Human Rights vs. State Sovereignty

Stefan Bauschard
Human Rights v. Sovereignty
*** General ***...............................................................................................................................6

Resolution.........................................................................................................................................6
Definitions -- Sovereignty................................................................................................................7
Affirmative.......................................................................................................................................8
*** Human Rights Good ***........................................................................................................9
Human Rights Generally Good...............................................................................................10
Human Rights Solve Extinction..............................................................................................13
Human Rights Solve War.........................................................................................................14
Human Rights Solve War.........................................................................................................16
Human Rights Key National Security.....................................................................................18
Human Rights Solve Genocide................................................................................................20
Human Rights Solve Terror.....................................................................................................22
Human Rights Solve Terror.....................................................................................................25
Human Rights Key to Democracy...........................................................................................27
Human Rights Key to Hegemony............................................................................................29
Human Rights Universal..........................................................................................................30
Discourse Impacts....................................................................................................................34
U.S. Key to Global Human Rights..........................................................................................35
Human Rights Key To Peace...................................................................................................36
Human Rights Key to Security................................................................................................37
Human Rights Key To Democracy..........................................................................................38
Human Rights Key To Development.......................................................................................40
Denying Human Rights Dehumanizes The Individual............................................................41
*** A2: Common Negative Arguments ***...............................................................................42
A2: Cultural Relevatism..........................................................................................................43
A2: International Regimes Solves...........................................................................................45
*** Morality ***.........................................................................................................................47
Must Act Morally -- General...................................................................................................49
Must Act Morally Intervening Actors...................................................................................50
Consequentialism Is bad..........................................................................................................53
Consequentialism Is bad..........................................................................................................54
Moral Constraints Apply To Governments..............................................................................56
Morality Cant Be Solved by Other Actors.............................................................................57
War is Immoral........................................................................................................................58
Moral Decision-Making Applies to Policy..............................................................................60
Morality Applies in Foreign Policy.........................................................................................61
Morality Applies in Foreign Policy.........................................................................................63
*** Utilitarianism Bad ***.........................................................................................................64
A2: Callahan Rights Specific................................................................................................66
A2: Callahan -- General...........................................................................................................68
Categorical Rules Justified Even If One Can Imagine Exceptions.........................................70
*** Sovereignty Not Key/Intervention Justified***..................................................................77
A2: Sovereignty is Unconditional...........................................................................................78
A2: Imperialism Is Bad............................................................................................................84
Sovereignty Derives from Popular Support.............................................................................86
Sovereignty Bad Biopolitics.................................................................................................88
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Violence K of Sovereignty.......................................................................................................90
AT: Perm..................................................................................................................................92
Intervention Necessary for Successful Democratization/Human Rights.................................93
Non-Military Intervention Solvency........................................................................................97
Military Intervention Good Responsibility to Protect..........................................................98
Military Intervention Good Morality....................................................................................99
A2: Intervention Always Fails...............................................................................................100
A2: West Irrelevant................................................................................................................101
Human Rights Abuses Justify Intervention...........................................................................102
*** Democracy Good ***............................................................................................................103
A2: Democratization Bad......................................................................................................105
A2: Democratization Bad......................................................................................................107
Democracy = Best Form of Government...............................................................................109
Democracy Good Laundry List/Econ.................................................................................110
Democracy Good Peace......................................................................................................111
Democracy Good Solves War.............................................................................................112
Democracy Good Backstop Against Turns.........................................................................113
Democracy Good Empirics.................................................................................................114
Democracy Good Solves Econ Collapse............................................................................116
Democracy Good Terrorism................................................................................................117
Democracy Solves Human Rights.........................................................................................118
Negative........................................................................................................................................120
*** Human Rights Promotion ***...............................................................................................120
Human Rights Promotion Undermines Human Rights.........................................................122
Human Rights Promotion Undermines Human Rights.........................................................124
Human Rights Promotion Fails.............................................................................................126
Human Rights Pressure Fails.................................................................................................129
Human Rights Pressure Backfires.........................................................................................134
*** Sovereignty Key/Intervention Not Justified***.............................................................144
Sovereignty Protects Diversity..............................................................................................145
Sovereignty Good Impacts: Global Peace.............................................................................146
*** Intervention Fails ***........................................................................................................148
Intervention Generally Fails..................................................................................................149
*** Mutua Human Rights Kritik ***.......................................................................................151
1NC Shell...............................................................................................................................152
2NC OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................158
2NC LINK FRONTLINE......................................................................................................161
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AT: PERMUTATION.............................................................................................................180
AT: PERMUTATION.............................................................................................................182
AT: PERMUTATION.............................................................................................................184
AT: WE SOLVE.....................................................................................................................186
AT: NO ALTERNATIVE.......................................................................................................188
AT: Holocaust Proves Human Rights Are Good....................................................................190
AT: RELATIVISM.................................................................................................................192
AT: KRISHNA.......................................................................................................................194
AT: REALISM.......................................................................................................................196
AT: FRAMEWORK...............................................................................................................198
Human Rights Promotion Imperialistic.............................................................................199
Human Rights Deny Agency.................................................................................................201
Universalization Link............................................................................................................202
A2: FGM Bad...............................................................................................................................204
A2: Womens Rights.....................................................................................................................206
A2: Freedom.................................................................................................................................207
*** Negative Kritik Links ***..................................................................................................209
Militarism Link......................................................................................................................210
Imperialism Link....................................................................................................................211
Realism Good K Links..........................................................................................................212
......................................................................................................................................................212
Human Rights Intervention Bad Convergence...................................................................214
Impact Divinization of Humanity.......................................................................................224
Impact Wars/Intervention....................................................................................................227
Impact Prime Modernity.....................................................................................................233
A2 Perm.................................................................................................................................235
Architecture K 1NC...............................................................................................................237
Link: Compassion *...............................................................................................................246
* Link: Assorted Victimhoods *...............................................................................................249
* Link: Helping *.........................................................................................................................252
Link: Helping.........................................................................................................................255
Link: Moral Imperative..........................................................................................................256
Link: Humanitarianism..........................................................................................................259
AT: CosmopolitanismNeoliberalism/Elitism.....................................................................269
AT: CosmopolitanismElitism.............................................................................................274
AT: CosmopolitanismNation-State Good..........................................................................277
HUMAN RIGHTS LINK......................................................................................................284
** Con Right to Protect (R2P) Bad ***.................................................................................287
Right to Protect Undermines American Leadership..............................................................288
R2P Bad: Sovereignty............................................................................................................296
A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty...........................................................................................300
A2: R2P Doesnt kill Sovereignty - its Preventive..........................................................301
A2: Safeguards Protect Sovereignty..................................................................................302
A2: N/U Sovereignty is Down Now...............................................................................303
Sovereignty Impact................................................................................................................305
R2O Increase War Moral Hazard (Syria/Iran)....................................................................306
R2P Increases War Moral Hazard.......................................................................................307
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Moral Hazard: Secessionism.................................................................................................309
Secession: A2: Alternative Causality.....................................................................................310
Secession Spills Over.............................................................................................................311
R2P Fails: A2 Good...............................................................................................................313
R2P Bad: Bias........................................................................................................................318
R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)..............................................................................................321
R2p Bad: Drone Strikes.........................................................................................................323
R2P = Imperialism.................................................................................................................325
R2P = imperialism: Africa.....................................................................................................326
R2P =Imperialism Kills International Law.........................................................................329
R22 Hypocritical....................................................................................................................333
R2P = White Supremacy........................................................................................................335
R2P = Syria Intervention.......................................................................................................337
Ditching R2P Solves..............................................................................................................338
Syria Crisis Impact: Middle East War...................................................................................340
Right to Protect Causes War Escalation.................................................................................342
Right to Protect Triggers Nuclear Proliferation.....................................................................347
Right to Protect Destroys US-Brazil Relations.....................................................................350
Con Imperialism Bad.............................................................................................................353
Racism...................................................................................................................................354
Ethics.....................................................................................................................................356
Indigenous Rights..................................................................................................................357
Terrorism................................................................................................................................359
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*** General ***
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Resolution
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RESOLVED: When in conflict, human rights protection ought to

supersede state sovereignty in the conduct of United States foreign
policy.
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Definitions -- Sovereignty
Four different understandings of sovereignty

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1054
Krasner (1999: 4ff.) argues that International Relations (IR) scholars use the term sovereignty to refer to four
analytically distinct phenomena: legal independence, the territorial exclusivity of political authority, effective
(supreme) political authority within the state, and control of various flows across borders.
Sovereignty is a conception of political authority

Political theorists understand sovereignty in a somewhat different, though clearly related, way. For them, it is a
conception of political authority, one that links rightful rule to a particular kind of political community, the sovereign
state as characterized by the attributes Krasner identifies. In Hinsleys (1986:26) classic definition, then, sovereignty
is final and absolute political authority within the political community when no such authority exists elsewhere.
Sovereignty so understood is primarily a normative doctrine describing the nature and location (source and extent) of
political authority.11 This normative doctrine, however, is a product of its time, reflecting the emergence of political
units (states) possessing the empirical attributes of sovereignty as Krasner defines them. Zacher (1992) emphasizes
significant state autonomy, reinforced by low levels of economic integration and a high tolerance for war, as central
pillars of this system
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Affirmative
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*** Human Rights Good ***
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Human Rights Generally Good

Global human rights violations create conditions where
extinction is inevitable
Human Rights Web, 94 (An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement Created on
July 20, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997, http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html)
The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were
written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes
trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on
the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found
they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors. In Germany, the
Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the
Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up,
because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a
Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone. -- Martin Niemoeller,
Pastor, German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in
social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people
in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable
living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become
the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from
the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected,
not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.
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Human rights key to stop global war

Burke white 04
Burke-White 4 William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special
Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge, "Human Rights and National Security: The
Strategic Correlation", The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249,
Lexis
For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of
human rights anti the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without
exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human
rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking
international human rights. While U.S. |*)licymakers have been motivated at times by human
rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example,
President Bushs 2(X)2 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a commitment to protecting
basic human rights. In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that defending our
Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal
Government.1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and
strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and
national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around
the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to
restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategicas opposed to
ideological or normativeargument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more
prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the
domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in
aggressive international conduct . Among the chief threats to U.S. national security arc
acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States,
as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 19dl, or they may require U.S. military action
overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-G)ld War period indicates that
states that systematically abuse their own citizens human rights are also those most likely to
engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states human rights records
decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can
significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a states domestic human ri ghts policy
appears to be a telling indicator of that states propensity to engage in international
aggression . A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace
and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it
provides U. S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the
promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national s ecurity and human rights would
result in a number of important policy modicat ions. First, it cha nges the prioritization of those
countries U.S. policymakers have identied as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters so
me of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a mean s of signaling benign
international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it
provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive
international behavior th rough the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it
addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass
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destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human
rights issues.
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Human Rights Solve Extinction

The protection of human rights is necessary for the survival of
the species
Copelon 99(Profesor of Law at NY School of Law, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev.), p. 71-2
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to
truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority
of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a culture and
jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing
poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and
military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and
new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the
world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the
protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and
betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights
that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability,
particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered
sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and
inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the
human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.
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Human Rights Solve War

Human rights solve war and WMD prolif
William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special
Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University; Spring 04
17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, pp. 249-50
ThisArticlepresentsastrategicasopposedtoideologicalornormativeargumentthatthe
promotionofhumanrights
shouldbegivenamoreprominentplaceinU.S.foreignpolicy.It
doessobysuggestingacorrelationbetweenthedomestic
humanrights
practicesofstatesand
theirpropensitytoengageinaggressiveinternationalconduct.AmongthechiefthreatstoU.S.
nationalsecurityareactsofaggressionbyotherstates.Aggressiveactsofwarmaydirectly
endangertheUnitedStates,asdidtheJapanesebombingofPearlHarborin1941,ortheymay
requireU.S.militaryactionoverseas,asinKuwaitfiftyyearslater.EvidencefromthepostCold
Warperiodindicatesthatstatesthatsystematicallyabusetheirowncitizens'humanrights
are
alsothosemostlikelytoengageinaggression.Tothedegreethatimprovementsinvariousstates'
humanrightsrecordsdecreasethelikelihoodofaggressivewar,aforeignpolicyinformedby
humanrightscansignificantlyenhanceU.S.andglobalsecurity.Since1990,astate's
domestichumanrights
policyappearstobeatellingindicatorofthatstate'spropensityto
engageininternationalaggression.AcentralelementofU.S.foreignpolicyhaslongbeenthe
preservationofpeaceandthepreventionofsuchactsofaggression.Ifthecorrelationdiscussed
hereinisaccurate,itprovidesU.S.policymakerswithapowerfulnewtooltoenhancenational
securitythroughthepromotionofhumanrights.Astrategiclinkagebetweennationalsecurity
andhumanrightswouldresultinanumberofimportantpolicymodifications.First,itchanges
theprioritizationofthosecountriesU.S.policymakershaveidentifiedaspresentingthegreatest
concern.Second,italterssomeofthepolicyprescriptionsforsuchstates.Third,itoffersstatesa
meansofsignalingbenigninternationalintentthroughtheimprovementoftheirdomestichuman
rightsrecords.Fourth,itprovidesawayforacurrentgovernmenttopreventfuturegovernments
fromaggressiveinternationalbehaviorthroughtheinstitutionalizationofhumanrights
protections.Fifth,itaddressestheparticularthreatof
humanrights
abusingstatesobtaining
weaponsofmassdestruction(WMD).Finally,itoffersamechanismforU.S.U.N.cooperation
onhumanrightsissues.
Human rights solve war

WilliamW.BurkeWhite,LecturerinPublicandInternationalAffairsandSeniorSpecial
AssistanttotheDean,WoodrowWilsonSchoolofPublicandInternationalAffairs,Princeton
University,Spring2004
17Harv.Hum.Rts.J.249
ThisArticlepresentsastrategicasopposedtoideologicalornormativeargumentthatthepromotionofhumanrightsshouldbegivenamoreprominentplaceinU.S.foreignpolicy.Itdoessobysuggestingacorrelationbetweenthe
domestichumanrightspracticesofstatesandtheirpropensitytoengageinaggressiveinternationalconduct.AmongthechiefthreatstoU.S.nationalsecurityareactsofaggressionbyotherstates.Aggressiveactsofwarmaydirectly
endangertheUnitedStates,asdidtheJapanesebombingofPearlHarborin1941,ortheymayrequireU.S.militaryactionoverseas,asinKuwaitfiftyyearslater.EvidencefromthepostColdWarperiod[*250]indicatesthatstates
inaggression.Tothedegreethatimprovementsinvarious
states'humanrightsrecordsdecreasethelikelihoodofaggressivewar,aforeignpolicyinformed
thatsystematicallyabusetheirowncitizens'humanrightsarealsothosemostlikelytoengage
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Stefan Bauschard
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byhumanrightscansignificantlyenhanceU.S.andglobalsecurity.
Since1990,astate'sdomestichumanrightspolicyappearstobeatellingindicatorofthatstate's
propensitytoengageininternationalaggression.AcentralelementofU.S.foreignpolicyhas
longbeenthepreservationofpeaceandthepreventionofsuchactsofaggression.Ifthe
correlationdiscussedhereinisaccurate,itprovidesU.S.policymakerswithapowerfulnewtool
toenhancenationalsecuritythroughthepromotionofhumanrights.Astrategiclinkagebetween
nationalsecurityandhumanrightswouldresultinanumberofimportantpolicymodifications.First,itchangestheprioritizationofthosecountriesU.S.policymakers
haveidentifiedaspresentingthegreatestconcern.Second,italterssomeofthepolicyprescriptionsforsuchstates.Third,itoffersstatesameansofsignalingbenigninternationalintentthroughtheimprovementoftheirdomestic
humanrightsrecords.Fourth,itprovidesawayforacurrentgovernmenttopreventfuturegovernmentsfromaggressiveinternationalbehaviorthroughtheinstitutionalizationofhumanrightsprotections.Fifth,itaddressesthe
particularthreatofhumanrightsabusingstatesobtainingweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD).Finally,itoffersamechanismforU.S.U.N.cooperationonhumanrightsissues.
Human rights are key to national security and preventing war

17Harv.Hum.Rts.J.249,p.2656
Onecausalpathwayrootedinliberalinternationalrelationstheorythatmayexplaintheobserved
correlationbetweensystematichumanrightsviolationsandinterstateaggressionisthe
institutionalconstraintthataccompanieshumanrightsprotections.Institutionalizationofhuman
rightsnormshasatleasttwopowerfuleffectsonstatebehavior.First,humanrightsprotections
governhowbroadaspectrumofthecommunityhasatleastsomevoiceinthepoliticaldecisions
ofthestate.Evenifthestateisnotademocraticpolyarchy,ifitprovidesbasicprotectionsforthe
humanrightsofallormostcitizens,thenaverybroadspectrumofthepolityisrepresentedin
politicalaffairs.Freedomofthoughtandfreedomfromextrajudicialbodilyharm,forexample,
allowcitizenstodeveloptheirownviewsonpoliticalissuesand,often,toexpressthoseviews
throughpublicchannels.Awiderspectrumofvoices,inturn,increasesthelevelofpolitical
competitiononeofthekeystructuralexplanationsforthedemocraticpeace
evenwithoutthe
establishmentofademocraticformofgovernment.Ofcourse,inanondemocratic,buthuman
rightsrespectingstate,theviewsofindividualinterestsmaynothaveadirecteffectonstate
policy,but,arguably,theycanstillincreasethelevelofpoliticalcompetitionbyfacilitating
debateandtheexchangeofideas.Thesecondeffectofinstitutionalizedprotectionsofhuman
rightsistosetaminimumflooroftreatmentforallcitizenswithinthedomesticpolity.Evenina
nondemocracy,minimumhumanrightsprotectionsensurethatrightsareaccordedtoindividuals
notdirectlyrepresentedbythegovernment.Byensuringaminimumtreatmentofthe
unrepresented,humanrightsprotectionspreventthegovernmentfromexternalizingthecostsof
aggressivebehaviorontheunrepresented.Inhumanrightsrespectingstates,forexample,
unrepresentedindividualscannotbeforcedatgunpointtofightorbeboundintoslaveryto
generatelowcosteconomicresourcesforwar,andthusrestrainthestatefromengagingin
aggressiveaction.Ontheotherhand,inastatewherepowerisnarrowlyconcentratedinthe
handsofapoliticalelitethatsystematicallyrepressesitsownpeople,thestatewillbemoreable
tobearthedomesticcostsofwar.Byviolatingthehumanrightsofitsowncitizens,astatecan
forceindividualstofightorsupportthemilitaryapparatusinitswarmakingactivities.Similarly,
bydenyingbasichumanrights,astatemaybebetterabletobearthepoliticalcostsofwar.Even
ifsuchastatehadfairelections,denialoffreedomofthoughtandexpressionmightwellinsulate
thegovernmentfromtheelectoralcostsofanaggressiveforeignpolicy.
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Human Rights Solve War

Human rights solve war
Thesocialbeliefsexplanationbeginsfromthepropositionthatindividualswithinhumanrights
protectingstatesshareapreferenceforaminimumsetofprotectionsofhumanrights.This
assumptionisappropriatefortworeasons.First,accordingtoliberalpoliticalsciencetheory,state
policyrepresentsthepreferencesofsomesubsetofthedomesticpolity.Iftheobservedstate
policyistoprotecthumanrights,thenatleastsomesubsetofthedomesticpolitymustsharethat
preference.Second,evenifindividualswithinadomesticpolityseekavarietyofdifferentiated
ends,basicrespectforhumanrightsallowsindividualstopursuetosomedegreeatleastthose
endsastheydefinethem.Liberaltheorythussuggeststhatindividualswithinahumanrights
respectingstatetendtosupportbasichumanrightsprovisions.Thenextstepinthesocialbeliefs
argumentistorecognizethatrespectforhumanrightshasaninherentlyuniversalisttendency.
Unlikeculturalornationalrights,humanrightsarejustthathuman.Theyapplyastothose
individualswithinadomesticpolityastothoseoutsidethepolity.Suchcosmopolitanliberalism
indicatesthat"themorepeoplearefree,thebetteroffallare."Thenetresultisthatindividuals
withinahumanrightsrespectingstatetend,ontheaverage,tosupportthehumanrightsof
individualsinotherstatesaswell.Givenasetofuniversalisthumanrightsvaluesinstatesthat
respecthumanrights,thepolicyarticulatedbythegovernmentmaybeonewhichrespectshuman
rightsathomeanddemandstheirprotectionabroad.Thisbeliefinathinsetofuniversalhuman
rightsmaycausetheleadershipofthestatetoframeitssecuritypolicyaroundthatbelief
structureandtorefrainfromaggressiveactsthatwouldviolatethehumanrightsofcitizensat
homeorabroad.AsPeterKatzensteinargues,"securityinterestsaredefinedbyactorswho
respondtoculturalfactors."Actsofinternationalaggressiontendtoimpingeonthehumanrights
ofindividualsinthetargetstateand,atleasttemporarily,limittheirfreedom.Afterall,bombs,
bullets,deathanddestructionarenotconsistentwithrespectforbasichumanrights.Framedinthe
liberalinternationalrelationstheorytermsofpolicyinterdependence,internationalaggressionbyStateAimposescostsonStateB,whosecitizens'humanrightswillbeinfringeduponbytheactofaggression.Thisinfringementinturn
imposescostsoncitizensinStateA,whosecitizenshaveapreferencefortheprotectionofthehumanrightsofcitizensinbothstates.ThissharedvalueofrespectforhumanrightsthusmayrestrainStateAfrompursuinginternational
Bycontrast,astatewhichcommitsgrosshumanrightsviolationsagainstitsownpeople
willnotbesubjecttothisrestraint.Suchviolationsoftenoccurwhenthegovernmenthasbeen
"captured"byaselectminoritythatchoosestoviolatehumanrights.Ifthecitizensthemselves
arenotinfavorofhumanrightsathome,theyareunlikelytobecommittedtotheenforcementof
humanrightsabroad.Wherecaptureoccurs,thegovernmentisnotresponsivetothepreferences
ofthedomesticpolity.Insuchcases,evenifthereisastrongpreferenceamongcitizensto
protecthumanrightsathomeandabroad,thegovernmentisunlikelytorespondtothoseinterests
anditspolicieswillnotbeconstrainedbythem.
aggression.n105
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Human Rights Key National Security

Human rights are key to national security
ThoughnationalsecurityhaslargelytrumpedhumanrightsintheformulationofU.S.policy,this
isnotnecessary,appropriate,norevenstrategic.Ratherthanbeingcompetinggoals,human
rightsandnationalsecurityareinfactcomplementary.Thissectionseekstodemonstratea
correlationbetweendomestichumanrightsabusesandinterstateaggressioninthepostColdWar
period.Threebasichypothesesresult:
1.Statesthatsystematicallyabusehumanrightsathomearemostlikelytoengagein
internationalaggression.
2.Stateswithaverageorgoodhumanrightsrecordsareunlikelytoengageininternational
aggression.
3.Humanrightsrespectingstatesmaystillengageininternationalinterventions(usuallyin
conformitywithinternationallaw)atleastinparttoprotectthehumanrightsofcitizensinastate
thatseriouslyandsystematicallyabusestherightsofitsowncitizens.
Ifthissuggestedcorrelationisaccurate,aforeignpolicythatactivelyadvanceshumanrights
aroundtheworldcanenhancebothnationalandglobalsecuritybydecreasingthenumberof
stateslikelytoengageininternationalaggressionandthedestabilizingconsequencesassociated
therewith.
Clearly,thisargumentiscloselylinkedwiththedemocraticpeacehypothesisnamelythat
democraticstateswillnotgotowarwithoneanother.However,ithighlightsascausalanoften
underappreciatedelementofthedemocraticpeace
literatureastate'sinstitutionalizedandactual
respectforitsowncitizensandusesthatelementtomakeapolicyargument.Theveryconcept
of"democraticpeace
"islargelyashorthandreferencetoanumberofdifferenttraitsthat
characterizedemocraciesthenatureofelections,institutionalsafeguards,orthenormative
beliefsdemocraciestendtohold.AsMichaelDoyleobserves:"Liberalstates,foundedonsuch
individualrightsasequalitybeforethelaw,freespeechandothercivilliberties,privateproperty,
andelectedrepresentationarefundamentallyagainstwar."Thehumanrightspeaceargument
presentedheredrawsonthiselementofinstitutionalsafeguardsandactualpracticesthatprotect
theircitizens'humanrights.Suchstatesmayormaynotbedemocraciesthoughthey,byand
large,haveandupholdliberalconstitutions.Theclaimhereisthatfarmoreimportantthan
whetherastateis"democratic"iswhetheritprotectsthebasicrightsofallitscitizensthrougha
formofconstitutionalliberalism.
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Human Rights Solve Genocide

Human rights key to solve genocide and millions of deaths
PaulHoffmanistheChairoftheInternationalExecutiveCommitteeofAmnestyInternational.
HeisacivilrightsandhumanrightslawyerwiththeVenicebasedlawfirmofSchonbrun,
DeSimone,Seplow,Harris&HoffmanLLP,HumanRightsQuarterly,Nov2004,p.932955
Historyshowsthatwhensocietiestradehumanrightsforsecurity,mostoftentheygetneither.
Instead,minoritiesandothermarginalizedgroupspaythepricethroughviolationoftheirhuman
rights.Sometimesthistradeoffcomesintheformofmassmurderorgenocide
,othertimesinthe
formofarbitraryarrestandimprisonment,orthesuppressionofspeechorreligion.Indeed,
millionsofliveshavebeendestroyedinthelastsixtyyearswhenhumanrightsnormshavenot
beenobserved.''Underminingthestrengthofinternationalhumanrightslawandinstitutionswill
onlyfacilitatesuchhumanrightsviolationsinthefutureandconfoundeffortstobringviolators
tojustice.'
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Human Rights Solve Terror

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION THWARTS OPPORTUNITIES FOR
TERRORISM
RosemaryFoot,ProfessorofInternationalRelations,St.AnthonysCollege,Oxford,2003,
Survival,Volume45,No.2,Summer,p.173
ItisalinkagethathaslivedontheneoReaganiteGeorgeW.Bushadministrationandappeals
becausethehumansecurityideaallowsforconnectionstobemadebetweenneoconservative
andliberalrhetoric.TheideacontributedtothedecisioninBushsJanuary2002,Stateofthe
UnionAddresstodescribeIraq,IranandNorthKoreaasanaxisofevilandtotheargumentin
theSeptember2002NationalSecurityStrategythatterroristswouldthrivewheretherewasan
absenceoftheruleoflawandafailuretoprotecthumandignity.Thus,fortheBush
administration,humanrightsconcernsenterintopolicymakingfirstasaresultofpolitical,
bureaucraticandlegislativecommitmentsmadeinthepast.Andsecondly,becauseofits
acceptancelatterlyoftheideathatgrossviolationsofhumanrightsgenerallytendtobethemark
ofastatethatmight,wittinglyornot,providethebasefromwhichterroristcellscanoperate,or
behospitabletotheestablishmentoflinkswithtransnationalterrorism,orthroughitactions
fomentviolentunrestthatspillsoveritsborders.
Human rights key to national security prevents terrorist

recruitment
MICHAEL J. O'DONNELL, Editor in Chief, Boston College Third World Law Journal, Winter
2004
24 B.C. Third World L.J. 223
The resentment and anger engendered by U.S. hypocrisy on human rights policy and corporate
responsibility are antithetical to long-term U.S. interests, and represent an immediate security
threat in an age of global terrorism. As the U.S. has become entrenched in the Middle East, an
area of the world currently saturated by virulent anti-Americanism, its perception abroad has
increasingly become a matter of national security policy. As one prominent human rights
leader has noted, "Human rights are the foundation of national security, both domestically
and around the world." Flagrant inconsistency between U.S. rhetoric and practice abroad
provides anti-American extremists and terrorists with an invaluable propaganda tool for adding
angry recruits to their ranks. Because such antagonism is eminently preventable, U.S. double
standards on human rights and corporate accountability represent a clear foreign policy failure.
US human rights leadership is key to national security and

stopping terrorism
Lorne W. Craner, Asst. Sec. Of State For Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, October 31,
2001
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/6378.htm
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The world has changed dramatically for all of us since September 11, and some people have expressed the concern that, as a result of the attacks on America, the Bush Administration will abandon human rights and democracy work.
maintaining the focus on human rights and democracy worldwide is an

integral part of our response to the attack and is even more essential today than before September
11th. They remain in our national interest in promoting a stable and democratic world. As Dr.
[Condoleezza] Rice said only a week after the horrific attack, "Civil liberties matter to this
President very much, and our values matter to us abroad. We are not going to stop talking about the things that matter to us, human rights,
To those people I say boldly that this is not the case. In fact,
religious freedom and so forth and so on. We're going to continue to press those things; we would not be American if we did not." In practical terms, we continue to raise human rights issues at the highest levels of governments
there is often a direct link between the absence of human

rights and democracy and seeds of terrorism. Promoting human rights and democracy addresses
the fear, frustration, hatred, and violence that is the breeding ground for the next generation of
terrorists. We cannot win a war against terrorism by halting our work promoting the universal
observance of human rights. To do so would be merely to set the stage for a resurgence of
terrorism in another generation. As Thomas Jefferson said: that government is the strongest of which everyone may feel a part. At the very least, the brutality of the attack on the World
worldwide and have made it clear that these issues remain important to us. We do so because
Trade Center and the Pentagon and the fact that it was completely unprovoked suggest that models based on what we used to call the "rational actor" are far from fully comprehensive -- unless, of course, you are willing to take
Clausewitz one step further and suggest that not only is war politics by another means, but so, too, is terrorism. But that would be to give it a legitimacy that it clearly does not merit. Even so, what drives individuals -- not states, but
This is not an attack on armies, but on

symbols. Obviously, we need to learn how to fight the perceptions and misperceptions that lie behind all that better than we do. The question that we all are asking ourselves since that terrible day last month is this: how do
men, individual, independent actors -- to assume the cloak of moral or religious rectitude and declare holy war on a country?
we, who have the responsibility for promoting and protecting the values that underpin civil society at home and throughout the world, pick our way through all the causes and effects of that and make sure that it does not happen again?
Obviously, there is much we can do: in intelligence-gathering and information sharing, in civil defense and homeland security, in diplomacy and economic leveraging, in international cooperation and coalition-building, in pressure and
in force. All this the Administration is doing, and much, much more. My point is not to venture into the realm of military strategy. That is not my responsibility in this administration. Fortunately for all of us, the President has
assembled a very experienced and capable team for that. This country is not the cause of all the problems of this world -- quite the contrary. We spend a great deal of time and effort trying to solve them. But still, we cannot be
. We cannot solve every regional dispute and ethnic conflict. And yet, we are the sole
superpower. Our reach is global and unprecedented. People look to us. Our power and our
potential are immense. We have interests and we have obligations to our friends and allies. As the
head of the bureau charged with advising the President and Secretary of State on human rights, I
have to worry about the causes and consequences of conflicts wherever they take place, for all of
them involve human rights in one way or another -- whether in Sudan or Sierra Leone,
Indonesia, Macedonia, or the Middle East. I suspect most of you are looking to hear something about this administration's priorities within the field of human rights,
everywhere at once
especially after the September 11th attacks. Let me begin by outlining the general principles that I think will guide us. First, over the past 20 years, both political parties -- Republicans and Democrats -- have firmly embraced the belief
America has an obligation to advance fundamental freedoms around the world.
that
Thus human rights have the deep and
strong backing of both parties, all branches of government, and, most importantly, the American people. This will not change. In a multilateral sense, the United States has been the unquestioned leader of the movement to expand
human rights since the Second World War. We pushed it in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and into the conventions and treaty bodies that have ensued. And when I say "we," I do not just mean the U.S.
government. For it was our people, Americans from every walk of life, who gave the international non-governmental organization (NGO) movement so much of its intellectual force, its financial muscle, and its firm commitment to
are proud to bear the mantle of leadership in

international human rights into this new century.
civil society. This, too, will not change. We in this administration are conscious of our history and
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Human Rights Solve Terror

HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION IS KEY TO FIGHTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
PaulaJ.Dobriansky,UnderSecretaryofStateforGlobalAffairs,HERITAGEFOUNDATIONREPORTS,
December21,2001,p.1.
Theadvancementofhumanrightsanddemocracyisimportantinitsownright.Atthesametime,
theseeffortsarethebedrockofourwaronterrorism.Theviolationofhumanrightsbyrepressive
regimesprovidesfertilegroundforpopulardiscontent.Inturn,thisdiscontentiscynically
exploitedbyterroristorganizationsandtheirsupporters.Bycontrast,astablegovernmentthat
respondstothelegitimatedesiresofitspeopleandrespectstheirrights,sharespower,respects
diversity,andseekstounleashthecreativepotentialofallelementsofsocietyisapowerful
antidotetoextremism.IampleasedtotellyouthatthisAdministration'scommitmenttohuman
rights,democracy,andreligiousfreedomisunshakeable.ThePresidentandotherseniorofficials
haveemphasizedthesecoreprinciplesrepeatedlyintheaftermathofSeptember11.The
President'sNationalSecurityAdvisor,CondoleezzaRice,atarecentForumontheAfricaGrowth
andOpportunityAct,reiteratedourcommitmenttopromotingdemocracy,noting
"democratizationandstabilityaretheunderpinningforaworldfreeofterrorism."
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Human Rights Key to Democracy

Human rights key to democratization
ThomasCarothers,director,DemocracyandRuleofLawProject,WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY,Summer1994,p.106.
Inmostofthecountriesthathaveundergonedemocratictransitionsinrecentyears,duringthe
generativeperiodofthetransitions(generallythelate1970sandearlytomid1980s),the
emphasisofexternalactorswasonhumanrightsadvocacyratherthandemocracypromotionper
se.Therefore,justashumanrightsadvocatesshouldnotoverlookthefactthatdemocratization
hasadvancedthecauseofhumanrightsinmanycountries,democracypromotionproponents
shouldnotignorethecontributionofhumanrightsadvocacytodemocratization.
Promoting human rights in China is a precondition for the

development of democracy and resolving regional conflicts
Samuel S. Kim, Adjunct Prof of PoliSci and Senior Research Associate at the East Asian Institute
at Columbia University, 2000
In What if China Doesnt Democratize?, ed. Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick. p.
155-156
To borrow from the familiar Chinese refrain"no state sovereignty, no human rights"we can
say, "no human rights, no or little chance of democratization." Viewing democratization as an
ongoing and multi-stage process rather than a natural outcome of certain social, cultural, and
economic preconditions, human rights can be defined as what David Held calls "empowering
rights"73 that are integral to strategic interactions among state, society, and international factors
necessary to bring about a transition to democracy. Democracy in a minimalist procedural sense
universal and equal suffrage and free electoral competition cannot come about without the
citizens enjoying civil and political rights as guaranteed in the UDHR (Article 21) and the ICCPR
(Article 25) Human rights are empowering democratization in normative and substantive terms as
well. There is no way or means of "seeking truth from facts" without an opposition. International
legitimation no longer rests solely on the claims of state sovereignty by the powers that be.
Increasingly, it rests on the condition of human rights, on how the government treats its own
sovereign people.74 Contrary to Deng's chaos theory, respect for human rights is not only a more
reliable guide to a peaceful transition to democracy but also for domestic stability in the multina tional Chinese state, especially for peaceful resolution of the simmering conflicts in Democratic
Taiwan, Buddhist Tibet, and Muslim Xinjiang. There is also the normative/behavioral
requirement of great power status: a great power abroad is and becomes what a great power does at
home and abroad.75 In short, a China that respects human rights would be a more democratic country,
just as a more democratic China would become part of the world order solution in the Asia-Pacific
region and beyond.
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Human Rights Key to Hegemony

Human rights leadership key to US hegemony
Roth 2000 [Chicago Journal of International Law, "AEI conference trends in global governance:
do they threaten American Sovereignty?"], p. 352-3
Washington's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has begun to weaken the US
government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world. Increasingly at UN human
rights gatherings, other governments privately criticize Washington's "a la carte" approach to
human rights. They see this approach reflected not only in the US government's narrow formula
for ratifying human rights treaties but also in its refusal to join the recent treaty banning antipersonnel landmines and its opposition to the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court
unless a mechanism can be found to exempt US citizens. For example, at the March-April 2000
session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, many governments privately cited
Washington's inconsistent interest in international human rights standards to explain their
lukewarm response to a US-sponsored resolution criticizing China's deteriorating human rights
record. The US government should be concerned with its diminishing stature as a standardbearer for human rights. US influence is built not solely on its military and economic power.
At a time when US administrations seem preoccupied with avoiding any American casualties, the
projection of US military power is not easy. US economic power, for its part, can engender as
much resentment as influence. Much of why people worldwide admire the United States is
because of the moral example it sets. That allure risks being tarnished if the US government is
understood to believe that international human rights standards are only for other people, not
for US citizens.
Decline in leadership causes nuclear war

Khalilzad 95 (WQ, p. lexis)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude
the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is
the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself,
but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous
advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American
values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better
chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation,
threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership
would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the
world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global
nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a
bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Human Rights Universal

Human rights are universal - Chinese scholars argue for the
inclusion of human rights and democracy into China. They are
compatible with Confucianism and Chinese tradition (key to
promoting Confucianism)
AlbertHYChen;ProfessorandDeanoftheFacultyofLaw,UniversityofHongKong;May
2000(ChineseCulturalTraditionandModernHumanRights;Perspectives,Vol.1,No.5;
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/5_043000/chinese_cultural_tradition_and_m.htm)
WeChinesepeopleareproudofthemanifoldachievementsofChinesecivilizationwhichhas
enjoyedmorethan5,000yearsofculturalcontinuity.Historyproducestradition,andtradition
shapespeople'sthinkingandbehavior.Therationality,morality,valuesandaspirationsofhuman
beingsareembeddedintheparticularculturaltraditioninwhichtheyfindthemselves.Thereare
probablynoabsoluteandobjectivestandardswithregardtorationalthinkingandmoraljudgment
thatarecompletelyindependentoftradition.Thereexistsno"viewfromnowhere,"notradition
freeground,fromwhichwecanthinkandreasoninahumanlymeaningfulway.Thisisthe
insightcontributedbycontemporaryphilosopherslikeMacIntyreandGadamer.Ifthisisright,
thenthequestionarisesastowhatmodernhumanrightsare,andhowtheymaybeevaluated,
fromthepointofviewoftheChineseculturaltradition.Inprinciple,thereisnoformalor
structuraldifferencebetweenthisquestionandthequestionofhowmodernhumanrightswould
beviewedfromtheperspectiveofthepremodernWesterntradition.Sincethisisnotthetopicof
thisarticle,Iwilldealwithitverybriefly,simplytoillustratetheformwhichapossibleanswer
cantake.WecansaythattherewereelementsinthepremodernWesterntraditionthatwere
consistentwithandprobablycontributedtotheriseofmodernhumanrights.Theseinclude,for
example,theChristianconceptionoftheequalworthanddignityofeachhumanindividual,the
classicalconceptionofnaturallawasbasedonauniversalhumannatureanduniversalreason,
theideaoflegalrightsimplicitinRomanjurisprudence,andmedievalpoliticalinstitutions
providingfordemocracyandrepresentationofinterests.Atthesametime,thereexistedelements
inthepremodernWesterntraditionthatwereinconsistentwithmodernhumanrights,whichis
preciselywhymodernhumanrightsareanewinvention.Examplesofsuchelementsinclude
religiousintoleranceandpersecutionofheretics,cruelandinhumanpunishment,slavery,
serfdom,aristocraticprivilegesandthusdenialofequalityunderthelaw,arbitraryexerciseof
absolutistpowersbyrulers,andtheideaoftheking'sdivinerighttorule.However,whenmodern
humanrightshavecomeintoexistence,peopleintheWesterntraditioncanevaluatethem
positivelyandaffirmthemasindicatorsofprogress,usingpreexistingstandardssuchasthe
principleofuniversalChristianloveandthatoftheequaldignityandworthofallhumanbeings.
Soweseehowatraditioncanactuallyevolveandeventransformitself,butstillrelyingonmoral
andspiritualresourceswithinthetraditionandachievingareconfigurationoftheelements,often
mutuallycontradictory,thatoriginallyexistedwithinthetradition.WhenweturntotheChinese
tradition,wecan,asinthecaseoftheWest,findbothelementsthathaveaffinitieswith,orcan
contributeto,themodernconceptionofhumanrights,aswellaselementsthatcontradictthat
conception.TheformerelementsincludetheConfucianprincipleofbenevolenceasthebasic
normgoverningrelationsbetweenhumanbeings,theethicsofbenevolentruleonthepartofthe
rulerwhomustcultivatehisvirtuesandserveasamoralexemplarforhissubjects,the
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27
recognitionoftheimportanceofconsultationbytherulerandhisfollowingthewishesofthe
peopleandwinningtheirheartsinsteadofjusttheiroutwardsubmission,theaffirmationofthe
moralautonomyandperfectibilityofeachhumanbeing,theideaoftheequalityofallhuman
beingsintermsofthecapacityformoralcultivationandgrowth,thehumanisticconceptionofthe
humanbeingasthenoblestcreatureinthenaturalandcosmicorder,andtherecognitionofthe
existenceoftranscendentprinciplesofHeaven(tianli)whichgoverntheuniverseandwhich
constitutethesourceoftheprinciplesofjusticeandethics.ElementsinChinesetraditionthatran
againstthemodernnotionofhumanrightsincludedespoticpowerinthehandsoftheemperoras
theSonofHeaven,paternalisticthinkingonthepartofthescholarofficialrulingclassandhence
denialofpoliticalparticipationfrombelow,socialrelationshipsthatarehierarchicaland
involvingrespectivepositionsofabsoluteauthorityandsubordination,theemphasisonsocial
harmonyandthesubsumingoftheindividualwithinthefamilybothofwhichoperatetodenythe
individual'sassertionofhisorherrightsandtheindividual'sindividuality,cruelandinhuman
methodsofpunishment,harshpunishmentregardingpotentiallyseditiouspublication,etc.Asin
thecaseoftheWesterntradition,theadoptionofmodernhumanrightsbytheChinesetradition
canbeassessedasamorallypositivedevelopmentevenbyusingcertaintraditionalstandardsand
concepts,suchastheConfucianprinciplesofbenevolenceandrighteousnessandtheConfucian
beliefineachhumanbeing'srationalpropensity,moralautonomyandspiritualcapacityfor
growthandperfection.Indeed,certainmorerecentlydevelopedhumanrightscanberegardedas
particularlycompatiblewithtraditionalChinesevalues.Iamreferringheretotherightto
education,sinceConfucianismlaysparticularemphasisoneducationforthepurposeofbringing
outthegoodpotentialinherentineachhumanbeing,andtotherecognitionoftherightsof
variousdisadvantagedgroups(e.g.women,children,theaged,thedisabled),sincetheConfucian
principleofbenevolencedrawsspecialattentiontotheneedsofthelessfortunatemembersof
society.Furthermore,asthecontemporaryphilosopherRichardRortyargues,theactualizationof
respectformodernhumanrightsdependsonthedevelopmentofthehumansentimentof
sympathyforthosewhodonotbelongtoone'sownethnic,culturalorsocialcommunity,andthis
viewconvergeswiththeConfucianperspectivethattheprincipleofbenevolenceistoberealized
byfirstcultivatingoneselfmorallyandcaringforthosewithwhomonehasasocialrelationship
(suchasfamilymembersorfriends),andthenextendingone'ssentimentofsympathytothose
situatedfurtherandfurtherawayfromone'simmediatesocialcirclesandfinallytoall
humankind.SinceextensivecontactsbetweenChinaandtheWestbeganinthe19thcentury,
manyWesternpoliticalandlegaldoctrines,includingtheideaofhumanrights,havegaineda
firmgroundintheChineseintellectualsceneandintheChineseconsciousness.Inthefirsthalfof
thiscentury,thediscourseofhumanrightswaswellreceivedbymanyChinesethinkersand
oftenusedamongpoliticalactivists,particularlythosewhocriticizedreigninggovernmentsfor
theirhumanrightsviolations.TheChineseCommuniststhemselvesemployedthistacticandused
humanrightslanguageincondemningtheKuomintangandinwinningpublicsupport.Sadly,
soonaftertheCommunistRevolutionsucceededin1949,humanrightsdiscoursedisappeared
fromthemainland,andfornearlyfourdecadesthetopicofhumanrightswasa"forbiddenzone"
forChinesescholars.Thiswasmainlybecausehumanrightswereregardedasbourgeoispolitical
andideologicaldevices,andwerethereforealientoandinconsistentwiththesocialistproject.It
wasonlyin1991thatthereoccurredaturnaboutintheChinesegovernment'sofficialposition,
andtheChinesegovernmentdeclareditsendorsementofthedoctrineofhumanrightsinthe
WhitePaperonthesubject.Sincethen,manyscholarlywritingsonhumanrightshaveemerged
inmainlandChina,andmyownsurveyofthesewritingssuggeststhatmostscholarshave
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enthusiasticallyembracedtheconceptofhumanrights.Inrecentyears,theChinesegovernment
hasbeenparticipatingmoreactivelyintheinternationalactivitiesanddialogueonhumanrights
matters.ThisculminatedinChina'ssignatureoftheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social
andCulturalRightsin1997andtheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRightsin1998
(althoughthecovenantshavenotyetbeenratifiedbyChina).Chinahasalsobeenapartytoa
numberofotherinternationalconventionsrelatingtomorespecificareasofhumanrights.A
developmentwhichoccurredalmostsimultaneouslywithChina'sentryintotheinternational
dialogueonhumanrightsisthedebateabouthumanrightsandAsianvalues.Thecentralissue
hereiswhethertherecanbeauniversaldoctrineofhumanrightsequallyapplicabletopeoplesof
allnationsandcultures,andtheextenttowhichculturecanmakeorjustifyadifferenceinthe
applicationofhumanrightsthinking,discourseandstandardstodifferentcountries.Forexample,
arethereparticularelementsinhumanrightsthinkinganddiscourseintheWestthatare
culturallyspecifictotheWestandlessapplicabletoaculturaltraditionlikethatofChina?Sucha
questionraisesthefundamentalissueofwhatistheChineseculturaltradition.Whoistointerpret
whatthistraditionis?Isthegovernmentthelegitimatespokesmanforthistradition?Professor
MichaelFreemanhasarguedthatitisthepeoplewholiveinthecultureortradition,ratherthan
theirgovernment,whoareinthebestpositiontospeakonwhatisthecontentofthecultureor
tradition.Myownviewisthatthereisalsomuchreferencevalueintheworksofscholarswho
arelearnedinthehistory,philosophyandcultureofthetraditionconcerned.SoIwouldliketo
concludethisarticlebysharingwithreaderstheviewsofMouZhongsan,probablythegreatest
Confucianphilosopherofthiscentury,whohasdevotedhiswholelifetoreconstructingthe
Chinesephilosophicaltradition.MouwascertainlynotaliberalintheWesternsense,andhewas
alsoastrongcriticofMarxism.HewastotallycommittedtoConfucianism,andbelievedthat
ConfucianismisthecoreandmainstreamoftheChinesecultural,intellectualandphilosophical
tradition.HeplacedhishopeforChina'sfutureonarenaissanceoftheConfuciantradition.What
isremarkableaboutMouforourpresentpurposeisthatdespitehisgreatConfucianlearningand
deepcommitmenttoConfucianphilosophy,healsoadvocatedenthusiasticallyandwithout
reservationtheadoptionofWesternnotionsofdemocracy,humanrightsandfreedoms,
constitutionalismandtheruleoflaw.Hisviewisthatsuchadevelopmentwouldnotonlybe
compatiblewiththeChineseculturaltradition,butwouldenableittofulfillitselfbetterthan
before.Inotherwords,theestablishmentofconstitutionaldemocracyandinstitutional
guaranteesforhumanrightsareinfactrequiredbyConfucianvaluesthemselves,andwill
facilitatetheirbetterrealization.Drawingontheancientphrasedescribingthebestlifeas
"innersagehoodandoutwardkingliness,"MoudescribedChina'schallengeandthechallengefor
contemporaryConfuciansas"theopeningupofanewmodeofoutwardkingliness",whichhe
identifiedasthewayofdemocracyandhumanrights.Likeanumberoftwentiethcentury
Confucianthinkers,Moubelievedthattheseedsfordemocracyandhumanrightsliewithinthe
Chineseculturaltraditionitself.Hedevelopedhisownphilosophicalvocabularytodiscussthis
aspectoftheChineseculturaltraditionandthemechanicsofitsmodernization.Inhistheory,the
Chineseculturaltradition,particularlyConfucianism,alreadygeneratedanddevelopedtothefull
rationalityorreasoninits"intensional"meaning(i.e.thecontentandapplicationofthespiritof
democracyandrespectforhumanrights).Whatitlackedwasrationalityinits"extensional"
meaning(i.e.theformandinstitutionalstructuresofdemocracyandrespectforhumanrights).
ConfucianethicsandConfuciandoctrinesabouthumannature,humanrelationshipsand,in
particular,themoralobligationsofrulers,exemplifytheintensionalaspectofrationality.
However,itisintheWestthattheextensionalaspectofrationalityfirstmatured,andthisaspect
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29
compriseselementssuchasdemocracy,humanrights,constitutionalism,popularsovereignty,
parliamentaryinstitutionsandtheruleoflaw.YetMoupointedoutthatthisdevelopmentin
theWestisnotculturallyspecifictotheWest,buthasuniversalsignificanceandgeneral
applicabilityforallrationalpeoplesandcultures.AsanothercontemporaryConfucian
philosopherZhaiZhichengpointsout,theculturalsphereofatraditionincludesethics,thearts,
politicsandscience.Inmoderntimes,ChinahasfallenbehindtheWestinthedomainsofpolitics
andscience.ButtherealmofethicsandtheartsarewherethestrengthsofthegreatChinese
culturaltraditionlie.SotheChinesepeopleshouldrediscoverthesestrengthsintheirown
traditionandrestoretheirconfidenceintheachievementsofthistradition,whileatthesametime
learningfromthepoliticalandscientificachievementsofmodernWesterncivilization.Thusit
wouldbepossibleforustorehabilitatethevirtuesandinsightsofConfucianismandother
preciouselementsintherichandgreatChineseculturaltraditionwhichmodernChinesedeserve
tofeelproudof,andsimultaneouslyworkforthefurtherdemocratizationandbetterprotectionof
humanrightsinChinaofthe21stcentury.This,Ibelieve,isthewayforwardforChina,andthe
lessonfinallylearntfromtheimmensesufferingswhichtheChinesepeoplehaveenduredinthe
throesofmodernizationinthelasttwocenturies.
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Discourse Impacts
Rhetorical public support for human rights important
Ignatief, Harvard01, [Michael, Professor, Kennedy School] Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry,
http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF-8&vid=ISBN0691114749&id=ZLvZ_fyAyYC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=us+human+rights+credibility&vq=human+rights+leadership&sig=y5iW4vs3
c7XvbIvpDqegaFam6Wa, p. 11-2
But the catastrophe of European war and genocide gave impetus to the ideal of moral intervention beyond national
borders and to the proposition that a network of international activists could shame their own states into intervening
in delinquent states in the name of universal values. Thanks to human rights advocacy, international politics has
been democratized, and the pressure that human rights advocates can bring to bear on state actors witness the
campaigns on behalf of Soviet Jewry, or the international struggle against apartheidhas forced most states to
accept that their foreign policy must at least pay rhetorical attention to values, as well as interests. Indeed, human
rights considerations are now increasingly used to make the claim that in cases where values point one way and
interests the other, values should trump. The United Nations system itself is beginning to reflect this new reality.
Until the 1960s, UN bodies were wary of criticizing the human rights behavior of member states. The apartheid
regime of South Africa was the first exception, and after this breach in the wall there came others: the denunciation
of the Greek junta in the 1970s, and the critique of repression in the Eastern bloc in the 1980s. After forty years of
deference toward the sovereignty of states, the United Nations decided in the 1990s to create its own cadre of human
rights activists under the leadership of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Commissioners office still
lacks financial resources and real support from UN member states, and the commissioner has the power only to name
and shame defaulting governments. Still, every time a state is denounced for its human rights record, it becomes
harder for it to secure international loans or political and military help when it is in danger. Naming and shaming for
human rights abuses now have real consequences.
Discursive practices regarding human rights important

Risse & Sikkink, European Univ. Institute & U. Minesota, 02, [Thomas, Chair of International Relations and
Kathryn, Professor of Political Science], The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change,
http://books.google.com/books?ie=UTF8&vid=ISBN0521658829&id=kpsDPvaCOCAC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=human+rights+leadership+foreign+pol
icy&vq=shaming&sig=Bt0ucnKd9vQTRaK4VCMOdX2LrG0, p. 14
In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialization often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations,
not aimed at producing changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the target.
Persuasion is also not devoid of conflict. It often involves not just reasoning with opponents, but also pressures,
arm-twisting, and sanctions. For example, Audi Klotzs work on norms and apartheid discusses coercion, incentive
and legitimation effects that are often part of a socialization process.
Nevertheless, we claim that the logic of persuasion and of discourse is conceptually different from a logic of
information exchange based on fixed preferences, definition of the situations, and collective identities. Discursive
processes are precisely the types of human interaction in which at least one of these properties of actors is being
challenged.
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U.S. Key to Global Human Rights

US still the key player in global human rights
Ignatief, Harvard02, [Michael, Professor, Kennedy School] Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, February 5,
http://www.alanalexandroff.com/ignatieffhr.pdf
Of course, just because the United States has other priorities doesn't have to mean that, in global terms, the era of this
movement is over. Human rights has gone global by going local, anchoring itself in struggles for justice that can
survive without American inspiration or leadership. The movement does not have its headquarters in Washington.
But if Washington turns away, the movement loses the one government whose power can be decisive in stopping
human rights abuses.
US pressure for human rights improvements key to hegemony

Ignatief, Harvard02, [Michael, Professor, Kennedy School] Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, February 5,
http://www.alanalexandroff.com/ignatieffhr.pdf
But the movement will have to engage soon in the battle of ideas: it has to challenge directly the claim that national
security trumps human rights. The argument to make is that human rights is the best guarantor of national security.
The United States, to encourage the building of secure states that do not harbor or export terror, will have to do more
than secure base agreements. It will have to pressure these countries to provide basic political rights and due process.
As the cold war should have taught us, cozying up to friendly authoritarians is a poor bet in the long term. America is
still paying a price for its backing of the shah of Iran. In the Arab world today, the United States looks as if it is on
the side of Louis XVI in 1789; come the revolution in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, American influence may be swept
away.
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Human Rights Key To Peace

Respect for human rights is key to stop internal and external
warfare
John Linarelli, Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University, DENVER JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Spring 1996, p. 253.
Peace and respect for human rights are closely interconnected. Professor Myres McDougal
has described the relationship between peace and human rights as follows: The most relevant
conception of peace must make reference to the least possible application of violence and
coercion to the individual human being and to the freedom of access of the individual to all
cherished values. For community members and their decision-makers alike, a viable conception
of peace cannot today be limited to reference to a mere absence of armed, and international,
conflict. The peace demanded by contemporary humankind is not that of the concentration camp
(however large) or that of the living dead (whatever the community).
The protection of human rights prevents war

William W. Burke-White, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Princeton University,
THE HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, Spring 2004, p. 265-266.
By ensuring a minimum treatment of the unrepresented, human rights protections prevent the
government from externalizing the costs of aggressive behavior on the unrepresented. In
human rights respecting states, for example, unrepresented individuals cannot be forced at
gunpoint to fight or be bound into slavery to generate low-cost economic resources for war,
and thus restrain the state from engaging in aggressive action. On the other hand, in a state
where power is narrowly concentrated in the hands of a political elite that systematically
represses its own people, the state will be more able to bear the domestic costs of war. By
violating the human rights of its own citizens, a state can force individuals to fight or
support the military apparatus in its war-making activities. Similarly, by denying basic
human rights, a state may be better able to bear the political costs of war.
Human rights protection vital to real peace

Mark Katayanagi, Embassy of Japan, Sarajevo and Bosnia, Human Rights Functions of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 2002, p. 269
Peace and security hardly exist where human rights are threatened. Building a system that
protects and promotes human rights helps in transforming a society where people have
been subjected to coercion and violence into one that is governed by the rule of law. The
peacekeeping operations may contribute in this Process through human rights functions
which bridge the international human rights law and humanitarian law and the lawless
reality on the ground.
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Human Rights Key to Security

Protection of human rights is necessary for the security of
millions
Paul Hoffman, Chair of the International Executive Committee of Amnesty International,
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, November 2004, p. 932-935.
For hundreds of millions of people in the world today, the most important source of
insecurity is not a terrorist threat but grinding, extreme poverty. More than a billion of the
world's six billion people live on less than one dollar a day. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the entire human rights framework is based on the indivisibility of
human rights. This includes not only civil and political rights but also economic, social, and
cultural rights. The discrepancy between these human rights promises and the reality of life for
more than one-sixth of the world's people must be eliminated if terrorism is to be controlled.
Every human being is entitled to a standard of living that allows for their health and wellbeing,
including food, shelter, and medical care. Yet more than three thousand African children die of
malaria each day. Only a tiny percentage of the twenty-six million people infected with
HIV/AIDS have access to the health care and medicine they need to survive. Many additional
examples could be given. Many governments have adopted the Millennium Development Goals
to be achieved by 2015. The goals include targets for child and infant mortality, the availability of
primary education for all children, halving the number of people without access to clean water
along with many others. According to the World Bank, these goals will not be achieved, in part
because the "war on terrorism" is shifting attention and resources away from long-term
development issues. How can we eradicate violent challenges to the existing world order if
education is not universal? Without education and peaceful exchanges between peoples, the "war
on terrorism" will only succeed in creating new generations of warriors. Why is terrorism given
more attention than the scourge of violence against women? Millions of women are terrorized in
their daily lives, yet no "war" on violence against women is being waged. Clearly, this problem is
more widespread than terrorist violence and invariably makes women insecure as well as secondclass citizens in every corner of the world. If some of the resources and attention devoted to the
"war on terrorism" were diverted to the eradication of world poverty or eliminating violence
against women, would the world be more secure? There is no easy answer to this question, but
the "war on terrorism" seems to sideline any serious discussions, along with any serious action on
the other pressing causes of human insecurity. True security depends on all of the world's
peoples having a stake in the international system and receiving the basic rights promised
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regardless of race, gender, religion, or any
other status.
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Human Rights Key To Democracy

Strong global human rights promote democracy
Thomas Carothers, director, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY, Summer 1994, p. 106.
In most of the countries that have undergone democratic transitions in recent years, during the
generative period of the transitions (generally the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s), the
emphasis of external actors was on human rights advocacy rather than democracy
promotion per se. Therefore, just as human rights advocates should not overlook the fact
that democratization has advanced the cause of human rights in many countries,
democracy promotion proponents should not ignore the contribution of human rights
advocacy to democratization.
Respect for human rights key to preventing democide

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Spring 199
, p. 253.
Liberal democracy and the rule of law (in the broadest sense) are valuable to the new world
order centrally and fundamentally because an impressive body of human knowledge now tells us
unmistakably that there is a direct correlation between these concepts and: human rights, the
avoidance of government-sponsored "democide" (the massive killing of a nation's own
population and the most extreme human rights failure of government), vigorous economic
progress, and the avoidance of a synergy that has produced the major international wars of
this century. In short, the spread of liberal democracy, or at least the minimization of
totalitarianism, is of the greatest importance in realizing fundamental human aspirations.
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Human Rights Key To Development

Respect for human rights key to development
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Spring 1996, p. 253
Development and respect for human rights are also closely interconnected. As explained by
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, General Counsel of the World Bank, "the essence of development
encompasses not only higher incomes but also better education, higher standards of health
and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner environment, more equality of opportunity, greater
individual freedom and a richer cultural life." According to Mr. Shihata, "a guarantee of human
rights protection does not merely relate to development but is central to the development
process." Human rights protections in the development process thus refer to economic and
social rights as well as civil and political rights.
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Denying Human Rights Dehumanizes The Individual

Human rights are fundamental to deny them is to challenge
ones very humanity
Natsu Taylor Saito, Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law, Yale Law &
Policy Review, 2002, 20 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 427, p. 427-8
There is a nexus between the abolition or the diminution of [the precepts of American
slavery jurisprudence] as advocated by the slavemasters in power in the American colonial
and antebellum periods and the efforts in this decade to advocate universal human rights
for all. The more we appreciate the extraordinary injustice of the original precepts, the more
persistent we will be in eradicating the vestiges of those precepts in the United States and the
equivalent denigration throughout the world. Nelson Mandela reminded a joint session of the
United States Congress in 1990 that "to deny any person their human rights is to challenge their
very humanity." Human rights law is a subset of international law designed to protect
certain fundamental rights of individuals and of ethnic, religious, racial, and national
minorities within states. It also encompasses the rights of peoples to self-determination.
Since World War II the major world powers have acknowledged that these universal principles of
human rights must be accepted as binding on all states, because the domestic laws that protect the
rights of "insiders" often fail to protect those regarded as "Other" within the polity. n4 The
colonial legacy of the arbitrary imposition of state boundaries upon indigenous nations in almost
every part of the world makes international human rights law particularly important.
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*** A2: Common Negative Arguments

***
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A2: Cultural Relevatism

Cultural relevatism destroys human rights protection
Ayton-Shenker
1995
, March
[Diana, LL.M., in intl. human rights law, Law School of the U of Essex, England. Human Rights Program at Hunter College of CUNY, The Challenge of Human Rights
and Cultural Diversity, http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm]
How can universal human rights exist in a culturally diverse world? As the international
community becomes increasingly integrated, how can cultural diversity and integrity be respected?
How could a global culture emerge based on and guided by human dignity and tolerance?
Cultural relativism is the assertion that human values
vary a great deal according to different cultural perspectives. Some would apply this relativism to the
promotion, protection, interpretation and application of human rights which could be interpreted differently within
different cultural, ethnic and religious traditions
this relativism
pose a dangerous threat to the effectiveness of
the international system of human
rights
If cultural tradition alone governs State compliance
then
widespread disregard, abuse
of human rights would be given legitimacy
the promotion and protection
of human rights perceived as culturally relative would only be subject to State discretion
By
rejecting or disregarding their legal obligation to promote and protect universal human rights, States advocating
cultural relativism could raise their own cultural norm
above international law and standards.
This situation sharpens a long-standing dilemma:
Is a global culture inevitable? If
so, is the world ready for it?
These are some of
the issues, concerns and questions underlying the debate over universal human rights and cultural relativism.
far from being universal,
. In other words, according to this view, human rights are culturally relative rather than universal. Taken to its extreme,
would
international law and
that has been painstakingly contructed over the decades.
with international standards,
and violation
. Accordingly,
, rather than international legal imperative.
s and particularities
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A2: International Regimes Solves

International regimes have no enforcement and norms do not
trigger compliance
Goodman and Jinks, 2004
[Ryan and Derek, Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law School and Professor of Law, Arizona State University
College of Law, Duke Law Journal, December, 54 Duke L.J. 621, Lexis]
Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes
especially productive in this arena. Most international regimes seek to facilitate cooperation or coordination among states. 11 The global promotion of human rights, however, is importantly different from
both types of regimes. 12 For several reasons, the prevalence of human rights violations is not reducible to a simple collective action problem. First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect
human rights within their territory without coordinating their efforts with [*629] other states. Without question, states retain some substantial measure of effective autonomy in this area. Second,
many states have little clear interest in promoting and protecting human rights abroad
and
domestically. Some states are simply willing to violate human rights
when it is convenient to do so, and they have no interest in accepting structural commitments that may alter their
current decision processes
The task of
designing effective human rights regimes is further complicated by several structural characteristics of international
society
First, international human rights norms are not self-enforcing. 13
This point issues from the fact that human rights regimes do not address coordination problems and
that states have no clear, direct interest in securing human rights protection in other states. Second, good faith
participants in such regimes are generally unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to coerce
recalcitrant states to comply with human rights norms. This "enforcement deficit" - exacerbated by high enforcement
costs and negligible direct returns - is a political reality of the current international order.
. Although "bad actors" impose externalities on other
states in extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights conditions trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only sporadically
typically affect only a few (bordering) states.
Third, many states have no interest in promoting and protecting human rights
. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems in human rights law is how best to influence "bad actors" to make fundamental changes. The question
whether international law can promote human rights norms may be recast, in an important sense, as how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social influence.
that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two.
Treaties prove the multilateral human rights commitments fail

Tsutsui, March 2005
[Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford University, The American Journal of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: the paradox of empty
promises, www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]
Scholars of international relations, particularly within the realist and neoliberal traditions, expect this compliance gap between states commitment to international law and states practices. Theses
mainstream international relations perspectives often regard the growing legalization of human rights principles as
epiphenomenal (Mearsheimer 1994/1995); or, they assume that states only comply with the principles of
international law when it is in their national interest and when international institutions are designed to enforce
observance of law (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). In short, the rationalist tradition has led scholars to expect
that the human rights regime has little impact on actual human rights practices. Treaties are simply not designed to
make ratifying governments accountable for their commitments.
Treaty signers more likely to violate human rights

Tsutsui 05, March 2005 [Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford
University, The American Journal of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing
World: the paradox of empty promises,
www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]
Table 3 below displays our major findings. Two outcomes re striking. First, state commitment to the international
human rights legal regime does not automatically translate into government respect for human rights. States that
ratify a greater number of human rights treaties are not more likely to protect human rights than states that ratify a
small number of treaties. To the contrary, model 1 suggests that ratification is frequently coupled with non
compliance behavior and that state commitment to the international human rights legal regime at times leads to
radical decoupling, exacerbating human rights abuse. (21) This finding is remarkably consistent when we
disaggregate overall commitment to the human rights regime and examine ratification of specific UN treaties
(models 2-7). In no instance does state ratification of any of the six core UN human rights treaties predict the
likelihood of government respect for human rights. Rather, state ratification of all six treaties has a negative effect on
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signatories behavior: treaty members are more likely to repress their citizens than non-ratifiers. (22) Together, these
findings draw a troubling picture: international human rights treaties do little to encourage better practices and
cannot stop many governments from a spiral of increasing repressive behavior, and may even exacerbate poor
practices.
Treaties enable governments to deflect responsibility

Tsutsui, March 2005
[Kiyoteru, Professor of political sociology at Stanford University, The American Journal of Sociology, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: the paradox of empty
promises, www.stanford.edu/~emiliehb/Papers/hr_practices.pdf]
These have created fertile grounds for

what we call radical decoupling, wherein treaties have an effect opposite to what are intended. We argue that
international human rights treaties lack the mechanisms of enforcement that provide governments with the incentives
not to defect from their policy commitments (Hathaway 2002; Downs et al. 1996, Tsutsui and Wotipka 2001). This
dual nature of the regimestate legitimation without enforcementmay at times lead governments to use global
laws as a shield for increasingly violent domestic behaviors.
First, we extend the concept of decoupling to the institutional processes and historical contingents around global human rights politics.
Treaties dont stop the human rights abuses of modern

warfare
Gentry, 1999 [John, researcher and writer on defense/security issues, traveled with the US Army in Bosnia, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and National Identity,
Vol. 22, No. 4:Pg 95, Lexis]
there are fundamental reasons why major parts of the international human-rights
agenda make little sense. Warfare in recent decades has changed dramatically toward total warfare of a sort that
prominently involves civilians as both targets and participants, which often is in alleged defense of group rights
Bureaucratic concerns and national ambitions aside,
. The
1992-1995 Bosnian war is a classic example. In this conflict, simply put, grievances among three ethnic factions -- Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims -- led to combat whose strategic as
well as tactical objectives focused on increasing the size and security of pockets of land held nearly completely by one's own ethnic group. This required expansion of key chunks of ethnically homogeneous
land and capture of some strategic locations, which simplified the demographic mosaic of prewar Bosnia. Pejoratively called ethnic cleansing, the strategy that all three sides employed had at its heart the
advancement of the rights of their own group over those of others and the targeting of members of other groups who stubbornly resisted achievement of those goals by refusing to leave their homes. When
bombast did not work, the groups used murder and other "atrocities" to move people to other places, either horizontally as corpses or vertically as living beings. This type of warfare both tramples the
human rights of victims and fosters alleged rights to personal and group security and self-actualization. Western descriptions, such as victim or war criminal, depend largely on who won and who lost, not on
This kind of conflict is incompatible with current international rules of warfare that define acceptable actions
between groups of fighters called soldiers who are government employees
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
other conventions that regulate by voluntary state compliance the conduct of the armies fighting conventional wars
are woefully inadequate to describe, let alone regulate, intrasocietal and intersocietal wars. In a conflict such as
Bosnia's
all significant participants were war criminals by conventional standards
because
behavior.
. That is,
in which movement of civilians was a major strategic goal,
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*** Morality ***
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Must Act Morally -- General

WE MUST ACT MORALLY, EVEN IF IT MEANS OUR OWN DEATH
Watson, philosophy professor, Washington University, WORLD HUNGR AND MORAL
OBLIGATION, 1977, pp. 118-9.
One may even have to sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would
preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason
tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes
available food in equal shares even if everyone dies. That an action is necessary to save ones life is no excuse for
behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one
of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral
principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The
moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks back to
the highest principle recant or die. The ultimate test always harks back to the highest principle recant or die
and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough.
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Must Act Morally Intervening Actors

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERVENING ACTORS MEANS WE ARENT
MORALLY CULPABLE FOR THE DA IMPACTS. JUST LIKE MARTIN
LUTHER KING WASNT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RIOTS AND
VIOLENCE OF THE WHITE SUPREMACISTS, WE ARENT
RESPONSBILE FOR INTERVENING ACTORS AND THEIR NEGATIVE
CONSEQUENCES
Alan Gewirth, philosophy professor, Chicago, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS
CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1994, p. 38.
An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King, Jr. was
repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the
disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations. By the
principle of the intervening action, however, it was Kings opponents who were responsible because their
intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the
Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black
Americans. As for the rights of other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot
justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it
is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or
may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die
rather than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths
obliquely but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terrorists that
his refusal eventuates in many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the sons, it does not affect his moral
duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute.
Just like Martin Luther King wasnt responsible for the violence
of white supremacists, we arent responsible for negative
consequences of intervening actors
Alan Gewirth, philosophy professor, Chicago, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS
CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1994, p. 38.
An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin
Luther King, Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights,
he was morally responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking
the American Republic to its foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it
was Kings opponents who were responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient
conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the Republic would not be
worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black
Americans. As for the rights of other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these
rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the
principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as
well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his
mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rather than kills them, or
that he does not harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths obliquely
but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the
terrorists that his refusal eventuates in many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the
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sons, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative
right remains absolute.
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Consequentialism Is bad
CONSEQUENTIALISM LEADS TO PARALYSIS ALL ACTION RISKS
POSSIBLE CATASTROPHE, SO NO ONE ACTS
Charles Fried, law professor, Harvard, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CRITICS, 1994, p. 170.
This line of analysis is enough to show that some quite plausible interpretations of absolute norms lead to impossibly
stringent conclusions, lead in fact to total paralysis. But the case is in fact even worse. For it the absoluteness of the
nor is interpreted to mean that the consequences such as the death of an innocent person is overwhelmingly bad,
then not only are we forbidden to do anything, for anything carries with it a risk of death, we are indeed required to
do nothing but to seek out ways to minimize the deaths of innocent persons. For if such a death is so bad that no
good can outweigh it, we are surely not justified in pursuing some good, even if that good does not present this risk
when we might instead be preventing this most undesirable of all consequences. So this interpretation is to actually a
prescription for paralysis, it is more like an obsession. This norm, by virtue of this view of its absoluteness, takes
over the whole of our moral life. Finally, since every action will endanger the life of some innocent, even action
intended to rescue some other innocent, we cannot escape the further corollary of this interpretation that we must
choose that course and only that course of action expected to produce the greatest net saving of life including, if
need be, the deliberate, cold-blooded killing of an innocent person. This situation is worse still, for this interpretation
is not only obsessive, it also opens the possibility of insoluable contradictions within any system containing more
than one absolute norm. The judgement that it is categorically wrong to lie would be interpreted in an analogous
way to mean that a false belief is absolutely bad that is, so bad that nothing can justifiy producing or even not
eradicating it. But obviously, telling the truth will very often increase to some small extent the chances that an
innocent person will die, and in any event the time spent in eradicating false belief will not be spent in warding off
the danger of death from innocent persons. Now, deontological systems avoid the paralysis, obsession, and
contradiction of this interpretation. They are at once less and more stringent. They would not allow killing an
innocent even to save several innocents from death; but the consequentialist interpretation would require the killing.
LACK OF CERTAINTY AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES MAKE

CONSEQUENTIALISM PRODUCE PARALYSIS
Germain Grisez, St. Marys College, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST
CRITICS, 1994, p. 49.
Artificial as the example is, it makes the crucial point that whenever we have a real choice to make it is because we
are confronted with various possibilities, each embodying a diverse mix of human goods. Consequentialism of
proportionalism requires that one weigh and measure the good as represented in the various possibilities and opt for
the instance promising more good. But each of the several possibilities comprises not merely so much (on an
imaginary scale) of a certain human good, but a unique package of instances of various goods whose very
uniqueness makes it impossible to measure it against other, similarly unique packages competing to be chosen.
Many proportionalists recognize the difficulty with their system and have tried to correct it. However, it cannot be
corrected. Their system requires that two incomparible conditions be met: first, that a morally significant choice be
made; second, that the option offering the grater quantity of good be known. Their approach is not just false but
utterly unworkable, and thus it is meaningless as practical guidance.
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Consequentialism Is bad
IF CONSEQUENTIALISM VALUES LIFE, EACH ACTION MUST AVOID
ANY RISK OF KILLING INNOCENTS, PRODUCING PARALYSIS
Charles Fried, law professor, Harvard, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CRITICS, 1994, p. 71.
For if the death of an innocent person really were that bad, then the norm would be no longer a limited, but a
pervasive one. What, for instance, if some action of mine carried a very slight risk of causing the death of an
innocent person? If the absoluteness of the norm is to be interpreted as making the fact of death so overwhelmingly
bad, it seems clear that I must not even take the slightest risk of killing an innocent person. But really everything I
do carries some risk that it will contribute to the death of an innocent person. Indeed, we cannot even save the
situation by limiting our calculations to the foreseeable consequences, for the limits of the foreseeable are set by
what we are obliged to look out for, if the consequence is as bad as all that, then we must also hunt about to see if
there is any conceivable way that we might inadvertently be facilitating it. Of course there will always be some
conceivable way, and that will be enough to stop us.
UTILITARIANISM SUBORDINATES JUSTICE IN THE NAME OF THE

GENERAL WELFARE.
David Lyons, PhD., Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 127.
Utilitarianism can be understood as a theory of justice in this sense, one that makes all moral appraisal subordinate to
the service of welfare. But we also use the idea of justice ot refer to a specific virtue of actions, individuals, and
institutions. In this narrow sense, justice is distinguished, for example, from mercy and benevolence. Utilitarianism
has no clear theory of justice in the narrow sense, and utilitarians have generally neglected this aspect of morality.
Some utilitarians have suggested that the specific virtue of justice amounts to decisions made uniformly or according
to rule. This is plausible when justice concerns the application of rules to particular cases, but it does not seem an
adequate conception of the justice of rules themselves or of social institutions more generally.
CONCEDING TO CONSEQUENTIALISM THREATENS INDIVIDUALITY

*& INTEGRITY
Judith Lichtenberg, research associate, Center for Philosophy & Public Policy, University of
Maryland, YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1983, p. 546-7.
If I am normally required to produce the objectively best state of affairs available to me, my life will not be my own.
My own concerns and desires will be lost in the larger calculus of goods and bads, and the shape and content of my
life will be at the mercy of that calculus. Full-time do-goodism will be my inescapable duty. This may seem not only
unrealistic, but also wrong and misguided, for human beings will cease to be agents who are sources of choice and
value and become machines that churn out the good. As a result, consequentialism seems to undermine our integrity
as agents. Call this the idea behind the view that it is not always wrong not to maximize the good the objection
from integrity.
UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFIES RAPE

David Lyons, philosophy professor, Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 121
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Utilitarianism holds that the only values that are basically capable of supporting reasons for action are human
interests, and that all human interests do so. We have already seen an argument challenging this claim. This is the
argument that rape could not be justified, to whatever degree whatsoever, by the pleasure that it gives the rapist.
Many arguments of this type are possible.
UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFIES SLAVERY

David Lyons, philosophy professor, Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 122
Suppose, for example, that it would be more costly overall to eliminate slavery and at the same time meet the needs
of former slaveholders, such as Bernard, than it would to continue slavery. Utilitarianism must then argue that it
would be better to continue slavery; but the other course of action appears morally preferable. A utilitarian might
argue that slavery could not be supported by utilitarian calculations. He might claim that the burdens imposed on
slaves always outweigh the benefits realized by slavery. This is a plausible contention. But a critic would reply that it
is beside the point. Whether or not slavery creates more burdens for the slaves, or creates more benefits than could
be achieved by any alternative system, it is morally objectionable. It subjugates some people to others control. It
violates their rights.
NO WAY TO EVALUATE A MORAL ACTION BASED ON

CONSEQUENCES
J.J.C Smart, philosophy professor, University of Adelaide, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND
AGAINST, ed., Knightbridge, 1973, p. 82
No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it in virtue of its consequences. If that
were so, one would just go one for ever, and there would be an obviously hopeless regress. That regress would be
hopeless, even if one takes the view, which is not an absurd view, that although mean set themselves ends and work
towards them, it is very often not really the supposed end, but the effort towards which they set the value that they
travel, not really in order to arrive (for as soon as they have arrived they set out for somewhere else), but rather they
choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel. Even on that view, not everything would have consequential value;
what would have non-consequential value would in fact be traveling, even though people had to think of traveling as
having the consequential value, and something else the destination the non-consequential value.
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Moral Constraints Apply To Governments

GOVERNMENTS STILL ACT WITH INTENT AND SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO MORAL CONSTRAINTS
Thomas Donaldson, professor of business and ethics, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
1995, p. 147.
States may not be human individuals, but they often behave with foresight and must be accountable to certain moral
principles. Genocide and torture are not to be weighed up by states on the scale of future consequences; rather, states
simply must not engage in them. The moral language of deontology may not be sufficient for the moral
interpretation of international affairs, but it turns out to be necessary.
STATES STILL POSSESS AN INTENT THAT CAN BE MORALLY

EVALUATED.
Thomas Donaldson, professor of business and ethics, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
1995, p. 149.
The state is not deprived of intentionality, as Hardin alleges, by the fact that various officials of a particular state
must typically reach different conclusions about what is rationally required. Like corporations and judicial systems,
states possess decision-making procedures designed to allow inferences abut the acts and intentions of the state itself
fro the acts of individual members. When, for example, majorities of the duly-elected members of both houses of the
U.S. Congress approve aid to Poland for the purposes of developing its economic infrastructure, and when the U.S.
President concurs, then we may correctly infer that the United States has acted intentionally in giving aid to Poland.
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Morality Cant Be Solved by Other Actors

ONE MAY ARGUE THAT MORALITY CAN BE SOLVED BY OTHER
ACTORS, BUT THIS IN NO WAY AFFECTS THE MORAL OBIGATION
OF THE OUR PLAN ACTOR TO ACT
Aiken, philosophy professor, Catham College, WORLD HUNGER AND MORAL
OBLIGATION, 1977, p. 53-4.
There is a danger in adopting this last resort condition since it poses and additional epistemological difficulty, that
is, the determination of whether or not I am the last resort. Beyond this, it is an undesirable condition because it will
justify inaction where more than one person could act but where no one is acting. In most emergency situations,
there is more than one potential assistor. For instance, five persons may simultaneously come across a drowning
child. Each would be obligated to act as if (s)he were the last resort, but no single one is the last resort, then all five
may refuse to act, claiming that it is not their duty to act any more than it is the duty of the other four and so each
would be justified in not acting. If this condition is placed on the right to be saved, the child could drown and none
of the five spectators could be held morally accountable. But surely the presence of another person at an accident
site does not automatically relieve me of a moral duty to assist the victim in need, any more than the presence of one
police officer called to the scene of a bank robbery relieves other officers in the area from attempting to apprehend
the suspect.
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War is Immoral
Just war language reinforces militarism
Sara Ruddick, Professor of Philosophy and Feminist Studies, New School for Social Research,
GENDERING WAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.114-5.
These ideals, I suggest, are exemplified in just-war languages and the "realities" to which they
refer. In Western philosophy, ideals of reason have sometimes been created in explicit connection
with the ideals of war. As Plato put the point boldly, an education in reason "must not be useless
to warlike men [or women]"; rulers must prove themselves "best in philosophy and with respect
to war." Whatever the historical connections between reason and war, contemporary war
theorists, like other men of reason, resort to abstraction, binary oppositions, and sharply bounded
concepts.
Just war theory conceals and licenses violence

GENDERING WAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.115-6.
Taken on its own terms, just-war theory is far more like its technostrategic counterpart than its
moral concern would suggest. Like their strategist counterparts, just-war theorists resort to
abstraction, dichotomy, and bounded definition. Like their counterparts, just-war theorists employ
abstraction to take a distance from unreasoned emotionality. Partly because the language of justwar theory is less evidently sexual/aggressive itself, it is even more able than strategic discourse
to occlude the sexual aggressivity of war. The moral emotions just-war theorists do invoke -righteousness, indignation, and (perhaps) shame and guilt -- conceal as well as license the cruelty
and delight in destruction that war provides. Most seriously, like its technostrategic counterpart,
the language of morality too easily obscures the realities of terrorizing and injuring, the defining
activities of war. To repeat: Just-war theory does not deny, and indeed insists on, the pain of
victims. But as one learns to speak within the theory, to unravel the puzzles the theory sets for
itself, to assess "causes" and strategies by criteria the theory establishes, it becomes increasingly
difficult to give weight to the varieties of loss and pain suffered by individual victims and
conquerors, their communities, and their lands.
Just war theories sanitize war

GENDERING WAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.115.
Superficially, the languages of justice and strategy seem quite unlike. just-war theorists do not
deny war's sufferings; if war weren't so damaging, one would not require a moral theory first to
justify and then to control the damage. Unlike technostrategists who explicitly eschew moral
questions, just-war theorists insist upon the interdependence of ethics and politics, thereby
providing the moral (soft and feminine) counterpart to realistic (hard and masculine)
instrumentality. Yet despite these differences, the justificatory languages of morality and strategy
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are intertwined. The success of just warriors is dependent on the strategies that defense
intellectuals legitimate. just conduct of a war (jus in bello) depends upon the "smartness" and
"cleanliness" of weapons, who acquire these virtues within the strategic discourse that brackets
pain and suffering as "collateral damage." To be sure, there is a frightening disconnection
between morality and strategy: might does not make right, but it does make victories. The
capacity to defeat and demoralize depends far more upon economic and technological than on
moral resources. But the high moral tone and abstract moral puzzles of just-war theory tend to
divert attention from this fundamental, often heartbreaking indifference of war to virtue.
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Moral Decision-Making Applies to Policy

Should consider morality in strategic policy information
Robert S. McNamara, Former Secretary of Defense, Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of
Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169
I would argue also that Kissinger and Sandel's emphasis on balance-of-power politics in the
twenty-first century assumes we will be willing to continue to accept a foreign policy which lacks
a strong moral foundation. I am aware that the majority of political scientists, particularly those
who are members of the political realist school, believe morality - as contrasted with a careful
calculation of national interests, based on balance-of-power considerations - is a dangerous guide
for the establishment of foreign policy. They would say that a foreign policy driven by moral
considerations promotes zealousness and a crusading spirit, with potentially dangerous results.
But surely, in the most basic sense, one can apply a moral judgment to the level of killing which
occurred in the twentieth century. There can be no justification for it. Nor can there be any
justification for its continuation into the twenty-first century. On moral grounds alone, we should
act today to prevent such an outcome. A first step would be to establish such an objective as the
primary foreign-policy goal both for our own nation and for the entire human race.
Morality has often been a part of US foreign policy

Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169-70
The United States has defined itself in highly idealistic and moral terms throughout our history.
We have seen ourselves as defenders of the human freedoms across the globe. That feeling was
the foundation of Woodrow Wilson's support for normative rules of international behavior to be
administered by a League of Nations. Our moral vision has had an impact on the world. It has
led to the formation of a score of international institutions in the economic, social, and political
fields. But it remains under attack both within and outside the USA - by those who put greater
weight on considerations of some narrow national interest.
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Morality Applies in Foreign Policy

Leaders arent exempt from moral considerations in foreign
policy
Joseph Nye, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, NUCLEAR
ETHICS, 1986, p.8.
In their personal lives, most people feel strongly bound by the sixth commandment: "Thou shalt
not kill." But presidents may have to take decisions that violate that rule if they are to protect
their own people in wartime. The fact that international politics is a difficult domain for ethics
means that one must be cautious about too simple a transposition of moral maxims from relations
among individuals to the domain of states. But being president does not release the statesman
from the duty of moral reasoning; it merely complicates his or her task. One must examine the
arguments leaders give for claiming there is no choice or for why they think normal moral rules
that we use in daily life should not be applied in particular cases. The burden of proof rests on
those who wish to depart from normal morality. While that burden may often be met, the quality
of their argument and conclusions deserves close examination. Some arguments for disregarding
normal moral rules are fallacious.
Critics of morality in foreign policy covertly employ moral

standards
ETHICS, 1986, p.7.
Considering the nature of the international milieu, it is not surprising many diplomats and serious
students of international politics have tended to be cautious about the role of ethics in foreign
policy and have warned about the possible disastrous consequences of well-intentioned moral
crusades in such a difficult domain. But there is a difference between healthy realism and total
skepticism. It does not follow from the difficulty of applying ethical considerations that they have
no role at all. The total skeptic who argues that there is no role for ethics in international politics
tends to smuggle his preferred values into foreign policy, often in the form of narrow nationalism.
When faced with moral choices, to pretend not to choose is merely a disguised form of choice.
Accepting moral concerns in foreign policy make intervention

less necessary
Robert Kagan and William Kristol, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, and editor of The Weekly Standard, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2000, p.62.
It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and, on
the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer overseas interventions
than under the "vital interest" standard, not more. Had the Bush administration, for example,
realized early on that there was no clear distinction between American moral concerns in Bosnia
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and America's national interest there, the United States might have been able to nip the Balkan
crisis in the bud. With the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, President Bush might
have been able to put a stop to Milosevic's ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing
military action. But because the Bush team placed Bosnia outside the sphere of "vital" American
interests, the resulting crisis eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the
ground.
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Morality Applies in Foreign Policy

Morality has often been a part of US foreign policy
Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169-70
The United States has defined itself in highly idealistic and moral terms throughout our history.
We have seen ourselves as defenders of the human freedoms across the globe. That feeling was
the foundation of Woodrow Wilson's support for normative rules of international behavior to be
administered by a League of Nations. Our moral vision has had an impact on the world. It has
led to the formation of a score of international institutions in the economic, social, and political
fields. But it remains under attack both within and outside the USA - by those who put greater
weight on considerations of some narrow national interest.
Many US foreign policies are based on moral judgments

Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 170
Many of the most controversial foreign-policy debates have found both sides basing their
arguments on moral considerations. US policy towards Cuba today is justified on moral grounds
by its supporters who say it is immoral to support dictators who abuse human rights. And it is
attacked, on moral grounds, by its critics who say it leads to suffering by the mass of the Cuban
people. Similarly, a US policy toward China which placed primary emphasis on support of
individual civil rights might well weaken the Chinese government's ability to increase the access
of the mass of its population to advances in nutrition, education, and health.
Leaders arent exempt from moral considerations in foreign

policy
ETHICS, 1986, p.8.
In their personal lives, most people feel strongly bound by the sixth commandment: "Thou shalt
not kill." But presidents may have to take decisions that violate that rule if they are to protect
their own people in wartime. The fact that international politics is a difficult domain for ethics
means that one must be cautious about too simple a transposition of moral maxims from relations
among individuals to the domain of states. But being president does not release the statesman
from the duty of moral reasoning; it merely complicates his or her task. One must examine the
arguments leaders give for claiming there is no choice or for why they think normal moral rules
that we use in daily life should not be applied in particular cases. The burden of proof rests on
those who wish to depart from normal morality. While that burden may often be met, the quality
of their argument and conclusions deserves close examination. Some arguments for disregarding
normal moral rules are fallacious.
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*** Utilitarianism Bad ***

Utilitarianism allows totalitarianism and war
Kateb, 1992 (George, Prof of Politics, Princeton Univ., The Inner Ocean: individualism and
Democratic Culture; Cornell University Press, p.11)
I do not mean to take seriously the idea that utilitarianism is a satisfactory replacement for the
theory of rights. The well-being (or mere preferences) of the majority cannot override the rightful
claims of individuals. In a time when the theory of rights is global it is noteworthy that some
moral philosophers disparage the theory of rights. The political experience of this century should
be enough to make them hesitate: it is not clear that, say, some version of utilitarianism could not
justify totalitarian evil. It also could be fairly easy for some utilitarians to justify any war and any
dictatorship, and very easy to justify any kind of ruthlessness even in societies that pay some
attention to rights. There is no end to the immoral permissions that one or another type of
utilitarianism grants. Everything is permitted, if the calculation is right.
Utilitarianism justifies the tyranny of the majority

Maximiano, Associate Professor of business ethics DLSU School of Business, 03 (Jose Mario
Maximiano, Nov 6, Business World, The View from Taft,)
According to the utilitarian principle, the correct action, decision or judgment is the one that will
produce the greatest net benefits at the lowest net costs for the greatest number of people. Sad to
say, this principle has no eyes to see and no brains to know who are those who have less in life,
and those who are disadvantaged and less gifted. Like a horse with blinders, utilitarianism
automatically focuses on the majority, regardless of socio-economic status. In the application of
the utilitarian principle, therefore, it is possible that those who have more in life would benefit
more, while those with less would benefit less. The utilitarian principle seems inadequate when
applied to situations that involve the basic rights of others. Was the government ethically correct
in demolishing some shanties to pave the way for the beautification project specifically for a
visiting leader? Similarly, was the government ethically correct to drive away some indigenous
tribes to give way for the construction of a dam? While some would see beautification, greening,
cleaning and the construction of the dam as benefits, others may see the same as unjust and
unfair, and hence as costs, because those projects may at times violate the basic rights of others.
Utilitarianism justifies doing evil in the name of preventing

evil, causing war and violence
Richard Norman, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Kentucky, ETHICS, KILLING,
AND WAR, 1995, p. 207
Since the waging of war almost invariably involves the deliberate taking of life on a massive
scale, it will be immensely difficult to justify. I have argued that utilitarian justifications are not
good enough. We cannot justify the taking of life simply by saying that the refusal to take life is
likely to lead to worse consequences. An adequate notion of moral responsibility implies that
other people's responsibility for evil does not necessarily justify us is doing evil ourselves in
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order to prevent them. We cannot sacrifice some of our people for the others and claim that we
are justified by a utilitarian calculus of lives.
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A2: Callahan Rights Specific

Rights must come first or they will always be violated in the
name of security
Kateb, Professor of Politic Princeton University, 92 (George, The Inner Ocean: Individualism
and Democratic Culture; Cornell University Press, p. 5)
All I wish to say now is that unless rights come first they are not rights. They will tend to be
sacrificed to some purpose deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. There will
be little if any concept of the integrity or inviolability of each individual. The group or the
majority or the good or the sacred or the vague fixture will be preferred. The beneficiaries will be
victimized along with the victims because no one is being treated as a person who is irreplaceable
and beyond value. To make rights anything but primary, even though in the name of human
dignity, is to injure human dignity.
Protection of rights over all else creates a quality to life which promotes community
development sustaining human survival; making survival the ultimate goal promotes and
unsustainable authoritarian society
Schroeder, Professor of Law, Duke University, 86 (Christopher H. Schroeder, RIGHTS
AGAINST RISKS, APRIL, The Columbia Law Review, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, p. 519-20)
Actually, expanding the idea of preservation to include bodily integrity on the basis of quality of
life considerations has already pointed the way to a more realistic statement of those individual
characteristics worth protecting. The same considerations of quality of life counsel recognizing
some freedom of action and initiative within the definition of the morally relevant aspects of the
individual. Doing so is consistent with a long political and philosophical heritage. Deeply
ingrained in practically all theories of the rights tradition is the vision of a person as capable of
forming and entitled to pursue some individual life plan. 91 Given this vision, placing survival or
bodily integrity absolutely above all other ends would be tantamount to saying that the life plan
that one ought to adopt is that of prolonging life at all costs. That idea is unacceptably
authoritarian and regimented. It would be extremely anomalous for a theory supposedly centered
on the autonomy of the individual to result in a conception of justice that constrained all
individuals to a monolithic result. Individual human beings want more from their lives than
simple bodily integrity, and the conception of an individual, of what defines and constitutes a
person, as so limited is peculiarly impoverished. Individuals are capable of formulating and
pursuing life plans, of forming bonds of love, commitment, and friendship on which they
subsequently act, of conceiving images of self- and community-improvement. Some of these may
directly advance interests in human survival, as when dedicated doctors and scientists pursue
solutions to cancer or develop chemical pesticides with a view to assisting agricultural selfsufficiency in developing countries. Some may dramatically advance the "quality of life," rather
than survival itself, as when Guttenberg's press made literature more widely available or when
Henry Ford pioneered the mass production of the automobile. However, even individual
initiatives of much less demonstrable impact on the lives of others constitute a vital element that
makes human life distinctively human. A just society ought to understand and value this element
both in the concrete results it sometimes produces and in the freedom and integrity that are
acknowledged when individual liberty to conceive and act upon initiative is respected.
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A2: Callahan -- General

Survival is not a value in itself- people take risks all the time we must uphold rights
otherwise there would be policy paralysis
Henry Shue, Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University, 1989 (Nuclear Deterrence
and Moral Restraint, pg. 45-6)
When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that
we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that
value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that
does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as
though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an
automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the
paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or
societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree
of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.
Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research

endorse commodification of humans
Robert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont
College of Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health
Pol'y L. & Ethics 189, p. 195
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are
never to be treated as a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected
the above arguments. It is sad and ironic that as the generation that bequeathed to us the
Nuremberg Code is passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained at such a high price. Using
identical utilitarian and pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the public
at large are endorsing the commodification and destruction of members of our human family.
Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research

endorse commodification of humans
Robert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont
College of Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health
Pol'y L. & Ethics 189, p. 195
(PDOCSS218)
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are
never to be treated as a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected
the above arguments. It is sad and ironic that as the generation that bequeathed to us the
Nuremberg Code is passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained at such a high price. Using
identical utilitarian and pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the public
at large are endorsing the commodification and destruction of members of our human family.
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Categorical Rules Justified Even If One Can Imagine

Exceptions
Categorical rules still justified even if there are circumstances
where they could be violated
Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Wisconsin
Law Review, 2003, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273, p. 282
Categorical approaches are designed to offset this tendency by screening out of consideration the
features of the circumstances that are likely to induce misjudgment. And, under some conditions,
they may succeed in doing so, when the categorical rules address decision-makers who might not
appreciate the importance of considerations thought to be peripheral to their more central tasks.
Consider, for example, a categorical rule against torture by police officers. Judges might think
that in the abstract they can imagine situations in which torture might be a valuable investigative
technique. Judges might think that they must communicate rules effectively to police officers.
They might also think that any verbal formulation of the (limited) circumstances in which torture
might be acceptable is too likely to be misinterpreted in ways that would lead the officers to
engage in torture more often than they should. The judges could then conclude that they should
announce a categorical rule against torture despite their awareness that such a rule does not
correspond to their own sense of what is acceptable.
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Imperialism Good
Imperialism does more good than bad
Boot 03 (Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security
Studies, U.S. Imperialism: A Force for Good May 13, 2003,
http://www.cfr.org/iraq/us-imperialism-force-good/p5959)
While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout
of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans
are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building"
experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this
is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there
But, on the whole,

U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world
during the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of
communism and Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and
Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped spread liberal
institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet,
have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians.
while generally successful as imperialists, Americans have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's
OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism" carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the
But it should definitely embrace the practice. That doesn't mean

looting Iraq of its natural resources; nothing could be more
destructive of the goal of building a stable government in Baghdad.
It means imposing the rule of law, property rights, free speech and
other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be. This will require selecting
a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and then backing him or
her to the hilt. Iran and other neighbouring states won't hesitate to impose their despotic views on Iraq;
term.
we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.
Imperialism is needed to maintain order

FERGUSON 04 (NIALL, Professor of History at Harvard University, A World
Without Power JULY 1, 2004,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power?
page=full)
If the United States
retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not
China, not the Muslim world -- and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the
alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but
the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like
Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative.
nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to
become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain,
and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed
modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only
through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion
In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise

and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded
that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would
inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be
usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan,
that history is a competition between rival powers.
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both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military
commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political
71
scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after
surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new
rivals. "[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century,"
contends Mearsheimer. "[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow
considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too
has the potential to become "a formidable rival." Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for
The "unipolarity" identified by some

commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer,
for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or
later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar,
multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually
mastery is both perennial and universal.
heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of
power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied
with the achievements of great powers -- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states -- they have not wholly
overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of
Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony

should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of
competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the
real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an
anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious
fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten
regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few
fortified enclaves.
"apolarity," if you will) is hardly encouraging.
American imperialism is awesome

Miller 11 (Harrison, head writer and research for The Miller Monitor,
Justifying Imperialism December 21, 2011, https://sites.google.com/a/ncpsk12.org/amhnews-h-miller-2011/intellectual/justifying-imperialism)
United States imperialism began in the late 1800s and since its inception Americans have been debating the moral
validity behind the idea. Through the tenacious leadership of American presidents, the United States has been
The effects of United States

imperialism have been positive and justify the concept because the
ideals of democracy have been spread to the nations of Panama and
the Philippines, and Puerto Rico continue to be positively influenced
by American politics, economy, and culture. Since interaction began
between America and Panama in the early twentieth century we
have been able to see how both parties benefit from the United
States intervention. America originally went into Panama because they wanted to build the Panama
influencing other countries in political, economic, and cultural ways.
Canal. The Panama Canal would benefit the United States in trade because it was a good passageway between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans - it could save Americans time and money. However, Columbia owned Panama at the
time, and would not let the United States build and use a canal in Panama; Panama, displeased with Columbias rule
Once independent, Panama granted

America the canal and both nations walked away from the situation
very pleased. America stayed in Panama to build and use the canal
until 1977, when the Panamanians wanted to be fully independent.
In 1989, however, the United States helped Panama overthrow the
dictator Noriega and restored democracy to the Central American
nation. The United States has stayed in Panama ever since, and the
Panamanians are happy with their involvement because America has
in their country, turned to the United States for help.
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helped them maintain both liberty and democracy. Panama is just one example;
America has also maintained freedom and democracy in Puerto Rico. The United States originally became involved
They gained Puerto Rico from the

war, and helped Puerto Rico by guiding them and controlling the
island's politics and economics for the first few years of
independence. Times have changed, and, Puerto Rico has become a
commonwealth; they have their own their own government, we
support them economically. Politically, Puerto Ricos government is
democratic due to the exposure the island received in prior years
from the United States. The democratic government ensures that all Puerto Ricans are free and
in Puerto Rico as a result of the Spanish American War.
equal and entitled to suffrage. Without Americas involvement, Puerto Rico might not have become the democracy
that it is today; America spread democracy to them, and perhaps there is one less dictatorship because of that.
Although America is no longer taking over other countries as much as they used to in the twentieth century, but a
different kind of imperialism still exists cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism is the promotion of American
While some say that

cultural imperialism does not affect other countries positively, it is
clear that there many benefits linked to cultural imperialism. Those who
beliefs in morals through the growth of our industry in other nations.
don't support imperialism believe that America needs to listen to Gandhi, who said that I want the culture of all
lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any. While the
quote has its truths, this is indeed and opinion that can easily be argued. Gandhi is saying that he is open to
However, America is
not forcing anyone to take part in their culture and has not in the
past; countries like France and China have limited American cultural
programming through satellites and the Internet. With six billion
people in the world, one culture taking over would be impossible.
And even if it were possible, what constitutes American culture? It is
my belief that our culture is just a homogenized cluster of all the
cultures in the world, so in part, nations are scared to accepted a
"tainted" version of their original culture? Cultural imperialism is spreading though
learning about other cultures, but doesnt want to be forced to take part in one.
American culture to those who want it, just as the most successful imperialism in the twentieth century resulted
The majorities of both Panama

and Puerto Rico (based on a vote) are happy with the current
involvement of the United States. The United States helped them
economically and politically. They are both democratic, and cultural
imperialism is just spreading other American beliefs through
American movies goods, and brand names, to those who want them.
After analyzing historical growth of the American empire, it is safe
to say that there has been an overall positive affect of United States
imperialism. Panama has been helped economically with the building of the canal, and the ideal of
when countries were happy overall with American influence.
democracy made their government democratic. Puerto Rico also has a democratic government, and the United
States economically supports them. Americans spread the ideal of democracy, and as a result these two countries
are democratic. American cultural imperialism exists today for those countries who want to learn about American
culture. Thus, the United States has positively affected other countries with the ideal of democracy, and continues
to spread their culture to other countries today, justifying the validity of imperialism.
Colonialism is key for democracy in underdeveloped nations

Ishiyama 11
[John T. Ishiyama, 6. Democratization and the Global Environment, Comparative Politics: Principles of Democracy
and Democratization, April 20 2011, Wiley interscience]
An oft- cited additional international factor affecting democratic development, particularly in the developing
world, is the legacy of colonialism. On the one hand, there is the extremely Eurocentric view that
the spread
of democracy is the political outcome of the spread of European values and

traditions via colonialism (for a discussion, see Huntington, 1984 ). This is because, theoretically,
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the colonial power may have transmitted some of its culture and
language to the colony, which in turn may have led to the emergence
of a cooperative political culture, or may have left institutions that were conducive to
democracy in place when the colonizing powers exited (Weiner, 1989 ). However, some scholars (Barro, 1999 ;
Quainoo, 2000 ) have found no relationship between colonial heritage and democracy, while others (Lipset et al .,
1993; Clague et al. , 2001 ) fi nd that being a former British colony increases the probability that a country becomes
democratic. In particular, several scholars have argued that the type of colonizer was important in explaining
whether a country was able to develop into a democracy after the end of colonial rule. Myron Weiner (1989) , for
instance, noted that by 1983 every country in the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since World War II
with a population of at least one million (and almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic
experience was a former British colony. This would suggest that there was something about British colonial rule that
made it different from the colonial administration of other European states, such as France and Belgium. Khapoya
(1998) , for instance, distinguishes between two main types of colonial rule in Africa: indirect rule and direct rule.
indirect rule, where the emphasis was not on the assimilation of

Africans to become black Britishers, but rather to share skills, values, and culture, to empower the
Africans with the ability to run their own communities. Thus, instead of assimilating
The British generally used a system of
the Africans as British citizens, society was segregated between the natives and the whites living in the colony. The
British also employed an indirect system of administrative rule. Generally this meant that the colonial authorities
would co - opt the local power structure (the kings, chiefs, or headman) and via invitations, coercion, or bribery,
incorporate them into the colonial administrative structure. In return, these local elites were expected to enforce
A positive
consequence of this system of indirect rule (a system used elsewhere in the British
Empire, such as in India and Malaya) was that it provided native elites with
important experiences in self - rule. Further, many British colonies
adopted practices that mimicked British practices such as experience
with electoral, legislative, and judicial institutions (Clague et al. , 2001 ). Given
laws, collect taxes, and serve as the buffer between the natives and colonial authorities.
this level of preparedness, then following World War II, Britain was much more willing than other colonial powers to
grant independence, which in turn made the newly independent states more willing to retain the institutions the
British had put into place. Thus, from this perspective, Britain seems to have left its colonies in a better situation to
develop democracy later than non - British colonies.
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Imperialism Ethical
Imperialism breeds democratic self rule
Kurtz 03 (Stanley, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, A
just empire? Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint, April 1, 2003,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6426)
Even the mildest imperialism
will be experienced by many as a humiliation. Yet imperialism as the
midwife of democratic self-rule is an undeniable good. Liberal
imperialism is thus a moral and logical scandal, a simultaneous
denial and affirmation of self-rule that is impossible either to fully
accept or repudiate. The counterfactual offers a way out. If democracy did not depend on colonialism,
we could confidently forswear empire. But in contrast to early modern colonial
history, we do know the answer to the counterfactual in the case of
Iraq. After many decades of independence, there is still no
democracy in Iraq. Those who attribute this fact to American policy
are not persuasive, since autocracy is pervasive in the Arab world,
and since America has encouraged and accepted democracies in
many other regions. So the reality of Iraqi dictatorship tilts an admittedly precarious moral balance in
Our commitment to political autonomy sets up a moral paradox.
favor of liberal imperialism.
American imperialism K2 world peace

Elshtain 03 (Jean Bethke, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social
and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, Just War
Against Terrorism pg. 169)
The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not
require that the United States remain on hair-trigger alert at every
moment. But it does oblige the United States to evaluate all claims
and to make a determination as to whether it can intervene
effectively and in a way that does more good than harmwith the
primary objective of interdiction so that democratic civil society can
be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort
visible in Rwanda, in Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to Americans by some of our European critics. At
this point in time the possibility of international peace and stability
premised on equal regard for all rests largely, though not
exclusively, on American power. Many persons and powers do not like this fact, but it is
inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, the "most carefree and confident empire in history now grimly confronts
America's fate is tied

inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the world. If
large pockets of the globe start to go badhere, there, everywhere
(the infamous "failed state" syndrome)the drain on American
power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be
borne.
the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9 Furthermore,
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Intervention protects basic human rights

Nardin and Pritcharal 90 (Terry- professor and head of the Political
Science Department at the National University of Singapore, Kathleen Ddirector of community impact product development for the United Way of
America, ETHICS AND INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN GRENADA,
1983 1990, pg 9)
A second major argument in favor of intervention is based on a
concern for human rights. This argument rests on the idea that a
country that values democracy and individual rights should be prepared to act when those values are threatened, not only at home
but abroad. According to this view, it is simply intolerable for a free nation
to stand on the sidelines while foreign tyrants like Idi Amin and Pal Pat
enslave and massacre their own unfortunate subjects. At least in extreme
cases like these. unilateral intervention should be permitted if other
means fall. A nation that is not in a position to intervene Itself
should support those governments (like Tanzania in the case of Idi
Amin) that are able to act.
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Imperialism Inevitable
Imperialism cant be blamed solely on the imperialist
Said 94 (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature
at Columbia University, a literary theorist, and a public intellectual, Culture
and Imperialism May 31, 1994, pg. 19)
Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting
The
nations of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are
politically independent but in many ways are as dominated and
dependent as they were 'when ruled directly by European powers.
On the one hand, this is the consequence of self-inflicted wounds,
critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont to say: they (everyone knows that
"they" means coloreds, wogs, niggers) are to blame for what "they"
are, and it's no use droning on about the legacy of imperialism. On
the other hand, blaming the Europeans sweepingly for the
misfortunes of the present is not much of an alternative. What we
need to do is to look at these Matters as a network of
interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless
to repress, useful and interesting to understand . The point here is not
they are also interpretable as having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms.
complicated. If while sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans that they belong to a basically
Even if you prevail over them,

they are not going to concede to you your essential superiority or
your right to rule them despite your evident wealth and power. The
history of this standoff is manifest throughout colonies where white
masters were once unchallenged but finally driven out. Conversely, the
sick or unregenerate culture, you are unlikely to convince them.
triumphant natives soon enough found that they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a
nationalist fiction designed mainly for what Fanon calls the "nationalist bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new
countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters.
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*** Sovereignty Not Key/Intervention

Justified***
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A2: Sovereignty is Unconditional

Sovereign authority is derived from following the law When
governments violate it they no longer have the right to claim
they are sovereign
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey
College at the University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 25
This brings us to the vexed relation between law and sovereignty. On a commonsense account, sovereignty is the
origin and source of law. The exercise of sovereignty by governments, by courts, and by the police ought to be in
conformity with law.
Sovereigns have a special responsibility to their own citizens

Calling the Europeans small-minded is to miss the point. Sovereignty is a system of power that correlates authority
with territory, legitimacy with national identity. It is the only system of power that, as a result, can create the
consensus for common action and sacrifice. Since sovereignty expresses national identity, it is bound to be morally
partial: Germans will help Germans, Greeks will help Greeks. Attacking sovereignty because it defends moral
partiality misunderstands its very nature: sovereigntys legitimacy reposes on the premise that a sovereign accords
special protection to its own citizens.
If sovereignty is treated as an absolute the sovereign loses

authority
But we should not be nave about where a defense of moral pluralism may lead us. The burqa in Afghanistan, the
expropriation of white farmers in Zimbabwe, the death penalty in Texas all secure moral coverand every other
violation of human rights likewiseunder the sovereign right of states to be wrong about justice. States do have a
right to be wrong about justice: that is clearly what the U.N. Charter means when it places sovereignty above all
other rights. Yet there must be some limits to this right, as there are to all rights, or else sovereignty loses any moral
standing or justification.
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If the sovereign does not protect individual rights, it has no
authority
These processes are absent in many of the states of the world. And where sovereignty is unconstrained, we could
argue that human rights invigilation by third party outsiders becomes justified, to exercise the scrutiny and control of
sovereignty that insiders would exercise if their sovereigns allowed them to. On this account, the moral authority of
human rights NGOs together with U.N. bodies is a residual right to protect the subjects of a sovereign when they
lack the institutional means to protect themselves. But why, Roth might reply, do they have the right to assume
functions of invigilation that belong to the sovereign people alone? The answer, I think, is that the legitimacy of
collective self-determination the right of states to be sovereignderives in turn from individual selfdetermination, the right of individuals to be free. If this individual right is crushed, an individual retains the right to
appeal for help outside, and those outside have a duty to assist. The duty to assist is not indeterminate. It is correlated
to the individual rights that have been abused and stays there, in peaceful advocacy of change from within, unless the
sovereign goes further and pushes abuse to the level of wholesale murder or massacre, ethnic cleansing or genocide.
At this point, an individualized duty to assist and support rights claimants would evolve into a responsibility to
protect whole populations whose existence is threatened. This is the doctrine of sovereign responsibility
articulated in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. It
appeared in 2001, was ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005, and saw its first application
in the Libyan intervention of 2011.
Sovereignty is based on individual responsibility and the

protection of the right to self-determination
Roth is skeptical that sovereign inviolability will remain able to protect weak states from the humanitarian whims of
the strong, once international law gives houseroom to the responsibility to protect. Yet he concedes that sovereignty
does entail responsibility. The sovereign right of collective self-determination presupposes the self-determination
rights of individuals. It follows that sovereignty entails a minimum responsibility that may not extend as far as full
democratic rights, but must extend as far as rights to life and basic security. Sovereigns have the right to be wrong,
but not about this.
Globalization means that nation states are not containers of

sovereignty
The problem with the new sovereigntists move from identifying the tension between democratic popular sovereignty
and global governance to the condemnation of the latter is that it gets this relationship backward. Rabkins comments
notwithstanding, the new sovereigntists argue that global governance should be rejected as undemocratic because it
conflicts with popular sovereignty. The normative ideal of popular sovereignty justifies their opposition to recent
empirical developments. From the point of view we are presenting, these developments instead provide evidence that
the empirical presumptions on which the normative ideal of popular sovereignty rests are increasingly shaky.
Although globalization is notoriously hard to define, at a minimum it connotes increasing global interdependence, a
growing density and significance of various types of transnational and international transaction and interaction.
These trends stimulate (among other things) increasing demand for governance of these transactions and interactions,
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whether in the form of law, regulation, bureaucratization, or politicization (the creation of political entities to
decide transnational policy questions). Increasing interdependence leads to an increasing demand for global
governance; like other states, the United States faces pressure to embrace this trend toward global governance and
the internationalist outlook animating it. This trend is both an instance of and a response to globalization, one that
undermines independence, autonomy, and control and renders the notion of states as containers of politics
implausible. Moreover, globalization has penetrated the public consciousness through academic and political debate
and through the popular media, such that there exists today a widespread and growing perception that
interdependence and interconnectedness are transforming politics profoundly. Both reality and perceptions of it are
changing in ways that directly challenge the empirical presumptions of popular sovereignty as a normative ideal.
Extensive empirical evidence supports these claims.15 There is no point reviewing it here, however, because the new
sovereigntists themselves acknowledge that globalization is profoundly transforming governance. It is precisely this
transformation that they deem so threatening to popular sovereignty and constitutional government. The ICC seeks to
impose binding rules to limit the conduct of states; the WTO, through its appellate body, creates mechanisms that
allow for binding trade rules to be imposed without the consent of all members (Rabkin 2005: chapter 8); the citation
of foreign court decisions and CIL transforms the domestic systems of constitutional government, allowing a way for
international norms to find their way into domestic law and policy; 16 European-style regulatory regimes dealing with
labor, the environment, and human rights subordinate democratic legislative processes to supranational judges and
bureaucrats and empower non-governmental organizations and so-called global civil society to influence
international regulators directly, circumventing domestic political processes and altering the constitutional dynamics
of sovereign government.
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Its in states own interests to participate in global governance
structures
Each of the new sovereigntists own examples of dangerous developments in global governance can be understood as
an effort by states to regain or retain control or influence in areas where heightened interdependence undercuts them.
To the extent that globalization compromises states capacity to protect and promote their citizens rights, welfare,
and interests effectively, these efforts could be seen as democratically required. As Drezner (2001) and others have
shown, the US government itself uses global governance to promote American aims and interestsjust as
Bolton recommends. To abandon global governance would necessarily (further) reduce American control and
influence vis-a`-vis other actors (and in the case of unilateral withdrawal, vis-a`-vis other states). This too has
democratic costs that the new sovereigntists simply overlookperhaps because American power blinds them to what
observers in other countries can see more clearly. The Irish, for example, no more want to leave the EU than they
want to cede influence within it.17 If democracy obliges states to protect and promote their citizens rights and
interests, the fact of growing interdependence strongly implies that states should seek to assert whatever control and
influence they can. It is of course true that doing so through global governance regimes undermines domestic
authority in the traditional sense, as the new sovereigntists assert. But it is equally true that with respect to the
requirements of popular sovereignty, this simply means that states are damned if they do and damned if they dont.
Paradoxically, popular sovereignty requires and also rules out global governance.
Popular sovereignty is not workable under modern conditions

Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p. 1056-7
This is what we mean by saying that popular sovereignty as a normative doctrine becomes incoherent once its
empirical presumptions are fundamentally altered. It is in this sense that the reassertion of democratic sovereignty in
an age of globalization is increasingly less plausible. Popular sovereigntys territorial conception of political
authority, on the one hand, and the protection and promotion of citizens freedom and equality, on the other,
sometimes pull in opposite directions in conditions of increasing interdependence. The point is not that the new
sovereigntists are wrong about what popular sovereignty ideally requires; it is rather that the complex normative
demands of popular sovereignty can only be simultaneously satisfied under particular, historically contingent,
conditions. As those conditions change, popular sovereignty becomes unworkable. Popular sovereignty is not wrong
or flawed; it is inadequate and increasingly ineffective in securing freedom and equality.
Globalization puts human rights at-risk

Reinterpreting these constraints in terms of human rights provides democratic criteria much more amenable to global
governance arrangements. Citizenship rights are limited to a particular polity in ways that reflect and help to
reproduce the framework of popular sovereignty. Human rights, appropriately for an era of growing interdependence,
point to the global extension of these guarantees. Among the chief threats globalization poses to freedom and
equality is the exercise of power that is not subject to traditional democratic constraints through the state. This power
might be exercised by IGOs like the IMF or the World Bank or by TNCs. State-based mechanisms are insufficient
they lack the authority and the reach to address these threats. Robust guarantees of human rights would constrain the
power of such entities. Similarly, the ideal of citizens holding elected officials to account relies on a statist
conception of politics, but there are numerous alternatives to electoral accountability of this kind, including holding
power wielders to specified normative standards (see also Grant and Keohane 2005). Human rights provide clear
standards to which power wielders can be held, standards that flow directly from the democratic principles of
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freedom and equality and thus do not depend on variable or controversial definitions of who the appropriate
accountability holders are.23 This is not to say that human rights are a substitute for electoral accountability; our point
is simply that, where electoral accountability is unavailable or incoherent, human rights help to define the parameters
of what counts as decisions consistent with democracy, the range of decisions that can plausibly be understood as
democratic.
The Responsibility to Protect is grounded in sovereignty and

when states do not protect their own citizens others are
obligated to intervene
The assertion is reinforced in multiple arenas. Practically, the United Nations grapples with reconciling sovereignty
as permissiveness and sovereignty as responsibility, since virtually much of its work (in development, human
rights, peacekeeping, and nation building, infringe on traditional notions of sovereign prerogative. A December 2001
United Nations sponsored, and International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
produced, a report entitled, The Responsibility to Protect, concluded that sovereign states
have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophefrom mass
murder and rape, from starvationbut that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that
responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states (2001: viii). Such
responsibility, the Commission contends, lies in obligations inherent in the conception of
sovereignty; the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24.
Globalization already diminishes sovereignty

Finally, we think the new sovereigntists deny the implications of their own argument. After all, for them sovereignty
is necessarily a conditional good, one valued because it enables constitutional democratic government. When we
consider how globalization diminishes the effectiveness of popular sovereignty as well as the democratic costs of
sovereigntysuch as its defense of undemocratic regimes and human rights violators (costs the new sovereigntists
acknowledge)the strong traditionalist case for popular sovereignty becomes much less persuasive. If sovereignty
no longer enables democracy or represents an obstacle to the realization of freedom and equality, its normative
justification collapses.
Claims of total sovereignty silence minorities within nations

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 6
On the other hand, popular sovereignty maintains that authority resides in or emanates from the will and consent of
(territorially and nationally defined) people. This construction triply and subversively divorces sovereignty from
human rights. First, by wedding sovereignty to the nation, popular sovereignty imposes a superincumbent thing (the
unitary nation) upon the diversity of human experience and identity. Any resulting homogenization silences minority
nations (Palestinians, Chechens, Basques) within the state. Second, popular sovereignty potentially de-links
individual rights and liberties from conceptions of the common good by tying public policy to majority decision. To
illustrate by way of parody, women in the United States may invoke their numerical majority to disenfranchise men,
or ethnic minorities might decide to disenfranchise whites. Realistically, heterosexuals may deny homosexuals
employment and housing protections, and even civil rights of marriage and adoption. More starkly, governments
may, under guise of majority decision, deprive minorities (for example, black Africans in Darfur) of essential rights
of political participation and religious worship.
Strong conceptions of sovereignty kill global cooperation

necessary to solve international problems
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Human Rights Review, January-March 2007,
83
p. 6
Third, binding sovereignty territorially and nationally separates peoples across borders such that a transnational
populist concern with, say, preventing pollution conceivably confronts (and is defeated by) state (so-called
national) interests in stimulating and perpetuating economic growth despite environmental degradation.
The purpose of sovereignty is to promote the good of citizens

p. 13
This article thus challenges the opposition between human rights and sovereignty, and takes its cue from The
Responsibility to Protect: from whence does the notion of sovereignty as responsibility arise? Here, I
contend that democratic, isocratic, humanistic elements (what may be thought of as human rights precursors) are
actually embedded in early notions of sovereignty, including what I call Bodins hierarchical, Althusiuss
confederative, Hobbes singular, and Hegels progressive sovereignty.6 I focus on these four because each offers a
unique, early conception of sovereignty tied to a particular governmental structure: Bodin to monarchy ediated by
sub-associations, Althusius to confederation, Hobbes to unmediated monarchy and Hegel to constitutional regimes.
Despite differences in government structure, however, each (radically) disassociates sovereignty from its agents and
aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). While their sovereignties may seem remote from contemporary debate,
and even, as with Bodin and Hobbes, antithetical to the argument, they serve to illustrate the theoretical abyss
between todays IR-dominated conceptions of sovereignty and earlier, more human rights friendly ones. From each
theorist I derive eight foundational theses to ground what I call a democratic sovereignty. In the language of The
Responsibility to Protect (2001), obligation towards and responsibility for a states citizens is arguably the
sine qua non of sovereigntyand thus forms its theoretical foundation.
SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT ABSOLUTE BECAUSE ALL GOVERNMENTS

ARE NOT ELECTED
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF
AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 102)
The principle of sovereignty needs to be reconsidered. Sovereignty belongs to the people; the
people are supposed to delegate it to the government through the electoral process. But not all
governments are democratically elected and even democratic governments may abuse the
authority thus entrusted to them. If the abuses of power are severe enough and the people are
deprived of opportunities to correct them, outside interference is justified. International
intervention is often the only lifeline available to the oppressed.
WHEN RULES OF STATES DO NOT PROTECT CITIZENS, THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO
INTERVENE
George Soros, Global Financier and International Development Expert, THE BUBBLE OF
AMERICAN SUPREMACY, 2004, p. 103)
The rulers of a sovereign state have a responsibility to protect the citizens. When they fail to do
so, the responsibility should be transferred to the international community. That principle ought
to guide the international community in its policies. One of my main objections to the American
intervention in Iraq is that it has compromised this principle by substituting American might for
international legitimacy.
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A2: Imperialism Is Bad

We do not support imperial conquest or occupation
The real challenge for a doctrine of sovereign responsibility is not to prove that there are some limits to a sovereigns
right to be wrong about justice. The greater challenge is to ground the responsibilities of intervening states in some
set of principles that makes their actions consistent. Libya but not Syria, Sudan but not Zimbabwe: intervention so
discretionary can seem unprincipled. The principles of the Commission on Sovereignty and Intervention sought to
balance basic respect for sovereignty with a clear thresholdethnic cleansing; massacre, actual or apprehended
that should trigger intervention in every case. And some further restraining principles flow from sovereignty itself. If
protecting a people from their own sovereign is a principled rationale for intervention, respecting that sovereignty in
turn precludes taking it away from the people you have intervened to protect. Imperial conquest or occupation must
be excluded.
Intervention is justified when people are trying to overthrow a

tyrannical sovereign
College at the University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p . 27
But legitimacy, as the Commission argued, is a matter not only of principle, but also of prudence. Interventions that
cannot succeed should not be tried, no matter how pressing the principle. (The question of how to measure the
probabilities of success is of course a difficult one.) It matters, too, to be clear about what the principle at stake
actually is. Libya and Syria may look like civil wars, but they are in fact revolutions. As Arthur Applbaum has
argued, overthrowing sovereigns and replacing them with othersthe revolutionary moveis an act that other
democratic peoples have good reason to support. Peoples, even just some of them, can decide to rise against their
sovereigns. When they decide to risk their lives, as the Libyans of Benghazi did last winter, and as the Syrians in
town after town did this summer and fall, they must earn their freedom with their own handsbut they are also
entitled to assistance when the only other choice is a return to tyranny.
In periods of revolution people have already withdrawn support

from the sovereign and intervention is justified
As long as we define these struggles as civil wars, we are inclined to stay out. Once we define them as revolutions,
the principle at stake looks different. (The difference is an empirical one, of course: each struggle must be carefully
studied, because too often they are described according to the prior ideological inclinations of the observer.) In
revolutionary situations, such large numbers of people have withdrawn consent from their sovereign that the
principle is not whether to protect them, but whether to help them make a revolution. Indeed, we can only protect
them by regime change, by transferring sovereignty into their hands. Prudence and principle must be intertwined at
this point. If we intervene in every civil war that purports to be a revolution, we sacrifice an important value: the
stability of an imperfect but necessary order of states. But if we turn a blind eye to revolution, we miss a chance
to align sovereignty more closely with justice.
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A2: Sovereigns Can Violate the Law

Sovereignty is based in exceptions to the law, it is prior to the
law
The exercise of sovereignty by governments, by courts, and by the police ought to be in conformity with law. Except,
of course, when there are exceptions: states of emergency, following insurrection, attack, or invasion, where the
sovereign mustor believes that it mustexercise extra-legal powers in order to save the state itself. Who has the
right to declare such states of emergency? Carl Schmitt, the Weimar legal theorist and Nazi sympathizer, gave a
notorious answersovereign is he who defines the exceptionthat overthrew the commonsense view of
sovereignty as emanating from law. Paul Kahn, in his magisterial book Political Theology: Four New
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, argues convincingly that Schmitts Nazi pedigree should not
invalidate his argument. Sovereignty is will, not law. On this account, sovereignty has to be above the law, since the
law itself may stand in need of extralegal authority for its defense. Sovereignty is also prior to law because there has
to be a founding moment that creates the law. In America, that moment was the Revolution: a violent rupture, a
forced founding, led by the sovereign people under arms. And if the sovereign is created in a moment of violence, at
least in democracies founded on revolution, we can begin to see that when we pledge allegiance to a sovereign, we
are doing something more than giving consent to be ruled by law. We are giving obedience to a force that originated
in violence and may use violence to protect us.
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Sovereignty Derives from Popular Support

Sovereignty is based on an emotional attachment of the people
to the government
Michael Ignatieff is a former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and a fellow of Massey College at the
University of Toronto, New Republic, February 16, 2012, p. 25
Sovereignty draws on much deeper identifications. The sovereign protects us with its monopoly of the means of
violence. It can also ask citizens to sacrifice their life for their country. This is nobodys idea of a rational contract,
but it is everybodys idea of the patriotic ideal. Sovereignty draws on this deep layer of emotional identification of
the people with the sovereign as the juridical embodiment of the nation. If this deeper layer did not exist, contract
alone would not keep political order intact. Sovereign obedience, on such a view, reposes on a primal emotional
bond between citizen and nation, a nexus of individual and collective identity, mediated through a government
elected by the people.
Sovereign legitimacy is grounded in the ability of sovereigns to

arouse patriotic passion
These emotional underpinnings of sovereignty make liberals uneasy. The liberal attempt to secularize obedience has
always been an attempt to make politics rational, to replace awe with consent. By vesting sovereignty in the people,
and by locating legitimacy in consent, liberals from Locke onward sought to expunge from sovereigntys claim upon
us those irrational, overbearing demands that could lead both to slaughter and to tyranny. Yet the sacramental,
sacrificial, all-consuming emotions that popular refuse to be thought away. Contractual sovereignty has never made
peace with patriotic passion and never can, any more than philosophies of limited government can make their peace
with the passion of the people to feel and act as one. Sovereigns are legitimate to us to the extent that they convince
our reason and rouse our patriotic passions.
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International Human Rights Regimes Promote Good Sovereignty

Democracy and human rights are mutually constitutive
New sovereigntists and other traditionalist defenders of rule by the people might raise a different objection: that the
rights we propose, and the institutions that will uphold them, lack democratic legitimacy precisely because they
originate outside any duly constituted sovereign democratic state. Further, these rights and institutions might
contravene popular sovereignty at home. We have three related replies: First, the same
principles that justify popular sovereignty freedom and equalityalso directly and
straightforwardly justify the human rights we are proposing. Democracy and human rights
are mutually constitutive; each entails the other, making conflicts between them
theoretically unproblematic (see Habermas 1996). As Dahl (1956:36) once argued, no friend
of democracy has ever held that it gives the majority the right to do whatever it wants. What
majorities are specifically precluded from doing is violating others human rights. That is not
to say that conflicts will not arise in practice: majorities are not always sensitive to the
niceties of democratic theory. Still, the approach we propose is consistent and compatible
with existing democratic arrangements in states and agnostic about the nature and extent of
possible developments in the international system. This agnosticism endows the approach
with a flexibility permitting its adaptation to various institutional forms in different functional
domains of governance.
A well-functioning international human rights regime would

strengthen the capacity of states to promote human rights
Michael Goodhart, University of Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, 2011 (55), p.
1065
Our second response is that a global governance regime that respects, protects, and promotes human rights would
actually expand participating states ability to protect their citizens rights. Insofar as all citizens of democratic states
have an interest in making the exercise of global governance more humane and more accountable, these
recommendations would advance a quite general democratic interest as well.
Global democratic governance upholds democratic norms

Human Rights Review, January-March 2007, p. 1065-6
In sum, we think that our substantive account of democratic global governance upholds democratic norms, advances
the rights, welfare, and interests of democratic citizens, and supports democracy and democratization within states,
all without appealing to problematic notions of popular sovereignty. It generates democratic standards based on the
democratic values of freedom and equality shared by all modern democratic theories. We recognize that we have not
provided a complete conception of global democracy, and a range of important questions necessarily remain
unanswered here. We do hope, however, to have shown what democracy without sovereignty might look like and
why it might be appealing in the context of globalization. Our aims have been to establish conceptually that there is
no necessary tension between democracy and global governance; to show that democratization is possible through
means other than the extension or retrenchment of popular sovereignty; and, to suggest how such an alternative
democratic account might be justified. the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;
specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties,
international humanitarian law and national law; and the developing practice of states, regional organizations and
the Security Council itself (xi). Curiously, and inexplicably, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility is passed off
as a post-1945 notion, not as an enduring feature of sovereignty.
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Sovereignty Bad Biopolitics

THE CONCENTRATION CAMP IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE
SOVEREIGNS EXERCISE OF BIOPOWER
Review in Radical Philosophy by Andrew Norris: The exemplary exception - Philosophical and
political decisions in Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer, 2003,
http://www.16beavergroup.org/monday/archives/000374.php
As this cutting defines the political, the production of the inhuman - which is correlative with the
production of the human - is not an activity that politics might dispense with, say in favour of the
assertion of human rights. More specifically, the Nazi death camps are not a political aberration,
least of all a unique event, but instead the place where politics as the sovereign decision on life
most clearly reveals itself: 'today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental
biopolitical paradigm of the West.'
STATE SOVEREIGNTY UPHOLDS STATE CONTROL OF BARE LIFE

Dillon, Lancaster Politics Lecturer, ALTERNATIVES, 20002, v. 25, p. 132
Four our purposes, Agambens analysisdiscloses a certain comparability in the operation of
sovereign power and the power/knowledge that Foucault termed governmentality. Not only are
they both a strategic form of power, they each operate by effecting a kind of phenomenological
reduction. Both claim to reduce life to its bare essentials in order to disclose the truth about it, but
in so doing actually reduce it to a format that will bear the programming of power to which it
must be subject if the power of sovereignty (or, as we shall see, that of governance as well) is to
be inscribed, instituted, and operated. Life is not of course natural life, whatever that may be. It
is in every sense the life of power. But since we are talking different operations of power, we are
also talking different forms of life; modalities formed by the different exercises of reduction
through which each operation of power institutes and maintains itself. Each form of life is the
stuff of life but in dissimilar ways. That is what we mean when we say that sovereignty and
governmentality reproduce life amenable to their sway. It is not uncommon for a form of life thus
reproduced to desire the processes that originate it. Sovereign and governmental powers alike
each also therefore work their own particular powers of seduction on the subjects of power that
they summon into being.
SOVEREIGN POWER IS USED TO EXTEND DISCIPLINARY POWER

Amy Allen, Dartmouth, 2002 (INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES, June, p. 131)
According to Foucault, disciplinary power ought by rights to have led to the disappearance of
the grand juridical edifice created by that theory. But this is precisely what hasnt happened.
Instead, the notion of sovereignty has been superimposed upon disciplinary techniques in such a
way that the dark and nefarious nature of these techniques has been concealed. In the modern era,
sovereign power has not disappeared, but has simply changed forms: no longer vested solely in
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the person of the King, it has been democratized, transformed into the foundational and
legitimating power of the people, a power that is codified in the principle of popular sovereignty.
However, this democratization has functioned to conceal the disciplinary power that is actually
the seamy underside of such democratized sovereign, juridical power. As Foucault puts it: in our
own times power is exercised simultaneously through this right [grounded in the notion of
popular sovereignty] and these [disciplinary] techniques and . . . these techniques and these
discourses, to which the disciplines give rise, invade the area of right so that the procedures of
normalization come to be ever more constantly engaged in the colonization of those of law.
SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE CHALLENGED TO CONTROL

DISCIPLINARY POWER
James Johnson, teaches social and political theory al the University of Rochester, 1997
(POLITICAL THEORY, August, p. 559).
Resistance trades upon a number of affirmative possibilities. Foucault locates these possibilities
within a quite specific understanding of the relations that obtain between intellectuals and
political movements. As he explains: If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power,
or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right
of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which
must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of
sovereignty.
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Violence K of Sovereignty
State sovereignty serves as a universal lens through which to
view the world and conduct political life it constitutes a
fantasy attempting to avoid confronting uncertainty, even to
the point of violent imposition.
Edkins, professor at Aberystwyth 2002 [Jenny The Subject of the Political Sovereignty and Subjectivity]
We have shown that the subject is of necessity incomplete, or impossible. It is always in process;
it never fully comes to presence but is structured around a lack. This lack arises, first, from the
gap between the real and the imaginary in the mirror phase and then from the gap between the
imaginary and the symbolic, or social, during interpellation. Like the subject, the symbolic, or
social, order is similarly constituted around a lack, one that in this case appears as a constitutive
antagonism.11 This antagonism appears in a variety of guises in different social orders, but it is
always there and cannot be removed. A society without antagonism cannot exist: social reality
can never be complete or whole. However, for life to go on the lack must be concealed and the
concealment hidden. This is accomplished by the production of social reality.
In order for what we call social reality to be constituted, meaning has to be imposed. This is
achieved through the "master signifier," a signifier that stands in the place of the constitutive lack
or antagonism at the heart of the social order. Without such a signifier, the social order cannot
constitute itself; the sliding of meaning cannot be arrested. This signifier is the embodiment of
lack; it enables us to account for the gap between result and intention. The act of imposing
meaning, halting the movement of free-floating signifiers, is an authoritative act, "a non-founded
founding act of violence" that recalls the violence of the founding decision in the work of Jacques
Derrida.12 At this moment, the symbolic order comes into being, the decision is taken, and the
law is founded. The violence that is implicated in this process then disappears: in the history of
what happened, what was brought into being with this foundational act is narrated as always
already inevitable. Once the decision has been taken, the moment of decision disappears, though
not entirely without trace.
We are now in a position to suggest how sovereignty and subjectivity implicate each other. As we
have seen, subjectivity can only exist, or rather, be constituted, in relation to a particular social or
symbolic order. The social order itself is brought into existence, supposed or posited, in relation
to a particular signifier, which covers the hole or lack in the-social or symbolic order and
provides a nodal point around which meaning is articulated. In modernity, one of the signifiers
that performs this function is sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty is central to discourse and
the International. It informs conventional notions of what power might be: the relationship
between sovereign and subject within the absolutist kingdom, or the sovereignty of a government
over the lives of its citizens in the modern nation state. Sovereignty also plays a foundational
role in discussions of international autonomy: the sovereign state is a bounded unit in the
international system. This centrality testifies to its place as the master signifier around which a
particular symbolic order is constituted
"Sovereignty" as a master signifier is not free and autonomous here but stands implicated and
embroiled in questions of "subjectivity." The authority of the master signifier derives only from
its position in the social orderwhich itself derives only from the subjection of the subjects that
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evoke it. It is an impostor, in a sense: any signifier that found itself at the place of constitutive
lack in the structure would dodivine providence, the invisible hand of the market, the objective
logic of history, or the Jewish conspiracy, for example.i3 Sovereignty performs this task for the
social reality that is taken to be modern politics. It conceals antagonism in a particular way and
implicates particular subjectivities. For example, it produces politics as subjection and
sovereignty as absolute. Within the legal authority it establishes, violence is concealed. That same
violence is banished to the nonsoviereign realm of the international. The subjectivities it invokes
(or rather, that invoke it) are the irresponsible camp followers of power insofar as they naturalize
a particular social order. Their actions respond to what they suppose are the desires of authority.
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AT: Perm
Meaningful ethical or political action is impossible as long as
the master-signifier of sovereignty remains unchallenged.
Edkins, professor at Aberystwyth 2002 [Jenny The Subject of the Political Sovereignty and
Subjectivity]
\A symbolic order centered on sovereignty is not the only (im)possible solution; we could
imagine other social realities. However, once sovereignty is in place, an ethical-political
challenge in the name of an alternative becomes illegitimate. This difficulty arises because
sovereignty as a master signifier conceals its status as will have been, constituting the social order
as always already. As such, sovereign as a political referent persists and endures almost as if it
were an inevitable and unavoidable _part of politics. Indeed, it functions to define politics in a
particular way such that sovereignty is the oily referent by which one can understand the
political. We will question this by asking whether another politics is possible, one that does not
invoke sovereignty or an alternative master signifier.
Arguably, without a master signifier either the social order nor the subject are possible. If this is
accepted, emancipation as such becomes impossible. Liberation is always to come. Revolution is
a joyous but impossible moment, a singularity outside time, where repressive authority has been
overthrown and a new order has yet to be reimposed. There was such a moment during the
revolutions at the end of the cold war in Europe, with "rebels waving the national flag with the
red star, the communist symbol, cut out, so that instead of the symbol standing for the organizing
principle of national life, there was nothing but a hole in its centre." Zizek raises the prospect of
"tarrying with the negative," although the logic of his Lacanian position would repudiate that
possibility. Derrida, in a parallel attempt to find a way of being outside the dichotomized violence
of logocentrism, suggests an endless process of decisioning.I54"
Both of these would be a way of engaging with the political and returning to an ethicsin
Derrida's case an ethics of responsibility, and for Zizek an ethics of the real. Examining how an
ethics of the real might operate leads to some interesting conclusions about the role of
sovereignty in preempting such a move. As a master signifier, sovereignty has precisely the task
of preventing the emergence of an ethics of the real. The imposition of meaning, which is what
the master signifier accomplishes, forecloses ethical possibility,)
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Intervention Necessary for Successful

Democratization/Human Rights
Foreign intervention limits repression. Limiting repression is
essential to advance democracy
ShadiHamid,DirectorofResearch,BrookingsDohaCenter,BrookingsInstitute,StatesNewsService,April26,
2011THESTRUGGLEFORMIDDLEEASTDEMOCRACY,
www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/0426_middle_east_hamid.aspxDOA:5/5/11
Similarly, Islamist leaders would often speak of an 'American veto' used by U.S. and European officials to block
democratic outcomes not to their liking. As senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Essam El-Erian told me at the height
of regime repression in 2008: "Even if you come to power through democratic means, you are facing an international
community that doesn't accept the existence of the Islamist representation. This is a problem. I think this will
continue to present an obstacle for us until there is a real acknowledgement of the situation." In recent years, a
growing academic literature and considerable empirical support have pointed to the critical role of
international actors in bringing down autocrats. In their recent book, Steve Levitsky and Lucan Way provide
extensive empirical support to what many have long argued. They write, "It was an externally driven shift in
the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of
authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s." Levitsky and Way find that "states' vulnerability to Western
democratization pressure . . . was often decisive." The key word here is "often." America's staunch support of
repressive regimes, and its unwillingness to back pro-democracy movements, helps explain why the Arab
world-until January 2011-seemed immune to democratic change. But it does not explain why, finally, Egyptians
and Tunisians, with the odds stacked against them, found a way to defy expectations and even history, bringing about
their own remarkable revolutions. Arab Springs In 2011, the Middle East witnessed the second 'Arab Spring.' The
first-now somewhat forgotten-took place in 2005. President George W. Bush had announced in November 2003 a
"forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East." In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, he
declared: "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did
nothing to make us safe-because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty." The Bush
administration cited democracy promotion among the reasons for its invading Iraq and toppling dictator Saddam
Hussein in 2003. As dubious, cynical and inconsistent as they may have been, Bush's policies helped produce an
otherwise unlikely outcome. The year 2005 saw the largest outpouring of pro-democracy activism the region
had ever seen up until then. On January 31, 2005, Iraqis braved terrorist threats to cast meaningful ballots for
the first time. In Bahrain, fifty thousand Bahrainis-one-eighth of the population-rallied for constitutional
reform. And there was, of course, the Cedar Revolution, which led to a removal of Syrian troops from
Lebanese territory. The Iraq war frightened Arab regimes into thinking that President Bush was serious about his
democratizing mission. However, after a succession of Islamist election victories in Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, the United States backed off from its aggressive pro-democracy
posture. With a deteriorating security situation in Iraq, a rising Iran, and a smoldering Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Arab democracy came to seem an unaffordable luxury. This was not a time for unsettling friendly Arab autocrats.
Their Islamist competitors, known for their inflammatory anti-Americanism, were, at best, an unknown quantity.
American policymakers shared an instinctive distrust of Islamists and made little effort to understand how they had
changed. At worst, Americans feared, the Islamists would use their newfound power to roll back U.S. influence in
the region. Without America to worry about, regimes felt they could do as they pleased. Beginning in 2006,
Egypt experienced the worst wave of anti-Islamist repression since the 1960s, while Jordan, long considered one
of the more open, progressive Arab states, gradually descended into full-blown authoritarianism. Nearly every Arab
country in the region experienced a decline in political rights and freedoms. This was the Arab world that the
newly elected President Barack Obama had to contend with. Instead of challenging the authoritarian status quo,
Obama reluctantly accepted it. In his historic Cairo University address of June 2009, he promised a "new beginning."
Instead, the Obama administration moved to rebuild relationships-frayed from Bush's democracy posturing-with
Egyptian President Mubarak and other autocrats. President Obama got one thing right-the centrality of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict to Arab grievance-but he got another wrong: that conflict was not, nor had it ever been, the most
important problem facing the region. But pursuing peace seemed a more promising course than trying to refashion
American foreign policy into a force for something-Arab democracy-it had actively resisted the previous five
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decades. The United States needed, or thought it needed, the support of 'moderate' Arab regimes to push the peace
process forward. What Obama did, albeit unwittingly, was remove the United States from its central place in the
ongoing Arab conversation over democracy. However hated he was, President Bush had injected himself into the
regional debate. The struggle for Arab democracy had been internationalized. Under President Obama, the United
States increasingly seemed beside the point. The election of Obama-with his evident desire to build bridges with the
Arab world, not to mention his Muslim family and middle name-was the best possible outcome that Arabs could
have hoped for. It was difficult to think of an American politician who seemed as sympathetic and thoughtful about
the challenges facing the region. But even the best possible outcome wasn't nearly enough. America's unwillingness
to align itself with democratic forces was not, it seemed, a matter of one president over another, but a structural
problem inherent in U.S. foreign policy. The optimism over the Cairo speech quickly subsided. Somehow, in several
Arab countries, U.S. favorability ratings dropped lower under President Obama than they were in the final years of
the George W. Bush administration. The months leading up to the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were
characterized by a renewed despair. The Mubarak regime had embarked on a systematic crackdown on opposition
groups and independent media, culminating in perhaps the most rigged elections in the country's history. The results
of the first round-returning 209 out of 211 seats to the ruling party-surprised everyone, including even regime
officials hoping for a more 'credible' result. I was in Egypt covering the elections. In the neighborhoods of Medinat
Nasr and Shubra, I talked to the Muslim Brotherhood 'whips' (the representatives who count the votes). One by one,
they ran me through all the violations. They didn't seem angry as much as resigned. But while opposition groups
were demoralized, they, along with a growing number of Egyptians, began to realize, with much greater clarity, that
gradual reform from within the system was impossible. The old paradigm-of pushing for small openings from
within-was roundly discredited. Calls for civil disobedience and mass protest intensified. The ingredients were therethe anger, disillusion, and the loss of faith in a system made for and by ruling elites. All that was missing was a
spark. The First Arab Revolution Before Tunisia, there were no successful examples of popular Arab revolutions.
The closest a mass movement came to ousting a regime was in 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the
Algerian elections in what was, up until then, the region's most promising democratic experiment and one of its
earliest. With the tacit, and sometimes not so tacit, support of Europe and the United States, the military annulled the
polls, banned the FIS, and sent thousands of Islamists to desert camps. "When you support democracy, you take what
democracy gives you," U.S. Secretary of State James Baker explained later. "We didn't live with it in Algeria because
we felt that the radical fundamentalists' views were so adverse to what we believe in and what we support, and to
what we understood the national interests of the United States to be." The fear of Islamists in power paralyzed
Western policymakers, turning a difficult situation into a destructive one. The civil war that soon broke out would
claim the lives of an estimated one hundred thousand Algerians. Having a model helps. In Eastern Europe, Kmara
copied Otpor and Pora copied Kmara. As Georgian opposition leader Ivane Merabishvili recounts, "all the
demonstrators knew the tactics of the revolution in Belgrade by heart. Everyone knew what to do. This was a copy of
that revolution, only louder." Until recently, courageous young Arab activists had nothing to copy. That changed,
finally, on January 14, 2011, the day that Tunisians toppled President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. The model, boiled
down to its essence, is devastatingly simple: bring enough people into the streets and overwhelm the regime with
sheer numbers. "No state," observes sociologist Charles Kurzman, "can repress all of the people all of the time."
Once protesters reach a critical mass, the regime finds itself in a precarious situation. The decision to shoot may
temporarily push back protesters, but it is a risky course. The use of lethal force can provide the spark for an
embattled opposition, as on Iran's 'Black Friday,' when around a hundred Iranians were killed on the way to their
revolution. Such violence threatens to strip regimes of their last shreds of legitimacy. It also creates sympathy for
opposition groups and their cause, spurring financial, moral, and political support from the international community.
More importantly, the use of live ammunition on unarmed citizens can often provoke divisions within the regime
coalition. Inevitably, some in the security forces or the military will refuse to obey orders. In the case of Tunisia, the
army was simply not willing to oversee a bloodbath to protect President Ben Ali. In the uprising against Libyan
leader Muammar Qaddafi that gained momentum in February, the Libyan regime shot down hundreds of peaceful
protesters. The move generated an immediate backlash against Qaddafi by the United States and other Western
powers, which in recent years had reestablished relations with his regime. As the Filipino opposition figure Francisco
Nemenzo once wrote, "It is one thing to shoot peasants in some God-forsaken village and another to massacre
middle class dissenters while the whole world is watching." International outrage, then, is an essential ingredient.
Before the Tunisian revolution, however, it had been almost entirely missing in the peculiar context of the Arab
world. With few exceptions, the most popular movements in the Arab world have been led by Islamists, and for
Western powers this made them more difficult to support. At the height of international interest in the first 'Arab
Spring,' Egypt experienced the largest pro-democracy mobilization it had seen in decades. On March 27, 2005, the
Muslim Brotherhood staged its first ever protest calling for constitutional reform, after the ruling party forced
through amendments that restricted opposition groups' ability to contest presidential elections. By May, the
organization had staged twenty-three demonstrations-an average of one every three days-in fifteen governorates.
Some brought out as many as fifteen thousand people. On May 4, the Brotherhood staged a coordinated nationwide
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protest in ten governorates, with an estimated fifty to seventy thousand protestors. In the course of less than two
months, the total participation of Brotherhood members neared one hundred and forty thousand. Such a show of
strength came at a price: nearly four thousand Brotherhood members were arrested. Yet, the international community
was largely silent. Paying a high price, the Brotherhood learned its lesson. If that's what happened when the world
was watching, what about when it wasn't. The New Opposition In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime couldn't use the
Islamist card. Tunisia's Islamists were either in prison, dead, or in exile. By destroying its main opposition, the
regime lost the last justification for its existence. Ben Ali couldn't argue that he was better than the alternative,
because there was no alternative left. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its widespread following, played a
significant but relatively limited role in the protests, which it did not endorse until after the success of the first day January 25 - was already apparent. Like Tunisia, Egypt's was a leaderless movement consisting of angry, ordinary
Egyptians who came not with ideologies or partisanship but the simple, overarching demand that President Mubarak
step down. Predictably, the regime tried to point the finger at the Brotherhood but the reality in Tahrir Square belied
such claims. That these were leaderless revolutions meant that the regimes had no one to demonize, except their own
people. If they shot into the crowd, they were not killing the Muslim Brotherhood but their own brothers, sisters,
sons, and daughters. And when they did kill-over two hundred in Tunisia and at least three hundred eighty-four in
Egypt-allied Western powers (and the international media) could no longer turn away. While Arabs have long
blamed the West, and particularly the United States, for supporting their oppressors, this was perhaps the one
case where American support ultimately worked to their favor. The Egyptian military and security forces did
not enjoy full freedom of action. The United States, as Egypt's primary benefactor, was watching closely. The
Obama administration may have had a high tolerance for regime repression, but it was unlikely to tolerate
massacres against peaceful protesters in broad daylight. This, whether indirectly or directly, exerted pressure
on regime officials who had to make difficult choices on whether to use force against protesters. The close
relationship between the United States and Egyptian militaries also offered another important point of
leverage in the crucial final days of the revolution, when the military had to decide whether to turn on Mubarak,
one of their own. Lessons from the Revolution In Tunisia and then Egypt, Arabs discovered a power they did not
know they had. These revolutions, as others before them, told a story of strength and safety in numbers. There was
no need to follow a sequence-economic reform first, democracy later-or meet a long list of prerequisites. Arabs, it
turns out, did not have to wait for democracy. More importantly, they didn't want to. The hundreds of millions of
dollars in civil society aid had been rendered beside the point. America's caution, hedging of bets, and fetish for
gradualism-previously the hallmarks of hard-headed realpolitik-proved both foolhardy and nave. Of course,
Americans always said they knew this: freedom and democracy was not the province of one people or culture, but a
universal right. To al Qaeda's dismay, real change does not come through violence. But it doesn't necessarily come
through NGOs. Arabs kept on waiting for America to change its policy and divest itself of dictatorship. It never did.
So they did. In doing so, they are forcing the United States to reconsider five decades of a failed, and failing, policy
in the Middle East. It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that international factors are now irrelevant. In the
cases of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, international pressure, whether from governments or citizens moved by what
they saw on television, played a critical role in undermining support for regimes that just months before were
thought by many to be invulnerable. The revolutions are far from complete. Tunisia has faced sporadic violence and
a succession of unstable interim cabinets. Despite being the original spark for the region's uprisings, it has, perhaps
predictably, become the forgotten revolution. Egypt is still governed by an institution-the military-that was long the
backbone of the Mubarak regime. For many Egyptian activists, March 9 was a turning point, bringing back painful
memories. That day, soldiers and plainclothes thugs armed with pipes and electric cables stormed Tahrir Square,
detained nearly two hundred people, and then took them to be tortured in a makeshift prison at the Egyptian
Museum.
Allowing dictators to shoot people destroys democratic

movements
National Public Radio (NPR), March 22, 2011, Why Libya Matters To The Middle East's Future,
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/22/134760674/why-libya-matters-to-the-middle-easts-future DOA: 5/2/11
GROSS: So what's really at stake in Libya for the West and for the Arab world?
Prof. LYNCH: When you're looking around the region, you've got a lot of people who desperately want to try and
push for peaceful change, and they saw Tunisia. They saw Egypt. And it led them to believe that it was possible. And
in both of those cases, one of the key things was that the armies decided not to shoot on their people. And even
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though it was tense, and it was difficult, it actually showed people that there was a possibility of change. And then
what Gadhafi did in Libya, and for that matter the rulers in Bahrain and Yemen, what they did was they said:
No, we're not going to go. And they then used really brutal force against the people. The people didn't back
down, but it then stalled and turned into this more of a pitched struggle. If Gadhafi survives, it sends a message to
every dictator in the region that force pays, that the way to stay on the throne is to shoot your people if they
protest, and the international community really won't do anything about it. And that sends a powerful
message both to the dictators and to the people. That's the real stakes in the region. GROSS: What about the
stakes for the West? Prof. LYNCH: We have a real stake in what this region's going to look like down the road.
What kind of Middle East are we going to be dealing with for the next decade, one in which you've had
peaceful transitions to some kind of more accountable, more democratic rule, where the people see that the
West was on their side? Or do we see a return to kind of sullen dictatorships, angry people who blame the
West for standing by while their hopes were crushed?
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Non-Military Intervention Solvency

High level intervention needed to push Middle East democratic
transitions. Intervention boosts US credibility in the region
As their challenges grow, the country's opposition groups have returned to their old fractious ways. Indeed,
democratic transitions are notoriously messy and uncertain. Recognizing this, the Arab world's new emerging
democracies will need support and assistance from the international community, including the United States.
This can be done through technical assistance and election monitoring. But more high-level involvement may
be necessary as well, by putting pressure on the new governments to uphold their commitments and providing
financial incentives to meet certain benchmarks on democratization. The question is whether the United
States and its European allies, with their cash-strapped governments and skeptical publics, are willing to
commit billions of dollars to helping democratize a still-troubled region. A great deal is at stake. America was
rightly credited for helping facilitate transitions in many Eastern European and Latin American countries. If the U.S.
is seen as helping make another transition possible, this time in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, it will give
Americans much-needed credibility in the region. Successful transitions could herald a reimagined relationship
between the United States and the Arab world, something that Obama promised in his 2009 Cairo address but failed
to deliver on.
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Military Intervention Good Responsibility to

Protect
Responsibility to protect obligates us to intervene if civilians
are being attacked
Democracy in America. March 11, 2011
What's the point of having this superb military if you can't use it?, Economist reprint,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/03/defence_spending_and_libya DOA: 5/5/11
FAR be it from me to argue that the United States or NATO should be intervening in Libya to stop Muammar
Qaddafi from crushing the rebels. But the fact that we're not intervening is pretty telling, if you consider it in
historical context. Had a broad-based citizen uprising against Mr Qaddafi broken out in 1999 or 2001, not only
would there have been strong American political will for intervention, it would have been easy to put together an
international alliance and perhaps even a UN mandate. Those were the years after the Clinton administration, in the
aftermath of its embarrassing failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, had decisively embraced the idea of humanitarian
intervention. NATO had gone along, and even the UN was pushing towards its eventual ratification of the
"Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, which obliged outside powers to intervene militarily when countries
failed to protect or actively attacked their own citizens. The Bush administration initially pulled back from the
idea of humanitarian interventions, but after the September 11th attacks it, too, embraced the liberal-internationalist
idea of democracy promotion through force. A NATO that endorsed bombing campaigns and eventually military
occupation of Kosovo would probably not have shrunk at the far more clear-cut case of Libya, had an uprising
happened a dozen years ago.
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Military Intervention Good Morality

The threat of bloodshed makes humanitarian intervention
acceptable
Global American Discourse, March 4, 2011, Middle East Democracy: American Dream Will Come True?,
newglobal-america.blogspot.com/.../middle-east-democracy-american-dream.html DOA: 5/2/11
Recent turmoil in Libya shows us that only US and NATO troops can act as the Global Police Force. Regarding
Western intervention, Ibrahim Sharqieh, deputy director of Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, said, "I don't think they
would have any problem with this. I would suspect that the Arab world would support this" (oeAnalysts: More
Libyan bloodshed could prompt U.S., NATO intervention; CNN; February 25, 2011). According to Sir Richard
Dalton, Former British Ambassador to Libya, the threat of bloodshed in this country is serious enough to consider
international humanitarian armed intervention. Though Russia and China oppose Western military intervention,
Libya has been isolated in the Arab world. Also, Libyan oil production can be replaced in the short term by others
like Saudi Arabia
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A2: Intervention Always Fails

Intervention has failed in the past because the US has not
backed the democratic protestors
To be sure, the United States has a checkered, tragic history in the region. For decades, the United States has been
on the wrong side of history, supporting and funding Arab autocrats and undermining nascent democratic
movements when they threatened American interests. So critics of Western 'meddling' have a point: whenever the
United States and Europe interfere in the region, they seem to get it wrong. That is precisely why it's so
important that, this time, they get it right. But getting it right requires that the United States fundamentally
reassess its Middle East policy and align itself with Arab populations and their democratic aspirations. This
has not happened.
Egypt and Tunisia, despite all their problems, remain the most promising cases. Elsewhere, the situation is
considerably more grave, with U.S.-backed autocrats in Yemen and Bahrain having used unprecedented force against
their own citizens. Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Bahrain has fanned the flames of regional sectarianism and
made an already explosive situation even worse.
Thus far, the Obama administration has been behind the curve in nearly every country, reacting to rather than shaping
events. President Obama adopted a slow and deliberate approach, and refused to take a stronger stand with America's
Yemeni and Gulf allies. Even enemies such as the Syrian regime have so far escaped any real pressure. If anything
is clear, it is that Arabs have shown that something more than caution and gradualism is called for in historic
moments of change. This time, they-not the international community-are leading the way. But they and their
countries need the international community to follow. Otherwise, their revolutions may still fail.
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A2: West Irrelevant

Western leverage a critical variable to the spread of democracy
Ivan Krastev is chairman of the board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria, and a fellow at the
Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna. He is also editor-in-chief of the Bulgarian edition of Foreign Policy and
associate editor of Europe's World. , Journal of Democracy, Volume 22, Number 2, April 2011 Paradoxes
of the New Authoritarianism, p. 10
Levitsky and Way have concluded, based on a study of numerous cases of competitive authoritarianism, that
authoritarian regimes have the best chance of surviving in countries where Western leverage is limited and where
linkages with the West are low. The existence of a functional state with a capacity for repression and the presence of
an efficient ruling party are other critical factors that boost the survival chances of authoritarian regimes. Such
regimes are harder to dislodge in big, nuclear-armed countries that have never been Western colonies, that are
governed by a consolidated ruling party, and that are ready to shoot when students come to protest on the main
square. Authoritarians are less likely to stay in power in states that are small and weak, that are located near the
European Union or United States, that need IMF loans, that are economically and culturally connected with the West,
that lack a strong ruling party, and that cannot or will not shoot protesters.
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Human Rights Abuses Justify Intervention

Human rights abuses and hoarding of resources justify
intervention
p. 13
Yet, for contemporary readers, widespread, systematic oppression is not the sole mechanism to trigger intervention.
Cases in which princes exhaust the finances of the treasury and ground the faces of the poor to serve the
benefit of the rich may also justify intervention. Instead of one tyrant they suffer ten thousand. [W]icked men,
assassins, and disturbers of the peace of all kinds commit their evil deeds with impunity, for the good and liberal king
cannot bring himself to refuse a petition of grace. The public good is sacrificed for the benefit of individuals, and the
whole burden of the commonwealth falls on the poor (64).16
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*** Democracy Good ***
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A2: Democratization Bad

Democratization now, US intervention critical to success
The Nation (Pakistan), April 16, 2011
Obama's dilemma!, http://mespectator.blogspot.com/2011/04/obamas-middle-east-dilemma.html DA 5/1/11
When US President Barack Obama used the Cairo University as a platform to lecture the Arab world on the merits of
democracy a couple of years ago, he did not imagine that his words and speeches would be tested before the end of
his presidency. In fact, the Arab revolutions have put Obama and his political advisers off guard, and have
presented them with a dilemma that needs to be dealt with at some point.
In Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and even in Libya, Washington seemed to have been quite content with the status
quo. It was forced to adjust its policy only when it became absolutely clear that change in these countries was
inevitable. Several excuses have been given to justify the lack of interest by the Obama administration in democracy
promotion in the Middle East (ME). Absorbed with his internal problems and preoccupied with re-establishing
America's leadership abroad, Obama's utmost priorities are to resuscitate the US economy and end two unnecessary
wars, i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan, it has been argued. Given the golden opportunity presented by the uprisings in
the Arab world to advance the cause of democracy, however, these excuses are hardly convincing. Unlike the
costly intervention in Iraq, for example, the US could contribute to establishing democracies in the Arab world
at a cheap price. Over the past two years, since he became President, Obama has not been really interested in the
kind of rhetoric which featured prominently under his predecessor and focused on democratic change in the ME.
Words such as democracy promotion' have almost disappeared from Obama's public speeches. This trend brought to
the fore the eternal question in US policy circles about the ability of America to live with democratic governments in
the ME. The thesis that America must support dictators or else accept to live with the very people it regards as
dangerous for its interests and core values has become the compass that directs US policy in the ME under Obama.
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A2: Democratization Bad

Democratization inevitable, US needs to provide assistance to
consolidate it
Congressional Documents and Publications, April 13, 2011, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East
and South Asia Hearing;
"Shifting Sands: Political Transitions in the Middle East, Part 1.";
Testimony by Scott Carpenter, Keston Family Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/Car041311.pdf DOA: 5/2/11
For the Saudis, however, there is an absolute paranoia surrounding the Shia, who they believe are being supported
wholly by the revolutionaries in Tehran. They hear Iranian propaganda about the Egyptian revolution being a
continuation of Iran's revolution as truth. It is for this reason that the Saudis have pressured the King of Bahrain and
bankrolled the hard-liners within the Khalifa family to guarantee that Bahraini Shia demands are in no way met.
The Saudis risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy which will be wholly negative for U.S. interests in the region. By
urging the King of Bahrain to crush the uprising there, the government of Saudi Arabia has handed Iran, Hezbollah,
and other Shia reactionaries, such as Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr, a new rallying cry. The Saudis are increasing public
pressure on the government of Iraq, for example, which provides Hezbollah with a welcome distraction at a time
when its patron in Damascus is under pressure. Clearly, the vehement anti-Shia rhetoric and violence used against
Bahrian's Shia in recent weeks is contributing to the radicalization of Shia across the region who, until Saudi troops
rolled across the causeway, were content to be Iraqi, Kuwati,Yemeni, Saudi or Bahraini. Ultimately, in my view, the
forest fire that has been burning will continue to spread and no fire break of money alone will stop it. For this
reason, it is critical that the United States convince Riyadh in some way that the focus should be on managing
change rather than trying to stop or roll it back. Constitutional monarchies in Jordan, Bahrain and elsewhere can
be tolerated and should even be considered enviable end states. Going forward, American interests in the region will
remain rather consistent with the past, but the environment in which we try to advance them will be radically
different, for both good and ill. As my remarks hopefully make clear, the key to successfully managing the
political transitions across the region lies in Egypt and, to a lesser extent (but no less critical), Tunisia. In my
view, it is of utmost importance that the United States do everything it can to help Egypt and Tunisia
consolidate their democratic transitions since their relatively successful transitions are necessary to create a
strong foundation for a new relationship with the region. Doing so will require creativity, resources, and
intestinal fortitude to weather the ups and downs of these countries' domestic politics over the next two or so years.
The Muslim Brotherhood--in some political guise--will play a role in the respective elections that are quickly
approaching. How big a role the MB will play remains unclear, but the United States will have to strike a wise
balance between, on the one hand, being alive to the dangers that the Brotherhood and its allies pose to critical U.S.
interests and, on the other hand, providing the Brotherhood with a political gift through lightning-rod statements or
actions that could motivate voters otherwise indifferent to the Brotherhood's message to support the movement.
Privately, the Administration should engage with the Supreme Military Council in Egypt concerning elements of the
political transition that might inadvertently abet the Islamist current's political prospects. Publicly, it is important
for the Administration to send a clear message to the political elite and voting publics in Egypt and Tunisia
that we support transitions producing governments that show, through action, their commitment to the
universal freedoms of speech, assembly, thought, and religion, and to a free press; that encourage religious
liberty and practice and enforce religious tolerance for all minorities; that support the rights of people to
communicate freely, including through the internet, without interference; and that combat extremism in all its
forms, including those based on religion. In the case of Egypt, we must clearly state that we also support a
government that fulfills its international obligations. It is also important for the Administration to act now to
create incentives encouraging Egyptians and Tunisians to choose the sort of leadership with whom we can
build new and lasting relationships. In the case of Egypt, such incentives might include opening negotiations
for a free trade agreement and the expansion of the QIZ program. For both governments, an early loan
collateralized by seized assets of the ancien regime could be a compelling incentive. In addition, the United
States should dramatically expand financial support to traditional democracy promotion NGOs such as the
National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute through either the Middle East
Partnership Initiative or USAID. The United States should also look to help consolidate democracy through
new media tools that could, for instance, safe guard the electoral process or assist in capturing and
remembering the legacy of the revolutions. At the same time, if the United States is to fundamentally leverage the
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changes taking place in the region in order to secure its interests, the Obama Administration must find a way to
reinvigorate the Green Movement in Iran. In April 2009, the Obama Administration missed a golden
opportunity to support a similar revolution to the one that swept Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011 because
it was convinced doing so would risk its efforts to broker a nuclear deal with Iran. This was a historic,
strategic mistake, but it has a second chance. As I elaborated earlier, I strongly believe that the Arab revolutions of
2011 pose an insurmountable challenge to Iran's regime, but accelerating the impact will require a comprehensive
strategy. Forging such a strategy and pursuing it aggressively, however, will do little to calm Saudi Arabia, whose
greatest nightmare is a democratic Iran that becomes a strong ally of the United States.
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Democracy = Best Form of Government

Democracy is the best form of government multiple reasons
- holds rulers accountable to the people
- institutions prevent abusive rule and corruption
- guarantees human rights
- stimulates political competition that generates higher quality officials
McFaul 10 (Michael McFaul, Hoover Senior Fellow, professor of polisci and director of the
Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford and nonresident associate at
Carnegie, Advancing Democracy Abroad, p. 35-37)
First and foremost, democracy
provides the best institutional arrangement for holding rulers

accountable to the people. If leaders must compete for popular support to stay in power, they will
respond to their citizens preferences. Rulers who do not need popular support to gain or maintain power will likely be more
responsive to whatever group the family, the military, the mullahs, or the communist party controls their fate. The larger the number of people
needed to elect a leader, the
more inclined that leader will be to pursue public policies that benefit the
majority. Not surprisingly, therefore, democracies have consistently generated superior levels of social
welfare compared to autocracies at similar income levels. Second, the institutions of democracy prevent
abusive rule, constrain bad government, and provide a mechanism for getting rid of corrupt or
ineffective leaders. Truly oppressive leaders cannot remain in power for long if they must seek
the electoral mandate of those being oppressed. Autocrats face no such constraints. Mass terror
and genocide occur in autocracies, not democracies. Democracies do not prevent all abusive behavior, but over the
centuries, democratic leaders have unquestionably inflicted less pain and suffering on their
people than have autocratic leaders. Joseph Stalin and the Soviet regime sent 28.7 million to forced
labor camps, 2.7 million of whom died while incarcerated. Stalin consciously starved millions in Ukraine in the 1932-33 holodomor, and
ordered the political execution of millions more during his bloody reign. Adolf Hitler not only unleashed carnage through war, he
murdered six million Jews and millions more poles, gypsies, and others in his concentration
camps. In China, Mao may have killed more than seventy million people during his reign, including the roughly
thirty-eight million people who died during a horrific famine generated by government policies. In only four years, P ol Pot exterminated
roughly a quarter of Cambodias population. Idi Amin in Uganda, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Slobodan
Miloevi in Yugoslavia also systematically slaughtered their own citizens. The carnage within democracies
during the same century is tragic, but its breadth is not on the same scale. In the twenty-first century, autocratic regimes in
Sudan, Zimbabwe, North Korea, and Burma inflict pain on their citizens in a manner with no
parallel in democratic countries. Famine is also a phenomenon of dictatorships, not democracies.
Amartya Sen notes in his work the remarkable fact that, in the terrible history of modern famines in the world, no
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively
free press. Ironically, skeptics in the democracy promotion debate in the U.S., often argue that bread and butter issues should come first,
or it is hard to care about our vote when you are starving. What these critics fail to recognize is that people often starve because
they do not have the power to vote. More generally, democracies are better at guaranteeing human
rights and individual freedoms than are autocracies, because they do not rely on the goodwill of
leaders. The correlation between Freedom House scores on political liberties and civil liberties is robust. For every liberal autocrat like
Singapores Lee Kuan Yew or the King of Jordan, there are several more Hitlers, Stalins, and Mugabes. Finally, democracy stimulates
political competition that helps to generate higher quality officials in government. Just as market
competition leads to better products, political competition produces better leaders, ideas, and
organizations. At a minimum, democracy provides a mechanism for getting rid of bad or incompetent
rulers in a way that autocracy does not. The absence of political competition in autocracies
produces complacency, corruption, and no mechanism for generating new talent.
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Democracy Good Laundry List/Econ

Democracy is the best system of governance solves war, terrorism, and economic growth
Mitchell and Phillips 8 (Lincoln A. Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Practice of International
Politics at Columbias School of International and Political Affairs, and David L. Phillips, project
director of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Enhancing Democracy
Assistance, January 2008, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/Enhancing
%20Democracy%20Assistance.pdf)
Democracy is both a reflection of American values and in Americas strategic interests.
Democracies do not fight wars against each other, nor do they engage in terrorism or produce
refugees. They also make more reliable allies and better trading partners. Democracy has proven
to be the best system of governance to realize universal human aspirations for freedom and to
support human development. Democracy is also the basis for steadier and more reliable economic
development. It is grounded in the rule of law, which stimulates competition, innovation, and
progress while providing the necessary legal framework for free markets. Democracy also fosters
an ethos of self-reliance and entrepreneurship that is far better suited to economic growth than
that of authoritarianism, which breeds apathy and stagnation. Democratic governance creates
conditions for individuals to fulfill their potential and live better lives.
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Democracy Good Peace

Democracy key to peace maintains internal stability, accountability, transparency, and
pluralism and decreases extremism
Craner and Wollack 8 (Lorne W. Craner, President of the International Republican Institute, and
Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute, New Directions for
Democracy Promotion, http://www.ndi.org/files/2344_newdirections_engpdf_07242008.pdf)
In recent decades, scores of countries have chosen to become democratic and the
majority of people in every region of the

world now believe that democracy is the best form of government. While democratic systems may be the
standard that nations seek, achieving that standard and sustaining support for democratic governance can be a difficult process. A critical challenge
for new democracies is to deliver better lives to their populations. To be successful and maintain popular support, a democracy cannot be just a set
of concepts or processes; it must be connected to economic prosperity and produce visible improvements, which are key factors in preventing
alternatives, such as autocratic regimes, from gaining ground. Democracies
also provide the best alternatives for

fostering peace across borders by maintaining internal stability and achieving economic and
social development. The September 11 attacks increased the focus on failed states and those in conflict as potential breeding grounds for
extremists. Democracies, with their focus on accountability, transparency, and pluralism, can help
reduce extremism by allowing avenues for dissent, alternation of power, and protections for the
rights of minorities.
Empirically, democracy saves lives the alternative is autocracy which breeds conflict and
extremism
Craner and Wollack 8 (Lorne W. Craner, President of the International Republican Institute, and
Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute, New Directions for
Democracy Promotion, http://www.ndi.org/files/2344_newdirections_engpdf_07242008.pdf)
Every major peace agreement negotiated in the last two decades has included, as a principal goal,
elections and the possibility of democratic governance. Developing democratic processes in the
course of building sustainable peace is central to achieving stability and securityboth domestically in
those countries and internationally. The return on this investment is astronomical. The value of lives saved in
places as diverse as East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, El Salvador, and
Kosovo, to list only a few, goes far beyond the expenditures that help to build inclusive political processes that cause belligerents to put down
arms and engage in peaceful competition for governmental power. The value in realized and potential economic
development and the economic implications derived from international peace and stability also
have to be considered in the equation. Democracies provide the best alternatives for fostering
peace across borders by maintaining internal stability and achieving economic and social
development. Conversely, autocracy, corruption, and lack of accountability exacerbate powerlessness,
poverty, and intolerance and breed instability, increasing the potential for conflict and extremism,
while hindering efforts to address famine, disease, and other matters essential for human development.
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Democracy Good Solves War

Democracy prevents war
- democratic states fight in self-defense only no risk of aggressive wars against other
democracies
- separation of powers
- toleration and respect among citizens
Rieffer-Flanagan 10 (Barbara Ann J. Rieffer-Flanagan, assistant professor of political science at
Central Washington University, Democratic peace in theory and practice, edited by Steven W.
Hook, p. 264)
There are other aspects
of liberal democracies that encourage restraint with regard to war. According to John
Rawls (1999), citizens in democratic states fight in self-defense, not for economic or territorial gain.
Thus, aggressive wars against other liberal democratic societies are improbable. It has also been
argued that the separation of powers found in many democratic political systems can slow down
and limit the drive to war (Russett 1993, 40). Furthemore, most citizens in liberal democratic societies hold
norms of toleration and respect for their fellow citizens. While they may disagree on particular issues, they
respect the rights of other citizens to participate and voice their views. If we extend these notions
of respect and toleration to liberal democratic peoples in foreign countries, the likelihood of war
decreases. Ultimately, the cultural and normative framework that democratic citizens develop results
in peaceful values and expectations and relations between states (Schafer & Walker 2006).
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Democracy Good Backstop Against Turns

Democracy acts as a backstop against all of their impacts no democratically elected leader
will allow policy disasters
McGinnis and Somin 7
John and Ilya, Professor of Law @ NU and Georgetown Respectively, Should International Law
Be Part of Our Law?, Stanford Law Review, Questia
Finally, democratic accountability also plays a crucial role in preventing major public policy
disasters, since elected leaders know that a highly visible catastrophic failure is likely to lead to
punishment at the polls. For example, it is striking that no democratic nation, no matter how
poor, has ever had a mass famine within its borders, (96) whereas such events are common in
authoritarian and totalitarian states. (97) More generally, democracy serves as a check on selfdealing by political elites and helps ensure, at least to some extent, that leaders enact policies that
serve the interests of their people.
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Democracy Good Empirics

Democracy solves all disadvantages empirical studies prove democratic governments
resolve conflicts peacefully
Ndulo, Professor of Law @ Cornell, 3
Muno Ndulo, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia; Professor, Cornell Law School; Director, Institute for African Development, Cornell
University, 2003, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Lexis
A 1993 study of 233 internal conflicts around the world, concluded that democracies had a far better
record of peacefully managing such conflicts than alternative systems. 54 The empirical fact that
democracies are far less likely to go to war with each other than other regimes further substantiates the relationship between poverty and
conflict, and their impact on the democratization process. Authoritarian or totalitarian systems
simply do not have the

institutions by which conflicts in society can be peacefully expressed and resolved. Dictatorships
generally try to deal with conflicts by ignoring or denying them, or by suppressing them using state coercive
apparatus. While such methods may indeed control conflicts (albeit usually at a severe cost), they [End Page
323] generally cannot resolve them. 56 The implication of fundamental issues such as identity and cultural
integrity in such conflicts means that almost nothing short of mass expulsions or genocide will make the conflicts disappear. It is
generally believed that the ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia in 1990, for example, had been suppressed for almost fifty
years during the years of communism, but was always present and unresolved. 57 An
authoritarian system can present an

illusion of short-term stability through its use of coercive state power to suppress dissent, but
is unlikely to sustain that stability over the long term. In contrast, it is argued that under a democracy,
disputes that arise are likely to be processed, debated, and reacted to, rather than resolved definitively and
permanently. 58 In short, democracy operates as a conflict management system. As Harris and Reilly have
observed, it is this ability to handle conflicts without having to suppress them or be engulfed by them that distinguishes democratic
governance from authoritarian rule. 59 This does not by any means suggest that democracy is perfect, or that the mere establishment of
democratic governance will itself lead to the settlement or prevention of conflicts. There are a number of cases in which democratic
institutions are hastily "transplanted" to post-conflict societies without taking root or with a subsequent resumption of hostilitiesas in the
cases of Burundi, Cambodia and Liberia. 60 But it is equally true that these cases offer many lessons as to how deals are struck and which
choices are of crucial importance to building a sustainable outcome. 61 Democracy is often messy and difficult, but it is also the best hope for
building sustainable solutions to most conflicts in the world. However, democratic institutions have to be strong enough to function
effectively and fairly. They can only be strong where the economic conditions are such that they can be sustained.
The most comprehensive empirical models prove the viability of democratic peace theory
Ward et al, Professor of Political Science, 98
Michael D. Ward, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, and Kristian S. Gleditsch, graduate research trainee in the
Globalization and Democratization Program, et al, at University of Colorado, Boulder, March 1998, The American Political Science Review
As Figure 1 details, democratization-whether
in mild or strong degrees-is accompanied by reduction,

not increase, in the risk of war. Though we do not present graphs of the converse, changes toward autocracy and reversals
of democratization are accompanied by increased risks of war involvement. These risks are
proportionally greater than the decline or benefits of further democratization. Thus, there is strong
evidence that democratization has a monadic effect: It reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a war. Although the
probability of war involvement does not decrease linearly, it does decrease monotonically, so that over the entire range of democracy minus
autocracy values, there
is a reduction of about 50%. During the democratic transition, at every point

along the way as well as at the end points, there is an attendant reduction in the probability of a polity being
at war. We also find that reversals toward greater levels of autocracy (not shown) not only increase the probability of war involvement.
Apparently, it is more dangerous to be at a given level of democracy if that represents an increase in the level of authoritarianism than it is to
be at the same level of democracy if that represents a decrease in the authoritarian character of the regime. Stated differently, reversals
are riskier than progress.ll It has been argued that institutional constraints are theoretically important in translating the effect of
democracy into foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Siverson 1995). If the idea of democracy is separated into its
major components, then the degree of executive constraints empirically dominates the democracy and autocracy scales (Gleditsch and Ward
1997). Accordingly, we demonstrate that moving toward stronger executive constraints also yields a visible reduction in the risk of war.
It continues
CONCLUSION Our results show that the process of democratization is accompanied by a decrease
in the probability of a country being involved in a war, either as a target or as an initiator. These results
were obtained with a more current (and corrected) database than was used in earlier work, and
121
Stefan Bauschard
122
our analyses also focus more clearly on the process of transition. In
comparison to studies that look only at the existence

of change in authority characteristics, we examine the direction, magnitude, and smoothness of
the transition process.
122
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123
Democracy Good Solves Econ Collapse

Democracy solves economic decline autocracies are twice as likely to experience economic
collapse
McFaul 10 (Michael McFaul, Hoover Senior Fellow, professor of polisci and director of the
Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at Stanford and nonresident associate at
Carnegie, Advancing Democracy Abroad, p. 46-47)
Just as democracy immunizes a society from the worst forms of governments, democracy also protects
a society from the

worst forms of economic disasters. Autocracies do not. No democracy has ever experienced the
level of economic and social dislocation of Stalinism, Maoism, or Pol Potism. To be sure, democratic
countries all suffered during the Great Depression, and economic downturns continue to occur in the democratic world. However, the
frequency and the scale of these economic swings are much more moderate in the democratic
world compared to the autocratic world. According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root, [T]he variance in
economic growth rates for autocracies is about twice what it is for democracies. Or put another way,
Mort Halperin, Joseph Siegle, and Michael Weinstein calculate that, Over the past 40 years, autocracies have been
twice as likely to experience economic collapse [that is, a shrinkage in annual GDP per capita of 10 percent or more] as
democracies. Really bad policies that can bring economic ruin occur less frequently in democracies.
In the long run, democratic regimes produce policies that favor sustained growth and prosperity just as well as authoritarian regimes do. On
average, democratic
regimes also have higher levels of trade liberalization, which in turn generates
higher growth rates. Democratic regimes also foster the accumulation of human capital, which
has a positive effect on economic development. Rulers in democracies also must be more responsive to the basic needs of
their population, which does not always produce positive economic results in the short run, but does compel political leaders to pursue policies
beneficial to majorities over the long run. In contrast, authoritarian
regimes are accountable to a powerful rich

minority, and thus are more likely to prey on parts of society. These regimes also have incentives
to extract the maximum possible surplus to use for their own purposes, not for the welfare of the
population as a whole. Contemporary comparisons of regime type and growth usually focus on the developing world, but leaving out
the developed economies skews the sample. When all countries are included in the analysis, the oldest democracies in the world
are also the richest countries in the world: only two of the twenty-five highest ranking countries on the Human Development
Index Hong Kong (if it is still counted as an independent political entity) and Singapore are not democracies.
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Democracy Good Terrorism

Lack of democracy causes terrorism
Pillar 10 (Paul R. Pillar, professor and director of graduate studies at the Center for Peace and
Security Studies at Georgetown, Democratic peace in theory and practice, edited by Steven W.
Hook, p. 246-7)
Although perhaps not reducible to convincing statistics, one empirical pattern that suggests a
relationship between a lack of

democracy and the roots of terrorism concerns two of the most conspicuous attributes of the
Middle East. One is that the Middle East, more than any other region, has been the birthplace of the
terrorist groups and individual terrorists most worrisome to the West today. The other is that the Middle
East is by most measures the least democratic region of the world. Admittedly, there are other important
characteristics of the Middle East that are pertinent to the role terrorism has played in that region, such as the long-running conflict between
Israelis and Arabs. But the correlation between terrorism and the paucity of democracy is no accident. The
connection can be understood by reflecting on the most basic principles of political systems and the articulation of political interests. Terrorism is
a difficult, dangerous, illegal, and, for most people, immoral business. Few would venture into it if easier and less nasty ways of pursuing the
same objectives were available. As
a political act, terrorism is used to pursue various interests and express

various grievances that more often are pursued and expressed peacefully, when permitted by the
political system. Political systems that offer peaceful channels democracies are less likely to
drive people into terrorism than systems that do not (Pillar 2007). That is a simple statement of the basic principle
involved. In practice, of course, counterexamples abound. Terrorism has many contributing causes, at the level of nations and societies as well as
at the level of individuals and their personal situations and psychologies. Any explanation based on one cause, be it a lack of democracy or any
other, always will fall short. Yet that does not deny the relevance of the cause or the prospect that addressing that cause could change the
magnitude and nature of the terrorist problem. The principle just offered is consistent with one of the most basic elements of traditional
democratic theory. Democracies
are good because they are more likely than other political systems to
ensure that the interests of the ruled will guide the actions of the rulers. That is because the ruled
have more of a role in selecting and removing their rulers. Many causes that terrorist groups
pursue involve a population (often defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, or class) that to some degree sees itself as
being ruled in a manner contrary to its interests and as not having peaceful means to rectify the
situation. Democratic theory offers other insights pertinent to how more democracy might mean
less of a proclivity toward terrorism. Democracy is good not only because it provides a
mechanism for the ruled to choose and cashier their rulers but also because of the effects that
broad participation in government has on the temperament and habits of the ruled themselves. As
one political theorist puts it, a justification for democracy is as a means to producing certain states or attitudes of mind in the citizens,
independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others, interest in public affairs, willingness to think about them and discuss them, and a sense of
responsibility for the whole community (Field 1963). Several of these qualities are the antithesis of the way most terrorists think and operate.
Certainly, intolerance
and a lack of respect for opposing opinions are central characteristics of the
terrorist mindset. Disdain for free discussion a preference for blowing up negotiating tables
rather than sitting at them is another. Within most terrorist groups there typically is not only a lack of independent thinking
but also assiduous efforts by group leaders to quash any hint of it. A sense of belonging to and responsibility for the
community also are important. That means not merely a mythical or longed-for community, such as the umma, or community of
believers in Islam, that Islamists often invoke as one of their reference points. It means the political system, nation-state, province, and town in
which an individual lives. Alienation
from ones community is an element in the sources of extremism in

much of the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in other parts of the Muslim world. People see
themselves as having little or no stake in the states and political systems in which they live. They
are subjects of a political order but do not feel a part of it. Consequently, they may have little
compunction about turning violently against that order. To the extent that democracy by
directly, peacefully, and meaningfully involving citizens in the political process imparts a sense
of belonging to the political system, it becomes a disincentive against such violent rejection.
124
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125
Democracy Solves Human Rights

Democracy key to human rights
Shale Horowitz, Ass. Prof. Of Polisci at University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and Albrecht Schnabel, Senior
Research Fellow at Swiss Peace Foundation, Bern, 2004
In Human Rights and Societies in Transition, ed. Horowitz and Schnabel, p. 7.
However, the situation for other human rights is likely to be worse if political rights and freedoms are weak or nonexistent. Authoritarian regimes and leaders typically use their discretionary power to attack and weaken their
political opponents and to prevent new opposition from arising. This strategy usually goes beyond action against
political freedoms proper: authoritarian regimes are more likely to try to monopolize control of the mass media and
other "informational" institutions, particularly the educational system and religious institutions. This control will be
used to shut out opposition voices, including human rights advocates. At the same time, the regime will argue that
local traditions and historical experiences justify its own practices and that they are threatened by the supposedly
"alien" demands of the opposition. Authoritarian regimes are also more likely to politicize economic subsidies and
regulations in an effort to build bases of support through patronage networks. This results in more widespread
discrimination and greater neglect in providing public goods. Last, authoritarian regimes may initiate or per petuate
civil and international conflicts, in order to divert public attention away from political and economic difficulties that
undermine their legitimacy.6 These likely interactions are shown in figure 1.1
The protection of human rights is necessary for the survival of the species
Copelon 99(Profesor of Law at NY School of Law, 3 N.Y. City L. Rev.)
The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in
the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority [*72] of the U.S. version of
rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of indivisible
human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official
and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental
depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being
broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern
Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of
individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation
rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new
mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include humancentered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. 38 Given the poverty and
inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the
human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.
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Stefan Bauschard
126
Negative
126
Stefan Bauschard
*** Human Rights Promotion ***
127
127
Stefan Bauschard
128
Human Rights Promotion Undermines Human

Rights
US pressure decreases Chinese human rights cooperation
A Cooper Drury and Yitan Li, Dept of Poli Sci, University of Missouri Columbia, 2003
http://www.missouri.edu/~isam/DruryLi.pdf
Thequestionofeffectivenessofthesesanctionthreatsdependslargelyonhowweconceptualize
Chinasbehavior.IfchangeinChinasbehaviorismeasuredbythelevelofrepression,thenthere
isnolinkbetweenU.S.threatsandBeijingsbehavior.Instead,repressionisseeminglydrivenby
thedomesticsituationinChina.Beijingdecidestorepressinorderto25maintainitscontrolof
thepopulation.ItdoesnottakecuesfromAmericawhethertheyareverbaloractivethreats.It
isworthnotingthatpositiveorcooperativemovesbyWashingtonalsohavenoimpact.Beijing
simplydoesnotrespondtoexternalfactorswhendecidingtorepress.Thesameisnottruefor
Chineseaccommodations.Inthiscase,AmericanthreatsdoinfluenceChinesebehavior,butnot
inthemannerintendedbythesender.Boththreateningactionsandrhetoricaresignificantly
associatedwithfewer,notmore,accommodations
.
Alternatively,Beijingrespondsfavorablyto
positive,cooperativeU.S.rhetoricandbehavior,andthisrelationshipisreciprocal.Positive
rhetoricandincreasedaccommodationsleadtopositivebehaviorbyWashington.Chinaisableto
sell(andAmericabuys)theideathatreleasingafewprisonersorrelaxingsomerestrictionscan
compensateforhigherlevelsofChineserepressionandameliorateWashingtonsconcerns.21In
theend,theU.S.threatstorevokeorconditionMFNstatusforChinahadaparadoxicaleffect.
ActualrepressionlevelswereunaffectedbyallofWashingtonsgyrations,while
accommodationsdecreasedasthethreatsbecamemoreintense.
Onlycooperativeactionsand
rhetoricleadtomorepositivebehaviorbyChina.Theseresultsraisequestionsaboutthe
effectivenessofsanctionthreats,theimportanceofconflictexpectations,andtargetresponses
affectingthesendersbehavior.Theyalsoraisequestionsaboutwhethercoercionorengagement
isbettersuitedtomakinggainsonhumanrightsissuesinChinaandperhapselsewhere.Asa
conclusion,weturntothesequestionsnow.Ouranalysissuggeststhatthe
MFNthreatswerenot
onlyineffectivebutalsocounterproductive
.Wearguedearlierthattheseresultscouldbe
generalizedtoothersanctionthreats,atleastthosetargetinghumanrightsabuses.Weholdthat
thefindingshereindospeaktootherhumanrightssanctions,butwedonotdisputetheother
findingsthatconcludesanctionthreatsaremostsuccessful(MorganandMiers,1999;Nooruddin,
2002;Drezner,2003).Aswearguedabove,thecommunication,capability,willingness,and
intentionsoftheAmericanthreatswereverymurky,andsotheycouldbeexpectedtoultimately
fail.However,thisresultdoesnotexplaintheinversereactionfromBeijingtotheintensityofthe
U.S.threatsthatfeweraccommodationswereoffered.Webelievethatthepublicnatureofthe
threatshelpsexplainthecounterintuitivefindings.TheAmericanMFNthreatswereextremely
public;theyweremostlyconstituted
inpublicdebatesandopenvotesinWashington.ForBeijing
tocomply,evenwithtrivialaccommodations,
meantthatitwas
publicly
bowingtoU.S.pressure.
Thus,ChinahadadisincentivetoofferanypositivebehaviortotheU.S.(LiandDrury,2004)
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Stefan Bauschard
129
Human Rights Promotion Undermines Human

Rights
US human rights promotion contributes to the oppression it attempts to alleviate Iraqi
sanctions prove
John A. Gentry, 1999, researcher and writer on defense- and security-related issues, Washington
Quarterly, Autumn.
Afocusonrights,andacollectiveconfidencethattheUnitedStatesknowsbetter
thantherestof
theworldwhathumanrightsareandhowtheyarerankordered,
hasledthegovernmenttoa
growingextenttopontificate,cajole,exhort,andextortthroughsanctionspoliticalaction
fromcountriesaroundtheworld
.Acrossthepoliticalspectrum,fromreligiousconservativesto
radicalsecularleftists,Americanscriticizetheperformancesofforeigngovernmentsinthose
partsofthehumanrightsspectrumthataretheirownpersonalinterest.TheyalsocriticizeU.S.
leaderswhofailtoadvocatethebrandofethicalimperialismthatadvancestheirfavoritehuman
rights.TheUnitedStateshasembodiedhumanrightsfirmlyintheinstitutionalframeworkofits
foreignpolicy.Humanrightsareprominentinthenationalsecuritystrategiesofpresidents.The
U.S.DepartmentofStatehasanassistantsecretarywhomanagesissuesrelatedtohumanrights
andanambassadorforwarcrimes.Policymakersbothpaylipservicetoandembodyhuman
rightsintopolicydecisions.n9Congress,reflectingtheactivismofconstituentswithnarrow
interestsacrossthepoliticalspectrum,pushestheexecutivebranchtobeyetmoreactivein
humanrightsarenas.Whenforeigngovernmentsfailtoheedtheiradvice,membersofCongress
increasinglyimposeeconomicsanctionstoforceaction.Byitsowncount,Congressthrough
mid1998imposedsanctions104timessinceWorldWarII,including61timessinceBillClinton
becamepresident.n10Stateandlocalgovernmentshavejumpedonthebandwagonbybanning
theirpurchasingagentsfrombuyinggoodsandservicesfromallegedlyoffendingnationsranging
fromMyanmartoSwitzerland.Theyhaveorderedgovernmentemployeepensionfundstosell
sharesofcompaniesdoingbusinessin"bad"places.Theseminiforeignpolicieshaveprompted
manylegitimateforeigncomplaintsandundoubtedlycausedconsternationattheState
Department.Americans
appeartosupportstronglysuchactionsinmostcases.They
evidently
carelittlethateconomicsanctionsrarelychangethebehaviorofforeigngovernmentsbut
regularlydamagethewellbeingofthecitizensoftargetcountries
.Since1991,
forexample,
manyreputableWesternorganizationsandUnitedNationsagenciesestimatethatsanction
induceddeprivationshavekilledseveralhundredthousandIraqis,mainlychildrenandold
people.AdvocatesforthesevictimsarguewithouteffectthatdeprivationsponsoredbytheUnited
Statesviolatestheirrights.ButAmericans,iftheyknowthehumancostofsanctions,typically
claimpiouslythatitisallSaddamHussein'sfault,thatallwouldbewellifSaddamonlydidas
Washingtonproperlydemands.
129
Stefan Bauschard
130
Human Rights Promotion Fails

Human rights pressure fails, especially if its unilateral
MerleGoldman,professorofChinesehistoryemeritaatBUandassociateatthefairbankcenter
atHarvard,2004
in,ImplementingU.S.HumanRightsPolicy,ed.DebraLiangFenton,138.
PressureismoreeffectivewhentheUnitedStatesandtheWesternnationscooperateontactics
andgoals;itislesseffectivewhentheUnitedStatesactsalone
.Evenwithnationscooperating,
however,combinedeffortshavebeenhalfhearted,notonlybecauseofthewaveringofthe
EuropeansforfearofimpairingtraderelationswithChina,butalsobecauseofU.S.concernthat
protestsoverhumanrightsabusesmayconflictwithU.S.effortstogainChina'scooperationon
strategicandeconomicinterests.Whilepressurehasnotachievedsignificantresults,acombinationof
multilateralandbilateralmonitoringhashadsomeimpact.ThedesireofChina'sleaderstobeseenascooperativemembersoftheinternationalcommunityhasservedasaconstraintontheirbehavior.TheyarewellawarethatChina's
internationalreputationinfluencestheiraccesstoforeigninvestment,moderntechnology,andtradeopportunitiesaswellasChina'sinternationalstature.
Any concessions on human rights due to pressure will be

purely cosmetic and transitory
Alan M. Wachman, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, 2001
Third World Quarterly, Vol 22 No. 2
In addition to the general deflection of criticism through its human rights white papers, Beijing
also uses '"cosmetic gestures" to impress foreigners'.62 This corresponds with Risse and Sikkink's
third phase of the spiral model, the phase of 'tactical concessions'. Accordingly, governments ...
changed their human rights practices only to gain access to the material benefits of foreign aid
or to be able to stay in power in the face of strong domestic opposi tion. In fact, the process of human rights change almost
always begins with some instrumentally or strategically motivated adaptation by national governments to growing domestic and transnational pressures. Between 1990 and
1991 Beijing endeavoured to influence the debate in the USA about whether to grant most
favoured nation (MFN) trade status to the PRC . Accordingly, the PRC released 881 individuals associated with the demonstrations in Tiananmen
63
Square, martial law was lifted in Beijing, Fang Lizhia noted senior activist who had taken refuge in the US embassywas permitted to leave the PRC, Han Dongfanga labour activist dying
in prisonwas released and the PRC offered the USA assurances that it would not prohibit individuals 'from going abroad for political reasons' ,64 In 1993, as the International Olympic Committee
was preparing to make its decision about which city would host the 2000 summer Olympics, the PRC released its long-held prisoner, Wei Jingsheng. As the PRC application to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was up for consideration, Beijing released Wang Dan, one of the most vilified students involved in leading the movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In
prisoners were released on the eve of

President Clinton's decision about whether to grant MFN status to the PRC in 1993. Of those
released, some were jailed again.66 In 1994, as the USA was again determining whether to grant MFN status to the PRC, Beijing demonstrated a willingness to
neither case did the releases buy for the PRC the approval it sought. Both men were eventually arrested again.65 Other
discuss individual cases of reported human rights violations. It released more political prisoners and moderated the sentences of others. The PRC also sent delegations abroad to
address the question of human rights, as an indication of the seriousness with which it wished to be portrayed dealing with human rights issues. 67 In the case of Wang Dan, the PRC
thumbed its nose at the USA in a gratuitous piece of diplomatic cynicism. After President Clinton announced that he had 'de linked' the granting of MFN from the human rights issue, the
PRC then held rather prominent trials of political dissidents. News of the start of these trials was released just as Ron Brown, then US Secretary of Commerce, was about to
begin a visit to China. Moreover, Wang Dan was rearrested just hours before Brown arrived in China.68 When the PRC releases a well known political prisoner, is it possible to
determine whether it did so in response to a sense of shame? Is it possible to distinguish between those acts of the PRC that are responses to shame and those that are instrumental
in the conduct of political horse trading? Moreover, even if elaborate and well timed displays of clemency are responses to shaming, what role do these acts play in the
The arbitrariness with which a regime can, in response to

political pressure, release an individual who had been sentenced to prison may be just as
much a signal of systemic deficiencies as the arbitrariness with which a regime can arrest and
imprison an individual. What comfort can advocates of human rights take from a decision
by Beijing to let Wei Jingsheng or Wang Dan out of prison, for example, if it does so in
response to political pressure or shaming from abroad? Does that not indicate that the
judicial system in the PRC is still highly politicised and has yet to establish its
independence from the political side of the house? Moreover, if the PRC's release of Wei and
Wang are viewed as responses to shaming, why is it that the Chinese government later
detained, for apparently contrived reasons, such people as the Dickinson College librarian
Song Yongyi and the Boston-based poet Huang Beiling ? One would expect that, if the government was shamed into releasing
130
broader effort to promote human rights in the PRC?69
Stefan Bauschard
131
dissidents like Wei and Wang, it would have become chastened about the arbitrary use of power, especially in cases involving individuals with links abroad, like Song and
. One would also need to account for the persistent reports of the brutal mistreatment of
Tibetans, Uighurs, detainees in police custody and others, especially the highly visible Falun
Gong practitioners. Regardless of what one concludes about the rationality of the Falun Gong
adherents themselves, a government eager to avoid the pressure of externally applied
shame would be unlikely to act with the force that has evidently been used to restrain those
associated with the sect.
Huang
131
Stefan Bauschard
132
Human Rights Pressure Fails

Human rights pressure results in counter-propaganda rather
than reform
Man-To Leung, Asst Prof of Polisci at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, 2004
In Human Rights and Societies in Transition, ed. Horowitz and Schnabel, p. 347
AfterthesuppressionofthestudentmovementinTiananmenSquareinJune1989inthePRC,
WesterncountriesimposedvarioustypesofsanctionsonthePRC.19ThePRC'sofficialresponse
totheWestwasreactionary:whendealingwith
internationalpressure
,theCCPattemptedto
launchaseriesofpropagandaeventstoshowthatthePRChadalwaysguaranteedhumanrights.20
FromtheperspectiveoftheChinesegovernment,anextensivestudyofhumanrightstheoryand
practiceinthePRCwasseenasindispensabletothedevelopmentofapositiveresponsetothe
West.Theearly1990shavethusseenatideofhumanrightsstudiesinthePRC.Thiswas
triggeredbyanimportantchangeinofficialattitudestowardstheissueofhumanrights.21
Moreover,Chinesehumanrightsscholarsattemptedtodevelopasocialisttheoryofhumanrights
tobackupofficialpropaganda.22
US pressure on human rights has no leverage on China

KennethW.Abbott,VisitingProfessor,UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeleySchoolofLaw;
ElizabethFroehlingHornerProfessorofLawandCommerce,NorthwesternUniversitySchoolof
Law.April99,93A.J.I.L.361
Asliberaltheorywouldpredict,somestatesappearmorevulnerablethanotherstonormative
persuasionandpressure
.n74KeckandSikkinkfind,forexample,thatstateswithliberal,law
basedtraditionshavedifficultyresistinglegalornormativearguments,evenifcurrentlyunder
authoritarianrule(e.g.,Argentina).Thislogicsuggests,however,thatstateswithoutthese
traditionsmayresistnormativepressure
s.Indeed,itimpliesthatthewidespreadratificationof
humanrightstreatiesmaskswidelyvaryingnormativeviews,aformof"organizedhypocrisy"
n75inconsistentwithlegaluniversality.Realismisalsorelevanthere:Westerngovernmentshave
beenreluctanttopressure
strategicallyoreconomicallysignificantstates,whilesometarget
countries(e.g.,China)areinsulated
frommostformsofleverage.
US pressure fails on chinese human rights, engagement key to

solve
Finally,thecounterproductiveeffectsoftheMFNthreatssuggestthatAmericancoercivepolicy
towardChinawasmisplaced,andastrategyofengagementmayhavebeenmoreeffectivein
promotinghumanrightswithintheworldsmostpopulacecountry.22Deployedsanctionsaimed
atpromotinghumanrightshaveaverypoortrackrecord(Hufbauer,Schott,andElliott,1990),
andtheevidencepresentedhereinsuggestthatsanctionthreatshavethesame(orworse)
ineffective,detrimentaloutcome.Therefore,itseemspossiblethatactiveengagementwithChina
132
Stefan Bauschard
133
maybethemosteffectivewaytosecurebetterhumanrights.Beforegeneralizingthisconclusion
toothercountrieswithpoorhumanrightsrecords,averysignificantconditionmustbeapplied.
Beijingmadeincreasedlevelsofinternationaltradeandeconomicdevelopmentoneoftheir
primarygoals(CableandFerdinand,1994).Thislevelofopennessindicatesthatthenationis
willingatsomeleveltoconformtosomeinternationalregimes,forexample,financialreporting
andtradeliberalizationasrequiredbytheWTO.Therefore,wesuggestthatengagementof
regimesthathavebeguntoacceptinternationalnormsmayprovemoreeffectivethanthreatened
ordeployedcoercion.Wecannotspeaktothosecountries,suchasNorthKorea,thathavenot
startedacceptingthenormstypicallyassociatedwithinternationalinstitutions.Futureresearch
shouldaddresssuchquestions.
133
Stefan Bauschard
134

Human rights pressure fails in china its making apple pie out
of egg rolls
Christopher Wall, LL.M., 1998, University of Durham, Dec 1998
22FordhamInt'lL.J.577
Ifroleswerereversed,however,manyAmericanswouldlikelyfeeldifferently.Theideathatany
statecouldcurrentlyimposetradesanctionssuccessfullyupontheUnitedStatesinordertogetit
tochangeitshumanrightslawsmayseemoutrageousbecausemoststateswouldbehard
pressedtoconvincetheUnitedStatesthrougheconomicmeanstorectifyitsownhumanrights
problems.Forexample,theircurrenteconomichardshipaside,theAsianfinancialpowerscould
scarcelyhopetouseitseconomicpowertopersuadetheUnitedStatestodosomethingaboutits
owncontinuinguseofcapitalpunishment.Similarly,aEuropeanUnion("EU")boycottofU.S.
goodsbecauseoftheUnitedStates'historicallydiscriminatoryapproachinthetreatmentof
womenwouldmeetthesameU.S.response:"It'snoneofyourbusiness."Thisresponsewould
suffice,consideringtheUnitedStates'currentdominanteconomicandmilitaryposition,which
permitsitto"goitalone,"andconsideringthattheUnitedStateswouldsimplybeunwillingto
maketheculturalconcession.TheUnitedStatescouldmakestridesinhumanrights
enforcementbykeepinginmindthatthesameculturalconstraintsexistinplacessuchasChina,
whereattemptstoim[*604]poseU.S.orWesternnormsinsomecasesamountstoanattemptto
makeapplepieoutofeggrolls.
134
Stefan Bauschard
135
Human Rights Pressure Backfires

T/Human rights pressure increases nationalistic sentiment that is more likely to impede
human rights efforts
Alan M. Wachman, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, 2001
Third World Quarterly, Vol 22 No. 2
The reason why one needs to be concerned about the arousal of nationalistic defiance in
response to foreign efforts to shame the PRC is that the very foreign- ness of the effort may
strengthen the arguments made in policy discussions to resist liberalisation and expansion
of rights. It may also diminish the moral authority of those would-be reformers in Beijing
as well as in China's police substations, prisons and labour camps. In this way, what are well
intended efforts to shame on behalf of a moral objective may have counterproductive effects
that actually impede those who might, otherwise, be able to take positive measures to improve
human rights.
Threats of US sanctions decrease Chinese human rights

cooperation
Recentliteraturearguesthatstudiesofeconomicsanctioneffectivenesssufferfromaselection
biasbyconsideringonlythosesanctionsthataredeployedandnotjustthreatened.Thesesanction
threats,itisargued,shouldbemoresuccessfulbecausebothsenderandtargethaveanincentive
tosolvetheirdisputebeforeenteringintoacostlyeconomicsanctionepisode.Testingthis
assertionissomewhatproblematicbecausesanctionthreatsare,inessence,nonevents
sanctionsthatwereneverdeployed.Thispaperprovidesanempiricalassessmentofonesetof
threatenedeconomicsanctionstheU.S.threatstorevokeorconditionChinasMFNstatusfrom
1989to1995.WeshowthatWashingtonsthreatsdidnotaffectthelevelofChinesepolitical
repressionandactuallydecreasedthehumanrightsaccommodationsofferedbyBeijing.
Further,whenChinawascooperative,theU.S.deescalateditsthreats.Wedonotconcludethat
sanctionthreatsaregenerallyineffectivebutthatsanctionthreatsdirectedathumanrights
behaviorcreateexpectationsoffutureconflictthatresultintheirfailure.Theoretically,theresults
highlighttheimportanceofconsideringtheimpactthatthetargetsbehaviorhasonthesenders
sanctiondecisions.Theresultsalsosuggestthatengagementwithcountriesopeningtheirmarkets
toglobaltrademayhaveamoreproductiveimpactthancoercivediplomacy.
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SANCTIONSANDPRESSUREARECOUNTERPRODUCTIVEINPROMOTING
HUMANRIGHTS
RandallPeerenboom,SchoolofLaw,UCLA,2000,ChinaInternationalReview:Vol7,No.2,
Fall,p.3112
Intheabsenceofeffectivelegalremedies,rightssupportersmayturntopoliticalchannels.
Donellysuggeststhatbecausehumanrightsarealegitimatematterofinternationalconcern,
sovereigntyrequiresonlythatstatesrefrainfromthethreatoruseofforceintryingtoinfluence
thehumanrightspracticesofotherstates(p.71).Shortofforce,governmentsarefreetouse
anyandalloftheotherforeignpolicymeansattheirdisposal,includingcensure,sanctions,and
foreigntradeandaidpoliciesthattiepreferentialtreatment,marketaccess,softloansand
governmentaidtoacountryshumanrightsperformance.Economicsanctionsandaidconditions
areusefulinsendingamessagetotheerrantcountrythathumanrightsviolationswillnotbe
tolerated,andinsomecaseshaveproducedpositiveresults,suchasinChinasperiodicrelease
andexilingofhighprofileprisoners.However,theyoftenbackfireanddomoreharmthangood.
Thedebateoversanctionsmaybeheldhostagetodomesticpolitics,orelseoppositionbythe
businesscommunitymayresultinachangeofpolicyandtheremovalofsanctions,whichthen
sendsthemessagethathumanrightsmaybetradedforshorttermdomesticeconomicand
politicalbenefits.Theselectiveimpositionofsanctionsonafewcountriesandnotalwaysthe
countrieswiththeworstrightsrecordsgivesrisetocriesofadoublestandardandcallsinto
questionthefairnessofthesanctionsandthemotivesofthecountryimposingthesanctions.
Moreover,whethersuchsanctionshelporhurtthepeoplewithinthetargetcountryisoften
unclear.Economicsanctionsmayworsenthelivingconditionsformanypeoplewhoarealready
livingontheedgeofsubsistence.Sanctionsmayalsoincreasetensionswithinacountryand
betweencountries,thuscausingtheriskofpolarizationanddecreasingthelikelihoodofreaching
agenuine,unforcedconsensusonrightsissues.Inanyevent,moststatesareunwillingtoexpend
politicalcapitalandgoodwillandjeopardizefriendlyrelationsandtheirowneconomicinterests
toprotecttherightsofdistantpeoplesagainsttheirowngovernments.
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HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION POLICIES ARE VIEWED AS SELFSERVING
Juan E. Mendez, law professor, Notre Dame Law School, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW
JOURNAL, Spring 2002, p.380.
The United States can shape events in other lands and influence the way other States treat their
citizens, and in fact almost invariably does so, whether it deliberately seeks to have a human
rights policy or not. That influence, however, is most effective and favorable to human rights
when the citizens of other societies perceive it as a genuine effort to uphold human rights for
their own sake, and not as a tool for other foreign policy interests.
HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION POLARIZES INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS
Anthony Chase, PhD candidate, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY, 1996, p.385.
The absolutist rhetoric of universal rights can arouse a political backlash among those who
have historical reasons to fear the universalizing goods of Europeans and Americans. The real
danger of the human rights movement's reliance on an ideology of universal rights is that it
has a polarizing effect: it raises mistrust and places local human rights activists in the
politically uncomfortable position of siding with those "universal" values popularly identified
with outside powers, rather than working with "indigenous," local traditions.
PUSHING HUMAN RIGHTS MOBILIZES THE OPPOSITION

Anthony Chase, PhD candidate, The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY, 1996, p.386.
Furthermore, at a certain point the attempt to push human rights norms as universal truths
may be counterproductive, stimulating resistance and mobilizing opposition from competing
natural law orders, instead of advancing the concretization of rights.
HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION PROGRAMS DO NOT HAVE A

PRAGMATIC IMPACT
Sherab Posel, articles editor, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, COLUMBIA HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, Fall 1995, p.133-134.
There are cultural and political factors that may also make it problematic to give genuine
content to the values embodied in human rights articles and charters. For a developing
country like Nepal to leap into wholesale endorsement of internationally generated
conventions or Western democratic constitutional models of fundamental rights may not only
be premature, but counterproductive. When ratification of international instruments and
adoption of legislation do not translate into pragmatic programs with real impact, the ensuing
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skepticism and cynicism can further undermine any effort to develop and implement
development strategies. A visitor to Nepal immediately senses such cynicism about prospects
for genuine change among those who may once have had high hopes for programs introduced
from outside the country, but who have since grown apathetic.
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TURN: HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION UNDERMINES INTERNAL
EFFORTS TO PROTECT RIGHTS
Michael J. Parrish, Editor in Chief, Cardozo Law Review, CARDOZO LAW REVIEW,
November, 2000, p.n239.
Placing unrealistic demands on countries that are in the process of reforming their human
rights standards would be counterproductive because it could undermine their efforts. See
Martin, supra note 159, at 1279 ("Many such regimes, particularly when newly installed, are
only beginning a difficult process of curbing human rights abuses committed by the military,
the police, or nongovernmental factions. We can support these efforts while still shielding the
truly jeopardized targets of those incompletely controlled elements.")
HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION TRIGGERS AN INTERNATIONAL

BACKLASH
Shefali Desai, JD candidate, University of Arizona, ARIZONA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 1999, p. 832.
At the same time, universalist positions, alone, are not a fruitful way to view the Taliban either. Mayer cites the
theory that the promotion of the universality of human rights by the West is counterproductive; it merely provokes
clashes and backlash movements in non-Western cultures: Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a
reaction against " human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support
for religious
fundamentalism.
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Human rights pressure backfires increases incentives for

repression
YitanLi&A.CooperDrury,UniversityofMissouri,2004,InternationalStudiesPerspectives,
Volume5,p.391
AperverseimplicationarisesfromtheUSthreats:Beijingsuseofhighleveldissidentsto
attempttoplacatetheUSandtheincreasedlevelofrepressionduringtheMFNdebatescreatesa
moralhazardfortheUS.
First,
forChinatohavedissidentstoreleaseorcurfewstolift,itmust
firstdetainthosedissidentsorimposethosecurfews.Thus,Beijing
couldand
didroundup
theusualsuspectspriortotheUSMFNdecisionandreleasethemlaterasasignofgood
will.Second,sinceBeijingfelttheneedtosignalthedissidentsthatWashingtonhadno
influenceinwhattheChineseleadershipconsideredasovereigntyissue
andtosignaltheU.S.
thathumanrightswerenonnegotiablesovereigntyissues,
theyincreasedpoliticalrestrictions.
Therefore,theUSthreatsgaveChinaamplereasontodetainmoreofitscitizensandcurtail
generalcivilfreedoms.
Afterall,thereleaseofafewhighlevelpoliticaldissidentsdoesnot
helpChinatoimproveitsoverallhumanrightsconditions.Instead,theMFNdebateitselfcreated
aperverse,counterproductivesituation.
. Pressure on China on human rights causes backlash and war
William Overholt 1993, Managing director of Bankers Trust Company, Hong Kong, PhD, Yale.
Rise of China, page 412-14
The greatest risk of all, a new and unnecessary cold war with China, is very severe. The most
sensitive spots are Taiwan. Hong Kong, and Tibet. The Bush administration in 1992 made the
decision to reverse a decade-old policy and sell high-performance fighter aircraft to Taiwan, just
prior to an election that brought advocates of Taiwan independence closer to power than they
have ever beenand closer than virtually any observers thought likely. Washington backed
Patten's push for democracy in ambiguous words that stopped just short of backing a British
decision to repudiate fundamental aspects of the agreement about how Hong Kong will be governed as it reverts to Chinese rule. President Clinton's Secretary of State adopted the language of
congressional advocates of Tibetan independence by referring to Tibetans as if they were not
citizens of China:17
The general approach that [Assistant Secretary of State-designate] Winston Lord is
recommending is the one that we'll be followingthat is to try to use MFN to encourage
better performance, better conduct in China on the many areas where we're disappointed,
as far as their attitude on proliferation, as far as their abuses of trade, and as far as their
human rights abuses, both with respect to their own citizens and with respect to people
living in Tibet. (Emphases added.)
Draft congressional legislation has taken a much stronger line than that, referring to Tibet as
occupied territory. As we saw in the epigraph to this chapter, the U.S. Secretary of State has
declared that it is the policy of his government to change China's form of governmentalbeit
peacefullyinto a democracy. (As all diplomats know, the phrase "peaceful evolution" is
currently the most dangerous expression in the Chinese leadership's vocabulary, a code phrase for
foreign subversion of their system.) The Congress has voted several times to use the most
powerful weapon of economic war at its disposal---removal of most-favored-nation statusin
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order to achieve political change in China, and this strikes at the heart of China's strategy for
national rejuvenation. In other words, the leaders in Beijing see Washington coming to the verge
of launching multiple challenges to China's territorial integrity, declaring that it is U.S. policy to
change the nature of China's government, and striking at the core of China's national strategy of
economic rejuvenation. This is the stuff that wars, cold and hot, are made of. Of course,
nobody in Washington intends a war with China; they are just expressing American values. They
would be horrified to think that those words could lead to a vast increase in China's military
spending, to curtailment of all Chinese cooperation in the UN Security Council, to broad reduction of economic intercourse, to an escalating conflict that could last for many
generations, and to isolation from all of today's Asian allies. Frequently, the target of the
rhetoric is not so much China as domestic constituents. But the nuances of intention tend to
fade away as they are translated across the Pacific. They do so when Washington perceives
Beijing, and it is not surprising that they do so when Beijing perceives Washington. The above
set of demands does not add up to a normal peaceful relationship between major nations, even
between major nations which have serious conflicts of interest. Ronald Reagan would never
even have considered mounting such a challenge to the Soviet Union in, say, 1982. Had he done
so, the Warsaw Pact denouement might have exploded in war. If Beijing were demanding
independence for Alaska, sending emissaries to impose immediate changes in the governance of
New York, and giving advanced weaponry to independence fighters in Puerto Rico, while voting
in favor of economic war and having its foreign minister declare the transformation of the United
States into a communist state a primary objective of Chinese foreign policy, Washington would
be concerned. Moreover, these criticisms from Washington were preceded by a preemptive flurry
of Chinese trade concessions, freeing of many political prisoners, modest political liberalizations,
and expressions of desire for good Chinese-American relations. There is a risk that Beijing will
draw the lesson that concessions just attract more intense demands.
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*** Sovereignty Key/Intervention Not Justified***

Respecting sovereignty protects liberty
We respect sovereign authority, while we comply with government power. The vital space for dissent in any free
society lies in our ability to distinguish between government and sovereignty. We allow ourselves to disagree,
sometimes radically, about government because we respect the sovereign authority that keeps us together. People
who revile the president of the United States still rise when he enters the room. Honoring the office while opposing
the man is the necessary, if fraying, restraint that keeps political disagreement from threatening order itself. The
respect we pay sovereignty is an unseen foundation of liberty, for it allows us the freedom to be contemptuous of
government.
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Sovereignty Protects Diversity

Sovereignty protects moral pluralism
Sovereignty defends the moral partiality of citizens, but in a world of nations it also protects moral pluralism, the
right of different peoples to decide their own way in the world. The strongest and most convincing defense of this
view is to be found in the work of the legal scholar Brad R. Roth, particularly in his splendid new book. The
institutional legal condition for moral pluralism in the world, Roth argues, is the sovereign equality of states. This
legal condition is written into the Charter of the United Nations. While sovereignty provides alibis for tyrants and
dictators, it also protects weak states against the strong. In so doing, it defends moral pluralism, or as Roth puts it, the
right of peoples to be wrong about justice.
There is no universal definition of justice

The right to be wrong about justice is a provocative formulation to anyone attached to international human rights,
and Roth intends to provoke. In defense of his position, it is a fact that human beings disagree about what justice
entails, in general and in detail. This is a fact, moreover, to which we ascribe value, our disagreements about justice
being an instance of what human beings do with their freedom of judgment. If we value this freedom in individuals,
Roth argues, we should value it in its collective national forms, and we should respect the international norms of
sovereignty that protect it. We all want the peoples of the world to find their own way to justice, and we all want to
respect their different accounts of what justice is.
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Sovereignty Good Impacts: Global Peace

WEAKER STATES UPHOLD THE NORM OF NON-INTERVENTION
ON GROUNDS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Stephen Krasner, Professor of International Relations, Stanford, PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY, 2001,p. 1
While autonomy can be compromised as a result of both intervention and voluntary choice, the
former has gotten much more attention. Some observers have regarded nonintervention as the
grounding of the sovereign state system. 16 Weaker states have always been the strongest
supporters of nonintervention, which was first explicitly articulated by Wolff and Vattel during
the latter part of the eighteenth century. During the nineteenth century Latin American leaders,
who governed the weakest states in the system, vigorously defended the notion that coercion was
unacceptable.
UNDERMINING NATION STATES RESULTS IN MORE VIOLENT

ALTERNATIVES
C. DALE WALTON, Southwest Missouri State University, 2002 (COMPARATIVE STRATEGY,
v. 21p. 418) (PDOCSS275)
This s is what John Mearsheimer has done in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and he is not
optimistic about the prospects for eternal peace. In reply to arguments about the alleged
impending "death of the state" he argues that: If the state disappears, presumably some new
political entity would have to take its place, but it seems that nobody has identified that
replacement. Even if the state disappeared, however, that would not necessarily mean the end of
security competition and war. Mer all, Thucydides and Machiavelli wrote long before the birth of
the state system. Realism merely requires anarchy; it does not matter what kind of political units
make up the system. They could be states, city-states, cults, empires, tribes, gangs, feudal
principalities,
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HISTORICALLY, SOVEREIGNTY DEVELOPED TO CHECK

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Jeremy Rabkin, professor of Government, Cornell, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS, 1998, p.
96-7
The truth is that calls to a higher human duty, transcending the interest of particular nations, are
not a novelty of the twentieth century. Something like that vision is quite old. In fact, it is
medieval. The most hopeful thinkers of medieval Europe emphasized that, beyond the quarrels
and ambitions of rival kings and princes, there remained an underlying unity of Christendom,
which should in time embrace all the world. The trouble with this vision was that such
transcending unity, even on the spiritual plane, was impossible to maintain without a common
authority. The effort to maintain the spiritual supremacy of the church turned out to add simply
one more occasion for bloodshed ~d division. The doctrine of sovereignty was invented in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the precise purpose of denying that human authorities,
enforcing a higher law on the supreme authority within each state, could maintain the unity of
Christendom. The exponents of sovereignty did not deny the truths of religion or of transcendent
doctrines. They simply insisted that no human power could enforce those claims on independent
states. Our own Declaration of Independence picks up the theme: independent nations are equal.
LIMITS ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY DON'T EFFECTIVELY

PROMOTE PEACE
Jeremy Rabkin. Professor of Government, Cornell, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS, 1998,
p.95-6
Many writers now insist that such views are outdated in a world that is so much more
"interdependent." But the same arguments were once supposed to be powerful objections to
private property and individual liberty in a modern economy. The truth, now acknowledged by
virtually all reputable economists, is quite the reverse: the complexity of the modern world makes
it all the more necessary to leave owners to determine how their resources and efforts can best be
deployed. Historically, the argument for national sovereignty was closely connected with parallel
arguments for private property.4 Certainly, we need collective authority to punish and deter
aggression. It would be a strong argument for international authority, if it could actually punish
and deter aggression among nations, as government police forces do among individuals in
domestic settings. But sovereign 'states are not willing to entrust such supreme authority to the
United Nations, so we find that international organization does little to punish or deter
aggression-whether in the mangled streets of Sarajevo or in the fiendish weapons laboratories of
Iraq. Instead of facing those most urgent challenges, we gratify the collectivist impulse with
international agreements on other subjects. Some contemporary agreements are, in fact, nothing
else but sheer monuments to collectivist ideology. Is it plausible that the world at large cares
more about the wildlife treasures of Africa or the art treasures of Europe-or, indeed, the national
parks of America-than do the sovereign states that derive tourist dollars and many other benefits
from protecting those national resources within their own borders? Plausible or not, that is the
necessary premise of such ventures as the UN's World Heritage Convention.
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*** Intervention Fails ***
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Intervention Generally Fails

Past political change is not due to the US
Democracy in America, March 1, 2011, Who lost Egypt?, DOA: 5/1/11, Economist reprint,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/03/arab_spring
EIGHT years after the craziness that was the invasion of Iraq, I barely have the patience to address neo-conservative
fantasies about how to turn political evolution in the Muslim world into a story that's somehow all about America
liberating grateful locals. So I'm glad Daniel Larison still does, though, in responding to Niall Ferguson, he seems to
be almost out of patience too: The sobering thing about rapid political change in these countries is that there
really is very little that the U.S. could have done differently in just the last few years that would have
produced a significantly different outcome. Democratists look at what happened in the 1980s, they reason
foolishly that 1989 happened because of what the U.S. and Western allies did in supporting political dissidents,
and they conclude that oewe did it before, we can do it again! Just as Iraq war supporters stupidly invoked
Japan and Germany as meaningful precedents for the political transformation that could happen in Iraq,
Ferguson is invoking the successes of eastern European dissidents as precedents for what could have
happened in the Near East. What makes Fergusons comparison even harder to take is the presumption that
Western support for eastern European dissidents was important to their success, when the success of eastern
European revolutions in 1989 rested almost entirely with the peoples of those countries. Fergusons analysis and
recommendations seem to hinge on believing that Western support for dissidents in communist states was important
to the successful political transition in those states, because Ferguson cant seem to imagine foreign political
movements that succeed or fail regardless of what Westerners do or dont do...If there is anything more pathetic than
the usual round of oewho lost [fill in the blank]?, it is the risible attempt to claim that all would be well if there had
just been more American emphasis on democracy promotion earlier on.
Democracy growing without US support now

Foreign Policy in Focus, March 1, 2011 Tuesday, The Twilight of Tyranny? Feffer, John,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_twilight_of_tyranny DOA: 5/4/11
First, the events taking place in the Middle East aren't happening because of U.S. policy but despite it. Washington
favors stability above all, because the status quo is both predictable and favorable to the United States. This explains
the double standard of supporting democracy in Iraq but not Saudi Arabia - a position many conservatives uphold in
their lamentations over Mubarak's fall, as FPIF contributor M. Junaid Levesque-Alam points out in Focal Points. It
also explains why the Obama administration hesitated to support the uprisings until it became clear that the status
quo was no longer tenable. Even then, as FPIF contributor Fouad Pervez explains in Democracy Doesn't Equal
Instability, "the Obama administration backed a transition to Omar Suleiman in the interests of preserving 'stability,'
or more appropriately, existing conditions. If the army opts to implement some reforms but still tries to maintain
much of the status quo, will Washington protest?"
Political change comes from within

Foreign Policy in Focus, February 24, 2011, Democracy Doesn't Equal Instability
Fouad Pervez is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, where he writes on international politics, economics, and
security. He helps run the blog and talk show There is No Spoon,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/democracy_doesnt_equal_stability DOA: 5/4/11
Ambassador (ret.) William A. Rugh who holds a Ph.D. in political science is the author of "Arab Mass Media" and
many articles on Middle Eastern subjects, as well as two books on public diplomacy. He was a U.S. Foreign Service
officer for 30 years, and during that time he served at embassies in six Arab countries, American Diplomacy,
February 21, 2011, Mideast revolutions and diplomacy.
The events we have witnessed in Egypt during the past three weeks contain some lessons we should think about. The
first lesson is: significant changes in a country's political system can best be brought about by the people of that
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country, not by outsiders. A revolution was accomplished by the efforts of the thousands of young Egyptians
whowere persistent in their demands, who were mature and peaceful, reacting with restraint to provocations, and
who showed Mubarak and the army that they would not give up until he was gone. They were resourceful, providing
medical care to the wounded, food and water to the demonstrators, and communication to the participants and the
outside world, and they did it all without any help from foreigners.
There have been many other examples of real political change coming from within rather than outside. When I was
ambassador to Yemen, I had occasion to discuss democracy with Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih, who at the
time (1986) rejected my advice and told me his one-party rule and authoritarian system was more appropriate for
Yemen than America's multi-party democracy. Four years later, when Salih allowed multiple parties and a degree of
press freedom, I asked him why he had changed his mind. He said he had discovered that there were opposition
organizations underground in Yemen and he decided to allow them to operate openly where he could see them. He
made a calculation to move democracy forward based on domestic political considerations, not my advice.
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Military intervention in Iraq discredited democracy promotion

Foreign Policy in Focus, February 24, 2011, Democracy Doesn't Equal Instability
Fouad Pervez is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus, where he writes on international politics, economics, and
security. He helps run the blog and talk show There is No Spoon,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/democracy_doesnt_equal_stability DOA: 5/4/11
President George Bush thought he could promote democracy by occupying Iraq, and his invasion brought about
some political changes there, but at a huge cost to the Iraqi people, as well as in American lives and treasure. That
has hopefully discredited the idea of democracy promotion by foreign military intervention, which the Arabs
opposed from the start. Moreover, most suicide bombers are motivated by the presence of a foreign military
occupation, as Professor Robert Pape hasso aptly demonstrated.
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*** Mutua Human Rights Kritik ***
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1NC Shell
A. OUR LINK THE 1AC SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A STORY THAT COMPLETES THE
COLONIAL PROJECT OF UNIVERSALIZE WESTERN VALUES BARBARIC SAVAGES
THAT HAVE NO REGUARD FOR INTERNATIONAL NORMS ARE TAMED BY THE
CIVILIZED COSMOPOLITIAN COMMUNITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD NEVER MIND
THAT OUR HANDS TOO ARE DIRTY WITH THE BLOOD OF SLAVERY AND CONQUEST
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AT ITS CENTER,
IS MARKED BY THIS PATHOLOGY OF WESTERN SELF-REDEMPTION IT ONLY
ALLOWS THE WEST TO WASH ITS HANDS OF THE HORRIFIC ATROCITIES OF THE PAST
BY POSITIONING ITSELF AS THE SAVIOR OF THE UNCIVILIZED THIRD WORLD THIS
DISCOURSE CONCEALS THE WESTS PATH OF DESTRUCTION, REINFORCES GLOBAL
RACIAL HIERARCHIES, AND COMPLETES THE COLONIAL PROJECT
Mutua, Professor of Law & Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY Buffalo, 2001
(Makau, Harvard International Law Journal, Winter, p. 206-7)
Third, the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present significant theoretical
problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights movement prevents the
movement from gaining cross-cultural legitimacy. This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no
bearing on the substance of the normative judgment being rendered. A particular leader, for
example, could be labeled a war criminal, but such a label may carry no validity locally
because of the curse of the SVS rhetoric. In other words, the SVS rhetoric may undermine
the universalist warrant that it claims and thus engender resistance to the apprehension
and punishment of real violators. The subtext of human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the
seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus. For example, the U.N. Charter describes
its mandate to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." <=23> n22 This
is certainly a noble ideal. But what exactly does that terminology mean here? This phraseology
conceals more than it reveals. What, for example, are fundamental human rights, and how are they determined? Do such rights
have cultural, religious, ethical, moral, political, or other biases? What exactly is meant by the "dignity and worth" of the human person? Is there
an essentialized human being that the corpus imagines? Is the individual found in the streets of Nairobi, the slums of Boston, the deserts of Iraq, or
the rainforests of Brazil? In addition to the Herculean task of defining the prototypical human being, the U.N. Charter puts forward another
pretense--that all nations "large and small" enjoy some equality. Even as it ratified power imbalances between the Third World and the dominant
the United Nations gave the latter the primary power to define and
determine "world peace" and "stability." These fictions of neutrality and universality, like so
much else in a lopsided world, undergird the human rights corpus and belie its true identity and
purposes. This international rhetoric of goodwill reveals, just beneath the surface, intentions and
reality that stand in great tension and contradiction with it. This Article is not merely about the language of human
American and European powers,
rights or the manner in which the human rights movement describes its goals, subjects, and intended outcomes. It is not a plea for the human
rights movement to be more sensitive to non-Western cultures. Nor is it a wholesale rejection of the idea of human rights. Instead, the Article is
fundamentally an attempt at locating--philosophically, culturally, and historically--the normative edifice of the human rights corpus .
If the
human rights movement is driven by a totalitarian or totalizing impulse, that is, the mission
to require that all human societies transform themselves to fit a particular blueprint, then
there is an acute shortage of deep reflection and a troubling abundance of zealotry in the
human rights community. This vision of the "good society" must be vigorously questioned
and contested. Fourth, the issue of power is largely ignored in the human rights corpus. There is an
urgent need for a human rights movement that is multicultural, inclusive, and deeply political. Thus, while it is essential that a new human rights
movement overcome Eurocentrism, it is equally important that it also address deeply lopsided power relations among and within cultures, national
economies, states, genders, religions, races and ethnic groups, and
(Makau, Harvard International Law Journal, Winter, p. 206-7)
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other societal cleavages. Such a movement cannot treat Eurocentrism as the starting point and
other cultures as peripheral. The point of departure for the movement must be a basic assumption
about the moral equivalency of all cultures. Francis Deng has correctly pointed out that to
"arrogate the concept [of human rights] to only certain groups, cultures, or civilizations is to
aggravate divisiveness on the issue, to encourage defensiveness or unwarranted self-justification
on the part of the excluded, and to impede progress toward a universal consensus on human
rights." The fifth flaw concerns the role of race in the development of the human rights narrative.
The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connotations in which the international
hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary
for the continuation of the
global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally
non-white and non-Western, while the saviors are white. This old truism has found new life
in the metaphor of human rights. But there is also a sense in which human rights can be
seen as a project for the redemption of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged
globally as a people--who
have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whites--redeem
themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior"
peoples. The metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption.
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B. HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE RELIES ON THE METAPHOR OF THE WEST AS DIVINE

SAVIOR - THIS COLONIAL LOGIC WHEN COMBINED WITH THE UNIVERSALIZATION
OF ABSOLUTE PRINCIPLES DRIVES CRUSADES, VIOLENT INTERVENTION, AND
INQUISITIONS IN THE NAME OF HUMAN RIGHTS DESPITE THE AFFS BEST
INTENTIONS
(Makau, Harvard International Law Journal, Winter, p. 218)
The metaphor of the savior is constructed through two intertwining characteristics-Eurocentric universalism and Christianity's missionary zeal. This section examines these characteristics and
the institutional, international actors who promote liberal democracy as the antidote to human rights abuses. First, the savior metaphor
is deeply embedded in the Enlightenment's universalist pretensions, which constructed
Europe as superior and as center of the universe. International law itself is founded on
these assumptions and premises. International law has succeeded in governing "states of all civilizations, European and nonEuropean," and it has become "universal" although some have argued that it bears an
ethnocentric fingerprint. In addition to the Eurocentric focus of human rights, the metaphor of the savior is also located in the
missionary's Christian religion. Inherent to any universalizing creed is an unyielding faith in the superiority
of at least the beliefs of the proselytizer over those of the potential convert, if not over the person
of the convert. The project of universality or proselytism seeks to remake the "other" in the image of the converter. Christianity has a long
history of such zealotry. Both empire-building and the spread of Christendom justified the means.
Crusades, inquisitions, witch burnings, Jew burnings and pogroms, burnings of heretics
and gay people, of fellow Christians and of infidels--all in the name of the cross. It is almost as if
Constantine, upon his and his empire's conversion to Christianity in the fourth century, uttered a well-fulfilled prophecy when he declared: 'In the
In
fact, the political-cultural push to universalize one's beliefs can be so obsessive that it has
been identified frequently with martyrdom in history. The supreme sacrifice was to die fighting under the
name of this cross we shall conquer.' The cross has played the role of weapon time and time again in Christian history and empire building.
Christian emperor. The supreme self-immolation was to fall in battle under the standard of the Cross . . . . But by the time Christianity was ready
to meet Asia and the New World, the Cross and the sword were so identified with one another that the sword itself was a cross. It was the only
kind of cross some conquistadores understood. There
is a historical continuum in this impulse to universalize

Eurocentrism and its norms and to ratify them under the umbrella of "universalism."
Whether it is in the push for free markets, liberal systems of government, "civilized" forms of
dress, or in the ubiquity of the English language itself, at least the last five centuries can
appropriately be called the Age of Europe. These Eurocentric models have not been content to
remain at home. They intrinsically define themselves as eternal truths. Universalization is an
essential attribute of their validity. This validation comes partly from the conquest of the
"primitive" and his introduction and delivery to "civilization." For international law, Anghie has captured
this impulse clearly: The extension and universalization of the European experience, which is achieved by transmuting it into the major theoretical
problem of the discipline [international law], has the effect of suppressing and subordinating other histories of international law and the people to
whom it has applied. Within the axiomatic framework of positivism, which decrees that European states are sovereign while non-European states
are not, there is only one means of relating the history of the non-European world, and this the positivists proceed to do: it is a history of the
civilizing mission, the process by which peoples of Africa, Asia, the Americas, [*235] and the Pacific were finally assimilated into a European
The impulses to conquer, colonize, save, exploit, and civilize non-European

peoples met at the intersection of commerce, politics, law, and Christianity and evolved into
the Age of Empire. As put by John Norton Pomeroy, lands occupied by "persons who are not recognized as belonging to the great
international law.
family of states to whom international law applies" or by "savage, barbarous tribes" belonged as of right upon discovery to the "civilized and
Christian nation." The
savior-colonizer psyche reflects an intriguing interplay of both European

superiority and manifest destiny over the subject. The "othering" project degrades
although it also seeks to save. One example is the manipulative manner in which the British took over large chunks of Africa.
Lord Lugard, the British
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colonialist, described in denigrating language a "treaty-making" ceremony in which an African ruler "agreed" to "British protection." He described
this ceremony with both parties "seated cross-legged on a mat opposite to each other on the ground, you should picture a savage chief in his best
turn-out, which consists probably of his weapons of war, different chalk colourings on his face, a piece of the skin of a leopard, wild cat, sheep or
ox." As put by a European missionary, the "Mission to Africa" was "the least that we [Europeans] can do . . . to strive to raise him [the African] in
the scale of mankind." <=143> n142 Anghie notes that the deployment of denigrating, demeaning language is essential to the psyche of the
savior. He writes: The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples is hard to overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate
vocabulary for denigrating these peoples, presenting them as suitable objects for conquest, and legitimizing the most extreme violence against
them, all in the furtherance of the civilizing mission - the discharge of the white man's burden. Human
rights law continues this

tradition of universalizing Eurocentric norms by intervening in Third World cultures and
societies to save them from the traditions and beliefs that it frames as permitting or
promoting despotism and disrespect for human rights itself.
OUR IMPACT IS HUMAN SURVIVAL

Solo 1992
(Pam, Cultural Survival Quarterly, 16.1, http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/csq/csq_article.cfm?
id=000002E9-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&region_id=0&subregion_id=1&issue_id=5)
That questions is particularly potent now that the Cold War is over. In the Third World, centuries
of colonialism and decades of superpower rivalry have left a damaging legacy. Southern
countries and other peoples victimized by colonial expansion and its consequent political
and economic systems are intensifying their calls for justice, not charity. The challenge is
made even more difficult because a major export of the developed world has been the concept of
the nation state, with its emphasis on militarization and internal security. On the positive side,
one lesson to be drawn from the collapse of communism is that grassroots politics can lead to
revolutionary changes in governments and institutions of all kinds. In Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, new thinking, developed and embraced first by local actors, opened up political
possibilities on an international scale. As the next millennium approaches, Cultural Survival
hopes to take that lesson toward a second wave of political action that will help turn around
relations between North and South, just as ordinary citizens helped reverse the tide of East-West
relations. But while Western movements have focused on the weapons of war, the politics of the
1990s will center on a single interlocking agenda: human rights, the environment, and
development. As its heart are some 600 million indigenous people. Their fate is a pathway
and litmus test of our progress toward a peaceful and sustainable world order. From the
periphery of political, economic, and social power, they are moving to the center of world
attention. Our survival depends on ensuring that no one, particularly the poorest of the
poor, is thrown out of the canoe or viewed as dispensable. This is a moral and a practical
imperative.
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FINALLY, OUR ALTERNATIVE IS REJECT THE REDEMPTIVE SCRIPT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS LAW AND OPEN OURSELVES TO NON-EUROPEAN DISCOURSES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VOTING NEGATIVE ALLOWS US TO CHALLENGE THIS COLONIAL
ENTERPRISE
The promise that human rights holds out to the Third World is that problems of cruel conditions of life, state instability, and other social crises
can be contained, if not substantially eliminated, through the rule of law, grants of individual rights, and a state based on constitutionalism.
Through the metaphor of human rights and its grand narrative, the Third World is asked
to follow a particular script of history. That script places hope for the future of the international community in liberal
nationalism and democratic internal self-determination. The impression given is that a unitary international
community is possible within this template if only the Third World followed suit by
climbing up the civilizational ladder. However, I argue that this historical model, as now
diffused through the human rights movement, cannot respond to the needs of the Third
World absent some radical rethinking and restructuring of the international order. The
human rights movement must abandon the SVS metaphor if there is going to be real hope
in a genuine international discourse on rights. The relentless efforts to universalize an
essentially European corpus of human rights through Western crusades cannot succeed.
Nor will demonizing those who resist these efforts achieve a truly international approach.
The critiques of the corpus from Africans, Asians, Muslims, Hindus, and a host of critical thinkers from around the world are the one avenue
through which human rights can be redeemed and truly universalized. This
multiculturalization of the corpus could be

attempted in a number of areas: balancing between individual and group rights, giving
more substance to social and economic rights, relating rights to duties, and addressing the
relationship between the corpus and economic systems. This Article does not develop those substantive critiques,
but it is important that these issues be raised. Further work must done on these questions to chart out how such a vision affects or distorts nonEuropean societies. Ultimately, a
new theory of internationalism and human rights, one that responds

to diverse cultures, must confront the inequities of the international order. In this respect,
human rights must break from the historical continuum--expressed in the metaphor and
the grand narrative of human rights--that keeps intact the hierarchical relationships
between European and non-European populations.
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2NC OVERVIEW
IN MOST WESTERNS, A TOUGH, WHITE HERO WITH A STEELY GAZE AND A
QUICK DRAW DEFENDS THE INNOCENT SETTLERS OF THE FRONTIER FROM A
SERIES OF DARK-SKINNED, LAZY, MALEVOLENT VILLIANS, AND RIDES ON
EVER WESTWARD INTO THE SUNSET TO SPREAD HIS CIVILIZING
GENEROSITY. IN THE MOVIE HIGH PLANES DRIFTER, CLINT EASTWOOD
PLAYS A TRAVELLING GUNSLINGER HIRED TO DEFEND A SMALL TOWN FROM
REGENEGADE OUTLAWS. EASTWOOD DOES DEFEND THE TOWN, BUT IN
RETURN HE DEMANDS ABSOLUTE CONTROL OVER THE TOWNS AFFAIRS. IN
TIME, HE GROWS TO HATE THE TOWNSPEOPLE, WHO HE VIEWS AS CORRUPT
AND COWARDLY. HE RAPES WOMEN, KILLS MEN, STEALS FROM EVERYONE,
AND BURNS THE TOWN DOWN, FORCING IT TO LITERALLY RESEMBLE THE
HELL WHICH HE THINKS IT IS.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE SHOULD BE ANALYZED AS A
TEXT OR STORY. ITS CONSTRUCTION IS COMMON ENOUGH: THE PLIGHT OF
OPPRESSED, VICITIMIZED BY SAVAGE DICTATORS AND BRUTAL MILITARY
JUNTAS, AND THEN THE RESOLUTION OF THE PLAN, WHERE THE UNITED
NATIONS RIDES INTO TOWN AND SAVES THE DAY, AND THEN THE
CONCLUSION OF THE SOLVENCY CONTENTION WHERE WE ARE TREATED TO
ONE FINAL MOMENT OF AWE AT THE GUNSLINGERS PROFICIENCY IN SAVING
THE VICTIMIZED FROM THEIR OPPRESSORS. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS ISNT
TRUE. THE UNITED NATIONS IS REALLY MORE LIKE CLINT EASTWOOD IN
HIGH PLANES DRIFTER A FORCE OF DESTRUCTION IN THE GUISE OF HELP.
OUR 1NC LINK EVIDENCE EXPLAINS SEVERAL LINK ARGUMENTS THEY HAVE
NOT ADDRESSED
A. SALVATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE THE WEST, AND
SPECIFICALLY THE UNITED NATIONS, PLAYS THE ROLE OF THE DIVINE
SAVIOR THAT WILL BRING CIVILIZED MODERN VALUES TO THE
BARBARIC NON-EUROPEAN SAVAGES UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
BECOME THE NEW CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES AND THE ULTIMATE
COMPLETION OF THE COLONIAL PROJECT REINFORCING GLOBAL
RACIAL HIERARCHIES THIS HAS BEEN THE HISTORIC JUSTIFICATION
FOR WARS, CRUSADES, AND INQUISITIONS
B. REDEMPTION THE WEST IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE WORST

ATROCITIES IN HUMAN HISTORY, SLAVERY, THE HOLOCAUST, THE
MIDDLE PASSAGE, AND THE GENOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICANS TO
NAME A FEW HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS A WAY FOR US TO
EXTERNALIZE THE BLAME GLOBAL SAVAGERY AND WASH OUR HANDS
OF OUR COLONIAL PAST LIKE EASTWOOD, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE U.S. INTERVENE, GUNS BLAZING, AND RIDE OFF INTO THE SUNSET
OUR IMPACT TURNS AND OUTWEIGHS THE CASE THE COMPLETION OF
THE COLONIAL PROJECT AND THE STRATIFICATION OF GLOBAL RACIAL
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HIERARCHIES ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF GLOBAL GENOCIDES AND
EXTERMINATION THAT PUT ALL OF HUMANITY AT RISK THATS OUR 1NC
SOLO EVIDENCE ONLY REJECTING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE CAN
OPEN UP THE NECESSARY SPACE FOR ALTERNATIVE VOICES ON HUMAN
AGENCY TO EMERGE CREATING BETTER AND MORE EQUITABLE
INTERNATIONAL NORMS SOLVING ALL OF THE CASE
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

THE IMPULSE TO UNIVERSALIZE WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS, AS EMBODIED
IN THE UN CHARTER, IS AN INCURABLE DISEASE THAT REINFORCES A WESTERN
MONOLOPY OF MORAL VIRTUE THIS INFLEXIBLE TRUTH OTHERIZES ALL NONEUROPEANS AS GODLESS HEATHENS THAT NEED TO BE INJECTED WITH OUR VALUES
The Charter of the United Nations, which is the constitutional basis for all U.N. human rights
texts, captures the before-and-after, backward-progressive view of history. It declares human
rights an indispensable element for the survival of humankind. It does so by undertaking as one
of its principal aims the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." This selfrepresentation of human rights requires moral and historical certainty and a belief in
particular inflexible truths. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the grandest
of all human rights documents, endows the struggle between good and evil with historicity in
which the defeat of the latter is only possible through human rights. This is now popularly
accepted as the normal script of human rights. In fact, there is today an orgy of celebration of
this script by prominent scholars who see in it the key to the redemption of humanity. But this
grand script of human rights raises a multitude of normative and cultural questions and problems,
especially in light of the historical roots of the human rights movement. Any valid critique must
first acknowledge that the human rights movement, like earlier crusades, is a bundle of
contradictions. It does not have, therefore, a monopoly on virtue that its most vociferous
advocates claim. This Article argues that human rights, and the relentless campaign to
universalize them, present a historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western
conceptual and cultural dominance over the past several centuries. At the heart of this
continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms
and values by repudiating, demonizing, and "othering" that which is different and nonEuropean. By this argument, the Article does not mean to suggest that human rights are bad per
se or that the human rights corpus is irredeemable. Rather, it suggests that the globalization of
human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality comes from the West as a
civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

HUMAN RIGHT DISCOURSE, AS ENSHRINED IN THE UNITED NATIONS RELIES ON
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD AS SAVAGE AND UNCIVILIZED
The human rights movement is marked by a damning metaphor. The grand narrative of
human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand,
against victims and saviors, on the
other. The savages-victims-saviors (SVS construction is a three-dimensional [*202] compound
metaphor in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself. The main authors of the human
rights discourse, including the United Nations, Western states, international non-governmental
organizations (INGOs), and senior Western academics, constructed this three-dimensional prism.
This rendering of the human rights corpus and its discourse is unidirectional and
predictable, a black-and-white construction that pits good against evil. This Article attempts
to elicit from the proponents of the human rights movement several admissions, some of them
deeply unsettling. It asks that human rights advocates be more self-critical and come to terms
with the troubling rhetoric and history that shape, in part, the human rights movement. At the
same time, the Article does not only address the biased and arrogant rhetoric and history of the
human rights enterprise, but also grapples with the contradictions in the basic nobility and
majesty that drive the human rights project--the drive from the unflinching belief that human
beings and the political societies they construct can be governed by a higher morality. This
first section briefly introduces the three dimensions of the SVS metaphor and how the metaphor
exposes the theoretical flaws of the current human rights corpus. The first dimension of the prism
depicts a savage and evokes images of barbarism. The abominations of the savage are
presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of
humanity. The human rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever
bent on the consumption of humans. Although savagery in human rights discourse
connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the operational instrument of savagery.
States become savage when they choke off and [*203] oust civil society. The "good" state
controls its demonic proclivities by
cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, on the other hand,
expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture. The
redemption or salvation of the state is solely dependent on its submission to human rights norms.
The state is the guarantor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights
law. But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest
otherwise, it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural foundation of the state.
The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture overcomes or disallows the development
of "good" culture. The real savage,
though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

THE 1AC ENDS THE STORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITH
THE WEST AS THE VINDICATED SAVIOR AND THE THIRD WORLD AS VICTIM
The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a victim as well as the essence
and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose "dignity and worth" have been violated by the
savage is the victim. The victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist
attributes have been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cultural
foundation of the state. The entire human rights structure is both anticatastrophic and
reconstructive. It is anti-catastrophic because it is designed to prevent more calamities through
the creation of more victims. It is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society to reduce the number of
victims,
as it defines them, and prevent conditions that give [*204] rise to victims. The classic human rights document--the human rights report--embodies
these two mutually reinforcing strategies. An INGO human rights report is usually a catalogue of horrible catastrophes visited on individuals. As a
The third dimension of the

prism is the savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes,
restrains, and safeguards. The savior is the victim's bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is
rule, each report also carries a diagnostic epilogue and recommended therapies and remedies.
freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular
values. In the human rights story, the
savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations,
Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a
benighted world. <=14> n13 In reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of culturally based
norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy. The human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is
fundamentally Eurocentric, and suffers from several basic and interdependent flaws captured in
the SVS metaphor. First, the corpus falls within the historical continuum of the Eurocentric
colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and subordinate positions. Precisely
because of this cultural and historical context, the human rights movement's basic claim of
universality is undermined. Instead, a historical understanding of the struggle for human dignity should locate the impetus of a
universal conception of human rights in those societies subjected to European tyranny and imperialism. Unfortunately, this is not part of the
official human rights narrative. Some
of the most important events preceding the post-1945, United

Nations-led human rights movement include the anti-slavery campaigns in both Africa and the United
States, the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the struggles for women's suffrage and equal rights throughout the
world. But the pioneering work of many non-Western activists and other human rights heroes are not acknowledged by the contemporary human
rights movement. These
historically important struggles, together with the norms anchored in nonWestern cultures and societies, have either been overlooked or rejected in the construction of the
current understanding of human rights. Second, the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the crosscontamination
of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is premised on the
transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cultures into a Eurocentric prototype and not
the fashioning of a multicultural mosaic.
The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines the creation of inferior clones,
in effect dumb copies of the original. For example, Western political democracy is in effect an
organic element of human rights. "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the
human rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy. It is this
distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create
victims. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual examples anchored in the
treatment of cultural phenomena, such as "traditional" practices that appear to negate the equal
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protection for women, also illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, nonEuropean cultures.
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THE UN DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS A VEHICLE FOR THE DOMINATION OF
WESTERN VALUES ITS PRIMARY GOAL IS THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF ALL
WESTERN VALUES AND PRESERVING WESTERN SUPERIORITY IN THE WORLD ORDER
The United States, whose history is simply a continuation of the Age of

Europe, suffers from this worldview just like its European
predecessors. American predestination, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, is
almost as old as the country itself. President Theodore Roosevelt
expressed this sense of predestination when he referred to peoples and countries
south of the United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south
of us" and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely
inevitable, to police these countries in the interest of order and
civilization." <=57> n56 The treatment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking
Latin America as being in the backyard of the United States was instrumental in
consolidating the psyche of the United States as an empire.

In the last several hundred years, the globe has witnessed the
universalization of Eurocentric norms and cultural forms through the creation of

the colonial state and the predominance of certain economic, social, and
political models. International law itself was founded on the preeminence of
four specific European biases: geographic Europe as the center, and
Christianity, mercantile economics, and political imperialism as superior
paradigms. <=58> n57 Both the League of Nations and its successor, the
United Nations, revitalized and confirmed European-American domination of
international affairs. In the post-War period, non-European states were trusted

or mandated to Western powers or became client states of one or another Western
state
Since 1945, the United Nations has played a key role in preserving the global
order that the West dominates. A critically important agenda of the United
Nations has been the universalization of principles and norms which are European
in identity. Principal among these has been the spread of human rights which
grow out of Western liberalism and jurisprudence. The West was able
to impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because
it dominated the United Nations at its inception. The fallacy of the
UDHR, which refers to itself as the "common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations," <=62> n61 is now underscored by the identification
of human rights norms with political democracy. The principal focus of human
rights law has been on those rights that strengthen, legitimize, and export the
liberal democratic state to non-Western societies.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

THE WEST HAS ITS HANDS ON THE LEVERS OF POWER AT THE UN UNIVERSAL
NORMS ONLY REINFORCE WESTERN DOMINATION AND EXCLUDE THE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PERIPHERY IN FACT, HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS ARE USED TO
PIT THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST EACH OTHER

It may appear that Third World states have participated in the legitimization
of the human rights corpus, particularly at the United Nations, the institution
most responsible for the creation and universalization of human rights norms.
However, too much should not be made of this Third World participation in the
making of human rights law. <=68> n67 The levers of power at [*216] the United
Nations and other international law-making fora have traditionally been out of
the reach of the Third World. And even if they were within reach, it is
doubtful that most Third World states actually represent their peoples and
cultures. In other words, a claim about the universality or democratization of
human rights norm-making at the United Nations cannot be made simply by looking
at the numerical domination of that body by Third World states.
The human rights movement is not only lacking in Third World legitimacy, but
also it is aimed primarily at the Third World. It is one thing for Europeans and
North Americans, whose states share a common philosophical and legal ancestry,
to create a common political and cultural template to govern their societies. It
is quite another to insist that their particular vision of society is the only
permissible civilization which must now be imposed on all human societies,
particularly those outside Europe. The merits of the European and American
civilization of human rights notwithstanding, all missionary work is suspect and
might easily seem as part of the colonial project. Once again, the allegedly
superior Europeans and North Americans descend on supposedly backward natives in
the Third World with the human rights mission to free them from the claws of
despotic governments and benighted cultures.
But the human rights project is no longer just a critique of the Third World
by the West. Individual states of all cultural and political traditions,
including those in the Third World, have taken coercive measures against other
states in the name of human rights. Based on imported Western norms and
definitions, many NGOs in the Third World openly oppose human rights violations
committed by their own states and societies. Non-Europeans now confront each
other within the confines of their states over the enforcement of human rights.
The observance or denial of human rights now pits African against African, Arab
against Arab, and Asian against Asian.

Today, most of the activities of the ICJ, AI, and the other Western-based
INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and the International Human Rights Law Group, are focused on the Third World. As
a consequence, the predominant image of the savage in the human rights discourse
today is that of a Third World, non-European person, cultural practice, or
state.
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THE 1AC MIMICS THE FORMULA OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
THAT CATALOGUES THE UNCIVILIZED DEVIATIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD AND
AFFIRMS OUR ARROGANT BELIEF THAT THE WEST REMAINS AT THE TOP OF THE
MORAL HIERARCHY WHILE THE THIRD WORLD REMAINS A SAVAGE TO BE TAMED BY
THE WEST
The image of the savage is also painted impressively by INGOs in their work through
reporting and other forms of public advocacy. The focus here is not on domestic human rights non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the Third World because many simply imitate the practices of their predecessors in the North. <=99> n98 Typically,
INGOs perform three basic functions: investigation,
reporting, and advocacy. <=100> n99 The focus of human rights INGOs is usually human rights violations in a Third World country, where the
"investigation" normally takes place. Generally, a Western-based INGO--typically based in the political and cultural capitals of the most powerful
countries in the West <=101> n100 --sends a team of investigators called a human rights mission to a country in the South. The mission lasts
anywhere from several days to a few weeks, and collects data and other information on human rights questions from victims, local NGOs,
lawyers, local journalists, human rights defenders, and government officials. Information from these local sources is usually cross-checked with
other, supposedly more objective sources--meaning Western embassies, locally based Western reporters, and other Western interests such as
The human
rights report is a catalogue of abuses committed by the state against liberal values. It criticizes
the state for departing from
the civil and political rights obligations provided for in the major instruments. Its purpose is to
shame the Third World state by pointing out the gulf between the state's conduct and
internationally sanctioned civilized behavior. This departure from good behavior is stigmatized
and used to paint the state either as a pariah or out-of-step with the rest of the civilized world.
Reports normally contain corrective measures and recommendations to the offending state. In many
foundations. Upon returning to the West, the mission systematizes the information and releases it in the form of a report.
instances, however, the audience of these reports is the West or some other Western institution, such as the European Union. The pleas of the
INGO report here pit a First World state or institution against a Third World state or culture. The
report asks that the West cut off aid,

condition assistance, impose sanctions, and/or publicly denounce the unacceptable conduct of the Third World state INGOs thus ask First
World states and institutions to play a significant role in "taming" and "civilizing" Third
World states, even though such a role relies on the power and economic imbalances of the
international order which favors the North over the South. The human rights report also tells
another, more interesting, story about the target of the human rights corpus. In this story, the
report describes several images of the savage, including the Third World state, the
quintessential savage. Human rights literature is replete with images of blood-thirsty Third
World despots and trigger-happy police and security forces.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

HUMAN RIGHTS CRUSADES ARE MOTIVATED BY A JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN ARROGANCE
THAT AFRICANS ARE BARBARIC SAVAGES THAT NEED A DOSE OF WESTERN
CHRISTIAN VALUES MAKING SUCH JUDGEMENTS REINFORCES RACIAL
PATERNALISM

The speed, for example, with which the 1994 mass killings in Rwanda took
place, and the weapons used, have come to symbolize in the Western mind the
barbarism of Africans. Philip Gourevitch, an American journalist, was one of the
instrumental voices in the creation of this portrayal:
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in the
spring and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres decimated the Republic of
Rwanda. Although the killing was low-tech--performed largely by machete--it was
carried out at dazzling speed: of an original population of about seven and a
half million, at least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a
hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a million deaths, and they may be right.
The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead
during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (emphasis added). <=107> n106
These images are critical in the construction of the savage. Human rights
opposition and campaigns against FGM, which have relied heavily on demonization,
have picked up where European colonial missionaries left off. <=108> n107
Savagery in this circumstance acquires a race--the black, dark, or non-Western
race. The Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD),
by contrast, opposed female circumcision but sharply denounced the racism
inherent in Western-led, anti-FGM campaigns:
This new crusade of the West has been led out of the moral and cultural
prejudices of Judaeo-Christian Western society: aggressiveness, ignorance or
even contempt, paternalism and activism are the elements which have infuriated
and then shocked many people of good will. In trying to reach their own public,
the new crusaders have fallen back on sensationalism, and have become
insensitive to the dignity of the very women they want to "save." <=109> n108
[*227] AAWORD vigorously questioned the motives of Western activists and
suggested that they were twice victimizing African women. It stopped just short
of asking Western activists to drop the crusade, yet openly denounced the use of
the SVS metaphor:
[Western crusaders] are totally unconscious of the latent racism which such a
campaign evokes in countries where ethnocentric prejudice is so deep-rooted. And
in their conviction that this is a "just cause," they have forgotten that these
women from a different race and a different culture are also human beings, and
that solidarity can only exist alongside self-affirmation and mutual respect
(emphasis in original).
As illustrated by the debate over FGM, advocacy across cultural barriers is
an extremely complex matter.
Making judgements across the cultural divide is a

risky business because the dice are always heavily loaded. Not even the
black-white pretense of human rights can erase those risks. But since that is
precisely what the human rights movement does--make judgements across
cultures--there is an obligation to create truly universal standards. Otherwise,
the human rights enterprise will continue to present itself as a struggle
between the cultures of non-Western peoples and the "universal" culture of the
West.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

THE VICTIMHOOD IDEOLOGY OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS IDEOLOGY IS BASED IN A
RACIALIZED UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD ORDER ROOTED IN COLONIALISM
THE 1AC REPRESENTATIONS SHOW THE OTHER AS POWERLESS, LAZY, AND
UNCIVILIZED
The representations of the victim in human rights literature spring from a

messianic ethos in both the INGO and the United Nations. There is a colonial
texture to the relationship between the human rights victim and the West. In the
colonial project, for example, the colonizer justified his mission by
drawing a distinction between the "native" and the "civilized" mind. In one
case, which was typical of the encounter between Africa and the West, a European
missionary compared what he called the "Bantu mind" to that of a "civilized
man":
It is suggested that the mere possession on the part of the Bantu of nothing but
an oral tradition of culture creates a chasm of difference between the Native
'mind' and that of civilized man, and of itself would account for a lack of
balance and proportion in the triple psychological function of feeling, thinking

and acting, implying that thinking is the weakest of the three and that feeling
is the most dominant. The Native seeks not truth nor works, but power--the
dynamical mood. <=129> n128
The view that the "native" is weak, powerless, prone to laziness, and unable
on his own to create the conditions for his development was a recurrent theme in
Western representations of the "other." Early in the life of the organization,
an International Labor Organization report concluded, for example, that
indigenous peoples could not by themselves overcome their "back-wardness." It
noted, "It is now almost universally recognized that, left to their own
resources, indigenous peoples would have difficulty in overcoming their inferior
economic and social situation which inevitably leaves them open for
exploitation." In the culture of the human rights movement, whose
center is in the West, there is a belief that human rights problems afflict
people "over there" and not people "like us." The missionary zeal to help those
who cannot help themselves is one of the logical conclusions of this attitude.
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2NC LINK FRONTLINE

INTERNATIONAL LAW IS AT THE CENTER OF THE IMPERIAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT IT IS A CONDUIT FOR US COLONIAL POWER AND DOMINATION
[*237] Proponents of human rights universality claim that the antidote to illiberal, authoritarian,
and closed societies is constitutionalism and political democracy. The corpus proceeds from the
premise that the world should
be a marketplace of ideas. The expressive rights in the basic human rights instruments are based
on this assumption although they are subject to some limitations. But this assumption imposes
on other cultures the
obligation and the requirement to compete against human rights, even though those
cultures may not be universalistic and may be ill-equipped to compete in the marketplace of
ideas. Human rights are part of the cultural package of the West, complete with an idiom of
expression, a system of government, and certain basic assumptions about the individual and his
relationship to society. The spread of the liberal constitution--with its normative assumptions
and the political structures it implies--makes human rights an integral part of the Western
conception of modern society and its ubiquitous domination of the globe. Institutionally,
saviors constitute a broad range of actors and interests which are driven by a belief in the
redemption of non-liberal, usually non-European, societies and cultures from human rights
abominations. Such actors include those at the intergovernmental, governmental, and nongovernmental levels. At the intergovernmental level, the U.N. vertical enforcement processes
and machineries act as the official guardians of the human rights corpus, and its
location at the heart of U.N. activities and purposes gives it the imprimatur of objectivity
and neutral internationalism. A maze of human rights bodies--committees and commissions--is
responsible for developing, overseeing, monitoring, and enforcing human rights. Most of the
U.N. work in human rights focuses on Third World states and societies, complete with
technical assistance programs and other "hand-holding" projects to ensure the incorporation,
dissemination, and enforcement of human rights norms, as well as the creation and nurturing of
institutions to perform these [*238] tasks. The United Nations is, in a sense, the grand
"neutral" savior, and Western liberal democracies treat it as such. Although the United Nations is an
institution composed of states, and therefore is bound in theory to respect the sovereignty of all states, it has recently taken a more active posture
in human rights matters. U.N. failures in Rwanda and Somalia, as well as the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, have embarrassed the world
body and have made an urgent case for more effective intervention. <=153> n152 The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, <=154> n153 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, <=155> n154 and the 1998 adoption in Rome of the Statute
of the International Criminal Court are just several recent examples of this renewed urgency in the area of human rights. <=156> n155 But these
actions came after long periods of resistance by major Western powers, including the United States, and only after intense public scrutiny and
media exposures of atrocities. <=157> n156 Following the Yugoslav and Rwanda crises, HRW lamented the "moral vacuum in the halls of the
United Nations." <=158> n157 It decried the U.N.'s "posture of neutrality between murderer and victim" and argued that the "failure of
leadership, eagerly abetted by the Security Council's permanent members, led to a squandering of the United Nations' unique capacity on the
The weight of responsibility

placed on the United Nations in the area of human rights is undeniable.
global stage to articulate fundamental human rights values and to legitimize their enforcement."
169
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170
Stefan Bauschard
171
AT: PERMUTATION
1. THE PERMUTATION SEVERS THE 1AC DISCOURSE
A. THE ENTIRE 1AC IS STEEPED IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE AS THE PRIMARY
JUSTIFICATION TO MOTIVATE US TO ACTION (INSERT EXAMPLES) IN FACT
WEVE READ LINK EVIDENCE THAT SAYS THAT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR U.N.
INTERVENTION ARE PREMISED ON THE NOTION THAT WESTERN
COSMOPOLITAN VALUES SHOULD BE UNIVERSALIZED AND SPREAD TO
UNCIVILIZED CULTURES THAT ARE INHERENTLY BARBARIC IF YOU SEVER
ALL THE 1AC JUSTIFICATIONS THERE IS LITERALLY NO REASON TO VOTE
AFFIRMATIVE
B. THIS IS ILLEGITIMATE IT MAKES IT LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO
WIN A CRITIC LINK YOU READ THE 1AC IT IS YOUR BURDEN TO DEFEND
ALL PARTS OF IT, INCLUDING YOUR DISCOURSE YOU SHOULD HOLD
THEM TO WHAT THEY SAID TO PRESERVE FAIR NEGATIVE GROUND
2. THE PERM STILL CLINGS TO THE PATHOLOGY OF SELF-REDEMPTION THEY STILL
AFFIRM THE BELIEF THAT WESTERN INSTITUTIONS ARE STILL REDEEMABLE,
BECAUSE THEY ARE BUILT ON SUPERIOR CIVILIZED THINKING THE PERMUTATION
DEFENDS UN ACTION, AND AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE THEY RIDE AWAY INTO
THE SUNSET OUR LINK EVIDENCE SAYS THAT REDEMPTION MAKES
PROBLEMATIZING HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE IT WHITEWASHES THE HISTORICAL LEGACY OF WESTERN COLONIZATION REDEMPTION IS
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH CRITICAL REFLECTION THIS DISCOURSE CANNOT BE
REFORMED FROM WITHIN
3. THE PERMUTATION IS A RIGGED GAME IT ASKS US TO QUESTION HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE AND FILLS THAT INTELLECTUAL SPACE WITH THE PLAN WHICH
UNQUESTIONINGLY CALLS FOR THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF WESTERN HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS THIS PREDETERMINED SOLUTION IS THE SAME WESTERN
ARROGANCE THAT PLAYS ITSELF OUT IN THE UN THE THIRD WORLD IS
REPRESENTED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLEY BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THEIR HANDS
ON THE LEVERS OF POWER THIS IS VISIBILITY WITHOUT POWER LISTENING TO
ALTERNATIVE VOICES AND THEN DOING WHATS IN THE WESTS INTERESTS ANYWAY
IT FILTERS THE ALTERNATIVE VOICE THROUGH THE LENS OF WESTERN INTEREST
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AT: PERMUTATION
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE LEAVES NO ROOM FOR OPPOSITION IT ILLICITS KNEEJERK COMPLIANCE THAT LIMITS INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS
Finally, INGOs constitute perhaps the most important element of the savior
metaphor. Conventionally doctrinal, INGOs are the human rights movement's foot
soldiers, missionaries, and proselytizers. Their crusade is framed in moral
certainty in which "evil" and "good" are as separate as night and day. They
claim to practice law, not politics. <=169> n168 Although they promote
paradigmatic liberal values and norms, they present themselves as neutral,
universal, and unbiased. Based in the capitals of the powerful Western states,
their staffs are mostly well-educated, usually trained in the law, middle-class,
and white. <=170> n169 They are very different from the people they seek to
save. They are modern-day abolitionists who see themselves as cleansers,
single-handedly rooting out evil in Third World countries and cultures by
shining light where darkness reins.
INGOs have also been instrumental in the creation of national NGOs in the
Third World. Mandates of many national NGOs initially mirrored those of INGOs.
However, in the last decade, many Third World NGOs have started to broaden their
areas of concentration and go beyond the INGOs' civil and political rights
constraints. In particular, domestic Third World NGOs are now paying more
attention to economic and social rights, development, women's rights, and the
relationships between transnational corporations and human rights conditions. In
spite of this incipient conceptual independence on the part of NGOs, many remain
voiceless in the corridors of power at the United Nations, the European Union,
the World Bank, and in the dominant media organizations in the West.
INGOs occupy such a high moral plane in public policy discourse that they are
rarely the subject of probing critiques. Morally righteous, they are supported
by an almost universal consensus that they are the "good guys." Even academia
has been slow to reflect seriously on INGOs. INGOs and their supporters see
those who question them as naive, at best, and apologists for repressive
governments and cultures, at worst. This climate of passivity has a chilling
effect on human rights speech, particularly of young, probing scholars and
activists. It also encourages a herd mentality and compliance with knee-jerk,
governmental human rights strategies, positions, or responses. It certainly does
not encourage innovation on the part of the movement.
INGOs also play the role of gatekeepers to powerbrokers in the West,
including powerful Western states. Significantly, national NGOs have virtually
no financial independence. They rely almost exclusively on funding from Western
states, foundations, charities, development agencies, and intergovernmental
institutions such as the European Union. In spite of these criticisms of INGOs,
many non-Western NGOs expressed appreciation for the work of INGOs at a retreat
which discussed the roles of NGOs in the human rights movement. In
fact, many sought a more involved approach by INGOs.
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AT: PERMUTATION
THE HUMAN RIGHTS METAPHOR IN THE 1AC LEAVES NO ROOM FOR
RENEGOTIATION THE PERMUTATION WILL FALL PREY TO WESTERN ZEALOTRY
AND EXCLUSION OF ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ONLY STANDING BACK FROM
THE HUMAN RIGHTS METAPHOR CAN SOLVE THE CASE BY AFFIRMING HUMAN
AGENCY

The contradictions between commitments to sovereign equality, stunning political and economic imbalances, and paternalistic humanitarianism
cannot be definitively resolved logically, doctrinally, or institutionally; rather, they must be confronted in ongoing struggle in all legal, political,
economic, and cultural arenas. Projections
of a unitary international community, even in the guise of the

inclusive U.N., or a unified civilizational consensus, even in the guise of human rights discourse,
may be provisionally useful and important but cannot indefinitely defer the need to confront
these contradictions. This Article has viewed the human rights text and its discourse as requiring the typology of state based on
constitutionalism and political democracy. The logic of the human rights text is that political democracy is the
only political system that can guarantee or realize the fundamental rights it encodes. As Henry Steiner
points out, the basic human rights texts, such as the ICCPR, "should be understood not as imposing a universalblueprint of the myriad details of
democratic government but rather as creating a minimum framework for popular participation, individual security, and nonviolent change."
However, the point then is that if this were a game or sport, its essence would have been decided, leaving those who adopt it only the option of
tweaking or revising the rules governing it without transforming its purpose. It is in this construction that the SVS metaphor comes to life. Using
political democracy as one medium through which the human rights culture is conveyed, one is able to capture the imperial project at work. First,
the choice of a political ideology that is necessary for human rights is an exclusionary act.
Thus, cultures that fall outside that ideological box immediately wear the label of the savage.
To be redeemed from their culture and history, which may be thousands of years old, a people must then deny themselves or continue to churn out
victims. The
savior in this case becomes the norms of democratic governments, however those are
transmitted or imposed on the offending cultures. Institutions and other media--both those that purport to have a
universalist warrant and those that are the obvious instruments of a particular nation's foreign policy and its interests--are critical to the realization
of the grand script and metaphor of human rights explored in this Article. However, the imposition of the current dogma of human rights on nonEuropean societies contradicts conceptions of human dignity and rejects the contributions of other cultures in efforts to create a universal corpus
of human rights. Proponents
of human rights should first accept the limitations of working within

the metaphor. Then they must reject it and seek a truly universal
platform. Stepping back from the SVS rhetoric creates a new basis for calculating human
dignity and identifies ways and societal structures through which [*245] such dignity could
be protected or enhanced. Such an approach would not assume, ab initio, that a particular
cultural practice was offensive to human rights. It would respect cultural pluralism as a
basis for finding common universality on some issues. With regard to FGM, for instance, such an approach would
first excavate the social meaning and purposes of the practice, as well as its effects, and then investigate the conflicting positions over the practice
in that society. Rather
than demonizing and finger-pointing, under the tutelage of outsiders and

their local supporters, the contending positions would be carefully examined and compared
to find ways of either modifying or discarding the practice without making its practitioners
feel shameful of their culture and of themselves. The zealotry of the SVS approach leaves no
room for a deliberative intra-cultural dialogue and introspection. The purpose of this Article is not to raise
or validate the idea of an original, pure, or a superior Third World society or culture. Nor is it to provide a normative blueprint for another human
rights corpus, although such a project must be pursued with urgency. Rather, the Article is a plea for a genuine cross-contamination of cultures to
The human rights movement should rethink and re-orient its

hierar-chical, binary view of the world in which the West leads the way and the rest of the
globe follows. Human rights can play a role in changing the unjust international order and
particularly the imbalances between the West and the Third World. Still, it will not do so unless it
stops working within the SVS metaphor. Ultimately, the quest must be for the construction of a
human rights movement that wins for all.
create a new multicultural human rights corpus.
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AT: WE SOLVE
OUR FIRST 1NC EVIDENCE ANSWERS THIS CLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS
JUDGEMENTAL ACROSS CULTURES AND DOES NOT TRANSLATE TO THOSE WHO HAVE
VALUE SYSTEMS THAT DIFFER FROM THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE THEY HAVE NO
ABILITY TO BUILD COALITIONS ACROSS CULTURES NOR CREATE AN INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITY
AND, THIS DEBATE IS ABOUT REPRESENTATIONS OUR 1NC FRAMEWORK IS THAT
THEIR DISCOURSE SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A TEXT SINCE THE PLAN DOESNT
HAPPEN IT IS THERE BURDEN TO PROVE THEIR REPRESENTATIONS AND DISCOURSE
ARE BENEFICIAL WE AGREE THAT GENOCIDE IS BAD, HOWEVER, WE DISAGREE
OVER THEIR JUSTIFICATIONS FOR UNIVERSALIZATION OF WESTERN VALUES WE
CAN ADVOCATE THEIR CASE FOR DIFFERENT REASONS
AND, THE 1ACS RELIANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE
TO ACCESS ANY ARGUMENTS ABOUT UNIVERSAL STRUGGLE THE NON-WESTERN
WORLD REJECTS YOUR ELITIST APPEALS ONLY OUR ALTERNATIVE OPENS SPACE
FOR GLOBAL EQUALITY
As currently constituted and deployed, the human rights movement will ultimately fail
because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western societies. The movement does
not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of non-Western states, except among hypocritical
elites steeped in Western ideas.
In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples.
The project of reconsidering rights, with claims to their supremacy, is not new. The culture of
rights in the present milieu stretches back at least to the rise of the modern state in Europe. It is that
state's monopoly of violence and
the instruments of coercion that gave rise to the culture of rights to counterbalance the abusive state. Robert Cover refers to this construction as the
myth of the jurisprudence of rights that allows society to both legitimize and control the state. Human rights, however, renew the meaning and
scope of rights in a radical way. Human rights bestow naturalness, transhistoricity, and universality to rights. But this Article lodges a
counterclaim against such a leap. This Article is certainly informed by the works of critical legal scholars, feminist critics of rights discourse, and
critical race theorists. Still, the approach of this Article differs from all three because it seeks to address an international phenomenon and not a
municipal, distinctly American
The
indigenous, non-European traditions of Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Americas must be
central to this critique. The idea of human rights--the quest to craft a universal bundle of
attributes with which all societies must endow all human beings--is a noble one. The problem
with the current bundle of attributes lies in their inadequacy, incompleteness, and wrongheadedness. There is little doubt that there is much to celebrate in the present human rights
corpus just as there is much to quarrel with. In this exercise, a sober evaluation of the current
human rights corpus and its language is not an option--it is required.
question. The critique of human rights should be based not just on American or European legal traditions but also on other cultural milieus.
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AT: NO ALTERNATIVE
OUR ALTERNATIVE SOLVES INTELLECTUALLY EMBRACING LOCAL NON-WESTERN
THEORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS OPENS UP SPACE FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE AND
EMPOWERING VISION OF HUMAN AGENCY
In the last decade in Africa, however, a more politically educated activist

and thinker, one who questions the human rights project more seriously and who
seeks a culturally grounded program for social change, has started to emerge.
This activist and thinker understands the connections among power
relations, human rights, economic domination, and the historical relationships

between the West and the rest of the world. Such a thinker is aware of the deep
contradictions that mark the human rights enterprise and seeks the construction
of a different human rights movement. While this new actor is still being
defined, and constitutes but a small fraction of the human rights movement on
the African continent, he is now increasingly at the center of innovative
thinking and action. At the core of this new activism and thinking is the push
for intellectual originality and self-reliance, local and not Western foundation
support, and a commitment to challenge all sources of violations, be they local
or foreign. This development represents the cultivation of a truly local human
rights culture in terms of the definition of rights and their enforcement.
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AT: Holocaust Proves Human Rights Are Good

YOUR HOLOCAUST EXAMPLE DEMONSTRATES THE CONTRADICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND EXPOSES ITS EUROCENTRIC NATURE IT WAS ONLY AFTER
HITLER THAT WE CARED ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WHERE EVEN THE BONE
CHILLING ATROCITIES OF COLONIZATION DID NOTHING TO MOTIVATE HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS IT WAS ONLY AFTER EUROPEANS WERE THREATENED THAT WE
CARED YOUR EXAMPLE PROVES WHY YOU SHOULD VOTE NEGATIVE TO SHATTER
THE COLONIAL NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Although the human rights movement is located within the historical continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an
attack on non-European cultures, it is critical to note that it was European, and not non-European, atrocities that gave rise to it. While the
movement has today
constructed the savage and the victim as non-European, Adolf Hitler was the quintessential savage. The abominations and demise of his
regime ignited the human rights movement. <=40> n39 Hitler, a white European, was [*211] the personification of evil. The Nazi regime, a
white European government, was the embodiment of barbarism. The combination of Hitler's gross deviation from the evolving European
constitutional law precepts and the entombment of his imperial designs by the West and the Soviet Union started the avalanche of norms known as
the human rights corpus. Nuremberg, the German town where some twenty-two major Nazi war criminals were tried--resulting in nineteen
convictions--stands as the birthplace of the human rights movement, with the London Agreement <=41> n40 its birth certificate. Originally, the
West did not create the human rights movement in order to save or civilize non-Europeans,
although these humanist impulses drove the anti-slavery abolitionist efforts of the nineteenth
century. Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric consequences and genocidal
dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by
Europeans, with its bone-chilling atrocities, were sufficient to move the West to create the
human rights movement. It took the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europe--a white people--to start the process of the
codification and universalization of human rights norms. Thus, although the Nuremberg Tribunal has been argued by some to be in a sense
hypocritical, it is its promise that is significant. For the first time, the major powers drew a line demarcating impermissible conduct by states
towards their own people and created the concept of collective responsibility for human rights. But no one should miss the irony of
brutalizing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials and the adoption of the UDHR. Perhaps more importantly, two of the
oldest and most prestigious human rights INGOs--the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Amnesty International (AI)--were established
to deal with human rights violations in Europe, not the Third World. The ICJ was formed as a tool for the West in [*212] the Cold War. <=45>
n44 According to A.J.M. van Dal of the Netherlands, one of its original officials, the mission of the ICJ was to "mobilize the forces--in particular
the juridical forces--of the free world for the defense of our fundamental legal principles, and in so doing to organize the fight against all forms of
systematic injustice in the Communist countries." <=46> n45 AI was launched in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer, to protest the
imprisonment, torture, or execution of prisoners held in Romania, Hungary, Greece, Portugal, and the United States because of their political
opinions or religious beliefs. <=47> n46 In all of these cases, the targets of AI were European or American, and not the Third World. Thus, the
human rights movement originated in Europe to curb European
savageries such as the Holocaust, the abuses of Soviet bloc Communism, and the denials of speech and other expressive rights in a number of
Western countries. The movement grew initially out of the horrors of the West, constructing the image of a European savage. The European
human rights system, which is now a central attribute of European legal and political identity, is designed to hold member states to particular
standards of conduct in their treatment of individuals. <=48> n47 It is, as it were, the bulwark against the reemergence of the unbridled European
savage--the phenomenon that gave rise to and fueled the Third Reich. The human rights corpus, only put into effect following the
atrocities of the Second World War, had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colonial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated
sense of European and Western global predestination. As put by David Slater, European "belief in the necessity of an imperial
mission to civilize the other and to convert other societies into inferior versions of the same" took hold in the nineteenth century.
<=50> n49 This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a ready mask and benign cover in
messianic faiths.
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AT: RELATIVISM
OUR ARGUMENT IS NOT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ALWAYS BAD, NOR IS IT
RELATIVISM RATHER THAT WHEN THOSE CONCEPTS ARE WIELDED BY DOMINATE
COLONIAL POWERS THEY ARE USED TO JUSTIFY HORRIFIC ATROCITIES IN THE
NAME OF A GREATER UNIVERSAL WE NOT REJECT HUMAN DIGNITY OR AGENCY
RATHER THAT WE SHOULD EMBRACE A MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
The historical pattern is undeniable. It forms a long queue of the colonial administrator, the
Bible-wielding Christian missionary, the merchant of free enterprise, the exporter of political
democracy, and now the human rights zealot. In each case the European culture has pushed
the "native" culture to transform. The local must be replaced with the universal--that is, the European.
Are the connections between human rights and particular attributes of European-American culture--such as hedonism, excess individualism, free
markets, and now globalization--contingent and not organic? Is, in fact, the text of
are nonEuropean cultures better advised to adopt the human rights text to their specific contexts, but to
leave its core in place, if they seek redemption from their own backwardness? Can they segregate the
human rights so open that it is up for grabs, allowing different interests to make whatever claims they wish on it? In other words,
"good" from the "bad" in human rights and reject the baggage of the West, while building a culture that is free from the evils that deny human
potential? Although it is not the purpose of this Article to address particularized national settings, it is sufficient to note that the
SVS
metaphor has deep historical parallels in the national histories of states where non-whites, and
especially persons of African ancestry, have been subjected to oppression, abuse, exploitation,
and domination by whites. The history of South Africa, as told by Nelson Mandela, is not just a testament to the cooperation of
black and white South Africans against apartheid. <=72> n71 There is in that history a strong undercurrent of white benefactors, sometimes
pejoratively referred to as "do-gooders," a species of humans cut from the abolitionist cloth. <=73> n72 During the darkest days of apartheid,
many individual white lawyers, white law firms, and white human rights organizations spoke for and defended black South
Africans. <=74> n73 Many whites became key leaders in what was essentially a black liberation struggle. <=75> n74 In the United States, from
the earliest days of [*219] the enslavement of Africans by whites up to the civil rights movement, whites often played important roles in the
struggle for equality by blacks. As in South Africa, many American whites held key positions in the fight for civil rights. <=76> n75 It seems
politically incorrect to consign white participation in these noble causes to the SVS metaphor. But it is an unavoidable conclusion that the
metaphor largely describes their involvement.
It would also be a tragic historical error not to recognize the

importance of those struggles to the liberal project and its centrality to democracy and the
freedom of whites as a people themselves.
The purpose of this Article is not to assign ignoble intentions or motivations on the individual proponents, leaders, or participants in the human
rights movement. Without a doubt many of the leaders and foot-soldiers of the human rights movement are driven by a burning desire to end
human suffering, as they see it from their vantage point. The white American suburban high school or college student who joins the local chapter
of AI and protests FGM in far away lands or writes letters to political or military leaders whose names do not easily roll off the English tongue are
no doubt drawing partly from a well of noblesse oblige. The zeal to see all humanity as related and the impulse to help those defined as in need is
A certain degree of human universality is inevitable and desirable.

But what that universality is, what historical and cultural stew it is made of, and how it is
accomplished make all the difference. What the high school or college student ought to realize is
that her zeal to save others--even from themselves--is
steeped in Western and European history. If one culture is allowed the prerogative of
imperialism, the right to define and impose on others what it deems good for humanity, the
very meaning of freedom itself will have been abrogated. That is why a human rights
movement that pivots on the SVS metaphor violates the very idea of the sanctity of
humanity that purportedly inspires it.
noble and is not the problem addressed here.
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AT: KRISHNA
THIS SAD OLD PIECE SHIT CARD DOES NOT ANSWER OUR ARGUMENT WE ARE NOT
RADICAL HIGH THEORY, WE ARE NOT WEARING CLOCKS AROUND OUR KNECKS OR
DOING RADICAL PERFORMANCE THIS KRISHNA EVIDENCE ASSUMES RADICAL
REJECTION OF ALL REFORMS AND LIBERAL POLITICS WE BELIEVE LIBERAL
POLITICS CAN BE USEFUL IF IT IS NOT BASED ON THE UNIVERSALIZATION OF
WESTERN VALUES
TURN THE AFF DESTROYS COALITION BUILDING OUR FIRST 1NC EVIDENCE SAYS
THAT MAKING CROSS-CULTURAL VALUE JUDGEMENTS WORSENS INTERNATIONAL
HIERCHARIES AND PREVENTS PEOPLES FROM CREATING MULTICULTURAL
THEORIES OF HUMAN DIGNITY THEIR IDEA OF COALITION BUILDING IS COERCING
NON-EUROPEANS TO ACCEPT A HOMOGENIZED VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORDER THIS DOES NOT TRANSLATE INTO COOPERATION, IN FACT IT DRIVES A
WEDGE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH OUR ALTERNATIVE ALLOWS COALITION
BUILDING BECAUSE IT REJECTS THE ARROGANCE OF US COLONIALISM
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AT: REALISM
1. THIS DOES NOT ANSWER OUR ARGUMENT WE MADE NO ASSESSMENT OF THE
ROLE OF STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER WE ONLY CLAIMED THAT
UNIVERSALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS JUSTIFIES COLONIZATION
REALISM SAYS THAT STATES ARE IN COMPETITION IN AN ANARCHIAL
INTERNATIONAL ORDER WE AGREE AND THIS PROVES WHY STATES IN THE
THIRD WORLD RESENT WESTERN ARROGANCE REALISM ACTUALLY
DEMONSTRATES WHY OTHER STATES WILL REJECT THE AFFIRMATIVES
ATTEMPT TO UNIVERSALIZE AND INTERVENE INTO THEIR AFFAIRS
2. TURN THE AFF IS NOT REALIST THEY PUT BLIND FAITH INTO COLLECTIVE
SECURITY AND LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS YOU HAVE A READ A
DISAD AGAINST YOURSELF IF REALISM IS TRUE THEN INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION WILL FAIL BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN STATE INTERESTS IF
REALISM IS TRUE YOU LOSE BECAUSE YOUR EVIDENCE SAYS A MOVE AWAY
FROM REALISM WILL RESULT IN INTERNATIONAL CHAOS YOU CANNOT
SOLVE ANY OF YOUR CASE
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AT: FRAMEWORK
1. THIS IS NOT OUR FAULT THE 1AC ALREADY CHOSE THE FRAMEWORK BY
TELLING A STORY ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS LAW THE 1NC EVIDENCE
EXPLAINS THIS LINK HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS A NARRATIVE TEXT AND
MUST CAN ONLY BE PROPERLY ANALYZED AS SUCH THIS IS EXPLAINED IN
THE OVERVIEW
2. THEY ARE OBSCURING OUR ARGUMENT WE NEVER SAID THEY CANNOT USE
THE PLAN TO WEIGH AGAINST OUR CRITIQUE OUR ARGUMENT WAS A LINK
TO THE PLAN AND DIRECTLY CLASHES WITH ALL OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR ACTION IN THE 1AC WE HAVE ARGUED WE TURN AND OUTWEIGH THE
CASE
3. REPRESENTATIONS SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN THEIR FRAMEWORK:
A. IT IS DISEMPOWERING TO IGNORE THE IMPACT OF REPRESENTATIONS
WE MAY NEVER HAVE OUR HANDS ON THE LEVERS OF POWER WE
ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE ACADEMICS REPRESENTATIONS HAVE AN
EFFECT ON THE WAY WE VIEW THE WORLD THEY HAVE PLENTY OF
GROUND TO DEFEND THEIR DISCOURSE THIS IS A MORE FRUITFUL
DEBATE BECAUSE IT HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON US
B. ITS BRAINWASHING OUR 1NC EVIDENCE TURNS ALL THEIR ROLE
PLAYING ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THE TRAINING THEY GIVE US IS ONLY
TRAINING FOR COLONIALISM THE GAME MIGHT BE COOL, BUT WE
SHOULDNT PRACTICE TO BE COLONIAL ADMINSTRATORS
C. THEIR FRAMEWORK ALLOWS NEGATIVE IN ROUND DISCOURSE SUCH
AS GENDERED LANGUAGE TO BE RELEGATED AS USELESS THIS
ENCOURAGES IRRESPONSIBLE POLICY DEFENSE
D. REPRESENTATIONS SHAPE HOW POLICIES GET IMPLEMENTED OUR
1NC EVIDENCE SAYS THAT TAKING A SAVIOR/VICTIMIZER METAPHOR
PERSEPECTIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS MAKES US MORE LIKELY TO BE
VIOLENT AND COERCIVE REPRESENTATIONS ARE INSEPERABLE
FROM POLICY ACTION - IT IS VITAL TO UNDERSTANDING WHETHER A
POLICY ACTION IS DESIREABLE AND WE HAVE PROVEN THAT IT IS NOT
E. THE 1AC SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OF ITS JUSTIFICATIONS IF
WE UNDERMINE ALL OF THE 1AC ASSUMPTIONS WHY POLICY ACTION IS
UNJUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF THE WAY IT IS DEFENDED THEN WE SHOULD
WIN
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Human Rights Promotion Imperialistic

The rhetoric of human rights pits groups against one another.
Under the guise of rights, Western nations portray
themselves as saviors and in turn use coercive measures to
control and subvert non-Western cultures
Mutua, Professor of Law at SUNY Buffalo, professor of law at Hilda L. Hurst, and visiting
professor at Harvard, 2001
(Makau, A Third World Critique of Human Rights Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor
of Human Rights, HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL vol. 42: 201-245,
http://www.ceu.budapest.edu/legal/universalism%20and%20local%20knowledge%20in%20HR
%202003/Makau_text.html, Accessed: 6/21/07)
The human rights movement,1 which includes its corpus and discourse, is marked by a damning metaphor. The subtext of human rights is a grand narrative of an epochal contest that pits savages, on the one hand, against victims and
saviors, on the other.2 The savages-victims-saviors (SVS)3 construction is a three-dimensional compound metaphor
in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself.4 Significantly, this metaphor and narrative rejects the crosscontamination of cultures.5 In other words, the metaphor is premised on the transformation by Western cultures of
non-Western cultures, and not the fashioning of a multi-cultural mosaic.6 This self representation of human rights
requires moral and historical certainty and a belief in particular inflexible truths.7 As eloquently noted by Mary Ann
Glendon, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the founding document of the human rights movement, "is
already showing signs of having achieved the status of holy writ within the human rights movement." 8 The UDHR,
the grandest of all human rights documents, endows the struggle between good and evil with historicity in which the
defeat of the latter is only possible through human rights.9 This is now popularly accepted as the normal script of
human rights. In fact, there is today an orgy of celebration of this script by prominent scholars who see in it the key
to the redemption of humanity.10(1992). But this grand script of human rights raises a multitude of normative and
cultural questions and problems.
The SVS metaphor is vividly manifested in both the norms and the discourse of the human rights movement. The
paper argues that the compound metaphor of human rights with its three sub-metaphors of the savage, victim, and
savior that the central purpose of the human rights movement is to transform society into a particular Eurocentric
prototype. It argues in all three sub-metaphors, for example, that political democracy, as known in the West, is an
organic part human rights. In other words, the paper contends that "savage" cultures and peoples lie outside the
human rights orbit, and by implication, the regime of political democracy. It is this distance from human rights that
allows certain cultures to create victims. Political democracy is then an essential panacea. Other textual examples,
which are anchored in cultural phenomena, such as "traditional"practices that appear to negate the equal protection
for women, are deployed throughout the Paper to illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, nonEuropean cultures.
As a civilizing crusade, the human rights movement is now a comprehensive cosmology on which legitimate
statehood partially rests. The adoption by the United Nations of universal human rights norms a set of values that
determine the fundamental character of any state or society ostensibly closes the book on the cultural biases of the
human rights project. Unlike yesterday, condemnations of human rights violations are longer just empty ritual. The
United Nations, regional organizations such as the European Union, the Organization of African Unity, the
Organization of American States, and individual states of all cultural and political traditions, including those in the
Third World,11 have taken coercive measures against other states in the name of human rights. Many nongovernmental organizations in the Third World openly oppose human rights violations by their own states and
societies. In other words, non-Europeans now confront each other within the confines of their states over the
enforcement of human rights. The observance or denial of human rights now pits African against African, Arab
against Arab, and Asian and Asian. The human rights project is no longer just a critique of the Third World by the
West.
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Human Rights Deny Agency

Western nations have imposed their authority on lesser
developed nations. They seek to transform natives into
normal and desirable homogenous culture that denies
human agency
Although the human rights movement arose in Europe, with the express purpose of containing
European savagery, it is today a civilizing crusade aimed primarily at the Third World. It is one
thing for Europeans and North Americans, whose states share a common philosophical and legal
ancestry, to create a common political and cultural template to govern their societies. But it is
quite another to insist that their particular vision of society is the only permissible civilization
which must now be imposed on all human societies, particularly those outside Europe. The merits
of the European and American civilization of human rights notwithstanding, all missionary work
is suspect, and for Third World states may easily seem part of the colonial project. Once again,
the "superior" Europeans and North Americans descend on "backward" natives in the Third
World with the human rights mission to free them from the claws of despotic governments and
benighted cultures.
The historical pattern is undeniable here. It forms the long queue of the colonial administrator,
the Bible-wielding Christian missionary, the merchant of free enterprise, the exporter of political
democracy, and now the human rights zealot. In each case the "native" culture is pushed to
transform by the European culture. The local must be replaced with the European, the
"universal." Are the connections between human rights and particular attributes of EuropeanAmerican culture, such as hedonism, excess individualism, free markets, and now globalization
contingent, and not organic? Is, in fact, the text of human rights so open that it is up for grabs,
allowing different interests to make whatever claims they wish on it? In other words, are nonEuropean cultures better advised to adopt the human rights text to their specific contexts, but
leaving its core in place, if they seek redemption from their own backwardness? Can they
segregate the "good" from the "bad" in human rights and reject the baggage of the West, while
building a culture that is free from the evils that deny human potential?
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Universalization Link
Campaigns to universalize human rights continues the
campaign of Western cultural and political dominance
Franck presents the apparent triumph of liberal democratic nationalism as the free, uncoerced, choice of non-Western
peoples. But this Paper argues that human rights, and the relentless campaign to universalize them, present a
historical continuum in an unbroken chain of Western conceptual and cultural dominance over the past several
centuries. At the heart of this continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the impulse to universalize Eurocentric
norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and "othering" that which is different and non-European. By this
argument, the Paper does not mean to suggest that human rights are bad per se or that the human rights corpus is
irredeemable. Rather, it wants to suggest that the globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all
high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the Rest of the world.
60
But the Paper does not pretend to provide a coherent formula for the creation of a new human rights corpus. What
it offers is a signpost of the way forward.
The victim is portrayed as weak, powerless, lazy, and passive.

Human rights defines the other as helpless and continues a
cycle of exploitation.
The view that the "native" is weak, powerless, prone to laziness, and unable on his own to create
conditions for his development is a recurrent theme in Western representations of the "other."
Early in the life of the organization, an International Labor Organization report concluded, for
example, that indigenous peoples could not by themselves overcome their "backwardness." It
noted:
[I]t is now almost universally recognized that, left to their own resources, indigenous peoples
would have difficulty in overcoming their inferior economic and social situation which inevitably
leaves them open for exploitation.135
There is a tendency in human rights literature to paint victims of human rights violations
who are mostly in the Third World as the product of backward, repressive, and
authoritarian cultures which cannot correct themselves. In the culture of the human rights
movement, whose center is in the West, there is a belief that human rights problems afflict
people "over there" and not people "like us." The missionary zeal to help those who cannot
help themselves is one of the logical conclusions of this attitude.136 The view that the human
rights corpus is about ordering the lives of non-European peoples has a long history in
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international law itself. More recent scholarship by a number of enterprising scholars establishes
this link between international law and the project of the control of non-European societies and
cultures.137 Since the inception of the current international legal order some five centuries ago,
there have been outright challenges by non-European cultures to the logic, substance, and
purpose of international law.138 The development of human rights, arguably the most benign
strain of international law, has only blunted, but not eliminated, some of those challenges.
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A2: FGM Bad
Western representations of Female Genital Mutilation depicts

cultures as savage and uncivilized and further racist notions of
barbaric African culture
The human rights report is a catalogue of abuses committed by the state against liberal values.105
It criticizes the state for departing from the civil and political rights obligations provided for in
the major instruments. Its purpose is to "shame" the Third World state by pointing out the gulf
between the states conduct and internationally-sanctioned "civilized" behavior. This departure
from "good" behavior is stigmatized and used to paint the state either as a pariah or out of step
with the rest of the civilized world. Reports normally contain corrective measures and
recommendations to the offending state. In many instances, however, the audience of these
reports is the West or some other Western institution, such as the European Union. The pleas of
the INGO report here pit a First World state or institution against a Third World state or a Third
World culture. The report asks that the West cut off aid, condition assistance, impose sanctions, or
publicly denounce the unacceptable conduct of the Third World state.106 INGOs thus ask First
World states and institutions to play a significant role in "taming" and "civilizing" Third World
states, even though such a role relies on the power and economic imbalances of the international
order which favors the West over the South.107]
But the human rights report tells another, more interesting, story about the target of the human
rights corpus. In this story, the report tells of several images of the savage, including the Third
World state, the quintessential savage. Human rights literature is replete with images of bloodthirsty Third World despots and trigger-happy police and security forces. Perhaps in no other area
than in the advocacy over "female genital mutilation"108 is the image of culture as the savage
more poignant. First, the descriptions of the practice are so searing and revolting that they evoke
images of a barbarism that defies civilization. Of the three forms of female circumcision
practiced, two are described in particularly graphic and cruel language.109 Although the practice
has dissipated over the last several decades, it is still carried it out in parts of Africa and the
Middle East. Given Western stereotypes of barbaric natives110 in the "dark" continent, Western
advocacy over FGM has evoked images of machete-wielding natives only too eager to inflict
pain on women in their societies. The speed, for example, with which the 1994 mass killings in
Rwanda took place, and the weapons used, have come to symbolize in the Western mind the
barbarism of Africans. Gourevitch, an American journalist, was one of the instrumental voices in
the creation of this portrayal:
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in the spring and early
summer of 1994 a program of massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda. Although the killing
was low-tech performed largely by machete it was carried out at a dazzling speed: of an
original population of about seven and a half million, at least eight hundred thousand people
were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans speak of a million deaths, and they may be right.
The dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the
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holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.111
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A2: Womens Rights
Western conceptions of feminism and gender rights and

seeped in essentialism and imperialism
The impression left by the reports and the activities of powerful INGOs is unmistakable. While
the West is presented as the cradle of feminism, countries in the South have been constructed as steeped in
traditions and practices which are harmful to women. In one of her first reports, Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women, confirmed this
impression when she noted that certain "customary practices and some aspects of tradition are
often the cause of violence against women."90 She noted that "besides female genital mutilation, a
whole host of practices violate female dignity. Foot binding, male preference, early marriage,
virginity tests, dowry deaths, sati, female infanticide and malnutrition are among the many
practices which violate a womans human rights."91 All these practices are found in non-Western
cultures. Among other treaties, CEDAW is seen as a treaty of particular relevance to non-Western
cultures because of their poor treatment of women. Images of practices such as "female genital
mutilation," dowry burnings, and honor killings have come to frame the discourse, and in that
vein stigmatize non-Western cultures.]
Elsewhere, the text of human rights points an accusing finger at the Third World. Non-European
political and cultural traditions which, which lie outside the liberal tradition, and do not yield
political democratic structures, are demonized in the text of human rights and its discourse. Take,
for example, the view of human rights documents in the area of political participation. Here, the
human rights corpus expects all societies to support a pluralist, democratic society. Both the
UDHR and the ICCPR, the two key documents in the area of civil and political rights, are explicit
about the primacy of expressive and associational rights in any society. They both give citizens
the right to political participation through elections and the guarantee of the right to assemble,
associate, and disseminate their ideas.92 This scheme of rights coupled with equal protection and
due process rights implies a political democracy or a political society with a regularly elected
government, genuine competition for political of lice, and separation of powers with judicial
independence. While it is true that the human rights regime does not dictate the particular
permutation or strain of political democracy, it requires a Western-style liberal democracy
nevertheless. Systems of government such as monarchies, theocracies, dictatorships, and one
party-states would violate associational rights and run afoul of the human rights corpus.93 The
human rights corpus raises the specter of political savagery when it rejects non-Western
political cultures as undemocratic.
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A2: Freedom
The savior promises freedom but the their language ensures

cultural and racial hierarchy and domination. This rhetoric
guarantees continued domination and racism. This evidence is
specific to Western imposition on Africa.
The last dimension of the prism is that of the savior or the redeemer, the good angel who protects,
vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior is the victims bulwark against tyranny.
The saviors promise is simple yet complex: freedom. It is freedom from the tyrannies of the
state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on particular
values. In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself but in reality the
United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities like the New York-based
Ford Foundation are the rescuers, the redeemers of a benighted world.71 In reality, however, these
institutions are merely a front. The savior is ultimately a set of culturally-based norms and
practices that inhere in liberal thought and philosophy. This Paper argues that the savage-victimsavior metaphor of human rights carries racial connotations in which the international
hierarchy of race and color are confirmed and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact
necessary for the continuation of the global racial hierarchy. One cannot exist without the
other. Thus the savages and victims are generally non-white and non-Western, while the
saviors are white. This is an old truism which has found new life in the metaphor of human
rights. But there is also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemption
of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a people -- and who have
historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against non-whites -- redeem
themselves by "defending" and "civilizing" "lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The
metaphor is thus laced with the pathology of self-redemption.
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to address particularized national settings, suffice it to
note that the savage-victim-savior metaphor has deep historical parallels in the national
histories of states where non-whites, and especially persons of African ancestry, have been
subjected to oppression, abuse, exploitation, and domination by whites.72 The history of
South Africa, as told by Nelson Mandela, is not just a testament to the co-operation of black and
white South Africans against apartheid, the system of official segregation.73 There is in that
history a strong undercurrent of white benefactors, sometimes pejoratively referred to as "dogooders," a species of humans cut from the abolitionist cloth.74 During the darkest days of
apartheid, many individual white lawyers, white law firms, and white human rights organizations
spoke for and defended black South Africans.75 Many whites became key leaders in what was
essentially a black liberation struggle.76 In the United States, from the earliest days of the
enslavement of Africans by whites up to the civil rights movement, whites often played important
roles in the struggle for equality by blacks. As in South Africa, many American whites held key
positions in the fight for civil rights.77 It seems politically incorrect to consign white participation
in these noble causes to the savior-victim-savage metaphor. But it is an unavoidable conclusion
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191
that the metaphor largely describes their involvement. It would also be a tragic historical error not
to recognize the importance of those struggles to the liberal project and its centrality to
democracy and the freedom of whites as a people themselves.
The purpose of this paper is not to assign ignoble intentions or motivations on the individual
proponents, leaders, or participants in the human rights movement. Without a doubt many of the
leaders and foot-soldiers of the human rights movement are driven by a burning desire to end
human suffering, as they see it from their vantage point. The white American suburban high
school or college student who joins the local chapter of Amnesty International and protests FGM
in far away lands or writes letters to political or military leaders whose names do not easily roll
off the English tongue no doubt drawing partly from a well of noblesse oblige. The zeal to see all
humanity as related and the impulse to help those defined as in need is noble and is not the
problem addressed here. A certain degree of human universality is inevitable and desirable. But
what that universality is, what historical and cultural stew it is made of, and how it is
accomplished make all the difference. What the high school or college student ought to realize is
that their zeal to save others even from themselves is steeped in Western and European
history. It drove the Christian crusaders and partly fired the imaginations of the colonialists. If
one culture is allowed the prerogative of imperialism, the right to define and impose on others
what it deems good for humanity, the very meaning of freedom itself will have been abrogated.
That is why a human rights movement that pivots on the savage-victim-savior metaphor violates
the very idea of the sanctity of humanity that purportedly inspires it.
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*** Negative Kritik Links ***
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Militarism Link
Intervening to protect democracy is used as a justification to
build the military
Democracy in America. March 11, 2011
What's the point of having this superb military if you can't use it?, Economist reprint,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/03/defence_spending_and_libya DOA: 5/5/11
All of which raises a question. Back in the days when the cause of humanitarian intervention was on the rise, during
the argument over Bosnia policy, Madeleine Albright (in Colin Powell's telling) encapsulated the thinking in a pithy
phrase: "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Mr Powell
wrote in his memoirs that he "almost had an aneurysm"; the military was not a toy to be used because we had it
sitting around. But basically, Ms Albright was right: the United States inherited the world's strongest military because
of the Cold War, and if in the post-Cold War world there were no longer any plausible uses for that military, there
really was no point in having it. Mr Powell, in fact, presided over dramatic cuts in the size of the defence
establishment. It was the embrace of humanitarian intervention in the cause of promoting democracy, first in
Kosovo, then (after the September 11 attacks) in Afghanistan and finally Iraq, that provided the new
justification for a military buildup.
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Imperialism Link
Intervention to promote democracy is a just a justification for
imperialism
The Palestine Chronicle, February 16, 2011, The Egyptian Revolution and Democracy,
www.democracynow.org/.../the_egyptian_revolution_a_democracy_now_special_on_mubaraks_resignation - DOA:
5/4/11
Imperial conquests have always had their ideological justifications. Even in earlier ages, exterminating a people,
exploiting their resources, stealing their lands, and enslaving their children were generally non-starters when it came
to firing up the local populace for another military campaign. Accordingly, the Romans "civilized" the
barbarians, the Spanish conquistadores "brought the gospel" to the "New World," and the English were
"shining the light of civilization" on the Indian subcontinent. Although most history books tend to minimize
the genocide and slavery that accompanied Europe's string of conquests (including North America), few have any
illusions about the true objectives of Rome, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and other countries' imperial
adventures. Similarly, when future students of history read about the mission undertaken by the US
government to "spread democracy" at the dawn of the twenty-first century, they too will most likely
understand its true motives far better than most of the intellectuals and analysts who frequently appear in the
news media today.
Democracy promotion grounded in imperialism

Oz Hassan is a research fellow on the EU funded FP7 EU-GRASP project and directs the MA level international
security programme in the Department of Political and International Studies at Warwick University, Democracy
promotion and human rights in US foreign policy The International Journal of Human Rights Volume 15, Issue 4,
2011, Pages 509 - 519
Yet as an idea embedded within the republican tradition, Wilsonianism includes a commitment to democracy, to
human rights and to the rule of law, including international law. It would have been wrong, in this respect, to
describe the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a Wilsonian policy, even if one could accept the dubious assumption that use of
military force was linked to the Bush administration's freedom agenda. This is because the Bush administration
openly rejected the Wilsonian principle of 'common counsel' at the United Nations, and, as we shall see below, it
rejected certain international human rights norms in the process.14 The fact that such policies are described as
Wilsonian (or at least neo-liberal) stems from a reading of American internationalism that is very different to
Deudney's. Tony Smith, for instance, locates the origins of the Wilsonian emphasis on democracy promotion in
the compromise between imperialists and anti-imperialists at the turn of the twentieth century. 'Democracy
promotion' appealed to the anti-imperialist principle while pandering to the imperialist's sense of moral
hierarchy and historical mission:
Imperialists could tout the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, while anti-imperialists could reassure
themselves that the ideals of self-government would not be endangered the democratisation of the Philippines
came to be the principle reason the Americans were there; now the United States had a moral purpose to its
imperialism and could rest more easily democracy would become [in the Philippines] the moving faith of
the forty-eight years of American control.
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Realism Good K Links

Democracy promotion rejects realism as a foundation of
foreign policy
Mark J.L. McClelland is a doctoral researcher in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at
the University of Birmingham , Exporting virtue: neoconservatism, democracy promotion and the end of history The
International Journal of Human Rights Volume 15, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 520 - 531
.
Neoconservatives began the 1990s advocating a somewhat cautious, limited, realist-isolationist response to the new
international landscape the US faced following the USSR's demise. This was seen in their broad support for the
limited war aims of George H.W. Bush during the 1991 Gulf War. Yet by the end of the decade neoconservatism
had evolved into a foreign policy ideology that emphasised the use of American hard power to force regime
on the basis of human rights and the imposition of liberal

democracy and not simply strategic rationale. This was most obviously seen in the Balkans,
change in certain states
where the policy of 'lift and strike' to support Bosnian Muslim forces in 1995 to help them fight the Bosnian
Serbs, had become by 1999 in Kosovo the advocacy of direct hard US power to topple Milosevic's regime and
bring about a democratic revolution in Belgrade.53 The advocacy of the use of military force to overthrow
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 was further evidence of just how far
neoconservatism had travelled as an ideology in a relatively short space of time. Lawrence Kaplan and William
Kristol in their 2003 book, The War Over Iraq, demonstrated
how neoconservatism had

distanced itself from the realist positions it had flirted with at the end of the
Cold War. Their recommendation that the US should invade Iraq was largely absent realist justifications
for war, instead emphasising the necessity for the US to oppose totalitarianism and gross human rights
violations and seek to export liberal democracy.54 It was the culmination of a neoconservative shift in thought
that had first been articulated in Kagan and Kristol's 1996 Foreign Affairs piece.55 where he currently holds a 1 + 3
studentship from the ESRC. His research interests lie in the fields of US and UK foreign policy, neoconservatism and
political history.
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Realism rejects democracy promotion

Oz Hassan is a research fellow on the EU funded FP7 EU-GRASP project and directs the MA level international
security programme in the Department of Political and International Studies at Warwick University, Democracy
promotion and human rights in US foreign policy The International Journal of Human Rights Volume 15, Issue 4,
2011, Pages 509 - 519
There is no doubt that America is founded as a democracy committed to fundamental rights protected by the rule of
law. It is wrong to assume, however, that all the founding fathers were committed to an activist foreign policy
designed to promote these values beyond America's shores. Of course, the United States at that time was not the
superpower it is today. The reluctance to spread democratic revolution, however, was not simply a consequence
of America's relative lack of power. The realists among the founding fathers questioned the universal
applicability of the American system. In a letter to Lafayette (the French aristocrat who became an honorary
American citizen for his participation in the war against the British) written on 6 January 1799, for instance,
Alexander Hamilton cast doubt on the ability of republicanism to succeed in revolutionary France. He did not doubt
the French right to establish internal liberty, he simply did not think the French spirit or ethos could sustain such a
government. 'I shall only say', he concluded, 'that I hold with Montesquieu that a government must be fitted to such a
nation as much as a Coat to the Individual, and consequently that what may be good at Philadelphia may be bad at
Paris and ridiculous at Petersburgh'.2 All the US could be expected to do in such a world was to take care of its
national interests. Not all American realists accept the risk of moral relativism inherent in an argument such as
this. They do, however, urge caution about using American power to advance a liberal agenda. George
Kennan is perhaps the most articulate of policymaker / intellectuals in this regard, although Reinhold Niebuhr,
Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger could easily lay claim to that particular mantle.3 For Kennan, US foreign
policy consistently failed to grasp the limitations of American power. At its worse it suffered from:
a failure to appreciate the limitations of war in general - any war - as a vehicle for the achievement of the
objectives of the democratic state. This is the question of the proper relationship of such things as force and coercion
to the purposes of democracy. That they have a place in the international as well as the domestic functioning of
democracy I would be the last to deny. But I would submit that we will continue to harm our own interests almost
as much as we benefit them if we continue to employ the instruments of coercion in the international field without a
better national understanding of their significance and possibilities. It is essential to recognize that the maiming and
killing of men and the destruction of human shelters and other installations, however necessary they may be for other
reasons, cannot in itself make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose. [T]he actual prospering occurs
only when something happens in a man's mind that increases his enlightenment and the consciousness of his real
relation to other people.4
From this perspective, US foreign policymakers could not afford to be influenced by the youthful exuberance of a
nation that believed it was the vanguard of a global democratic revolution. When policymakers were influenced by
that narrative, or when they were influenced by a democratic system that gave rise to irresponsible populism, the US
not only damaged its interests it also failed to advance the democratic cause. The best that the US could achieve in
foreign policy, these realists argued, was an international order that sustained the peace and allowed Americans to
prosper. This might not vindicate the American Revolution in the ways liberals might demand, but it would provide a
platform for America to be an example of good governance; and that, ultimately had a greater political power than
America's armed forces.
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Human Rights Intervention Bad Convergence

Thesis and Link Democracy Assistance produces and
maintains an ideology of convergence, trying to remake the
world in the style of America pseudo-democracy. This ideology
of convergence disables a truly empowering concept of
democracy, one rooted in institutional experimentation and
divergence. Until this experimentation becomes entrenched
around the world, war and crisis are inevitable they become
the only means of changing society.
Roberto Unger 5 Roscoe Pound Professor of Law, Harvard, former minister of strategic affairs, Brazil What Should
the Left Propose? P. 1-11
The world suffers under a dictatorship of no alternatives. Although ideas all by themselves are powerless to overthrow this
dictatorship we cannot overthrow it. All over the world, people complain that their national politics fail to deliver real alternatives: especially
alternatives that would give new meaning, new l life, and new efficacy to the old progressive idea of a better chance for everyone a chance to
ensure the moral as well as the material necessities of life, a chance to work and to be cared for when one cannot work, a chance to engage in the
affairs of ones community and ones society, a chance to do something with ones life that has value in ones own eyes. l Is it possible to suggest
a way forward in a short space? And to do so in a manner revealing the similarities as well as the differences between the way forward for richer
and for poorer countries? I believe that it is possible, and that it must be possible in brief if it is possible at all. Many countries are now governed
by people who would like to be Franklin Roosevelt, and who do not know how. Many others are ruled by people pander- 1 ing to the interests of
big business and to the desperate I and inverted resentments of a working-class majority that feels abandoned and betrayed by the would-be l
Roosevelts. The self-described progressives appear on the stage of contemporary history as the humanizers of the inevitable: their program has
become the program of their conservative adversaries with a falling dis- l count. They disguise surrender as synthesis for example, of social
cohesion with economic flexibility. Their "third ways" are the first way with sugar: the sweetener of compensatory social policy and social
insurance making up for a failure to achieve any fundamental broadening of opportunity. The calamitous ideological adventures of the
twentieth century are spent. No global ideology with the worldwide authority of classical liberalism or socialism has
yet arisen to take their place and to contest the arrangements now associated with the rich North Atlantic
democracies and with the ideas emanating from their universities. With this surprising silence of the intellect and
with the consolidation of the American ascendancy, an unquiet order has descended upon the world. Wars are local:
punitive expeditions by the remaining superpower against those who defy it, or i products of extreme oppression and
desperate resistance in disunited countries, under the yoke of des- i potic governments. No economic collapse seems likely - given the resources
of economic management { within countries and of economic coordination among them that could rival in magnitude the economic disaster
of the 1930s. The great European social theorists Karl Marx i first among them identified the internal dynamics of
societies the revelation of inescapable conflicts and i missed opportunities as the proximate cause of their transformation.
These thinkers were mistaken. War and economic collapse have been the chief levers of change; catastrophe
unforeseen and uncontrolled has served as the midwife of reform. 4 The task of the imagination is to do
the work of crisis without crisis. However, the high academic culture of the rich countries, with its glittering worldwide prestige
and influence, has fallen under the ` control of three tendencies of thought that help prevent this work from being done. Although the
votaries of these three tendencies often regard themselves as adversaries and rivals, they are in fact partners. In the social sciences
especially in the most powerful, economics rationalization rules: the explanation of the workings of contemporary society
becomes a vindication of the superiority or the necessity of the arrangements now established in the rich countries .
In the normative discourses of political philosophy and l legal theory, humanization is in command: the justication of practices, such as
compensatory redistribution by the State or the idealization of the law as a repository of impersonal policies and principles, that would make life
less harsh for the poorest or the Q weakest. The most admired theories of justice place a gloss of metaphysical apology on the practices of
redistributive tax-and-transfer adopted by the conservative social democracies of today. In this way, the humanizers hope to soften what they no
longer know how to change or remake. In the humanities escapism l is the order ofthe day: consciousness takes a ride on a i roller coaster of
adventure, disconnected from the i reshaping of practical life. We are taught to sing in our chains. The silent partnership of these
rationalizing, humanizing, and escapist tendencies in university 1 culture leaves the field open for forms of practical political thinking that are as
deficient in insight as they are bereft of hope. * In the United States, the Democratic Party, ever the instrument of American progressives, has
failed to i produce a practical and attractive sequel to Roose- X velts program, or to make up for the absence of 1 economic ruin and world war as
incitements to re- ; form. Much of the white working-class majority of the country holds the policies favored by the Demo- crats to the
extent these policies differ at all from I those advocated by the Republicans to be products j of a conspiracy between some of the rich and many
of the poor to promote the moral interests of the former and the material interests of the latter at the cost of their own values and advantages. They
see little in the l shrunken governmental activism favored by the would-be progressives that addresses their interests I and much especially
by way of apostasy from the 4 religion ofthe family that offends their ideals. Better i to mitigate their losses by cutting the federal govemment
down to size. The result oft he divorce in the preponderant world power between the white working-class majority a group that thinks of itself
as "middle class" and their would-be champions is fateful for the entire world. Its consequence is to aggravate a circumstance without
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precedent in modern history. When, during the earlier, nineteenth-century episode of globalization Great Britain and the other European powers
exercised a dominance less complete than the one the United States enjoys now, the ideological debates that resounded throughout the world
were reflected, indeed anchored, within the most advanced countries. Now the hegemonic power is not in imaginative
communion with the rest of humanity. Its leaders, its thinkers, and its population look out and see a world that will
continue to be dangerous, poor, and unfree, unless it converges to the same institutional formula by which they
believe themselves blessed. The rest of humanity, full of admiration for the material exuberance and personal space
enjoyed by Americans, curses in response, ill concealing the thought that it must ultimately choose war if the
requirement of peace is surrender. The commanding beliefs of the American people that everything is possible, that vast problems can
be solved if broken up into pieces and addressed one by one, and that ordinary men and women contain within themselves, individually and
collectively, the constructive genius with which to craft such solutions now find themselves without adequate practical expression. The
richest and freest part of the world has shown two faces to the rest of humanity. European social democracy has
seemed to provide an alternative to the harshness of the American model; if the world could vote it might vote to become
Sweden rather than the United States a Sweden of the imagination. In the meantime, however, the heart has been going out of
historical social democracy. Under the disguise of an effort to reconcile Europeanstyle social protection l with Americanstyle
economic flexibility, social democracy has given up, one by one, many of its traditional traits, and retreated to the lastditch defense of a highlevel of social entitlements. [ This eviscerated version of social democracy can l neither address the problems of contemporary Euro- pean
societies nor bear the weight of humanitys hopes. In Europe itself the erstwhile progressives appear as chastened votaries of the ideas of their l
neoliberal opponents. In many countries, they find i their proposals for reform repudiated by an electorate I that is offered no real alternatives and
that is told by g the political and academic authorities that none exist. i When we now turn to the world outside the North I Atlantic haven of
relative freedom and prosperity, we see only fragments of feasible and attractive alterna- ` tives, unexpressed in any project or family of
projects that could appeal to the rest of mankind. Among the most successful developing countries in Q recent decades have been the two most
populous China and India. Each has succeeded by maintaining a measure of resistance to the universal formulas dispensed by the North
Atlantic elites, particularly Washington, Wall Street, and the universities of the United States. Each has wanted to join the global i economy on
terms that would allow it to organize its national life and to orient its economic development l in its own way. i However, in the great country
that has been most \ fertile in institutional innovations China the scope and development of such innovations have remained I subordinate to
the defense ofonepaity rule. The role that might have been played by an alternative set of ideas has been occupied by
genuflections to the dead, inherited orthodoxy of Marxism and by fascination with the new, imported orthodoxy of
the market economy, as it is understood in the political, financial, and academic capitals of the North Atlantic . In India,
with its flawed but vibrant democracy, resistance to this imported orthodoxy has mainly taken the indis- 1 tinct {cnn of slowness and compromise,
as if the point were to take ones time in treading a path from which 5 there is no escape. The region of` the world that proved most pliant to the
recommendations from the North Latin America has suffered a catastrophic decline in its relative position. In history obedience
rarely pays; what pays is defiance. To the question, however, about the directions defiance should take if it is to
further the promises of democracy, there is not yet an answer. We see in the world a universal political-economic
orthodoxy contested by a series of local heresies. Yet only a universalizing heresy would suffice to counteract a
universal orthodoxy. If the heresy is merely local in character and content it is likely to be abandoned at the first sign of trouble and pressure.
If the local heresy l can resist, its resistance may depend on a religiously \ sanctioned way of life unsympathetic to the demo- _ cratic and
experimentalist ideals to which progressives adhere. It is not only for practical reasons that a universaliz ing heresy seems to be the
indispensable antidote to l the universal orthodoxy about markets and govern- l ments that now provokes such resistance throughout l the world
whether in France and Germany or in g Russia, Brazil, and South Africa. It is because the causes of discontent of which the first is failure to r
anchor economic growth in a great broadening of { opportunity are themselves universal. It is also because the established ways of responding
to that discontent are so meager and ineffective. The repertory of institutional and policy alternatives on offer for the
organization of economic, social, and political life is now very restricted. If we could progress anywhere in the world
rich or poor in expanding this institutional repertory and anchoring practical progress in a broadening of
opportunity, such an advance might have implications for every country. I The attempt to achieve economic growth with
social inclusion fits readily with the search for proposals that are more than local solutions to local problems. It prepares the mind for a
universalizing i heresy. However, the failure to anchor practical progress in a sustained widening of opportunity is not the sole source of the
present unhappiness. There is another powerful source of discontent: the complaint that the orthodoxy prevents countries
or regions of the world from developing their different forms of life and ideals of civilization by denying them an
opportunity to house them in distinct ways of organizing society. Because it calls for a convergence of all countries
to the institutions and practices now established in the North Atlantic, as well as for convergence within that world
itself the orthodoxy seems to be the enemy of deep differences of experience and vision. The demand for pluralism,
unlike the search for ` growth with inclusion, seems incompatible with a political and economic alternative
claiming to be general in relevance and reach. 5 It is not. The semblance of paradox dissolves once i two premises are made explicit.
The first premise is that an unqualified pluralism an openness to any form of national life, no matter how despotic and unequal can form
no part of the objective. The aim should be a qualified pluralism: to build a world of democracies in which the individual is empowered both to
participate and to dissent. There is no single, uncontroversial interpretation of what a democratic society is or can
become. Democratic ideals must be allowed to develop in different, even clashing directions if they are to
develop at all. Under democracy the differences that matter most are those that lie in the future rather than those we
have inherited from the past. Under democracy prophecy speaks louder than memory. The second premise is that the small
repertory of institutional solutions now available to humanity the existing forms of political democracy, of the
market economy, and of free civil societies fails to provide the tools we need to develop national difference in a
form compatible with democratic ideals. A particular set of innovations in the organization of contemporary polities, economies, and
societies can provide them. This set of innovations - a major part of the progressive program that now needs to be
advanced throughout the world defines a narrow gateway \ through which humanity must pass if it is to
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strengthen its capacity to produce difference on the basis of democracy. To describe this gateway as it might be 1 approached
by both richer and poorer countries is the concern of this hopeful manifesto. We cannot, however, understand this way forward unless we first
grasp the nature of the obstacles with which we must contend, and of the forces and the opportunities on which we can count, in treading it. 11
And, US democracy assistance is inevitably and inalterably tied to convergence. Because of

US imperial ambitions, its programs attempt to impose an orthodox version of neoliberal
democracy, disabling all of the various alternatives.
AlisonJ.Ayers 9Simon Fraser University Imperial Liberties: Democratisation and Governance in the New
Imperial Order POLITICAL STUDIES: 2009 VOL 57, 127
Transformation in the three spheres (state, civil society and self) was fundamental, as James Tully (1988) has elaborated, to the historical
transformation to capitalist modernity which occurred in Britain between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, i.e. liberalism was integral to
the mode of governance (juridical government) constructed in the transition to capitalist modernity in North-Western Europe. The article
contends that the democratisation project seeks to impose or construct (neo)liberal conceptions in the domains of state,
society and self, reproducing the patterns of transformation characteristic of Western politico-economic histor y
( Williams, 1999). Democratisation is to be understood therefore as constitutive of the endeavour to reconstitute social
relations beyond the heartlands of (neo)liberal capitalism. Democracy and governance interventions need to be
understood in terms of the social relations historically being brought into being. As such, the informal imperialism of our time,
as articulated through the project of democratisation and governance, is integral to the world-historical constitution of capitalist sociality and
the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. Thus, far from non- or indeed anti-imperial, the current global mission to
democratise the world is internal to contemporary imperialism. For those who do constantly think within the horizons of
the putatively non-imperial present, the internationalisation of (neo)liberal democracy is presumed to be incompatible with imperialism, but this
habitual and normative acceptance is highly problematic (Marks, 2000; Tully, 2008). Mainstream accounts of democratisation pre-
suppose what requires explanation, taking for granted the non-imperial character of this global project, the hegemony
of a specific and impoverished model of (neo)liberal democracy, highly problematic, de-historicised notions of state,
society and self and the categorical separation of the domestic and the international. The article seeks to address such
lacunae through a critique of the project of democratisation. It provides detailed empirical evidence from Africa. As such Africa is central while
also curiously marginal to the general thesis. The article seeks to demonstrate that far from an alternative to imperialism, the
democratisation project involves the imposition of a Western (neo)liberal procedural form of democracy on
imperialised peoples. As such, democracy promotion is concerned, in part, with manufacturing mentalities and
consent around the dominant (neo)liberal notion of democracy, foreclosing attempts to understand or
constitute democracy in any other terms. It should be noted, however, that this project is executed somewhat
inconsistently. Western powers have been selective in their approach to liberal-democratic reform when countervailing strategic, economic or
ideological interests have prevailed. Thus Western governments have eschewed aid restrictions despite gross and persistent violations of human
rights or good governance in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Egypt, Colombia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Niger (Callinicos, 2003; Crawford,
2001; Olsen, 1998). As demonstrated by the situation in Uganda (detailed below) as well as Niger, in cases of violations of liberal democratic
principles, official Western agencies have routinely prioritised liberalisation over democratic principles . Likewise, in other
instances, Western intervention has terminated autonomous democratic processes, for example in Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua (Slater, 2002).
Selective adherence notwithstanding, the orthodox (neo)liberal model of democracy claims universality. As Bhikhu
Parekh notes in his account of the cultural particularity of liberal democracy, such claims have aroused deep fears in the fragile and nervous
societies of the rest of the world (Parekh, 1992, p. 160). In seeking to constitute African (and other) social relations in its own
particular image, the democratisation project reproduces internal tensions and antinomies within liberal thought . As
such, a profound non-correspondence exists, in Mahmood Mamdanis (1992) terms, between received (neo)liberal democratic theory and living
African realities. Resistance is therefore widespread, with Western (neo)liberal democratic notions being re-assessed in many places on the
continent nowadays, often more censoriously than may be heard above the clamor of Euro-American triumphalism (Comaroff and Comaroff,
1997, p. 141).
The impact until divergence and experimentation are institutionalized around the world,
wars will be fought in the name of democracy. Mass graveyards are inevitable.
Steven Best 7, Prof Of Phil, UTEP (The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, Vol. 3, No. 2 (April
2007)) http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol3/vol3_no2_Best_crisis_culture_PRINTABLE.htm
Since the election of George Bush in 2000 (and his re-election in 2004), the tragedy of 9/11, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001
and 2003 respectively, and ever more indicators of human-induced global climate change, the crisis in the social and natural worlds has sharpened
considerably. The deterioration of society and nature demands a profound, systematic, and radical political response,
yet in recent decades Left opposition movements have grown weaker in proportion to their importance. As the globe
spirals ever deeper into disaster, with all things becoming ever more tightly knit into the tentacles of global
capitalism, and as oppositional voices propose programs of reform and moderation at best, there is an urgent need for
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new conceptual and political maps and compasses to help steer humanity into a viable mode of existen ce. Karl Marx's
1843 call for a "ruthless criticism of everything existing" has never been more pressing and profound than in contemporary times of predatory
global capitalism, neoliberalism, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the demise of social
democracies, the police states of George Bush and Tony Blair, the assault on liberties and the criminalization of dissent, species extinction,
rainforest destruction, resource wars, and global warming. Given the advances of capitalism and the cooptation and retreat of radical
politics, it is urgent that genuine oppositional viewpoints be kept alive and nurtured in intellectual, public, and
political forums. When one considers the paucity of radical viewpoints that still survive, the project of Inclusive Democracy immediately
comes to mind as one of the few, if not the only, coherent and comprehensive theoretical and political frameworks for systemic social change.
Inclusive Democracy aims to develop a radical theoretical analysis of and political solution to the catastrophic social
and environmental impact of the market economies spawned by Western capitalist nations. This approach is inclusive in
two senses. First, it seeks to transform all realms of public life, economic, political, legal, cultural, educational, and so on. Second, it aims to
incorporate a wide diversity of social voices (or at least those legitimate expressions of difference not dedicated to ending difference and
democracy by imposing authoritarian, elite, and fascist systems onto others) into revitalized public spheres. It is a form of direct democracy in its
synthesis of classical Greek and libertarian socialist outlooks, a perspective that seeks to abolish all hierarchies and dissolve power into
confederated local direct, economic, social and ecological democracies. Cultures in Crisis The Inclusive Democracy project was developed in the
1990s by Takis Fotopoulos in the pages of Society and Nature and Democracy and Nature. These journals were dedicated to analyzing the broad
social crisis, the ecological crisis, and their interrelationships. In 1997, Fotopoulos systematized his ideas in a landmark work entitled, Towards An
Inclusive Democracy: The Crisis of the Growth Economy and the Need for a New Liberatory Project (London/New York: Cassell/ Continuum).
The international character and influence of Inclusive Democracy is evident in the publication of Fotopoulos book in Italian, Greek, French, Latin
American, and German editions (with Chinese and Arab editions also on the way), and debates and contributions generated by theorists
throughout Europe, the UK, the US, and Latin America. The immense crisis that Inclusive Democracy seeks to analyze and solve is two-fold,
defining both the realities of global capitalism and the numerous failed attempts to oppose it. Inclusive Democracy theorizes a multidimensional
crisis (political, economic, social, ecological, and cultural) in the objective world which sharpened after World War II. Fuelled by new forms
of science and technology, military expansion, and aggressive colonization of Southern nations, capitalism evolved
into a truly global system, one inspired by neoliberal visions of nations as open free markets that flow and grow
without restrictions and regulations, driven by multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil and Monsanto, anchored in
transnational institutions and courts like the WTO, and homogenizing nations into a single economic organism though
arrangements such as NAFTA. As formulated by Fotopoulos, and developed in dialogue with radical theorists throughout the world, the
Inclusive Democracy project considers the ultimate cause of the present multidimensional crisis to be the concentration of economic and political
power in the hands of various elites. This power is maintained and reproduced by the dynamics of the global market
economy and its political complement, representative democracy a mystification that Fotopoulos dismisses as a form of
liberal technocracy which disempowers citizens in the name of representing their interests . Yet, where one might
expect this multifaceted crisis to generate an appropriate political response, another crisis has form ed. Theoretical and
political opposition to global capitalism in any significant and truly radical form embodying democratic social and political alternatives has
collapsed. Elitism, bureaucratic domination, and the destruction of nature was grotesquely replayed in various communist or socialist states
that intended or alleged to present an alternative to capitalist systems. The European tradition of Social Democracy, dating back to Edward
Bernstein and the German Social Democratic Party in the early 20th century, presented itself as an alternative to both capitalism and bureaucratic
socialism, but unavoidably succumbed to the failed logic of reformism that attempted to repair rather than radically transform a system with
inherent structural flaws. Social Democracy mounted no effective alternative or opposition and today is little but a museum piece amidst
increasing the privatization and market domination of European nation states. Inclusive Democracy seeks to show how the discourse of
democracy has been distorted and perverted in order to build empires, dig graveyards, and wage wars in the
name of freedom, democracy, and progress three of the most distorted concepts in the modern lexicon, to which
in the post-9/11 era we must also add security. Yet no discourse or concept is more important today than that of democracy,
and so Fotopoulos tries to clarify its real meaning and redeem the concept from limitless forms of corruption. In Western liberal form, for
instance, Fotopoulos notes that democracy has become a spectator sport in which the general public chooses sides among contending groups of
experts. It is urgent, he insists, to recover the authentic meaning of democracy, such as relates to autonomy, citizenship, education, and the selfmanagement of people. Since the 1960s, more current forms of critique and resistance have emerged, but none proved to be significant or
enduring forces of opposition and radical change. From the new social movements and subsequent identity politics formations (feminism,
civil rights, gay and lesbian liberation, multiculturalism, anti-nuclear groups, and so on) to apolitical, reformist, and esoteric postmodernism; from
the Green movement to the mystical tendencies of deep ecology, Fotopoulos finds organizations and political expressions that are reformist,
subjectivist, irrational, or coopted, leaving a barren political scene devoid of significant resistance to ever-destructive forms of capitalist
domination. Beginning in the 1990s, a far more promising approach variously described as anti-globalization, alter-globalization, or
globalization from below (as opposed to globalization from above) has emerged to challenge transnational capitalism. Unlike the
fragmentary nature of identity politics, alter-globalization movements often advance radical visions and have crossed various political lines and
geographical boundaries to form alliances against global capitalism. While recognizing potential in these movements, Fotopoulos nonetheless
finds that they lack an anti-systemic perspective (i.e., a holistic and radical critique of the totality of capitalist systems) and viable democratic
alternative to market domination and manifold social hierarchies. For Fotopoulos, a truly radical or anti-systemic viewpoint has a social not
individual emphasis. It upholds the importance of rational debate and criticism over mystical and subjective turns, avoids utopian fantasies in
order to focus on real challenges and possibilities for change, links environmental problems to social and political problems, and understands
capitalism and hierarchical social systems as interrelated problems that require overarching and coherent solutions. Moreover, such a standpoint
insists on the crucial importance of articulating compelling alternatives to capitalism and of building transitional strategies. Its key objective is to
tackle the most crucial and basic problem of all the unequal distribution of political and economic power and to solve it in favour of genuine
democracy, rather than leaving corrosive and destructive arrangements intact so that the social and ecological crisis can deepen still further.
Where some people concede defeat, others declare this to be the best of all possible worlds (I'd hate to see the worst)
with the entrenchment of Western liberal democracy (Francis Fukuyama). And while these self-ascribed prophets announce the
end of history with the death of the masses (Jean Baudrillard), others fight for meaningless reforms and lesser evils (liberals, labor
bureaucrats, democrats, et. al.). Against the prevailing forms of complacency and nihilism, one of the first conditions
of
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change is the realization that things could and must be profoundly different than as organized by the prevailing social
prisms/prisons. Whereas Inclusive Democracy diagnoses crises, one of the gravest and most fundamental problems today is
a crisis of the political imagination. Social critique and change in the slaughterhouse of global capitalism needs to
be guided and informed by powerful descriptions of what is the degraded forfeiture of human potential in a world where over a
billion people struggle for mere existence. But social transformation must also be inspired by bold new visions of what can
be, by imaginative projections of how human beings might harmoniously relate to one another and the living/dying
earth. Radicals such as Herbert Marcuse and Murray Bookchin have recognized that so-called "utopian" visions are not when
authentic starry-eyed dreams of abstract ideals, but rather can be empirically grounded in actual social tendencies
and existing potential for a rational, egalitarian, and ecological society. It must be emphasized, however, that Inclusive
Democracy explicitly differentiates itself from the objective rationalism of the Enlightenment, such as both Marcuse and Bookchin adopt, since
the project for a democratic society cannot be grounded on an evolutionary process of social change, either a teleological one (such as Marxs
dialectical materialism) or a non-teleological one (such as Bookchins dialectical naturalism). Still, as Fotopoulos emphasizes the fact that no
grand evolutionary schemes of Progress are supported by History does not mean that we should overemphasise the significance of the social
imaginary (in the Castoriadian terminology) at the expense of the systemic elements. On this basis, the Inclusive Democracy project sees
History as the continuous interaction between creative human action and the existing institutional framework, i.e. as the interaction between the
imaginary and the systemic elements, the outcome of which is always unpredictable. Similarly, Inclusive Democracy envisions a true
democratic society to be a rupture, a break in the historical continuity that the heteronomous society has historically established.
Our alternative -- Reject American Democracy Assistance and embrace the democratic
experimentalist impulse. We must let democratic institutions develop indigenously around
the world in order for the maximum amount of divergence to be realized.
Revitalizing democratic experimentalism is the most important and effective way of
energizing programmatic imagination of alternatives around the globe
David Slater 9 Dept. Geog, Loughborough University, Human Geography Volume 2, Number 3 2009,
EXPORTING IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE US CASE
In the global context of a resurgence of imperial politics the promotion and diffusion of one particular interpretation
of democracy acts as a potentially effective legitimization of re-asserted forms of the penetration of Third
World sovereignties. The call for democracy is a powerful one since it evokes a movement towards equality, progress
and a modern form of political engagement and rule. Who could be sensibly against the seductive spread of
democracy and freedom? But the key issue lies in the contextualization and content of the democratic imperative, as
well as in the manner of its deployment. For example, like every other imperative, the injunction to democratise in a
specific way creates an asymmetry between those issuing the injunction and those subjected to it , or in other words
between those who democratise and those who are being democratised. In the official Western or specifically US
template, the parameters and effects of the imperial gaze tend to be veiled, whereas the politics of the seer are
normalized and naturalized, so that alternatives are excluded or rendered abnormal. In the case of democracy, this
means that the enabling potential of learning across cultural divides is negated and in its place there is a tendency to
prefer processes of imposition based on the supposition that the Western template is universally applicable. However,
the attempt to impose Western norms and in extreme cases with the use of force violates the tenets of mutual respect
and equal recognition which are pivotal conditions for a democratic ethos. Unfortunately, some policy makers still
privilege cannons over canons of learning, so according to two US intellectuals (Frum and Perle) writing about
democracy and foreign policy, the US ought to be committed to a global war for democracy and freedom which can
only de realized by American armed might and defended by American might (quoted in Dallmayr 2005: 4). 8 This
may be taken as an example of an uncompromising and extremist position but it does connect to a wider
contextualization of US foreign policy with strongly unilateralist features. Alternatively instead of the unilateral
export of Western liberal democracy to the rest of the world, what is needed is the creation of a space in which
learning about the different cultures of democracy can take place in a spirit of mutual respect and recognition
(see Gaonkar 2007), remembering also that in an era of globalisation, the sources of learning need to be genuinely
global, transcending Westocentric visions. For democracy to flourish, it has to be home-grown and autonomously
sustained, not implanted from outside as part of a justification of a subordinating imperial project. At the interface of
the imperial and the democratic there are a series of antagonistic tensions that can never be resolved since crucially
the imperial ethos, with its subordinating mode of power, violates the foundational and dialogic roots of the
democratic spirit. If that spirit is to be protected and sustained the imperial mentality has to be continually challenged
and superceded so that democracy may flourish in an open and creative manner.
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US democracy assistance of necessity presumes the universal applicability of American

institutional arrangements the entire enterprise is connected with American imperial
ambitions. Promoting democracy is a ruse used to justify interventions in countries around
the world the last decade of democracy promotion proves American intentions are
vacuous.
David Slater 1 Department of Geography, Loughborough University Other domains of democratic theory: space,
power, and the politics of democratization Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2002, volume 20, pages
255 ^ 276
The sense of doing politics in different ways has often been closely related to the resurgence of indigenous movements and the validation of
autochthonous cultural practices (Brysk, 2000). Equally, the link with the `indigenous' can lead us into questioning the framing
of democracy and democratization, especially in the context of our previous concern with the limitations of Euro ^
Americanism. As a number of authors have pointedly observed (Dhaliwal, 1996; Parekh, 1993; 1999; Rivera, 1990; Sheth, 1995), Western
representations of democracy and liberalism frequently presume a universal relevance for institutional
arrangements and cultural values that may not be equally applicable in other regions of the world . Moreover, the
historical and contemporary context of the exclusionary nature of democratic societies in relation, for instance, to issues of race and
ethnicity, as well as the historical association of democracy with imperialism, and the intimate connections between the
two, define a rather salient but often omitted thematic nucleus. There are four elements of this thematic that I want to identify here.
First, significant historical and geopolitical events occurring in peripheral regions of the world, events, for example, which have an important
bearing on the way we can think about social struggles, are not infrequently excluded from Western accounts of global history. For example,
Trouillot (1995), in his illuminating examination of what he calls `archival power' and the `silencing of the past', demonstrates how, in much
Western scholarship, including both Anglo-American and French, the Haitian Revolution, with its crucial connection to racism, slavery, and
colonialism, has largely been either erased from history or trivialized in terms of its wider import. A long process of social rebellion from the
initial slave uprising in 1791 through to the proclamation of Independence in 1804, represented in indigenous struggle for freedom, dignity, and
independence, which played a central role in the collapse of the entire system of slavery. Such events are conventionally overshadowed by a
concentration on the founding importance of the French Revolution for the future of democracy. But if we are to develop a perspective that is not
only genuinely global but also postcolonial in its thematic and ethical sensibilities, it is important to broaden our analytical scope and in this
specific context consider the relations between the French and Haitian Revolutions in terms of the place of race and colonialism in one of the
founding moments of European democracy. As Dubois (2000, page 22) argues, the slave insurgents claiming Republican citizenship and racial
equality expanded and `globalized' the idea of rights, so that ``developments in the Antilles ... actually outran the political imagination of the
metropole, transforming the possibilities embodied in the idea of citizenship.'' Second, when considering the established view that the
West has diffused and continues to diffuse democracy to other parts of the globe (Smith, 1994), it is important to
remember that the West, and in particular the United States, has intervened geopolitically in societies of the periphery to
replace one government by another, sometimes unsuccessfully, as in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, or otherwise effectively, as in Panama in
1989. Transgressions of national sovereignty have been well documented (Kolko, 1988; Morales, 1994; Niess, 1990), but my point here is that in
addition to the replacement of undemocratic regimes, deemed unfavourable to US interests, the United States has
intervened directly (through supporting a military coup, as in Guatemala in 1954 and in Chile in 1973, or indirectly through a
continuing strategy of destabilization, as in Nicaragua after the elections of 1984) to terminate democratic governments whose
directions and objectives were considered to be unacceptable. In times of geopolitical amnesia, and uncritical writing
on Western democracy, it is important to remind ourselves of these historical realities, so that the link between
Western power and the subversion of other democracies can be brought back into focus and employed to broaden the
analytical and ethical terrain. Third, a Western notion of `democracy' and the desire to defend it have provided a
justification for a variety of geopolitical interventions, as in the Central American and Caribbean region during the 1980s
(Carothers, 1991). Falk (1995) has referred to this phenomenon as the geopolitical appropriation of `democracy', pointing to the importance of the
continuing struggle over the meanings of democracy. This discussion underlines the significance of the discursive enframing of
terms such as `democracy' and `democratization', and the continuing conflict over their substantive meanings as
influenced by different cultural and political traditions. Fourth, in relation to those intricate crossovers of culture and politics, it is
also instructive to keep in mind that within the Western canon of political thought there has always been a strong
universalist ambition, not only rooted in patriarchy and androcentrism (Butler, 2000; Phillips, 1993), but also embedded in
ethnocentric privilege. Tocqueville (1990), for example, writing towards the middle of the 19th century, felt compelled to connect democracy
in America to a politics of founding whereby violence against the Indian could be left to reside in oblivion. For Tocqueville, the historical
consolidation of the civic^territorial complex required the elimination of the Indian, that first Other, who had, as legally ordained, neither the right
of soil nor of sovereignty, and therefore had to be cleansed from the founding of American democracy. Moreover, it was not only the Indians who
were located as extraneous to such a founding; for Tocqueville (page 356), the ``most formidable of all the ills that threaten the future of the Union
arises from the presence of a black population upon its territory''. In a similar vein, and writing a little later in the 1850s, Mill (1989) drew a key
line of connection between the right to social justice and liberty, and the existence of a `civilized community'. For Mill, the principles of justice
only applied to human beings in the maturity of their faculties, so that one could leave out of consideration ``those backward states of society in
which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage'' (page13). In this context, and in a manner reminiscent of Rousseau's (1990, page 250)
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earlier belief that liberty was not within the reach of all peoples, Mill asserted that ``despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end'' (1989, page13). The ethnocentric
ground on which Mill built his argument was not of course unique for the 19th century, nor for following periods, and the binary split between
civilized and barbarian, or peoples with history and those without, as well as the adult/child separation, received later elaborations in the 20thcentury context of modern/traditional, advanced/primitive, and developed/developing dichotomies. Overall, my point here is to
reemphasize that the way the temporal and geopolitical configurations of the spatial power/democracy problematic
have been and continue to be interpreted is importantly affected by an ethnocentric universalism that is profoundly
rooted in the evolution of Occidental thought.(13)
Democratization is not innocent it is a tool of Western imperialism, whereby third world

countries must conform to Western understandings of democracy and governance.
Democratization simply recreates the model of government that already exists in the West.
Notions of empire and imperialism have increasingly returned to the lexicon of mainstream theorisation of the
international. Much of this literature identifies a new imperialism, distinct from the supposed post- and nonimperial global(ising) order of the Westphalian state system. The article contends that such accounts occlude our
understanding of the long history of imperialism. It argues that the putatively post-imperial institutions and
discourses of global governance are internally related to post-colonial imperialism. In particular the regime
of democratisation and the curtailing of democratic freedom constitute a principal means through which
imperial rule is articulated. Despite a vast literature on democratisation, there has been a paucity of analysis
which interrogates the Great Power-defined agenda of democratisation. Mainstream accounts presuppose what
requires explanation, taking for granted the non-imperial character of this global project, the hegemony of a specific
and impoverished model of (neo)liberal democracy, highly problematic, de-historicised notions of state, society and
self and the categorical separation of the domestic and the international. The article provides detailed substantive
analysis of the endeavour by the dominant social agents of the democratisation project to constitute a (neo)liberal
procedural notion of democracy in the post-colonial world. It identifies the dominant social agents of this project
and explores the theoretical underpinnings of the dominant model being pro- pounded. Informed by this, the article
examines the democratisation project according to coveted transformations in three domains: the minimal, neutral
state, the constitution of civil society and the promotion of the liberal self. The article contends that far from an
alternative to imperialism, democratisation involves the imposition of a Western (neo)liberal procedural form of
democracy on imperialised peoples. The character of the informal imperial order is such that self-determination
does not mean autonomy. Rather it means the freedom to embrace the rules, norms and principles of the emerging
(neo)liberal global order.
And, the rhetoric of democratization recreates the Western imperial mission, dividing the
world into the barbarian and the civilized. This logic necessitates convergence until the
recipient country is modeled like the United States, it will continue to be targeted for
democratization.
The article rejects this dominant narrative, whereby colonialism and imperialism are understood to have been
ejected and substituted by novel and distinctive forms of rule. Rather, it endorses the argument that colonialism,
being just one form of imperialism, metamorphosed in such a way as to retain the fundamental powers of
imperialism while shedding the outward forms of colonialism (Saurin, 2006, p. 31, based on Louis and Robinson,
2001). Imperialism has constantly reinvented itself as the structure of global capitalism itself changes (Ahmad,
2004; Wood, 2005). According to the current modalities of informal or non-territorial imperialism the subaltern are
governed indirectly rather than through (formal) colonial rule. Imperialism without colonies has existed in many
forms (Ahmad, 2004; Magdoff, 2003), at times as commercial empires preceding military conquest (such as
European mercantilism within Africa prior to the 1880s Scramble), in other instances following decolonisation
(such as within South America following the cessation of Spanish and Portuguese rule) and sometimes in the form
which Lenin (1986) characterised as semi-colonial (such as Turkey, Persia and China). But as Aijaz Ahmad has
argued, the imperialism of our time constitutes the first fully post-colonial imperialism, not only free of colonial rule
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but antithetical to it (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 445). The preponderance of informal rather than formal imperialism
reflects not simply current socio-political sensibilities, but rather a structural imperative of the current composition
of global capital itself (Ahmad, 2004, p. 45). The circulation of capital and commodities must be as unconstrained
as possible yet this is realised through the nation-state form. The state constitutes the articulating principle
between globalising capital and national political economies (Ahmad, 1996). As such, the internationalisation of the
rule of capital is enforced through globally constituted domestic regimes, in conditions specific to each
territorialised unit (Ahmad, 2004; Wood, 1999; 2005). The dissolution of the formal colonial empires and the postwar reconstitution of the capitalist order under US dominance have witnessed therefore an intensification of the
nation-state form carved from the old colonial empires (Ahmad, 1995a, p. 12). Nation states constitute the primary
means through which the social relations and institutions of class, property, currency, contract and markets are
produced and reproduced, and through which the international accumulation of capital is carried out (Panitch and
Gindin, 2004, pp. 412). Within such a system, imperialism operates through formally independent
internationalised states that is, states which assume responsibility for the production and reproduction of the
necessary internal conditions for sustained international accumulation (Panitch and Gindin, 2004, p. 48, emphases in
original). As such, the empire of capital is increasingly reliant upon a territorially based state system to provide the
local conditions for global accumulation ( Wood, 2005).4 Internal to the new modalities of informal imperialism
are therefore the constitution, governance and governmentalities of domestic political jurisdictions. In
particular, it has been through the putatively non-imperial languages and practices of sovereignty and
democratisation that post-colonial imperial governance has been realised (Anghie, 2004; Gathii, 1999; 2000;
Grovogui, 1996). The promotion of democratisation and good governance serves the function of legitimating the
extension and deepening of neoliberal capitalist accumulation by seeking to create the political institutions, the
system of government, that would further a particular set of economic arrangements (Anghie, 2004, p. 263). As
such, the governmentality of democratisation the origins of which can be identified in the Mandate System of the
League of Nations reproduces the very old project of civilization and commerce (Anghie, 2004, p. 262).
The claim that colonized peoples want democracy is falsely presented it justifies more
democratic imperialism. AND, even if democracy is wanted, global convergence is still bad.
In the official narrative of bringing democracy to the world there is a hidden assumption that the US has the right,
under circumstances chosen by the global sovereign, to spread democracy to others through the use of force. This
might be expressed in a call for the imposition of democracy from above, as asserted by Ferguson (2005: 52) a keen
supporter of the US imperial mission. For Ross (2004: 41) democratic imperialism is the claim that a democratic
state has some kind of duty, as a citizen of the world, to act with the goal of ending non-democratic governments
everywhere. This is a relevant point, but equally we must remember that whilst force has been used,
democratic imperialism requires a more subtle and multi-dimensional legitimization. This includes the idea
that democracy is being called for, or in other words that democracy US-style is being invited by peoples
yearning for freedom. Rather than democracy being imposed or, as Appadurai (2007: 29) sardonically puts it
democracy is being offered to many societies, even if this requires them to be invaded..., it is suggested that the US
is responding to calls from other societies to be democratized, so that through a kind of cellular multiplication, a US
model can be gradually introduced. The owners will be the peoples of other cultures, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, who
will find ways of adapting the US template to their own circumstances. What is being proposed here is a kind of
viral democracy whereby the politics of guidance is merged into a politics of benign adaptation. George W Bush
expressed this idea quite clearly, noting that the US faith in freedom and democracy is now a seed upon the wind,
taking root in many nations ... our democratic faith...is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of
humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along (quoted in Gardner 2005: 25).
Even if the plan itself is not imperialist, the use of democracy as a justification for it
legitimates the rest of the imperial project. The plan sustains a larger imperialist project
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Before taking up this theme of democracy as a mode of justification of imperial power, it is first necessary to
delineate one approach to the main components of imperial power relations wherein the geopolitical context is
formed by North-South encounters. First, one has what can be referred to as a geopolitics of invasiveness that is
manifested through strategies of appropriating resources and raw materials and/or securing strategic sites for military
bases (see Johnson 2004), and which is accompanied by the laying down of new patterns of infrastructure and
governmental regulation. Invasiveness, or processes of the penetration of states, economies and social orders can be
linked to what Harvey (2003) has called accumulation by dispos- session, whereby the resources and wealth of
peripheral societies are continually extracted for the benefit of the imperial heartland (see Klein 2008 for the Iraqi
case). But such invasiveness is not only a question of political economy; the desire to be invasive is expressed in
cultural, political and psychological terms as well. For example, the violation of the sovereignty of a Third World
society is not only a question of the transgression of international law; more profoundly it constitutes a negation of
the will and dignity of another people and another culture. Violations of sovereignty negate the autonomous right
of societies of the global south to decide for themselves their own trajectories of political and cultural being. In
this sense the imperial is rooted in a power-over conception that reflects Occidental privilege and denial of the nonWestern others right to geopolitical autonomy. And in anti-imperialist discourses, this denial is always strongly
contested. Second, as a consequence of the invasiveness of imperial projects, one has the imposition of the
dominant values, modes of thinking and institutional practices of the imperial power. This is sometimes established
as part of a project of nation building or geopolitical guidance, where the effective parameters of rule reflect a clear
belief in the superiority of the imperializing culture of institutionalisation. Clearly, under colonialism such
impositions were transparent and justified as part of a Western project of bringing civilisation to the non-Western
other. In the current era, and specifically in relation to Iraq, bringing democracy and a market economy, US-style
has been part of a tenuous project to redraw the map of the Middle East (Achcar 2004 and Gregory 2004), a
project which has seen both resistance and partial accommodation. Whilst the violation of sovereignty can be more
appropriately viewed under the category of invasiveness, the related imposition of governmental norms constitutes
an effect of that violation but here the process of geopolitical guidance can be better interpreted in terms of an
imperial governmentality. Such a governmentality crucially involves the installation of new rules, codifi- cations and
institutional practices which are anchored in a specific set of externally transferred rationalities concerning marketled development and democracy, effective states, good governance, property rights , open economies and so on
(for an earlier formulation see Williamson 1993). The imposition is thus a project for societal transformation that
aims to leave behind an imperialized polity which is owned and run by indigenous leaders. Whether such projects
can be successful is surely doubtful given the nature of their imposition but in the final outcome much will depend
on both the extent and resilience of resistances to imperial power, as well as on the efficacy of the domestic leaders
who act as introjecting agents of externally initiated authority. Again, in both instances, with resistance and accommodation, the key significance of relationality is clearly evident. In addition, we need to stress the complexi- ties of
the imperial encounter, including not only the limits of externally deployed power -- or more emphatically the
posited incoherence of Empire, to borrow a phrase from Mann (2005) -- but also the unpredictable dynamics of
internal situations which are affected by the clash of rival interests and competing discursive orienta- tions, whereby
a hierarchy of forces is combined with an heterogeneity of political subjectivities. Third, it is necessary to bear in
mind that imperial relations contain a lack of respect and recognition for the colonised or, expressed more broadly,
imperialised society. Hence, the processes of penetration and imposition are viewed as being beneficial to the
societies that are being brought into the orbit of imperial power. The posited superiorities of Western progress,
moderni- sation, democracy and civilisation and so on are deployed to legitimise projects of enduring
invasiveness that are characterised by a lack of recognition for the autonomy, dignity, and cultural value of
the imperialised society. Overall, there is a mission to Westernise the non-Western world, and resistances to such a
mission, especially in their more militant forms, are seen as being deviant and irrational and in need of repression
and cure. Moreover, the existing cultural heritage of the imperialised society, as in the case of Iraq, is treated with
disdain (see Varea, Valverde and Sanz 2009) In this context, Arundhati Roy (2004: 111) reminds us that before the
invasion of Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance sent the Pentagon a list of sixteen crucial
sites to protect; the National Museum was second on that list and yet the Museum was not just looted, it was
desecrated (for a detailed critical evaluation of the cultural impact of the invasion see, for instance, Bez 2004).
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Impact Divinization of Humanity

International democratic divergence is necessary to realizing the full value of nationalism
form of the moral specialization of humanity. Only this style of nationalism allows for
divergence each nation must be able to create its own unique form of social life.
Unger 2 The Boutwood Lectures, http://www.law.harvard.edu/unger/english/docs/corpus2.doc
After the collapse of communism and the discrediting of traditional socialist ideas, there is a limited repertory of
institutional alternatives available in each domain of social life. To understand this repertory, to explain its
genealogy, to criticize it, and then to expand and renovate it is the true object of constructive social thought and
action in the contemporary circumstance. Our goal, however, should not be simply to replace some institutions by
others. It must also be to change the character as well as the content of the institutions, their relation to the
constructive freedom or action by which we defy or reshape them. We should not want institutional and discursive
systems that are presented to us as brute natural facts on a take it or leave it basis. We should want institutional and
discursive systems that lay themselves open to challenge and revision. Such orders of society and of culture allow us
to attenuate the contrast between the normal activities by which we pursue our interests and ideals in a framework
taken as given and the extraordinary activities by which we re-imagine and remake parts of this framework. We
have a fundamental stake in this transformation of the quality of institutional life: to make a social world that
is a more suitable habitation for us as beings who exceed all cultural and social systems that we create and inhabit.
Such systems are finite. We, relative to them, are infinite. There is always more in us than there is in them. This
interest of ours in arranging society and culture in a way that bears the imprint of spirit spirit transcending
circumstance -- can be made to converge with our moral interest in the relative equalization of economic
circumstance as well as with our material interest in quickening of the pace of invention, innovation, and practical
progress. The zone of possible intersection among these interests, translated into a project of cumulative institutional
renovation, is the program and the practice that I here outline and defend. Although I presented this program in terms
that are specially directed to the circumstances of the contemporary European social democracies, I do not regard
this proposal, defined in such general terms, as a local program. It is a universal program in its intentions. It is not
just one of many ways; it is another way, a second way. Nevertheless one of the aims of this program is to facilitate
the creation of real difference in the world, so that in the future the nature of the national difference in a world of
democracies can more fully represent a moral specialization within humanity. The powers and possibilities of
mankind develop, if they are to develop at all, in different directions, as unique forms of life, with distinct
institutional embodiments. Thus the idea of many ways as the alternative to the One True Way may seem irresistibly
attractive; it combines practicality with modesty. The thesis of the many ways is nevertheless false and dangerous.
In the circumstances of poorer as well as of richer countries, to democratize the market and to deepen democracy we
must renovate, with the limited tools at hand, the institutional repertory available to us. If the contemporary societies
are to become more truly different in the future different on the basis of democracy and experiment rather than
different solely by the force of tradition, compulsion, weakness -- they must pass through a common gateway of
institutional innovations. I here call this threshold the second way. to pass through this gateway so that they then can
become more truly different in the future. The need to pass through the gateway rests on two grounds: one, arising
from the requirements of effective rebellion; the other, throwing light on a disturbing ambiguity in the idea of the
many ways. A universal orthodoxy cannot be adequately be resisted by local heresies. Only a universalizing heresy
can successfully combat a universal orthodoxy as the liberals and socialists of the nineteenth century understood.
The peculiar character of the present contest of collective identities, and of the national and ethnic animosities to
which they give rise, lies in their relative emptiness. The will to collective difference is aroused as actual difference
wanes. Actual difference diminishes because under the conditions of world history countries can remain strong and
independent only by pillaging practices and ideas from others and because all are now subject to the worldwide
seduction of a culture promising material gratification and moral fulfillment to the ordinary man and woman. What is
the distinctive will that combines the pillaged practices with the local residues? It needs instruction, and cannot get it
from traditions and preconceptions it has already begun irretrievably to dismantle.
And, this elevation of ordinary humanity must be the guiding impulse it is the only way to
advance the democratic experiment and enable everyone in the world live a fruitful life
Unger 5 What Should the Left Propose pp. 20ff
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The hallmark of the alternative is to anchor social inclusion and individual empowerment in the institutions of
political, economic, and social life. It is not enough to humanize the social world; it is necessary to change it. To
change it means to engage, once again, with the effort to reshape production and politics, from which social
democracy withdrew when the mid-twentieth-century compromise defining its present horizon was first formed. It
means to take the familiar institutional forms of the market economy, representative democracy, and free civil society
as a subset of a far broader set of institutional possibilities. It means to reject the contrast between market orientation
and governmental direction as the axis organizing our ideological contests, and to replace it with a contrast among
ways of organizing economic, political, and social pluralism. It means to root a bias to greater equality and inclusion
in the organized logic of economic growth and technological innovation rather than making it rest on retrospective
redistribution through tax and transfer. It means to democratize the market economy by innovating in the
arrangements that define it, rather than merely to regulate it in its present form or to compensate for its inequalities
through after-the-fact transfers. It means to radicalize the experimental logic of the market by radicalizing the
economic logic of free recombination of the factors of production within an unchallenged framework of market
transactions. The goal is a deeper freedom to renew and recombine the arrangements that compose the institutional
setting of production and exchange, allowing alternative regimes of property and contract to coexist experimentally
within the same economy. It means to take the overriding aim of social policy to be the enhancement of capability.
Such an enhancement would progress thanks to a form of education addressed to the development of generic
conceptual and practical capacities rather than to the mastery of job-specific skills. It would advance as well as
through the generalization of a principle of social inheritance, assuring each individual of a basic minimum stake in
resources on which he can draw at turning points in his life. It means to advance this democratization of the market
economy in the context ofa practical organization ofsocial solidarity and a deepening of political democracy. It
means never to reduce social solidarity to mere money transfers. Social solidarity must rest instead on the sole secure
basis it can have: direct responsibility of people for one another. Such responsibility can be realized through the
principle that every able-bodied adult holds a position within the caring economy - the part of the economy in which
people care for one anotheras well as within the production system. It means to establish the institutions of a highenergy democratic politics: one that permanently raises the level of organized popular participation in politics,
engages the electorate as well as the parties in the rapid and decisive resolution of impasse between the political
branches ofgovernment, equips government to rescue people from entrenched and localized situations of
disadvantage from which they are unable to exit by the normal forms ofpolitical and economic initiative, allows
particular sectors or localities to opt out of the general legal regime and to develop divergent images of the social
future, and combines features of direct and representative democarcy. The guiding impulse of this Leftism is not the
redistributive attenuation of inequality and inclusion; it is the enhancement of the powers and the broadening of
the opportunities enjoyed by ordinary men and women on the basis of the piecemeal but cumulative
reorganization ofthe State and the economy. Its watchword is not the humanization of society; it is the divinization
of humanity. Its innermost thought is that the future belongs to the political force that most credibly represents the
cause of the constructive imagination: everyone's power to share in the permanent creation of the new.
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Impact Wars/Intervention
The quest for democracy and human rights justifies mass global violence any nation or
movement deemed anti-democratic can be invaded and destroyed. In other words, the plan
creates a new quest to seek out anti-democratic nations and subject them to US imperial
control. This can only happen in one way: WAR!
Bar oban 10 Yeni Yzyl University Globalisation of Violence: The Death Game of New Imperialism,
Critique Vol 38, Issue 2, pp 309-320
The transformation of the globe through the globalisation of capitalism or, in other words, the new imperialism, has
brought a transformation of all social practices. The new imperialism as the global form of capitalism has changed
and transformed the nation-state form as well as international relations, except for the economic structure. During
this period, the global dominant power has brought new forms of politics, and political violence has been put into use
as one of the effective means of this process. Reintroduction of violence as an effective form of politics is directly
linked with the economic structure. The new global power has been pushing the whole world to follow the economic
policies modified by it and imposes acceptance of its new concept of politics. Neo-liberal policies have turned
violence into an ordinary component of social life in many different ways. Accepting the uniform definition of
democracy imposed by the dominant power is a pre-condition for seeing it as a democratic structure and this process
pre-supposes the acceptance of neo-liberalism of the new imperialism. Structures that are, or prefer to be, out of
this process are diagnosed as anti-democratic and positioned as a threat. Forms of violence utilised by the new
imperialism against opposition movements that are posing a threatarmed attacks, coup attempts, assassinations,
etc.are described as the campaign for democratisation and the war on terror. With effective use of new
communication technologies, together with presentation of both new forms of economy and politics as the only
alternative, as well as calling the resistance coming from those opposing this alternative as terrorists and
legitimisation of use of violence against this terror, i.e. the war on terror, brings the necessity of a re-discussion of
definitions of violence and terror . In this sense, the globalisation process refers to both the globalisation of violence
and the monopolisation of violence via imperialistic power and its allies. Power as a monopoly of violence or the
modern state, like all other political unions, sociologically, can only be described in terms of its particular concrete
means: power and the use of violence: similarly the global power has been striving to monopolise violence which
has not been limited to localities but, on the contrary, has embraced the whole world.
This is especially true when it comes to the US imperial venture intervention justified in
the name of democracy ensures violence, wars, and the decimation of indigenous
populations.
Geopolitical interventions have been a permanent feature of imperialism: they can be viewed in terms of the interlinkages among desire, will, capacity and legitimization. The will to intervene can be portrayed as a crystallization of
the desire to expand, expressed in such incursive notions of Manifest Destiny or in Cecil Rhodes comment that he
would annex the planets if I could, encouraging Hannah Arendt (1979: 125) to suggest that expansion as a
permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism. 1 The will to intervene, to
possess, to take hold of another society, even if only temporarily, flows from a deeply rooted sense of supremacy and
mission. It was not just that the United States had a ruling vision of itself that was associated with a destiny that
needed to be fulfilled; it was a vision, for instance the Jeffersonian notion of an Empire of Liberty, that was
embedded in a hierarchical perspective on peoples, races and cultures, whereby the constructed white/black binary
division was seen as a crucial marker of value. At the outset of the twentieth century, for instance, Theodore
Roosevelt placed imperial violence at the heart of US nation building, declaring in the context of the ongoing
colonial war in the Philippines that the war represented the triumph of civilization over forces which stand for the
black chaos of savagery and barbarism, and moreover, the warfare that has extended the boundaries of civilization
at the expense of barbarism and savagery has been for centuries one of the most potent factors in the progress of
humanity (quoted in Kramer 2006: 169).2 The will to expand, to penetrate and to invade has frequently been
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explained in the context of the political economy of imperialism whereby, as Harvey (2003) suggests, imperialism is
a diffuse political-economic process in which command over the use of capital takes primacy. For Harvey the central
idea is to posit the territorial and capitalist logics of power as distinct from each other, while recognising that the two
logics inter- twine in complex and contradictory ways. But the will to expand and imperialize needs to be also
connected to deeply-sedimented values of socio-political and cultural superiority. In the case of the United States the
emergence of an imperial ethos cannot be solely anchored in the drive for raw materials and resources, nor in the
needs of capital. There is something broader and more multi-dimensional which connects to notions of geopolitical
predestination (Weinberg 1963), the formation of an imperial self (Anderson 1971) and to the collective psyche of a
nation that is being formed through violence, war and the decimation of an indigenous people (see for example,
Brown 1991 and Slotkin 1998, and for a treatment of the more recent period, see Sherry 1995). The desire to
expand and penetrate needs to be seen as connected to a political will which represents a crystallization of that
desire, and which is perhaps most appropriately envisaged as centred within the ambit of an imperial state where
agents of power formulate and deploy a strategy of expansion which is a response to the interweaving of
geopolitical, economic, cultural and psychic compulsions. Such a will can only be made effective when the
capacities military (see for example Bacevich 2005: 214-215), economic and political (see for example Zakaria
2008: 167-214) to intervene are sufficiently developed. Will and capacity together provide a potent force, but
their effectiveness is only secured through the deployment of a discourse of justification. A political will that
focuses desire and is able to mobilise the levers of intervention seeks a hegemonic role through the ability to induce
consent by providing leadership, while retaining the capacity to coerce. This is why I would argue that an
understanding of imperial politics must be centred on the state as the key propulsive and coordinating node of power
and furthermore any realistic attempt to comprehend the contours of hegemony must also pass through the nucleus
of state power, an issue I shall return to below. The will to intervene, to penetrate another society and begin to
reorder, modernise, civilise, democratise that other society is an essential part of any imperial project. The political
will is provided by agents of power working in and through the apparatuses of the imperial state, as has been the
case with the neo-con project closely associated with the Project for a New American Century (see for example
PNAC 2000 and Parraguez 2007). The processes of legitimization for that will to power are produced both within the
state (see for example, Wolfowitz Defense Planning Guidelines [Ross 2004: 20-21] and within civil society,
including a range of influential think-tanks (see Rich 2004). In the case of the US, and its relations with the
societies of the global South, and especially the Latin South, the discourses of spreading and promoting freedom
and democracy have been particularly significant in the justification of the projection of geopolitical power
(see for example Carothers 1991 and Grandin 2006).
The spread of this ideology creates unending war and violence,

in failed conquests like Iraq, Vietnam, and Libya as well as
destructive geographies spreading poverty and systemic
inequality.
Shift your decision calculus away from flashpoints to the
invisible violence that substructures their impact claims
otherwise it becomes inevitable. Even with calculation, more
people die from objective violence
Swyngedouw 10 (Erik, Geography, School of Environment and Development @ U. of
Manchester, The Communist Hypothesis and Revolutionary Capitalisms: Exploring the Idea of
Communist Geographies for the Twenty-first Century Antipode, Vol. 41 S1, pgs. 313-315 bb)
What the new spirit of capitalism points at is the general privatization of the commons: the commons of the
intellect/affect, the commons of external nature, and the commons of internal biopolitical/bio-genetic nature. The
unprecedented enclosure of the registers of the commons through privatization points to a final and, arguably, crucial
conflict and contradiction, namely the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion: the separation between those who are part
and those who are not. The figure that literally inscribes the markers of the proliferation of
walls, demarcations, separations and the multiple insides/outsides of the current geo-political
order is the moving body and, in particular, the body of the illegal immigrant, the refugee,
the idealized neoliberal subject, the one without political inscription, without papers (and therefore
without rights): Nowadays, when the welfare state is gone, this separation between citizens and non-citizens still
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remains, but with an additional paradox that non-citizens represent the avant-garde within the neo-liberal
project, because they are indeed positioned within the labor force market without any kind of social rights or
state protection. Thus, if we examine this problem in such a way, the sanspapiers and the erased are the avant-garde
form of sociality which would prevail if the neo-liberal concept is to be fully realized, if it would not be important
anymore if someone is a citizen or not, if everybody would be defined only according to their position in the
labor market and the labor process (Pupovac and Karamani 2006:48). While running the risk of unacceptable
overgeneralization, the refugees in Darfur, the Albanese diaspora in Greece and Italy, mass
illegal migration from Africa to Europe, the Latino exodus to North America are marked
by distinct geographies of exclusion and encampment. This undefined rabble, those who are
non-existent in proper political terms, homines sacri; those who do not have a voice to speak, do not have the right to
be, yet are everywhere, often itinerant, are the signifier par excellence of the travesty of really existing democracy.
The flip side of these itinerant bodies are those who cannot move, imprisoned
behind walls, material (like Gaza and West-Bank) or symbolic (those with no or the wrong papers),
or concentrated in slums, favelas, asylum centres, or labour camps (like in China). This large and growing army of
excluded stand in for the scandal of democracy, the fact that indeed not everyone is equal and the bio-political
state is here the central demarcating agent of inclusion and/or exclusion. A radical democratic
demand, therefore, is the one around which the illegal immigrants rally: we are here, therefore
we are from here. Of course, this egalitarian demand does not only pertain to the place
of utterance, but to all other places to which these multi-scaled bodies belong (see
Swyngedouw and Swyngedouw 2009). Under conditions of abject exclusion, violence can become the only conduit
for voicing radical discontent. Indeed, we cannot ignore the rise of subjective violence over the past few years:
the burning French banlieues (see Dikec , 2007), the rioting students and other youths in
Greeces main cities in December 2008, the food riots that spread like wildfire in mid-2008 (in the
midst of a massive hike in both food and oil prices), the sequence of urban rebellions in places as different
as Italy, Denmark, Moldavia, South Korea, or Haiti, and the like, or the string of ritualistic
anti-globalization protests and their perennial promise of violence. The resurgence of such
forms of subjective violence, ie when participants engage voluntarily in acts recognized as violent,
seems to be a permanent feature of the new geographies of a post-political world.
Subjective violence is of course always measured with respect to a state of apparent
non-violence, a benign condition of absence of violent conflict. This absolutist measuring rod
disavows the multiple expression of objective violence, that is the de-subjectified normal condition
of everyday violence, often of the most brutal and repressive kind (see iek 2008b).
Consider for example the death-toll in Iraq, the genocidal march of HIV in subSaharan countries and parts of Asia in the absence of accessible retroviral drugs, the death of an
unknown number of refugees that try to reach the shores of Europe or the USA. Or the fact
that 1.5 billion people worldwide do not have access to water, a situation that is
the worlds number one cause of premature mortality, of people dying before their sellby date has passed. Closer to home and less dramatic, one can think of the violence inflicted by the
repossession of homes, rising unemployment, disappearing savings, etc. These
forms of objective violence, normal everyday conditions in the existing state of the situation and which are
not measured against a condition of non-violence are strictly parallel to the regular outbursts
of subjective violence. Universally condemned by the political elites, these are desperate
signs of the levels of discontent, screams for recognition, and express profound dissatisfaction with the
existing configuration, while testifying to the political impotence of such gestures and signalling the
need for a more political, that is politicized, organization of these anarchic expressions for
the desire for a new commons.
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Our alternative is to refuse democracy assistance in favor of an

assistance of hope
We have to rethink the very possibility of the affirmative
project, reject its violent ideological premises and hidden
spatial assumptions, and provide assistance based on a
thoughtful compassion
Springer 11 (Simon, Prof. in Department of Geography @ U. of Otago, Violence sits in
places? Cultural practice, neoliberal rationalism, and virulent imaginative geographies Political
Geography, Vol. 30, pp. 96-97)
The movement of neoliberalism towards economic orthodoxy , and its
eventual capture of such hegemony, was not only achieved through
dissemination of its class project geographically through shocks or otherwise, but
also by spreading its worldviews across various discursive fields (Plehwe & Walpen,
2006). Through this merger of discourse and an imperative for spatial diffusion, neoliberalism has
constructed virulent imaginative geographies that appeal to
commonsense rhetorics of freedom, peace, and democracy through the
destructive principles of Orientalism, and in particular by proposing a static and
isolated place-based culture of violence thesis in the context of the Other. These
representations of space and place are never merely mirrors held up to somehow reflect or represent the
world but instead enter directly into its constitution (and destruction). Images and words release enormous
power, and their dissemination. can have the most acutely material consequences (Gregory & Pred, 2007:
2). Neoliberalism is a discourse, and words do damage as actors perform their scripted roles. But
neoliberalism is also a practice that has actually existing circumstances (Brenner & Theodore, 2002)
where new violences are created. Thus, the global south has become the
theater of a multiplicity of cruel little wars that , rather than barbaric throwbacks,
are linked to the current global logic (Escobar, 2004: 18). Yet there is nothing
quintessentially neoliberal about Orientalism. Its entanglement with the neoliberal doctrine is very much
dependent upon the context in which neoliberalization occurs. Initially conceived during the
Enlightenment, and later revived in the postwar era, neoliberalism had a western birth,
radiating outwards across the globe as the sun was setting on Keynesian economics.
Orientalism is, however, entangled in the project of imperialism, which is supported
and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain
territories and people require and beseech domination , as well as forms of
knowledge affiliated with domination (Said, 1993: 9). As the latest incarnation of empire (Hardt &
Negri, 2000; Pieterse, 2004), the principles, practices, theories, and attitudes of a particular class-based
faction maintaining economic control over various territories remains intact under neoliberalism and so
we should not be too surprised to discover that the pernicious discourses that support such resurgent
imperialism similarly remain unchanged (Hart, 2006). If, as Richard Peet (2000: 1222) argues,
economic rationality is a symbolic logic formed as part of social
imaginaries, formed that is in culture, then like the project of colonialism, and
indeed in keeping with the Self-expanding logic of capital and its
fundamental drive to capture new sites for (re)production (Harvey, 2005),
neoliberalism is intimately bound up in articulating and valorizing

cultural change. Yet in order for such change to be seen as necessary, the irrationality of the
Other must be discursively constructed and imagined. This is precisely where neoliberalism and
Orientalism converge. Neoliberalization proceeds as a civilizing enterprise; it is the confirmation of
reason on barbarians who dwell beyond. Reason, like truth, is an effect of power, and its language
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developed out of the Enlightenment as an antithetical response to madness, or the outward performances
of those seen as having lost what made them human (Foucault, 1965). Reason as such, triumphs at the
expense of the non-conformist, the unusual, the Other. As a consequence, neoliberal ideas are
proselytized to rescind the ostensible irrationality and deviance of the Other. A closely related second
reason for evangelism relates to the purported wisdom of neoliberalism, which repeatedly informs us
that we have never had it as good as we do right now, and thus Others are in need of similar salvation.
If they are to be ruled, whether by might or by markets, they must become like us. This theology of
neoliberalism maintains a sense of rationalism precisely because it looks to reason rather than experience
as the foundation of certainty in knowledge. As Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002: 353) argue, the
manifold disjunctures that have accompanied the worldwide imposition of neoliberalism between
ideology and practice; doctrine and reality; vision and consequence are not merely accidental side
effects of this disciplinary project. Rather, they are among its most essential features. In other words, the
effects of neoliberalization (poverty, inequality, and mythic violence) are ignored (Springer, 2008), and in
their place a commonsense utopianism is fabricated (Bourdieu, 1998). And so we stand at the end of
history (Fukuyama, 1992), or at least so we are told, wherein the monotheistic imperative of one God
gives way to one market and one globe. Yet the certainty of such absolutist spatio-temporality is in
every respect chimerical. Space and time are always becoming, invariably under construction. The
future is open, and to suggest otherwise is to conceptualize space as a vast lacuna. There are
always new stories yet to be told , new connections yet to be made, new contestations yet
to erupt, and new imaginings yet to blossom (Massey, 2005). As Said (1993: 7) argued, Just as none of
us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the
struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about
soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings. This sentiment
applies as much to the geographies of neoliberalism as it does to violent geographies. If so much of
the worlds violence is made possible through virulent imaginings , then
perhaps the first step towards peace is a collective imagining of
nonviolence. Undoubtedly, this is an exercise made possible though culture via human agency
because, [i]f violence has meaning, then those meanings can be challenged (Stanko, 2003: 13). Yet
conceiving peace is every bit as much a geographic project. Violence sits in places in a
very material sense, we experience the world though our

emplacement in it, where violence offers no exception to this cardinal
rule of embodiment. But there is no predetermined plot to the stories-so-far of space, the
horizons of place are forever mercurial, and geographies can always be re-imagined. Geography is
not destiny any more than culture is, and as such the possibility of violence being bound in place is only
accomplished through the fearful and malicious imaginings of circulating discourses. Put differently, it is
the performative effects of Orientalism and other forms of malevolent

knowledge that allow violence to curl up and make itself comfortable
in particular places. What can emerge from such understandings is a principled refusal to
exclude others from the sphere of the human and an appreciation of how violence
compresses the sometimes forbiddingly abstract spaces of geopolitics
and geo-economics into the intimacies of everyday life and the
innermost recesses of the human body (Gregory & Pred, 2007: 6). Violence is
not the exclusive preserve of the Other rooted in the supposed determinism of either biology or culture;
it populates the central structures of all societies . The capacity for violence exists
within the entirety of humanity, but so too does its opposite, the rejection of violence. There are choices
to be made each moment of every day, and to imagine peace is to actively refuse
the exploitative structures, virulent ideologies, and geographies of

death that cultivate and are sown by violence. This emancipatory potential
entails challenging the discourses that support mythic violence
through a critical negation of the circuits it promotes , and nonviolent
engagement in the sites both material and abstract that it seeks to subjugate. It requires a
deep and committed sense of Self-reflection to be able to recognize
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the circuitous pathways of violence when it becomes banal,
systematic, and symbolic. And it involves the articulation of new
imaginative geographies rooted not in the architectures of enmity (Gregory, 2004a),
but in the foundations of mutual admiration, respect, and an introspective sense of
humility. By doing so, we engage in a politics that reclaims the somatic as a
space to be nurtured, reproduces familiar and not so familiar
geographies through networks of solidarity built on genuine
compassion, and rewrites local constellations of experience with the
poetics of peace.
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Impact Prime Modernity

The forgetting of ideology has allowed the unquestioned
imposition of prime modernity across the globe a tyranny of
justice through unending war
Flint & Falah 4 (Colin, Dept. of Geography, U. of Illinois, and Ghazi-Walid, Dept. of
Geography and Planning, U. of Akron, How the United States justified its war on terrorism:
prime morality and the construction of a just war Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25.8, pp. 1395)
The US hegemonic project is imposing a tyranny of justice. By tyranny we mean a
continual grabbing of things that dont come naturally, an unrelenting struggle to rule
outside ones own company.127 This requires a moral mission, backed by
military and economic might, with an extra-territorial geographic expression. A
hegemonic sense of justice, embedded in the prime morality, runs rough-shod
over the idea that Justice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things
of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life.128 Indeed, if every account of justice is
understood to be a local account,129 then To override those understandings is (always) to act
unjustly.130 Hence, the hegemonic power is challenged to create a political
geography of just war while violating the geographic assumptions of state
sovereignty that underpin the international state system it manages. Construction of
and resistance to the prime morality is then a political geographic conflict
with major implications as Justice is relative to social meanings.131 The key political
geographic question is whose meanings and with what geographic expressions? US
meanings with a universal scope, or justice defined within indigenous settings? The tradition of
just war is based upon the geographic assumptions of territorial sovereignty.
And an unjust war is a war misliked.132 So, territorial causes must be used to construct a
war that is the result of extra-territorial needs. As a result, the human rights record and
weapons capabilities of Saddam Hussein were, and still are, used to construct
a just war. These are established reasons for just war, based upon the geographic assumption of
territorial sovereignty. Being grounded within the axioms of just war, criticisms of these reasons
for war must rest upon the facts of weapons readiness and atrocities. However, the
acknowledgement of the absence of WMD in Iraq will make it harder to justify military
intervention as pre-emptive strikes. Instead, a universal project to define and defend
human rights will become an increasing component of the USs just war
rhetoric, as understood through the concepts of prime modernity and prime
morality: here lies a more fertile avenue of critique. Hegemonic authority, by definition, has
to be legitimated by being unquestionably just. If it were not then its rule would indeed by
imperial rather than hegemonic. For the USA, it is by being able to relate interests to
the ideals of its prime morality that provides the ability to cast military
intervention as just. But this strategy can be turned against itself.133 If the USA is
portrayed as immoral, if its ideals are seen as false or tainted, then the very grounds for an
extra-territorial presence founded on military strength are weakened. Critique of US
hegemony can be focused upon the individual, the freedom to define ones
identity, and collective identities, in a ways different from the hegemonic
directive. Resistance to hegemony utilizes the same language of US prime morality;
freedom and human dignity.
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A2 Perm
Refuse the synthesis the K calls for a reformulation of the
1ACs simplified moral stories of GOOD vs. EVIL. Privileging the
criticism solves the aff better
Jones & Clark 6 (Stephen H., Prof. of Sociology @ Goldsmiths College, U. of London, and
David B., Prof. of Geography @ U. of Wales Swansea, Waging terror: The geopolitics of the
real, Political Geography, Vol. 25, pp. 311-312)
Baudrillards repeated attempts to awaken us to our own blunted sense of the self-evident issue from a profound
recognition of the inevitability of our situation, itself the inexorable result of a triumphalist globalisation battling
to maintain the illusion of its own morality. Political misinformation and media complicity both derive from a
concerted effort to maintain this illusion. Crucially, this is an illusion that both provokes and is maintained by
desire. The media merely adds a layer of complexity. From the judicious vengefulness demanded in response to the
execution of Ken Bigley,2 to the supposedly aberrational character of acts of torture on the part of the US and UK
military (the term torture frequently appearing in suspended form), the reification of Western morality through
the reality-effects solicited by such image-based, hyperreal stories ensures, following the tautologous logic of
the opinion poll, what state of affairs should be true. Media facts invariably play second fiddle to affects. The
Evil the media repeatedly seeks recourse to ensures the endemism of inhumanity on any side other than the
West. We should not underestimate, therefore, the problem of fighting axiomatically unjustifiable fundamentalisms
of either a religious or political nature; nor of exposing such illusions, given how unpalatable the resulting
admission of guilt may be. As iek (2002: p. 51) points out, however, The choice between Bush and Bin Laden
is not our choice; they are both Them against Us. The fact that global capitalism is a totality means that it is the
dialectical unity of itself and of its other, of the forces that resist it on fundamentalist ideological grounds.
Recognition of this situation dictates a need to distance ourselves from the disjunctive synthesis of two nihilisms
and the moral and religious platitudes plated onto all that Good, Evil, and God which are only ever used
as rhetorical ornaments to jousts of financial ferocity (Badiou, 2003: pp. 158e159). But it is also worth stipulating
that we share in the guilt in direct proportion to the extent that we share in the wealth that ensures it. As
Derrida (cited in iek, 2004: p. 66) put it, My unconditional compassion, addressed to the victims of September
11, does not prevent me from saying this out loud: with regard to this crime, I do not believe anyone is
politically guiltless. Yet guilt is the first victim of a system based on the adiaphorization of morality. It is therefore
necessary to privilege that agency Ecos (1998) semiological guerrilla warfare that seeks to fight against
presupposed morality. Here, the intellectual Left has spoken with uncharacteristic unanimity, even if it remains
divided elsewhere. In this context, two final points deserve underscoring. First, from Badiou (2003: p. 163):
thought, criticism, and philosophy all need to break with the omnipresent motif of finitude that leads thought
itself into endings, corners and nihilisms; a reformulation and reassertion of ontology is, perhaps, required.
Second, from Baudrillard: but lets not forget what were up against.
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219
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Architecture K 1NC
Human rights promotion is central to a Western narrative of
bringing savages from darkness into an American liberaldemocratic image the key is forcing them to participate
Doty 96 (Roxanne Lynn, Assoc. Prof. in School of Gov Politics & Glob, Imperial Encounters:
The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, pp. 128-134)
The purpose of U.S. aid was to provide opportunities for self-help and selfachievement for the "emerging peoples" (Congressional Record, July 13, 1966: 15405). What
is presumed in such a designation? One is tempted to suggest that this term, put in the proper
historical context, refers to the emergence of a people from darkness, from an
uncivilized condition. A kinder interpretation might suggest the emergence of peoples (and
nations) from colonial domination and dependence. In either case, the presupposition is that
these "emerging peoples" did not exist in any meaningful or significant sense before
the West recognized them as a "new" or "emerging" entity entitled to be labeled a
"people" or a nation. This replicates the representational practices of the turn of the century
when U.S. colonizers denied existence as a "people" to the "heterogeneous mass of humanity"
inhabiting the Philippine Islands. The history that matters is the history of the West,
and human beings emerge as "a people" when they are recognized in the eyes of the West.
An equally important and related goal of U.S. foreign assistance was to "reconcile the
unreconciled among men and nations to the continued validity and viability of the present world
system" (Zablocki, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, July 13, 1966: 15405).
"Unreconciled" implies unsettled, potentially unstable, and unpredictable. It implies a dangerous
population in need of transformation. Like "pauperism" in the nineteenth century, "unreconciled"
invoked images of indefiniteness, a dangerous fluidity, at once massive and vague. Restraint and
guidance thus became important bases of policies for reconciling the unreconciled, for
transforming "emerging peoples" into social citizens.7 Unreconciled populations were a threat
to stability, which was an important goal of U.S. foreign assistance. Political stability thus
required their transformation, and to this end Title IX was important. Democratic
institutions and popular participation were recognized as necessary elements in the
achievement of political stability (ibid.: 15405). Activities that were part of Title IX were
considered important in helping the "new nations" ultimately to "stand on their own." For
Congressman Donald Fraser of Minnesota, sponsor of Title IX, political development meant "the
fostering, stimulation, and guidance of fundamental social structures and behaviors that make
effective self-government possible" (ibid.: 15454). The problem with existing U.S. policy and
interaction with the "new nations" was that "we usually treat those nations as though they
already have the capacity to run their own affairs, if we only give them substantial
additions to their material resources" (ibid.). To explain the problems with this policy, Fraser
used the following analogy: A child matures to adulthood, at least physically, pretty much without
human intervention, given a reasonable diet and protection against the harshest threats to his life.
We don't really teach a child to stand or walkwe merely encourage him to
follow our example when he is physiologically ready. Without our intervention doubtless he
would stand and walk and run as soon and as well on his own as with our coaching. Our present
international policies have largely relied on economic and military aidanalogous to the food
and security needed by a child. I suspect that we have assumed these measures would allow the
recipient young nations to mature politically by some automatic inner-directed process toward
stable, responsible nationhood. But we know far too little about political development of societies
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to rest our hopes on such an assumption of automatic political maturation. I for one am convinced
that we must take a far more deliberate and more comprehensive role toward developing nations.
We should systematically try to trigger, to stimulate, and to guide the growth of fundamental
social structures and behaviors among large numbers of people in other countries if we are to
insure political development commensurate with the technological and defensive military
prowess we are already striving for. To return to the human analogy I warned against earlier,
sophisticated parents know that the emotional and social maturation of their children requires far
more conscious effort on their part than their physical development does. Surely we can alert
ourselves to the need for encouraging political growth if we hope them to become well rounded
nations, (ibid.: 15454-55) Fraser's rhetoric is reminiscent of earlier encounters in its
representation of the South as lacking the capacity to run its own affairs. An important
difference is revealed between dealing with poverty in post-World War II Europe and in the "third
world." In the former case, Secretary of State George Marshall urged the countries of Europe to
draw up a joint program for economic recovery and submit it to Washington; the Americanfinanced European Recovery Program began in 1948. No such initiation was invited when it
came to foreign assistance to the South. The earlier mission to uplift and civilize was replaced
with the intent "to trigger, to stimulate, and to guide the growth of fundamental social structures
and behaviors." Once again the West must breathe life into a base and lifeless (though
always potentially volatile) element of humanity, giving it an identity and beginning its
history. The motive force remains outside of the "third world" society and its indigenous culture,
social structures, and inhabitants. The parent-child (problem child) analogy found in
earlier encounters is again prominent in these texts. The "emerging peoples" are the
childlike subjects of previous encounters. The parents in this relationship cannot
simply turn them loose in a dangerous world of competing forces of good and evil.
Rather, they need to be nurtured, guided, and aided until they are capable of
handling their own affairs and making their own decisions. As childrenand children
are always potentially problem childrenthey presented their parents with many
potential problems. Not yet fully developed, unreconciled, they are always subject to the
dangers stemming from their own immaturity. They are prone to getting themselves into
situations they cannot handle. Parents should encourage and teach them to think ahead, to
take a long-range view so they will not find themselves in situations they are not prepared
to deal with. The crises the United States faced in 1966 were attributable to its past mistake of
treating the children, the "new nations," as if they had the capacity to run their own affairs.
Having assumed that they only needed economic or technical help, the
United States had failed to encourage and guide them into full political and
social maturity. The Eraser text exemplified this parent-child analogy. The inability of the
"new nations" to run their own affairs, coupled with their poverty and the potential
attractiveness of communism, led to an inherently unstable and dangerous
situation in which U.S. interests were at risk. It was not poverty per se that was the
source of this danger, but the people who personified poverty, dependence, and
at least potential delinquency and deviance.
Intervention creates hierarchies of demcoratic-ness that

smooth over difference until endless war becomes inevitable
Behnke & Bishai, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the
University of Reading & Senior Program Officer in the Education Program at the United States
Institute of Peace, 7
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[Linda S. & Andreas, War, violence and the displacement of the political, in The International
Political thought of Carl Schmitt, eds. Louiza Osysseos and Fabio Petito, pg. 113-4]
Within states, a temporal adjudication of the contest on the meaning of democracy is possible, and even necessary.
Here, constitutions usually decide about the structure of democracy and the reading of new developments as
democratic or undemocratic. Yet in the realm of international politics there is no such institutionalized position
from which to adjudicate conceptual contests.6 Within the international system, no voice is
present to declare one form of political organization more democratic than the
other. If there is any democratic-ness in the international system, it resides exactly within the contestability and the
actual contest of different political and social designs. The task DPT faces is therefore a formidable one. It has to
extract democracy from the very contest that defines its possibility in the international system and fashion a
purely descriptive and analytical concept out of an essentially contested one. DPT can only work with a fixed
and stabilized meaning of democracy that does not show much regard for the historically and culturally
contingent articulations of this term within political discourse. Based on this methodological reification of
democracy, the term becomes available for differentiation between types of states.
More specifically, different types of states can now be hierarchically ordered according to their
democratic-ness or lack thereof. Democracy becomes an objectified set of values and norms that
sets states apart not only in terms of being different, but also in terms of being better. DPT, in other words,
takes sides. As Ido Orens study on the The subjectivity of the democratic peace: changing perceptions of
Imperial Germany demonstrates, democracy [in the US foreign policy discourse] is usually coded in
terms of current American normative and empirical structures (Oren 1996: 263300). Any
contestability of this particular ordering of democracys complex internal structure is disregarded. Consequently,
democracy should be read as of our kind or America-like. As the author demonstrates, this normative
structure between the American self and foreign other is indeed an important
feature in the formulation and execution of Americas foreign relations. DPT is therefore an active
intervention into the anarchical logic of international politics. Anarchy, as Alexander Wendt (1992) has put it so
succinctly, is what states make of it and part of what they make of it is the designation of identities as friends or
enemies. The uses and abuses of democracy are part and parcel of these processes and should be considered
part of the subject matter of our critical studies, rather than serving our methodological assumptions. The fact that we
can identify DPT as an expression of a political move itself, however, does not yet tell us how and to what effect it
intervenes in the logic of international politics. For Schmitt, conflict was made endurable by the
creation of an agonistic structure of mutual restraint between equal sovereigns. Conflict,
to repeat the point, is inherent in politics, and not something imported into an otherwise harmonious
system by pathological actors. Moreover, there is an economy of truth in the international system, (more or
less) isomorphic with its anarchical structure. As truth is always involved with power, it hardly exceeds the
boundaries of the latter, tying it intimately to the geographics of sovereignty and anarchy. DPT goes up against
all of these features. For liberalism, anarchy understood this way is a scandal that needs to be resolved. First of all,
truth becomes centralized, as it now becomes possible to give voice to the proper identification of democracy
and the universal validity of the values associated with it. Consequently, the agonistic respect that
characterizes the relationship between states in Schmitts realism is now replaced
with a hierarchical relation, in which tolerance defines the benevolent, and

intervention the belligerent extremes (Rawls 1999).7 Liberalism therefore creates a
hierarchy of states in which some are virtually a priori suspicious, dangerous
and threatening. As such, they are the object of constant strategic surveillance, concern and, if needed,
intervention by democratic states.
The fetishism of liberal participation shades a tactical

compromise between individuals and the government that
rejects ethical consciousness in favor of results, reentrenching
militaristic violence in the Middle East.
Weizman 11 (Eyal, Architect and Director of the Centre for Research Architecture @
Goldsmiths, U. of London, The Nightmare of Participation, pp. 9-11)
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At the horizon of the concept of participation its very absolute extreme is that of
collaboration. Collaboration might be thought of as the tendency for forcefully or willingly
aligning one's actions with the aims of power, be it political, military, economic, or a
combination thereof. The historical allusions are clear. This alignment is usually justified as a
commonsensical, if tragic, solution to a problem of limits. The dilemma of
participation/collaboration implies a closed system in which the options available for
choice, and those who present them, cannot be challenged. Seeking to force the subject into
compliance, a set of alternatives might thus be posed in such a way that "free-subjects,"
choosing for their interests in moderating harm, would end up serving the aims of this
power. Participation thus tends to raise a number of political and ethical dilemmas that demand
a clearheaded study of the alignment of powers around the arena where it is called for. The
paradox of participation impacts most independent non-governmental organizations that make up
the ecology of contemporary crisis. It operates by creating upon a common ground
where activists must cooperate with the very states, armies, or militias they
originally sought to confront. Thus, for example, a military officer attempting to
administer life in an "enlightened" manner might seek the collaboration of humanitarian agents
who need military permission for providing life substances and medical help. The logic of this
participation might somewhat obscure the fundamental moral differences between these groups.
At the core of the paradoxes of participation is a tactical compromise that often
deteriorates into a structural impossibility one that entangles the state and its opposition in a
mutual embrace, making nonstate organizations de facto participants in a
diffused system of government in which the state outsources its ethical selfconsciousness to a non-governmental ethical agency, and this agency delegates its
claim to effectiveness in the state. Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of
the problem of participation is equally in practicing and in avoiding it. There is, of
course, no general formula to address this dilemma, but the deliberation of a political
thought-practice might insist on an orientation of political patterns and on
the constant expansion of the limits of the problem in both space and time.
The former by seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections, by
studying and analyzing the force field around and outside the dilemma; and the latter by
looking further into the future. The ancient Greeks thought of dilemmas as one of the elements
of tragedy. Each option that a "tragic hero" faced necessarily led to different forms of terrifying
suffering, and the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of
an angry bull. But the dilemma, if we are still to think in its terms, must not only be
about which of the horns to choose, but whether to accept the terms of the
question and choose at all. Robert Pirsig suggested several ways to subvert this complicity
of the opposites: one can "refuse to enter the arena," "throw sand in the hull's eyes," or
"sing the bull to sleep." Political and spatial activists will always be within an arena of
struggles in compromising situations, but these forms of practice must look for
ways to challenge the truth claims, and thus the basis of the authority of the
powers with which they both cooperate and confront the very people who placed
their bulls before us and then asked us to choose the lesser of their two horns. When this is
impossible, refusal might still be regarded as one effective form of political
action. But this option must be reserved for those who can and otherwise will act.
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Americas absolute universalization of liberal democracy and

human rights has attempted to create a world in its image, a
world without an outside. The impact is extinction, momentary
stability is paid for by continuous global civil war
Odysseos 8 (Louiza, Senior Lecturer in Internation Relations at the University of Sussex,
Liberalisms War, Liberalisms Order: Rethinking the Global Liberal Order as a Global Civil
War, March 17, p. 15-18)
Second, the reference to the limits of the world and the theme of internality itself point to Nancys
insight that the present war is a global civil war, one internal to the West as an
order, or a way of being, whose end is to create a world without an exterior, as
a worldwide enclosure of absolute immanence (Ojakangas 2007: 215; cf. Schmitt 1995a: 447; 1995b).
Such enclosure or internality means, at a superficial level, that the war of monotheism waged
by/in the West must be understood as a kind of civil war: it is no longer the old war of
sovereign States, not since the open conflict of 1914 suggests Nancy, consistent in this way with
other accounts of the demise of Westphalia at the time of the Great War (Nancy 2003b: 51; cf. Schmitt
2003: 140). Yet, less superficially perhaps, internality or interiority also pertains to the presumed
dissipation of the age of the line [das Zeitalter des globalen Liniendenkens]: the end of both political
thought structured by lines15 and also of the Westphalian world- ordering praxis of drawing lines,
leading to a restructuring of world order and international law [die Struktur des Vlkerrechts] (Schmitt
1995a: 447; cf. Odysseos 2007: 130-134 and Rasch 2005; cf. section three) that was decisive for
Westphalian world politics. Nancys war of monotheism, much like Hardt and Negris global war, is
not war as such; rather, it may be best understood as that order-producing war and war-making
order which is unlimited in scope, duration and space.16 Schmitt had called this a borderless,
global pan-interventionism (1995a: 446-447).17 Yet, in its claim to limitless scope and duration, this
war-order still divides space into zones of war and peace, though peace itself
becomes warlike, filled with relations of force, surveillance etc., while war becomes
a form of order and peace maintenance (cf. Hard and Negri 2004; Beck 2005). Peace and war must
be understood in accordance with a substitutive value that makes the two terms absolutely
contemporary with one another, starting with the inversion both of their functions and of their
classical relations (Alliez and Negri 2003: 110). Such an order is no longer open to multifarious
possibilities of determination. As Mika Ojakangas notably illustrates, it may well be the function of
enmity to introduce[s] a moment of transcendence, and thereby a moment of openness and freedom,
into the immanence of world order (Ojakangas 2007: 211). This points to a third significant insight,
that the global civil war amounts to the disorganisation of all the Western worlds
own forms of equilibrium (Nancy 2003b: 51), in other words, to what we in IR call balance
of power or threat (see Schmitt 2003; Waltz 1979; Walt 1987). This is not trivial, not for IR, not for
Nancy, and not for possibilities of order. This is because, as the discussion of Westphalia below
indicates, to balance involves a structuring of the field of politics (cf. Laclau 2005) that
requires a recognition of the other as a (procedurally) just and equal enemy, with
recognised rights to existence, neutrality and resistance (see Odysseos 2007). Balancing also
means that, just as war can be waged with this kind of enemy, peace can also be negotiated and accepted
(Schmitt 2003). The disavowal of balancing disavows also the commitment to a distinction between
war and peace and makes it possible and permissible (licit is Agambens legal term, see 2000: 107)
to eliminate the other as enemy (cf. Odysseos 2002). Importantly, moreover, the withering of
power-political forms of equilibrium is the twin process of what Nancy calls the tendential
obliteration of its Western distinction at the heart of the process of its own
globalisation (Nancy 2003b: 51). The Wests globalisation must be thought of
as a replication of its normative- ideological and material-economic

structures, as well as the governmentalisation of its political structures, as
discussed above. Yet such replication produces the world order but also life and subjects (Foucault
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1997a: 59; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Althusser 1971). In the process of replicating its
structures its effective globalisation the West can no longer sustain its own
distinction from others, a distinction or difference which, however, forms the very basis on
which it globalises itself. The West has come to encompass the world, and in this movement disappears
as what was supposed to orient the course of this world (Nancy 2007: 34): As Enrique Dussel argued a
decade earlier, the West was never an independent, autopoietic, self-referential system, but instead is
part of a world-system, a system nevertheless which it has helped bring into being and which it works
to police and sustain; it is in fact, its center (1998: 4; emphasis in original; cf. Schmitt 2003: 233). But
if the distinct centre which orients the course of the order or system can no
longer remain distinct or central, it begins to tear itself apart. The result of this
rupture is a situation that destabilises the splits of the old Europe and that produces, on the one hand,
the American superpower, and, on the other hand, the heavy deficit of identity that is Europes lot,
revealing to the full light of day the contradiction between its claim to rational-moral universality
(i.e., in science and democracy) and the glaring injustice of the situations created by its own
domination. (Nancy 2003b: 51) Thus, Nancy suggests that the West and its civilization is but a work
of death (2003a: 24) so that everything takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself
with a death drive that soon would have nothing else to destroy than the
world itself... (Nancy 2007: 34). Finally, what might this work of death actually mean? For Nancy,
arguably, global civil war is the product and character of that war-order propelled by a
civilisation whose values of monotheism, self-presence, and truth have exhausted
themselves (Hrting 2006: 6). We clearly see the emergence of this kind of war-order as the lot
of a civilisation that is coming up against its own limit (Nancy 2003b: 52), which cannot, given
Nancys critical Abbau of Heidegger, but remind us of the latters discussion of the end of philosophy
and the completion of metaphysics (Heidegger 1972). More specifically, for Nancy however, global
civil war designates an epistemological and material war of the West (Hrting 2006: 6). That the
same Western world is in a permanent state of internal war (Nancy 2003b: 51),
renders all talk of clash amongst civilisations inappropriate and ultimately
othering, because it points to the causes of this war as the Wests own spiritual
emptiness and self-destructive logic of sameness (Hrting 2006: 6). This kind of spiritual
exhaustion leads also to a blindness or hypocrisy: The civilization that has represented
the universal and reason also known as the West cannot even encounter and
recognize any longer the relativity of its norms and the doubt of its own certainty (Nancy
2007: 34). Nancy does not, of course, think that this assumption of universalism and the hypocrisy or
self deception to which it points, is new (cf., prominently, Koselleck 1988; Edwards 2006). This was
already the situation two centuries ago, Nancy writes, referring to Hegel (Nancy 2007: 34). He might as
well have pointed, as others have done, to the French Revolution (cf. Kesting 1959; Schnur 1963,
discussed in section three). This is significant because, as Hrting suggests, Nancys locating of this
war(-order) as Western, yet at the same time as global civil war, makes legible the ways in which
global civil war arises as an epistemological problem of Western

metaphysics (Hrting 2006: 6).
Our alternative is to reject intervention in favor of an

unconditional support for local political institutions
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Resist the urge to shape new institutions into our mold only
an ethics that insists upon the peoples control of the direction
of new movements solves
Badiou 11 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate School, Former chair of Philosophy @ cole
Normale Suprieure, The Universal Reach of Popular Uprisings the symptom,
http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=1031)
The Wind of the East Carries Away the Wind of the West Until when will the idle and crepuscular West, the
international community of those who still believe themselves to be the rulers of the world, continue to give
lessons in good management and good behavior to the rest of the world? Is it not laughable to see well-paid
and well-fed intellectuals, retreating soldiers of the capital-parliamentarism that serves us as a moth-eaten Paradise,
offering their services to the awe-inspiring Tunisian and Egyptian people, in order to teach these savages the
ABC of democracy? What pathetic persistence of colonial arrogance! In the situation of political misery that
weve been living in for the last three decades, is it not evident to surmise that it is us who have everything to learn
from the popular uprisings of the moment? Dont we sense the urgency of giving a close look at everything, that,
over there, made possible, by collective action the overthrow of oligarchic and corrupt governments, who or
maybe especially stood in a humiliating position of servitude to the Western world? Yes, we should be the
students of these movements, and not their stupid professors. For they give life, with the genius of their own
inventions, to those same political principles that for some time now the dominant powers tried to convince us were
obsolete. And in particular the principle that Marat never stopped recalling: when it is a matter of liberty, equality,
emancipation, we all have to join the popular upheavals. We Are Right To Revolt Just as in politics, our states
and those that benefit from them (political parties, unions and complaisant intellectuals) prefer management to
revolt, they prefer peaceful demands and orderly transition to the breach of law. What the Egyptian and
Tunisian people remind us is that the only action appropriate to the sentiment of scandalous takeover by state power
is the mass uprising. In this case, the only rallying cry capable of linking together the disparate aspirations of those
making a crowd is: you there, go away! The exceptional significance of the revolt, namely its critical power, lies
in the fact that its rallying cry, which is repeated by millions of beings, gives the measure of what will be,
undoubtedly, irreversibly, its first victory: the flight of the designated man. And whatever happens next, this
triumph, illegal by nature, of popular action, will be forever victorious. Now, that a revolt against the power of the
state can be absolutely successful is an example of universal reach. This victory points out the horizon over which
any collective action, unencumbered by the authority of the law, itself outlines: what Marx called the deterioration
of the state. The knowledge that someday the people, freely associated and resorting to their creative power, will be
able to throw away the funereal coercion of the state. Thats the reason why this idea arouses boundless enthusiasm
in the entire world and will trigger the revolution that ultimately will overthrow the authority in residence. A Spark
Can Set The Plain on Fire It began with the suicide, a self-immolation by fire, of a man who had been downgraded
to unemployment, and to whom was forbidden the miserable commerce that allowed him to survive; and because a
female police officer slapped him in the face for not understanding what in this world is real. In a few days this
gesture becomes wider and in a few weeks millions of people scream their joy on a distant square, and this entails the
beginning of the catastrophe for the powerful potentates. What is at the root of this fabulous expansion? Are we
dealing with a new sort of epidemic of freedom? No. As Jean-Marie Gleize poetically said: The dissemination of a
revolutionary movement is not carried by contamination. But by resonance. Something that surfaces here resounds
with the shock wave emitted by something that happened over there. Lets name this resonance event. The
event is the sudden creation, not of a new reality, but of a myriad of new possibilities. None of them is the
repetition of what is already known. This is the reason why its obscurantist to say this movement claims
democracy (implying the one that we enjoy in the West), or that this movement pursues social improvement
(implying the average prosperity for the petit bourgeois de chez nous). Starting with almost nothing, resonating
everywhere, the popular uprising creates unknown possibilities for the entire world. The word democracy is
hardly uttered in Egypt. There is talk about a new Egypt, about the true Egyptian people, about a constituent
assembly, about complete changes in everyday life, of unheard-of and previously unknown possibilities. There is a
new plain that will come after that which no longer exists, the one that was set on fire by the spark of the
uprising. This plain to be stands between the declaration of an alteration in the balance of forces and the grasping of
new tasks. Between the shout of a young Tunisian: We, children of workers and of peasants, are stronger than the
criminals; and what a young Egyptian said: As from today, January 25, I take in my own hands the matters of my
country. The People, Only the People, Are the Creators of Universal History Its amazing that in our West, the
governments and the media consider that the insurgents in a Cairo square are the Egyptian people. How can that
be? Arent the people for them, the only reasonable and legal people, the one usually reduced to the majority of a
poll, or the majority of an election? How did it happen that suddenly, hundreds of rebels are representative of a
population of eighty million? Its a lesson that should not be forgotten, and that we will not forget. After a certain
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threshold of determination, of stubbornness and of courage, the people, in fact, can concentrate their existence in a
square, an avenue, some factories or a university The whole world will witness the courage, and especially
the wondrous creations that go with it. These creations prove that there, there is a People. As an Egyptian rebel
strongly put it: before I watched television, now television is watching me. In the stride of an event, the People
is made of those who know how to solve the problems brought about by the event. Thus, in the takeover of a
square: food, sleeping arrangements, watchmen, banners, prayers, defensive actions, so that the place where it all
happens, the place that is the symbol, is kept and safeguarded for the people, at any price. Problems that, at the level
of the hundreds of thousands of risen people mobilized from everywhere, seemed insoluble, all the more that in this
place the state has virtually disappeared. To solve insoluble problems without the assistance of the state becomes
the destiny of an event. And this is what makes a People, suddenly, and for an indeterminate time, exist where
they have decided to assemble themselves.
The Framework is to see ourselves as political architects The

question is What is being built? and How should it happen?
this round becomes a crucial micropolitical front in the battle
against the hegemony of consensual democracy and human
rights
Mouffe & Miessen 11 (Chantal, Prof. of Politics and International Relations, U. of Westminster, UK, and
Markus, Harvard Fellow on a research project in Kuwait, Prof. for architecture and curatorial practice @ Hochschule
ftir Gestaltung, The Nightmare of Participation, pp. 120-123)
MM Since, as you have said, we are now facing a situation in which it is crucial to think about a commonality
that allows for conflict as a form of productive engagement, could a model of "bohemian participation," in
the sense of an outsider's point of entry, allow for the "outsider" to become a role model for the
future? CM - According to me, what is really necessary today is to create an agonistic
public space, an agonistic type of politics. This is really what is missing. We are living in a
situation that, in On the Political, I call "post-political," in which we are constantly being told that
the partisan model of politics has been overcome, that there is no more Left and Right: There is this kind of
consensus at the center, in which there is really no possibility for an alternative. We
are told that, given the state of globalization, there is nothing we can do. And this is why most
Socialistparties or Labor parties have moved so much towards the center. What they
offer is really not fundamentally different from what Center-Right parties offer. There is now a general
consensus that there is no alternative, which I think is extremely dangerous. In my view, such a
situation has created the terrain for the rise of right-wing populism in Europe.
They are the only parties that say, "There is an alternative to this consensus at the center, and we will offer it.
We will bring back to you, the people, the voice that the establishment has taken away from you. We will provide
you with the possibility to exercise popular sovereignty." Of course, the alternatives they present are inadequate and
unacceptable because they are usually articulated in a xenophobic language. But given that right-wing populist
parties are often the only ones that pretend to represent an alternative, I don't think it is surprising that they are
attracting more and more people. They are also the only ones trying to mobilize passions, and offer forms of
identification with a strong affective component. It is very important for the Left to understand that, instead of
reacting with moral condemnation, they need to understand the reasons for the success of these parties to be
able to provide an adequate answer. MM - In this context, what is your specific understanding of dissensus? CM I think that what is important is to subvert the consensus that exists in so many
areas, and to reestablish a dynamic of conflictuality. And so, from that point of view, I can see
that what you call "the outsider" could play a role. Personally, I would put it differently, because this is more
the person who disagrees, who will have another point of view. It is not necessarily an outsider. It
could be somebody from within the community who is not part of the prevailing consensus, who will allow
people to see things differently. MM - Yes, but is this not precisely the outside voice that is entering
the arena? It depends on those who will be able to access existing debates and discourses untroubled by their
disapproval. CM Of course. In some cases it can be somebody from the outside who suddenly opens up the view and
says, "Look, there are also these other things that you are not taking into account." So, yes, it can be an outsider, but
it need not be an outsider. There are also some voices within communities that have been silenced. But I agree,
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you could say that it is an outsider to the consensus. I think it is important to hear most of the voices that have been
silenced or that have not been able to express themselves. I am not necessarily saying that they have not been granted
the right to speak, but maybe a voice that has not yet emerged, because the whole culture of consensus simply
does not allow for people to envisage that things could be different. This is what I like in the slogan of the alterglobalization movement: "Another world is possible." I think it's really important for all of us to begin
thinking in these terms. Another world is possible. And the present neoliberal hegemony has
tried to convince us that things can only be as they are. Fortunately, this is not the
truth. All forms of what we call the "productive engagement to disturb the consensus" are crucial in order to
bring to the fore the things that consensus has tried to push aside. In the creation of what I call an agonistic
public space, there are many different voices and people that all play a role. For instance, I think this is definitely an
area where artists, architects, or people who are engaged in the entire field of culture at large, play an incredibly
important role, because they provide different forms of subjectivities from the ones that exist at the moment. MM
It seems to me that there is an urgent need to undo the innocence of participation, which is precisely the modus
operandi that we find in so many "socially relevant" practices today? It is interesting how particular practices have
hijacked the notion of participation as an unquestionably positive, user-driven means of engagement. In this context,
it could be useful to think in terms of "conflictual participation" as a productive form of interventional practice. CM
I think that is an important point. Today, we are in a phase that I call the post-Washington
consensus phase. Of course, the Washington consensus is still in place. It is fortunately more and more
challenged, particularly in Latin America, where what is happening is quite interesting. More and more
countries simply say that they no longer want to obey the IMF or the World Bank, but
instead organize things in their own ways. The power of globalization has begun to realize
that it needs to use a different strategy, a strategy of participation. And this is why participation has
become such a buzzword. But, in many cases participation consists simply in people exploiting themselves. They
do not just accept things the way they are, but actively contribute to the consensus; but they
accept the consensus. And this is why I find your notion of the "violence of participation" very interesting. We
need to realize that participation can also be very dangerous.
MM - What constitutes the danger? CM - I was in a discussion at LSE [London School of Economics] where there
were people who participated in the Davos [World Economic] Forum,_as well as people who participated [in the
World Soctal Forum] in Porto Alegre. They were all bringing to the table their different experiences. One person who
had been in Porto Alegre was telling a story about the event, and then a person who had attended the Davos Forum
would say, " But that's incredible, because it's exactly the same thing that was discussed in Davos. It's exactly the
same thing." This was understood as something optimistic, and I was saying, "But wait a minute, they cannot
possibly be talking about the same thing." The fact that there is the same vocabulary is because the people at Davos
have realized that they need to transform their vocabulary. They need people to feel that they are part of this
movement. I am very suspicious of this notion of participation, as if participation by itself was going to bring
about real democracy. Of course, there are many different forms of participation. If it's some kind of agonistic or
conflictual participation, as you call it, in which there is a real confrontation between different views, then, yes, I
think it's very good. But participation can also mean participating in some form of consensus, which nobody is really
able to disturb, and in which some agreement is presupposed. I would definitely not see that as something positive.
Participation really depends on how you understand it. It is certainly not an innocent notion. MM - Any form of
participation is already a form of conflict. In order to participate in any environment or given situation, one needs to
understand the forces of conflict that act upon that environment. How can one move away from
romanticized notions of participation into more proactive, conflictual models of
engagement? What would you refer to as micro-political environments, and where do micropolitical movements exist? CM - Concerning the issue of space, I don't think that there is such a big
difference between what you call micro-political, macro-political, and geo-political, because I think that this
dimension of the political is something that can manifest itself at all levels. It is
important not to believe that there are some levels that are more important
than others. In a way, it is coming back to what I have said before in regards to Hardt and Negri. When we
began to organize the European Social Forum, they were against this idea, because they were saying the struggle
should be at a global level. There is no point in having a European Social Forum because it automatically privileges
Europe. But I think that it is very important to have social forums at all levels: cities, regions, nations all these
levels and scales are very important. The agonistic struggle should take place on a
multiplicity of levels, and should not privilege either the geopolitical or the
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micro-political, but instead realize that the political dimension is something that
cannot be localized in a privileged space. It is a dimension that can manifest itself in all kinds of
social relations, whatever the specific space may be. As many recent geographers have insisted, space is
always something that is, to use an expression that Deleuze and Guattan criticized, striated. What they were
thinking of was a smooth and homogeneous space, while Doreen Massey argues that every form of space is always
some configuration of power relations. It means that what I would call the hegemonic struggle, or the political
struggle, needs to take place on all these levels. There is a multiplicity of levels where the agonistic struggle
needs to be launched. This is why I think that there is a potential for politization on multiple levels, and it is
important to engage with all these levels and not just simply say, "Oh well, the global struggle is the most important
one." This is not the case. We need to really try to transform and articulate power
relations on all levels.
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Link: Compassion *
The compulsion to act when presented with the sufferings of
abject others is not a simple, altruistic equation. Compassion is
paradoxically a means of keeping our distance from others, of
assuaging the guilt we feel without examining the complex
relationships that produce those we feel guilty toward or bring
their suffering to us. We must refuse this impulse to act in the
face of abject otherness, traversing the fantasy that locks us
into the repetition of these cycles of trauma
Edkins, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Wales, 2000 [Jenny, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices
of Aid p. 112-116]
The experience of disaster as an encounter with the Real is one that, like the gaze of the victim,
forces us to confront the impossibility of social reality, the void at its heart. The Real is that which cannot be
symbolized. The symbolic or social order is always incomplete or impossible. It can only be
constituted by the exclusion of some (nonsymbolizable) kernelthe Real. The literature on trauma and post-traumatic
stress emphasizes that not only those caught up in a disaster experience this shock of an encounter with
the Real, but also those who witness it. Whole communities can be caught up in it; indeed,
those who share a traumatic experience of this type feel themselves both part of a new
community of a special type (a community made up of those who share a revised view of the
world, produced by trauma, that they must continue to bear witness to) and apart from all
usual social links.
However, for witnesses of disaster the traumatic element is not so much the encounter with the Real
as the encounter with "the gaze of the helpless otherchild, animalwho does not know why
something so horrifying and senseless is happening to him." It is not, as might be supposed, the gaze of a hero, willingly
sacrificing himself, that is so striking to observers of tragedy, but "the gaze of a perplexed victim," the passive, helpless
casualty. It is this gaze that gives rise to the compassion felt by outsiders. It is not, as we might think, the
outsiders in distant countries who are the passive ones in cases of humanitarian disasters, who do
nothing, who do not want to get involved. Rather, it is the people caught up in the events themselves. They see the horrors that are engulfing them but cannot understand how such horrors are
possible and are unable to act. Their gaze, the gaze of the uncomprehending victim, is unbearable
and gives rise to guilt in witnesses to distant disaster. It is to avoid the pressure of this gaze
that we feel compassion toward those in trouble. This compassion can be related to the reflexive nature of
human desire, which is always desire for a desire. Compassion is "the way to maintain the
proper distance towards a neighbour in trouble." By giving, we present ourselves so that we
like what we see when we look at ourselves from the position of the victim. By responding compassionately, we present ourselves as that which is desired by those who are suffering. This account
does not in any sense invalidate compassion; on the contrary, it shows why it is so important and necessary. The reaction of the subject of
compassion, the victim, is a separate matter.
In the Ethiopian famine, we saw that the images
that provoked an immediate reaction and a strong response

were those that portrayed perplexed victims, children in particular, and specifically those that
portrayed their passivity and bewilderment. It was precisely that picture of passivity that formed the basis of so many of the
subsequent objections to the media coverage. However, the mediated nature of the image, the fact that it was an image seen on television, leads to
another account of the response to disaster.
When we
watch a television program, we do so from a disembodied space outside and beyond the reach of
the scene we are viewing. We ourselves are invisible to the people we are watching. We are not
there, they cannot see us, yet we can see them. The same is the case with a theatrical drama on stage, except that there the
distance is fictional or posited by convention and can be broken by audience participation or by applause. In a theater, too, people are part of an
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audience, not alone. When we witness scenes of suffering on television, our subjectivity is suspended. We
are like ghosts. It is as if we were already dead. We cannot intervene, and we cannot be harmed by
what is going on. Yet, in an important sense we are not passive. As (apparently) the focus of the
victim's perplexed gaze, the viewer is placed in the position of the master signifier, the place
of the subject who is supposed to know. This is the place the analyst occupies in psychotherapy.
The symbolic or social order can never be complete. It constitutes itself around a lack, a paradoxical
element that halts the shifting of signifiers in a "non-founded founding act of violence." This paradoxical element is the master signifier and provides the reference point that holds the symbolic field
together. It conceals the void by occupying it and thus enables the social order to be constituted.
However, the "master" is always an impostoranyone at the place of the constitutive lack in the structure of the symbolic
order will do. The character of master is produced by the position the figure assumes. It is by
reference to the master that the symbolic order acquires meaning and purpose, and its emptiness
is concealed. The lack, the empty place at the heart of the symbolic order, cannot be abolished
it is constitutiveit can only be rendered visible as empty. As witnesses of distant suffering on our
television screens, we are placed in that empty place, the void that has to be concealed for the social
order to come into being. We are the ones who are supposed to be able to answer the perplexity of
the victims about the purpose of their suffering. This is an impossible position to hold. The
imposture of the master signifier is usually concealed; however, in this case, we ourselves are interpellated into this position,
and we know we are impostors. We know that what we are part of is not real. We cannot
help. We cannot answer the appeal. According to Zizek, the accepted interpretation in media studies is that
our perception of violence in a modern society of spectacle is aestheticized by media manipulationwe no longer see reality as such, but reality
as spectacle, pseudo-reality. Zizek argues that this is not the case: "The problem of contemporary media resides not in their enticing us to
confound fiction with reality but, rather, in their 'hyperrealise character by means of which they saturate the void that keeps open the space for
The symbolic order can function only by maintaining a minimal distance towards
reality, on account of which it ultimately has the status of a fiction. . . . if it is to function
normally, symbolic order is not to be taken literally." We are not part of what we see: we cannot
take on the role demanded of us.
We are watching, helpless to prevent, yet implicated. Not only are we unable to stop the tragedy,
we are unable to comfort its victims. We feel the full impact of the ambiguity and ambivalence
the undecidabilitythat is the metasubject. From this empty place we are summoned by the perplexed gaze to
provide answers, to respond to the questioning of the victims who cannot understand the horror
they have been caught up in. It is not a place we can occupy. There are no answers we can give.
There are only (impossible) decisions to be made. Here we see what Zizek meansthe space for the
symbolic fiction (the master signifier) has been removed. The scene is the impossible one pictured in
a Steve Bell cartoon, which shows the living room of a modern home in semidarkness. Seated on the
floor is a figure, its eyes closed and the television set cradled in its arms. On the bright
television screen we can see a body lying curled up on a road somewhere. We can just make
out what looks like a figure holding a gun in the background. The title is "International
Community.
This is what Zizek describes as an experience of the sublime. Such an experience takes place when we "find ourselves in the face of
some horrifying event whose comprehension exceeds our capacity of representation; it is so
overwhelming that we can do nothing but stare at it in horror; yet at the same time this event
poses no immediate threat to our physical well-being, so that we can maintain the safe distance of
an observer."'
We are forced to traverse the fantasy, to face the traumatic void at the heart of the social or
symbolic order. We experience the nonexistence of the big Other, that is, the social or symbolic order.
What do we do after we have traversed the fantasy? Is this moment, when the symbolic order no
longer exists and we experience our own nonexistence as subjects, no more than a gap between two ordersa
symbolic fiction.
fleeting, vanishing mediator, "an enthusiastic intermediate moment necessarily followed by a sobering relapse into the reign of the big Other,"
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like a revolution followed by a return to a more repressive regime? One response to this question is a
move to produce an alternative social order, one based on a different master signifier.
Another response is a return to, or reassertion of, the previous symbolic order. The first leads to an
international community of affect, based on compassion, and a humanitarian practice. This claims
a neutrality derived from universal basic human values or rights. The second produces a return to
developmentalism, which is founded on the scientific search for objective causes of events and a
belief in rational, technical solutions. It claims a value-free truth founded on the certainty of
objective method. A third response, to which I return later, is the possibility of "tarrying with the
negative." Lacanian work allows us to see the various responses in relation to a desire for (impossible)
completion, for an overcoming of the lack inherent in la condition humaine as such.
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* Link: Assorted Victimhoods *
233
The Affs claims of ethical/moral obligation are not based in

some selfless, respect for life. They are merely a self-serving
protection of the power, safety and humanitarian
righteousness that these claims give to their plan. These roles
rigidly enforces usas protectors and them as weak , limiting
out any alternative dialougues.
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Campbell, professor at durham university, 2002 [David Violence, Justice, and Identity in the Bosnian
Conflict Sovereignty and Subjectivity]
Assorted victimhoods is the only universal ideology in the postcold war world according to Jean
Baudrillard. An extreme assessment, perhaps, but many of the current developments in international politics point in that direction. The
"failed state as international victim has become a preeminent security issue, establishing the limit
case of concern when the power of the global media is there to gaze upon the plight of its
devastated peoples. Whether the site is Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, (Rwanda) or Chechnya the sight is
familiar-"generalities of bodiesdead, wounded, starving, diseased, and homelessare
pressed against the television screen as mass articles." The effect can be strangely comforting
for the viewing population: "in their pervasive depersonalisation, this anonymous corporeality functions as
an allegory of the elephantine, 'archaic,' and violent histories of external and internal subalterns."
Through a peculiar trade, a pitiful eye is cast over the victims, consuming their image as a
source for compassion. In return, through a process of "cultural anaesthesia," which banishes
"disconcerting, discordant, and anarchic sensory presences and agents that undermine the
normalising and often silent premises of everyday life," we are reassured that the horrors
evident over there are safely confined and our resultant superiority confirmed
This is the strange morality of pity that Friedrich Nietzsche warned against. In questioning morality so as establish the possibility for a revaluation
of values, Nietzsche paid particular attention to "unegoistic"
instincts such as pity. Nietzsche regarded the morality of pity

a danger to all right-thinking persons, for it represented a constraint upon the sovereignty of the individual through
the transmission of pain from the victim to the observer. But Nietzsche argued the danger was greater than that, for he
saw that some "good" persons sought objects of pity as a means to increase their own position
and contro1. The objects of pity would remain victims regardless of the amount of attention
directed their way, whereas the pitiers would markedly increase their feeling of superiority.
as
The international community has

focused on the abnormality of the conflict through an oft-repeated parade of pathetic images
while finding it difficult to confront the normality of life lived in the context of violence. As Slavoj
zizek argues, what disturbs us most is not the sense that there is something perversely unique about
In few places has this productive complex of pity been more evident than the Bosnian conflict.
Bosnia in general and Sarajevo in particular, though most assessments attempt to make that case:
The unbearable is not the difference.
The unbearable is the fact that in a sense there is no difference: there are
no bloodthirsty "Balkanians" in Sarajevo, just normal citizens like us. The moment we take full note
of this fact, the frontier that separates "us" from "them" is exposed in all its arbitrariness, and we
are forced to renounce the safe distance of external observers.
To maintain the distance, therefore, we emphasize compassion for the victim. Zizek, like Baudrillard,
believes something global has emerged: "Sarajevo is but the special case of what is perhaps the key feature of the
ideological constellation that characterises our epoch of world-wide triumph of liberal
democracy: the universalisation of the notion of victim." To say as much is not to degrade the
evident suffering or downplay the abundant horrors of the violence that has consumed the Bosnian capital
(among other areas) since early 1992. To the contrary, in order to come to terms with the violence, it is necessary to
highlight the function of compassion and what it conceals if we are to respond more effectively. In this context it
might be said, as zizek argues, that "our compassion, precisely in so far as it is 'sincere,' presupposes that in
it, we perceive ourselves in the form that we find likeable: the victim is presented so that we
like to see ourselves in the position from which we stare at her." In our empathy toward Bosnian victims,
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we have, especially through the emphasis upon humanitarian aid and intervention, thought
of ourselves in a manner that we find congenialthe humanitarians giving charity to the helpless
This desirable sense of our self more often than not does little for the other. Moreover, the victims,
who are neither so weak nor easily indulged as we think, can plainly see this. Indeed, the
"justifiable contempt" held by many Sarajevans toward both their enemy and those Europeans who, with their
"hypocritical contrition . . . bronze their good conscience in the sun of solidarity," pierces the
phantasm of the pitiful victim and exposes the political deficit of compassion. For what our
surfeit of concern conceals is the "immobilising power of fascination . . . [which] thwarts our
ability to act" and prevents a political analysis of the conflict in Bosnia. The "ethics of
compassion with the victim legitimises the avoidance, the endless postponement, of the act.
All 'humanitarian' activity of aiding victims, all food, clothes and medicine for Bosnians, are there to
obfuscate the urgency of the act." This is certainly the view of Rony Brauman, a former president of Medecins sans Frontieres,
who has charged the international community with hiding' behind compassion in-the face of genocide.
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* Link: Helping *
Next, is liberal communism:
The affs compassionate benevolence toward the other is a
means of assuaging guilt. The plans dispensation of charity
only makes us all more comfortable and complacent in our
continual participation in the socio-economic processes that
guarantee the third worlds emiseration.
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Zizek, Prof. of Sociology at Univ. Ljubljana, 2006. [Slavoj, Nobody Has to be Vile, London Review of
Books, Vol. 28 No. 7]
Liberal communists are pragmatic; they hate a doctrinaire approach. There is no exploited
working class today, only concrete problems to be solved: starvation in Africa, the plight of Muslim
women, religious fundamentalist violence. When there is a humanitarian crisis in Africa (liberal communists
love a humanitarian crisis; it brings out the best in them), instead of engaging in anti-imperialist
rhetoric, we should get together and work out the best way of solving the problem, engage
people, governments and business in a common enterprise, start moving things instead of relying
on centralised state help, approach the crisis in a creative and unconventional way.
Liberal communists like to point out that the decision of some large international corporations to ignore apartheid rules within their companies
was as important as the direct political struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Abolishing segregation within the company, paying blacks and
whites the same salary for the same job etc: this was a perfect instance of the overlap between the struggle for political freedom and business
interests, since the same companies can now thrive in post-apartheid South Africa.
Liberal communists love May 1968. What an explosion of youthful energy and creativity! How it shattered the bureaucratic order! What an
impetus it gave to economic and social life after the political illusions dropped away! Those who were old enough were themselves protesting and
fighting on the streets: now they have changed in order to change the world, to revolutionise our lives for real. Didnt Marx say that all political
upheavals were unimportant compared to the invention of the steam engine? And would Marx not have said today: what are all the protests against
global capitalism in comparison with the internet?
liberal communists are true citizens of the world good people who worry. They worry about
populist fundamentalism and irresponsible greedy capitalist corporations . They see the deeper causes of todays problems: mass
poverty and hopelessness breed fundamentalist terror. Their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world
(and, as a by-product, make even more money). Bill Gates is already the single greatest benefactor in the
history of humanity, displaying his love for his neighbours by giving hundreds of millions of
dollars for education, the fight against hunger and malaria etc. The catch is that before you can
give all this away you have to take it (or, as the liberal communists would put it, create it). In
order to help people, the justification goes, you must have the means to do so, and experience
that is, recognition of the dismal failure of all centralised statist and collectivist approaches teaches us that private
enterprise is by far the most effective way. By regulating their business, taxing them excessively, the state is
Above all,
undermining the official goal of its own activity (to make life better for the majority, to help those in need).
Liberal communists do not want to be mere profit-machines: they want their lives to have deeper meaning. They are against old-fashioned religion
and for spirituality, for non-confessional meditation (everybody knows that Buddhism foreshadows brain science, that the power of meditation can
be measured scientifically). Their motto is social responsibility and gratitude: they are the first to admit that society has been incredibly good to
them, allowing them to deploy their talents and amass wealth, so they feel that it is their duty to give something back to society and help people.
This beneficence is what makes business success worthwhile.
This isnt an entirely new phenomenon. Remember Andrew Carnegie, who employed a private army to suppress organised labour in his
steelworks and then distributed large parts of his wealth for educational, cultural and humanitarian causes, proving that, although a man of steel,
he had a heart of gold? In the same way, todays liberal communists give away with one hand what they grabbed with the other.
There is a chocolate-flavoured laxative available on the shelves of US stores which is publicised

with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! i.e. eat more of
something that itself causes constipation. The structure of the chocolate laxative can be discerned
throughout todays ideological landscape; it is what makes a figure like Soros so objectionable.
He stands for ruthless financial exploitation combined with its counter-agent, humanitarian worry
about the catastrophic social consequences of the unbridled market economy. Soross daily
routine is a lie embodied: half of his working time is devoted to financial speculation, the other
half to humanitarian activities (financing cultural and democratic activities in post-Communist countries, writing
essays and books) which work against the effects of his own speculations. The two faces of Bill Gates are
exactly like the two faces of Soros: on the one hand, a cruel businessman, destroying or buying out competitors, aiming at a
virtual monopoly; on the other, the great philanthropist who makes a point of saying: What does it serve to have computers if
people do not have enough to eat?
According to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity:
charity is part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation.
Developed countries are constantly helping undeveloped ones (with aid, credits etc), and so
avoiding the key issue: their complicity in and responsibility for the miserable situation of the
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Third World. As for the opposition between smart and non-smart, outsourcing is the key notion. You export the
238
(necessary) dark side of production disciplined, hierarchical labour, ecological pollution to non-smart Third World locations
(or invisible ones in the First World). The ultimate liberal communist dream is to export the entire working class to invisible Third
World sweat shops.
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Link: Helping
People sacrifice themselves for the other because they
secretly enjoy their suffering, engineering it create narcissitic
satisfaction
iek, Institute for Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, 1998 [Slavoj, Why does the law need an obscene
supplement? Law and the Postmodern Mind, p. electronic]
Another key philosopher and theologian to be inserted in this series is Nicolas Malebranche, the
great Cartesian Catholic who, after his death, was excommunicated and his books destroyed on
account of his very excessive orthodoxy. In the best Pascalian tradition, Malebranche laid the
cards on the table and "revealed the secret" (the perverted truth) of Christianity: it was not that
Christ came to Earth in order to deliver people from sin, from the legacy of Adam's Fall; on the
contrary, Adam had to fall in order to enable Christ to come to earth and dispense salvation.
(Malebranche applies here to God Himself the "psychological" insight that tells us that the saintly
figure who sacrifices himself for the benefit of others, to deliver them from their misery, secretly
wants the others to suffer misery so that he will be able to help them-like the proverbial
husband who works all day for his poor crippled wife, yet would probably abandon her if she
were to regain health and turn into a successful career woman. It is much more satisfying to
sacrifice oneself for the poor victim than to enable the other to lose the status of a victim and
maybe even to become more successful than ourselves)
Malebranche develops this parallel to its conclusion, to the horror of the Jesuits who organized
his excommunication: in the same way that the saintly person merely uses the others' suffering to
bring about his own narcissistic satisfaction in helping the others in distress, God also ultimately
loves only Himself, and merely uses man to promulgate his own glory ... From this reversal,
Malebranche draws a consequence worthy of Lacan's famous turnabout of Dostoyevski ("If God
doesn't exist," the father says, "then everything is permitted. Quite evidently, a naive notion, for
we analysts know full well that if God doesn't exist, then nothing at all is permitted any
longer"):3 it is not true that, if Christ were not come to earth to deliver humanity, everybody
would be lostquite the contrary, if Christ were not to come, nobody would be lost, i.e., every
human being had to fall so that Christ could come and deliver some of them ... What further
follows from this is the paradoxical nature of predestination and grace: divine grace is
contingently disseminated, it has absolutely no correlation with our good deeds. The moment the
link between grace and our deeds were to be directly perceptible, human freedom would be lost:
God is not allowed to intervene directly in the universe, i.e., grace has to remain masked,
nonperceptible as such, as a direct divine intervention, since its direct transparency would change
man into a slavish entity subordinated to God like an animal and would deprive him of faith
grounded in free choice.4
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Link: Moral Imperative

The Affirmatives moral imperative constitutes a totalitarian
paralysis and continuity of conservative politics which replicate
your case harms.
Stavrakakis, Prof Psychoanalysis @ U Essex, 03 [Yannis , parallax, 2003, vol. 9, no. 2, 5671 Re-Activating the
Democratic Revolution: The Politics of Transformation Beyond Reoccupation and Conformism]
This brings us to the whole discussion around the ethical turn in contemporary political
philosophy. Even if one concludes that radical democracy can be a viable and fruitful project for
a politics of transformation, what about the prioritization of ethics within recent radical
democratic discourse? For example, at a fairly superficial level, it seems as if Zizek questions the
importance of ethics in this field, and thus would also seem to question the deployment of the
radical democratic attitude at the ethical level. Consider, for example, his outright condemnation
of the ethical turn in political philosophy: The return to ethics in todays political philosophy
shamefully exploits the horrors of Gulag or Holocaust as the ultimate bogey for blackmailing us
into renouncing all serious radical engagement.60 Surely, however, this cannot be a rejection of
ethics in toto. Even if only because Zizek himself has devoted a considerable part of his work
elaborating the ethics of psychoanalysis in the Lacanian tradition.61 It follows then that it must
be a particular form of ethical discourse that constitutes his target. The same is true of Alain
Badious argument, to which we will now turn. Badious target is a particular type of ethics, of
ethical ideology, which uses a discourse of human rights and humanitarianism in order to
silence alternative thought and politics and legitimize the capitalist order. This is an ethics
premised on the principle that good is what intervenes visibly against an Evil that is identifiable
a priori.62 What Badiou points to here, is what appears as a strange inversion; here the Good is
derived from the Evil and not the other way round.63 The result of such an inversion is
significant for the theory and politics of transformation: If the ethical consensus is founded on
the recognition of Evil, it follows that every effort to unite people around a positive idea of the
Good, let alone identify Man with projects of this kind, becomes in fact the real source of evil
itself. Such is the accusation so often repeated over the last fifteen years: every revolutionary
project stigmatized as utopian turns, we are told, into totalitarian nightmare. Every will to
inscribe an idea of justice or equality turns bad. Every collective will to the Good creates Evil
[] In reality, the price paid by ethics is a stodgy conservatism.64 This ethic, which is revealed
as nothing but a mindless catechism, a miserable moralism,65 is an ethics that can have no
relation to a transformative political agenda. 66 This ethics is presented in Badious argument as
a distortion of a real ethic of truths, which attempts to restore the logical priority of Good over
Evil. Badious ethic of truths is an ethics related to the idea of the event, a category central for his
whole philosophical and political apparatus. To put it briefly, the event here refers to a real break
which destabilizes a given discursive articulation, a pre-existing order.
Ethics result in conservatism and the preservation of the status

quo.
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Jackson, Dept. of English, Wayne St. Univ, 2007. [Ken, The Great Temptation of Religion: Why Badiou has been
so important to iek IJZS Vol. 1 no. 2]
The reason our attention to ethics can be considered an ideology is two-fold. First, much of the academic world and, in particular,
the academic left does not recognize its attention to the other as ethics as such and, indeed, recoils from the notion that they
are engaged in primarily ethical pursuits. They are even more horrified when presented with the notion that this ethics, our ethics,
is connected somehow to religion. We are, in short, ethically interpellated subjects that can not see our own ideological
constitution clearly. Second, as the remarks from iek quoted above suggest, our ethics actually functions in a
conservative fashion, preserving the neoliberal status quo under the guise of challenging hierarchical
power structures. As Badiou puts it, the price paid by ethics is a stodgy conservatism. The ethical conception
of man, besides the fact that its foundation is either biological (images of victims) or Western (the selfsatisfaction of the armed benefactor), prohibits every broad, positive vision of possibilities.what ethics
legitimates, is in fact the conservation by the socalled West of what it possesses (2001: 24). We respect the
other Badiou points out, but only inasmuch as that other conforms to our vision: Respect for differences, of
course? But on the condition that the different be parliamentary-democratic, pro freemarket economics, in
favour of freedom of opinion, feminism, the environment(2001: 24). For this reason Badiou
shockingly proposes that the whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other should be
purely and simply abandoned (2001: 25).
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Link: Humanitarianism
Their politics of humanitarianism does not challenge status quo
power relations but confirms them. Aid is not simply
benevolence, it is a narcissistic way of reinforcing a
relationship of dependency. Relieving (the debt/porverty/etc)
does not liberate the thid world from the tutelage of the United
States, but ironically reasserts the power differential all while
ostensibly absolving the US of responsibility for the
sociopolitical conditions of the continent.
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Zizek, Prof. of Sociology @ Univ. Ljubljana, 2004 [Slavoj, Opera, lacan.com]
the dispensation of mercy is the most efficient constituent of the exercise of power. That is to say, is the relationship
mercy is by definition dispensed as a
free and excessive act, as something that the agent of mercy is free to do or not to do - mercy under compulsion is no mercy but, at its best, a travesty of mercy? What if, at a
deeper level, the relationship is the opposite one? What if, with regard to law, we have the freedom to choose (to obey or violate it), while mercy is
obligatory, we HAVE to display it - mercy is an unnecessary excess which, as such, HAS to occur. (And does the law not always take into account this freedom of
ours, not only by punishing us for its transgression, but by providing escapes to being punished by its ambiguity and inconsistency?) Is it not that showing mercy is the
ONLY way for a Master te demonstrate his supra-legal authority? If a Master were merely to guarantee the full application of the law, of legal
As such,
between law (legal justice) and mercy really the one between necessity and choice? Is it really that one HAS to obey the law, while
regulations, he would be deprived of his authority and turn into a mere figure of knowledge, the agent of the discourse of university. (This is why even a great judge is a Master figure: he always
somehow twists the law in its application by way of interpreting it creatively.) This goes even for Stalin himself, a figure which we definitely do not associate with mercy: one should never forget
that, as the (now available) minutes of the meetings of the Politburo and Central Committee from the 1930s demonstrate, Stalin's direct interventions were as a rule those of displaying mercy.
When younger CC members, eager to prove their revolutionary fervour, demanded instant death penalty for Bukharin, Stalin always intervened and said "Patience! His guilt is not yet proven!" or
something similar. Of course this was a hypocritical attitude - Stalin was well aware that he himself generated the destructive fervour, that the younger members were eager to please him - but,
nonetheless, the appearance of mercy is necessary here.
in our late capitalist societies, this perverse logic of mercy is brought to extreme,
And, if anything,
as the ultimate expression of
the weird unity of the opposites that permeates our attitudes. Today's hedonism combines pleasure with constraint - it is no longer the old notion of the right measure between pleasure and
constraint, but a kind of pseudo-Hegelian immediate coincidence of the opposites: action and reaction should coincide, the very thing which causes damage should already be the medicine. The
ultimate example of it is arguably a chocolate laxative, available in the US, with the paradoxical injunction "Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate!", i.e., of the very thing which
causes constipation. Do we not find here a weird version of Wagner's famous "Only the spear which caused the wound can heal it" from Parsifal? And is not a negative proof of the hegemony of
this stance the fact that true unconstrained consumption (in all its main forms: drugs, free sex, smoking...) is emerging as the main danger? The fight against these dangers is one of the main
investments of today's biopolitics. Solutions are here desperately sought which would reproduce the paradox of the chocolate laxative. The main contender is safe sex - a term which makes one
appreciative of the truth of the old saying "Is having sex with a condom not like taking a shower with a raincoat on?". The ultimate goal would be here, along the lines of decaf coffee, to invent
opium without opium: no wonder marihuana is so popular among liberals who want to legalize it - it already IS a kind of opium without opium.
the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity.

Commendable as it is in itself, Bill Gates' charitable activity of gigantic proportions in no way redeems his
economic pursuits. More generally, charity is, today, part of the game as a humanitarian mask hiding the
underlying economic exploitation: in a superego-blackmail of gigantic proportions, the developed
countries are constantly helping the undeveloped (with aid, credits, etc.), thereby avoiding the key issue,
namely, their COMPLICITY in and co-responsibility for the miserable situation of the undeveloped.
And the same paradox occurs even at the military level of the "war on terror." The category of homo sacer, reactualized recently by Giorgio Agamben - those
who, according to the ancient Roman law, could have been killed with impunity and whose death was, for the same reason, without any sacrificial value -, is
best fitted to cover this newly emerging entity of the excluded, who are not only terrorists, but also those
who are on the receiving end of the humanitarian help (Ruandans, Bosnians, Afghanis...): today's homo sacer is the
privileged object of the humanitarian biopolitics - in both cases, the population is reduced to an object of
biopolitics. It is thus is absolutely crucial to supplement the usual list of today's homo sacer (les sans papiers in
France, the inhabitants of the favelas in Brasil, the African-American ghettos in the US, etc.) with the humanitarian side: perhaps, those perceived as
the receivers of humanitarian aid are THE figure of homo sacer today.
One should therefore assume the paradox that concentration camps and refugee camps for the delivery of
humanitarian aid are the two faces, "human" and "inhuman," of the same socio-logical formal matrix. This is
We encounter the same unity of opposites in the new capitalist ethics, where
another facet of the new global order: we no longer have wars in the old sense of the regulated conflict between sovereign states in which certain rules apply (the treatment of prisoners, the
prohibition of certain weapons., etc.). What remains are two types of conflicts: either struggles between groups of homo sacer, i.e. ethnic-religious conflicts which violate the rules of universal
human rights, do not count as wars proper, and call for the humanitarian pacifist intervention of the Western powers, or direct attacks on the US or other representatives of the new global order,
in which case, again, we do not have wars proper, but merely unlawful combatants resisting forces of universal order. In this second case, one cannot even imagine a neutral humanitarian
organization like the Red Cross mediating between the warring parties, organizing the exchange of prisoners, etc.: one side in the conflict (the US-dominated global force) ALREADY ASSUMES
THE ROLE OF THE RED CROSS - it does not perceive itself as one of the warring sides, but as a mediating agent of peace and global order crushing down particular rebellions and,
simultaneously, providing humanitarian aid to the local populations. This weird coincidence of the opposites reached its peak when, in April 2002, Harald Nasvik, a Right-wing member of the
Norvegian parliament, proposed George W. Bush and Tony Blair as the candidates for the Nobel peace prize, quoting their decisive role in the "war on terror" as the greatest threat to peace today the old Orwellian motto "War is Peace" finally becomes reality, so that, sometimes, military action against Taliban is almost presented as a means to guarantee the safe delivery of the humanitarian
We thus no longer have the opposition between war and humanitarian aid: the two are closely connected,
THE SAME intervention can function at two levels simultaneously: the toppling of the Taliban regime was presented as part of the
aid.
strategy to help the Afghani people oppressed by the Taliban - as Tony Blair said in September 2001, perhaps, we will have to throw more bombs on Afghanistan in order to secure the food
the ultimate image of the treatment of the local population as homo sacer is that of
the American war plane flying above Afghanistan - one is never sure what it will drop, bombs or food
parcels. War itself, the ruthless bombing destined not only to annihilate the enemy, but to produce "shock and awe," is legitimized as being in the service of mercy... It is against this
transportation and distribution. Perhaps,
historical background that we should read today Mozart's Clemenza. The entire canon of Mozart's great operas can be read as the deployment of the motif of pardon, of dispensing mercy, in all its
variations. The first two masterpieces, Idomeneo and Die Entfuehrung, still rely on the traditional absolutist-monarchic figure of the Master dispensing mercy: at the very point of the lowest
despair, when the hero heroically assumes readiness to die, to sacrifice himself for the beloved, the authority intervenes and shows mercy. Le nozze di Figaro marks the first big break: in its finale,
it is the Master himself (the Count) who, in the inversion of the normal situation, has to kneal down and ask for mercy from his wife and his subjects, and when he is pardoned by them, the
opera can conclude with the assertion of universal brotherhood. Don Giovanni introduces an additional twist: in the terrifying finale, when confronted with the Stone Guest, the hero is offered
mercy if he just renounces his sinful past and repents, but don Giovanni proudly rejects the offer, preferring eternal damnation to betraying his existential choice of seducer. The lowest point is
reached in Cosi fan tutte, the only Mozart's opera with a failed finale; however, far from condemning this failure, one should perceive it, in an Adornian way, as anh injdication of Mozart's
truthfulness - after the abyssal imbroglio of betrayals, any reconciliation of the two couples can only be a fake. With The Magic Flute, the reign of mercy is reinstalled, but with a price: the register
shifts from the grim realism of Don Giovanni and Cosi... to the artificially resuscitated fairy-tale magic
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Human rights are only attainable when life is tripped of all
contexts. Attempting to solve human rights in a great sociopolitical context only legitimizes humanitarianism that
amounts to the implicit spread of neo-liberal ideology and the
explicit military interventionism
Slavoj Zizek, No date given (Political philosopher and cultural critic) The Obscenity of Human Rights: Violence as
Symptom http://www.lacan.com/zizviol.htm
From this specific insight, one should make the move to the general level and render problematic
the very depoliticized humanitarian politics of "Human Rights" as the ideology of military
interventionism serving specific economico-political purposes. As Wendy Brown develops
apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the individual
against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic
conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power
against individuals." 3 However, the question is: "what kind of politicization /those who
intervene on behalf of human rights/ set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand
for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?"
4 Say, it is clear that the US overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in the terms of ending
the suffering of the Iraqi people, not only was motivated by other politico-economic interests
(oil), but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions that should
open up the perspective of freedom to the Iraqi people (Western liberal democracy, guarantee of
private property, the inclusion into the global market economy, etc.). The purely humanitarian
anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the implicit
prohibition of elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation.
And, at an even more general level, one should problematize the very opposition between the
universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being "as such," and
specific political rights of a citizen, member of a particular political community; in this sense,
Balibar argues for the "reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between 'man' and
'citizen'" which proceeds by "explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by
man." 5 Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendt's insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of
refugees:
The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as
such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the
first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific
relationships - except that they were still human. 6
This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben's notion of homo sacer as a human being reduced
to "bare life": in a properly Hegelian paradoxical dialectics of universal and particular, it is
precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political identity which accounts
for his determinate citizenship, that he, in one and the same move, is no longer recognized and/or
treated as human. In short, the paradox is that one is deprived of human rights precisely when one
is effectively, in one's social reality, reduced to a human being "in general," without
citizenship, profession, etc., that is to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal
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245
BEARER of "universal human rights" (which belong to me "independently of" my profession,
sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity...).
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246
Even if they win that Humanitarianism does not lead to violence directly, the Wests framing of a certain
issue as humanitarian precludes the possiblity of interving to stop structural violence like genocide,
climatic famine, or other geopolitical situations
Slavoj Zizek 2004 (Political philosopher and cultural critic) The Free World of Slums in These
Times http://www.lacan.com/zizekslums.htm
It is true one can only be shocked by the excessive indifference toward suffering, even when this
suffering is widely reported and condemned in the media. Sudan offers a current example, but
recall the three-year-long siege of Sarajevo, when the population was starving and exposed to
permanent shelling and sniper fire. The enigma here is why, although the media was continually
covering the crisis, was neither the U.N. forces, NATO nor the United States willing to impose a
corridor in Sarajevo through which people and provisions could circulate freely? The only answer
to this enigma was proposed by Rory Brauman, who, on behalf of the Red Cross, coordinated the
help to Sarajevo: The very presentation of the crisis of Sarajevo as "humanitarian," the
recasting of a political-military conflict into humanitarian terms, was sustained by a
political choice, that of taking the side of Serbia.
Because of their situation, their displacement, and their lack of political rights, the affirmative
cries, we must format a pragmatic solution to help them. History is on our side, pragmatic
humanitarian solutions fail because of the dominating structure in which rights are returned to
sender.
Slavoj Zizek 2004 (Political philosopher and cultural critic) The Free World of Slums in These
Times http://www.lacan.com/zizekslums.htm
What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to the rights of those excluded from
the political process-i.e, when they become useless, since they are the rights of those who,
precisely, have no rights? Jacques Ranciere, the French philosopher, recently gave this answer:
They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the victims of the
absolute denial of right. For all this, they are not void, Political names and political places never
become merely void. The void is filled by somebody or something else. ... If those who suffer
inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody
else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. This is what is called the
"right to humanitarian interference"-a right that some nations assume to the supposed
benefit of the victimized populations, and very often against the advice of humanitarian
organizations themselves. The "right to humanitarian interference" might be described as a
sort of "return to sender:" the disused right that had been sent to the rightless are sent
back to the senders.
Thus, in the reigning discourse of humanitarian intervention, the developed West is effectively
getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. This is also where
we should look for candidates to fill the position of "universal individual," a particular group
whose fate stands for the injustice of today's world: Palestinians, Guantnamo prisoners, etc.
Palestine today presents us with the "opportunity" of Ash's subtitle because all of the standard
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"pragmatic" solutions to the "Middle East crisis" have repeatedly failed, which suggests
that a utopian invention of a radical new space may be the only "realistic" choice.
LINK: Humanitarianism
Its a guise for yet another form of state control over our lives.
By trusting the state to save people, we give it an arena to
create a state of emergency in which to prove its
capabilities. This depoliticizes the decisions made involving
aid, as they will always err in favor of the state.
Edkins, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, 2003 [Jenny, Trauma and the
Memory of Politics, 211-212]
One reason why the tale of the concentration camp survivor is so compelling is that although it is
presented as a space of exception, the camp is nothing more than the coming to fruition of the
horror contained in everyday existence under the sway of sovereign politics in the west. Thus our
response to the camps is in part a recognition of our own predicament as participants in the
reduction of life to bare life and politics to biopolitics. As Foucault reminds us `we are all
governed and, to that extent, in solidarity'. But this is of no use if our invocation of the trope of
humanitarian crisis repeats the metaphor that reinforces the very power that produces the
humanitarian emergency in the first place. As Agamben puts it:
It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double-sided:
the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers
always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the
state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power
from which they wanted to liberate themselves.
This double-sidedness, of course, recalls Jacques Derrida's double contradictory imperative
where the question, for example, of whether and in what way to intervene in a humanitarian
emergency is a dilemma that has to be resolved in any particular instance by a decision. Aid cannot be both offered and withheld: only one course of action can take place. But to seek general
rules, applicable overall to aid organizations and their operations, is to duck the very question of
the political that is inherently involved. Agamben's work enables us to analyze what is at stake in
the politics of the decision. He elaborates how sovereign power operates through the state of
emergency and how the very posing of the question through the trope of emergency is always
already on the side of sovereignty. The implication of the argument in the final part of the chapter
is that although the power of the sovereign state over the lives of its populations has been
successfully challenged in the post-cold war period and the notion of humanitarian concern as
overriding sovereignty widely accepted, this is not a liberation or an emancipation but
merely the beginning of another and more authoritarian form of sovereign control over life.
Just as the role of the revolution in the transition to modern state rule can be seen as an ironic
strengthening of central authority, the role of humanitarian intervention can be seen as a
tightening of a global structure of authority and control.
northern]
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Cheah, Professor of Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, 1998 [Pheng, Given Culture, Cosmopolitics:
Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nations, eds. Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins, p. 314-315]
The failure of both Marxist and hybrid cosmopolitanisms to account for postcolonial nationalism as given culture should
therefore be referred back to their common theoretical source: the modern philosophical concept of culture as the realm of
freedom from the given. Indeed, Clifford's and Bhabha's privileging of migrant mobility in globalization as the
type
case of hybrid dynamism also repeats Marx's teleological view of economic
development. Like Marx, they also regard global economic processes as the
positive material condition for disrupting the givenness of naturalized national or
local ties. The difference between new hybrid and old Marxist cosmopolitanisms
is merely that the former is organized around the idea of cultural dispersal because
it does not regard globalization as leading to a unified world order. Both
cosmopolitanisms are premised on the transcendence of the given.
The nontranscendable finitude of postcolonial nationalism in
neocolonialglobalization, however, implies that a contemporary revival of
"cosmopolitanism" cannot feasibly take the form of an "-ism," the project of a
mass-based global emancipatory consciousness, no matter how strategic or compromised. Simply put, "discrepant cosmopolitanisms" do not cover the whole
picture of what is happening in neocolonial globalization. This is not just because
transnational migrancy is not identical to postcoloniality. More to the point,
although globalization creates a greater sense of belonging-to-aworld insofar as it
makes individual lives globally interdependent, it has not, thus far, resulted in a
significant sense of political allegiance or loyalty to the world. Unlike nationalism, which is
notoriously nonphilosophical, or under-intellectualized, cosmopolitanism lacks a mass base. Bodies like Amnesty International and international human-rights NGOs
are creatures of intellectuals aimed at promoting a wider

consciousness of humanity as a whole through the power of rational or affective persuasion. They attract
allegiance by working at a different level from nationalism. As I pointed out
earlier, in order to reach a wider base or to be effective at the level of state policy,
these transnational bodies usually have to work through the political morality of
the state and through popular nationalism. Especially with regard to the
postcolonial nation-state in the current neocolonial conjuncture, it is not likely that
they can displace the nation, however imperfect it is, as the object of mass-based
loyalty. In part, this may be because some of these transnational bodies are located
in and/or depend on the hegemonic North for funding and can be unwittingly used
in various ways to bypass the already-beleaguered Southern nation-state and
undermine its legitimacy.
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AT: CosmopolitanismNeoliberalism/Elitism
reject cosmopolitanismFar from being inevitable,
cosmopolitanism offer no sense of belonging to a world
community outside of the affluent west. Nationalism has its
risks and should not be uncritically embraced, but we should
not demonize the nation-state in favor of a hollow
cosmopolitanism that does not even fundamentally question
the state. Uncritical transnationalism ends up endorsing global
economic and political equality, and prevents massive global
resistance to violent neocolonialism
Cheah, Associate Professor of English at Northwestern University,1998, [Pheng,
Introduction Part II, Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nations, eds.
Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins, p. 30-35]
From a historical perspective, it is evident that the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism
has fluctuated between varying degrees of alliance and opposition and that both discourses have
progressive as well as reactionary dimensions. This shifting relationship between cosmopolitanism and
nationalism and the unpredictable content and consequences of both practical
discourses imply several things. First, it is precipitous to consider nationalism as
an outmoded form of consciousness. An existing global condition ought not to be
mistaken for an existing mass-based feeling of belonging to a world community
(cosmopolitanism) because the globality of the everyday does not necessarily
engender an existing popular global political consciousness. Ipso facto, neither
cosmopolitanism nor nationalism can be seen as the teleologically necessary and
desired normative outcome of past and present globalizing processes. Popular nationalist
movements contain exclusionary moments that can easily develop into oppressive official nationalist ideologies when these movements achieve statehood.
the staging of an international civil society of elite nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) at U.N. World Conferences can become an alibi for
economic transnationalism, which is often U.S. economic nationalism in global
guise. Through strings-attached funding to elite NGOs that take over some social services from the public sector in developing states, international aid agencies
can erode the ability of these already weakened states to implement genuine social redistribution. In the latter case, the point is to look at the
consequences of cosmopolitanist claims in a given historical situation, just as in
the first case, the point is not to demonize the state as the corrupter of the nationpeople but to account for the necessary link between decolonizing nation and state
in the current conjuncture and the built-in dangers of official nationalism.
In other words, the ethico-political work that nationalism and cosmopolitanism can do at
any given moment depends on how either formation emerges from or is inscribed
within the shifting material linkages and interconnections created by global
capitalism at a particular historical conjuncture.-The corollary to this is that although capitalism is the
condition of possibility of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism, neither
discourse can be reduced to its ideological instrument or regarded as its simple
reflection. The tightness or laxity of the hyphen between nation and state is an
important historical factor in the evaluation of the aims of nationalism and their
compatibility with normative cosmopolitanism. Hence, instead of indulging in the
complacent demystification of nationalism as "a derivative discourse" or
Conversely,
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moralistically condemning cosmopolitanism as uncommitted bourgeois
detachment, we ought to turn our critical focus to the mutating global field of
political, economic, and cultural forces in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism
are invoked as practical discourses. The cosmopolitical is an apposite term for this global force field of the political. To return to
250
the theme of this collection of essays, the question is whether the cosmopolitical today is conducive to the rise of new normative cosmopolitanisms, mass-based
emancipatory forms of global consciousness, or actually existing imagined political world communities.
postnationalism has become an increasingly popular trend. Adopting the

modes-of-production narrative that Fredric Jameson borrowed from Ernest Mandel, some argue that the deterritorialization
of space in transnational, flexible, disorganized, or late capitalism erodes the
naturalized borders of the nation, pointing to its imminent demise or, at least, to
the eventual development of an alternative spatialization of
In contemporary cultural studies,
(Continues)

(Continues)
politics. For instance, Arjun Appadurai suggests that contemporary transnational cultural flows
create a zone in which emergent global forms of cosmopolitanism are brought into
a conflictual relationship with nationalist forms of culture. Appadurai claims that the
cosmopolitanization of cultural consumptionthe widening of its horizons by
greater frequency of travel and improved media communicationshas political
repercussions because national culture is the site where oppressive politics and
culture are conjoined.19 He suggests that insofar as the state attempts to tether the
masses to it by deploying ideologies of "national belonging" and "national
culture," subnational/local uses of transnational cultural messages and
deterritorialized ideas of nationhood formed from population flows challenge the
nation-state's cultural hegemony and contribute to its crisis.20 For Appadurai, these are signs of the
dawning of a postnational, poststatist age, and they require a theoretical
vocabulary that can express "complex, non-territorial, post-national forms of
allegiance" and "capture the collective interests of many groups in translocal
solidarities, cross-border mobilisations and postnational identities."21 Otherwise,
"the incapacity of many de-territorialised groups to think their way out of the
nation-state is itself a cause of much global violence since many movements of
emancipation and identity are forced, in their struggle against existing nationstates, to embrace the very imaginary they seek to escape" (PF, 418).
Appadurai's argument is a useful example of postnationalism in cultural studies because it details its
three fundamental presuppositions. First, like Marx, the postnationalist relies on a restrictive
definition of the nation as "the ideological alibi of the territorial state" (PF, 412).
In this definition, popular nationalism involves masses who are duped by state
ideology. Second, the postnationalist subscribes to the teleological argument that
flexible capitalist accumulation tends toward a postnational age. Appadurai, for
instance, suggests that a global economy constituted by disjunctive flows offers
greater resources for undermining the oppressive nation-state. Thus, where
intellectuals participating in anticolonial liberation movements had considered the loose
hyphen between emerging nation and state in colonialism as an opportunity for a
popular renationalization of the state, the postnationalist takes the distending of
the hyphen in contemporary globalization as a sign of the disintegration of both
nation and state. Finally, the postnationalist suggests that the constraining
discourse of nationalism/statism can be transcended through acts of thought and
imagination that find sustenance in a large variety of existing transnational
movements. Grouping transnational NGOs and philanthropic movements,
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diasporic communities, refugees, and religious movements under the rubric of
actually existing "postnational social formations," Appadurai suggests that these
organizational forms are "both instances and incubators of a postnational global
order" (PF, 421) because they challenge the nation-state and provide nonviolent
institutional grounding for larger-scale political loyalties, allegiances, and group
identities. There are, however, more cogent reasons to be more cautionary about the virtues of contemporary transnationalism and less dimissive of the fu-
251
ture of the nation-state and nationalism. In the first place, transnationalism is not only a contemporary phenomenon; it has always coexisted with the state. Michael
Mann points out that European capitalism "was especially transnational in its early industrial phase, with virtually free mobility of capital and labor and with most of
its growth zones located in border or cross-border areas, like the Low Countries, Bohemia and Catalonia."22 Nor does the intensification of transnational capitalism
today undermine the utility of states. Instead, "the increasing density of global society gives states new geopolitical roles," notably in negotiations over tariffs,
communications, and environmental issues (138). Indeed, even though capitalism erodes state sovereignty, it also needs the agency of states. Capitalism, Mann
suggests, "seems to be near its state-subverting limits" and "will not further reduce the -nation-state": "Capitalist profit-taking has resulted in not quite Fredric
Jameson's 'postmodern hyperspace.' Though capitalism has reduced the social citizenship powers of the nation-state, and in association with military and geopolitical
trends it has also reduced the military sovereignty of most states, it still depends on continuous negotiations between sovereign states in a variety of ad hoc agencies"
(138-39).
The necessity of popular nationalism as an agent of ethico-political transformation

in transnationalism becomes clearer once we observe that, notwithstanding
increased transnational labor migration in the contemporary era, the
deterritorialization of peoples remains limited for reasons that are structural to the
global political economy. Samir Amin suggests that popular nationalism in the periphery is a
necessary step toward socialist cosmopolitanism because we live in an uneven
capitalist world-system that largely confines the most deprived masses of
humanity to national(Continues)

(Continues)
peripheral space. He points out that the globalization of productionliberalization of btrade and
capital flowsinvolves the global integration of commodities and capital but stops short of an unlimited integration of laborthe unrestricted opening of the centers
to labor migration from less or nonindustrialized peripheries where the bulk of capital's reserve army is located.23 Consequently, "the mobility of commodities and
capital leaves national space to embrace the whole world while the labour force [largely] remains enclosed within the national framework" (RPP, 74).
the neoliberal sermon

that the global spread of free market mechanisms will lead to generalized development and global democratization, neocolonial globalization only exacerbates
world polarization and leads to the formation of comprador states. Resource-intensive and
As long as there is no free movement of workers worldwide, the globality of capital remains truncated. Contrary to
wasteful macropolicies of economic development and market economy-led linear models espoused by international development agencies and financial institutions
like the World Bank and IMF mortgage the state to transnational capital, and state adjustment to global restructuring loosens the hyphen between nation and state.
Because the compradorized state cannot actively shape its own society and political morality, democratic national projects for social welfare in the periphery are
the state must resist structural adjustment.

But resistance is possible only if the state is made to serve the people's interests.
Thus, instead of producing large groups of deterritorialized migrant peoples who
prefigure the nation-state's demise and point to a postnational global order, uneven
globalization makes popular nationalist movements in the periphery the first step
on the long road to social redistribution.
The contrast between Amin's argument for the sociopolitical necessity of popular
nationalism in the South and postnationalism in cultural studies is even more
striking because of Amin's Marxist-internationalist bent. For Amin, the new phase of
globalization beginning in the 1970s intensifies global crisis. The negative impact
of the former phase was mainly felt as the failure of national development and the
stillbirth of genuine social democracy in the South. Contemporary globalization, however, clashes
with national interests in the center. The rise of an autonomous global economy
through heightened forms of financial and technological transnationalization is not
matched by the emergence of supranational social and political mechanisms for
regulating accumulation.24 Even as the historic role of the nation-state as a framework for economic management is eroded in the new
phase of globalization, existing forms of social and political power remain based on national realities. Amin points out that the US and Japan are
not merely geographical areas of a world economy that is under construction.
either killed off or handicapped from the start. For social redistribution to occur,
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Stefan Bauschard
They are and will remain national economies, with a state that ensures the
continuance of national structures while grabbing the lion's share of world
trade. . . . These national options remain decisive at such levels as: spending on
research, development, and labour force retraining; de facto protection of
agriculture; mineral and oil resource development; and even manufacturing and
financial ma anagement. (EC, 46)Consequently, the increasing interpenetration of national productive systems at the center
"destroys the effectiveness of traditional national policies and delivers the overall
system to the dictates and errors of the constraint of the world market, which
cannot be regulated as there are no genuinely supranational political institutions,
or even a political and social consciousness that really accepts this new demand of
capitalism" (RPP, 211).
Amin's internationalist solution to global crisis is emphatically not post-nationalist
because it begins from and revolves around the success of popular nationalist
movements in the periphery. Only an international political and social
consciousness can equitably regulate the uneven global economy. But in the initial
instance, popular nationalisms, whatever their shortcomings, are needed to save
the state from capitulation to the demands of trans-nationalization. They alone can
renationalize the state and allow it to gain control over accumulation: "The system
of real existing capitalism being first and foremost a system condemned to
perpetuate, reproduce and deepen world polarization, the revolt of the peoples of
the periphery against the fate that had beeaordained for them constitutes the
central axis of the recomposition of the internationalism of the peoples" (SM, 137). As
was the case with decolonizing nationalisms, this proposed alliance between
nationalism and cosmopolitanism also grows out of a situation where the hyphen
between nation and state needs to be strengthened because global neocolonialism
has unmoored the state from its nation. Amin's example is the comprador state in
Africa, but his general argument can be extended to describe people's diplomacy in the Philippines, the popular mobilization in support of Sukarnoputri in
252
Indonesia, and so on.
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253
AT: CosmopolitanismElitism
Cosmopolitanism is an elite outlook that flattens out lived
human existence and cannot serve as a base for progressive
grassroots change
The necessity and even urgency of a cosmopolitical frame of analysis is not in
question here. The problem is not whether there is material interconnection on a global scale, whether more women
and men of discrepant class and cultural backgrounds are transnationally mobile and inhabit competing worlds. The
world is undoubtedly interconnected, and transnational mobility is clearly on the
rise. However, one should not automatically take this to imply that popular forms
of cosmopolitanism already exist. Whether this mobility and interconnectedness
give rise to meaningful cosmopolitanisms in the robust sense of pluralized worldpolitical communities is an entirely separate issue. Anthony Smith, for instance, suggests that a
mass-based
global loyalty is anthropologically impossible:
A timeless global culture answers to no living needs and conjures no memories. If
memory is central to
identity, we can discern no global identity-inthe-making, nor aspirations for one,
nor any collective amnesia to replace existing "deep" cultures with a cosmopolitan
"flat" culture. The latter remains a dream confined to some intellectuals. It strikes
no chord among the vast masses of peoples divided into their habitual
communities of class, gender, region, religion and culture. Images, identities,
cultures, all express the plurality and particularism of histories and their
remoteness from . . . any vision of a cosmopolitan global order.25 But even if a popular
global consciousness exists, is it or can it be sufficiently institutionalized to be a feasible political alternative to the nationstateform? Or is it merely a cultural consciousness without political effectivity? The
uneven force field of the

cosmopolitical has produced and will continue to produce inspiring examples of
politically oriented cosmopolitanisms: Amnesty International, Mdecins sans
Frontires, the Asian PacificPeople's Environmental Network based in Penang,
Malaysia, for example.Mainly articulated by intellectuals and activists in both
North and South, these cosmopolitanisms deserve support and admiration.
However, it is questionable whether these cosmopolitanisms are mass based, even though
they initiate or participate in grassroots activities. Even grassroots feminist NGOs do not represent "all women." Moreover ,
it is unclear how these cosmopolitan activities are related to transnational
underclass migrant communities. For instance, over and above interventions on
behalf of underprivileged migrant minority groups on an ad hoc basis, to what
extent can activist cosmopolitanisms take root in the latter in a consistent manner
to generate a genuinely pluralized mass-based global political community within
the Northern constitutional nation-state as distinguished from the defensive
identity politics of ethnic, religious, or hybrid minority constituencies? Can these
cosmopolitanisms be embedded in a global community in the South forged from transnational media networks? This leads
to the most difficult question of all: In an uneven neocolonial world, how can struggles for multicultural recognition in
constitutional-democratic states in the North be brought into a global alliance with postcolonial activism in the periphery?
The realizability of a global civil society or an international public sphere capable

of representing/mediating the needs and desires of humanity's radically different
constituencies through cross-identifications stands or falls here.
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254
AT: CosmopolitanismElitism
Radical cosmopolitanism as a new global subjectivity is a
western, academic perspective which ignores the fact that
millions of victims of neocolonial violence do not have the
privilege of non-national mobility or identity
But perhaps it is asking too much from these hybrid cosmopolitanisms to expect them to respond to the precarious necessity
of postcolonial nationalism in neocolonial globalization. For is it not obvious, from the start, that the paradigm for these
radical cosmopolitanisms is not really decolonized space but the metropolitan scenario of migrancy and mobility?
Notwithstanding Bhabha's copious sermonizing about postcoloniality, the
occluded model for hybridity

turns out to be the migrant "minority" subject who subverts metropolitan national
space: "colonials, postcolonials, migrants, minoritieswandering peoples who
will not be contained within the Heim of the national culture . . . but are
themselves the marks of the shifting boundary that alienates the frontiers of the
modern nation" (LC, 164; emphasis added). I should not, of course, be understood as dismissing the pain and
suffering of migrants, political refugees, and exiles. However, my point is that they do not represent the
whole picture of contemporary globalization. For even when Bhabha makes the rare reference to
transnational capitalism, the focus is not on the exploitation of labor in free trade zones in the South, but instead on migrant
workers who move to wealthier territory. "Transnational
capitalism and the impoverishment of

the Third World certainly create the chains of circumstance that incarcerate the
Salvadorean and the Filipino/a. In their cultural passage, hither and thither, as
migrant workers, part of the massive economic and political diaspora of the
modern world, they embody . . . that moment blasted out of the continuum of history" (LC, 8; emphasis added).
Indeed, we discover that in essence, hybrid cultural agency consists of physical freedom from
being tied to the earth. Such freedom is the phenomenal analogue and material
condition of possibility for endless hybrid self-creation and autonomy from the
given: "There is a return to the performance of identity as iteration, the re-creation
of the self in the world of travel" (LC, 9). This is why Bhabha is not interested in those who do not migrate,
those who cannot migrate and for whom coerced economic migration would be a plus, or in the vicissitudes of
uneven economic development in the postcolonial South. Indeed, he cannot even
be said to be very interested in those who leave the South temporarily, in order to
return, or in the repatriation of funds by migrant workers to feed their kin in the
Third World. In Bhabha's world, postcoloniality is the hybridity of metropolitan
migrancy. Everything happens as if there are no postcolonials left in decolonized
space. With the onset of decolonization, all the former colonial hybrids have become postcolonials. And it seems that to keep their hybrid powers and status intact, they
have had to depart for the metropolis, following on the heels of their former
colonizers, to torment them and enact moral retribution by subverting their
cultural identity.
It is, therefore, at least tendentious to personify linguistic freedom and hybrid
cultural flux in the diasporic subject and to celebrate these forms of
-cosmopolitanisrn, at--the--expense- of nationalism, as the most progressive form
of postcolonial transformative agency in contemporary globalization. Indeed, even
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255
though Bhabha allegedly considers subalternity, his "postcolonial perspective" is devoid of any analytic specificity, because
hybrid freedom is an abstract theory of marginality general enough to accommodate experiences as diverse as slavery,
diaspora, ethnic/racial minority experiences in constitutional democracies, and

queer sexuality, as well as subaltern resistance. This general postcolonial
perspective effaces the unbridgeable divide between the migrant literary critic in
the metropolis and the subaltern in de-colonizing space. It elevates the time-lagdiagnosing postcolonial critic into the best resistant hybrid who is able to grasp the
condition of possibility of resistance before it is realized in experience. My point here is
that Bhabha's picture of contemporary globalization is virulently postnational because he The Culture-Concept
in Philosophical Modernity and Given Culture in Global Neocolonialism pays
scant attention to those postcolonials for whom postnationalism through mobility
is not an alternative.
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256
AT: CosmopolitanismNation-State Good

Radical cosmopolitanism fails as a politics of resistance to the
violence of nations and global capital. Theyre politics
sacrifices those who cannot migrate nationally or ideologically
to the whims of neocolonial global capitalism, and inherently
fail to provide a mass based politics. We must affirm the postcolonial nation-state, even if only provisionally
My position on hybridity theory can be summed up as follows. First, as a
paradigm of postcolonial agency in globalization, hybridity is a closet idealism. It
is an anthropologistic culturalism, a theory of resistance that reduces the complex
givenness of material reality to its symbolic dimensions and underplays the
material institution of neocolonial oppression at a global-systemic level. Second,
as a new internationalism or cosmopolitanism, it is feasible only to the extent that
it remains confined to metropolitan migrancy and forecloses the necessity of the
postcolonial nation-state as a precarious agent that defends against neocolonial
global capitalist accumulation. Third, there is a fundamental link between this new
cosmopolitanism and cultural-ism. Hybrid cosmopolitanisms can ignore the
necessity of the nation-state precisely because they regard cultural agency as
unmoored from, or relatively independent of, the field of material forces that
engenders culture.26 They privilege migrancy as the most radical form of
transformative agency in contemporary globalization because, for them, it is the
phenomenal analogue of hybrid freedom from the given. As Bhabha puts it, "The great
connective narratives of capitalism and class drive the engines of social reproduction, but do not, in themselves, provide a
fundamental framework for thosemodes of cultural identification and political affect that form around issues of the
lifeworld of refugees or migrants" (LC, 6).
However, as purported analyses of globalization, these accounts of trans-formative

agency and cosmopolitanism sadly miss the mark. For although the meaning and
symbols of neocolonial culture are unmotivated, their materialization through
economic and political institutional structures in an unequal global order means
that they cannot be translated, reinscribed, and read anew in the ways suggested
by theories of hybridity. For thoroughgoing global transformation to occur, some
recourse to the ambivalent agency of the postcolonial nation-state and, therefore,
to nationalism and national culture seems crucial even as we acknowledge that this
agency is not autarchical but inscribed within a global force field. Clifford is not entirely
unaware of this, since he notes that he has not gone far enough in reconceiving practices of dwelling in a transnational
context (TC, 115). My
point is that in the current conjuncture, such practices of

dwelling, if they are to be mass based, necessarily engender a national
consciousness rather than a cosmopolitanism, no matter how "discrepant." To
comprehend the possibility of the national-in-the-cosmopoliticaland I use this
awkward phrase to indicate a condition of globality that, in the current
conjuncture, is short of a mass-based cosmopolitan consciousnesswe need to
understand postcolonial national culture in terms other than as an immutable
organic substrate or as an ideological form imposed from above, a constraint to be
transcended by the formation of an emancipatory cosmopolitan consciousness.
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257

The affirmatives vision of global cosmopolitan loyalty is just
that: a vision. There is no basis in globalization today to form
transnational solidarity, especially ones that can overcome the
hijacking of postcolonial states by neocolonial capitalism.
Affirming that nation-state against cosmopolitanism is
dangerous, but necessary. There is no alternative
The aporia, however, is that in the current conjuncture, nationalism cannot be transcended by cosmopolitan forms of
solidarity no matter how pathological it may appear in its ineradicably oppressive moments. First,
transnational
networks are, in and of themselves, neither mass based nor firmly politically
institutionalized. Proponents of a global civil society or an international public sphere that already exists
independent of nation-states must gloss over the fact that we inhabit a decentralized political system
in which global loyalty is thin, an ideal vision largely confined to activists and
intellectuals.43 This means that in order to be effective at the level of political institutions or the popular masses,
transnational networks have to work with and through the nation-state in order to
transform it. They have to negotiate directly with the state in the hope of
influencing its political morality and/or mobilize local support into popular
national movements that press against the state. As Alexander Colas observes, the nationstate is both a constraining factor and an emancipatory potential in its relation to
global networks. Global networks are subject to the same constraining social and historical forces that shape other
social actors, but "the nation-state is not necessarily at odds with the emancipatory
aspirations of cosmopolitanism... [and] cosmopolitan political action would
actually involve the defense of social and political rights via the democratic
nation-state."44
Second, the necessity of the nation-state as a terminal that progressive global-local
networks must pass through is especially salient in the postcolonial South, where
economic poverty is the root cause of economic, social, and political oppression.
Although foreign capital-led market growth and development may alleviate
poverty when actively regulated by strong host governments to serve official
national interests, such as in high-growth Southeast Asia, high economic growth
cannot lead to social development or gender equity unless the existing inequitable
sociopolitical-economic structures within these nation-states are overhauled. Indeed,
high growth may provide greater legitimation to authoritarian regimes, as in the case of Singapore. In the worst-case
scenario, as in some African nations, we have the development of underdevelopment that produces the Fourth World. The
point is that in the absence of a world-state capable of ensuring an equitable international political and economic order, economic globalization is uneven. Instead
of engendering an emancipatory cosmopolitan consciousness, globalization
produces a polarized world in which bourgeois national development and
industrialization in the periphery are necessarily frustrated by state adjustment to
the dictates of transnational Capital. To alleviate the shortfalls of global
restructuring in the South, the state needs to be an autonomous agent of economic
accumulation. But the state can resist capitulation to trans-national forces only if it
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is transformed from a comprador regime into a popular national-state. This is why
popular rearticulations of postcolonial national identity are ethically imperative and
cannot be dismissed per se as statist ideologies that hinder the rise of a more
equitable cosmopolitan consciousness, even though the exclusionary dimension of popular nationalism
258
can always be manipulated by state elites and captured by official nationalism.
Contemporary revivals of postcolonial nationalism that are primarily instances of

negative identification in defense against neocolonial globalization should
therefore be seen as weak repetitions of the earlier phase of negative identification
in decolonization that initially united the people into a nation. This ambivalent
necessity of postcolonial nationalism deforms the concept
(Continues)

(Continues)
of cultural agency at the heart of old and new cosmopolitanisms. In Marx's version of the
culture-concept of philosophical modernity, economic forces of production constitute an autotelic realm of necessity that
points beyond itself to a realm of human freedom from the given the
proletarian world community

based on, but sublating, the realm of necessity. The urgency of postcolonial
nationalism in contemporary globalization, however, refutes Marx's economistic
assumption that transnational forces of production necessarily lead to transnational
movements that engender mass-based loyalty to a transnational body or a popular
global consciousness.
In his critique of orthodox Marxist cosmopolitanism, Samir Amin points out that peripheralization and the
North-South conflict are the two truths of really existing capitalism. He argues that
socialist revolution is not possible in the current conjuncture because "the
expansion of capitalism in the periphery . . . ruins the chances of national
crystallization and accentuates the fragmentation and atomization of society."46
Consequently, he suggests that there is "no real alternative to popular national transformation in
the societies of the periphery" (SM, 124) and that African and Asian popular
nationalist-socialism are inheritors of the true vocation of Marxism.47 In his vision of a
polycentric world, Amin rejects the orthodox Marxistcosmopolitanist idea of the
withering away of the state because strong post-colonial states, and hence popular
nationalism, are crucial to resist recompradorization (SM, 127).
Put another way, postcolonial nationalism is the irreducible stuttering that the permanent
threat of peripheralization introduces into the dialectic of global socialism.
Therefore, contrary to neo-Marxist critiques of postcolonial nationalism such as Partha
Chatterjee's and Ranajit Guha's, postcolonial nationalism is not necessarily an ideology imposed from above, a "forced resolution . . . of the
contradiction between capital and the people-nation."48 Postcolonial

nationalism is not a contradiction that we can and ought to transcend in the name
of a cosmopolitanism, because it does not obey the logic of dialectical
contradiction. Both medicine and poison, postcolonial nationalism is a doubleedged stricture that, instead of being transcended, is made necessary by
neocolonial globalization. By pulling us back from a cosmopolitical realm of
freedom into nationalism as given culture, globalization problematizes the Marxist
understanding of the given as something we can transcend through normative
human action.

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259
Some form of nationalism is necessary to create a political

community for third world countries whose destinys have been
appropriated by first world economic institutionstheir
cosmopolitan ideal is northern radical chic, devoid of
democratic politics
Transnational mobility notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether transnational migrant communities can be characterized as examples of cosmopolitanism in the robust
It is
unclear how many of these migrants feel that they belong to a world. Nor has it
been ascertained whether this purported feeling of belonging to a world is
analytically distinguishable from long-distance, absentee national feeling.26
Second, the argument that transnational print and media networks extend a world
community beyond transnational migrancy to include peoples dwelling in the
South has to reckon with the banal fact that many in the South are illiterate and/or
do not have access to televisions or other hardware capable of receiving CNN and
Rupert Murdoch's Asia-based Star TV. Finally, if we recall that the nation is a
mass-based imagined political community, it is unclear whether in the current
interstate system, the so-called international public sphere or global civil society
(names for mass-based global political communities) formed by transnational networks can achieve social redistribution on a global scale if it does not go through
the institutional agency of the nation-state.27 Especially in the postcolonial South, relying
on the state as an agent for social development involves changing its political
morality, more often than not by a counterofficial popular nationalism and electoral education.
As long as the state is mortgaged to global capital and unmoored from its nation-people,
talk of social democracy in the South is meaningless. If transnational networks can
be politically effective only by working through popular nationalism, then it may
be more appropriate to describe such activity as nationalisms operating in a
cosmopolitical force field rather than mass-based cosmopolitanisms (see my contribution to this
normative sense even after we have acknowledged that this normative dimension is necessarily diluted or compromised by historical contextualization.
volume). This would also allow us to exercise due caution toward the World Bank's cosmopolitan rhetoric: its utilization of the concept of international civil society
to bypass the beleaguered sovereignty of Southern states and dictate adjustment according to the imperatives of global restructuring. In her essay in this volume,
Gayatri Spivak calls the non-Eurocentric ecological movement and the women's movement against population control and reproductive engineering "globe-girdling
The
point is that in the cosmopolitical today, even activist cosmopolitanisms are in a
conflictual embrace with the popular nationalisms that are imperative in the
postcolonial South. These popular nationalisms cannot afford to refuse the
resources and gifts of aid offered by transnational networks. However, given their
irreducible inscription within the material linkages of global capital, these giving
cosmopolitanisms can also unintentionally undermine popular attempts to
renationalize the cornpradorized state. Global justice involves an interminable
navigation through the uneven and shifting force field of the cosmopolitical that
engenders and circumscribes nationalisms and activist cosmpolitanisms alike. As the
vigorous and sometimes heated debates in this collection indicate, the tension between nationalism and
cosmopolitanism is far from being resolved. The contributors cannot pretend to possess the key to cosmopolitical
transformation, to know the way out of uneven neocolonial globalization. However, their individual essays at least begin to
broach the most pressing political topic of our time with the intellectual rigor and
theoretical clarity that it requires and deserves. These interdisciplinary essays
exemplify in themselves the extensive reach of the topic. They bear witness to the
movements" and emphatically distinguishes them from both the international civil society of elite NGOs and the postnationalism of "Northern radical chic."
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fact that nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and the cosmopolitical are formed from
the complicated intertwinings of culture, politics, and economics, and that we can
conceptualize these phenomena adequately only by working in the volatile zone
where ethical philosophy, political theory, cultural anthropology, social theory,
critical theory, and cultural studies intersect.
260

nationalism is resistance to global inequality that is the
ongoing legacy of colonialismit is key to a just economic
order
In macrosociological terms, postcolonial national identity formation is in part a response to
neocolonial economic globalization.38 The uneven accumulation of capital and
distribution of wealth and resources on a global scale exacerbates the unequal
distribution of political power and economic resources within decolonised
countries. At the same time, globalization is accompanied by the spread of a
political culture that historically emerged in the West: human rights, women's
rights, equality, democratization, and so on. This intersection of cultural change
and economic decline leads to resentment and resistance on the part of
disadvantaged groups who may use "cultural resources to mobilize and organize
opposition . . . even though a motivation and cause of opposition is economic and
social disadvantage" (IP, 8). Political elites may also draw on "tradition" or "intrinsic cultural values" to justify
their actions and maintain hegemony, sometimes overemphasizing cultural issues such as religion, morality, cultural
imperialism, and women's appearance to divert attention from economic failures
and social inequality. As Moghadam notes with regard to Islamic reassertions:
"Culture, religion, and identity are thus both defense mechanisms and the means
by which the new order is to be shaped. Islamist movements appear to be archaic
but in fact combine modern and premodern discourses, means of communication
and even political institutions[, and] . . . must therefore be seen as both reactive
and proactive"
It would be precipitous to dismiss all postcolonial national-cultural re-assertions as
fanaticist pathologies or statist ideologies. In the first place, they are not necessarily religious or
confined to Islamic Middle Eastern states with economies weakened by the falling
price of oil. Reassertions of national-cultural identity occur in most postcolonial states, ranging from weak
neocolonial African states to the high-performing newly industrializing economies of East and Southeast Asia. The
seemingly undivided stand by Asian governments in rejecting intervention by Northern states over human rights issues at
the Vienna Convention on the basis of cultural differences is in small part a collective assertion of postcolonial national
sovereignty in response to the history of colonialism and the inequality of contemporary North-South relations.39 Hence
Islamic fundamentalist nationalism ought tobe analyzed alongside the Confucian

chauvinism championed by the Singaporean government as the basis of the East
Asian path of global capitalist development as cases of postcolonial nationalism in
the New World Order. Moreover, these cultural reassertions are not necessarily
ideological constructions of state elites, because they also express the needs of
disadvantaged social groups in changing economic conditions. Although nongovernmental
organizations from the South concerned with human rights have rejected the position of Asian states on human rights, they
have also been careful to distinguish their criticisms of their own governments from the position of Northern governments
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261
by asserting the need to respect cultural differences and the urgency of establishing an equitable international economic
order and interstate system.
The resistance to global forces promised by contemporary rearticulations of

postcolonial national culture is, however, severely curtailed by the fact that they arise in response to
economic processes and can be manipulated by state elites in the indirect service of post-Fordist global capital. We
know that, in part, decolonization failed because it involved the devolution of state
power to local and regional actors who used this power to attract investment and
expand production within a transnational economic system of surplus extraction.
Similarly, much contemporary official postcolonial nationalist ideology is aimed at fostering social cohesion to attract
foreign direct investment and providing cheap female labor for multinational-owned industries in free trade zones.
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262
HUMAN RIGHTS LINK

Human rights are only attainable when life is stripped of all
contexts. Attempting to solve human rights in a great sociopolitical context only legitimizes humanitarianism that
amounts to the implicit spread of neo-liberal ideology and the
explicit military interventionism
Slavoj Zizek, No date given (Political philosopher and cultural critic) The Obscenity of Human
Rights: Violence as Symptom http://www.lacan.com/zizviol.htm
From this specific insight, one should make the move to the general level and render problematic
the very depoliticized humanitarian politics of "Human Rights" as the ideology of military
interventionism serving specific economico-political purposes. As Wendy Brown develops
apropos Michael Ignatieff, such humanitarianism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics a pure defense of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the individual
against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of culture, state, war, ethnic
conflict, tribalism, patriarchy, and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power
against individuals." 3 However, the question is: "what kind of politicization /those who
intervene on behalf of human rights/ set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand
for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?"
4 Say, it is clear that the US overthrowing of Saddam Hussein, legitimized in the terms of ending
the suffering of the Iraqi people, not only was motivated by other politico-economic interests
(oil), but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions that should
open up the perspective of freedom to the Iraqi people (Western liberal democracy, guarantee of
private property, the inclusion into the global market economy, etc.). The purely humanitarian
anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the implicit
prohibition of elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation.
And, at an even more general level, one should problematize the very opposition between the
universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being "as such," and
specific political rights of a citizen, member of a particular political community; in this sense,
Balibar argues for the "reversal of the historical and theoretical relationship between 'man' and
'citizen'" which proceeds by "explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by
man." 5 Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendt's insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of
refugees:
The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as
such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the
first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific
relationships - except that they were still human. 6
This line, of course, leads straight to Agamben's notion of homo sacer as a human being reduced
to "bare life": in a properly Hegelian paradoxical dialectics of universal and particular, it is
precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political identity which accounts
for his determinate citizenship, that he, in one and the same move, is no longer recognized and/or
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263
treated as human. In short, the paradox is that one is deprived of human rights precisely when one
is effectively, in one's social reality, reduced to a human being "in general," without
citizenship, profession, etc., that is to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal
BEARER of "universal human rights" (which belong to me "independently of" my profession,
sex, citizenship, religion, ethnic identity...).
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264
** Con Right to Protect (R2P) Bad

***
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265
Right to Protect Undermines American Leadership

An unconditional R2P obligation destroys US sovereignty,
draining the military
R2p kill us sovereignty, causes overstretch
Groves 8
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-un-responsibility-toprotect-doctrine
Steven Groves works to protect and preserve American sovereignty, self-governance and
independence as leader of The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Project. Groves, who is the
Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in Heritages Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, also advocates American leadership on issues involving international political and
religious freedom, human rights and democratic institutions. He has testified before Congress on
international law, human rights, the United Nations and controversial treaties such as the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 2013,
Groves was awarded the Dr. W. Glenn and Rita Campbell Award for his work. The award is given
annually to the Heritage employee who delivered an outstanding contribution to the analysis and
promotion of a free society. Before joining Heritage in 2007, Groves was senior counsel to thenSen. Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) on the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
He played a lead role in the subcommittee's investigation of the U.N. "oil-for-food" scandal, the
most extensive congressional probe ever conducted of the United Nations. Groves previously was
an associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, specializing in commercial litigation. Before that
he served as assistant attorney general for the State of Florida, where he litigated civil rights
cases, constitutional law issues and criminal appeals, among other matters, in state and federal
court. Groves is a frequent guest commentator on domestic and international television and radio.
He has appeared on ABC, BBC, CNBC, CNN and CNN International, Fox News Channel,
National Public Radio, Voice of America, NHK, Al Jazeera, Alhurra and the Canadian
Broadcasting Corp. His commentary and opinion pieces have been published by journals such as
National Review, The Weekly Standard and Human Events, as well as by The Washington Times
and other major newspapers across America. Groves holds a law degree from Ohio Northern
University's College of Law and a bachelor of arts degree in history from Florida State
University.
If wholly accepted as official U.S. policy, the R2P doctrine would greatly expand U.S. obligations
to prevent acts of genocide around the world. More important, adoption of R2P would effectively
cede U.S. national sovereignty and decision-making power over key components of national
security and foreign policy and subject them to the whims of the international community. The
U.S. government, as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (the Genocide Convention), is currently obligated to prevent acts of genocide that
occur within U.S. territory.[29] The Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987 (the
Proxmire Act), the legislation implementing the Genocide Convention, was signed into law by
President Ronald Reagan in 1988.[30] The Proxmire Act defined the crime of genocide as an act
committed "with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group." The new law even criminalized the act of inciting another person to
commit an act of genocide.[31] Importantly, U.S. enforcement of these criminal offenses was
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limited to acts committed in the United States.[32] However, adoption of the R2P norm would
obligate the United States to prevent all acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes even if
they occur outside of the U.S. Such an obligation would impose unique responsibilities. As the
world's preeminent military force, the United States would have to bear a disproportionate share of
the R2P international commitment. In the event that acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing occur,
the vast majority of nations in the international community could reasonably plead military
inferiority on each such occasion, leaving the United States to bear the brunt of any intervention.
Most members of the international community could also plead poverty, again leaving the United
States to fund the intervention. Even if the intervention is funded through the United Nations
system, the United States would still pay an unequal share of the cost.[33]
The doctrinal dominance of r2p wrecks Americas global

leadership BOTH structurally AND perceptually. Foreign policy
must shift back to SELF-INTEREST
Kaplan 8/1/13
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-tragedy-us-foreign-policy-8810
Robert D. Kaplan is a foreign correspondent for The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Center for a
New American Security in Washington and a member of the Pentagons Defense Policy Board.
His most recent book is Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (Random
House, 2010).
The 1990s were full of calls for humanitarian intervention: in Rwanda, which tragically went
unheeded; and in Bosnia and Kosovo where interventions, while belated, were by and large
successful. Free from the realpolitik necessities of the Cold War, humanitarians have in the past
two decades tried to reduce foreign policy to an aspect of genocide prevention. Indeed, the Nazi
Holocaust is only one lifetime removed from our owna nanosecond in human historyand so
postCold War foreign policy now rightly exists in the shadow of it. The codified upshot has been
R2P: the Responsibility to Protect, the mantra of humanitarians. But American foreign policy
cannot merely be defined by R2P and Never Again! Statesmen can only rarely be concerned with
humanitarian interventions and protecting human rights to the exclusion of other considerations.
The United States, like any nationbut especially because it is a great powersimply has
interests that do not always cohere with its values. That is tragic, but it is a tragedy that has to be
embraced and accepted. What are those overriding interests? The United States, as the dominant
power in the Western Hemisphere, must always prevent any other power from becoming equally
dominant in the Eastern Hemisphere. Moreover, as a liberal maritime power, the United States
must seek to protect the sea lines of communication that enable world trade. It must also seek to
protect both treaty and de facto allies, and especially their access to hydrocarbons. These are all
interests that, while not necessarily contradictory to human rights, simply do not operate in the
same category. Because the United States is a liberal power, its interestseven when they are not
directly concerned with human rightsare generally moral. But they are only secondarily moral.
For seeking to adjust the balance of power in ones favor has been throughout history an amoral
enterprise pursued by both liberal and illiberal powers. Nevertheless, when a liberal power like
the United States pursues such a goal in the service of preventing war
among major states , it is acting morally in the highest sense . A telling
example of this tensionone that gets to the heart of why Never Again! and R2P cannot always
be the operative words in statesmanshipwas recently provided by the foreign-affairs expert
Leslie H. Gelb. Gelb noted that after Saddam Hussein had gassed close to seven thousand Kurds
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to death in northern Iraq in 1988, even a truly ethical secretary of state, George Shultz,
committed a moral outrage. For Shultz basically ignored the incident and continued supporting
Saddam in his war against Iran, because weakening Irannot protecting the citizens of Iraq
was the primary American interest at the time. So was Shultz acting immorally? Not completely,
I believe. Shultz was operating under a different morality than the one normally applied by
humanitarians. His was a public morality; not a private one. He and the rest of the Reagan
administration had a responsibility to the hundreds of millions of Americans under their charge.
And while these millions were fellow countrymen, they were more crucially voters and citizens,
essentially strangers who did not know Shultz or Reagan personally, but who had entrusted the
two men with their interests. And the American publics interest clearly dictated that of the two
states, Iran and Iraq, Iran at the time constituted the greater threat. In protecting the public
interest of even a liberal power, a statesman cannot always be nice; or humane. I am talking here
of a morality of public outcomes, rather than one of private intentions. By supporting Iraq, the
Reagan administration succeeded in preventing Iran in the last years of the Cold War from
becoming a regional hegemon. That was an outcome convenient to U.S. interests, even if the
morality of the affair was ambiguous, given that Iraqs regime was at the time the more brutal of
the two. In seeking good outcomes, policymakers are usually guided by constraints: a realistic
awareness of what, for instance, the United States should and should not do, given its finite
resources. After all, the United States had hundreds of thousands of troops tied down in Europe
and Northeast Asia during the Cold War, and thus had to contain Iran through the use of a proxy,
Saddams Iraq. That was not entirely cynical: it was an intelligent use of limited assets in the
context of a worldwide geopolitical struggle. The problem with a foreign policy driven foremost
by Never Again! is that it ignores limits and the availability of resources. World War II had the
secondary, moral effect of saving what was left of European Jewry. Its primary goal and effect
was to restore the European and Asian balance of power in a manner tolerable to the United
Statessomething that the Nazis and the Japanese fascists had overturned. Of course, the Soviet
Union wrested control of Eastern Europe for nearly half a century following the war. But again,
limited resources necessitated an American alliance with the mass-murderer Stalin against the
mass-murderer Hitler. It is because of such awful choices and attendant compromisesin which
morality intertwines with amoralitythat humanitarians will frequently be disappointed with the
foreign policy of even the most heroic administrations. World War II certainly involved many
hideous compromises and even mistakes on President Franklin D. Roosevelts part. He got into
the war in Europe very late, he did not bomb the rail tracks leading to the concentration camps,
he might have been more aggressive with the Soviets on the question of Eastern Europe. But as
someone representing the interests of the millions of strangers who had and had not voted for
him, his aim was to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in a manner that cost the fewest
American soldiers lives, and utilized the least amount of national resources. Saving the remnants
of European Jewry was a moral consequence of his actions, but his methods contained tactical
concessions that had fundamental amoral elements. Abraham Lincoln, for his part, brought mass
suffering upon southern civilians in the last phase of the Civil War in order to decisively defeat
the South. The total war waged by generals William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant
was evidence of that. Simply put, there are actions of state that are the right things to do, even if
they cannot be defined in terms of conventional morality. Amoral goals, properly applied, do have
moral effects. Indeed, in more recent times, President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state,
Henry Kissinger, rushed arms to Israel following a surprise attack by Arab armies in the fall of
1973. The two men essentially told the American defense establishment that supporting Israel in
its hour of need was the right thing to do, because it was necessary to send an unambiguous
message of resolve to the Soviets and their Arab allies at a critical stage in the Cold War. Had
they justified the arms transfers purely in terms of helping embattled post-Holocaust Jewry
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rather than in terms of power politics as they didit would have made for a much weaker
argument in Washington, where officials rightly had American interests at heart more than Israeli
ones. George McGovern was possibly a more ethical man than either Nixon or Kissinger. But had
he been elected president in 1972, would he have acted so wisely and so decisively during the
1973 Middle East war? The fact is, individual perfection, as Machiavelli knew, is not necessarily
synonymous with public virtue. Then there is the case of Deng Xiaoping. Deng approved the
brutal suppression of students at Beijings Tiananmen Square in 1989. For that he is not respected
among humanitarians in the West. But the consolidation of Communist Party control that
followed the clampdown allowed for Dengs methodical, market-oriented reforms to continue for
a generation in China. Perhaps never before in recorded economic history have so many people
seen such a dramatic rise in living standards, with an attendant rise in personal (if not political)
freedoms in so short a time frame. Thus, Deng might be considered both a brutal Communist and
the greatest man of the twentieth century. The morality of his life is complex. The Bosnia and
Kosovo interventions of 1995 and 1999 are frequently held out as evidence that the United States
is most effective when it acts according to its humanitarian valuesnever mind its amoral
interests. But those who make that argument neglect to mention that the two successful
interventions were eased by the fact that America operated in the Balkans with the balance-ofpower strongly in its favor. Russia in the 1990s was weak and chaotic under Boris Yeltsins
incompetent rule, and thus temporarily less able to challenge the United States in a region where
historically the czars and commissars had exerted considerable sway. However, Russia, even in
the 1990s, still exerted considerable sway in the Caucasus, and thus a Western response to halt
ethnic cleansing there during the same decade was not even considered. More broadly, the 1990s
allowed for ground interventions in the Balkans because the international climate was relatively
benign: China was only just beginning its naval expansion (endangering our Pacific allies) and
September 11 still lay in the future. Truly, beyond many a moral response lies a question of
power that cannot be explained wholly in terms of morality. Thus , to raise morality as a
sole arbiter is ultimately not to be serious about foreign policy. R2P must
play as large a role as realistically possible in the affairs of state. But it cannot ultimately
dominate . Syria is the current and best example of this. U.S. power is capable of many things,
yet putting a complex and war-torn Islamic societys house in order is not one of them. In this
respect, our tragic experience in Iraq is indeed relevant. Quick fixes like a no-fly zone and arming
the rebels may topple Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but that might only make President Barack
Obama culpable in midwifing to power a Sunni-Jihadist regime, even as ethnic cleansing of alAssads Alawites commences. At least at this late juncture, without significant numbers of
Western boots on the ground for a significant periodsomething for which there is little public
supportthe likelihood of a better, more stable regime emerging in Damascus is highly
questionable. Frankly, there are just no easy answers here, especially as the pro-Western regime
in Jordan is threatened by continued Syrian violence. R2P applied in 2011 in Syria might actually
have yielded a better strategic result: it will remain an unknowable. Because moralists in these
matters are always driven by righteous passion, whenever you disagree with them, you are by
definition immoral and deserve no quarter; whereas realists, precisely because they are used to
conflict, are less likely to overreact to it. Realists know that passion and wise policy rarely flow
together. (The late diplomat Richard Holbrooke was a stunning exception to this rule.) Realists
adhere to the belief of the mid-twentieth-century University of Chicago political scientist, Hans
Morgenthau, who wrote that one must work with the base forces of human
nature, not against them . Thus, realists accept the human material at hand in any
given place, however imperfect that material may be. To wit, you cant go around toppling
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regimes just because you dont like them. Realism, adds Morgenthau, appeals to historical
precedent rather than to abstract principles [of justice] and aims at the realization of the lesser
evil rather than of the absolute good. No group of people internalized such tragic realizations
better than Republican presidents during the Cold War. Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon,
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush all practiced amorality, realism, restraint and humility in
foreign affairs (if not all the time). It is their sensibility that should guide us now. Eisenhower
represented a pragmatic compromise within the Republican Party between isolationists and rabid
anti-Communists. All of these men supported repressive, undemocratic regimes in the third world
in support of a favorable balance of power against the Soviet Union. Nixon accepted the
altogether brutal regimes in the Soviet Union and Red China as legitimate, even as he balanced
one against the other. Reagan spoke the Wilsonian language of moral rearmament, even as he
awarded the key levers of bureaucratic power to realists like Caspar Weinberger, George Shultz
and Frank Carlucci, whose effect regarding policy was to temper Reagans rhetoric. The elder
Bush did not break relations with China after the Tiananmen uprising; nor did he immediately
pledge support for Lithuania, after that brave little country declared its independencefor fear of
antagonizing the Soviet military. It was caution and restraint on Bushs part that helped bring the
Cold War to a largely peacefuland, therefore, moralconclusion. In some of these policies, the
difference between amorality and morality was, to paraphrase Joseph Conrad in Lord Jim, no
more than the thickness of a sheet of paper. And that is precisely the point: foreign policy at its
best is subtle, innovative, contradictory, and truly bold only on occasion, aware as its most
disciplined practitioners are of the limits of American power . That is heartrending, simply because
calls to alleviate suffering will in too many instances go unanswered. For the essence of tragedy
is not the triumph of evil over good, so much as the triumph of one good over another that causes
suffering.
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University.
Operational Flexibility vs. Precautionary Principles. Even if surrendering control of America's
armed forces to the will of the world community were acceptable, the U.S. military could
not operate effectively under the R2P doctrine.
Once committed to a military operation with all of its attendant risks, U.S. armed forces must be
allowed the operational freedom to create the conditions to succeed. However, the R2P doctrine
espouses a "proportional means" limitation to the rules of engagement that would likely hinder
the success of a military intervention. Specifically, the ICISS report suggests that the "scale,
duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to
secure the humanitarian objective in question."[51] In other words, any intervening armed force
may act only to end genocidal acts and ethnic cleansing -- and go no further. However, a combat
environment is rarely so predictable. Some situations would require the total destruction of the
forces perpetrating the genocide or the overthrow of the government providing command and
control. Yet the ICISS report states that "[t]he effect on the political system of the country
targeted should be limited...to what is strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
intervention."[52] Several instances of genocide and ethnic cleansing in recent history have
occurred with the complicity and active involvement of a national government and its armed
forces. It is unrealistic to mandate that a military intervention limit its effect on the political
system and its leadership while stopping genocidal crimes. It is likewise nave to believe that
government forces that are complicit in genocidal acts would cease and desist from committing
atrocities after a military intervention has ended and the intervening troops are withdrawn. In
addition, the R2P doctrine demands that "all the rules of international humanitarian law should be
strictly observed" in the event of a military intervention.[53] There is, however, widespread debate
over certain crucial aspects of that law. For example, there are major differences of opinion
regarding the classification, treatment, confinement, and trial of certain classes of enemy
combatants. The use of certain weapons, such as cluster bombs and land mines, is also disputed.
The R2P's requirement of strict observance of the law of armed conflict is therefore
unachievable because there is broad disagreement on what "strict observance" would entail.
Adoption of r2p crushes US hegemony without improving

security
Holmes 11
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibility-to-protect
Kim R. Holmes, a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, oversaw the think tanks
defense and foreign policy team for more than two decades. Holmes was Heritages vice
president for foreign and defense policy studies and director of the Davis Institute for
International Studies from 1991 through 2012 except for his service, during most of the first term
of President George W. Bush, as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs.
Holmes priority is writing a book, due in fall 2013, in which he hopes to lay out a compelling
vision for Americas future by uniting Heritages domestic and foreign policy ideas. Few people
bring greater clarity and historical wisdom to thorny issues than Kim Holmes, Heritage
President Edwin J. Feulner said in announcing the new role on Dec. 5, 2012. Holmes previously
directed Heritage's team of foreign and defense policy experts in four centers on the front lines of
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international affairs: the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, the Asian
Studies Center, the Center for International Trade and Economics and the Margaret Thatcher
Center for Freedom. Davis also includes the Washington Roundtable for the Asia-Pacific Press
(WRAPP). Holmes joined Heritage in 1985 and rose to vice president in 1991. He was a
founding editor of the annual Index of Economic Freedom, which has become a signature
Heritage publication. He led the think tanks efforts to convince the United States to withdraw
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He launched Heritages widely respected homeland
security program after September 11, as well as its program on international trade, and expanded
the missile defense program to what it is today. Holmes left Heritage in late 2001 to serve as an
assistant secretary of state. After rejoining the think tank in 2005, he authored the book Liberty's
Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century. Recognized around the globe as one of
Washingtons foremost foreign and defense policy experts, Holmes is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations, where he formerly served on the Washington Advisory Committee.
Previous appointments include the Defense Policy Board, which is the U.S. defense secretarys
primary resource for expert outside advice; the Board of Directors of the Center for International
Private Enterprise; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing
policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international
organizations. Important goals achieved at that time included the U.N. mandates enabling Iraq to
make the transition to democracy; the Security Council's first binding nonproliferation resolution;
the U.N.'s first mandate requiring the Office of Internal Oversight Services to release reports to
member states; an international outcry over Libya's assuming chairmanship of the Commission
on Human Rights, which culminated in that body's refashioning; and establishment of the U.N.
Democracy Caucus and U.N. Democracy Fund. Holmes earned his doctoral and masters degrees
in history from Georgetown University. He received a bachelors degree in history from the
University of Central Florida in Orlando. He was a research fellow at the Institute for European
History in Germany and adjunct professor of European security and history at Georgetown
University
What are these objectives?
First, to undermine the idea that force should be used only to protect national security. Advocates
argue that protecting civilians is the only just cause for using force. Defending our allies from
attack or even launching military interventions overseas to take out terrorist bases would, under
this definition, be illegitimate. The second objective is to elevate the Security Council as the
only body that can legitimately authorize the use of force by any nation, including the U.S. This
has obvious implications for the U.S. Constitution, which recognizes the war-making powers only
of the President and the Congress. Our nation has the bulk of the worlds military forces. This
doctrine would constrain us from using force for our own protection (except
for very obvious invasions). Worse, it leaves our forces on the hook to intervene overseas at the
behest of the Security Council, at our expense. It relegates our military to the status of U.N.mandated world police force. This makes no sense in terms of U.S. national security or in terms of
the U.N. Charter. Article 51 of the Charter affirms that nations can use military force for selfdefense. The Charter also says that when force is used for other purposes, it must do so to counter
international threats and restore international peace. And it says nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. In other words, internal abuses by states are no
excuse to intervene. Advocates of the responsibility to protect may find this provision
inconvenient, heartless or even illegitimate. But thats what the Charter says. As envisioned by
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many of its supporters, this doctrine violates the U.N. Charter. The Security Council has pecked
away at national sovereignty for years, justifying arms embargoes, no-fly zones and sanctions.
But it has recently become far more willing to ignore this Charter restriction in response to
perceived threats to civilian security. Before dismissing the slippery slope argument that the
Security Council will someday claim exclusive jurisdiction over the use of force, remember how
far we have drifted away from the original purposes of the U.N. Charter. Responsibility to
protect is pure sophistry, riddled with contradictions. In reality, it is a cynical attempt to assert
external decision-making powers over the use of U.S. military force. By trying to change the rules,
advocates hope to delegitimize Americas traditional use of force to defend itself and its allies and
to put that decision in the hands of an international body that includes France , Russia and
China. Its easy to see why Russia and China would want the U.N. to control U.S. decisions to use
military force. Its not at all clear why a U.S. president would want that.
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R2P Bad: Sovereignty

Accepting r2p destroys us sovereignty
Groves 8
University.
While genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities will always be incompatible with American
values, the McCain and Clinton statements raise the issue of whether preventing genocide and
ethnic cleansing would necessarily constitute a vital U.S. national interest. In some situations,
acts of large-scale ethnic cleansing in some remote nation may indeed affect U.S. national
interests. However, the real question is whether or not the United States should obligate itself
through an international compact to use its military forces as the rest of the world sees fit in cases
of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Accepting such an obligation would arguably empower other
nations to judge whether U.S. national interests or national values are at stake. That begs the
question of who will decide whether the United States must commit its limited resources -including its military forces -- to prevent atrocities occurring in a foreign land. The R2P doctrine
is designed to take decision making on these crucial issues out of the hands of the U nited States and
place it in the hands of the international community, operating through the United Nations. If the
United States consented to such a doctrine, it would effectively surrender its authority to exercise
an essential , sovereign power. First Principles and National Sovereignty The United States
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must not surrender its independence and sovereignty cavalierly. The Founding Fathers and
subsequent generations of Americans paid a high price to achieve America's sovereignty and
secure the unalienable rights of U.S. citizens. The government formed by the Founders to
safeguard American independence and protect individual rights derives its powers from the
consent of the governed, not from any other nation or group of nations.[42] Having achieved its
independence by fighting a costly war, America's Founders approached permanent alliances and
foreign entanglements with a fair degree of skepticism. President George Washington, in his 1796
farewell address, favored extending America's commercial relations with other nations but
warned against extensive political connections.[43] Washington well understood that legitimate
governments are formed only through gaining the consent of the people. He therefore placed a
high value on the independence that the United States had achieved and was rightfully dubious
about involvement in European intrigues. Integral to national sovereignty is the right to make
authoritative decisions on foreign policy and national resources, particularly the use of the nation's
military forces. Many of the reasons why America fought the War of Independence against Great
Britain revolved around Britain's taxation of the American people without their consent and its
practice of "declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases
whatsoever."[44] Once America gained control of its revenue, natural resources, and industry and
had formed a government separate and apart from any other, the Founders would not have
compromised or delegated its prerogatives to any other nation or group of nations. Washington
rightly warned his countrymen to "steer clear" of such foreign influence and instead to rely on
"temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."[45] The R2P doctrine strikes at
the heart of the Founders' notion of national sovereignty. The Founders would have
deplored the idea that the United States would cede control -- any control -- of its armed forces to
the caprice of the world community without the consent of the American people. Washington
stated that the decision to go to war is a key element of national sovereignty that should be
exercised at the discretion of the American government: Our detached and distant situation
invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient
government, the period is not far off...when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.[46] The U.S. interest, guided by justice and exercised with the consent
of the American people, must remain the standard for making decisions of war and peace. The
interest of the international community, which is guided by its own collective notion of justice
and without the consent of the American people, should not serve as America's barometer,
especially when placing the lives of U.S. military men and women in jeopardy.[47] The United
States cannot rely on world opinion, as expressed through an emerging international norm such as
R2P, to set the proper criteria for the use of U.S. military force. The commitment to use force
must be made exclusively by the U.S. government acting as an independent, sovereign nation
based on its own criteria for military intervention.[48] In sum, the R2P doctrine does not
harmonize with the first principles of the United States. Adopting a doctrine that binds the United
States to scores of other nations and dictates how it must act to prevent atrocities is the very sort
of foreign entanglement against which Washington warned us. The United States would betray the
Founding Fathers' achievement of independence and sovereignty if it wholly acceded to the R2P
doctrine.
Actively rejecting r2p crucial to maintain sovereignty

Groves 8
274
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University.
Protecting American Sovereignty
Given the recognition of the responsibility to protect doctrine in the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, as well as the continuing efforts by certain actors in the international
community to promote and operationalize R2P, the United States should clarify its position on its
national sovereignty and the criteria for the use of its armed forces.
To that end, the United States should:
Maintain its current official position, as set forth in Ambassador Bolton's letter regarding the
2005 World Summit Outcome Document, that the R2P doctrine does not create a binding legal
obligation on the United States to intervene in another nation for any purpose.
Affirm that the United States need not seek authorization from the U.N. Security Council, the
U.N. General Assembly, the international community, or any other international organization to
use its military forces to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other atrocities occurring
in another country.
Base its decisions to intervene in the affairs of other nations -- including punitive economic,
diplomatic, political, and military measures -- on U.S. national interests, not on criteria set forth
by the R2P doctrine or any other international "test."
Scrutinize ongoing efforts by certain actors within the international community to
operationalize and otherwise promote the R2P doctrine in the United States, the United Nations,
the international NGO community, and other international forums.
Reject the notion thatthe R2P doctrine is an established international norm.
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Conclusion
The United States should take no comfort from the fact that, as a party to the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, it has committed itself only to being "prepared to take collective action" to
end atrocities or that the ICISS report represents the obligation to prevent atrocities as a mere
"responsibility." R2P advocates are attempting to achieve worldwide consensus that the
international community has an obligation to intervene, with military force if necessary, in
another country to prevent acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. R2P
proponents may not be satisfied with anything less than a multilateral treaty -- a United Nations
Convention on the Responsibility to Protect -- that creates binding legal obligations on its
signatories.
The United States should therefore continue to treat the responsibility to protect doctrine with
grave skepticism. The independence won by the Founders and defended by subsequent
generations of Americans should not be squandered, but rather should be safeguarded from
furtive encroachments by the international community.
Only by maintaining a monopoly on the deployment of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions,
political coercion, and military forces will the United States preserve its national sovereignty.
Acceding to a set of criteria such as those set forth by the R2P doctrine would be a dangerous and
unnecessary step toward bolstering the authority of the United Nations and the international
community and would compromise the consent of the American people.
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A2: R2P Expands Sovereignty

Defense of r2p misdefine sovereignty the redefinition still
erodes it
Gay 7/23/13
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-deceptive-appeal-the-responsibility-protect-8764
John Allen Gay is an assistant managing editor at The National Interest. His book (co-authored
with Geoffrey Kemp) War with Iran: Political, Military, and Economic Consequences was
released by Rowman and Littlefield in early 2013, The National Interest, July 23, The Deceptive
Appeal of the Responsibility to Protect, DOA: 12-7-14
The third pillar is where the rub is. The notion that the international community has an obligation
to become involved in a country under certain circumstances, regardless of what its government
says, appears to erode national sovereignty. Albright and Williamson charge that this is a
misperceptionin fact, they say, R2P is designed to reinforce, not undermine, national
sovereignty. It places primary emphasis on the duty of states to protect their own people and its
complementary focus on helping governments improve their capacities to fulfill their
commitments. In other words, R2P expands the concept of sovereigntysovereignty includes not
only rights, but also responsibilities, responsibilities which states should help each other fulfill.
Sovereignty here is so sacrosanct that states failing to exercise it fully lose their title to itOnly
when a government fails or refuses to live up to the responsibility of sovereignty does it run the
risk of outside intervention. Yet this is a curious way to construe sovereignty . Sovereignty becomes
not merely an empirical fact about states that is prudently respected, but a right entrusted from on
high; given that the right passes to the international community when abused, it would seem this
sovereignty sees the world as a federation. International institutionstreated in the report as the
final authorities on third-pillar actionsgraciously devolve their responsibilities to local viceroys
and governors-general, whom it may relieve of their duties if their failures are severe enough.
Its not really sovereignty, thenits mere administrative convenience.
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A2: R2P Doesnt kill Sovereignty - its Preventive

Even if its prevention, the doctrine still kills sovereignty
Gay 7/23/13
Albright and Williamson might reply that all these worries repeat the error of assuming that R2P
is mainly about its third pillar, when in fact R2P is at its core an instrument of prevention. It does
not mandate military action by the United States or others. The idea is to generate preventive
diplomacy, increased development aid, sanctions, and other tools to avoid the military options
that might be necessary when prevention fails and atrocities commence. The second pillar, for
them, bears the most weight. et the way Albright and Williamson envision this pillar working
is also a threat to sovereignty . They imply this in the Politico op-ed they released to
plug the report, as they note that Syria today presents us with a stark reminder of the high
human costs of equivocation. As Assad began to turn state organs into his own tool of repression,
R2Ps preventive underpinnings were rightfully called into question ... Indeed. No preventive
action could have kept Assad from turning the states institutions into tools of repression while also
respecting Syrian sovereignty, because Assads rule was already repressive. As in most
autocracies, the government could not become less repressive without endangering its continued
hold on power. Assad was thus likely to regard the second-pillar efforts that would have been
necessary to stabilize prewar Syria as a threat, and to refuse them. (Indeed, other autocracies,
such as Russia and Egypt, have similarly refused such help.) So should these second-pillar
measures be conducted over a governments objections? If not, theyll often be insufficient; if so,
sovereignty is further eroded. Yet Albright and Williamson pass over this problem in silence.
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A2: Safeguards Protect Sovereignty

R2P safeguards AUGMENT erosion of sovereignty
Menon 6/12/13
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2013/06/12/its-fatally-flawed/
Rajan Menon is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science, City College of New
York/City University of New York, and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
R2Ps originators anticipated that any prescription perceived as proposing lax criteria for the use
of force would be dead on arrival, so the ICISS report and follow-on publications of its ilk have
bowed before the shrine of sovereignty. They affirm that the obligation to protect people rests in
the first instance with the governments that have jurisdiction over them, but they add that when a
state cannot or will not protect human rights, the responsibility shifts to the international
community, which means, ideally, the UN girded with Security Council authorization, or in a
pinch regional organizations if they promise subsequently to seek UNSCR approval. R2P
proponents take pains to explain that the concept is not a pretext for military intervention. Force,
Gareth Evans tirelessly reiterates, should be used only during human rights emergencies and only
following the failure of diplomacy, mediation, naming and shaming, and sanctions. Even then, he
stresses, feasibility, risks, proportionality and the prospects for success must be weighed. (There
is more than a dollop of just war theory in R2P; Augustine and Aquinas would be proud.) R2Ps
expositors also recommend various preventive measures: early-warning mechanisms, pre-crisis
mediation, peacekeeping, economic assistance and post-conflict reconstruction.2 Yet the
reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not placated critics, for several
reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing remedies and add nothing to
diplomacys toolkit. Whats new is the casuistry of reframing and diminishing sovereignty
in order to legitimize altruistic armed intervention in defense of the abstract rights that most
political communities agree upon in theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on feasibility and the chances
for success, weak states are its most likely proving grounds; powerful ones need not fear, no matter
the magnitude of their misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably intertwined, with
the latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides powerful states one script for playing
the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their interests, and another for eschewing or
opposing aid when it doesnt.
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A2: N/U Sovereignty is Down Now

Aff is unique sovereignty is strong HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION is the ONLY cause
Chirstensen 3/2/12
http://notesonliberty.com/2012/03/02/bizarre-love-triangle-towards-a-new-internationalism/
Brandon Christensen (follow him on Twitter) received his B.A. in cultural anthropology from
UCLA in 2013, where he also minored in Middle Eastern and African studies. His writings have
been featured in the Freeman and at RealClearHistory. He was born in the middle of Utah, raised
in a small Northern California town, and spent two years attending a community college in Santa
Cruz before moving to Los Angeles. He is interested in pre-colonial polities, property rights,
ethnicity, and international trade.
Perhaps, but I strongly disagree with Dr. Larisons observations here. Not with the notion that
weaker states have selfish interests too, but rather with the argument that state sovereignty has
been eroding precipitously over the past twenty years. To the isolationist, free trade and
international governance (including military alliances) are necessarily bad things for a state and
its sovereignty, because these concepts are perceived to be taking away from the ability of a state
to make decisions in its own interests. Yet the major powers and, to a lesser extent, the regional
powers of the world are largely able to do what they want in terms of formulating domestic and
foreign policies. Just think of the recent attempt by Brazil and Turkey to get Iran to play nice with
its nuclear technology. With the exception of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weak
states of the world and their predation by major powers seems only to be occurring along
peripheries of the major powers territories, specifically in the region of the world traditionally
under Russian influence. And even these predatory practices of the Russian state are largely
aimed at defending Moscows peripheries from the incursions into region by the American state.
So I would look at the situation of weak states outside the peripheries of great powers not as a
steady erosion of state sovereignty, but as the last stage of colonization by Europeans a century
ago. The weakness in these states was inherent from the beginning, as they were largely
constructed to extract resources for shipment to European industry and to ensure that recently
conquered non-Western rivals, whether monarchies, confederations, city-states, or empires,
remained conquered once and for all. In order for a state to have sovereignty, it needs to be
recognized by its own people as legitimate, and not by major powers (though it certainly helps!),
and the structure of weak states, at least outside the peripheries of major powers, is illegitimate in
the eyes of most the people living within these states. Dr. Larison continues: If there is one thing
more misguided than organizing foreign policy around humanitarian and democratist meddling
in the affairs of other nations, it has to be the revival of the liberal nationalist conceit that there
should be an independent nation-state for every group that wants one. Hardly. The
Wilsonian notions of humanitarian intervention and democratic nationbuilding are easily the most misguided ideals being espoused throughout Washington today, and
the fact that some of the idealists over at Foreign Policy have latched onto liberal nationalism as a
way to promote their misguided policies should not deter us from the fact that the United States
has not pursued nor promoted liberal nationalism in its foreign policy since Wilsons disastrous
meddling in Europe over (nearly) a century ago. Let us be clear: the NATO excursions into the
Balkans had nothing to do with promoting liberal nationalism, and everything to do with
humanitarian intervention, democratic state-building, and geostrategic maneuvering. The military
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excursions into Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, and God knows where else over the past twenty
years have nothing to do with the concept of liberal nationalism and everything to do with
humanitarian intervention, democratic state-building, and/or geostrategic maneuvering. Liberal
nationalism, as it is promoted by the idealists, is extremely new on the scene in D.C. and is
probably just one of the many, many fads that swing through the capital and are used to apply
humanitarian intervention and democratic state-building to foreign policy proposals.
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Sovereignty Impact
Global adoption of R2P causes great power wars denial of
sovereignty.
Trombly 11
Dan Trombly, GWU IR Grad Student, 8-27-2011 The upending of sovereignty
http://slouchingcolumbia.wordpress.com/2011/08/27/the-upending-of-sovereignty/
The second dangerous element is that on the international scale, the potential for
creating serious enmity among the great powers. The importance of consensus belies the
reality of how consensus is formed , not by automatic recognition but by a careful
negotiation of interests and calculation of threats. Yet the more we choose, falsely, to
view R2P as simply a norm which automatically initiates a series of actions to enforce
itself, the more tension we are likely to provoke when this imagined process hits against
the friction of world politics as they actually are. While I have predicted that military limitations
by US allies in power projection and the increasing ability of countries to deny the US ability to
unilaterally project power itself will make the implementation of R2P unlikely beyond Africa or certain
parts of the Middle East, even the attempts to apply it in the backyard of China or Russia could seriously
destabilize the international system. For the US to seek to implement a norm which in theory
only a UNSC veto prevents from being employed against China in that countrys
backyard would be a serious escalation of tensions and in utter denial of the type of
sovereign, qualified space China is seeking to create in its own neighborhood . R2P is not
a plot by great powers. But it is a radical denial of the historic purpose of sovereignty, which was not to
protect societies from foreign states, but to protect society from itself. But rather than empowering a
global society, it will empower the great powers of the international system , along with
those societies whose appeals suit their perceived interests. It is built on a fundamentally
untenable illusion of consensus among great powers which will not endure a crisis in a
more strategically meaningful area of the world. Should activists succeed in convincing great
powers that societies of affected states can legitimize the actions of intervening states, and jus ad bello
trump the need for the impossible-to-enforce consensus, the results will seriously challenge the
basis of amicable great power relations in the first place.
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R2O Increase War Moral Hazard (Syria/Iran)

R2P incentivizes war deal-making it rules out compromise.
Specifically drives Assad and militias
Gay 7/23/13
The R2P concept of sovereignty can also give bad actors like Assad perverse incentives . A
case in point is threats to bring those behind atrocities before international courtsthreats made
in Albright and Williamsons report. Assad is hardly more likely to seek peace and step down if he
thinks that might see him brought before the International Criminal Court and thrown in prison
for decades. Such a risk is all the more reason to hang on desperately and to keep
inflicting horrors on his people. Second-pillar actions, too, could make him more troublesome. If
the international community insists that states accept outside efforts to change their politics,
autocracies will have incentives to resist the international community ; those within autocratic
regimes who benefit from their positions have incentives to spoil the deal. And the resistance
can be quite destructive, endangering international stability and even causing atrocities. Irans
support for terrorist groups and sectarian militias throughout the Middle East
may be driven in part by this dynamic .
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R2P Increases War Moral Hazard

Moral hazard blocks negotiated solutions
Beaumont 5/4/13
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene
Peter Beaumont writes on foreign affairs for the Guardian and Observer. He has reported
extensively from conflict zones including Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East, and has
reported widely on human rights issues and the impact of conflict on civilians. The winner of the
George Orwell Prize for his reports from Iraq he is the author of The Secret Life of War: Journeys
Through Modern Conflict
Jennifer Walsh, professor of international relations at Oxford University who has studied the
development of R2P, agrees with Evans's analysis. But she also identifies a "moral hazard"
inherent in R2P that it can create a perception in conflicts that a rebel force may be only a
regime-sponsored atrocity away from international interveners coming to its aid. The incentive
for rebels to find a negotiated solution is thus reduced.
Serbia proves moral hazard

Menon 6/12/13
Those who start wars are often confident that they know how they will end. They are just as often
proved wrong. Idealistic humanitarian interveners, a sub-species of such hubristic planners,
congratulate themselves on their high-mindedness, which leads most of them to assume that if no
self-interested motives attach to their intentions, then no self-interested consequences can emerge
from them. Of course this is absurd. One result of NATOs (eventual) decision to strike Bosnian
Serb forces in 1995, very popular among the soon-to-be-hatched R2P brood, was to alter the
political balance within the Kosovar Albanian opposition. The Dayton deal skirted Kosovo,
confirming most Kosovars belief that the world couldnt care less about their plight. The new
context helped the KLA but, as already noted, shaped the ferocity of its tactics. In response, Serb
forces mounted a major counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the multiplication of Western calls
to do something had the perverse effect of inducing Slobodan Milosevic to ramp up the killings
and expulsions. Once NATO started bombing, Milosevic moved even faster and more ruthlessly
to quash the KLA, but NATO still limited itself to airpower and restricted pilots to safe altitudes.
The result? In less than three months after NATO began bombing, Serbian troops killed some
10,000 people in Kosovo and drove another 1.4 million from their homes. The shallowness of the
alliances commitment to humanitarian principles was revealed when it chose to conduct a
campaign that would produce minimal, ideally zero, casualties for its own soldiers, no matter the
horrendous consequences for the people it had intervened to protect. NATOs defenders say that it
did not do the killing and expelling, that Milosevic was responsible and that he would have done
what he did anyway. Yes, the Serbian leadership unquestionably bears responsibility; yes,
atrocities occurred before NATO acted; but there can be no doubt that the scale and duration of
Serbian atrocities owed much to NATOs intervention. The self-exculpatory claim that what
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happened would have happened is unpersuasive. It is also worth noting in passing what the
Kosovar victory enableda set of concerns almost universally ignored in Western accounts of
the war. NATO defended the intervention as a response to killings and ethnic cleansing, but after
the war Albanians killed many Serb civilians and forced thousands of Serbs and Roma from their
homes even as NATO troops (organized as KFOR) were moving in to secure Kosovo. The KLA
maintained detention centers in Albania where several hundreds of Serbs and other minorities,
plus Albanians suspected of complicity with the Serb authorities, were held. Some were tortured,
others killedin some cases after their organs were removed for sale by Albanian criminal
networks.6 High-ranking KLA officials participated in some of these activities. Before the war, in
those parts of Kosovo not controlled by Serb forces, criminal clans, again involving KLA leaders,
seized industries, natural resources and property, foreshadowing the massive corruption and
criminality that mark Kosovo today. None of this ever excited much passion in Brussels or
Washington; nor were European governments welcoming toward refugees fleeing Kosovo. Their
focus was on Serb atrocities. The KLA, which had gained in stature partly because the United
States and Europe embraced it as a war partner and as the legitimate representative of Kosovar
resistance, got a pass. In humanitarian interventions Manichean world of artificial passion plays,
there are no shades of gray. Unintended consequences are either ignored or blamed on others.
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Moral Hazard: Secessionism

R2P sparks global secessionism through moral hazard
Janik 13
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist Movements: On
the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6, 2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed),
Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2013). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the University of
Vienna. After completing his studies in law and political science at the University of Vienna and
the Universidad Alcala de Henares (Madrid) , he has worked inter alia as a research assistant in
the project International Law through the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at
the University of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well as at
the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his postgraduate LL.M.
degree in international law
The historical and political roots of such secessionist struggles will be briefly outlined in the next
section, which is followed by a short overview on the legal framework regarding secessionist
claims. After having discussed the extent to which law has a say in this subject matter and the
possibility of secession as a remedial , ultima ratio right under extraordinary circumstances,
the following part will then proceed to demonstrate that secession is increasingly gaining factual
and legal importance in light of the increasing tendency to deal with intra-state conflicts on the
international plane instead of treating these as essentially domestic matters. The last step in this
development has been the emergence of the concept of the Reponsibility to Protect
which essentially enshrines the duty of states to protect their respective populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and also de lege ferenda obligations
upon the international community to act once a state is unable or unwilling to protect its
population from such acts or even carrying out these serious human rights violations itself. As
will be shown however, this concept does not only have positive effects but may also constitute an
incentive for secessionist movements to actively provoke the government they are
fighting to react in a manner that might force the international community to step up with at least
some kind of international support on their behalf. Here, one needs to bear in mind that such
support might decisively shift the balance of power towards the otherwise clearly disadvantaged
secessionist group. This incentive is further fostered by the fact that massive state retaliation may
also provide the basis for the above-mentioned right to remedial secession , thereby also
influencing the international community in its subsequent assessment of the pressing issue of
recognition. Assuming that such a nexus of the Responsibility to Protect and the right to remedial
secession indeed exists, the international community could thus often unknowingly and
unintentionally become the midwife of new states. That would call for a fundamental reconceptualization either of the attitude towards secessionism or that towards intervention on
humanitarian grounds; this point will be addressed in the last part, which will be followed by a
conclusion.
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Secession: A2: Alternative Causality

R2P is the CRUCIAL determinant of global secessionism
Janik 13
Janik, Ralph R. A., The Responsibility to Protect as an Impetus for Secessionist Movements: On
the Necessity to Re-Think Territorial Integrity (December 6, 2013). Matthias Kettemann (ed),
Grenzen im Vlkerrecht (Jan Sramek Verlag, 2013). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364478
Ralph Janik is research assistant of Prof. August Reinisch and lecturer at the University of
Vienna. After completing his studies in law and political science at the University of Vienna and
the Universidad Alcala de Henares (Madrid) , he has worked inter alia as a research assistant in
the project International Law through the National Prism: The Impact of Judicial Dialogue at
the University of Vienna, Section for International Law and International Relations , as well as at
the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam, where he also obtained his postgraduate LL.M.
degree in international law
It is all too likely that, due to the change in attitude towards intervention in civil wars,
often fought over secessionist demands, as well as regarding recognition of thereby possibly
emerging states, such conflicts are here to stay and may well increase in the future. This would
particularly but not exclusively affect countries composed by many ( easily ) separable groups
living in more or less distinct territories without sharing any sense of community or even
solidarity. The possibility of a doubled moral hazard caused by the interplay of remedial secession
and the prospect of outside intervention is thus of crucial significance for the future
of the international legal order. Yet, this effect in general and regarding
secession in particular has largely remained ignored both by practitioners and theorists.
Rather, scholars usually seem reluctant to voice fundamental criticism in connection with the
advances in connection with the use of force on humanitarian grounds, especially upon
authorization by the Security Council, in fear of being seen as advocates of oppressive regimes.
At the same time, states seem to avoid or simply not consider the possibility of this very issue in
their shortterm pursuance of strategic goals, while they are keen on avoiding the creation of any
precedence at all costs and regardless of the facts. In the case of Kosovo for instance, the
intervening countries simply emphasized that the conflict was not an issue of an attempt to
secession but a humanitarian catastrophe that had made the use of force necessary to stop and
prevent a regime from gross human rights abuses. 107 Nanda, Self-Determination, 279. 108
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Secession Spills Over

Secession linked globally spills over
Larison 11
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-wages-of-kosovo-and-south-sudan/
Daniel Larison is a senior editor at TAC, where he also keeps a solo blog. He has been published
in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, Orthodox Life, Front Porch
Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and is a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD
in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Dallas.
This is always very easy for others with nothing at stake to say. Sudans break-up doesnt threaten
the rest of Africa until it provides the precedent in other countries for similar independence
movements. Kosovo was supposed to be exceptional, too, until recognition of its independence more
or less directly led to the effective partition of Georgia. When the U.S. and other states recognized
Kosovo, few believed that it could have an effect on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but it did. How
many countries will suffer from greater instability because self-determination prevailed in Sudan?
Once major powers start re-drawing borders to satisfy the demands of self-determination or
other concerns, there is no obvious place to stop . Kosovos example isnt supposed to
have any effect on the situation in Karabakh, either, but why are the people in Karabakh and
Armenia bound by this Western assumption? Supporters of the secession of South Sudan have to
take into account the possibility that the success of the southern Sudanese in achieving
independence will encourage other separatist and automomist movements in Africa and elsewhere.
In many ways, African nation-states are among the most arbitrary, artificial creations in the entire
world, but that doesnt mean that splitting them up into equally artificial, less viable statelets will
make things any better. Kosovos separation from Serbia and eventual independence empowered
a gang of criminals.
Secession creates a domino effect

Byman and Pollock 12
Byman, Daniel, and Kenneth Pollack. "The Syrian Spillover." Foreign Policy (2012).
Kenneth Michael Pollack, PhD, is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle
East politics and military affairs.
Dr. Daniel L. Byman is a professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service
in the Security Studies Program and Department of Government
Secessionism: As the Balkan countries demonstrated in the 1990s, seemingly triumphant
secessionist bids can set off a domino effect . Slovenia's declaration of independence inspired
Croatia, which prompted Bosnia to do the same, which encouraged Macedonia, and then Kosovo.
Strife and conflict followed all of these declarations. Sometimes it is the desire of one subgroup
within a state to break away that triggers the civil war in the first place. In other cases, different
groups vie for control of the state, but as the fighting drags on, one or more groups may decide that
their only recourse is to secede. At times, a minority comfortable under the old regime may fear
discrimination from a new government. The South Ossetians, for example, accepted Russian rule
but rebelled when Georgia broke off from the Soviet Union, as they feared they would face
discrimination in the new Georgian state. After Russia helped South Ossetia defeat the Georgian
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forces that tried to re-conquer the area in 1991-1992, the next domino fell when ethnic Abkhaz
also rebelled and created their own independent area in 1991-1992. The frozen conflict that
resulted from this civil war finally burst into an international shooting war between Georgia and
Russia in August 2008.
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R2P Fails: A2 Good

Self-interest and UN charter structurally precludes effective
R2P
Holmes 1/7/14
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness-of-the-responsibility-toprotect-as-an-international-norm
University.
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Over the last 60 years, additional international conventions and United Nations resolutions have
also established norms and standards of international humanitarian law. These include the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and its subsequent Protocols. Although not sidestepping the respect for
national sovereignty still embedded in the U.N. Charter (and thus the right of the Security
Council to decide ultimately questions of international peace), these conventions and resolutions
did quite consciously stretch the boundaries of old definitions of sovereignty. They not only
diminished the legitimacy of national sovereignty but also broadened the scope of action that
international bodies could take in defense of human rights and to protect against genocide and
mass murder. It was always a balancing act, but there was inherent tension between the rights of
national sovereigntywhich the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council jealously
protected and the rights of individuals to protectionwhich were championed in such bodies
as the Human Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the
human rights treaty bodies.
The resolutions on R2P ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005 tried to overcome these
tensions, but it still recognized the ultimate authority of the Security Council . Each state had a
responsibility to protect its population, the resolution said, but collective action was to be taken
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a caseby-case basis. In other words, only the Security Council could decide whether an intervention
of the international community should be undertaken, which implied not only the rights of the
veto of the Permanent Five (P-5) members (including the United States), but also that the
universal humanitarian legal principles supposedly established by the R2P resolution were still
subordinate to the principles of national sovereignty--to rights of the P-5 members in particular.
Why does this matter? Because it points to the fact that R2P is a mere aspiration, as
opposed to a real principle of international norms or even law. R2P sometimes not only runs
against the practices of Realpolitik (where national sovereignty still reigns supreme), but more
importantly, it is at odds with a fundamental principle of the United Nations itselfnamely, the
ultimate legal deference to national sovereignty as decided by the national members
of the Security Council. The Council may approve of the concept with respect to Libya but does
not do so in Syria because certain members of the P-5 (namely Russia) object. In that difference
is the ultimate weakness of R2P as a principle . The opposition of Russia to a Syria
intervention, for example, reveals that no matter what Moscow may think about R2P as a
principle, it will not adhere to it if it violates its national interests. Frankly, as a matter of
principle, the United States as a P-5 member more or less does the same thing. Regardless of what
the General Assembly may say, it is the actions of the Security Council that count in international
peace and stability. If there is no consensus among the P-5 on how R2P should be followed, or
subsequent observance of any agreement on it in practice, then it will never survive as a viable
legal or normative principle of international order.
R2p fails humanitarian intervention without the pretext

solves better
Holmes 1/7/14
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/the-weakness-of-the-responsibility-toprotect-as-an-international-norm
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University.
Finally, there is the question of how R2P affects the United States. Since the U.S. has a veto on
the U.N. Security Council, it will never be forced to send an armed force in defense of the R2P
principle against its will. But that is not the real concern. Rather, it is that, over time, the norm
will be established that the only proper use of American military force is for the kinds of
humanitarian operations implied by the R2P principle. Woodward and Morrison imply such a
norm when they say R2P is arguably the most radical adjustment to sovereignty since the Peace
of Westphalia was signed in 1648. The authors see this as a positive development, rather than as
a concern for the use of force. They envision it as a revolutionary advance, a victory for
democracy because it pledges to support sovereign rule only when it protects the populace it
governs. Undermining national sovereignty as a principle is a double-edged sword for the
United States. As any U.S. diplomat with U.N. experience will tell you, many nations around the
world are all too happy to downplay national sovereignty if it means criticizing the internal
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practices of the United States or Israel. And yet they jealously defend that sovereignty when it
comes to their own acts. More fundamentally, however, the purposes of U.S. armed forces are
still, first and foremost, to defend the sovereignty, security and freedom of the American people.
They are not primarily mercenary forces to be deployed at the behest of a U.N. body, no matter
how well intended that mission may be. Therefore, significantly altering U.S. military missions or
planning to accommodate the R2P doctrine would be misguided. After all is said and done, R2P is
not really a principle but an aspiration , and a rather weak one at that. Its defenders often
say, The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we
can. In other words, they argue that intervening in the face of mass murder is an option that
cannot be relinquished. That is true. But we dont need R2P to have that option. Whether
the U.N. Security Council authorizes such an intervention will always be a practical judgment, at
the discretion of sovereign members of the UNSC, and depending on all sorts of circumstances.
And it is these exceptions that illuminate the weakness of R2P as a principle. The problem with R2P
is that its reality never lives up to its high-sounding principles. If it wanted to, the Security Council
could have intervened to stop genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere. The reason it didnt are the same
ones that will likely keep it from doing so elsewhere in the future. Ultimately R2P is riddled with
too many contradictions and practical problems to make it a serious doctrine for implementation by
U.S. strategy. It mainly comes down to an argument of moral suasion to intervene against mass
murder and genocide, which one can make without resorting to tortured
arguments about supposed international principles or even the proper purposes of warfare,
and certainly without damaging the vital notion of national sovereignty.
Scattershot application means fail

Holmes 11
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/04/whose-responsibility-to-protect
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University.
The 1990s genocides in Srebrenica and Rwanda sparked U.N. debate on how to prevent such
massacres. This led to a 2001 U.N.-commissioned study, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. That report laid out the
doctrines main ideas: All nations have a responsibility to protect their citizens from large-scale
loss of life or ethnic cleansing, and if a nation failed to do this, the international community
working through the U.N. had a responsibility to protect the aggrieved population. The U.N.
General Assembly enshrined this idea in the 2005 Millennium Summit Outcome Document. The
U.S. accepted, but stipulated that the document did not obligate nations to intervene. The
Security Council subsequently reaffirmed the responsibility lines on several occasions, most
recently in this years first Libyan resolution. It referenced the authorities responsibility to
protect its population. There are many problems with this idea. First is the hypocrisy of protecting
one population while ignoring others. Why intervene with force to stop a potential massacre in
Libya and ignore real genocide in Sudans Darfur region? Why were some of the same people
who advocate a responsibility to protect in Libya so fiercely opposed to intervening in Iraq,
where Saddam Hussein killed about 300,000 civilians? Given its scattershot
application, responsibility to protect fails as a principle .
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R2P Bad: Bias

Prefer our evidence r2p good cards tainted by promilitary
bias
Mahoney 10/22/13
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/liam-mahony/myth-of-military-might-in-r2pchoices
Liam Mahony has been working in the field of civilian protection and human rights since the
1980s. Author of Proactive Presence: Field Strategies for Civilian Protection, he has done
extensive fieldwork in many countries, and is a pioneer in the theory and practice of international
protection. A former lecturer in Human Rights at Princeton University, he co-founded Fieldview
Solutions and through it has led analysis and training for hundreds of UN and NGO protection
staff deployed in conflict zones.
In the debate over Responsibility-to-Protect , assumptions, cultural myths and
language conspire to promote unwise military action. The effectiveness of military responses to
conflict has become unconsciously and widely assumed. Are military responses so popular
because objective scientific study has proven their efficacy? Or does this debate mostly reflect
the daily teaching in many cultures throughout the world, that the bigger stick always wins?
The promotion of violent force as the problem-solving option of last resort pervades
popular culture from Hollywood to school history curricula. And it pervades this debate .
R2P proponents insist that their doctrine prefers non-military approaches. But the language of the
debate suggests otherwise: robust by definition means strong and healthy, but in the international
communitys debate over approaches to conflict it is usually a synonym for military and violent.
The double-edged phrase last resort implies both that the military option has great risks but also
that if all other means fail, this is the one that will work. Gareth Evans piece in this debate, for
instance, refers to the military option as something to be considered when no lesser measure is
available. With thousands of lives at stake, why would we settle for lesser measures? Such
language, so frequently used even by those who are honestly committed to civilian protection,
inevitably supports calls for military action, even if it is unwise . The implicit message is that the
only really serious action is military action. Everything else is weak and half-hearted. This
language also invites world powers like the US to clothe their military aspirations in humanitarian
rhetoric, regardless of whether their intent or final impact helps civilians on the ground. Syria,
with its consistent support to Hezbollah, has been considered an enemy by the US for decades.
Can we seriously be considering that the US is all of a sudden engaging now out of concern for
Syrians civilians? The US is already engaged militarily supporting one side in this war, and the
civilian death toll has only increased as a result. If anything, the debate regarding how best to
protect civilians in Syria is much too late the balance of consequences for civilians should have
been assessed before the first military or political support was offered to the rebels, back in 2011.
I have had the opportunity to spend some time in the Democratic Republic of Congo in recent
years, assessing strategies for the protection of civilians, in a situation where the international
community and the UN have put all their eggs in the military basket. Many Congolese
themselves are also desperately hoping for military salvation. Yet after a decade of blue berets
and billions of dollars spent, civilians remain totally vulnerable to privations from armed groups
as well as from the (UN-supported) Congolese military. This year the UN was faced with broadbased pressure to do something more. Despite there being no objective assessment of the real
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protective impact on the Congolese people of the current militarized approach, the only new
strategy they could come up with was to strengthen the military approach and approve a UN
force with an explicit offensive mandate: more military, more robustly offensive. Interestingly,
a recent study looking at a different type of conflic t resistance movements against repressive
regimes suggests that in the last hundred years, unarmed resistance movements were more
successful at achieving their objectives than armed ones. (Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J.
Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.) With
adequate research, the hypothesis of a correlation in international interventions between military
force and protective impact might be shown to be valid, or it might not. But in the meantime it is
largely a myth , a heuristic simplification that gives us a too-readily-available and simple
answer to complex situations. It is also a myth that gives many people hope, because we deeply
wish that there were a quick solution to the human suffering we are witnessing in the conflicts that
prompt these debates. Decision-makers truly concerned with protecting civilians need to
recognize this unconscious assumption that privileges the military option . Rather than
reacting to knee-jerk pressures to do something, or to do more, policy decisions should be based
on a careful context-based analysis of each particular case, and an extremely cautious assessment
of reasonable expectations of consequences. This kind of assessment is necessary before military
action, before economic sanctions, or any other pressure. Those in power who order atrocities whether President Assad or an armed group leader in the Congo - are most often interested in
sustaining or increasing their own power. Such power is political, economic, and military and it
depends on their relationships with others. A strategy to protect civilians must examine the real
interests of these people, identifying all the political, economic and military relationships they
have that present opportunities for leverage. From that analysis, a nuanced and more complex
strategy would combine the range of tools of leverage available. These in turn would be tailored
to maximize their combined impact, and the strategy would assess the projected balance of
consequences with an emphasis on minimizing negative impacts on civilians. Those in power
who order violence against civilians are usually linked to a range of powerful economic interests,
and may be even more sensitive to economic pressures than to military ones. (In fact, external
military threats can sometimes serve to strengthen domestic support for a targeted group
consider how Hezbollah has benefitted from Israeli attacks on Lebanon.) Economic sanctions are
not a panacea, either, and may well in some cases hurt civilians far more than can be justified by
their impact. Further, just as military decisions tend to be based on geo-politics divorced from the
interests of civilians, decisions about economic measures tend to be skewed in the interests of
economic power brokers for whom sacrificing profits for humanitarian gain is unacceptable. It
should not be surprising that we cannot control the arms trade, for instance, when huge
multinational interests in the US and Europe make so much money from it; or that we have
difficulty fully implementing other kinds of smart sanctions even when they have UN Security
Council backing. The fact that sanctions so seldom effectively target the wealthy, but instead too
often inflict greater suffering on the poor, is no accident. The point here is not that economic
measures are better or worse than military ones, but rather that there is no self-evident hierarchy
among them. If wise decisions are to be made, the costs and benefits of different measures must
be carefully assessed, based on past experiences and on the real dynamics of each current context.
But this is not what is happening. Instead, the debate is dominated by myths, bias
and rhetoric . The crucial assessment of the expected balance of consequences has become a
phrase for s oundbite s, rather than an analytical prerequisite to action . As long
as the military option is perceived as more potentially effective than it is in reality, and economic
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and political pressures considered less effective than they might be, unwise decisions result. That
is the f undamental nature of bias.
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R2P = Genocide (Sudan/Syria)

R2p derails effective genocide prevention abandoning it is
key to Syria and Sudan
De Waal 12
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/opinion/how-to-end-mass-atrocities.html?_r=0
Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School, Tufts
University., How to End Mass Atrocities, New York Times, March 10, DOA: 12-7-14
High from last years interventions in Libya and Ivory Coast, Evans wrote triumphantly in
Foreign Policy last December that those missions brought an end to most of the confused
debates about humanitarian intervention. The vision he, Power and fellow idealists share is to
send the cavalry over the hill not only to stop any massacres but also to herald justice and
democracy. If only it were that simple. In the face of evil, the idealists tend to turn righteous
and forget to ask important questions about what they want to achieve and how. The result is a
misrepresentation of history and a misunderstanding of the measures that can most
effectively halt atrocities today. One major problem is that the idealists tend to
misconstrue or overlook the fundamental motivations of perpetrators. They typically see the
killers as insatiable. This is understandable because they are driven by the memory of the
Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide. But the Nazis and Hutus were exceptional for making the
extermination of a people essential to their politics. Most mass killers have other goals. In many
cases, the perpetrators simply stop killing when they have reached their goals, become exhausted,
fallen out among themselves or been defeated. Take the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70. Despite a
blockade of the secessionist province of Biafra and the genocidal rhetoric of some Nigerian
leaders, the killing ended when the Biafran rebels finally fell to Nigerian forces. Having achieved
their military aim, the Nigerians then began a process of reconciliation and reconstruction under
the banner no victor, no vanquished. In Guatemala, the perpetrators of the 1980-83 massacres
of Mayan communities suspected of supporting Communist insurgents called an end to the
atrocities after defeating the rebels. In Indonesia, the generals stopped killing the Communists in
1966 once the group no longer posed a threat. The soldiers of President Milton Obote massacred
tens of thousands of people in Ugandas Luwero Triangle in 1983-4 until they were defeated
on the battlefield. Likewise, the killings in East Pakistan ended with Indias invasion in 1971 and
the Khmer Rouges atrocities in Cambodia with Vietnams intervention in 1978-79. In other
words, even once they are under way, mass atrocities do not lead inexorably to bottomless
massacres. The killers usually have political goals: They are determined to kill until they have
achieved their objectives, not until theres no one else left standing. Their use of violence can be
excessive, but more important, it is often instrumental. This creates an opportunity for
negotiating an end to mass atrocities, through peace talks and with financial and diplomatic
incentives and pressure. In recent history such deal-making has brought to an end, albeit often an
imperfect one, massacres in Burundi, East Timor, Kenya, Macedonia and
South Sudan. Yet the idealists insist on pursuing a more ambitious agenda: nothing short of
democracy and justice, imposed by military intervention. And this can undermine simply
getting the killing to stop. For perpetrators, the prospect of foreign intervention and
prosecution rules out the possibility for compromise. For rebels, it creates a perverse incentive to
escalate ethnic violence so as to provoke an international military response. The idealists blind
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spot about nonideal endings also means they cannot decide what do to when the killings do
subside. In September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that a genocide had
occurred, and might be continuing, in Darfur. But by then the level of violence had already begun
to drop, and it continued to diminish over the next few years. U.S. policy stayed stuck on trying
to stop massacres that were no longer happening. In 2009, Scott Gration, the U.S. special envoy
to Sudan, was saying there were remnants of genocide. But in 2010, Susan Rice, the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, was still insisting there was an ongoing genocide. Unable to
commit itself to either aggressive regime change or a program of reconstruction and
reconciliation, the U.S. government hasnt made any progress on either approach. And its
indecision has delayed finding a workable political solution for Darfur. Western policy makers
interested in stopping mass crimes should not overlook tools that can work. Where violence is
used as an instrument for political gain, it is negotiable. Some perpetrators can be moderated
through diplomacy. Others will stop killing if they defeat a rebellion or realize they cannot. The
main aim should be to stop genocidal killing . Holding elections and prosecuting the
perpetrators of crimes, however laudable those goals, arent the priority. Today, with civilians in
Sudans Nuba Mountains threatened by mass hunger and violence, U.S. campaigners are calling
for humanitarian intervention. They should remember to keep the political solution firmly in
focus. The root of the crisis is a war between evenly matched adversaries who must recognize
that they need to live with the other. The peace talks that stalled last July should be revived. This
would require Khartoum to lift the ban against the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement in the
northern sector and begin an inclusive constitutional reform process. The rebels and their South
Sudanese backers, for their part, would have to repudiate the goal of regime change. Politics are
also all-important in Syria. The crisis has evolved from a civilian uprising to a fully fledged civil
war, with each side fearing annihilation if it loses. The regime of Bashar al-Assad needs a soft
landing, and so the model for solving this crisis is the kind of patient mediation effort that
was deployed in Yemen, not aggressive intervention as in Libya. Responding to mass
atrocities, whether ongoing or imminent, is difficult enough, but the idealism of Evans and Power
makes it that much more so. They have composed a story, based on ethics rather than evidence,
that incorrectly assumes all perpetrators of mass political violence are insatiable killers and that
dictates who should respond (Western nations), how (with military intervention) and why (for
justice and democracy). It is a morality tale that undermines the best ways to
deal with the worst crimes.
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R2p Bad: Drone Strikes

R2P legitimacy key to escalating globe drone strikes
Brooks 1/14/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-drone-war.html?
itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a columnist and
contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the New
America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special
Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated
to those issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to 2009,
and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights issues. At the Pentagon
her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights issues and global engagement, strategic
communication, and she received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
for her work.
This notion of a " responsibility to protect" was embraced by the international
community -- including the United States -- with surprising rapidity. In every way, it represents a
radical assault on traditional legal concepts of sovereignty. The "responsibility to protect" doctrine
-- often now referred to as R2P -- suggests that when a state fails to protect its own population, it
can no longer claim any right to be free of external intervention (including, in extreme cases,
military intervention) if intervention is needed to secure the safety of a threatened population.
And by implication, that intervention need not necessarily be authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. If the Security Council "fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscienceshocking situations crying out for action...concerned states may not rule out other means to meet
the gravity and urgency of that situation," observed the 2001 ICISS report. The logic is clear
enough: If failure to protect its population delegitimizes a state's legal claim to sovereignty, then
the failure of collective security structures (such as the UNSC) to take appropriate corrective
action would similarly delegitimize those collective institutions. Put a little differently, the
Responsibility to Protect logically implies that both "the international community" and individual
states have a right and a duty to intervene -- militarily, if necessary -- when another state is
"unwilling or unable" to protect its own population. If the language justifying drone strikes in
sovereign states appears to directly parallel the language of the Responsibility to Protect, it's no
accident. Although the R2P doctrine was developed in response to genocide and other mass
atrocities, the language of R2P was easily turned to other purposes . That's not
entirely inappropriate, either: R2P's underlying logic is equally applicable to terrorism, which is
itself a form of human rights abuse (and one that can have devastating consequences for civilian
populations). As I have argued elsewhere, you "might even say that the R2P coin ought
logically to be seen as having two sides . On one side lies a state's duty to take action
inside its own territory to protect itsown population from violence and atrocities. On the other
side lies a state's duty to take action inside its own territory to protect other states' populations
from violence. Either way, a state that fails in these duties faces the prospect that other states will
intervene in its internal' affairs without its consent." In a sense, then, it was the human
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rights community's critique of sovereignty that helped pave the way for
drone strikes.
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R2P = Imperialism
R2p is a fig leaf for imperialism
Global Policy Forum 14
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention.html
Global Policy Forum is an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the United
Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking. We promote accountability and citizen participation
in decisions on peace and security, social justice and international law.
What is to be done in a crisis like the genocide in Rwanda, when the international community
seeks to stop the killing? Can nations, acting through the UN Security Council, fulfill a
"responsibility to protect" innocent civilians? Or is such a doctrine just a Trojan horse for great
power abuse? When nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, it is rarely (if
ever) for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically pursuing their narrow national interest grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural resources.
Leaders hope to win public support by describing such actions in terms of high moral purposes bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area. In the era of colonialism,
European governments all cynically insisted that they acted to promote such higher commitments the "white man's burden," "la mission civilisatrice," and so on and so forth. The appeal to higher
moral purposes continues to infect the political discourse of the great powers. Today's
" humanitarian intervention" is only the latest in this long tradition of
political obfuscation . In 2003, the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq was labeled
"humanitarian intervention" by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
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R2P = imperialism: Africa

Indeterminacy of R2p allows repeated interventions against
Africa
Branch 11/6/12
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52035-the-responsibility-to-protectwhat-is-the-basis-for-the-emerging-norm-of-r2p.html?itemid=id#26087
Assistant Professor of Political Science, San Diego
State University, 2008Research Associate, Makerere Institute of Social Re
search, 2011EDUCATION
Ph.D. (Political Science) Columbia University, 2007
A.B. (Social Studies) Harvard University, 1998
Africa has a long history of being 'protected' by the West. And today, with the precipitous rise of
the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it appears that intervention in the name of
protecting Africa has returned to the centre of Western concern or
regained its utility. Three-quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked or applied have
been in Africa and the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on R2P announced that the
responsibility to protect really came from Africa and the African experience" Africa also provided
the military testing ground for R2P and following foreign military intervention in Libya in 2011,
according to Ramesh Thakur, R2P is closer to being solidified as an actionable norm". R2Ps
privileged application in Africa bears comparison to the continent's experience with the
International Criminal Court (ICC). Critics have argued that the Court targets Africa because it
can operate there in an accountability-free zone, able to intervene in ongoing conflicts, take sides
in civil wars, scuttle amnesties and peace processes, or align itself with US military forces all
without being held responsible for the consequences of its actions. But at least with the ICC,
there is a concrete institution prosecutors and judges who make statements and decisions that
can be critiqued on legal, political, or moral grounds. With R2P, however, even this modicum of
publicity and formalisation is absent. And this makes its expanding use in Africa all the more
dangerous. The first problem is that no-one seems sure of what R2P even is. Its proponents have
celebrated it as a norm, a doctrine, a concept, an idea, a principle, a framework, or a lens, while
its critics have dismissed or condemned it as an excuse, an ideology, a fad, or an empty slogan.
Illustrating this uncertainty is the fact that, while most agree that R2P enjoys no legal status of its
own, others seem to give it an almost super-legal status. Take the statement by Susan Rice,
current US Ambassador to the UN, for example, who in 2007 invoked R2P to justify a threatened
US ground and air attack against Sudan without Security Council approval. Rice cited R2P to
dismiss the possible legal problems of invading a sovereign state, asserting: Still others insist
that, without the consent of the UN or a relevant regional body, we would be breaking
international law. Perhaps, but the Security Council last year codified a new international norm
prescribing the responsibility to protect. It commits UN members to decisive action, including
enforcement, when peaceful measures fail to halt genocide or crimes against humanity. Not
surprisingly, there is also no consensus on what actions R2P actually legitimates, nor by whom or
when. The problem is compounded by the multiplicity of statements on R2P, from the 2001
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report to the United
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Nations 2004 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, to the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, to the Secretary-Generals 2009 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
The original statement of R2P in the ICISS report explains: State sovereignty implies
responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state
itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. Of course, the
statement poses more questions than it answers. What is the threshold at which responsibility is
legitimately taken up by the international community? Who makes that decision? And who is the
international community? The precise sequence of actions necessary to fulfil R2P is also left
undefined. According to ICISS, R2P comprises three specific responsibilities: the responsibility
to prevent, by addressing both the root causes and direct causes of crises; the responsibility to
react to situations of compelling human need by employing appropriate measures, up to
military intervention; and the responsibility to rebuild, which will help address the causes of the
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert. Given the increasingly expansive
formulations of R2P, according to which R2P action is to help prevent, react, and rebuild
countries, work with, pressure, and coerce states, and address root causes and prevent the
recurrence of conflict, there seems to be little that is not included among the instruments that may
be legitimately used in the name of R2P. This could span from development aid to diplomatic
pressure, from direct budgetary assistance to invasion and occupation, from traditional
reconciliation to international criminal prosecution. Even one of R2Ps most vocal academic
supporters, Alex Bellamy, admits that, it is seldom if ever clear what R2P requires in a given
situation. The result is a situation in which some analysts can condemn the AU-UN intervention
in Darfur as a dismal failure of R2P while others can laud it as a success; some blame R2P as an
excuse used to prevent effective intervention there while others credit it with enabling
international involvement. The same ambiguity characterises discussions of the R2P in Kenya
during the post-election violence in 2008. Some would agree with Kofi Annan that Kenya is a
successful example of R2P at work but others deny that R2P played a role in the unfolding of
international involvement, explaining that the situation was only labelled a R2P situation
retrospectively. This fundamental indeterminacy of R2P was made even clearer, as was its danger,
in the Libya intervention. The doctrines first full-scale deployment led to the bombing of civilian
infrastructure, the deposing and killing of Muammar Gaddafi, the installing of a rebel
government, and the arming of civilians all in the name of protection. The last was justified by
a senior French diplomatic source as: an operational decision taken at the time to help civilians
who were in imminent danger. A group of civilians were about to be massacred so we took the
decision to provide self-defensive weapons to protect those civilian populations under threatIt
was entirely justifiable legally, resolution 1970 and 1973 were followed to the letter." R2P is not
only dangerous because it is flexible enough to be used to justify overthrowing governments and
arming civilians, but also because it allows those using it to refuse accountability. States can
engage in political and military intervention without having to justify those interventions on
political or military grounds, only on protection grounds. And they can refuse responsibility for
the consequences of their actions all is fair when civilian protection is at stake. R2P can be used
to justify military intervention or non-intervention, invasion or withdrawal. Thus, it is precisely
R2Ps indeterminacy that makes it so popular today. This may suggest something about the
Wests current approach to Africa: occasional violent engagement in the name of protection when
a state has been declared to have failed in its own protection role, complemented by military
assistance to client states in the name of promoting their capacity to protect. This is combined
with disengagement when convenient in the name of allowing states to fulfil the protection
mandate themselves, all with no objective standards and no accountability. Mahmood Mamdani
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has argued that one consequence of R2P is to institute a divided international
system that distinguishes African states , whose legitimacy and sovereignty are to be
judged by the international community, from Western states, whose sovereignty
is beyond question and that judge and intervene in Africa. R2P institutes a
divided international system in another way as well: one within Africa that distinguishes those
African states that are favoured by the West and tend to be labelled human rights protectors,
responsible, and thus deserving support, from those that are out of favour with the West and are
labelled human rights violators, failed or criminal, and meriting international coercion. This is not
to say that every Western ally will be termed a human rights protector and every adversary a
human rights violator. But, by grounding the judgment as to state legitimacy in the flexible,
informal language of R2P, giving that judgment to those who have the power to claim to speak in
the name of the international community, and stripping away the need for the state or interveners
to be accountable to African citizenries, this division remains an ever-present and dangerous
possibility.
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R2P =Imperialism Kills International Law

R2P is a pretext for interventionism crushes collective
security and ilaw
Herman 11/9/13
http://www.voltairenet.org/article180927.html
Edward S. Herman is professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania and has written extensively on economics, political economy, and the media.
Among his books are Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge University Press, 1981),
The Real Terror Network (South End Press, 1982), and, with Noam Chomsky, The Political
Economy of Human Rights (South End Press, 1979), and Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon,
2002).
Both the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Intervention (HI) came into
existence in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, which ended any obstruction that that
contesting Great Power had placed on the ongoing power projection of the United States. In
Western ideology, of course, the United States was containing the Soviets in the post-World War
II years, but that was ideology. In reality the Soviet Union was always far less powerful than the
United States, had weaker and less reliable allies, and was essentially on the defensive from 1945
till its demise in 1991. The United States was aggressively on the march outward from 1945, with
the steady spread of military bases across the globe, numerous interventions, large and small, on
all continents, engaged in building the first truly global empire. The Soviet Union was an
obstruction to U.S. expansion, with sufficient military power to constitute a modest containing
force, but it also served U.S. propaganda as an alleged expansionist threat. With the death of the
Soviet Union new threats were needed to justify the continuing and even accelerating U.S.
projection of power, and they were forthcoming, from narco-terrorism to Al Qaeda to Saddams
weapons of mass destruction to the terrorist threat that encompassed the entire planet earth and its
outer space. There was also a global security menace alleged, based on internal ethnic struggles
and human rights violations, that supposedly threatened wider conflicts, as well as presenting the
global community (and its policeman) with a moral dilemma and demand for intervention in the
interests of humanity and justice. As noted, this morality surge occurred at a moment in history
when the Soviet constraint was ended and the United States and its close allies were celebrating
their triumph, when the socialist option had lost vitality, and when the West was thus freer to
intervene. This required over-riding the several hundred year old Westphalian core principle of
international relations that national sovereignty should be respected which if adhered to
would protect smaller and weaker countries from Great Power cross-border attacks. This rule was
embodied in the UN Charter, and could be said to be the fundamental feature of that document,
described by international law scholar Michael Mandel as the worlds constitution. Over-riding
this rule and Charter fundamental would clear the ground for R2P and HI, but it would also clear
the ground for classic and straightforward aggression in pursuit of geopolitical interests, for which
R2P and HI might supply a useful cover. It is obvious that only the Great Powers can cross borders
in the alleged interest of R2P and HI, a point that is recognized and taken as an entirely acceptable
premise in every case in which they have been applied in recent years. The Great Powers are the
only ones with the knowledge and material resources to do this benevolent global social work.
As NATO public relations official Jamie Shea explained in May 1999, when the question came
up as to whether NATO personnel might be indicted for war crimes during NATOs bombing war
against Serbia, which seemed to follow from the letter of the International Criminal Tribunal for
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the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) charter: NATO countries organized the ICTY and International
Court of Justice, and NATO countries fund these tribunals and support on a daily basis their
activities. We are the upholders, not the violators, of international law. This last is a contestable
assertion, but Sheas other points are clearly valid. It is enlightening that when a group of
independent lawyers submitted an extensive dossier in 1999 showing probable NATO violations
of ICTY rules, after a long delay and following open pressure from NATO authorities, the antiNATO claims were disallowed by the ICTY prosecutor on the ground that with only 496
documented killings of Serbs by NATO bombs there is simply no evidence of a crime base for
indicting NATO, although the original May 1999 indictment of Milosevic involved a crime base
of only 344 deaths. It is of similar interest that International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo declined to prosecute NATO officials for their attack on Iraq in 2003,
despite over 249 requests for ICC action, on the ground that here also the situation did not
appear to meet the required threshold of the Statute. These two cases illustrate the fact that the
structures and laws that underlie the application of R2P (and HI) exempt the Great Power
enforcers from the laws and rules that they enforce on the lesser powers. It also exempts their
friends and clients. This means that in the real world there is nobody responsible for protecting
Iraqis or Afghanis from the United States or Palestinians from Israel. When U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright acknowledged on national TV in 1996 that 500,000 Iraqi children may
have died as a result of UN (but really U.S.) -imposed sanctions on Iraq, declaring that U.S.
officials felt these deaths were worth it, there was no domestic or global reaction demanding
the end of these sanctions and the application of R2P or HI on behalf of the victimized Iraqi
population. Similarly there was no call for any R2P intervention on behalf of the Iraqis when the
United States and Britain invaded Iraq in March 2003, with direct and induced civil war killings
of perhaps a million more Iraqis. When the Canadian-sponsored International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect considered the Iraq war in relation to R2P, its authors concluded that
abuses by Saddam Hussein within Iraq were not of a scope in 2003 to justify an invasion, but the
coalition never even raised the question of whether the Iraqi people didnt need protection from
the invaders responsible for the death of vast numbers. They worked from the imperial premise
that the Great Power enforcers, even when aggressing in violation of the UN Charter and killing
hundreds of thousands, are exempt from R2P as well as the rule of law. This works from the top
of the global power structure on down; Bush, Cheney, Obama, John Kerry, Susan Rice, Samantha
Power at the top, then on the way down we have Merkel, Cameron, and Hollande, then further
down Ban Ki-Moon and Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and with their power base to be found in the
corporate leadership and media. Ban Ki-Moon and his predecessor Kofi Annan have been open
servants of the Great NATO Powers, to whom they owe their status and authority. Kofi Annan
was an enthusiastic supporter of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, a believer in the enforcement
responsibility of the NATO powers, and keen on the institutionalization of R2P; and Ban KiMoon works in the same mode. This same global power structure also means that ad hoc
Tribunals will be formed and used against villains of choice, as well as international courts. Thus
when the United States and its allies wanted to dismantle Yugoslavia and weaken Serbia, they
were able to use the Security Council in 1993 to establish a tribunal, the ICTY, precisely for this
service, which the ICTY carried out effectively. When they wanted to help their client Paul
Kagame consolidate his dictatorship in Rwanda, they created a similar tribunal for this service,
the ICTR. If these powers want to attack and bring about regime change in Libya, they can get
the ICC to accuse Gaddaffi of war crimes speedily and without independent investigation of any
charges, and based mainly on anticipations of civilian killings. But as noted, the ICC couldnt
find any basis for action against the invaders of Iraq whose killings of civilians were large-scale
and realized, not merely anticipated. There was, in fact, a major World Tribunal on Iraq organized
to hear charges against the United States and its allies for their actions in Iraq, but it was privately
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organized and had a critical anti-war bent, so that although it held hearings in many countries and
heard many prestigious witnesses, this tribunal was given negligible attention in the media. (Its
final sessions and report in June 2005 were unmentioned in the major U.S, and British media.)
R2P fits snugly into this picture of service to an escalating imperial violence, with the United States
and its enormous military-industrial complex engaged in a Global War on Terror and multiple
wars, and its NATO arm steadily enlarging and embarked on out of area service, despite the
ending of its supposed role of containing the Soviet Union. It conveniently premises that the
threats that the world needs to address come from within countries, not from cross-border
aggression in the traditional mode that the makers of the UN Charter considered of first
importance. They are wrong: William Blum lists 35 cases where the United States overthrew
governments between 1945 and 2001 (thus not even counting the war-making of George W. Bush
and Barak Obama; Blum, Freeing the World to Death [Common Courage, 2005], chaps. 11 and
15) In the real world, while R2P has a wonderful aura of benevolence, it will be put in play only at
the instigation of the Great NATO Powers and it will therefore never be used in the interest of
unworthy victims, defined as victims of the Great Powers or their clients (see Manufacturing
Consent, chap 2, Worthy and Unworthy Victims). For example, it was never invoked to
constrain Indonesian violence in its invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975 onward,
although this invasion-occupation accounted for an estimated 200,000 deaths on a population
base of 800,000, thus exceeding the proportionate deaths under Pol Pot. In this case the United
States gave the invasion a green light, gave further arms to the invaders, and protected them from
any UN response. This is a case where the UN Charter was being violated and East Timorese
desperately needed protection, but as the United States supported the invader no international
response transpired. It is enlightening and amusing to see that Gareth Evans has been perhaps the
leading spokesperson in support of R2P.as an instrument of justice. Evans is a former Foreign
Minister of Australia, author of a book on R2P, past president of the International Crisis Group, a
co-founder of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and a
participant in several reports and debates on R2P. Evans was the Foreign Minister of Australia
during the years of Indonesias genocidal occupation of East Timor, and in that role Evans
honored and feted Indonesian leaders and worked with them in sharing the stolen oil rights of
East Timor. (See John Pilger, East Timor: a lesson in why the poorest threaten the powerful,
April 5, 2012, pilger.com.) So Evans was really a collaborator in a major genocide. Can you
imagine the medias response to a non-NATO human rights campaign that used as spokesperson a
Chinese official who had maintained friendly relations with Pol Pot during his most deadly
years? It is enlightening to see how Gareth Evans deals with the criteria for enforcing R2P. In
answering questions on this subject at a UN General Assembly session on R2P, Evans appealed to
common sense: R2P defines itself, and the crimes, including ethnic cleansing, are all
inherently conscience-shocking, and by their very nature of a scale that demands a responseIt
is really impossible to be precise about numbers here. Evans notes that sometimes modest
numbers will suffice: We remember starkly the horror of Srebrenica [with only 8,000 deaths].
Was Racak with its 45 victims in Kosovo in 99 sufficient to trigger the response that was
triggered by the international community? It was sufficient to trigger a response for the simple
reason that it helped advance NATOs ongoing program of dismantlement of Yugoslavia. But
Evans dodges answering his own question. You may be sure that Evans does not ask or attempt to
explain why there was no triggering of a response to East Timor with its 200,000 or Iraqs
500,000 plus a million. The politicization of choices here is total, but Evans has apparently
internalized the imperial perspective so completely that this huge double standard never reaches
his consciousness. But the most interesting fact is that a man with such a record and such blatant
bias can be accepted as an authority and his biased perspective is treated with respect. It is
interesting, also, to see how Evans never mentions Israel and Neither Palestine, where ethnic
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cleansing has been in active process for decades, works openly and is deeply resented by vast
numbers across the globe. do other members of the power pyramid suggest Israel-Palestine as an
area where consciences are shocked and the nature and scale of abuse demands a response from
the international community. In order to obtain her U.N. Ambassadorship, Samantha Power
thought it was necessary to go before a group of pro-Israel U.S. citizens and assure them, with
tears flowing, that she regretted any past suggestions that AIPAC was powerful and that its
influence had to be over-ridden for developing a U.S.-interest policy toward Israel and Palestine.
She pledged a devotion to Israels national security. The world will wait a long time for Power
and her bosses to support R2Ps application to ethnic cleansing in Palestine In sum, the
international power structure in the post-Soviet world has worsened
global inequality and at the same time increased Great Power interventionism
and literal aggression . The increased militarism may have contributed to the growing
inequality, but it is also designed and serves to facilitate pacification at home as well as abroad.
In this context, R2P and HI are understandable developments, providing a
moral cover for actions that would repel many people and constitute a
violation of international law if viewed in a cold light. R2P puts aggression in a
benevolent light and thus serves as its useful instrument. In short, it is a
cynical fraud and a constitution ( UN Charter)-buster
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R22 Hypocritical
R2P is necessarily a hypocritical fiction only used against
weak states
Menon 6/12/13
The world has not obliged revolutionary liberals. Raison dtat is resilient: Practical interests
shape what states do, not abstract ideals. The United States and its democratic allies are not
exceptions to this rule. When it comes to R2P, they, just as China and Russia have, will block
punitive measures against friendly governments. Imagine that the so-called Arab Spring makes a
delayed appearance in Saudi Arabia. Would the Saudis ever face a Security Council resolution
with R2P in it? Would the United States, Britain or France back an R2P resolution occasioned
by Israels use of force in the West Bank or Gaza? No and no. Those who doubt this might ponder
recent events in Bahrain, where a Sunni-run state lords over its Shia majority. The Obama
Administration deemed Qaddafis violence against the Libyan opposition R2P-worthy but has
been unmoved by the Bahraini regimes repression of unarmed protestors. Nor is Washingtons
stance likely to change so long as the U.S. Fifth Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia
played a decisive role in mobilizing Arab support for UNSCR 1973, which authorized the
intervention against Qaddafi; but it sent troops into Bahrain to crush the Shia rebellion three
days before NATOs intervention in Libya. Qatar, too, mustered Arab League support for the
move against Qaddafi and provided combat aircraft to supplement NATOs Libya intervention,
but its troops joined the Saudi gendarmes march into Manama. What mattered for the Gulf
monarchies was preventing the rise of a Shia-dominated state in Bahrain aligned with Iran. Selfdetermination and liberty could waitindefinitely. Egyptian security forces killed 840 unarmed
civilians and injured some 6,000 during the uprising against Mubarak; no major government
invoked R2P.Had Mubarak survived and unleashed his army in full, would he have shared
Qaddafis R2P-tinged fate? Not likely. Strong horses dont attract R2P attention; only weak or
vulnerable ones do. Powerful democracies have long been willing to countenance the killing and
expulsions of people and to arm governments that commit such acts . Consider some examples.
Turkeys war against the PKK has killed thousands of civilians since 1984 and displaced another
386,000. In 198889, Saddam Hussein gassed and deported thousands of Kurds, killing as many
as 100,000 of them, and systematically razed their towns and villages. But Washington turned a
blind eye because the Iraqi dictator was then providing a useful service by fighting Khomeinis
Iran. Consider, too, that between Indonesias annexation of East Timor in 1975 and the 1999 UNsanctioned, Australian-led intervention, 18,600 East Timorese civilians were killed, and another
102,800 died from war-related hunger and disease, with the vast majority of the fatalities
occurring before 1999. Australia was rightly complimented for leading the multilateral force that
helped bring stability, and eventually independence, to East Timor. But the Australian
government, its own documents have since revealed, knew that Indonesia was preparing to
conquer East Timor in 1975, may have provided tacit approval, and certainly was willing to arm
Suhartos government in the years preceding the annexation.Not only was Australia the only
major Western democracy to officially recognize the annexation; Gareth Evans, then its Foreign
Minister, signed a deal in 1989 with his Indonesian counterpart, Ali Alatas, giving Australian
energy companies access to the seabed off East Timor. As for the United States, it armed the
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Indonesian army for years, even though between 500,000 and one million people perished
following the 1965 coup that brought Suharto to power. It is now clear that Indonesias conquest
of East Timor occurred with the Ford Administrations foreknowledgeand acquiescence.
American arms sales to Indonesia rose substantially after its occupation of East Timor. Britains
dealings with Suharto followed a similar pattern.
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R2P = White Supremacy

R2p is a cover for global white supremacy
Barake 9/9/13
http://www.fairobserver.com/article/humanitarian-intervention-us-imperialism
Ajamu Baraka was the Founding Executive Director of the US Human Rights Network
(USHRN) from July 2004 until June 2011. The USHRN became the first domestic human rights
formation in the United States explicitly committed to the application of international human
rights standards to the US. Under Baraka, the Network grew exponentially from a core
membership base of 60 organizations to more than 300 US-based member organizations and
1,500 individual members who work on the full spectrum of human rights issues in the United
States. Baraka has also served on the boards of various national and international human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International (USA) and the National Center for Human Rights
Education. He is currently on the boards of the Center for Constitutional Rights; Africa Action;
Latin American Caribbean Community Center; Diaspora Afrique; and the Mississippi Workers
Center for Human Rights. Baraka has taught political science at various universities, including
Clark Atlanta University and Spelman College. He has been a guest lecturer at academic
institutions throughout the US, and has authored several articles on international human rights.
How is it that the administration can announce to the world its intentions to circumvent, and by
doing so, subvert international prohibitions on war? By wrapping itself in the false flag
of humanitarian concerns f or the suffering masses in Syria. President Barack Obama, the
corporate and financial elites most effective propaganda weapon since Ronald Reagan, explains
to the world that it is only the plight of people in Syria that drives the US decision to attack the
country. No one asks the president to explain to the innocent human beings who are walking
around today alive, but who will be the dead and maimed collateral damage of this pending
attack, why their sacrifice is for the greater good of humanity. This justification for the latest
breech of international law is yet another example of the sham that is humanitarian intervention.
If mass killings of its own people constitutes a crime against humanity and mass in Syria
means over a thousand people killed, surely the killing of over a thousand in Egypt must also
constitute a serious crime against humanity. But that kind of rational calculation could only occur
if there were one ethical standard for all states and an equal value placed on human life. Two
Moral Standards The reality, however, is that there are two mutually exclusive moral standards:
one for the vast majority of nations, and another for those comprising the dying but dangerous
collection of European colonial capitalist nations. It is the naked pursuit of US geo-political
interests like the gas off the coast of Syria, oil, and the desire to isolate Iran that drive policy and
not some concern for the people in Syria. That is the context that shapes and informs US foreign
policies globally. In the current context of relative US decline, international law related to noneconomic functions and relationships the Geneva accords and the law of war, human rights and
the Charter of the United Nations are now constraints on the ability of the US to pursue its
interests. And with no domestic checks on executive power with the capitulation and
collaboration of Congress (despite this feint toward democratic accountability represented in
seeking congressional approval from Congress before attacking Syria), a corporate media that
serves as cheerleaders for the administration, and peace and anti-imperialist movements that are
marginal and in political disarray, US criminality is completely out of control with the result that
the United States has become the quintessential Rogue State. Why has it been so easy for the State
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to obfuscate its interests and to create a bipartisan coalition united in its support for the essentials
of US foreign policies, even while there may be disagreements on some of the tactical issues?
This can be partially explained by the innovative discourses produced by Western propagandists
during the last two decades, the most innovative being the concept of humanitarian
intervention and its dubious corollary, the right to protect. Humanitarian
intervention and the right to protect evoke the unacknowledged white supremacist
assumption that the international community read as the governments of the
capitalist/colonialist West has a duty and a right to arrest, bomb, invade, prosecute, sanction,
murder and violate international law anywhere on the planet to save people based on its own
determinations and values. That is precisely why the question of what entitles the US to inflict
punishments on the Syrian government is not even raised as part of a public discussion. That
question and its answer are obvious to the victims of Western colonial and imperialist brutality:
The US and its European allies have that right because they have always had the right over the last
500 years to universalize and impose their assumptions, world views and values.
Normalization of White Supremacist Domination The normalization of white
supremacist domination and its prerogatives are so completely inculcated in US and Western
consciousness that not only is the question as to what right the US and the West have to attack
Syria outside the framework of consideration, but alternative ways of viewing the world are
beyond cognitive comprehension . This is the cultural and ideological foundation of
American exceptionalism and the intellectual framework and assumptions that informed
Western-based human rights organizations and their theoreticians in the construction of the
notion of humanitarian intervention. De-contextualized from the reality of globalized
Euro-American domination, the idea that there is a collective responsibility on the part of states
to protect people from gross and systemic human rights violations associated with war crimes,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, could be viewed as a progressive
development for international relations and global morality even if that protection if offered
selectively. But in the hands of an arrogant minority that still dominates the international system
and sees its civilizational project as representing the apex of human development, the right
to protect has become a convenient cover for rationalizing and justifying
continued Euro-American global hegemony through the use of armed
interventions to refashion local realities in line with Western geopolitical interests.
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R2P = Syria Intervention

R2P crucial to selling Syrian intervention
Thrall 2/22/12
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/responsibility-protect-6559
A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University
and director of the Biodefense Program. He is the coeditor of American Foreign Policy and the
Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11 and coeditor of the forthcoming book Why Did the
United States Invade Iraq?
Intervention in Syria is either a dangerous idea, an opportunity to further the cause of democracy
promotion or nothing less than the moral duty of the international community. The Obama
administration continues to act cagey about the prospects of a successful intervention and the
potential for geopolitical fallout from Russia, China and Iran. But given European pressure and
the recent Libyan precedent, it seems more than possible that the United States will come to
embrace some sort of military intervention in Syri a as the love child of regime-changing
neoconservatives and genocide-preventing idealists . The real question then will be:
Can Obama sell a Syrian intervention to the public? And if so, how? The likeliest
pitch for Obama to use is some form of the responsibility-to-protect (R2P) ethic .
Articulated after the international communitys tepid response to the Bosnian meltdown, R2P has
become the liberal interventionists best friend, offering a justification for violating national
sovereignty and taking foreign governments to task for failing to protect their people from
violence. Obama used this line with Libya, arguing that: To brush aside America's responsibility
as a leader andmore profoundlyour responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such
circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. . . . Some nations may be able to turn a
blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as
president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action. And
indeed, the loudest voices so far urging intervention in Syria belong to the
R2P crowd (Washington Post editorial here, for example), thanks in part to confidence
engendered by what they viewed as success in Libya. But the question remains: Will the public
buy this argument? Certainly, such responsible rhetoric resonatesat least on the surface
with the public. Though precise poll data are scanty, a couple of polls from the Pew Research
Center illustrate that the public generally agrees that the United States has a responsibility to
prevent genocide.
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Ditching R2P Solves

R2P is the worst path in Syria moderate internationalism
solves
Chimini 9/11/13
http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/bschimni/r2p-and-syria-imperialism-withhuman-face
B.S. Chimini is Professor of International Law at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi.
Second, states have become wiser after the intervention in Libya. States that did not oppose the
invocation of R2P in Libya are now unwilling to support it because the UNSC resolution 1973
was misinterpreted and used by NATO powers to bring about regime change. Third, there is the
valid concern that military action will lead to an escalation of violence in Syria and the region,
leading to a greater humanitarian crisis. Millions more will be displaced outside and inside Syria.
Thousands more will lose their lives. It is believed that even the departure of Assad will bring
little relief to the people of Syria. This has been the experience of the Libyan people, who have in
the post-Gaddafi era been subjected to unceasing violence by armed militias holding sway in
large parts of the country. Fourth, it is felt that military action will undermine the Geneva 2
process, which holds out the best possibility of bringing to an end the conflict in Syria. It could
mean a long period of political uncertainty in which the Syrian people will be unable to take
control of their political destiny. Fifth, it is pointed out that the support for democratic forces in
Syria comes from many Arab regimes that are anything but democratic. It strengthens the
suspicion that what drives support for military action is a geopolitical agenda. Sixth, there is the
genuine fear that arms supplied to rebels may end up with extremist groups who are a part of the
rebel forces. And seventh, it is believed that there are no innocent parties in this conflict. Both the
government and the rebel forces are contributing to the escalating violence and violating
international humanitarian laws. Even in global civil society, there is resistance to the idea that the
choice before the international community is between supporting military action or a brutal regime .
This resistance emanates from a certain reading of history. It is believed that the false choice is a
function of the geopolitics of imperialism with deep roots in colonialism. The roots of violence in
post-colonial states goes back to the construction of the colonial state that saw the economy,
bureaucracy, police and the army positioned to serve the state rather than the people. The
structures of colonial state were never fully dismantled in the post-colonial era. However, where
the post-colonial states are democracies, social and human rights movements are able to prevent
gross violations of human rights (or, when it takes place, to use the legal system to bring the
perpetrators to justice). But in cases where the post-colonial state transfigured into an
authoritarian state, as in the case of Syria, this is not possible. These authoritarian states have
often received support from hegemonic powers pursuing geopolitical ambitions. But when such
regimes become a liability, the same states manipulate the politics of the post-colonial state by
relying on the genuine grievances of the people to oppose the incumbent regime. The outcome
often is increased violence by the state against its own people. It is against this backdrop that the
lifting of the embargo by the EU to supply arms to rebels, and earlier to allow the use of oil
revenues to fund the insurgency, together with the possibility of President Obama ordering
military action, are to be viewed. It is felt that despite denials, forces of imperialism are using the
acute distress of the Syrian people to pursue the agenda of regime change. What we need today is
not military intervention but prudent internationalism. It is an internationalism that refrains from
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undermining the normative consensus in the international community on when military action is
permissible. Prudent internationalism also acknowledges that democracy and democratic
practices cannot be exported to societies and that military action can undermine the future of
democracy by sharpening sectarian and social divides. Prudent internationalism also takes
cognizance of the past outcomes of military action , especially the continuing violence in societies
that have been the subject of military action (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya). Prudent
internationalism also does not accept the view that non-support of military action is support for
the brutal Assad regime. Prudent internationalism sees a third way , that of
diplomatic and political action to resolve the conflict. It requires that states and civil society forces
opposed to military action ensure that the Geneva 2 process gets under way . Indeed, there is a
moral obligation on all those opposed to military action not to remain passive spectators to the
unfolding tragedy in Syria. In this respect, it is particularly important that key developing
countries such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa act immediately to garner support for the
diplomatic process. The decision on convening the Geneva 2 process cannot be left to a few
states, in particular the US. Egypt has shown how the same hegemonic power that speaks of the
need to institute a democratic regime in Syria is a mute witness to its destruction in Egypt.
Meanwhile, as efforts are being made to start the Geneva 2 process, the Syrian people must be
offered increased humanitarian assistance to relieve their sufferings.
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Syria Crisis Impact: Middle East War

Continued Syrian crisis destabilizes Middle East, respawns al
Qaeda
Hashemi 2/20/14
Nader Hashemi is director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University of Denver. His latest book is The Syria Dilemma. The
views expressed are his own.
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/20/why-u-s-should-care-about-syria-crisis/
The moral case for why Syria matters is easy to make. The killing fields of Syria are now
reminiscent of those in Bosnia. Over the past three years, we have witnessed state-sanctioned war
crimes and crimes against humanity replete with chemical weapons, barrel bombs, the targeting
of children, mass rape, a refugee crisis and according to a new report industrial-scale torture
and killings. Indeed, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has described Syria as a
disgraceful humanitarian calamity with suffering and displacement unparalleled in recent
history. But a new dimension to this conflict has emerged: Syria is now a global security problem.
The Syrian conflict is destabilizing the Middle East . Lebanon has been convulsed, Iraq
has been shaken and Jordans fourth largest city today is a Syrian refugee camp. To a lesser
extent, Turkey has also been adversely affected some 600,000 refugees are said to be currently
living on the Turkish-Syrian border, and Turkeys role in the conflict has become a major bone of
contention in domestic Turkish politics. Meanwhile, the conflict has heightened sectarian tensions
across the Arab-Islamic world, fueled in part by the regional maneuverings of Saudi Arabia and
Iran and their respective allies. Both are fighting to expand their regional influence, and Syria
today is the key battleground for the contest. Finally, al Qaeda has re-emerged from the ashes of
the Syrian conflict. Al Qaeda now controls territory that stretches more than 400 miles across the
heart of the Middle East, CNN analyst Peter Bergen recently observed. This deeply troubling
development has obvious implications for global security, especially for Europe and the United
States.
Al Qaeda makes conflict spread regionally

Karam 1/8/14
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140108-jihadist-gains-in-syria-iraq-raise-stakesin-mideast.ece
Zeina Karam,
The Associated Press
Al-Qaeda is positioning itself as a vanguard defending Sunni Muslims against persecution by
Shiite-dominated governments in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. As a result, a Syrian rebellion against
President Bashar Assad is evolving into something bigger and more ambiguous: a fight
increasingly led by Sunni jihadists determined to create an Islamic state. Battling these extremists
is a coalition that includes Syrian moderates who are horrified that their cause has been
discredited, with parts of the nation falling under strict religious law. For moderates in the Middle
East, the renewed assertiveness of the extremists is increasingly taking on the aspect of a
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regional calamity. The war in Syria has poured gasoline on a raging fire in Iraq, and
conflicts in both countries are feeding upon one another and complicating an already complex
struggle, said Fawaz Gergez, director of the Middle East Center at the London School of
Economics. Now the reverberations of the Syria war are being felt on Arab streets, particularly
Iraq and Lebanon, and are aggravating Sunni-Shiite tensions across the Arab Middle
East. Why now? Experts see al-Qaeda characteristically taking advantage of social, religious
and ideological divisions of the kind that have been exposed by the Sunni-Shiite battle in
Syria.
Longer conflict causes Mideast explosion

Kaplan 8/27/13
http://www.globaldashboard.org/2013/08/27/seven-scenarios-for-the-future-of-syria/
Seth Kaplan is a Professorial Lecturer in the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He teaches, writes, and consults on issues related to
fragile states, governance, and development. He is the author of Fixing Fragile States: A New
Paradigm for Development (Praeger Security International, 2008) and Betrayed: Politics, Power,
and Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). A Wharton MBA and Palmer scholar, Seth has
worked for several large multinationals and founded four companies. He speaks fluent Mandarin
Chinese and Japanese.
6) Regional conflict. The likelihood of this also increases the longer the war goes on. Lebanon and
Iraq have already suffered from spillover : bombs have gone off in South Beirut and Tripoli in
the past week and Sunni extremists have been strengthened in Iraq in recent months. It is not out
of the realm of possibility that these trends will continue and a broad Sunni-Shiite conflict will
engulf the whole Levant. This is the worst result, and would have even greater consequences
for the region. Over 50 million people would be directly affected.
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Right to Protect Causes War Escalation

R2P interventionism is uniquely destabilizing BECAUSE its
ineffective
Menon 6/12/13
Yet the reassurances that force would be a rare, last-ditch response have not placated critics, for
several reasons. R2Ps pre-intervention prescriptions merely repeat existing remedies and add
nothing to diplomacys toolkit. Whats new is the casuistry of reframing and diminishing
sovereignty in order to legitimize altruistic armed intervention in defense of the abstract
rights that most political communities agree upon in theory. Given R2Ps emphasis on feasibility
and the chances for success, weak states are its most likely proving grounds; powerful ones need
not fear, no matter the magnitude of their misdeeds. Because idealism and power are inextricably
intertwined, with the latter frequently corrupting the former, R2P provides powerful states one
script for playing the Good Samaritan when intervention promotes their interests, and another for
eschewing or opposing aid when it doesnt. R2Ps defenders see this indictment as reflecting
hyperbole or misunderstanding, or as the artifice of dictators who declaim about sovereignty and
legality but in truth seek to avoid accountability. Yes, dictators have every reason to avoid
accountability, but it doesnt really matter which side is right. What matters is that in a world of
diverse polities and cultures, such objections and anxieties have sufficient appeal to prevent the
doctrine from acquiring the universal pragmatic applicability its supporters seek. Many states
have signed on to R2P, but it does not follow that they will stand behind its sovereignty-eroding
features when it is proposed as a plan for military action.
Disrupting sovereignty destroying the basis for collective

security
Brooks 1/14/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52290-hate-obamas-drone-war.html?
itemid=id#26087
Rosa Brooks is a law professor at the Georgetown University Law Center, a columnist and
contributing editor for Foreign Policy and a Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the New
America Foundation. From April 2009 to July 2011, she served as Counselor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, and in May 2010 she also became [1] Special
Coordinator for Rule of Law and Humanitarian Policy, running a new Pentagon office dedicated
to those issues. Brooks wrote a weekly column for the Los Angeles Times from 2005 to 2009,
and is an expert on national security, international law and human rights issues. At the Pentagon
her portfolio included both rule of law and human rights issues and global engagement, strategic
communication, and she received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service
for her work.
Second, arguments premised on the Responsibility to Protect are transparent : Evidence that a state
is unwilling or unable to protect its population from egregious harm can be examined by all, and
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R2P-based interventions are publicly proclaimed, making it possible to hold interveners
accountable for errors or abuses. Nonetheless, the parallels between R2P and the understanding of
sovereignty that undergirds U.S. drone policy are troubling. I'm no fan of the traditional legal
conception of sovereignty, which has been used to mask many abuses. But in a world with no
meaningful international governance structures, sovereignty -- even a weak and
hypocritical conception of sovereignty -- is one of the few bulwarks
against unilateral overreaching by great powers. Our fragile international
order rests less on "law" than on implicit bargains between states , and
insofar as U.S. drone policy further undermines traditional norms relating to sovereignty and the
use of force, it risks undermining those tenuous bargains. It risks sending the message -- to
friends and foes alike -- that we will no longer even offer much pretence of respecting
sovereignty. As a result, it risks undermining the fragile order we so desperately need.
Sovereignty erosion = international wars

Gay 7/23/13
Why is R2Ps gutting of national sovereignty a problem? Respect for sovereignty
is generally a stabilizing force in the international community. It narrows the scope of acceptable
disagreement between statesthere are fewer things to fight about. This can lead, in turn, to fewer
international armed conflictsand fewer of their attendant atrocities. R2Ps disregard for
sovereignty might empower the international community to, from time to time, actually stop
a genocide by intervention. Yet all too often, no international community exists. Interventions
can become proxy conflicts (this would happen in a Syria intervention, and was a danger in the
Balkans). And these proxy conflicts can readily yield atrocities of their own, perhaps far worse than
those the intervention was launched to prevent.
WW III
Johnstone 1/25/13
http://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/52236-responsibility-to-protect-is-apower-play.html?itemid=id#26087
Johnstone gained a BA in Russian Area Studies and a Ph.D. in French Literature from the
University of Minnesota.[1] She was active in the movement against the Vietnam War, organizing
the first international contacts between American citizens and Vietnamese representatives. Most
of Johnstone's adult life has been spent in France, Germany, and Italy. Johnstone was European
editor of the U.S. weekly In These Times from 1979 to 1990. She was press officer of the Green
group in the European Parliament from 1990 to 1996. Johnstone also regularly contributes to the
online magazine CounterPunch.[further explanation needed].
Opposing genocide has become a cottage industry in the United States. An example is a program
called "World Without Genocide" at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul. The recent
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commentary by its executive director, Ellen Kennedy ("Never again, its been said of genocide.
Do we finally grasp it?" Jan. 19), employs all the usual clichs of that well-meaning but
misguided campaign. Misguided, and, above all, misguiding. The antigenocide movement is
directing people of good intention away from the essential cause of our time -- to reverse the
drift toward worldwide war . The Bible of this campaign is Samantha Power's book, "A
Problem from Hell." Power's thesis is that the United States is too slow to intervene to "stop
genocide." It is a suggestion the U.S. government embraces, to the point of taking on Power as a
White House adviser. The reason is clear. Since the Holocaust has become the most omnipresent
historical reference in Western societies, the concept of "genocide" is widely accepted as the
greatest evil to afflict the planet. It is felt to be worse than war. Therein lies its immense
value to the U.S. military-industrial complex , and to a foreign-policy elite seeking
an acceptable pretext for military intervention. The obsession with "genocide" as the primary
humanitarian issue in the world today relativizes war. It reverses the final judgment of the
Nuremberg Trials that: "War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the
belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is
not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime, differing only from other
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Instead, war is
transformed into a chivalrous action to rescue whole populations from "genocide ." At the same
time, national sovereignty , erected as the barrier to prevent strong nations from invading
weaker ones -- that is, to prevent aggression and "the scourge of war" -- is derided as nothing but
a protection for evil rulers ("dictators") whose only ambition is to "massacre their own people."
This ideological construct is the basis for the Western-sponsored doctrine, forced on a more or less
reluctant United Nations, of " R2P, " the ambiguous shorthand for both the "right" and the
"responsibility" to protect people from their own governments. In practice, this can give the
dominant powers carte blanche to intervene militarily in weaker countries in order to support
whatever armed rebellions they favor. Once this doctrine seems to be accepted, it can even serve
as an incitement to opposition groups to provoke government repression in order to call for
"protection." Kennedy blames "genocide" on the legal barrier set up to try to prevent aggressive
war: national sovereignty. For more than 350 years," she writes, "the concept of 'national
sovereignty' held primacy over the idea of 'individual sovereignty' ... The result has been an 'over
and over again' phenomenon of genocide since the Holocaust, with millions of innocent lives lost
in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Guatemala, Argentina, East Timor ..." Yet Hitler
initiated World War II precisely in violation of the national sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and
Poland -- partly, he claimed, to stop alleged human-rights violations against ethnic Germans who
lived there. It was to invalidate this pretext, and "save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war," that the United Nations was founded on the basis of respect for national sovereignty. Of
course, there is no chance that the United States will abandon itsnational sovereignty. Rather,
other countries are called upon to abandon their national sovereignty to the United States.
Kennedy's list includes events that do not remotely fit the term "genocide" and leaves out others
that do -- all according to the official U.S. narrative of contemporary conflicts. But the significant
fact is that the worst of these slaughters -- Cambodia, Rwanda and the Holocaust itself -- occurred
during warsand as a result of wars. The systematic killing of European Jews took place during
World War II. In Rwanda, the horrific slaughter was a response to an invasion by Tutsi forces
from neighboring Uganda. The Cambodian slaughter was not the fault of "national sovereignty"
but the direct result of the U.S. violation of Cambodia's national sovereignty. Years of secret U.S.
bombing of the Cambodian countryside, followed by a U.S.-engineered overthrow of the
Cambodian government, opened the way for takeover of that country by embittered Khmer
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Rouge fighters who took out their resentment against the devastation of rural areas on the hapless
urban population, considered accomplices of their enemies. Some of the bloodiest events do not
make Kennedy's genocide list. Missing is the killing of more than half a million members of the
Indonesian Communist Party in 1965 and 1966. But the dictator responsible, Suharto, was "a
friend of the United States," and the victims were communists. A principal danger of the R2P
doctrine is that it encourages rebel factions to provoke repression, or to claim persecution, solely to
bring in foreign forces on their behalf. It is certain that opposition militants exaggerated
Moammar Gadhafi's threat to Benghazi to provoke the 2011 French-led NATO war against
Libya. The war in Mali is a direct result of the brutal overthrow of Gadhafi, who was a major
force for African stability. The sole purpose of R2P is to create a public opinion willing to accept
U.S. and NATO intervention in other countries. It is not meant to allow the Russians or the
Chinese, say, to intervene to protect housemaids in Saudi Arabia from being beheaded -- much
less to allow Cuban forces to shut down Guantanamo and end U.S. violations of human rights (on
Cuban territory). Intervention means war; war causes massacres and more
wars . The sense of being threatened by U.S. power incites other countries to build up their own
military defenses and to repress opposition militants who might serve as excuses for outside
intervention. Today, the greatest threat to the peoples of the world is not "evil dictators," but the
militarization of international relations which, unless reversed, is leading
toward the unimaginable catastrophe of World War III.
R2P incentivizes escalation to provoke an intervention

Menon 6/12/13
The point here is not to condemn particular states for their selective moral outrages or for putting
interests before ethics. This is what states of all stripes tend to do. Its not that they never act in
defense of principles or altruistically; its that they dont do so when important interests point
another way, or when the costs and hazards of defending them are deemed prohibitive. R2P
boosters and revolutionary liberals will reply that the inability to defend basic values everywhere
does not mean they cant be defended when possible. Examples of supposedly successful action
(Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Libya) are trotted out, perhaps supplemented by Emersons
quip about consistencys allure for little minds. But given the realities of power, what this
riposte concedes is that if a weak and ally-bereft state kills its citizens, it risks falling into the R2P
file and facing armed intervention. If not, then notwhich brings us to the problem of moral
hazard inherent in R2P. The prospect of an external humanitarian intervention, as noted
earlier, led the KLA to adopt tactics that bordered on terrorism , and Serbia in turn to adopt
tactics that resembled migratory genocide . In Libya, once the UN-sanctioned machinery of
intervention began to move, anti-Qaddafi insurgents had no reason to compromise and Qaddafi
had no motivation to hold back. R2P presents a theoretical continuum of measures with armed
intervention at one end, but engaged antagonists know that the various intermediate steps can
easily and rapidly be skipped, the continuum collapsed, and the concept applied expansively.
That encourages opposition forces to magnify violence to attract and suborn outside help, and it
encourages embattled regimes to accelerate efforts at repression before external intervention can be
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agreed upon and implemented. In short, the prospect of R2P interventions can easily make bad
situations worse. onsider Syria in this light. The Assad government has certainly slaughtered
enough of its own citizens to attract R2P attention. But no major power has proposed armed
intervention or even arming the insurgents in a dramatic or open way. Why? Because, unlike
Qaddafi, Assad has the equipment to make the establishment of a no-fly zone, let alone use of
ground troops, a very hazardous venture. Syria also has reliable supporters and arms suppliers in
Russia and Iran, and Beijing has joined Moscow in scuttling successive Security Council
resolutions aimed at the Assad regime. Russia and China had not forgotten that in Libya what
began as an R2P intervention to protect civilians turned quickly into one aimed at regime change.
Its impossible to prove, being a counterfactual, but had an R2P intervention in Syria ever seemed
possible to the combatants, it might well have made the carnage worse by quickening the tempo of
killing.
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Right to Protect Triggers Nuclear Proliferation

Strengthened R2P norm causes prolif.
Bolfrass 9/12/11
Alexander K. Bollfrass is a visiting scholar at the Stimson Center 9-12-2011 Explaining Libya to
Iran
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9970/explaining-libya-to-iran
Eight years after Moammar Gadhafi gave up his mail-order nuclear weapons program and chemical
munitions in exchange for dtente with the West, he has been chased from power by a ragtag rebel army
backed by Western airpower. Chances are that Gadhafi regrets his decision to forgo his WMD programs.
If he had been armed with nuclear or chemical weapons, NATO might not have intervened when he
threatened to massacre his own people. While Gadhafi's fall is good news, the end of the eccentric
colonel's dictatorship now heightens the challenge of getting the Irans and North Koreas of the world to
give up their nuclear ambitions in exchange for better relations with the West. Before the bombs started
falling on Tripoli, the intellectual and legal momentum behind such an intervention had been building for
years. Through the work of academics and humanitarian advocates, the idea known as the "responsibility
to protect," or R2P, has emerged as an increasingly mainstream norm among Western policymakers. R2P
emphasizes the responsibility of states to protect their populations and permits international intervention if
a government is unable or unwilling to prevent mass atrocities against its people. In March, the
international community did not dither when Gadhafi appeared to be preparing a massacre in Benghazi.
R2P was used to justify the first U.N.-sanctioned humanitarian intervention in a sovereign country against
the wishes of its government. The architects of the intervention were some of the very same countries that
had convinced Gadhafi to give up his weapons of mass destruction eight years earlier: France, Britain and
the United States.
Parallel to the humanitarian community's development of the R2P
doctrine, another community of foreign policy thinkers, those worried about the spread
of nuclear weapons, had worked to promote an idea with very different implications for
sovereignty. They reached the conclusion that fear of outside intervention was among
the many factors driving governments to build weapons of mass destruction . For this
reason, they argued, it was necessary to assuage that fear with the offer of a security guarantee once the
government could prove it had abandoned its WMD ambitions. In Libya, this security-assurance principle
successfully brought the archpariah of the 1980s back into the international fold in 2003.
The
contradictory doctrinal developments in humanitarian and security circles are not

abstract intellectual exercises; they have practical implications . In light of the Islamic
Republic's crushing of the Green Movement in 2009, it takes little imagination to see a Libya-like
situation emerge in Iran. Iranian leaders weighing the pros and cons of coming clean over their country's
nuclear program might look closely at what happened to Gadhafi after he surrendered his weapons
program. They might also consider Saddam Hussein and his nonexistent weapons of mass destruction,
while contrasting both these dictators with Kim Jong Il and his unpunished nuclear roguery and human
rights violations. They might come to the conclusion that nuclear weapons are useful. In
fact, we need not speculate about such a scenario, for this is essentially what Iranian Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said at the start of the Libyan campaign. The Iranians are not the only
ones learning this lesson, one that sets the stage for a future in which nuclear weapons
are prized as a counterweight to the threat of international intervention represented by
R2P and its inherent challenge to state sovereignty. Instead of greater openness and
West-friendly behavior, the response of the rogue states would be deeper retrenchment
under the cover of asymmetric WMD capabilities.
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Proliferation snowballs and puts everyone on hair trigger

every small crisis will go nuclear.
Soloski 9
Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S.
congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism, 9 (Henry, Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd, Policy Review June & July,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)
such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed
during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another
At a minimum,
of the two superpowers strong alliance systems the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led
Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance
tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States,
that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a
relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk).
nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies
in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of
nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent
nuclear powers by making them strategic partners (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France
and the uk), non-nato allies (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging
if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either
not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European
nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic
security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes,
by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed
entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak
alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the
international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there
is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in
a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not
matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that
might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence
or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military

science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or
unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to
date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below):
Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the
perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all
actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out
or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear
actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear
rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each
nuclear states military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its
military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get
to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be
even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision
guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options . Certainly, in
such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small
developments e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired
terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in
Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored
assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. could easily
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prompt nuclear weapons deployments with strategic consequences (arms races,
strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world every
quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is
possible today.23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition,
nor their critics, would ever want.
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Right to Protect Destroys US-Brazil Relations

Unchecked humanitarian intervention tanks US Brazilian
relations overwhelms alt causes
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style
Matias Spektor is assistant professor of international relations at Fundao Getulio Vargas in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil.
While Washington saw the Libya episode as a successful model for future humanitarian
interventions, Braslia saw it as a dangerous precedent . Brazils foreign policy elite believed
the resolution was too broad, giving NATO free rein over the terms and conditions of the
intervention. For Brazilian leadership, the thin rules governing the use of force on the part of the
major powers represent a great threat to international stability. The idea stems from a belief
that intrusive norms of humanitarian intervention will corrode the principles of
sovereignty and national autonomy and threaten international stabilityrepresenting
potentially even a greater risk than the rise of new powers, radical Islam and even
nuclear terror.
Brazil wants LIMITED and RESTRAINED r2p syncing with the

Brazilian position boosts relations and Brazilian soft power
Spektor 12
http://www.americasquarterly.org/humanitarian-interventionism-brazilian-style
Matias Spektor is assistant professor of international relations at Fundao Getulio Vargas in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil.
Brazilian officials were sensitive to the criticism. By November 2011, they began to circulate a
concept paper at the UN entitled Responsibility While Protecting, or RWP. The paper argued that
without limits on what the powerful may do, the emerging ideology of humanitarian intervention
could easily become a tool for foreign manipulation. It then went on to suggest that the
international community ought to codify standards and procedures to govern humanitarian
intervention in the future. In practice, RWP proposed the introduction of criteriasuch as last
resort, proportionality, and balance of consequencesbefore the Security Council authorized the
use of force. The paper called for the creation of a system for monitoring and reviewing the
intervention as it evolves. The RWP concept was not open- ended and it stopped short of
specifying how to roll out the criteria it proposed. Braslia conceived it less as a finished doctrine
and more as a broad message to the international community: if humanitarian interventions in the
future are loosely regulated and big power coalitions intervene as they please, then R2P will
divide the international community between north and south, rich and poor, strong and weak.
There was nothing new here. Brazils core message that interventions need to be carefully
regulated can in fact be found in the 2005 R2P initiative. The fact that the Brazilian government
dusted off its old proposal and presented it to the public demonstrated its willingness to engage
constructively in the global debate over the rules that govern the use of force in the next decades.
The reception of Brazils RWP in the U.S. and parts of Europe was negative at first. With the
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partial exception of Germany, Europe quickly dismissed the initiative as an attempt to block
action and let tyrannical leaders hide behind the legal shield of sovereignty. So far, Brazil has
done a poor job of explaining what RWP entails and answering suspicions that it is an attempt to
paralyze global action against mass atrocities instead of what it claims it is: a tool to ensure
interventions cause less damage than they set out to prevent. China, Russia and India did not
show much sympathy for RWP either. They were unhappy to see Brazil go further than they were
ready to go in criticizing the Assad regime in Syria, and in their eyes RWP only confirms Brazils
unpredictability when it comes to defending the primacy of sovereignty. This is, of course,
problematic for Brazil. Without the military or financial resources to be a major player in the
business of intervention and peacekeeping operations, its ability to speak up in global councils
rests on the tacit support of others. If it wants its new ideas to stick, then Brazil first needs to
convince and influence powerful countries. RWP has yet to achieve this. Equally complicated is
the reception of RWP at home. Brazils commitment to sovereignty is deeply rooted in and
around the state apparatus, and talk of humanitarian intervention is bound to clash with
embedded understandings of how the world works. It is among networks of activists and private
foundations, however, that RWP seems to have found its closest friends. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that networks of human rights NGOs active in Brazil and in and around the UN system
welcomed the initiative and are keen to learn more about it. Among these activists, there is a
sense that if R2P is ever going to become a key organizing principle of global order that is embraced
by all, then part of the bargain will have to involve some form of criteria for intervention. On this
view, weaker nations around the globe will only grant legitimacy to humanitarian intervention if
the use of force on behalf of strangers is strictly regulated to ensure that the interests of the
people come before those of powerful nations. Stepping Up or Stepping Out of Line? Future
disagreement between the U.S. and Brazil over humanitarian intervention is not
inevitable. Brazilian leaders have been sensitive to the accusation that they just want to be
recognized as a major power without paying any of the costs. Instead, Braslia believes it has
gone out of its way to demonstrate its burden-sharing credentials. To further the debate, though,
Brazilian leaders will need to remain involved in the shaping of humanitarian intervention norms
and avoid alienating the United States. As part of this process, Brazil is aiming to demonstrate
that it is entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, based not only on its
willingness to deploy military missions abroad to enforce peace and stability, but on the argument
that it can bring to international and multilateral debates and decisions a new, modern perspective
on security that is more in tune with the demands of a changing world. Along these lines, Braslia
believes that it can add legitimacy to global order because it seeks to preserve humanitarian
intervention while defending the weak from the selective geostrategic predations of the most
powerful. This is a message that strikes a chord with large swaths of people around the globe.
What is the implication for the United States? Since Brazil is more interested in adapting existing
conceptions of intervention than in offering alternative ones, the U.S. would be wise to invest in
greater dialogue and practical cooperation on the ground. A good example is the work currently
conducted by the two countries in Haiti or in bilateral military cooperation in partner countries
throughout Africa. Along these lines, Washington should not discard RWP too quickly. If notions
of civilian protection are going to become fixtures in the emerging normative landscape, then they
will have to be embraced by major rising powers, first among them the members of the BRICS
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Among those countries Brazil has been the one
most willing to engage on this topic. Rather than see RWP as an attempt to block progress toward
better and more efficient humanitarian interventions, the U.S. should take it as an attempt to
return to the initial spirit of R2P in the mid-2000s. At inception, the principle did not focus on the
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use of military force as the sole or primary instrument to cease violations of rights. Instead, it
gave equal attention to building state capacity to address structural causes of violence, such as
poverty. Brazil wants to emphasize that side of humanitarian intervention because it will not and
cannot take active part in it through military force. But it is keen to make contributions in the
fields where it has the ability to deliver, such as poverty alleviation, sustainable agriculture,
public service reform, and international aid and cooperation. These may not be integral to current
understandings of humanitarian intervention, but are likely to become so if R2P is to become a
dominant norm in twenty-first century international society. The best response by the U.S. would
be to take Brazils proposals seriously and engage Braslia in further specifying how the concept
would work in practice. Dialogue with Brazil is a low-cost initiative to try bridging the gap
between the Western industrial countries and the major developing states that now threatens the
future survival of a global shared responsibility to protect.
Constrained r2p boosts Brazilian prestige as global middleman

Stuenkl 11/28/11
Oliver Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getlio Vargas
Foundation (FGV) in So Paulo, where he coordinates the So Paulo branch of the School of
History and Social Science (CPDOC) and the executive program in International Relations. He is
also a non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of
the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network. His research focuses on rising powers; specifically
on Brazils, Indias and China's foreign policy and on their impact on global governance. He is
the author of the forthcoming IBSA: The rise of the Global South? (2014, Routledge Global
Institutions) and BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2014, Lexington).
In this context, Brazils President Dilma Rousseff has offered an interesting concept that may
bring the two sides together. During her opening speech at the UN General Assembly earlier this
year, Rousseff argued that better mechanisms were needed to assure that in an intervention
unwanted damage would be kept at a minimum, calling it the responsibility while
protecting (responsabilidade ao proteger). Since then, Brazil has been low-key about the
idea, and it has attempted to integrate the concept into last months IBSA declaration. Brazilian
Presidents Rousseff argument during her speech that while there was been a lot of talk () of
the right to protect, there is little said about the responsibility while protecting may seem
insignificant, but in essence means that if carried out in a responsible manner, Brazil could, in
principle, support intervention in the UN Security Council in the future and India and South
Africa are not fundamentally opposed to this idea. In an op-ed in todays Folha de So Paulo,
Matias Spektor, professor at Fundao Getulio Vargas who coordinates the Center for
International Relations, argues that the concept has the potential to turn into one of the Rousseff
administrations important contributions to the international debat e. If accepted by
the P5, the Brazilian initiative would impose constraints on interventions that could help
reluctant actors such as China and Russia support them, mitigating worries that interventions
cause more damage than necessary or support a hidden agenda. In order to successfully launch
the concept, Spektor argues, Brazil needs to promote it on many levels such as the G20 and
during the BRICS summit, which takes place in India next year. Whatever happens, the case
shows Brazil is eager to turn into an international agenda-setter : It is not only willing to
participate in international negotiations, but it also increasingly seeks to frame the debate and
decide which issues should be discussed in the first place.
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Con Imperialism Bad
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Racism
Imperialism is grounded in racism and strips countries of their culture
Narobi 86.[James, Professor of NHU, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics
of Language in African Literature. July 6th, 2013 London:Heinemann
Kenya, New Hampshire http://www.swaraj.org/ngugi.htm ]
ForthesepatrioticdefendersofthefightingculturesofAfricanpeople,imperialismisnota
slogan.Itisreal;itispalpableincontentandformandinitsmethodsandeffects.Imperialismis
theruleofconsolidatedfinancecapitalandsince1884thismonopolisticparasiticcapital
hasaffectedandcontinuestoaffectthelivesevenofthepeasantsintheremotestcornersof
ourcountries.Ifyouareindoubt,justcounthowmanyAfricancountrieshavenowbeen
mortgagedtoIMFthenewInternationalMinistryofFinanceasJuliusNyerereoncecalledit.
Whopaysforthemortgage?Everysingleproducerofrealwealth(usevalue)inthecountryso
mortgaged,whichmeanseverysingleworkerandpeasant.Imperialismistotal:ithas
economic,political,military,culturalandpsychologicalconsequencesforthepeopleofthe
worldtoday.Itcouldevenleadtoholocaust.Thefreedomforwesternfinancecapitalandfor
thevasttransnationalmonopoliesunderitsumbrellatocontinuestealingfromthe
countriesandpeopleofLatinAmerica,Africa,AsiaandPolynesiaistodayprotectedby
conventionalandnuclearweapons.Imperialism,ledbytheUSA,presentsthestruggling
peoplesoftheearthandallthosecallingforpeace,democracy.andsocialismwiththe
ultimatum:accepttheftordeath.Theoppressedandtheexploitedoftheearthmaintain
theirdefiance:libertyfromtheft.Butthebiggestweaponwieldedandactuallydaily
unleashedbyimperialismagainstthatcollectivedefianceistheculturalbomb.Theeffectof
aculturalbombistoannihilateapeoplesbeliefintheirnames,intheirlanguages,intheir
environment,intheirheritageofstruggle,intheirunity,intheircapacitiesandultimately
inthemselves.Itmakesthemseetheirpastasonewastelandofnonachievementandit
makesthemwanttodistancethemselvesfromthatwasteland.Itmakesthemwantto
identifywiththatwhichisfurthestremovedfromthemselves;forinstance,withother
peopleslanguagesratherthantheirown.Itmakesthemidentifywiththatwhichisdecadent
andreactionary,allthoseforceswhichwouldstoptheirownspringsoflife.Itevenplants
seriousdoubtsaboutthemoralrightnessofstruggle.Possibilitiesoftriumphorvictoryare
seenasremote,ridiculousdreams.Theintendedresultsaredespair,despondencyanda
collectivedeathwish.Amidstthiswastelandwhichithascreated,imperialismpresents
itselfasthecureanddemandsthatthedependantsinghymnsofpraisewiththeconstantrefrain:
Theftisholy.Indeed,thisrefrainsumsupthenewcreedoftheneocolonialbourgeoisiein
manyindependentAfricanstates.Theclassesfightingagainstimperialismeveninitsneo
colonialstageandform,havetoconfrontthisthreatwiththehigherandmorecreative
cultureofresolutestruggle.Theseclasseshavetowieldevenmorefirmlytheweaponsofthe
strugglecontainedintheircultures.Theyhavetospeaktheunitedlanguageofstruggle
containedineachoftheirlanguages.Theymustdiscovertheirvarioustonguestosingthesong:
ApeopleunitedcanneverbedefeatedColonialism dehumanizes individuals of all races
332
Stefan Bauschard
Hardt and Negri 2k
333
[Michael and Antonio, Political Philosopher and Literary Theorist at Duke University, Political Philosopher, Empire, page 129]
The work of numerous authors, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and
Franz Fanon, who have recognized that colonial representations and colonial sovereignty are dialectical in form has proven useful in several
The White
and the Black, the European and the Oriental, the colonizer and the colonized are all
representations that function only in relation to each other and (despite appearances) have
noreal necessary basis in nature, biology, or rationality. Colonialism is an abstract
machine that produces alterity and identity. And yet in the colonial situation these
differences and identities are made to function as if they were absolute, essential, and
natural. The rst result of the dialectical reading is thus the denaturalization of racial and
cultural difference. This does not mean that once recognized as articial constructions, colonial identities evaporate into thin air; they
respects. First of all, the dialectical construction demonstrates that there is nothing essential about the identities in struggle.
are real illusions and continue to function as if they were essential. This recognition is not a politics in itself, but merely the sign that an anti
the dialectical interpretation makes clear that colonialism

and colonialist representations are grounded in a violent struggle that must be continually
renewed. The European Selfneeds violence and needs to confront its Other to feel and maintain its power, to remake itself continually. The
colonial politics is possible. In the second place,
generalized state of war that continuously subtends colonial representations is not accidental or even unwantedviolence is the necessary
foundation of colonialism itself. Third, posing colonialism as a negative dialectic of recognition makes clear the potential for subversion inherent
in the situation. For a thinker like Fanon, the reference to Hegel suggests that the Master can only achieve a hollow form of recognition; it is the
Slave, through life-and-death struggle, who has the potential to move forward toward full consciousness. The dialectic ought to imply movement,
but this dialectic of European sovereign identity has fallen back into stasis. The failed dialectic suggests the possibility
of a proper dialectic that through negativity will move history forward.
333
Stefan Bauschard
334
Ethics
Imperialism destroys ethics by valuing security risks over collateral
damage
McNally 6 (David, Professor of political science at York University The new imperialists
Ideologies of Empire Ch 5 Pg 92) JL
Yet, even on Ignatieff s narrow definition, in which human rights are about stopping unmerited
cruelty and suffering, the crucial question is how we are to do so. What if some means to this
ostensible end say, a military invasion can reasonably be expected to produce tens of
thousands of civilian casualties and an almost certain breakdown in social order? Ignatieff s
doctrine of human rights provides absolutely no ethico-philosophical criteria in that regard.
Instead, he offers a pragmatic judgement and a highly dubious one that only U.S. military
power can be expected to advance human rights in the zones where barbarians rule. But note:
this is an utterly ad hoc addition to his theory. In no respect can it be said to flow from any of his
reflections on human rights per se. Moreover, others proceeding from the same principle of
limiting cruelty and suffering have arrived at entirely opposite conclusions with respect to imperial
war. Ignatieff s myriad proclamations for human rights thus lack any demonstrable tie to his
support of empire and imperial war. This is convenient, of course, since the chasm between
moralizing rhetoric and imperial advocacy allows Ignatieff to pump out empty platitudes as if these
contained real ethical guidance. Concrete moral choices, involving historical study and calibrations
of real human risk, never enter the equation. So, Ignatieff can drone on about the world being a
better place without Saddam, never so much as acknowledging the cost of this result: some 25,000
Iraqis killed as a result of armed conflict since the start of the U.S. invasion, and probably more
than 100,000 dead as a result of all the consequences of the U.S. war.24 Nowhere does he offer
any kind of calculus for determining if these tens of thousands of deaths are ethically justified.
Instead, banalities about being rid of Saddam are offered up without even countenancing the scale
of human suffering that Ignatieff s preferred course of action war and occupation has
entailed. But then, Ignatieff shows little regard for ordinary people in the zones of military
conflict. His concern is for the security of the West and of the U.S.A. in particular. Ruminating
about Americas new vulnerability in the world, for instance, he writes, When American naval
planners looked south from the Suez Canal, they had only bad options. All the potential refuelling
stops Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen are dangerous places for American
warships. As the attack on the U.S.S. Cole made clear, none of the governments in these
strategically vital refuelling stops can actually guarantee the safety of their imperial visitors.25
334
Stefan Bauschard
335
Indigenous Rights
335
Stefan Bauschard
336
Imperialism deteriorates the culture of indigenous people

Galeota2004[Julia,TheHumanist,ArticleCulturalImperialism:AnAmericanTradition
http://www.thehumanist.org/humanist/articles/essay3mayjune04.pdf]
In his 1976 work Communication and Cultural Domination, Herbert Chiller defines cultural
imperialism as: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern
world system, and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and
sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the
values and structures of the dominant center of the system. Thus, cultural imperialism
involves much more than simple consumer goods; it involves the dissemination of ostensibly
American principles, such as freedom and democracy. Though this process might sound
appealing on the surface, it masks a frightening truth: many cultures around the world are
gradually disappearing due to the overwhelming influence of corporate and cultural
America. The motivations behind American cultural imperialism parallel the justifications
for U.S. imperialism throughout history: the desire for access to foreign markets and the
belief in the superiority of American culture. Though the United States does boast the
worlds largest, most powerful economy, no business is completely satisfied with controlling
only the American market; American corporations want to control the other 95 percent of
the worlds consumers as well. However, one must question whether this projected society is
truly beneficial for all involved. Is it worth sacrificing countless indigenous cultures for the
unlikely promise of a world without conflict? Around the world, the answer is an
overwhelming No! Disregarding the fact that a world of homogenized culture would not
necessarily guarantee a world without conflict, the complex fabric of diverse cultures
around the world is a fundamental and indispensable basis of humanity. Throughout the
course of human existence, millions have died to preserve their indigenous culture. It is a
fundamental right of humanity to be allowed to preserve the mental, physical, intellectual,
and creative aspects of ones society. A single global culture would be nothing more than a
shallow, artificial culture of materialism reliant on technology. Thankfully, it would be nearly
impossible to create one bland culture in a world of over six billion people. And nor should we
want to. Contrary to Rothkopf s (and George W. Bushs) belief that, Good and evil, better and
worse coexist in this world, there are no such absolutes in this world. The United States should
not be able to relentlessly force other nations to accept its definition of what is good and just
or even modern. Fortunately, many victims of American cultural imperialism arent blind to the
subversion of their cultures.
336
Stefan Bauschard
337
Terrorism
Imperialism encourages fundamentalism which leads to terrorist organizations.
Gagnon 12
[Jean, Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Greater China Studies, Journal of South Asian Development, The Taliban Did Not Create the
Taliban, Imperialism Did, vol. 7 no. 1]
Sir Karl Poppers (2002) method of historicism has been neglected in the analysis of the radicalization of Afghanistans society in the form of the
Taliban. Poppers historicism is the idea that the past may allow the forecasting of the future by understanding the state of the present in one
by analyzing periods of imperialismthose eras of

social injustice, violence and oppressionit is seen that such imperialism led to radical
fundamentalism, as many had no choice but to lash out. The push to strenuous religious
identity, heavily laden with violent tactics, was the natural response of peoples trying to
maintain their identities and collective destiny from imperial domination. Furthermore, as
evidence continues to show, most often those individuals that are first to radicalize are the
poorest of the poor, the dispossessed, or those who have experienced violent injustices.
Using Poppers method, it is possible to explain how imperialism breeds radicalism (using
Afghanistan as an example) and as such provide some general recommendations to swing the pendulum in reverse so as to
specific line of historical inquiry. It is argued herein that
minimize radical behavior. This article has implications for international relations, foreign policies and aid.
Nuclear technology is easily accessible to terrorist groups, enabling them to inflict

maximum damage.
O'Neill 97 from the Institute for Science and International Security
[Kevn, Editor at the Institute for Science and International Security, The Nuclear Terrorist Threat
http://www.isisonline.org/publications/terrorism/threat.pdf]
The proliferation of nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices to terrorist groups

is perhaps one of the most frightening threats to U.S. security. Nuclear materials,
technologies and know-how are more widely available today than ever before. Small
quantities of both fissile materials and highly radioactive materials, sufficient to
manufacture a radiological dispersal device, are actively traded on the black market. A
nuclear detonation by a terrorist group would likely result in an unprecedented number of
casualties. In contrast, a radiological dispersal attack would probably be less violent, but
could significantly contaminate an urban center, causing economic and social disruption.
Both types of attacks would have significant psychological impacts on the entire
population.
337

Human Rights vs. State Sovereignty

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Stefan Bauschard

Human Rights v. Sovereignty

*** General ***...............................................................................................................................6

*** General ***

RESOLVED: When in conflict, human rights protection ought to

Four different understandings of sovereignty

Sovereignty is a conception of political authority

*** Human Rights Good ***

Human Rights Generally Good

Human rights key to stop global war

Human Rights Solve Extinction

Human Rights Solve War

Human rights solve war

Human rights are key to national security and preventing war

Human Rights Solve War

Human Rights Key National Security

Human Rights Solve Genocide

Human Rights Solve Terror

Human rights key to national security prevents terrorist

US human rights leadership is key to national security and

maintaining the focus on human rights and democracy worldwide is an

there is often a direct link between the absence of human

This is not an attack on armies, but on

America has an obligation to advance fundamental freedoms around the world.

are proud to bear the mantle of leadership in

Human Rights Solve Terror

Human Rights Key to Democracy

Promoting human rights in China is a precondition for the

Human Rights Key to Hegemony

Decline in leadership causes nuclear war

Human Rights Universal

Discursive practices regarding human rights important

U.S. Key to Global Human Rights

US pressure for human rights improvements key to hegemony

Human Rights Key To Peace

The protection of human rights prevents war

Human rights protection vital to real peace

Human Rights Key to Security

Human Rights Key To Democracy

Respect for human rights key to preventing democide

Human Rights Key To Development

Denying Human Rights Dehumanizes The Individual

*** A2: Common Negative Arguments

A2: Cultural Relevatism

Is a global culture inevitable? If

so, is the world ready for it?

These are some of

far from being universal,

international law and

that has been painstakingly contructed over the decades.

with international standards,

, rather than international legal imperative.

A2: International Regimes Solves

typically affect only a few (bordering) states.

that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two.

Treaties prove the multilateral human rights commitments fail

Treaty signers more likely to violate human rights

Treaties enable governments to deflect responsibility

These have created fertile grounds for

Treaties dont stop the human rights abuses of modern

in which movement of civilians was a major strategic goal,

*** Morality ***

Must Act Morally -- General

* General *...............................................................................................................................6

* General *

* Human Rights Good *

* Morality *

* Utilitarianism Bad *