Wittgenstein

Themes from the Tractatus I:

Reality and Pictures of Reality
James Studd
FRW Lecture 7. Friday wk. 3, TT14
1 Two Lectures on the Tractatus
The 7 principal propositions of the Tractatus
1. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the casea factis the existence of states of affairs.
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.
4. A thought is a proposition with sense.
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
6. The general form of a truth-function is [p, , N pq].
This is the general form of a proposition.
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
Week 3: Wittgensteins Logical Atomism, the Picture Theory
Week 5: Logic, the limits of expression; showing and saying.

2 Logical Atomism
The opening of the Tractatus has an ostensibly metaphysical character:
1. The world is all that is the case.
2. What is the casea factis the existence of states of affairs.
2.01. A state of affairs. . . is a combination of objects.
2.02. Objects are simple.
Lets consider Wittgensteins elaboration on the various elements at face value:

Objects
Example of objects
Frege: ordinary things (chairs, people, . . . .); abstract things (numbers, . . . )
Russell: sense-data (the-brown-patch-chair-shaped-datum, . . . )
Wittgenstein:
[Tractatus gives no examples; for the sake of exposition, we pretend ordinary things are
objects.]
Objects vs. relations
Frege and Russell: objects are sharply distinguished from relations.
Wittgenstein:
The objects remains constant across possible situations
2.022 It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the
real one, must have somethinga formin common with it.
2.023 Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.

States of affairs and facts

(a) In a state of affairs, objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
(b) States of affairs vary from world to world
(c) Facts are existent states of affairs.
(d) Unlike Russell: no general facts; no genuine (existent) negative facts.
(negative facts (so called) are the non-existence of a fact. (2.06))
Example: Jamess standing and Jamess sitting are both states of affairs; only the former
is a fact.

Possible situations
Possible situations consist of the possibility of existence and non-existence of states of
affairs (see, e.g. 2.2012.202)
2.061 State of affairs are independent of one another.
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible
to infer the existence or non-existence of another.
`
4.27 For n states of affairs, there are Kn nv0 nv possibilities of existence
and non-existence.
Of these states of affairs, any combinations can exist and the reminder
not exist.1
A toy example: Suppose there are two states of affairs: F a and F b. Then, there are:
`
1 p 20 q possible situation where neither exists.
`
2 p 21 q possible situation where one exists.
`
1 p 22 q 1 possible situation where both exist.
` ` `
So the total number of possible situations is 4. (K2 20 ` 21 ` 22 22 )

The world
Wittgenstein elaborates:
1. The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts not of things
1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts
Granted the invariance of objects, the world must clearly be more than their collection
(else all possible worlds would be the same).
But why require that the facts be all the facts?
Russell: You never can arrive at a general proposition by inference from particular propositions alone. (LA, 235.)
Suppose, for example, that you wish to prove . . . that All men are mortal
. . . and say A is man that is mortal, B is man that is mortal, C is a man
that is mortal, and so on until you finish. You will not be able, in that way, to
arrive at the proposition All men are mortal unless you known when you have
finished. That is to say, that in order to arrive . . . at the general proposition,
you must already have the general proposition All men are among those I have
enumerated. (ibid.)
Russell: there are general facts (and primitive knowledge of them).
Wittgenstein: no general facts. The truth and falsity of general propositions is determined
by the particular facts being all the facts.
1

`
Recall nv is the number of ways of choosing v things from n thingsi.e. the number of v-membered
`
subsets and n-membered set has. e.g. 32 3.

3 Picture Theory
Wittgenstein: We picture facts to ourselves. (2.1)
2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of objects.
2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a
determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the
same way.
The picture theory of propositions
4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality
A propositions is a model of reality as we imagine it. (cf. 2.12)
3.22 In a proposition a name [simple sign (3.201)] is the representative of an
object. (cf. 2.131)
3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration
of simple signs in the propositional sign. (cf. 2.15)
A picture of the picture theory
How might we picture the state of affairs that Russell loves Wittgenstein.
form:
F
hkkkikkkj

aRb

Propositional sign (a fact)

Pictorial relationship

Sense (a possible situation)

Russell
loves Wittgenstein pP q
loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
form: F
Other pictures (composed of words, sounds, action figures, . . . ) with the same logical
form can represent the same possible situation.
Holding fixed: bRa asserts that Wittgenstein loves Russell.
Varying : aRb can express any possible situation with logical form F
(A) A picture (or propositional sign) P is fact: the fact that the elements e1 , e2 , . . . of the
picture (constituent simple signs) are arranged accord to the pictures pictorial form
(propositions logical) form F. (2.14, 3.14)
(B) The elements e1 , e2 , . . . of P stand in a pictorial relation to things in the world
pe1 q, pe2 q, . . .. (2.15134)
(C) P represent the possible situation pP q that the depicted things pe1 q, pe2 q, . . . are
arranged according to the form F. (2.15, 2.2, 2.201)
(D) P is a correct picture (a true proposition) if pP q is how things actually are. (2.21)

4 Motivations for the Picture theory

Russell and Wittgenstein:
Empty names (which dont represent any object) are meaningless.
False propositions (which dont represent any fact) are meaningful.
How can we explain this difference?
Russell Desdemona loves Cassio cant express the fact that Desdemona loves Cassio. She
doesnt; so theres no such fact. (LA, 225)

Freges solution: posit thoughts

Empty names may be meaningful by virtue of expressing a sense.
False propositions may be meaningful by expressing a thought.
Frege: thoughts neither belong to the subjective inner world, nor the external world
A third realm must be recognized. What belongs to this corresponds with
ideas, in that it cannot be perceived by the senses, but with things, in that
it needs no bearer to the contents of whose consciousness to belong. Thus
the thought, for example, which we expressed in the Pythagorean theorem is
timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It
needs no bearer. It is not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is
like a planet which, already before anyone has seen it, has been in interaction
with other planets. (The thought, 302)2
Worry: how, then, do we come to grasp thoughts? How do we access the third realm?

Russells solution: the multiple relation theory of judgment

Although the fact that Desdemona loves Cassio does not exist; its constituents do.
Russell (1910): Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio iff Othello stands in the
believing relation to: Dedemona, the relation loves, and Cassio.
Analogously (we might suggest): The sentence Desdemona loves Cassio says that Desdemona loves Cassio iff the sentence stands in the saying relation to: Dedemona, the relation
loves, Cassio.

Mind 65 (1956) [1918], 289311.

Wittgenstein objects
3.141 A proposition is not a blend of words.(Just as a theme in music is not
a blend of notes.)
A proposition is articulate.
3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.
Consider the difference between the following:
(1) Desdemona, loves, Cassio
(2) Desdemona loves Cassio
The list of words (1) merely lists entities: Desdemona, the relation loves, and Cassio.
The sentence (2) says something about how these constituents fit together: namely,
that Desdemona loves Cassio.
How can (2) achieve this?
Russell (1910): hard to see how (2) improves on (1).
Russell (1913): Bring in logical forms too. Othellos belief is not just a relation to Desdemona, loves, and Cassio, but also the logical form of the proposition.
Worry: a return to the third realm?

Wittgensteins response
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one
composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of
written signs.
Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the
proposition.
3.1432 Instead of, The complex sign aRb says that a stands to b in the relation
R, we ought to put, That a stands to b in a certain relation says that
aRb.
3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation correponds to the configuration
of simple signs in the propositional sign.
(A) The crucial point is that while (1) is a list; (2) is a fact.
(B) We need not be acquainted with a third realm of forms in order to see how the
constituents fit together.
(C) The propositional sign itself shows us this in its logical form.
(D) It is not the list of words that says that Desdemona love Cassio; it is the fact that
Desdemona stands to Cassio in a certain relatione.g. respectively flanking the
left and right of the expression lovessays that Desdemona loves Cassio.

5 A case for atomism

Russell and Wittgenstein both endorse the possibility of analysis:
4.221 It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary
propositions which consist of names in immediate combination.
Why is this obvious?
Russell: analysis is necessary to explain how we can understand propositions. They must
after analysisconsist only of constituents with which we are acquainted.
Wittgenstein: simple objects are a precondition for meaningful expression.

Wittgenstein case for atomism

2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be
composite.
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)
4.061 A proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts.

Pears on Wittgensteins case for atomism

(P1) If there were any complex things named in the complete analyses of ordinary factual
sentences, then the analysing sentences would have sense only if certain other sentence
. . . were true.
(P2) But the sense of a sentence about a complex thing cannot possibly depend on the
truth of another sentence about its components.
So (C) Only simple things are named in complete analyses.3
In support of (P1)
Consider a, and suppose a is complex: e.g. b-standing-in-R-to-c.
Wittgenstein: this has sense (depicts a possible situation) only if a denote an object.
But: a denotes an object only if bRc
So has sense only if bRc is true.
In support of (P2): why cant bRc be a condition on a having sense?
Pears: sense-conditions are ineffable. But what. . . bRc says is evidently not ineffable.
Next time: why does Wittgenstein take sense-conditions to be ineffable?
3

David Pears The False Prison, vol 1 (OUP, 1987), pp. 66ff.