocratic Party of Macedonian National
Unity (VMRO-DPMNE),10 condoned the use of force. In addition to parties,
nationalist movements belong to this category, such as the ultra-nationalist
movement Obraz in Serbia, whose following has grown since the fall of the
Milosevic regime.11 While some groups and parties maintained their own
paramilitaries, others merely advocated the use of force. In times when the use
of force was legitimate within the political framework these parties and groups
operated, few of those who condoned the use of force refrained from some
degree of direct or indirect involvement. As a result most parties and groups
at time of war might fall into the third category of organizations using violence
against objects or groups.
In the next category, we find groups, which engage in both sporadic acts of
violence and which at the same time publicly advocate violence. Often such
groups would substantially use the threat of violence, rather than violence
itself. Stopping short of being outright terrorist groups or paramilitaries, these
8

See for example M. Lenkova (ed.), Hate Speech in the Balkans, ETEPE, Athens, 1998.
The Party of Serbian Unity was in fact set up by the paramilitary leader and convicted criminal
Zeljko Arkan Raznatovic.
10
The name of the party is borrowed from a pre-World War II group which employed guerilla
strategies at the turn of the century and terrorist tactics in inter-war Yugoslavia. On this issue see S.
Troebst, IMRO 100 FYROM? The politics of Macedonian historiography, in J. Pettifer (ed.), The
New Macedonian Question, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 6078.
11
Although Obraz has also been implicated in a few violent incidents, the primary function of the
group is advocating the use of force and extreme nationalist ideas. Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Serbia, Human Rights and Transition. Serbia 2001, Belgrade, 2002, pp. 236239.
9

Secret services

Special police and

army units

Organized violence
against individuals

Organized violence
against groups

Paramilitary groups

Paramilitary groups

Paramilitary groups

Secret services

Organized violence
against material
objects

GovernmentGovernmentsponsored
tolerated
Extremist political parties and movements
Parties, movements, paramilitary groups

Governmental
groups
Governments

Relationship to the government

Rhetoric of violence
with sporadic
incidents of violence
(low degree of
organization)

Rhetoric of violence

Readiness to use
violence

Table 1. Taxonomy of political violence

Anti-government

Guerilla groups
(terrorist groups)

Terrorist groups
(guerilla groups)

Terrorist groups
(guerilla groups)

Extremist groups and movements

Governmental
indifference

42 Florian Bieber

Political violence and terrorism 43

groups are usually characterized by a lower organizational degree and might
have other constraints such as the danger of a ban if engaging to openly in
violence. Such groups would typically include Skinheads and other neo-Fascist
groups and movements, as well as some extremist parties.
A third group can be defined as openly engaging in acts of violence, with
varying degrees of public acknowledgment thereof. Such groups include
paramilitaries, parts of the army and police in some countries, guerilla groups
and terrorist organizations. To further define this category, it is worth differentiating the nature of the violence perpetrated, although one is likely to often
find these groups perpetrating violence in all three categories.
The first category limits violence to material damage inflicted, for example,
through bombs. Such attacks usually seek to instill fear in the population or a
particular group. This tactic has been commonly used either as a tool to engage
in ethnic cleansing or to prevent the return of refugees after the end of the
wars. Thus, it can be found mostly in areas directly affected by war, such as
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia. However, such attacks also occurred against
minorities in Serbia during the early phases of the war in 19911992. As the aim
is immediate (expelling/preventing return of communities) and the political
intention obvious, most attacks have not been claimed by the perpetrators.12
This type of political violence, beyond the wars themselves, has probably been
the most common and had lasting effects on inter-ethnic relations and the
demography of former Yugoslavia. In Croatia, for example, in areas which
were occupied by the Serbian Republic of Krajina between 1991 and 1995 some
22,000 Serb-owned homes were destroyed after the end of the armed conflict
in August 1995.13 In addition to the destruction of houses, attacks against
symbols of other nations have been common, such as the destruction of most
mosques in the Serb Republic during and after the Bosnian war and bombing
of Serbian Orthodox churches and monuments in Kosovo after the end of the
war in 1999.
In the subsequent category, violence is targeted against individuals. This
type of violence expresses itself in assassinations, car bombs and other types of
targeted attacks. Although nationalism and inter-ethnic tension have played
their part, this type of political violence has rarely been directed against
political figures of other nations. Altogether these types of attack have been
sporadic and are often indistinguishable from organized crime. There have
been generally four types of assassinations: the first targeted politicians, such
as the car bomb against the Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov in 1995 or the
spree of assassinations of Serbian regime politicians in 2000.14 A second group
affected individuals who have been uncovering war crimes, such as the
assassination of Milan Levar, a key witness in a Croatian war crimes case at
The Hague war crimes tribunal in 2001 and the car bomb against the editor of
the Bosnian Serb independent newspaper Nezavisne Novine, Zeljko Kopanja, in
1999, for investigating war crimes by local Serbs. Third, some attacks were

12
In a number of cases the respective governments and some of its agencies (police, army) have
been directly or indirectly involved.
13
Croatia war veterans protest against UN grave dig, Reuters, 24 April 2001.
14
The assassination included the Federal Minister of Defence, Pavle Bulatovic.

44 Florian Bieber
directed against officials for investigating organized crime, such as the assassination of the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Bosnian Federation,
Jozo Leutar, in 2000. Finally, opposition politicians and personalities have been
targeted, presumably by the authoritarian regimes of the 1990s. This has been
uruvija was shot
particularly the case in Serbia, where the journalist Slavko C
during the Kosovo war in 1999, as well as at least one attempt on the life of
Vuk Draskovic, president of the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO),
was made in 19992000. While most assassinations have largely remained
unresolved, most can be characterized by the (presumed) perpetrators:
Nationalists and groups with links to war criminals for the second group,
organized crime with the third and individuals and organizations associated
with the authorities with the last group.
Finally, organized groups might target particular groups defined by ethnicity, political conviction, sexual preferences and religion. These acts of political
violence can include most crimes committed during ethnically motivated wars,
such as the ethnic cleansing and mass murder by armed forces during the wars
in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Additionally, paramilitary groups and government-controlled forces have been targeting groups outside of war zones. Such
instances include the expelling of Croats from the Vojvodina village of
Hrtkovci in 1992, organized by the paramilitary organization of the SRS,15
attacks by Croatian government forces, as well as Serbian paramilitaries in 1990
in ethnically mixed areas in Croatia.
While paramilitaries and terrorist groups will be identifiable in all three
categories of violence committed, terrorist groups would most fall into the first
and second group of the types of violence employed (objects and individuals),
while paramilitaries would mostly be active in violence of the third category
(groups).
In addition to the categorization according to the types of force employed,
a distinction is required as to the role of governmental involvement. Here the
role of the government surveyed is less the question of the general support a
movement might receive from any government outside the area of conflict, as
often the case with terrorist groups, but rather the relationship on the ground.
Here government does not need to refer to the legitimate or internationally
recognized government, but rather the authority, which controls a particular
territory and exercises authority over it. Thus the army of the Republika Srpska
during the Bosnian war would not qualify as a terrorist group, but as an army
or as a paramilitary group. Generally speaking, we can distinguish five types
of relationships to governments. Some groups might be direct institutions of
the government, such as army and police units. They might sometimes be
acknowledged by the authorities, while at times these links might be denied.
Most importantly, they are part of the integral structure of the state and the
authorities exercise direct control over these units. In addition, it is important
that the state (or parts/actors) control these groups. Due to cronyism and
personalization of state institutions, it would be flawed to include civilian or
democratic control in this category. In the case of former Yugoslavia most

15
See Humanitarian Law Centre, Human Rights 19911995. Spotlight Series, Belgrade, 2002,
pp. 83108.

Political violence and terrorism 45

secret services, special army and police units have acted as belonging to this
category,16 as have some groups resemble paramilitary formations, but were in
fact integrated into and controlled by state structures, such as the Lions
paramilitaries in Macedonia, which have been implicated in some of the acts of
violence against Albanians and opposition during the conflict in 2001.17
The second category includes groups which are intrinsically linked to the
state either through personnel or funding, but which maintain a certain degree
of independence. Within the category of engaging in rhetoric of violence,
they might be coalition partners in government, orwith higher propensity to
violencethey might be paramilitary groups working with the state. A number
of Serbian paramilitary groups, such as Arkans Tigers, would fall in this
category.18
Closely linked are groups, which are tolerated by the government, but not
explicitly endorsed or supported by governmental authorities. The difference
to the second group might be caused by the collusion of goals, but not of
means. Other factors, such as international pressure or competition for power,
might explain the difference to the second category. Such groups include some
of the Serb paramilitary groups active in Bosnia after 1993, when the Serbian
government sought to end the war and put pressure on the Bosnian Serb
authorities to accept international peace plans. In Croatia and Bosnia the
paramilitary Croatian Defense Forces (HOS) maintained separate units from
the government forces active in Croatia in 19911992 and in Bosnia in 1992. The
government eventually took control of HOS and integrated it into the regular
forces in Croatia and into the Bosnian Croat army (HVO).19
Some groups with a rhetoric of violence and the sporadic use of violence
might be met with government indifference, especially if the targets of these
groups are on the social margins of the society where governments might have
little motivation to pursue these groups. It is at the same time inconceivable for
groups to be using violence as a main means of advancing their agenda,
without either tacit government support or opposition. Per definition, governments hold the monopoly over the use of force. Any erosion of this monopoly
is usually met with resistance by the government, unless these groups serve
some political purpose for the government. There might be instances when
non-political violence, especially in connection with organized crime, might
meet government indifference, but the inherent political nature of the violence
described here prohibits such indifference.
The final category includes groups, which oppose the government, either
through a rhetoric of violence, such as extremist anti-system parties and
movements, or through acts of violence. It is here where we would locate
classic terrorist groups, as well as guerilla movements. A distinction between

16
For this in Bosnia see M. A. Hoare, Civilianmilitary relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina
anic (eds), The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 19911995, Frank
19921995, in B. Magas and I. Z
Cass, London, 2001, pp. 178199. For Kosovo see Fond za humanitarno pravo, Kosovo. Kako viztseno,
tako receno, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 2125.
17
P. Sherwell, Ministers arm paramilitaries in Macedonia, Sunday Telegraph, 1 July 2001.
18
Milosevic and the chain of command in Kosovo, Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, New York,
2 July 2001.
19
US Department of State, Croatia Human Rights Practices 1993, Washington, 1994.

46 Florian Bieber
the two types of groups will be elaborated later. Most acts of political violence,
which would be categorized as classical terrorism in former Yugoslavia, have
had few claims of responsibility. Guerilla groups have been more prominent.
The armies of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia and the Serbian Republic would
not fall into this category, however, as they were structurally part of the
Yugoslav army and soon controlled a territory which resembled a parastate.
Cases of guerilla groups in the former Yugoslavia have been the Kosovo
Liberation Army (UC
K) between 1996 and 1999, the Liberation Army of
Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UC
PMB) in 2000 and 2001, as well as the
National Liberation Army (UC
K) in Macedonia in 2001.20
What emerges from this taxonomy is that terrorism constitutes merely a
small segment of organized political violence. While groups of nearly all
sub-categories have been described as terrorists, it is more useful to focus on
the distinctions between the groups. As all groups share at least the rhetorical
support for the use of violence to achieve political goals, boundaries might be
fluid and cooperation between groups belonging to different categories is
frequent.
As development is a key factor in all movements, one will often observe
groups moving from one sub-category to another in the course of time. Due to
the over-usage of the term terrorism in the context of the former Yugoslavia
and globally, a closer examination of terrorism is in order.
Understanding terrorism
The previously mentioned rhetoric of terrorist threats points us to a key
problem associated with the study of terrorism: definitions. It is no surprise
that terrorism has been more prolific in the rhetoric of politicians than of
scholars. Terrorism, as some scholars point out, is a convenient label to attach
to someone you dislike: If you get others to accept that label, you have won a
substantial victory in the struggle by getting others to adopt your value
system.21 The use of the label terrorism has and is frequently used to describe
the use of violence opposed by the person or government using the label. As
such, it can be seen more as a discursive practice than as valid categorization
of violence. In order to grasp terrorism as a concept, one has to place it in a
relational context with other forms of violence, thus limiting it. While the
border to other forms of violence might remain fluid, using a restrictive
definition is the only way to use the term terrorism in an academically useful
way.22
Terrorism can be defined as a type of political violence, which uses the
threat or act of violence to create an atmosphere of fear for the advancement
20

On the three see T. Judah, Kosovo. War and Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and
London, 2000; S. Lipsius, Vorbild UcK: Albaner in Serbien grunden UcPM, Sudosteuropa, 49(34),
2000, pp. 133143; S. Lipsius, Die neue UcK in Makedonien und die politische Entwicklung in
Kosovo, Sudosteuropa, 50(13), 2001, pp. 116.
21
D. W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics, 8th edn, Longman, New York, 2000, p. 147.
22
This is also pointed out by Walter Laqueur in the introduction to his updated work on terrorism
from 1987 where he addressed critiques, which noted that he did not categorize guerilla warfare or
state terrorism as terrorism, see W. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown, Boston and Toronto,
1987.

Political violence and terrorism 47

of a political agenda.23 As such, as Paul Wilkinson points out, terrorism is a
weapon or method which has been used throughout history by both states
and sub-state organizations for a whole variety of political causes or purposes.24
Political violence implies that the act of terrorism is carried out with a
particular agenda. Assassinations for example without a political motive would
not be considered terrorism (e.g. the assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan
in 1981). When the motivation is criminal, one also cannot speak of terrorism
(such as assassinations among members of the Belgrade underground). These
acts of violence are usually considered criminal by both domestic laws under
which they are carried out (arson, murder, blackmail, etc.) as well as by
international law (targeting of civilians). To distinguish terrorist movements
from guerilla movements and parties in an ethnic conflict, it is necessary to
include a dimension of territory to the definition. Guerilla movements confine
their activities to the area of dispute and are mostly confined to rural settings.
Urban guerilla movements have been generally limited and occurred primarily
in collapsed states, such as Beirut in the 1970s and 1980s.25 Similarly acts of
violence committed during an ethnic conflict by either militias or paramilitary
groups are similar to terrorism in the sense that they are criminal in nature and
seek to instill fear, especially when taking the example of ethnic cleansing
committed during the Bosnian war, it is worth distinguishing it from terrorism.
Finally, it is important to differentiate goals and effects of terrorist movements
from those of parties to an ethnic conflict. While it is again difficult to draw a
firm distinction, most terrorist movements seek to trigger a larger conflict,
rather than overthrow the existing order (in the broad sense of both political
system and social order) single-handedly. As such, they rely on either a
reaction by the government targeted which will trigger solidarity of the victims
of the government reaction with the terrorist movement or a withdrawal of the
government (if possible) in the face of losses inflicted by the terrorist acts.
Fighting by paramilitary and other groups is often aimed at changing the
ethnic composition itself and does not perceive itself primarily as a trigger.
The difficulty of this distinction is highlighted by the activities of the UC
K
which acted both as a guerilla movement and as a terrorist group: it attacked
Albanians loyal to the Yugoslav authorities, sought to trigger Western intervention and built mass support by seeking reprisals against civilians by Serbian
and Yugoslav (para-)military and police forces. While structurally resembling
guerilla groups, the tactics of the UC
K of securing external support through its
acts rather than accomplishing its goals, i.e. independence of Kosovo, are more
reminiscent of terrorist groups.26
As mentioned above, it is hard to avoid the normative dimension when
defining terrorism. Few, if any, movements would agree with being described
23
berschatzte Bedrohung?, in C. Leggewie (ed.),
P. Waldmann, Terrorismus-Unterschatzte oder U
Politik im 21. Jahrhundert, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2001, pp. 392394.
24
P. Wilkinson, op. cit.
25
W. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 300.
26
T. Loza, A need for atrocities, Transitions, 6(3), March 1999, pp. 1617. More generally on the
use of international attention as a tool to advance domestic goals in the Balkans see S. Troebst,
Balkanisches Politikmuster? Nationalrevolutionare Bewegungen in Sudosteuropa und die
Ressource Weltoffentlichkeit , Osteuropa, 50(11), 2000, pp. 12541266.

48 Florian Bieber
a terrorist organization, as it implies activities, which are per definition
immoral and target innocent people.27 As a result, the analysis of terrorism will
inevitably condemn the acts of terrorism. At the same time, it is to separate the
acts of violence from the goals. Just as the aims do not justify the means, the
means should not automatically discredit the goals. All to often the goals
themselves are incompatible with liberal democracies and human rights and,
even if they are, the means employed cast doubt on the sincerity of its
proponents. Nevertheless, it would be shortsighted to dismiss the goals outright, especially in cases where the terrorist movement appears to have a broad
base and when operating in or against an oppressive system.
In addition to the definition, one can arrive at a number of features of most
terrorist movements. Firstly, a group that engages in acts of terrorism can have
other functions and the use of terrorism might not be the only way it acts. The
group might also operate as a guerilla movement or as a political party at the
same time.28 Obviously terrorist groups can transform themselves over time
into parties or organizations that pursue their aims only peacefully. Alternatively, many terrorist groups just disappear because of arrest, the fulfillment of
their goals or the decline of the movements ideological underpinnings. Most
terrorist organizations are characterized by their small size, most often numbering only a few dozen or a few hundred members. This is to their military
advantage and political disadvantage, as Laqueur has emphasized: [w]hile
it is difficult to detect small groups and while they can inflict considerable
damage, their political effect is bound to be limited.29
Beyond former Yugoslavia, terrorist groups can derive their motivation and
claim to legitimacy from a number of different sources. The basis could be
ideological, anti-colonial, nationalistseparatist or religious. These categories are not
to be conceived as being rigid dividers. Many movements have combined
characteristics from several categories. The Palestinian movement Hamas is
both a religious movement and an anti-colonial movement. The strength of the
different categories of terrorist movements has changed throughout time.
While in the 1970s ideological movements were identified as the main threat to
peace, religion-based movements replaced them by the 1980s and 1990s.
Although the reach of activities of organizations might be global and directed
not only at the particular regimes they seek to change, but also their international supporters mostly keep a local political agenda. A few movements,
however, have extended their activities and goals primarily beyond the
national framework and sought a global goal, most notably and recently
Al-Qaida. By definition, neither nationalistseparatist nor anti-colonial movements have developed such a global agenda, despite the existence of some
types of coalitions between different movements.
At the same time the use of violence might evolve to a degree that the
actual agenda becomes submerged so that the main raison detre of movements
is violence, as has been the case with later generations of Western European
27
On the nature of terrorism from a moral perspective, see P. Gilbert, Terrorism, Security, and
Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 442.
Gilbert seeks to differentiate terrorism from freedom fighting or tyrannicide by focusing on the system
against which the movement operates.
28
Similarly parties can be closely coupled to terrorist organizations, such as the IRA and Sinn Fein.
29
W. Laqueur, op. cit., p. 301.

Political violence and terrorism 49

radical left-wing terrorist organizations in the 1970s and 1980s.30 In addition to
violence being the motivator of such movements, non-political criminal activities can become prominent stimuli for terrorist movements. While these organizations would merely become criminal organizations if they ceased entirely to
pursue a political agenda, criminal and political goals are often closely wed.
One reason lies in the per definition criminal nature of terrorism. Another key
factor can be attributed to the need to use illegal sources to raise funds for
criminal activities. Drug smuggling (e.g. Shining Path/Peru, UC
K/Kosovo)
and kidnapping (Abu Sayef Group/Philippines) are among the activities often
pursued by terrorist movements with the result that at times the moneygaining components of the movements activities gains the upper hand over
the political goals, as evidenced with a number of loyalist groups in Northern
Ireland.
Terrorism and Southeastern Europe
Terrorism has not been alien to Southeastern Europe. Throughout the 20th
century, a significant number of terrorist movements have been active in the
region, including the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914
by Mlada Bosna and the assassination of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar in
Marseille in 1934 by the Macedonia nationalist VMRO together with the
Croatian fascist Ustase movement. In more recent decades, some radical Croat
emigre organizations conducted terrorist acts against Yugoslav institutions and
representatives abroad in the 1970s. As outlined above, the violence in former
Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s and early in the new millennium is more
difficult to define. Contrary to many expectations, especially in the West during
the NATO bombing and exemplified in Western popular culture (e.g. the
movie The Peacemaker), only little terrorism took place. In most cases, the
violence cannot be qualified as terrorism. For this phenomenon, we can identify
three tentative reasons:
Most violence was state organized and/or sanctioned. As such, there was
little need for small terrorist groups to further their political agenda independently from state-sanctioned violence.
Despite the high degree of inter-ethnic tensions, the politicalcriminal elites
pursuing the wars and violence engaged with each other to an unprecedented degree. The degree of explicit and implicit cooperation between
these elites throughout most of the conflict reduced the interest of states in
sponsoring terrorism in former Yugoslavia.
The goals of the war were largely confined to the conquest and/or control of
territory while expelling or controlling populations of other ethnicity. Consequently, the overthrow of the other states/authorities was not the primary
interest of the nationalist movements.
Although terrorism has been largely absent from the spectrum of violence
employed in former Yugoslavia in the past decade, it would be false to
completely deny the effects the wars had on terrorism. More important than
the emergence of local terrorist movements have been the international
implications for terrorist movements.
30

Ibid.

50 Florian Bieber
Firstly, the wars in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, and the
passivity of Western countries were instrumentalized by many radical Islamic
organizations in the Muslim world as evidence for the anti-Muslim policies of
the West.
Secondly, the wars and the weak position of the Bosnian government
during the war led to the arrival of both radical Islamic fighters and organizations that have remained active in Bosnia after the end of the war.
Finally, one consequence of the wars has been the emergence of weak
political units where public authority does not control the entirety of the
territory effectively. Weak states, both in terms of the lack of control of
territory, fragility of institutions, and the absence of the rule of law, can easily
host global terrorist groups.31 With these effects in mind, it is important to
remain cautious and not overestimate their impact. The rhetoric of large and
well-organized terrorist groups in Southeastern Europe has not been backed by
substantial evidence and mostly been a tool to advance a particular political
often a nationalistagenda.32
Defining the threat of political violence
The main threat of political violence in the past decade emanated from
governments and organizations sponsored by recognized or unrecognized
authorities. With different governments at conflict with each other and supporting groups using violence as a means to achieve political objectives, little
room for terrorist groups in the narrow sense existed. We can note attacks
against buildings and members of ethnic, religious and social minorities
through the past decade. Some of these attacks were specific to the conflict
such as the bombing of houses and religious monumentswhile others were
mirrored throughout Europe, i.e. Skinhead attacks against Roma. In most cases,
however, these incidents were either perpetrated by paramilitary groups with
government support or consent, or were rather sporadic with either nobody
claiming responsibility or shady groups with little structure or consistency.
With the end of the authoritarian regimes in Serbia and Croatia and the
substantial international military presence in the region the risk of outright
state-sponsorship of political violence has declined. Despite the change of
regimes, political and ethnic violence continued to be a significant problem in
Macedonia, Kosovo and Southern Serbia. In these areas there is a continued
danger of violence perpetrated by paramilitary and terrorist groups.
In the larger region the main danger for political violence lies elsewhere.
Here two types of political violence can be identified as possible dangers.
Firstly, violence against social and ethnic minorities might increase. A number
of attacks against Roma in Serbia and elsewhere in recent years committed by
Skinheads and other extremist groups point to this trend. Such movements
thrive on the dissatisfaction of especially the youth with the transformation
process.33 The high degree of nationalism, result of the nationalist mobilization
of the 1990s, might feed into this phenomenon. This type of violence can,
31

See M. Glenny, Heading off terrorism in the Balkans, New York Times, 16 October 2001.
A. Ciric, FRY in war against terrorism, AIM Belgrade, 8 October 2001; W. v. Meurs, Der Balkan
im Schatten des 11. September 2001, Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen, 42(4), 2002, pp. 1013.
33
For Serbia see Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, op. cit., pp. 235239.
32

Political violence and terrorism 51

however, be equally observed in other transition countries, as well as in
Western Europe.
The second type of violence might arise in former conflict areas through
terrorist groups or radical movements who might seek to reverse the tentative
re-integration in parts of the former conflict zones. Lacking state-sponsorship,
they might be explicitly directed against the governments and be ready to use
violence to pursue their aims. Until today such groups have only appeared in
the form of declarations, rather than through acts of violence.34
Beyond the future threat of political violence, the record of the 1990s
highlights another source of concern: the erosion of the state monopoly of
the use of force.35 Although most use of force, as has been demonstrated,
has been instigated by governments, rather than by sub-national actors, a
considerable degree of political violence has been committed by groups only
loosely or indirectly controlled by governments. A high degree of private
ownership of weapons, the participation of significant parts of the population
in former Yugoslavia in armed formations during the past decade and continuing weaknesses of some states in the region pose a threat arising from
non-governmental political violence.
Florian Bieber is senior non-resident research associate at the European Centre
for Minority Issues based in Belgrade and International Policy Fellow at the
Open Society Institute, Budapest. He has published articles on nationalism and
politics in Southeastern Europe in Nationalities Papers, Third World Quarterly,
Current History and other journals. He authored Bosnien-Herzegowina und
Libanon im Vergleich. Die historische Entwicklung und das politische System vor
Ausbruch des Burgerkrieges [Comparing Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon. Historical
Development and the Political System Prior to the Civil War] (Pro Universitate
Verlag, Sinzheim, 1999) and edited together with Dzemal Sokolovic Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001) and with Zidas Daskalovski Understanding the War in Kosovo (Frank
Cass, London, 2003). He is co-editor of the journal Southeast European Politics
and founder and editor of Balkan Academic News.
Address for correspondence: Majke Jevrosime 6/14, Serbia and Montenegro
11000 Beograd. E-mail: bieberf@gmx.net

34
In 2001, for example, leaflets were distributed in the Serb entity of Bosnia threatening Bosniak
returnees. The materials were signed by largely unknown organizations called Serbia to Tokio and
Greater Serbia, see Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Republika Srpska, Human Rights
in Republika Srpska AprilJune 2001, Bijelina, 2001.
35
In addition, the use of force by governments has been frequently illegitimate in its targeting of
groups and individuals for political and ethnic reasons. On general consideration on this issue see
A. Leander, Globalisation and the eroding state monopoly of legitimate violence, COPRI Working
Paper, No. 24, 2002.