Feminist State Theory

Feminist State Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the Welfare State
Author(s): Lynne A. Haney

Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 641-666
Published by: Annual Reviews
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Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000. 26:641-66

Copyright? 2000 by AnnualReviews. All rightsreserved
FEMINISTSTATETHEORY:Applications
to Jurisprudence, Criminology,
and the Welfare State
LynneA. Haney
Departmentof Sociology, New YorkUniversity,269 MercerSt. 4th Floor, New York,NY;

e-mail: Haney@mail.soc.nyu.edu
Key Words gender,socialpolicy, law, criminaljustice

* Abstract Thischapterdiscussesdevelopmentsin feministstatetheorythrougha
criminology,andwelfarestate
comparisonof feministinterventionsintojurisprudence,
were subordinated
how
women
on
the
state
feminist
work
by a
analyzed
theory.Early
centralizedstate.Morerecently,feministscholarsunearthedhow statesaredifferentiThisdiscoveryof statevariaatedentities,comprisedof multiplegenderarrangements.
tionsurfaceddifferentlyin thesethreebranchesof scholarship.Feministlegaltheorists
concentratedon multiplelegal discourses,feministcriminologistson the diversesites
of case processing,andfeministwelfaretheoristson the varieddimensionsof welfare
stratification.
Becauseof theirdifferentapproachesto stategenderregimes,thesescholarshavemuchto offer,andto gainfrom,one another.Thus,thischapterarguesfor the
feministdialogueon the state.It also suggestsways
importanceof an interdisciplinary
to promotesucha dialogueandto inserta sociologicalperspectiveintothisnewmodeof
theorizing.
INTRODUCTION
State theoryis a relativelyrecentadditionto feminist scholarship.Althoughmany
political sociologists spent the last decade bringingthe state back into their field,
many feminist social scientists used this period to conceptualize ways to bring
the state into the study of gender. Initially, feminists drew the state into gender
studies throughanalyses of the state's role in reproducingpatriarchalsocial relations; they examined how women, as a homogenous group, were oppressedby
a centralized state. More recently, feminists have eschewed such conspiratorial
notions of statepatriarchyto takeup the more complicatedtask of illuminatingthe
ways states shape, and are shaped by, gender relations.Throughstudies of state
spheres-including welfare provisions, legal codes, and penal policies-feminist
theorists uncovered how states are differentiatedentities, composed of multiple
gender arrangements.The result has been the proliferationand diversificationof
0360-0572/00/0815-0641$14.00
641
642
HANEY
feminist analyses of the state. This chapterchartsthe trajectoriesof the new feminist scholarshipon differentstate realms.
To a large extent, this new feminist scholarshipis organizedby the type of
state apparatus.Some scholars focus on the dynamics of welfare redistribution
and policy formulation(Skocpol 1992, Orloff 1993, Gordon 1994); others center on the assignment of political citizenship and legal rights (Pateman 1988,
MacKinnon 1989, Rhode 1989). Still others are concerned with the formation of
penal and disciplinarypractices (Smart 1990, Daly 1994, Messerschmidt1997).

Existingreviewstendto echo these divisionsby systematizingfeministanalysesof
a particularstateapparatusandfleshingout theircontributionsto generalscholarly
debates(Smart1991, Orloff 1996, Daly & Maher1998). By dialoguingwith nonfeminist scholars, feminists made inroadsinto "mainstream"social science and
heightenedthe visibility of their work (Chavetz 1997). Although extraordinarily
important,these externaldialogues often deflected attentionfrom internalfeminist exchanges.Feministwelfare scholarsrarelyreferto the workof feminist legal
theoristsor criminologists;the reverseis also true.Thus,we lack an understanding
of the theoreticaldevelopmentsand empirical findings of different branchesof
-feminist state theory.
This chaptercrosses the traditionalbordersof subfields to compare feminist

interventionsinto jurisprudence,criminology, and welfare state theory. I chose
these fields for three primaryreasons. First, although not all of these scholars
claim to study the state per se, they all analyze the gendereddynamics of state
apparatuses.Second, feminist research in these areas has been the most extensive, thus allowing me to compare work of similar complexity. Third, feminist
scholarshipin these fields has the most relevanceto a broadsociological audience;
it addresses issues of concern to sociologists of law, criminologists, and political sociologists. This does not imply that I confine my analysis to texts written
exclusively by sociologists. Although I place sociological work in the forefront,
feminist state theoryis too interdisciplinaryto be limitedto one field. At the same
time, I do restrict my discussion in several ways. Most importantly,I address
feminist analyses of the state's gender regime-or the "state of play of gender
relationsin a given institution"(Connell 1987, p. 120). I review works that illuminatethe stateprocesses and arrangementsactive in fashioninggenderrelations
in the legal, criminaljustice, and welfare systems. My interestis less in feminist
discussions of how or why women and men reach state systems, and more in their
theoriesof the genderedprocesses thatsubjectsencounteronce embeddedin these
systems.
Even within these conceptualparameters,it is exceedingly difficultto do justice to the vast literature on gender and the state. Thus, this chapter is necessarily schematic; it paints a portrait of feminist state scholarship in broad strokes.
Nonetheless, the portraithas a frame. As I analyze developmentsin these three

fields, I comparefeminist work in two dimensions:their accounts of the state as
"need interpreter" and as "need satisfier" (Fraser 1989). I explore the extent to
which feminists in these fields view state gender regimes as operatingthrough

interpretivestructures,redistributivestructures,or some combinationof the two.
STATETHEORY
FEMINIST
643
How do feminists understandthe state's role in interpretingthe categoriesof gender? Do they see these acts of interpretationas key to the genderregimes of law,
criminaljustice, and welfare?Or do they conceptualizestateregimes as primarily
redistributivein nature,thatis, as stratifyingwomen and men throughdifferential
access to materialgoods, social rights,andpunishment?Have feministsconnected
these dimensions to link state interpretationand stratification?In short,I investigate the trajectoriesof three branchesof feminist scholarshipthrough"cultural"
and "structural"
perspectives.
This two-dimensionalframeworkwill facilitatedialogueamongfeministthinkers who too often seem to talkpasteach other.It also offers a way to disentanglethe
complex processes thatmakeup stategenderregimes,andit highlightsthe similarities and differencesin feminist theoreticaltrajectoriesand empiricalfindings.In
all of these fields, feminists have moved away from simply critiquingnonfeminist
scholarshipor imposing mainstreamparadigmsonto gender analyses. They have
developed models that draw on and expand existing frameworks.Their models
tend to share a critical, albeit tacit, understandingof the state as a multifaceted
entity.In a similarmanner,they expose the way statearenasare often fraughtwith
conflicting and contradictorymessages about gender.When taken together,this
feminist work replaces the notion of a singular,centralizedstate structurewith a
conception of the diversityof state apparatuses.
This recognitionof state variationhas surfaceddifferentlyin these threefields
of feminist studies. Feministlegal scholarshave developed sophisticatedtheories
of legal interpretationand textual representation,but remainless attentiveto the
law's stratifying dimensions. I discuss this development in the first section of
this chapter.Feminist criminologists,on the otherhand, have done extraordinary
empiricalworkon the redistributiveinequalitiesof the criminaljustice system, but
have yet to advancea full theorizationof the politics of representation.I describe
this trajectoryin the secondpartof the chapter.Recentfeministwelfarestatetheory
has moved in two directions-one strandexaminingthe politics of redistribution
and the otherexaminingthe politics of recognition.It has also begun to link these
state dimensions in provocativeways. These theoreticalinnovationshave much
to offer, and to gain from, feministjurisprudenceand criminology.I outline these
lessons in the chapter'sthird section. In the concluding section, I argue for the
importanceof establishing a dialogical field that encompasses feminist analyses
of the state. I also suggest ways to create such a field and to insert a sociological
perspectiveinto this new mode of theorizing.
REPRESENTATIONS OF EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE:
Feminist Jurisprudence
Feminist jurisprudencearose in the 1970s in response to political and intellectual developments in the field of law. From the onset, feminist legal scholars
were closely tied to the second-wave women's movement (Weisberg 1993). As
more women entered law school, they began to problematizeissues of sexual
644
HANEY
discrimination;as many of them became practitioners,they confronteddifficulties "doinglaw" as feminists (Kay 1985, Littleton 1987). Feministjurisprudence
also emergedalong with critical legal studies, formingpartof a largercritiqueof
legal liberalismand the inherentlogic of law (Menkel-Meadow1988). Feminist
jurisprudencealso arose at a time when sociologists of law had largely moved
away from structuralapproachestowardideological and interpretiveframeworks
(Seron & Munger1996). Thus, the timingof feministjurisprudence'sbirthshaped
its subsequentmaturation.These broadintellectualcurrentssurfacedin the developmentof feministjurisprudence-in its view of the law as a sexist ideology, then
as an interpretationof genderrelations,and finally as a constitutivediscourse.
Much of the early work in feminist jurisprudencechronicled the law as an
institutionof male dominance. Like many Marxist feminists, these scholars indicted the law as a tool and a symbol of male power.Echoing Hartmann(1976),
they claimedthatthe law actedto secureprivatepatriarchy-by excludingwomen
from the public sphere and refusing to interferein the domestic realm, the law
ensuredthatwomen remainedsubordinateto men (Taub& Schneider1982, Polan
1982). Moreover,echoing Rubin (1975), feminist legal theoristsarguedthat law
was constructedaround the exchange and commodificationof women (Rifkin
1980). The law distortedsocial realityin the interestof men and was thus integral
to patriarchalculture(McIntosh 1978).
Such conspiratorialargumentswere a sign of the times, reminiscentof early
trends in feminist theory. Although provocative,these conspiracytheories soon
proved to be limited. They were of little help to feminist practitionersin their
strugglesdoing law. Nor did they offer particularlynuancedaccountsof legal institutions.Like feminist theory in general, feminist jurisprudencebegan to shift
focus to view the law as an interpretivestructurethat articulatedpowerful statements about gender differentiation.Throughoutthe 1980s, feminist scholarsunearthedthe legal system's genderregime and explicatedthe stateof play of gender
relations in legal doctrine. There was little consensus over the characterof this
regime: For some, the law's gender regime operatedthroughits assumptionsof
gender difference, for others throughits sameness standard,and for still others
throughits constitutionof genderedsubjects.
Gender Regimes of Difference and Sameness

The equality/differencedebatewithinfeministjurisprudenceis well documentedin
the literature (Fineman & Thomadsen 1991, Weisberg 1993, Smith 1993,
Holland 1996). At the center of the debate were competing visions of the legal
system's representationof gender.On one side were those scholarswho viewed
the law's insistence on genderdifferenceas the core of its regime:by conceiving
of women andmen as fundamentallydifferent,the law perpetuateddiscrimination
againstwomen. Commonlyknownas "equalityfeminists,"these scholarsanalyzed
the genderedassumptionsof U.S. legal theoryandpractice.Like theirfeministpredecessors, they locatedthe law's genderbias in women's exclusion fromthe rights
FEMINIST
STATETHEORY
645
grantedto some men (Minow 1987). Their work documentedthe long history of
such exclusion and linked it to classificationsof "real"sex differences(Eisenstein
1988). In effect, they arguedthatthe law reproducedgenderinequalityby adhering
to an ideology of difference (Williams 1984). The solution was thereforeclear:
if the law's gender regime rested on sexual difference, it could be counteredby
accentuatingsexual similarity.Equalityfeministsthereforepushedlegal liberalism
to its limits-claiming thatthe law shouldindeedbecome a neutralinstrumentand
treatwomen as citizens not classified by sex (Minow 1987, Eisenstein 1988).
These argumentsaboutgendersamenessunquestionablyled to a series of court
victories.By appropriatingnotionsof equality,feministschallengedlong-standing
legal biases, especiallyin the areasof employmentanddivorce(Smart1986, Rhode
1989, Hoff 1991). Yet this approachhad more troublingoutcomes in other areas,
particularlyin reproductivelaw. For instance, the PregnancyDiscriminationAct
of 1978 sparkeda heated debate within feminist jurisprudence.The Act applied
a disability standardto pregnancyand effectively compelled employers to treat
it like all other disabilities (Kay 1985, Finley 1986). Some feminists found such
reasoning entirely appropriate-to secure equality, pregnantworkers should be
treatedlike workerswith temporarydisabilities (Williams 1984). For others, the
absurdityof viewing pregnancyas a disability exemplifiedthe dangerinherentin
the applicationof a single standardand the overall poverty of equality feminism
(Krieger& Cooney 1983, Scales 1986, Eisenstein 1988).
Equalityfeminismwas not only challengedon practicalgrounds;legal scholars
who advanceda deepercritiqueof law also subjectedit to theoreticalscrutiny.For
these scholars, equality feminists accepted precisely what was most problematic
about law-its myth of equal treatmentand individualism.Often referredto as
"difference"or "inequality"feminists, these scholarssaw the law's genderregime
as rooted in the tyranny of male objectivity and male norms (Weisberg 1993).
They locatedthe law's genderbias in its viewpoint,thatis, in its objective,neutral,
and distanced stance towardthe social world. They arguedthat objectivity was
male in both the culturaland the psychological sense: It not only reflectedmale
interests, but it was integral to male socialization and the male psyche (Scales
1986). They also faulted legal liberalism's assumptionsabout human separation
and distance-assumptions thatfailed to appreciatethe connectednessfosteredby
women's child-rearingexperiences (West 1988). As MacKinnon(1989, p. 162)
put it, the law "sees and treatswomen as men see and treat women" and is thus
the institutionalizationof male subjectivity.
Other feminist scholars used a difference approachto analyze the masculine
foundationsof legal norms. They revealed how legal notions of reasonablebehavior worked to dismiss the experiences of those who refused to conform-the
structuresof sexism, racism, and homophobiaoften conditionedpeople to act in
ways that made them appearunreasonableand thereforenot entitled to legal protection (Lahey 1991). Legal interpretationsof sufferingalso failed to acknowledge
the distinct quality of women's pain. According to West (1991), men and women
experiencepleasureandpain differently;men often findpleasurein those acts that
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HANEY
cause women pain, such as sexual harassmenton the street, the consumptionof
pornography,or domestic abuse. Here too the law adheredto a male standardby
excludingwomen-specificformsof injuryfromlegal redress(Dixon 1994). Moreover,legal constructionsof relevancyinsistedon a male mode of argumentation
by demandingthat women frame argumentsin legal or administrativecategories
andabandona story-tellingmode, the law systematicallycurtailedwomen's ability
to speak or be heard(Finley 1986, Bumiller 1990).
Still otherfeministsexposedhow the law's genderregimeof samenessobscured
social relationsof domination.They problematizedequalitydoctrine'spromiseof
similartreatmentfor the similarlysituated-pointing outthatit maskedthose social
processes thatsituatedwomen andmen differently(Minow 1987). As MacKinnon
(1987) argued,the sameness standardremovedpower from the social world and
negated women's economic dependency and sexual accessibility. It also failed
to recognize the distinct natureof women's embodiment,that is, how women's
bodies are used as an entrancepoint for the regulationof social norms(Eisenstein
1988, Smart 1993). In this way, the law's denial of structuralinequalityended up
reproducingmale dominanceand privilege.
Thus, the equality/differencedebate encompassedcompeting perspectiveson
the law's genderregime:For some, the law was unjustin its unequaltreatmentof
equals,whereasfor othersits injusticelay in its equaltreatmentof unequals.By the
late 1980s, manylegal scholarsconcludedthatthis debatehadreachedan impasse.
They then proposedways to link the insights offeredby each side. These scholars
advanced alternativeconceptions of equality-equality as acceptance (Littleton
1987), equality as a strategy (Majury 1987), and equality as "episodic" (Kay
1985). They also redefinednotions of differenceby shiftingfocus from difference
to disadvantage(Rhode 1989) and by emphasizing multiple axes of difference
(Harris 1990, Crenshaw 1991). In addition, they attemptedto break down the
dichotomies inherentin the difference/equalitydebate to argue for a theory of
equality based on a pluralizednotion of difference, what Eisenstein (1988, p. 5)
termed"radicalegalitarianism."
All of these theoristsprovidedpowerfulreadingsof the law's interpretivebias.
Their theoreticalsophisticationis largely unparalleledin other areas of feminist
state theory.However,their concentrationon legal interpretationoften deflected
attentionfrom full analyses of redistributivepractices. By eschewing empirical
work in favor of abstracttheorizing, feminist jurisprudenceleft a series of issues underexplored.How have differentlegal interpretationsbeen received in the
courtroom?What practicaland discursiveresources have they accordedwomen
as claimants?As practitioners?How have these interpretationsbeen adjudicated?
Whatwere the outcomes?
The one case in which feminists have explored these practicaloutcomes was
the infamous Sears Case-the 1979 case in which the Equal EmploymentOpportunityCommission accused Sears, Roebuck and Co. of sex discriminationin
theirassignment,training,and promotionof women (Milkman 1986, Scott 1988,
Eisenstein 1988). The case exemplified what could happen when certain legal
FEMINISTSTATETHEORY
647
interpretationswere put into action. Few feminists liked what they saw: The case
pitted "difference"feminism, articulatedby Rosalind Rosenberg,against "equality" feminism, articulatedby Alice Kessler Harris.Even more troublingthan the
court's 1986 rulingin favor of Sears was its selective use of differencearguments
to justify discrimination.Once they hit the courtroom,both feminist approaches
were strippedof their complexity and nuance (Scott 1988). Although the ominous tale of the Sears case could have provoked a renewed interest in the relationship between legal theory and practice,it did not. Instead,feminist jurisprudence moved towardincreasinglyabstractconceptionsof the law as a constitutive
discourse.
Postmodern LegalFeminism
Feminists' disillusionmentwith the difference/equalitydebatecoincided with the
rise of postmodernismin critical legal studies. For many,postmodernismoffered
a way out of the impasse (Ashe 1987, Smart 1991). Insteadof viewing law as a
series of rules and doctrines,feminists definedit as a constitutivediscourse (Frug
1992). The law,theyargued,producesmeaningandcreatessocial categories(Smart
1992). Throughrepresentationand subjectivization,the law sets social boundaries.
Like literatureand the media, the law is a culturalproductthatdefines knowledge
andpower (Heinzelman& Wiseman 1994, Fineman1995, Fineman& McCluskey
1997). Intheprocessof rethinkinglaw,these scholarsalso reconceptualizedgender.
Unlike feminist scholars who worked with fixed gender categories, postmodern
legal feminists saw gender as a classificatory scheme open to negotiation. The
legal system's gender regime encompassed precisely this classificatoryworkthe discursive processes through which gender categories accrued significance
(Cornell 1992). In Smart's(1992) terms, postmodernlegal feminists analyze the
"technologyof gender":the law as a mechanismthatfixes gendersignifiers,subject
positions, and differentiation(de Lauretis1987).
Another key element of postmodernlegal feminism is its recognition of the
law's constitutionof multiple categories of difference. Here too postmodernlegal feminists found fault in the work of their predecessors.They arguedthat the
equality/differencedebate focused on a single axis of oppression;it was infused
with essentialismandpremisedon unifiedgenderinterests(Crenshaw1991, Dixon
1994). Such reductionismmissed the complex ways the law subordinatescitizens
along the lines of race, class, and sexuality (Coombs 1996). According to Harris
(1990), these classificationsform "inexplicablewebs" of oppression;the law sets
down multipleboundariesof inclusion and exclusion. Thus, in Crenshaw's(1989)
terms, legal theory and politics should begin to "demarginalizethe intersections"
by centeringon the multiply disadvantaged.
Postmodernismthus marked a profound shift in feminist jurisprudence.For
these theorists,the law became a framingdiscourse. Legal language became the
site of power struggles (Frug 1992). Gender became a subject position that the
law brings into being (Smart 1993). Cases like the Sears affairbecame texts to be
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unpackedfor theirlevels of rhetoricalsignification(Scott 1988). Whenpostmodern
legal feminists veered away from abstractdeconstruction,they turnedto personal
narrativesof legal power and subversion(Williams 1991, White 1991). Like legal
deconstruction,such narrativesfostered an appreciationof juridical variability.
They revealedthatthe law's regime does not operatethroughsameness or difference, but throughinterpretiveprocesses that shape experience in complex ways.
Althoughprovocative,it is not clear whethersuch narrativesled feminist scholars
any closer to answeringthe questionsposed earlier.How do legal discourses distributeresources,rights,andtools to those they target?As Seron& Munger(1996)
ask of legal theoryin general:what aboutthe powerof race, class, and genderthat
extendsbeyond individualexperience,consciousness, or discursivesignification?
In short,what abouta more sociologically inspiredlegal feminism?
PRACTICES OF BENEVOLENCEAND PUNISHMENT:

Feminist Criminology
In contrastto the abstracttheorizingof feministjurisprudence,feminist criminology is quite empiricallygrounded.Feminist criminologistshave been less influenced by the theoreticaland epistemologicalshifts of postmodernism(Carrington
1994). They have also been less engaged in the conceptual debates of feminist
theory (Simpson 1989). Until recently,their focus was primarilyon the field of
criminology.This dialogue with criminologyleft its markon feminist analyses
surfacingin the kinds of questionsthey ask and the ways they answerthem (Daly
& Maher 1998). Feminist criminologistsare arguablythe least theoreticalof the
feminist scholars discussed in this essay, but they are also the most empirically
sophisticated.They investigateprecisely those issues thatelude feminist legal theorists, that is, distributivepatternsof punishmentand stratificationin the justice
system.
Overall,analyses of the justice system's genderregime constituteonly a small
part of feminist criminology. As Daly & Chesney-Lind(1988) argue, feminist
criminologistswere morepreoccupiedwith gender-ratioandgeneralizabilityproblems. First, feminist criminologists conducted importantresearch on the gender gap in crime rates. They found that women commit fewer crimes than men
(Morris1987, Triplett& Myers 1995); they discoveredthatwomen and men commit differentkinds of crime (Heimer 1995), and they unearthedhistoricalchanges
in patternsof female offending(Adler 1975, Simon 1975). Second, feminist criminologists challengedthe misogyny underlyingtraditionalexplanationsof female
crime, such as theories of hormonalimbalances,mental illness, and sexual malfunction (Smart 1977, Naffine 1987). They also critiquedcriminologistswho imposed male models onto female experience-arguing thatan "addwomen andstir"
approachled to distortedexplanationsof female crime (Morris 1987, Gelsthorpe
& Morris 1988). In response, feminist scholarsproposedtheir own explanations
for female criminality.They pointed to a series of explanatoryfactors, including
FEMINISTSTATETHEORY
649
structuresof gender and racial inequality,levels of anomie, modes of informal/

formal social control, socializationpatterns,gendernorms,and opportunitystructures (Steffensmeier& Allan 1996, Mann 1996, Messerschmidt1997).
In addition to analyses of the nature and causes of female crime, feminist
criminologistsoffered importantinsights into how the justice system genders its
subjects. At one level, their accounts parallel those of feminist legal theorists;
both groups are centrally concerned with questions of equality and difference.
Yet feminist criminologists approachthese questions differently; they are less
interestedin interpretivestructuresand more in patternsof trackingor labeling. In
particular,feminist criminologistssought to understandhow women and men are
treatedin the justice system, thatis, whetherwomen are subjectedto more severe
or more lenient treatmentthanmen.
GenderRegimes of Severityand Leniency

Unlike feministjurisprudence'sdebateaboutthe law's genderregime of sameness
or difference,feminist criminologybegan from the premise of difference.Empirical evidence collected since the 1970s clearly pointedto differentialtreatmentof
women in the justice system. Yet it was not entirelyclear how to characterizethis
treatment.Sometimes referredto as the "evil woman thesis,"a few early studies
found that women were treatedmore harshlyby the justice system (Temin 1973,
Chesney-Lind1977). This was particularlytruefor those who engaged in serious
offenses; women who were thoughtto repudiatefemale norms had their "morality" called into question (Visher 1983). Stateofficials were said to deal with these
women retributivelyand to come down harderon those who did not conform to
conventionalfemale expectations(Parisi 1982).
This argumentaboutthe severe treatmentof females was especially prominent
in studies of the juvenile system. For example, Chesney-Lind& Sheldon (1997)
documentedthe discriminationthat girls experiencedin the justice system. They
arguedthatgirls were drawninto the state's web for less serious offenses, such as
sexual transgressionsand status violations. They assertedthat the justice system
attemptedto securefemale obedience and compliance,particularlyfor those girls
thoughtto be sexually active. Thus, the justice system's gender regime was said
to operatethroughits harshtreatmentand furthervictimizationof girls.
Using large-scale statisticalsurveys, other feminist criminologistsuncovered
the opposite pattern:The justice system treatedwomen more leniently than men
(Steffensmeieret al 1993). Attentionthen turnedto explainingthis variation.On
the one hand,some criminologistsused these datato suggestthatthejustice system
workedwith stereotypicalnotions of gender (Eaton 1986). They claimed that the
statetook a chivalrousapproachto women;justice officials did not believe women
could commitcrimeandwere unwillingto inflictharmon them (Webb1984). State
actorswere also said to act paternalistically,assumingthatwomen were childlike
and not responsible for their actions (Anderson 1976). The outcome was lenient
treatmentdesigned to protectthe vulnerable.
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HANEY
Feminist criminologists who supplementedstatistical surveys with qualitative data discoveredthat state officials seemed less influencedby paternalistimpulses and more affected by practical exigencies (Allen 1987, Ferraro 1989,
Simpson 1991). Although they also saw the justice system's gender regime as
one of leniency, they viewed its motives differently.For instance, in a study of
> 1000 probationcases, Kruttschnitt(1982) found thata defendant'slevel of economic dependencywas the primaryfactordeterminingsentence severity.Instead
of attributingthis to state patriarchy,she revealedthatprobationofficers saw dependent women as safer bets owing to the control exerted over them by their
families. In a similar manner,Steffensmeieret al (1993) suggested that judges
viewed female defendantsas less culpablein partbecause of women's ties to and
responsibilitiesin the community.They also discoveredthatjudges weightedpractical concernsquite heavily in sentencingdecisions, factoringin whetherwomen
had child-careresponsibilitiesand physical or emotional problems. Daly (1987,
1989) uncovered a similar reasoning at work in the court system. She claimed
that the justice system was invested in policing traditionaleconomic and familial
roles-the court "familied"women not because they wantedto protectthem, but
becausethey soughtto maintainconventionaldomesticarrangementsandinformal
modes of social control.
Like the equality/differencedebate, the severity/leniencydebate preoccupied
feminists for much of the 1980s. As in feminist jurisprudence,feminist criminologists eventually deemed this debate futile (Daly 1994). Instead of insisting on a dichotomous gender regime, some suggested that the regime operated
throughboth severityand leniency. Perhapsthe system did not function the same
way at all points for all women; in arrestand imprisonmentdecisions, sex had
a positive effect, but in sentencing decisions it exerted little influence; in all of
these decisions, race and class exertedtheirown influence(Morris1987, Simpson
1991, Mann 1996). Others suggested that the "evil woman"and "statepaternalism" theses be seen as complementary(Crew 1991). Perhapsthe system's gender
regimewas rootedin its enforcementof traditionalsex roles, which sometimesbred
more severe, and sometimes more lenient, treatment.Still others questioned the
premise of the severity/leniencydebate, arguingthat it took men as the norm to
analyzehow women deviatedfrom thatnorm (Daly 1994, Naffine 1996). The political implicationsof this troubledmany feminists:In this case, applying a male
standardto women could imply incarceratingmore women under worse conditions for longerperiods(Rafter1990). Why not take women as the norm?In short,
perhapsthe justice system consisted of multipleregimes and diverse disciplinary
practices.
Processing Gender, Race, and Class

Althoughmanylegal theoriststranscendedtheirequality/differencedebatethrough
postmodernism,few feminist criminologists took this route out of the severity/
leniency impasse. Instead, in recent years they have broadenedtheir empirical
FEMINIST
STATETHEORY
651
focus to illuminate the gendered dynamics of case processing. Ratherthan examine how gender affects sentencing outcomes, these criminologists elucidate
the way gender constructsbecome embeddedin case processing. With this new
focus, feminist criminologists discovered variationsin the justice system's messages, targets,and mode of operation.Hence, like feministjurisprudence,feminist
criminology has become more sensitive to the diversity of gender regimes. Yet
they center on a differenttype of variation-exploring the diversityin the justice
system's stratifyingand labeling processes.
Daly's (1994) researchon the New Havencourtsystem is an excellent example
of this approach.Daly uses multiple methods to capturethe diverse contexts and
dimensionsof case processing.She revealsthatthe behaviorof courtofficials was
not motivatedby patriarchy,but was guided by genderedpresuppositionsabout
criminalityandjustice. As cases madetheirway throughthe court,defendantswere
constructedin contrastingways: notions of appropriatedomestic arrangements,
good mothering,familial responsibility,reformability,and victimizationwere deployed to label women and men. This labeling helped to shape genderdifferences
in outcomes. Daly's analysis thus moves beyond the severity/leniencydichotomy
to reject the idea of a singulargenderregime. It also offers a compelling account
of the many justificationsused to explain female and male criminality.In short,
Daly's work introduces one type of state variation-diversity in the processes
throughwhich the justice system gendersits subjects.
Daly's work identifiesanotherform of variationthroughan analysis of how the
justice systemconstructsdefendantsalongrace,class, andgenderlines. Indoing so,
Daly rejects the essentialismthatplagued so much feminist work in criminology.
As Simpson& Elis (1994) put it, earlyfeministcriminologyhadprivilegedgender
subordination.By ignoring the intersectionof race, class, and gender, feminist
criminologists had producedinaccurateanalyses of the causes of female crime
and the system's gender regime (Hill & Crawford1990, Simpson 1991, Mann
1996). The justice system did not hold all women up to the same gender norms
(Ferraro1989, Carrington1994). Nor did it label all women accordingto the same
evaluativecriteria(Arnold 1990, Naffine 1996). Thus, these scholarspointed to a
second type of variation-differences in the social constructionsand disciplinary
practicesappliedto women themselves.
Reflecting these shifts, Messerschmidt's(1997) most recent work lays out an
importantframeworkfor analyzing the constructionof gender, race, class, and
crime. Messerschmidt's frameworkcombines Connell's (1987) structuraltheory of gender and West & Fenstermaker's(1995) theory of "doing difference."
Like crime, Messerschmidtclaims that gender, race, and class must be "done."
They are situationalaccomplishmentsthat can take on a multiplicity of forms.
Their precise form depends largely on a social actor's structurallocation and
context-positions thatmakeavailabledifferentconstructiveresources.Todemonstrate this, Messerschmidtpresents four case studies of gender, race, class, and
crime in the making: He analyzes individual, institutional,and cultural stories
to explicate how these categories were constructed and how crime became a
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resource for "doing"other identities. In acknowledgingthe constructivequality of these categories,Messerschmidturges criminologiststo unpackthe diverse
natureof gender,race, and class relations. Moreover,in illuminatingthese constructs'structuraland situationalaspects,he encouragescriminologiststo examine
the ways social relationshipsare "made"in different institutions,including the
state.
At one level, there are definite parallelsbetween developmentsin feministjurisprudenceand feminist criminology.Both fields emergedwith a critiqueof state
patriarchyand evolved to recognize variationsin the form and content of state
genderregimes.However,theiranalyses of variationsareof a differentsort.Overall, feminist criminologists remain focused on how the justice system stratifies
its subjects. Some examine how gender affects arrestand sentencing outcomes,
thus offering compelling accountsof the system's structuraltracking;others link
these structuraldynamics to the labeling of women and men, thus providing insights into the constructionof genderrelations.Feministcriminologists'empirical
focus thereforeenablesthemto capturepreciselywhatis missing fromfeministjurisprudence:a sociologically inspiredlegal feminismattentiveto formsofjuridical
stratificationand redistributiveinequities.
Yet one could arguethat the reverseis also true.Feministcriminologistshave
yet to develop the sophisticatedinterpretiveanalyses advancedby feminist legal
theorists.Most feminist criminologistscontinueto study patternsof treatmentby
sex. However,the justice system also gives meaning to the categories of gender.
Although some feminist criminologistshave begun to illuminatehow state actors
draw on availablegenderedscripts,they tend to assume the existence of a stable
symbolic order.That is, they take genderedmeanings and scripts as being "out
there,"readyto be utilized by actors in differentsituations.However,as feminist
legal theoristsreveal, the legal and penal systems help to establish this gendered
order:They producekey social categories,often in dichotomousterms,andimbue
those categories with significance. State actors not only use the available repertoires to constructgenderrelations;they also help to constitutethose repertoires.
Thus, these two feminist fields have much to gain from each other. Together,
they point to the importanceof analyzing state structuresof stratificationand of
interpretationin all of their nuance and complexity. It is here that feminist welfare scholars have much to offer, and to learn from, their colleagues in law and
criminology.
POLICIES OF REDISTRIBUTION AND

INTERPRETATION:Feminist Welfare State Scholarship
Althoughfeminist welfare scholarshipemergedat roughly the same time as feminist jurisprudenceand criminology,it arose in response to differentintellectual
developments.As Gordon(1990) argued,feminist welfare scholarsstood in dialogue with the broaderstatescholarship.Manyfeministsdrewon the long tradition
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of theoreticalwork on welfare development.They confrontedstructuralfunctionalist theories of the welfare state's usurpationof family functions, they grappled
with Marxisttheoriesof the welfare state as an instrumentof capitalism,and they
encounteredstate-centeredtheories that tracedthe welfare state to particularpolitical configurations.These theoreticalperspectives left their mark on feminist
welfare scholarship.Of all the feminists scholarsreviewed here, welfare scholars
are most likely to define themselves as state theorists.They also tend to adhereto
a more comparativeand historicalfocus. From this perspective,feminist welfare
scholars have begun to combine their approachesto produceinnovativetheories
of state stratificationand interpretation.
Yet these theoreticalinnovationstook time to blossom. As in legal theory and
criminology, feminist welfare scholars began by inserting women into existing
frameworks.Unlike feministjurisprudence,the welfare scholarshipwas not characterizedby debates about equality and difference-the welfare state clearly enmeshed men and women in differentprograms.Thus, like feminist criminology,
the welfarescholarshipbeganfroma premiseof difference.Forthem,the key question was whetherthis differentialtreatmenthurtor helped women. Early welfare
scholarstendedto view the state as accentuatingsexual hierarchiesand reproducing capitalismandpatriarchy(Hartmann1976). Throughits supportof the nuclear
family, codificationof a family ethic, and insistence on the family wage, the state
was said to bolster "private"patriarchy,or female dependenceon individualmen
(Abramovitz1988). In addition,the state was indictedfor creatinga new form of
"public"patriarchy,or female relianceon men as a collective embodiedin the state
(Brown 1981). By taking over men's familial power and stepping in to manage
women's lives, feminists arguedthatthe welfare statefosteredfemale dependence
on the state itself (Boris & Bardaglio 1983).
At the same time, otherfeministsadvanceda more sanguineview of the welfare
state. They arguedthat,whateverits limitations,welfarepolicy does help women.
They pointed out that generous welfare states tend to be associated with lower
levels of female poverty (Ruggie 1984, Kamerman1984). Even when states do
not eliminatefemale poverty,assistanceprogramscan shield women fromextreme
deprivationandenhancetheirabilityto survivematerially(Piven 1990, Edin& Lein
1996). These scholarsalso claimedthatwelfarepolicies can fosterfemale activism
andheightensolidarityamongthe otherwisedisconnected(Piven& Cloward1977,
Schneider 1990).
Both feminist approachesoffered insights into the welfare system's effects on
women. Nonetheless, as Orloff (1996) argued,these analyses failed to capturethe
complexity of welfare provision. They lacked an appreciationof how states actually operate;they were blind to nationaland historicalvariationin state structure.
To correctfor these omissions, recentfeministwelfare scholarshipbranchedoff in
two directions-some unpackedvariationin systems of redistributionand others
exploredvariationsin interpretivestructures(Haney 1998). Together,these scholars unearthedthe stratifyingand discursivepracticesof differentwelfare states as
they develop over time.
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Gender Regimes of Need Satisfaction and Interpretation

To transcendthe good state/badstatedivide, feminist scholarsbegan to probeinto
the actualworkingsof the U.S. welfare state. They arrivedat a criticaldiscovery:
the welfare state was bifurcatedinto masculineand feminine subsystemsthat operatedin contrastingways (Gordon 1990). The top tier, commonly known as the
"social insurance"subsystem,positioned recipientsas rights-bearingindividuals
entitledto assistance(Sapiro 1990). Policies like workmen'scompensation,unemployment insurance,and Social Security bolsteredrecipients' providerroles and
enabledthem to supporttheirfamilies (Nelson 1990). The bottomtier,commonly
known as the "social assistance"subsystem, positioned recipients as dependent
clients who lacked a male breadwinner(Mink 1994). Policies like Mothers' Pensions, Aid to DependentChildren,and Aid to Families with DependentChildren
accordedassistancebasedon a principleof care;they allocatedbenefitsin a discretionaryfashionthatsubjectedrecipientsto means-testsandconsiderableregulation
(Nelson 1990).
Althoughfew feminist scholarsdisputedthis characterizationof the two-tiered
welfare state, manyfound it to be incomplete.It relied on a narrowset of incomemaintenanceprograms;the state's redistributiveregime looked far more complex when a fuller range of state policies were considered (Gordon 1994). As
Orloff (1996) points out, the two-tieredcharacterizationalso took the U.S. case
as the norm-implicitly assumingthatotherstateswere similarlybifurcated.This
assumptionprovedto be inaccurate.Drawing on Esping-Andersen's(1990) welfare regime typology, feminist scholarsconductedcomparativestudies of the redistributiveoutputsof differentwelfare states. They began by adding women to
Esping-Andersen'stypology to ascertainwhetherliberal,conservative,and socialdemocraticregimeshad differenteffects on women's materialwell being (Hobson
1994, Gustafsson 1994). They discoveredthat these regimes variedin severaldimensions, including the organizationof care work, rates of female employment,
andreproductivepolicies. They also unearthedvariationsamongcountriesof similarregimetypes-social-democratic regimesdifferedin theirsupportfor employed
mothers,conservativeregimesdifferedin their supportfor women's paid employment, and liberal regimes differed in their supportfor sole mothers(Leira 1992,
Shaver1993, Borchorst1994, Orloff 1996). Perhapstherewas not a single, uniform
state genderregime;perhapsgenderregimes variedby system type?
With this insight, feminist scholars probed furtherinto the gendered dimensions of stateredistribution.This resultedin a plethoraof feminist welfareregime
models that emphasizeddifferentdimensions and redistributiveoutcomes (Lewis
1992, O'Connor1993, Sainsbury1994). Of all these models, Orloff's work(1993,
1996) provides the most elaborategender analysis of state welfare regimes. Her
regime analysis began with an extension of Esping-Andersen'sframework-she
addedgenderdifferentiationto his stratificationdimension, she expandedhis notion of decommodificationto accountfor carework,and she conceptualizeda new
dimensionto capturewomen's abilityto maintainautonomoushouseholds(Orloff
FEMINIST
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1993). More recently,O'Connor,Orloff & Shaver(1999) proposedthe most comprehensiveregime model to date:Theirmodel assesses threepolicy arenas-labor
markets, income support, and reproduction-to explicate gendered patterns of
stratification,social/civil rights,income organization,andpowerrelations.The result is a multidimensionalanalysis of the redistributivepracticesof severalliberal
welfare states.
As these regime analysts constructednew maps of the gendered dimensions
of state redistribution,another strandof feminist scholarshipexplicated the interpretivebases of the welfare state. These scholars drew on and expandedthe
conceptionof the welfare state articulatedby otherpolitical sociologists (Skocpol
1992, Quadagno1994, Amenta 1998). For them, the welfare state was not only a
redistributivearena;it was also a site of clashes over genderedmeanings (Fraser
& Gordon 1994). State gender regimes were reflectionsof these ideological and
discursivebattles.Welfarestates embodieddistinctclaims-makingmodes and offered an arrayof rhetoricalpossibilities for framingneeds (Peattie& Rein 1983).
Like its distributionof materialbenefits,the allocationof discursiveresourceshad
profoundpolitical and strategicimportance.The state's culturaldimensionswere
thus as criticalas its stratifyingdimensions;both dimensionsfixed social relations
and shapedsocial identities (Pringle& Watson 1992).
Withthis interpretivefocus, feminist scholarsproduceda rich historiographyof
the formationof state conceptions of gender.Their discoveries were many.First,
they complicated argumentsabout the state's masculine origins-revealing how
female reformersappropriateda discourse of maternalism,and mixed it with a
unique version of professionalism,to participatein the constructionof Western
welfare states (Bock & Thane 1991, Koven & Michel 1993). Exalting women's
capacityto mother,female activistsin the UnitedStatesused a politics of difference
to enterthe policy sphereand fill the political vacuumoccupied by working-class
movementsin othercountries(Skocpol 1992, Sklar1993). In doing so, they helped
establishpolicies that emphasizedwomen's child-rearingresponsibilitiesand the
desirabilityof female dependence(Muncy 1991, Goodwin 1997).
However,female reformerswere not the only ones motivatedby gender interests. Feminist historiansalso unearthedthe genderedscripts adheredto by other
social movements as they helped to constructthe welfare state. Feminists recast
the traditionalbattlebetween capitaland labor,movementsof militarism,and the
politics of pronatalismto expose their genderedundercurrents(Klaus 1993). For
example, Gordon's(1994) study of the US welfare staterevealedthat a varietyof
political forces workedwith genderedagendas-from professionalcaseworkersto
social securityadvocatesto New Deal social movements.In her comparativestudy
of the origins of the British and Frenchwelfare states, Pedersen(1993) provides
a similarlynuancedaccountof the interestsat stakein stateformation.She shows
the policy sphereto be a crowdedarenaoccupiedby unions, employers,feminists,
and Catholicleaders,all with theirown visions of social relationships.Ultimately,
these conflictingdiscoursesbecame embodiedin the Frenchparentalstateand the
British male breadwinnermodel.
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These two strandsof welfare scholarshipexpose the dynamics of state stratification and interpretation.Their work adheres to a comparativeand historical
perspectiveunmatchedin other areas of feminist state theory.The forms of state
variationthey uncoverarethusof a differentsort:Feministwelfaretheorypointsto
nationalvariationamong state genderregimes as they evolve. Yet thereis another
insight to be garneredfrom their scholarship-a way to link the redistributiveand
interpretivedimensionsof state genderregimes.
Linking State Stratification and Interpretation

Feminist analyses of welfare stratificationand interpretationdid not develop in
isolation from one another.Perhapsbecause of their comparativeand interdisciplinary focus, these scholars forged links between their approaches.As Adams
(1998) argues, feminists working in other areas of state theory might want to
consider how welfare scholars have connected the state's structuraland cultural
dimensions.
Sainsbury(1996) offers one example of how welfare scholarsmade these linkages. Her work begins from a redistributivefocus and expands to include the
interpretiveeffects of welfare stratification.On the one hand, Sainsburylocates
her comparativestudy of the U.S., U.K., Dutch, and Swedish welfare states in a
traditionalwelfare regime framework.She then extends this frameworkby highlighting the bases of entitlementoperativein each state, that is, how recipients
are drawninto the state and on what terms. Sainsburyreveals that states provide
a varietyof modes of claims-making;they base entitlementclaims on recipients'
needs, employment,families, or citizenship.By includingtypes of claims-making
in herregimeanalysis,Sainsburyconnectsthe insightsof poststructuralistscholars
like Pringle & Watson(1992) to those of regime analysts like Orloff (1993) and
Lewis (1992). Her approachhas empiricalpayoffs. She reveals why women fare
betterin regimes thatbase claims on citizenship (like Sweden) and fare worse in
regimes thatbase claims on need and/oremployment(like the United States).
As Sainsbury'swork moves from the redistributiveto the interpretive,Fraser's
(1989, 1997) scholarshipmakes the reverse connection. Influenced by critical
theory, Fraser's (1989) work explicates the "politics of need interpretation"by
showinghow needs leak out of the privatesphere,aretakenup in the social sphere,
and become administeredin the state sphere.In the process, needs are translated
into juridical,administrative,or therapeuticissues. To investigatethis translation
of needs, Fraser grounds her discursive model in an analysis of the two-tiered
welfare state:a statebifurcatedbetween masculineand feminine subsystemsthat
distributeresourcesdifferently.Fraserthen links these redistributivepatternsand
interpretationsof need. The masculinesubsystemtranslatesneed intojuridicaland
administrativeissues as it constructsrecipientsas rights-bearingindividuals;the
feminine subsystemtranslatesneed into administrativeand therapeuticissues as
it frames recipientsas dependentclients or troubledsouls in need of therapeutic
intervention.In Fraser's(1997) recentwork, she suggests thatthis formulationbe
FEMINIST
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used as an evaluativestandard.She puts out a critical call to feminist scholarsurging them to consider both redistributionand recognitionwhen assessing state
genderregimes.
THE LOOSE COORDINATION OF FEMINIST

STATESCHOLARSHIP
This review of developmentsin feministjurisprudence,feminist criminology,and
feminist welfare theoryrevealedparallelsamong these fields. They all arose with
argumentsabout state patriarchy,moved on to trackstate conceptions of equality
and/or difference, and reached a recognition of state diversity. Together,these
scholars have come to reject the notion of a univocal state; they reveal that state
systems speakmanylanguages.Moreover,as theirresearchevolved, these scholars
confrontedsimilardilemmas.They encounteredobstacles as they conceptualized
the dimensions of state systems and analyzedtheir influence on genderrelations.
Yet feminists came at these issues quite differently.In theirdifferences,they have
much to offer one another.
One of the main strengthsof feministjurisprudenceis its sophisticatedaccount
of the politics of representation.Feministlegal theoristsprovideways to mine legal
normsfor theirgenderedmeanings-frameworks thatcould help welfare scholars
expand their focus on social policy to include a broaderrange of state projects
and interventions.Feministjurisprudencealso offers powerful argumentsabout
the limitations of opposing equality and difference-arguments that could help
feminist criminologists transcendthe severity/leniencydichotomy. At the same
time, feministjurisprudencehas much to gain from feminist work in other fields.
They could look to feminist criminology for clues on how to retain a structural
analysis of juridical stratification.They could also appropriatewelfare scholars'
comparativefocus to illuminate the modes of claims-makingthat women have
utilized over time and in differentnationalcontexts to secure stateresources.
Feminist criminologistsalso have importantcontributionsto make to an interdisciplinaryfeminist dialogue on the state. One of their main strengthsis their
willingness to conduct both quantitativeand qualitativeanalyses; these scholars
are a model for how to mix researchmethods.Theirwork is also exemplaryin its
concretedescriptionof state stratifyingprocesses-from arrestratesto sentencing
patternsto courtroomdynamics.Fromtheirconcretepictures,feminist criminologists revealthe practicaleffects of stategenderregimes andhow they varyby race
and class. Thus, their empiricalwork provides a model of how to accountfor the
intersectionsof gender,race, and class in the legal and welfare systems. However,
feminist criminologistshave much to take from these otherfields. They could appropriatefeminist jurisprudence'sconception of law as an interpretivestructure
to capturethe discursivedimensions of penal policies. Feminist welfare theorists
also offer the tools to approachthis issue historically.Theirhistoricalframeworks
could enablefeministcriminologiststo explorehow these discourseswere inserted
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into the justice system and how they evolved. In fact, the few historicalaccounts
of the justice system's gender practices have revealed unexpectedfindings with
grave conceptualimplications(Feeley & Little 1991).
In additionto offeringa comparativeapproachto existing analysesof statestratificationand interpretation,feminist welfare theoryformulatesways to join these
two statedimensions.This is perhapstheirmost importantcontributionto an interdisciplinarydialogueon the state.They not only recognizethatstateredistribution
and interpretationare intricatelylinked, but they have constructedframeworksto
capturethese linkages. Their recent work explicates the stratifyingeffects of different modes of claims-making;it also exposes the interpretiveunderpinningsof
differentredistributivemodels. At the same time, welfare scholarshave much to
gain from increaseddialogue with other fields. Feministjurisprudence'sconceptualizationof gender as a process of significationcould deepen welfare scholars'
accounts of need interpretationand the constitutionof gender identities. Welfare
theoristscould also draw on feminist criminologists'use of multiple methods to
reveal the complex dynamicsof welfare case processing.
In this way, the creationof a dialogicalfield thatencompassesfeminist scholars
of law, criminology,and the welfare state could foster theoreticaland empirical
insights in all three areas.In this chapter,I establishedsuch a field througha twodimensionalframeworkof state stratificationand interpretation.Using this frame,
I uncovered the ways in which feminist analyses have become attentiveto the
diversityof stategenderregimes-from therecognitionof multiplelegal discourses
to the acknowledgmentof multiple sites of case processing to the identification
of multiple dimensions of welfare stratification.Yet this frameworkdid little to
explain these variations.Such an explanationwould requirethe developmentof
broaderexplanatorymodels or concepts, that is, a way to integrate feminists'
argumentsabout state diversityand to assess their common features.One way to
achieve this would be to begin to theorizethe layeredqualityof state apparatuses
(Haney 1996).
Hagan's(1998) formulationof the organizationaldynamicsof the criminaljustice systemprovidesa promisingway to approachsuchtheorizing.Haganproposes
a frameworkfor explainingthe seeminglyrandom,andfrequentlyinconsistent,operationsof the criminaljustice system. He arguesthatthe system is composed of
a series of loosely coupled subsystems:entities that are organizationallydistinct
but highly responsive to one another.His is an image of state layering, of state
apparatuseswith macro-andmicrolevelembodimentsthatareloosely coordinated
and synchronized.This looseness is a key element of the framework.It opens up
the possibility of disjuncture-of rules that go unimplemented,of mandatesthat
go unobserved,and of precedentsthat go unfollowed in differentstate arenas.
Moreover,instead of viewing the criminaljustice system as perpetuallyfracturedandunpredictable,Haganposits thatits level of looseness can wax andwane
over time. He roots such fluctuationsin the presence of political power directed
at crime-orientedgoals. At historicaljunctures, when the political environment
makes proactivedemands on this state sphere, there is often a tighteningof the
FEMINIST
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659
links among subsystems.In a similarmanner,in highly politicized settings where

particularsocial groups are targeted,the system's boundariestend to tighten in
an attemptto maximize desired outcomes. Yet state systems not only act in accordancewith largerpolitical mandates,but can also tighten their systemic links
to directpublic attentionto certainpolitical goals. In Hagan'smodel, politics and
political power arekey determinantsof the organizationof state systems and their
degree of looseness.
Although Hagan'smodel of the loosely coupled system was not designed with
feministstatetheoryin mind,it may offerthe kindof conceptualframeworkneeded
to betterintegratethis scholarship.On the one hand,the conceptprovidesa way to
make sense of the diversityof genderregimes within particularstate apparatuses.
If feminist scholarsbegin to think of state arenasas loosely coupled, it becomes
understandablewhy they find differentmessages and agendaswithin a given state
sphere(Horowitz1995). It also becomes clearhow stategenderregimescantakeon
macro- and microlevel embodiments:At one level, welfare policy might position
women as dependentmothers,whereasat anotherlevel welfare institutionsmight
centeron women as wage laborers.Ratherthanview these messages as competing
or contradictory,they can be seen as rootedin the welfare system's loose coupling.
This approachcould also help explain why feminist criminologists' large-scale
statisticalfindingsoften divergefrom those of observationalstudies (Daly 1994).
In short,it could clarify how feminists' argumentsaboutthe state dependon their
unit of analysis and on the specific subsystemfrom which they theorize.
Conceptualizingstate spheresas loosely coordinatednot only explains the diversityin feminists' empiricalfindings-it also raisesa seriesof new issues ripefor
investigation.As Hagan (1998) notes, we know very little aboutthe natureof the
links within state subsystems;we need a far more detailed understandingof how
macro-andmicrolevel subsystemsremainorganizationallydistinctyet responsive
to one another.Feministscholarsarein a uniquepositionto theorizesuch linkages.
They have collected extensive data on differentstate subsystems;they could use
these datato probeinto how genderedmessages arerelayedamongstatelevels. For
instance,althoughsome scholarsanalyze abstractlegal narratives,othersresearch
the concretepracticesof courtofficialsand stateadministrators.Drawingthis work
togetherwould enablefeministsto reflecton the macro-andmicroleveltranslation
of gendered messages and signifiers. Hence, the concept of the loosely coupled
system raises common questions about state filteringprocesses-questions that
could unite feminist scholarsworkingin a varietyof subfields.
This concept also raises new questionsregardinghistoricalvariabilityin these
macro- and microlinkages.Once the legal, criminaljustice, and welfare systems
are seen as loosely coupled, feminists can begin to explorepotentialshifts in their
systemic tightnessover time (Haney,forthcoming).Throughoutthis chapter,I have
arguedthatfeminist scholarsin all threefields have moved away fromthe assertion
of a singular,uniformgenderregimeto recognizethe varied,andoften inconsistent,
natureof state genderregimes. Is this shift a reflectionof organizationaland institutionalchanges in these state systems-of a political environmentthat loosened
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the coupling of their respective subsystems?Or is it a reflectionof the theoretical and empiricaltools now used by feminist scholars?Recent work by welfare
scholarsindicatesthat the U.S. welfare system has always been characterizedby
diverse gender regimes: Their researchon welfare policies and practices reveals
thatloose linkageshaveheld this system togethersince its inception(Kunzel 1993,
Gordon 1994, Goodwin 1997). Similar analyses of the evolution of macro- and
microconnectionsin the legal and criminaljustice systems could providethe basis
for broadercomparisonand theorizing. Again, the goal is to use the concept of
the loosely coupled system to tighten the links among feminist scholarsworking
in differentsubfields.
In addition to illuminatingand explaining diversity within a given state apparatus,the concept of the loosely coupled system can be extended to expose
the connectionsamong differentstateapparatuses.Such an extension would push
the concept beyond Hagan's formulation:Although his concept was designed to
explicate the organizationaldynamics within one system, the state itself can be
conceptualizedas a composite of loosely coordinatedsystems that draw on and
respondto one another.Such a conceptualizationwould thenopen up anotherlevel
of dialogueamongfeminist scholars,enablingthemto exploreconnectionsamong
the legal, criminaljustice, and welfare systems. It would allow them to compare
the macro-and microfilteringprocesses and translationwork characteristicof different state apparatuses.For example, feminist legal scholars and criminologists
have uncovered strikingly similar dichotomies:The equality/differencebifurcation embodiedin law bearsa close resemblanceto thejustice system's practicesof
severity/leniency.With increaseddialogue, feminist scholarscould theorize how
the legal andjustice systems,althoughorganizationallydistinct,remainresponsive
to similardoctrinesand organizationalroutines.
Finally, not only would the developmentof a sharedanalyticalframeworkbe
theoreticallyinnovative,butit has also become increasinglypoliticallyimperative.
In the last decade, tighter links seem to be forming among state apparatuses;
transformationsin one state sphere appear to feed off of and inform changes
in other spheres. Evidence of this abounds.At the structurallevel, expansion in
the criminaljustice apparatusoccurredalong with retrenchmentin the welfare
system (Western& Beckett 1999). At the policy level, tougher sentencing laws
were passed along with the legislation of time limits and work requirementsfor
welfare recipients(Danner 1998). At the institutionallevel, new welfare agencies
have set up shop in some legal aid centers and criminaljustice offices. These
linkages among state systems are certainlynot new; they clearly existed at other
historicaljunctures, most notably the ProgressiveEra (Clapp 1998). But these
connections will make it difficult for feminist scholars to continue to limit their
analysesto one staterealm.Theprofoundshiftsunderwayin theU.S. legal, criminal
justice, and welfare systems call for a more integratedfeminist social science and
politics.
Hence,I amnotproposingthatfeministscholarsreunitearounda grandtheoryof
the centralized,tightlycoordinatedstate.Nor am I suggestingthatthey move to the
FEMINISTSTATETHEORY
661
opposite extreme through a theory of uncoordinated, dispersed sites of state power.

Rather, I would argue that feminist scholars make use of their collective finding of
state diversity to theorize the dimensions of state layering, both within and among
apparatuses. I would also maintain that an interdisciplinary feminist dialogue on
the state is the best way to capture this layering. By loosely coordinating their
scholarship, feminist social scientists could retain their focus on specific state
spheres, while remaining responsive to theoretical and empirical developments in
research on other state arenas.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many colleagues and students offered valuable feedback on different incarnations
of the ideas presented in this chapter. For contributing to my understanding of
feminist legal theory and criminology, I thank Liena Gurevich, Vanessa Barker,
and Jo Dixon. For helping me to refine my general arguments about the welfare scholarship, I thank Julia Adams, Michael Burawoy, Nancy Cauthen, Ruth
Horowitz, Sonya Michel, and graduate students in my 1998 seminar on gender
and the welfare state at New York University.
Visit the Annual Reviews home page at www.AnnualReviews.org
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Feminist State Theory

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Feminist State Theory: Applications to Jurisprudence, Criminology, and the Welfare State

Author(s): Lynne A. Haney

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2000. 26:641-66

Departmentof Sociology, New YorkUniversity,269 MercerSt. 4th Floor, New York,NY;

Key Words gender,socialpolicy, law, criminaljustice

penal and disciplinarypractices (Smart 1990, Daly 1994, Messerschmidt1997).

This chaptercrosses the traditionalbordersof subfields to compare feminist

Nonetheless, the portraithas a frame. As I analyze developmentsin these three

which feminists in these fields view state gender regimes as operatingthrough

Gender Regimes of Difference and Sameness

PRACTICES OF BENEVOLENCEAND PUNISHMENT:

structuresof gender and racial inequality,levels of anomie, modes of informal/

GenderRegimes of Severityand Leniency

Processing Gender, Race, and Class

POLICIES OF REDISTRIBUTION AND

Gender Regimes of Need Satisfaction and Interpretation

Linking State Stratification and Interpretation

THE LOOSE COORDINATION OF FEMINIST

links among subsystems.In a similarmanner,in highly politicized settings where

opposite extreme through a theory of uncoordinated, dispersed sites of state power.

ArnoldR. 1990. Processesof victimizationand

Leira A. 1992. Welfare States and Working Mothers: The ScandinavianExperience.

mothers'aid. See Gordon 1990, pp. 123-51

Sklar KK. 1993. The historicalfoundationsof

as a labor marketinstitution.Am.J. Sociol.

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