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WhyArabsLoseWars
byNorvellB.DeAtkine
MiddleEastQuarterly
December1999
http://www.meforum.org/441/whyarabslosewars

NorvellDeAtkine,aU.S.ArmyretiredcolonelwitheightyearsresidenceinLebanon,Jordan,and
Egypt,andagraduatedegreeinArabstudiesfromtheAmericanUniversityofBeirut,iscurrently
instructingU.S.ArmypersonnelassignedtoMiddleEasternareas.Theopinionsexpressedhereare
strictlyhisown.
Arabicspeakingarmieshavebeengenerallyineffectiveinthemodernera.Egyptianregularforcesdid
poorlyagainstYemeniirregularsinthe1960s.1SyrianscouldonlyimposetheirwillinLebanonduring
themid1970sbytheuseofoverwhelmingweaponryandnumbers.2Iraqisshowedineptnessagainst
anIranianmilitaryrippedapartbyrevolutionaryturmoilinthe1980sandcouldnotwinathree
decadeslongwaragainsttheKurds.3TheArabmilitaryperformanceonbothsidesofthe1990Kuwait
warwasmediocre.4AndtheArabshavedonepoorlyinnearlyallthemilitaryconfrontationswith
Israel.Whythisunimpressiverecord?Therearemanyfactorseconomic,ideological,technicalbut
perhapsthemostimportanthastodowithcultureandcertainsocietalattributeswhichinhibitArabs
fromproducinganeffectivemilitaryforce.
Itisatruismofmilitarylifethatanarmyfightsasittrains,andsoIdrawonmymanyyearsof
firsthandobservationofArabsintrainingtodrawconclusionsaboutthewaysinwhichtheygointo
combat.ThefollowingimpressionsderivefrompersonalexperiencewithArabmilitaryestablishments
inthecapacityofU.S.militaryattachandsecurityassistanceofficer,observerofficerwiththeBritish
officerTrucialOmanScouts(thesecurityforceintheemiratespriortotheestablishmentoftheUnited
ArabEmirates),aswellassomethirtyyear'sstudyoftheMiddleEast.
FalseStarts
Includingcultureinstrategicassessmentshasapoorlegacy,forithasoftenbeenspunfromanugly
brewofignorance,wishfulthinking,andmythology.Thus,theU.S.armyinthe1930sevaluatedthe
Japanesenationalcharacteraslackingoriginalityanddrewtheunwarrantedconclusionthatthecountry
wouldbepermanentlydisadvantagedintechnology.5HitlerdismissedtheUnitedStatesasamongrel
society6andconsequentlyunderestimatedtheimpactofAmerica'sentryintothewar.Asthese
examplessuggest,whencultureisconsideredincalculatingtherelativestrengthsandweaknessesof
opposingforces,ittendstoleadtowilddistortions,especiallywhenitisamatterofunderstandingwhy
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statesunpreparedforwarenterintocombatflushedwithconfidence.Thetemptationistoimpute
culturalattributestotheenemystatethatnegateitssuperiornumbersorweaponry.Ortheopposite:to
viewthepotentialenemythroughtheprismofone'sownculturalnorms.Americanstrategistsassumed
thatthepainthresholdoftheNorthVietnameseapproximatedtheirownandthattheairbombardment
oftheNorthwouldbringittoitsknees.7ThreedaysofaerialattackswerethoughttobealltheSerbs
couldwithstandinfact,seventyeightdayswereneeded.
Itisparticularlydangeroustomakefacileassumptionsaboutabilitiesinwarfarebasedonpast
performance,forsocietiesevolveandsodoesthemilitarysubculturewithit.ThedismalFrench
performanceinthe1870FrancoPrussianwarledtheGermanhighcommandtoanoverlyoptimistic
assessmentpriortoWorldWarI.8ThetenacityandcourageofFrenchsoldiersinWorldWarIled
everyonefromWinstonChurchilltotheGermanhighcommandvastlytooverestimatetheFrench
army'sfightingabilities.9IsraeligeneralsunderestimatedtheEgyptianarmyof1973basedonEgypt's
haplessperformanceinthe1967war.10
Cultureisdifficulttopindown.Itisnotsynonymouswithanindividual'sracenorethnicidentity.The
historyofwarfaremakesamockeryofattemptstoassignrigidculturalattributestoindividualsasthe
militaryhistoriesoftheOttomanandRomanempiresillustrate.Inbothcasesitwastraining,discipline,
esprit,andlanwhichmadethedifference,nottheindividualsoldiers'origin.11Thehighlydisciplined,
effectiveRomanlegions,forexample,wererecruitedfromthroughouttheRomanempire,andtheelite
OttomanJanissaries(slavesoldiers)wereChristiansforciblyrecruitedasboysfromtheBalkans.
TheRoleofCulture
Theseproblemsnotwithstanding,culturedoesneedtobetakenintoaccount.Indeed,awarenessof
priormistakesshouldmakeitpossibletoassesstheroleofculturalfactorsinwarfare.JohnKeegan,
theeminenthistorianofwarfare,arguesthatcultureisaprimedeterminantofthenatureofwarfare.In
contrasttotheusualmannerofEuropeanwarfarewhichheterms"facetoface,"Keegandepictsthe
earlyArabarmiesintheIslamiceraasmastersofevasion,delay,andindirection.12ExaminingArab
warfareinthiscenturyleadstotheconclusionthatArabsremainmoresuccessfulininsurgent,or
politicalwarfare13whatT.E.Lawrencetermed"winningwarswithoutbattles."14Eventhemuch
laudedEgyptiancrossingoftheSuezin1973atitscoreentailedamasterfuldeceptionplan.Itmay
wellbethattheseseeminglypermanentattributesresultfromaculturethatengenderssubtlety,
indirection,anddissimulationinpersonalrelationships.15
Alongtheselines,KennethPollackconcludeshisexhaustivestudyofArabmilitaryeffectivenessby
notingthat"certainpatternsofbehaviorfosteredbythedominantArabculturewerethemostimportant
factorscontributingtothelimitedmilitaryeffectivenessofArabarmiesandairforcesfrom1945to
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1991."16Theseattributesincludedovercentralization,discouraginginitiative,lackofflexibility,
manipulationofinformation,andthediscouragementofleadershipatthejuniorofficerlevel.
ThebarrageofcriticismleveledatSamuelHuntington'snotionofa"clashofcivilizations"17innoway
lessensthevitalpointhemadethathowevermuchthegroupingofpeoplesbyreligionandculture
ratherthanpoliticaloreconomicdivisionsoffendsacademicswhopropoundaworlddefinedbyclass,
race,andgender,itisareality,onenotdiminishedbymoderncommunications.
Buthowdoesoneintegratethestudyofcultureintomilitarytraining?Atpresent,ithashardlyany
role.PaulM.Belbutowski,ascholarandformermemberoftheU.S.DeltaForce,succinctlystateda
deficiencyinourownmilitaryeducationsystem:"Culture,comprisedofallthatisvagueand
intangible,isnotgenerallyintegratedintostrategicplanningexceptatthemostsuperficiallevel."18
Andyetitisprecisely"allthatisvagueandintangible"whichdefineslowintensityconflicts.The
VietnamesecommunistsdidnotfightthewartheUnitedStateshadtrainedfor,nordidtheChechens
andAfghansfightthewartheRussianspreparedfor.Thisentailsfarmorethansimplyretooling
weaponryandretrainingsoldiers.Itrequiresanunderstandingoftheenemy'sculturalmythology,
history,attitudetowardtime,etc.demandingamoresubstantialinvestmentintimeandmoneythana
bureaucraticorganizationislikelytoauthorize.
Mindfulofwalkingthroughaminefieldofpasterrorsandpresentculturalsensibilities,Ioffersome
assessmentsoftheroleofcultureinthemilitarytrainingofArabicspeakingofficers.Iconfinemyself
principallytotrainingfortworeasons.First,Iobservedmuchtrainingbutonlyonecombatcampaign
(theJordanianArmyagainstthePalestineLiberationOrganizationin1970).Secondly,armiesfightas
theytrain.Troopsareconditionedbypeacetimehabits,policies,andprocedurestheydonotundergoa
suddenmetamorphosisthattransformsciviliansinuniformintowarriors.GeneralGeorgePattonwas
fondofrelatingthestoryaboutJuliusCaesar,who"Inthewintertime...sotrainedhislegionsinall
thatbecamesoldiersandsohabituatedthemtotheproperperformanceoftheirduties,thatwheninthe
springhecommittedthemtobattleagainsttheGauls,itwasnotnecessarytogivethemorders,forthey
knewwhattodoandhowtodoit."19
InformationasPower
Ineverysocietyinformationisameansofmakingalivingorwieldingpower,butArabshusband
informationandholditespeciallytightly.U.S.trainershaveoftenbeensurprisedovertheyearsbythe
factthatinformationprovidedtokeypersonneldoesnotgetmuchfurtherthanthem.Havinglearnedto
performsomecomplicatedprocedure,anArabtechnicianknowsthatheisinvaluablesolongasheis
theonlyoneinaunittohavethatknowledgeoncehedispensesittoothershenolongeristheonly
fontofknowledgeandhispowerdissipates.Thisexplainsthecommonplacehoardingofmanuals,
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books,trainingpamphlets,andothertrainingorlogisticsliterature.Ononeoccasion,anAmerican
mobiletrainingteamworkingwitharmorinEgyptatlonglastreceivedtheoperators'manualsthathad
laboriouslybeentranslatedintoArabic.TheAmericantrainerstookthenewlymintedmanualsstraight
tothetankparkanddistributedthemtothetankcrews.Rightbehindthem,thecompanycommander,a
graduateofthearmorschoolatFortKnoxandspecializedcoursesattheAberdeenProvingGrounds
ordnanceschool,collectedthemanualsfromthecrews.Questionedwhyhedidthis,thecommander
saidthattherewasnopointingivingthemtothedriversbecauseenlistedmencouldnotread.Inpoint
offact,hedidnotwantenlistedmentohaveanindependentsourceofknowledge.Beingtheonly
personwhocanexplainthefirecontrolinstrumentationorboresightartilleryweaponsbringsprestige
andattention.Inmilitarytermsthismeansthatverylittlecrosstrainingisaccomplishedandthat,for
instanceinatankcrew,thegunners,loaders,anddriversmightbeproficientintheirjobsbutarenot
preparedtofillinforacasualty.Notunderstandingoneanother'sjobsalsoinhibitsasmoothly
functioningcrew.Atahigherlevelitmeansthereisnodepthintechnicalproficiency.
EducationProblems
Trainingtendstobeunimaginative,cutanddried,andnotchallenging.BecausetheArabeducational
systemispredicatedonrotememorization,officershaveaphenomenalabilitytocommitvastamounts
ofknowledgetomemory.Thelearningsystemtendstoconsistofonhighlectures,withstudents
takingvoluminousnotesandbeingexaminedonwhattheyweretold.(Italsohasinteresting
implicationsforforeigninstructorsforexample,hiscredibilityisdiminishedifhemustresorttoa
book.)Theemphasisonmemorizationhasaprice,andthatisindiminishedabilitytoreasonorengage
inanalysisbasedupongeneralprinciples.Thinkingoutsidetheboxisnotencourageddoingsoin
publiccandamageacareer.Instructorsarenotchallengedandneither,intheend,arestudents.
Headtoheadcompetitionamongindividualsisgenerallyavoided,atleastopenly,foritmeansthat
someonewinsandsomeoneelseloses,withtheloserhumiliated.Thistaboohasparticularimport
whenaclasscontainsmixedranks.Educationisingoodpartsoughtasamatterofpersonalprestige,so
ArabsinU.S.militaryschoolstakepainstoensurethattherankingmember,accordingtomilitary
positionorsocialclass,scoresthehighestmarksintheclass.Oftenthisleadsto"sharinganswers"in
classofteninaratherovertmannerorjuniorofficersconcealingscoreshigherthantheirsuperior's.
AmericanmilitaryinstructorsdealingwithMiddleEasternstudentslearntoensurethat,before
directinganyquestiontoastudentinaclassroomsituation,particularlyifheisanofficer,thestudent
doespossessthecorrectanswer.Ifthisisnotassured,theofficerwillfeelhehasbeensetupforpublic
humiliation.Furthermore,intheoftenparanoidenvironmentofArabpoliticalculture,hewillbelieve
thissetuptohavebeenpurposeful.Thisstudentwillthenbecomeanenemyoftheinstructorandhis
classmateswillbecomeapprehensiveabouttheiralsobeingsingledoutforhumiliationandlearning
becomesimpossible.
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Officersvs.Soldiers
Arabjuniorofficersarewelltrainedonthetechnicalaspectsoftheirweaponsandtacticalknowhow,
butnotinleadership,asubjectgivenlittleattention.Forexample,asGeneralSadashShazli,the
Egyptianchiefofstaff,notedinhisassessmentofthearmyheinheritedpriortothe1973war,they
werenottrainedtoseizetheinitiativeorvolunteeroriginalconceptsornewideas.20Indeed,leadership
maybethegreatestweaknessofArabtrainingsystems.Thisproblemresultsfromtwomainfactors:a
highlyaccentuatedclasssystemborderingonacastesystem,andlackofanoncommissionedofficer
developmentprogram.
MostArabofficerstreatenlistedsoldierslikesubhumans.WhenthewindsinEgyptonedaycarried
bitingsandparticlesfromthedesertduringademonstrationforvisitingU.S.dignitaries,Iwatchedasa
contingentofsoldiersmarchedinandformedasingleranktoshieldtheAmericansEgyptiansoldiers,
inotherwords,areusedonoccasionasnothingmorethanawindbreak.Theideaoftakingcareof
one'smenisfoundonlyamongthemosteliteunitsintheEgyptianmilitary.Onatypicalweekend,
officersinunitsstationedoutsideCairowillgetintheircarsanddriveofftotheirhomes,leavingthe
enlistedmentofendforthemselvesbytrekkingacrossthedeserttoahighwayandflaggingdown
bussesortruckstogettotheCairorailsystem.Garrisoncantonmentshavenoamenitiesforsoldiers.
Thesamesituation,invariousdegrees,existselsewhereintheArabicspeakingcountrieslesssoin
Jordan,evenmoresoinIraqandSyria.
TheyoungdrafteeswhomakeupthebulkoftheEgyptianarmyhatemilitaryserviceforgoodreason
andwilldoalmostanything,includingselfmutilation,toavoidit.InSyriathewealthybuyexemptions
or,failingthat,areassignedtononcombatantorganizations.AsayoungSyriantoldme,hismusical
skillscamefromhisassignmenttoaSyrianarmybandwherehelearnedtoplayaninstrument.In
general,themilitariesoftheFertileCrescentenforcedisciplinebyfearincountrieswhereatribal
systemstillisinforce,suchasSaudiArabia,theinnateegalitarianismofthesocietymitigatesagainst
fearastheprimemotivator,soagenerallackofdisciplinepervades.21
Thesocialandprofessionalgapbetweenofficersandenlistedmenispresentinallarmies,butinthe
UnitedStatesandotherWesternforces,thenoncommissionedofficer(NCO)corpsbridgesit.Indeed,a
professionalNCOcorpshasbeencriticalfortheAmericanmilitarytoworkatitsbestastheprimary
trainersinaprofessionalarmy,NCOsarecriticaltotrainingprogramsandtotheenlistedmen'ssense
ofunitesprit.MostoftheArabworldeitherhasnoNCOcorpsoritisnonfunctional,severely
handicappingthemilitary'seffectiveness.Withsomeexceptions,NCOsareconsideredinthesamelow
categoryasenlistedmenandsodonotserveasabridgebetweenenlistedmenandofficers.Officers
instructbutthewidesocialgapbetweenenlistedmanandofficertendstomakethelearningprocess
perfunctory,formalized,andineffective.Theshowandtellaspectsoftrainingarefrequentlymissing
becauseofficersrefusetogettheirhandsdirtyandprefertoignorethemorepracticalaspectsoftheir
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subjectmatter,believingthisbelowtheirsocialstation.Adramaticexampleofthisoccurredduringthe
GulfwarwhenaseverewindstormblewdownthetentsofIraqiofficerprisonersofwar.Forthreedays
theystayedinthewindandrainratherthanbeobservedbyenlistedprisonersinanearbycamp
workingwiththeirhands.
Themilitarypriceforthisisveryhigh.WithoutthecohesionsuppliedbyNCOs,unitstendto
disintegrateinthestressofcombat.Thisisprimarilyafunctionofthefactthattheenlistedsoldiers
simplydonottrusttheirofficers.Onceofficersdepartthetrainingareas,trainingbeginstofallapartas
soldiersbegindriftingoff.AnEgyptianofficeronceexplainedtomethattheEgyptianarmy's
catastrophicdefeatin1967resultedfromalackofcohesionwithinunits.Thesituation,hesaid,had
onlymarginallyimprovedin1973.Iraqiprisonersin1991showedaremarkablefearandenmity
towardtheirofficers.
DecisionmakingandResponsibility
Decisionsaremadeanddeliveredfromonhigh,withverylittlelateralcommunication.Thisleadstoa
highlycentralizedsystem,withauthorityhardlyeverdelegated.Rarelydoesanofficermakeacritical
decisiononhisowninstead,heprefersthesafecourseofbeingidentifiedasindustrious,intelligent,
loyalandcompliant.Bringingattentiontooneselfasaninnovatororsomeonepronetomake
unilateraldecisionsisarecipefortrouble.Asincivilianlife,conformismistheoverwhelmingsocietal
normthenailthatstandsupgetshammereddown.Ordersandinformationflowfromtoptobottom
theyarenottobereinterpreted,amended,ormodifiedinanyway.
U.S.trainersoftenexperiencefrustrationobtainingadecisionfromacounterpart,notrealizingthatthe
ArabofficerlackstheauthoritytomakethedecisionafrustrationamplifiedbytheArab's
understandablereluctancetoadmitthathelacksthatauthority.Thisauthorhasseveraltimesseen
decisionsthatcouldhavebeenmadeatthebattalionlevelconcerningsuchmattersasclassmeeting
timesandlocationsrequiringapprovalfromtheministryofdefense.AllofwhichhasledAmerican
trainerstodeveloparuleofthumb:asergeantfirstclassintheU.S.Armyhasasmuchauthorityasa
colonelinanArabarmy.Methodsofinstructionandsubjectmatteraredictatedfromhigher
authorities.Unitcommandershaveverylittletosayabouttheseaffairs.Thepoliticizednatureofthe
Arabmilitariesmeansthatpoliticalfactorsweighheavilyandfrequentlyoverridemilitary
considerations.Officerswithinitiativeandapredilectionforunilateralactionposeathreattothe
regime.Thiscanbeseennotjustatthelevelofnationalstrategybutineveryaspectofmilitary
operationsandtraining.IfArabmilitariesbecamelesspoliticizedandmoreprofessionalinpreparation
forthe1973warwithIsrael,22oncethefightingended,oldhabitsreturned.Now,anincreasingly
bureaucratizedmilitaryestablishmentweighsinaswell.AveteranofthePentagonturfwarswillfeel
likeakindergartnerwhenheencounterstherivalriesthatexistintheArabmilitaryheadquarters.
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Takingresponsibilityforapolicy,operation,status,ortrainingprogramrarelyoccurs.U.S.trainerscan
finditveryfrustratingwhentheyrepeatedlyencounterArabofficersplacingblameforunsuccessful
operationsorprogramsontheU.S.equipmentorsomeotheroutsidesource.Ahighrateofnon
operationalU.S.equipmentisblamedona"lackofspareparts"pointingafingeratanunresponsive
U.S.supplysystemdespitethefactthatAmericantrainerscandocumentamplesuppliesarrivingin
countryanddisappearinginamalfunctioningsupplysystem.(Suchcriticismwasnevercausticor
personalandoftensoindirectandpolitelydeliveredthatitwasn'tuntilafterameetingthatoblique
referenceswereunderstood.)Thisimperativeworksevenatthemostexaltedlevels.DuringtheKuwait
war,IraqiforcestookoverthetownofKhafjiinnortheastSaudiArabiaaftertheSaudishadevacuated
theplace.GeneralKhalidbinSultan,theSaudigroundforcescommander,requestedaletterfrom
GeneralNormanSchwarzkopf,statingitwastheU.S.generalwhoorderedanevacuationfromthe
Sauditown.23AndinhisaccountoftheKhafjibattle,GeneralBinSultanpredictablyblamesthe
AmericansfortheIraqioccupationofthetown.24InrealitytheproblemwasthatthelightSaudiforces
inthearealeftthebattlefield.25TheSaudiswereinfactoutgunnedandoutnumberedbytheIraqiunit
approachingKhafjibutSaudipriderequiredthatforeignersbeblamed.
Asforequipment,avastculturalgapexistsbetweentheU.S.andArabmaintenanceandlogistics
systems.TheArabdifficultieswithU.S.equipmentarenot,assometimessimplisticallybelieved,a
matterof"Arabsdon'tdomaintenance,"butsomethingmuchdeeper.TheAmericanconceptofa
weaponssystemdoesnotconveyeasily.Aweaponssystembringswithitspecificmaintenanceand
logisticsprocedures,policies,andevenaphilosophy,allofthembasedonU.S.culture,withits
expectationsofacertaineducationallevel,senseofsmallunitresponsibility,toolallocation,and
doctrine.ToolsthatwouldbeallocatedtoaU.S.battalion(aunitofsome600800personnel)would
mostlikelybefoundatamuchhigherlevelprobablytwoorthreeechelonshigherinanArabarmy.
Theexpertise,initiativeand,mostimportantly,thetrustindicatedbydelegationofresponsibilitytoa
lowerlevelarerare.TheU.S.equipmentanditsmaintenancearepredicatedonaconceptofrepairat
thelowestlevelandthereforerequiredelegationofauthority.Withouttheneededtools,spareparts,or
expertiseavailabletokeepequipmentrunning,andloathetoreportbadnewstohissuperiors,theunit
commanderlooksforscapegoats.AllthisexplainswhyImanytimesheardinEgyptthatU.S.
weaponryis"toodelicate."
IhaveobservedmanyincountryU.S.surveyteams:invariably,hostsmakethecaseforacquiringthe
mostmodernofmilitaryhardwareanddoeverythingtoavoidissuesofmaintenance,logistics,and
training.TheyobfuscateandmisleadtosuchanextentthatU.S.teams,nomatterhowearnesttheir
senseofmission,finditnearlyimpossibletohelp.Moregenerally,Arabreluctancetobecandidabout
trainingdeficienciesmakesitextremelydifficultforforeignadvisorsproperlytosupportinstructionor
assesstrainingneeds.

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CombinedArmsOperations
AlackofcooperationismostapparentinthefailureofallArabarmiestosucceedatcombinedarms
operations.AregularJordanianarmyinfantrycompany,forexample,ismanformanasgoodasa
comparableIsraelicompanyatbattalionlevel,however,thecoordinationrequiredforcombinedarms
operations,withartillery,air,andlogisticssupport,issimplyabsent.Indeed,thehighertheechelon,the
greaterthedisparity.Thisresultsfrominfrequentcombinedarmstrainingwhenitdoestakeplace,itis
intendedtoimpressvisitors(whichitdoesthedogandponyshowisusuallydonewithuncommon
gustoandtheatricaltalent)ratherthanproviderealtraining.
Thisproblemresultsfromthreemainfactors.First,thewellknownlackoftrustamongArabsfor
anyoneoutsidetheirownfamilyadverselyaffectsoffensiveoperations.26Exceptionstothispatternare
limitedtoeliteunits(whichthroughouttheArabworldhavethesamedutytoprotecttheregime,
ratherthanthecountry).Inacultureinwhichalmosteverysphereofhumanendeavor,including
businessandsocialrelationships,isbasedonafamilystructure,thisorientationisalsopresentinthe
military,particularlyinthestressofbattle.Offensiveaction,basically,consistsoffireandmaneuver.
Themaneuverelementmustbeconfidentthatsupportingunitsorarmsareprovidingcoveringfire.If
thereisalackoftrustinthatsupport,gettingtroopsmovingforwardagainstdugindefendersis
possibleonlybyofficersgettingoutfrontandleading,somethingthathasnotbeenacharacteristicof
Arableadership.
Second,thecomplexmosaicsystemofpeoplescreatesadditionalproblemsfortraining,asrulersinthe
MiddleEastmakeuseofthesectarianandtriballoyaltiestomaintainpower.TheAlawiminority
controlsSyria,EastBankerscontrolJordan,SunniscontrolIraq,andNejdiscontrolSaudiArabia.This
hasdirectimplicationsforthemilitary,wheresectarianconsiderationsaffectassignmentsand
promotions.Someminorities(suchtheCircassiansinJordanortheDruzeinSyria)tietheirwellbeing
totherulingeliteandperformcriticalprotectionrolesothers(suchastheShiaofIraq)areexcluded
fromtheofficercorps.Inanycase,theassignmentofofficersbasedonsectarianconsiderationsworks
againstassignmentsbasedonmerit.
Thesamelackoftrustoperatesattheinterstatelevel,whereArabarmiesexhibitverylittletrustof
eachother,andwithgoodreason.TheblatantlieGamalAbdelNassertoldKingHusayninJune1967
togethimintothewaragainstIsraelthattheEgyptianairforcewasoverTelAviv(whenmostofits
planeshadbeendestroyed)wasaclassicexampleofdeceit.27Sadat'sdisingenuousapproachtothe
SyrianstoenticethemtoenterthewarinOctober1973wasanother(hetoldthemthattheEgyptians
wereplanningtotalwar,adeceptionwhichincludedusingasecondsetofoperationalplansintended
onlyforSyrianeyes).28Withthissortofhistory,itisnowonderthatthereisverylittlecrossorjoint
trainingamongArabarmiesandveryfewcommandexercises.Duringthe1967war,forexample,nota
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singleJordanianliaisonofficerwasstationedinEgypt,norweretheJordaniansforthcomingwiththe
Egyptiancommand.29
Third,MiddleEasternrulersroutinelyrelyonbalanceofpowertechniquestomaintaintheir
authority.30Theyusecompetingorganizations,duplicateagencies,andcoercivestructuresdependent
upontheruler'swhim.Thismakesbuildinganyformofpersonalpowerbasedifficult,ifnot
impossible,andkeepstheleadershipapprehensiveandoffbalance,neversecureinitscareersorsocial
position.Thesameapplieswithinthemilitaryapowerfulchairmanofthejointchiefsisinconceivable.
Jointcommandsarepaperconstructsthathavelittleactualfunction.Leaderslookatjointcommands,
jointexercises,combinedarms,andintegratedstaffsverycautiouslyforallArabarmiesareadouble
edgedsword.Oneedgepointstowardtheexternalenemyandtheothertowardthecapital.Theland
forcesareatoncearegimemaintenanceforceandthreatatthesametime.NoArabrulerwillallow
combinedoperationsortrainingtobecomeroutinetheusualexcuseisfinancialexpense,butthatis
unconvincinggiventheirfrequentpurchaseofhardwarewhosemaintenancecoststheycannotafford.
Infact,combinedarmsexercisesandjointstaffscreatefamiliarity,softenrivalries,erasesuspicions,
andeliminatethefragmented,competingorganizationsthatenablerulerstoplayoffrivalsagainstone
another.ThissituationismostclearlyseeninSaudiArabia,wherethelandforcesandaviationare
undertheministerofdefense,PrinceSultan,whiletheNationalGuardisunderPrinceAbdullah,the
deputyprimeministerandcrownprince.InEgypt,theCentralSecurityForcesbalancethearmy.In
IraqandSyria,theRepublicanGuarddoesthebalancing.
Politiciansactuallycreateobstaclestomaintainfragmentation.Forexample,obtainingaircraftfromthe
airforceforarmyairbornetraining,whetheritisajointexerciseorasimpleadministrativerequestfor
supportoftraining,mustgenerallybecoordinatedbytheheadsofservicesattheministryofdefenseif
alargenumberofaircraftareinvolved,thisprobablyrequirespresidentialapproval.Militarycoups
maybeoutofstyle,butthefearofthemremainsstrong.Anylargescaleexerciseoflandforcesisa
matterofconcerntothegovernmentandiscloselyobserved,particularlyifliveammunitionisbeing
used.InSaudiArabiaacomplexsystemofclearancesrequiredfromareamilitarycommandersand
provincialgovernors,allofwhomhavedifferingcommandchannelstosecureroadconvoypermission,
obtainingammunition,andconductingexercises,meansthatinorderforacouptowork,itwould
requireamassiveamountofloyalconspirators.Arabregimeshavelearnedhowtobecoupproof.
SecurityandParanoia
Arabregimesclassifyvirtuallyeverythingvaguelymilitary.InformationtheU.S.militaryroutinely
publishes(aboutpromotions,transfers,namesofunitcommanders,andunitdesignations)istopsecret
inArabicspeakingcountries.Tobesure,thisdoesmakeitmoredifficultfortheenemytoconstructan
accurateorderofbattle,butitalsofeedsthedivisiveandcompartmentalizednatureofthemilitary
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forces.Theobsessionwithsecurity
canreachludicrouslengths.Priortothe1973war,Sadatwassurprisedtofindthatwithintwoweeksof
thedatehehadorderedthearmedforcesbereadyforwar,hisministerofwar,GeneralMuhammad
Sadiq,hadfailedtoinformhisimmediatestaffoftheorder.Shouldawar,Sadatwondered,bekept
secretfromtheverypeopleexpectedtofightit?31OnecanexpecttohaveanArabcounterpartorkey
contacttobechangedwithoutwarningandwithnoexplanationastohissuddenabsence.Thismight
wellbesimplyatransferafewdoorsdowntheway,butthevaguenessofitallleavesforeignerswith
direscenariosscenariosthatmightbetrue.Anditisbestnottoinquiretoomuchadvisorsortrainers
whoseemoverlyinquisitivemayfindtheiraccesstohostmilitaryinformationorfacilitieslimited.
ThepresumedcloseU.S.Israelrelationship,thoughttobeoperativeatalllevels,aggravatesand
complicatesthispenchantforsecrecy.Arabsbelievethatthemostmundanedetailsaboutthemare
somehowtransmittedtotheMossadviaasecrethotline.ThisexplainswhyaU.S.advisorwithArab
forcesislikelytobeaskedearlyandoftenabouthisopinionofthe"Palestineproblem,"thensubjected
tomonologuesonthepresumedJewishdominationoftheUnitedStates.
IndifferencetoSafety
Intermsofsafetymeasures,thereisagenerallaxness,aseemingcarelessnessandindifferenceto
trainingaccidents,manyofwhichcouldhavebeenpreventedbyminimalefforts.Tothe(perhaps
overly)safetyconsciousAmericans,Arabsocietiesappearindifferenttocasualtiesandshowa
seeminglylackadaisicalapproachtotrainingsafety.Thereareanumberofexplanationsforthis.Some
wouldpointtotheinherentfatalismwithinIslam,32andcertainlyanyonewhohasspentconsiderable
timeinArabtaxiswouldlendcredencetothattheory,butperhapsthereasonislessreligiouslybased
andmorearesultofpoliticalculture.Asanymilitaryveteranknows,theethosofaunitissetatthe
topor,astheoldsayinghasit,unitsdothosethingswellthatthebosscaresabout.Whenthetop
politicalleadershipdisplaysacompletelackofconcernforthewelfareofitssoldiers,suchattitudes
percolatedownthroughtheranks.ExhibitAwasthebetrayalofSyriantroopsfightingIsraelinthe
Golanin1967:havingwithdrawnitseliteunits,theSyriangovernmentknowinglybroadcastthe
falsehoodthatIsraelitroopshadcapturedthetownofKuneitra,whichwouldhaveputthembehindthe
largelyconscriptSyrianarmystillinposition.Theleadershiptookthissteptopressurethegreat
powerstoimposeatruce,thoughitledtoapanicbytheSyriantroopsandthelossoftheGolan
Heights.33
Conclusion
ItwouldbedifficulttoexaggeratetheculturalgulfseparatingAmericanandArabmilitarycultures.In
everysignificantarea,Americanmilitaryadvisorsfindstudentswhoenthusiasticallytakeintheir
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lessonsandthenresolutelyfailtoapplythem.Theculturetheyreturntothecultureoftheirown
armiesintheirowncountriesdefeatstheintentionswithwhichtheytookleaveoftheirAmerican
instructors.
WhentheyhadaninfluenceoncertainArabmilitaryestablishments,theSovietsreinforcedtheir
clients'culturaltraitsfarmorethan,inmorerecentyears,Americanswereableto.LiketheArabs',the
Soviets'militaryculturewasdrivenbypoliticalfearsborderingonparanoia.Thestepstakentocontrol
thesources(realorimagined)ofthesefears,suchasarigidlycentralizedcommandstructure,were
readilyunderstoodbyArabpoliticalandmilitaryelites.TheArabs,too,feltanaffinityfortheSoviet
officerclass'scontemptforordinarysoldiersandtheSovietmilitaryhierarchy'sdistrustofawell
developed,wellappreciated,wellrewardedNCOcorps.
Arabpoliticalcultureisbasedonahighdegreeofsocialstratification,verymuchlikethatofthe
defunctSovietUnionandverymuchunliketheupwardlymobile,meritocratic,democraticUnited
States.Arabofficersdonotseeanyvalueinsharinginformationamongthemselves,letalonewith
theirmen.Inthistheyfollowtheexampleoftheirpoliticalleaders,whonotonlywithholdinformation
fromtheirownallies,butroutinelydeceivethem.TraininginArabarmiesreflectsthis:ratherthan
prepareasmuchaspossibleforthemultitudeofimprovisedresponsibilitiesthatarethrownupinthe
chaosofbattle,Arabsoldiers,andtheirofficers,areboundinthenarrowfunctionsassignedthemby
theirhierarchy.Thatthisrendersthemlesseffectiveonthebattlefield,letaloneplacestheirlivesat
greaterrisk,isscarcelyofconcern,whereas,ofcourse,thesetwoissuesaredominantintheAmerican
militaryculture,andarereflectedinAmericanmilitarytraining.
ChangeisunlikelytocomeuntilitoccursinthelargerArabpoliticalculture,althoughtheexperience
ofothersocieties(includingourown)suggeststhatthemilitarycanhaveademocratizinginfluenceon
thelargerpoliticalculture,asofficersbringthelessonsoftheirtrainingfirstintotheirprofessional
environment,thenintothelargersociety.Itobviouslymakesabigdifference,however,whenthe
surroundingpoliticalcultureisnotonlyavowedlydemocratic(asaremanyMiddleEasternstates),but
functionallyso.UntilArabpoliticsbegintochangeatfundamentallevels,Arabarmies,whateverthe
courageorproficiencyofindividualofficersandmen,areunlikelytoacquiretherangeofqualities
whichmodernfightingforcesrequireforsuccessonthebattlefield.Forthesequalitiesdependon
inculcatingrespect,trust,andopennessamongthemembersofthearmedforcesatalllevels,andthisis
themarchingmusicofmodernwarfarethatArabarmies,nomatterhowmuchtheyemulatethe
correspondingsteps,donotwanttohear.

1SaeedM.Badeeb,TheSaudiEgyptianConflictoverNorthYemen19621970,(Boulder,Westview

Press:1986),pp.3342.
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2R.D.McLaurin,TheBattleofZahle(AberdeenProvingGrounds,Md.:HumanEngineering

Laboratory,Sept.1986),pp.2627.
3AnthonyCordesmanandAbrahamWagner,TheLessonsofModernWar,VolumeII:TheIranIraq

War,(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1990),pp.8998PhebeMarr,TheModernHistoryofIraq
(BoulderColo.:WestviewPress,1985),pp.22223,233234.
4KennethM.Pollack,"TheInfluenceofArabCultureonArabMilitaryEffectiveness"(Ph.d.diss.,

MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,1996),pp.259261(Egypt)pp.533536(SaudiArabia)pp.
350355(Iraq).Syriansdidnotseesignificantcombatinthe1991Gulfwarbutmyconversationswith
U.S.personnelinliaisonwiththemindicatedahighdegreeofparanoiaanddistrusttowardAmericans
andotherArabs.
5DavidKahn,"UnitedStatesViewsofGermanyandJapan,"KnowingOne'sEnemies:Intelligence

BeforetheTwoWorldWars,ed.,ErnestR.May(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1984),pp.
476503.
6GerhardL.Weinberg,TheForeignPolicyofHitler'sGermany:DiplomaticRevolutioninEurope,

19331936(Chicago:UniversityofChicago,1970),p.21.
7StanleyKarnow,Vietnam:AHistory(NewYork:PenguinBooks,1984),p.18.
8PaulKennedy,TheRiseandFallofGreatPowers(NewYork:RandomHouse,1987),pp.186187.

TheGermanassessmentfromT.DodsonStampsandVincentJ.Esposito,eds.,AShortHistoryof
WorldWarI(WestPoint,N.Y.:UnitedStatesMilitaryAcademy,1955),p.8.
9WilliamManchester,WinstonSpencerChurchilll:TheLastLionAlone,19321940(NewYork:Dell

Publishing,1988),p.613ErnestR.May"Conclusions,"KnowingOne'sEnemies,pp.513514.Hitler
thoughtotherwise,however.
10Avraham(Bren)Adan,OntheBanksoftheSuez(SanFrancisco:PresideoPress,1980),pp.7386.

"Thustheprevailingfeelingofsecurity,basedontheassumptionthattheArabswereincapableof
mountinganoverallwaragainstus,distortedourviewofthesituation,"MosheDayanstated."Asfor
thefightingstandardoftheArabsoldiers,Icansumitupinonesentence:theydidnotrunaway."
MosheDayan:StoryofMyLife(NewYork:WilliamMorrowandCompany,1976),p.510.
11JohnKeegan,AHistoryofWarfare(NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,1993),p.18.
12Ibid.,p.387
13JohnWalterJandora,MilitarisminArabSociety:AHistoriographicalandBibliographical

Sourcebook(Westport,Ct.:GreenwoodPress,1997),p.128.
14T.E.Lawrence,TheEvolutionofaRevolt(Ft.LeavenworthKans.:CSI,1990),p.21.(Areprintof

articleoriginallypublishedintheBritishArmyQuarterlyandDefenseJournal,Oct.1920.)
15Author'sobservationsbuttressedbysuchscholarlyworksasEliShouby,"TheInfluenceofthe

ArabicLanguageonthePsychologyoftheArabs,"ReadingsinArabMiddleEasternSocietiesand
Culture,ed.AbdullahM.LutfiyyaandCharlesChurchill(TheHague:MoutonCo.,1970),pp.688
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703HishamShirabiandMuktarAni,"ImpactofClassandCultureonSocialBehavior:TheFeudal
BourgeoisFamilyinArabSociety,"PsychologicalDimensionsofNearEasternStudies,ed.L.Carl
BrownandNormanItzkowitz(Princeton:TheDarwinPress,1977),pp.240256SaniaHamady,
TemperamentandCharacteroftheArabs(NewYork:TwaynePublishers,1960),pp.2885Raphael
Patai,TheArabMind(NewYork:CharlesScribner'sSons,1973),pp.2085.
16Pollack,"TheInfluenceofArabCulture,"p.759.
17SamuelP.Huntington,"TheClashofCivilizations,"ForeignAffairs,Summer1993,pp.2149.
18PaulM.Belbutowski,"StrategicImplicationsofCulturesinConflict,"Parameters,Spring1996,pp.

3242.
19CarloD'Este,Patton:AGeniusforWar(NewYork:HarperCollins,1996),p.383.
20SaadelShazly,TheCrossingoftheSuez(SanFrancisco:AmericanMideastResearch,1980),p.47.
21Jordanmaybeanexceptionherehowever,mostobserversagreethatitseffectivenesshasdeclined

inthepasttwentyyears.
22Pollack,"TheInfluenceofArabCulture,"pp.256257.
23H.NormanSchwarzkopf,ItDoesn'tTakeAHero(NewYork:BantamBooks,1992),p.494.
24KhaledbinSultan,DesertWarrior:APersonalViewoftheWarbytheJointForcesCommander

(NewYork:HarperCollins,1995),pp.36869.
25BasedondiscussionswithU.S.personnelintheareaandfamiliarwiththebattle.
26YesoshatHarkabi,"BasicFactorsintheArabCollapseDuringtheSixDayWar,"Orbis,Fall1967,

pp.678679.
27JamesLunt,HusseinofJordan,SearchingforaJustandLastingPeace:APoliticalBiography

(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1989),p.99.
28PatrickSeale,AsadofSyria:TheStrugglefortheMiddleEast(Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia

Press,1988),pp.19799Shazly,CrossingoftheSuez,pp.21,37.
29SamirA.Mutawi,Jordaninthe1967War(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1987),p.161.
30JamesA.BillandRobertSpringborg,PoliticsintheMiddleEast,3rdEd.(NewYork:Harper

Collins,1990),p.262.
31AnwarelSadat,InSearchofIdentity(NewYork:HarperandRow,1978),p.235.
32Hamady,TemperamentandCharacteroftheArabs,pp.184193Patai,TheArabMind,pp.147

150.
33JosephMalone,"SyriaandtheSixDayWar,"CurrentAffairsBulletin,Jan.26,1968,p.80.

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