BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

American

Political

Economy.

Including Remarks on the Management of the Currency and the

Finances since the Outbreak of the War
of the
Great Rebellion

One volume, crown

t3T"

8vo, cloth, $2.50

Sent, post-paid, upon receipt of the price by the

Publishers,

CHARLES SCRIBNER S SONS,

743

&

745

BROADWAY,

NEW

YORK.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY,
FROM

DESCARTES TO SCHOPENHAUER

HARTMANN.

BY

FRANCIS BOWEN,

A. M.,

n\
PHILOSOPHY
A1FOBD PROWSSOB OP NATURAL RELIGION AND MORAL
HARVARD COLLEGE

THIRD EDITION

NEW YORK:
CHARLES SCRIBNER S SONS,
743

&

745

BROADWAY.

B
2T7
COPTRIOHT, 1877,

Bv SOIURNKK,
AKMSTKON.i,

& CO

...BRARY
717577
UH!V_ERS[TY_OFJORONTO_J

RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE

STEREOTrPED jrr PRINTKI) BI

H.

IIOUGHTON AND COMPANY

MODERN PHILOSOPHY,
DESCARTES TO SCHOPENHAUER

HARTMANN

PREFACE.
my purpose in this work to write a com
Modern Philosophy. Such an undertaking,

IT has not been

plete History of
if fitly

carried out, would far exceed the limits within which

and would compel me to enter into some

I wished to keep,

wearisome

details.

have endeavored to present a

full anal

systems only of those great think

ysis and
ers whose writings have permanently influenced the course
of European thought, paying most attention to the earlier

criticism of the

French and later German philosophers, with whom com

paratively few English readers are at all familiar. Hence
I have said little about Hobbes or Locke, Hume, Reid, or
Hamilton, whose writings are accessible to all, and who
ought not to be studied by thoughtful and earnest inquirers

But the great names of Descartes, Spinoza,

and Malebranche, of Leibnitz and Kant, of Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel, are little more than names with most English
students, even including many of those who assume to weigh
their systems against each other and to dogmatize respect
Perhaps the experience of one
ing their merits and defects.
whose duty it has been for many years to lecture upon their
writings to large classes of University students may have
at second hand.

been valuable,

make

in so far as it

intelligible

what

is

has induced the endeavor to

abstruse and obscure, and to render

a discussion interesting which

appear at first sight re

I be
pulsive, though it is really important and profound.
lieve that Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, to mention no

may

PREFACE.

VI

students
fairly appreciated by English
been
not
have
because
of philosophy,
thoroughly un
they
that
reason
the
for
metaphysical thought
derstood, probably
on the Continent of Europe generally assumes a pedantic
others,

have not been

which the countrymen of Locke and

which they have an
Berkeley are not habituated, and for
A translation of their works, however
instinctive dislike.

and technical garb

to

faithfully executed, is even

as it sacrifices the advantage

German

more obscure than the original,

which one who studies them in

of the technical
possesses through the etymology
reflects much light upon their meaning

terms, which often

of thought.
My purpose has
been to furnish an exposition of their systems which should
be intelligible throughout, and also comprehensive enough
to enable the student to form a fair estimate of their excel
lences and defects, and even, if he wishes, to peruse with

and upon the general course

the works themselves, either

In particular,
or in an English translation.

little difficulty

in
I

the original

have endeav

Kant s
for one who lias fairly mas
of Pure Reason;
the
holds
work
key to all German meta
great

ored to give a complete analysis and explanation of

"Critique

tered this
physics.

One who

publishes a treatise upon

Modern Philosophy,

however, may reasonably aspire to be something more than

a commentator.
Aiming to be thorough and impartial in

have also held it to bo

setting forth the opinions of others, I
a duty frankly to avow and earnestly to defend the whole
doctrine which appeared to me to be just and true, whether
No one can be an earnest
it was also of good report or not.

student of Philosophy without arriving at definite convic

In
tions respecting the fundamental truths of Theology.

my own
flection

and re
case, nearly forty years of diligent inquiry
to enlarge
served
have
truths
these
only
concerning
began, and which
Earnestly desiring to avoid

and confirm the convictions with which

are

inculcated in this book.

PREFACE.
prejudice on either side, and to welcome evidence and argu
ment from whatever source they might come, without pro

and free from any external inducement to

teach one set of opinions rather than another, I have faith
of these modern
fully studied most of what the
fessional bias,

philosophy
times and the science of our own
day assume to teach. And
the result is, that I am now more
firmly convinced than
ever that what has been
called
the dirt-philosophy
justly
of materialism and fatalism is baseless and false.
I accept
with unhesitating conviction and belief the doctrine of the
"

"

being of one Personal God, the Creator and Governor of the

world, and of one Lord Jesus Christ, in whom
dwelleth all
"

the fulness of the

Godhead bodily
and I have found noth
ing whatever in the literature of modern infidelity which,
to my mind, casts even the
slightest doubt upon that belief.
"

Not being a clergyman,

I am not exposed to the cruel im

which
unbelievers
have too long been permitted to
putation
the
of
fling against
clergy,
being induced by prudential
motives to profess what they do not believe. Let me be
permitted also to repeat the opinion, which I ventured to
the time seems to have
express as far back as 1840, that
arrived for a more practical and immediate verification than
"

the world

ever yet witnessed of the great truth, that

is not based
upon Christianity is big
with the elements of its own destruction."
lias

the civilization which

UARVAKU COLLLGE, CAMBRIDGE,

July

3,

1877.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

I.

FAQB

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

INTRODUCTORY.
RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC

...

CHAPTER

II.

DESCARTES

CHAPTER
INNATE IDEAS.

THE IDEA OF GOD

IN

THE

Sour,

OF

MAN

...
9

CHAPTER

CHAPTER

gO

73

VI.

PASCAL

87

CHAPTER VTL

....

CHAPTER

CHAPTER

99

VIII.

REALISM, NOMINALISM, AND CONCEPTUALISM

BERKELEYANISM

38

V.

........

...

22

IV.

SPINOZA

LEIBNITZ

III.

CHAPTER

MALEBRANCHB

...

127

IX.

......

141

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

X.
PAOl

TRANSITION TO KANT.

His LIFE AND CHARACTER.

THE PURPOSE OF
154

THE CRITIQUE

CHAPTER
KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL ^ESTHETIC

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

CHAPTER
KANT

CRITIQUE CONTINUED.

XI.

XII.

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

CHAPTER
S

CRITIQUE CONTINUED.

KANT

GROUNDWORK OF ETHICS

CHAPTER

.192

.221

XIII.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

KANT

170

XIV.
245

CHAPTER XV.
RELATIONS OF

POSITIVISM.

WHAT

is

CALLED SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER
SCHOPENHAUER

FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT

CHAPTER

283

XVII.
31

FICHTK

CHAPTER
SCHELLING

I.

XVIII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE

CHAPTER
HEGEL.

259

XVI.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

REASON.

327

XIX.

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE

357

CHAPTER XX.
HEGEL.

II.

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL

373

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

XI

XXI.
PA OK

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

I.

THE WORLD AS PRESENTATION AND WILL

CHAPTER
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

II.

HARTMANN

XXII.

PESSIMISM, ^ESTHETICS,

CHAPTER

389

AND ETHICS

410

429

XXIII.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

CHAPTER XXIV.
HARTMANN

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

...

459

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER

I.

INTRODUCTORY.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY.
RELATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY TO PSYCHOLOGY
AND LOGIC.

WHAT

we have first to consider is the philosophy of the seven

teenth century
and this as represented to us more
particularly in
the writings of Descartes and his immediate successors.
Histori
;

the period is one of great importance.

It is
than any other century since the Christian era in the
great names, and the leading dogmas and systems, of the phil
cally considered,

more

fertile

osophy of these modern times. It is the age of Descartes, Pascal,

Spinoza, Gassendi, Malebranche, and Leibnitz,
of Hobbes, Cudworth, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke.
I do not include the
name which many will think the greatest of them all, because the
philosophy of Bacon is primarily concerned only with the means
of

discoveries

in

making
physical science, and, through them, of
promoting the outward well-being of mankind, treating only in
cidentally, and with a view to this purpose, of the great problems
of metaphysical science, and of those fundamental truths of
our
intellectual, moral, and spiritual being, which it is our present ob

The Novum Organou ought to be read in

connection with the writings, not of the
great men just mentioned,
except so far as some of these distinguished themselves also in the
departments of mathematical and physical research, but of Kepler,

ject to investigate.

"

"

Galileo, and Newton, of Franklin, Cuvier, and

The
Faraday.
philosophy of modern inductive science will come into view in this
book only so far as it is governed
by the universal laws of thought
and by the philosophy of the human mind.
The seventeenth century deserves
study not only on account of

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

who illustrated it, but because it was

human thought, and the proper birth-

the genius of the great men

in the history of

an epoch

time of the philosophy of these modern days. Every former age,

every preceding school of thought, as far back at least as the origin
of metaphysical speculation with the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics,

by antecedent systems and the authority

built upon a foundation that had been
each spoke to minds already to a great extent
already laid for it
Even Plato professed only to repeat the colloquial
preoccupied.
his
of
great master Socrates, and Aristotle continually
teachings
the ancients, whom
refers to the doctrines of those whom he calls

was more or

less colored

Each was

of former times.

"

with a sort of indulgent consciousness of superi

cites, indeed,
At a later period, the Alexandrian School avowed tho
ority."

he

"

Eclectic principle, and put together a patchwork of Oriental mys

Then, for a long interval, philosophy
ticism and Greek dialectics.

was merged m theology, and all questions we re answered peremp

In
and the Church.
torily by the authority of the Scriptures
Scholasticism pure speculation and argumentative subtlety revived,
The ambition of Thomas
but only within the limits of faith.
was
to erect theology into a
and
the
other
Schoolmen
Aquinas
and rest
perfect science, distributed into parts with exact method,

ing upon philosophical dogmas with a carefully traced filiation of

Aristotelic premises were evoked to support theolog
doctrines.
ical conclusions.
Novelty was shunned, because it immediately
incurred suspicion of heresy.

Then came

startling

about a revolution
brought
~
of

external

affairs.

The

conjuncture of great events, which

in human thought and in the course
Revival of Letters, the invention of

printing, the Reformation in religion, the discovery of America

and the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, and the rapid

development of the power of the municipalities and the burgher

class, were all crowded together, so to speak, into one epoch, about
A great crisis had arrived, and
the dose of the fifteenth century.
men s minds were perplexed with awe and hope as old institutions
crumbled around them, and former modes of thought became dis
credited.
Other revolutions had been produced and accompanied
shock
the
of arms, and were productive in the main of material
by
but the present was an outburst of mental activity,
changes
which showed itself in the destruction of old dogmas, the progress
of discovery and invention, and the collision of new opinions.
Physical science started first in the race, and soon achieved great
it was comparatively little
success, because it carried less weight
;

INTRODUCTORY.

Most of its devo

impeded by jealous authority or old traditions.
worked in an open field and without dread of consequences
the persecution of Galileo was an almost solitary case. Metaphys
ical science at first threw off the yoke of Scholasticism and the
authority of the Middle Ages only to subject itself once more to
the great minds of Greece, whose writings had been brought again
to light with all the charms of novelty and the graces of eloquence
by the Revival of Letters. The philosophy of the sixteenth cen
tury is rightly called by Cousin a necessary and useful transition
from the absolute slavery of thought in medieval times to its ab
tees

The leading philos

solute independence a century afterwards.
ophers of that century were great scholars, rather than great
thinkers.
They hunted out and collated old manuscripts; with
and
indefatigable zeal and industry they translated, annotated,
find among them a school of
lectured on Plato and Aristotle.
idealistic Platonism. always tending to mysticism, and a class of

We

into
peripatetics, worshipping Aristotle, and always sliding
The former school may be said to
rialism and skepticism.

mate
have

begun with Marsilius Ficinus, and ended with the martyr, Gior
dano Bruno. The latter consisted of a crowd of speculatists upon
medicine, astronomy, and cosmogony, not infrequently passing over
into
and thaumatunjy.
O/
O
The glory remained for Descartes and his contemporaries and
ma<ric

successors, the men of the seventeenth century, to break with the

past altogether.
They no longer deigned even to controvert an
cient philosophy or mediaeval metaphysics, but passed them by as
obsolete, perhaps with silent contempt, and busied themselves with

an attempt

to reconstruct the

philosophical edifice from

its

foun

They accepted nothing upon authority they borrowed

not a stick or a stone from those who had gone before them.
None of them were learned men, except in the mathematical and

dations.

physical sciences.

meaning

of

that

I mean they were riot scholars

name; they cared nothing for

in the technical

antiquity,

and

seldom quoted books.

Perhaps they carried this peculiarity too
far
much
had
too
contempt for what had gone before ;
they
For they aspired to
their chief fault was intellectual arrogance.
;

not merely the foundations of knowledge, but the

whole structure to build anew from corner stone to pinnacle.
Eacli one aimed at completeness
each endeavored to think out a
with all the parts fitly dovetailed and
full
of

reconstruct

theory

philosophy,

put together.
Philosophy to them was the science
and verified by
ples carried out to its ultimate results,

of first princi
its

adequacy

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

4
to

meet every case and

settle

every doubt.

At

least,

this

was

eminently the case with Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hobbes, and,

It was long ago re
though in a different sense, John Locke.
marked of Descartes, that he began by doubting every thing, even
existence, and ended by thinking that he had proved
every thing, so as to leave his successors nothing to do.
Spinoza

his

own

even greater mathematical

Beginning after the manner of the geometer
with a full series of definitions and axioms, by their aid he dem
onstrates in order ail the propositions needing proof, and thus
followed
ri<ror

he

Cartesian method with

and precision.

till he has covered the whole ground of possible knowl

Though the writings of Leibnitz were fragmentary and
edge.
miscellaneous, the character of his mind was systematic even to
his genius more daring and comprehensive than that
exee>s, and
His towering ambition aspired to
of any man of modern times.
fashion and create anew all science and philosophy, through a few

proceeds

stated w ith inimita

pregnant aphorisms and assumptions, which he
and though he was obliged to leave them not
ble force and brevity
half worked out, many of them have been verified by the progress
of discovery since his day, and have shaped the whole course of
modern speculation. The character of llobbcs is intimated in his
r

If I had read as many books as other men, I

should have been as ignorant as they are."
According to an emi
nent critic, onlv Aristotle and Kant were his equals in what may
the logical filiation of doctrines
be called the genius of Sy-tem,

insolent remark,

"

His influ
having the broadest and most diverging consequences.
ence is even now predominant in one of the leading schools of
The modspeculative science both in England and this country.
and dogmatism of
esty of Locke is as evident as the haughtiness
Hobbes.
But his philosophy covers as much ground, though
worked out in a different spirit and with a very dissimilar method.
His object was to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent
of human knowledge," not by logical deduction from a few selfevident principles, but by careful observation and patient research.
The characteristics of his work are sound judgment and clear com
mon sense existing in that rare perfection in which they become
In his Essay, he never cites
coincident with far-sighted genius.
Descartes or Hobbes by name, though his purpose evidently is to

some

of their principal doctrines.

of the chief influences that shaped the philosophy of the
seventeenth century was the rapid development, at that time, of

refute

One

mathematical

and physical

science.

Descartes, Leibnitz, and

INTRODUCTORY.

own acre,
and
o
the greatest of all modern times.
The discoveries of the
two former changed the whole face of the science and paved the
Pascal were the greatest
mathematicians of their
fj

among

its subsequent success ; and Pascal was a

prodigy of
discovered
parts,
geometry anew, and seemed to discern by
intuition what others could obtain only by patient and long con
tinued effort.
The rigorous methods of filiation and proof, the

way

for all

who

completeness, precision, and certainty which characterize mathe

men endeavored to transfer to philosophy. Spinoza

and Ilobbes, though not to so great a degree adepts in exact sci
ence, still strove, with good success in this respect, to follow their
Locke, as might have been expected from his early
example.
studies in medicine, rather followed the inductive method, and
aimed at completeness through a comprehensive examination of
all the phenomena.
Physical discovery had made vast progress,
and the triumphant anticipations of Bacon had begun to be real
ized.
Astronomical science had been revolutionized, and the dis
covery and proof of the great law of gravitation were already fore
This great
shadowed, though not as yet formally announced.
success had generated enthusiasm and inspired confidence in future
effort.
Never was there greater activity of mind, or more vigor
and originality of speculation. Not in physical science only, but
in every department of intellectual effort, ambition was kindled
and grand results were confidently expected. In the mere collis
matics, these

ion of opinions, in the conflict of opposing systems, many sparks

of truth were struck out ; everywhere were signs of
energy and
life.

It has

seemed

me

that the writings of these men would be a

a course of philosophical study.
need
shall thus be unprofitably detained in groping

to

fitting introduction to

not fear that

we

We

over the history of the past, digging up the dead bones of dogmas
and systems that have passed away and of obsolete controversies.
Philosophy, it is true, repeats itself in each succeeding age,
under new influences perhaps, with a different bias, and with ten
dencies and applications that are often entirely novel.
But the
is
always the same, the old problems and questions are
perpetually recurrent, the same difficulties and stumbling blocks
impede our progress, and the answers, the attempted solutions, are
found along the old lines of inquiry.
Philosophy is uniform, be

groundwork

founded on the unity of human nature.

Curiosity is
same objects, the old doubts and fears start up
afresh, and we try the former paths of escape from the same laby-

cause

it is

excited by the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

not a question now agitated between the lival

Mill and the
speculation in our own days, either by
Positivists on the one hand, or by the German Transcendentalistg
on the other, which does not find its prototype in the discussions
of the seventeenth century, and even much farther back, in the
Academy, the Torch, and the Garden of the Greeks. Hamilton
and Mansel repeat Pascal. Mill follows the same track with
Hobbes and Locke. Kant is largely influenced by Leibnitz

There

rinth.

is

of

schools

Fichte
ling

is

motto

the old Cartesian coyito, ergo

is

sum

and Schel-

of Spinoza.
reproduction, with modern improvements,
will sooner be emancipated from Copernicus

Modern astronomy

and Kepler, than modern philosophy from its teachers and guides
of two hundred years ago.
This is no confession of weakness or plagiarism on the part of

The repetition is often uncon-cious little is

our contemporaries.
and
no
borrowed,
attempt is made to establish systems or opinions
The coincidence is that only
on the mere authority of the past.
;

which necessarilv
of

human

Montaigne, but
read

from the sameness of subject, the unity

results

common purpose

nature, and the

in his

in

myself.

book.

says

Always,

also,

in

view.

"It

is

not in

which I
the issues are colored and diver

Pascal.

"

that I find all

The theme
and is ap
the protean forms of literature, and to the
plied and adapted to
The empirici.-m and po.-iconstant progress of physical science.
tivism of llobbes are necessarily unlike those, of Comte and
Lewes, because, in the interval between them, whole sciences,
like biology, geology, and political economy, have been constructed
of the age.
by the ever changing circumstances
with a thousand variations,
old. but it is

sified
is

repeated

These large additions to our stores of

and largely developed.
knowledge, have not only supplied new evidence and illustrations
bearing on old problems, but have affected the whole current of
philosophic thought.

we lose something of the freshness of modern inquiry by

two centuries ago, we gain by
going back to the philosophy of
when they were presented
questions nearer their source,
li

taking up
with greater purity and simplicity.

much under
day.

the direction of

AVhat we have

to

dread

Already we are falling too

thought of our own

the schools of
is

the authority not so

much

of the

the overshadowing influence, the pres

past, as of the present,
names
and
European reputation. Great distance
tige, of great
affects

the imagination

great

antiquity.

The

and cows the

best

discipline

intellect

even more thau

for enabling us

fairly

to

INTRODUCTORY.

own thoughts is to escape from the heated discussions

on
the hour, the glare and turmoil of the work actually going
same
the
to
back
and
questions
around us,
study essentially
go
and still atmosphere of a former age.
under the softer
think our
of

The
and

light
of partisanship is rife among us, not only in politics
what should be the calm domain of science and
religion, but in
take sides too eagerly in a number of hot
spirit

abstracAhought, We
combatants apparently think more of triumph
disputes, where the

than of the progress of discovery or the

ing over their opponents
Some of our savans seem more ambitious to be
interests of truth.

accounted hard

hitters,

than to be

first in

peaceful victories over

The taste for these gladiatorial exhibitions has

ignorance and sin.
the
been fostered by
unhappy transference of the arena of contest
to periodicals weekly or bi-monthly, and even to the newspapers,
where the shoats of a mob are the guerdon of victory. It is a
relief to 20 back to a century in which the war of words was
conducted only in folios read by the erudite few, and of which the
have long since been buried.
personal animosities
But is not the admission now made a hazardous one ? What
asked, can there be in constantly grinding the
same corn over again in the old mill ? Or what gain in repeating
and unravelling the same
forever
the labor of

profit,

may be

it

weaving

Penelope,

we may

frankly answer, if the only object

To adopt the language of Mr.
in life is to be fed and clothed.
Wallace, the very terms in which Lord Bacon scornfully depre
ciated one great result of philosophy must be accepted in their
Like a nun, a virgin consecrated to God, she pro
literal truth.

web

None

at

all,

The question which

duces no offspring; she bears no fruit."
to our Saviour, and did not wait for an
addressed
Pilate
jesting
and proba
answer, What is truth ? has not been answered yet,
But is there no advantage, then, in the en
bly never will be.
deavor to find an answer, though it be announced only with a
we are even now
stammering tongue ? The problems with which
and
Thales
of
in
the
Xenophanes
days
occupied were problems
in the very infancy of the human race
they are unsolved yet,
But what of that?
of them are perhaps insoluble.
and
"

"

many

much truth, as the

Philosophy, as its very name imports, is not so
Hamilton with good reason quotes Seneca,
search after truth.
wrdet cognita veritas ; the truth already known is already of no
but
account, as it no longer enters into the activity of intellect,
The wealth, polit
only cumbers it with passive accumulations.
ical economists tell us, which is literally locked up, only rusts or

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

8
rots

and we might as well put dried leaves or

when

slate

stones in

its

form of capital
constantly changing its form, circulating from hand to hand, and
thereby keeping up the industry and life of the whole community.
So is it with knowledge. Truths already found out and demon
strated, and then duly classified and ticketed, so as to be stored
away in books or in the pigeon-holes of memory, are really unpro
ductive and dead wealth, serving no purpose but to pamper the
It

place.

vanity of

is

its

gotten, for

it

really of use only

possessor.
is

registered

in the

large portion of it is voluntarily for

in books, and with the aid of cata

indices, and vade-mecums,

cannot be too often reminded,

logues,

it is

we know where

to

find

it,

says an eminent empiricist,

that the really great men, and those who are the sole permanent
benefactors of their species, are not the great experimenters,
"We
"

great observers, nor the great readers, nor the great

but the great thinkers.
Thought is the creator and
vivifier of all human affairs.
Actions, facts, and external man
but it is
ifestations of every kind, often triumph for a while

nor the

scholars;

the progress of ideas which ultimately determines the progress of

the world.
Unless these are changed, every other change is

and every improvement is precarious." The world

already has more facts at its command than it knows what to do
with.
The mind, like the body, can easily get food enough ;
superficial,

The
it craves is
exercise and a good digestion.
activity,
naturalists, in respect to the mere materials of their science, are
already suffering from the embarrassment of riches, and so are
what

beginning to think that there is something better to do than to

travel to the ends of the earth in order to add one or two new
species or varieties to a list already numbering about one hundred
In
thousand, carefully laid away and drying up in herbariums.
our own day and neighborhood, an earnest advocate of what are
the boundless
called
utilitarian studies," frankly confesses that
nomenclature of natural history bids fair to exhaust the resources
of all languages, as it has already done of most brains that have
"

"

about its amplification and its reduction to use."

am not decrying the proper worth of such collections. They
have a use, though it is a subordinate one. Like encyclopaedias
that is, to aid in
and dictionaries, they are good for reference,
set

are serviceable, also, so far as they suggest new

so far as they stim
or
feed
the discussion of old ones,
questions
But the means must never outrank
ulate and keep up research.
quiry.

the end.

They

Always what

is

of highest

moment

is

the search, the

INTRODUCTORY.
endeavor, the question not yet answered, the
solved, and,

it

may

But why seek

which

at

problem not yet

be, insoluble.

to estimate the loss

rate

any

is

inevitable

or gain from an
undertaking
have been engaged in the

Men

pursuit of speculative truth ever since they began to think, though

voices have never been wanting to admonish them that the end
was unattainable. But the warning was unheeded, for it is selfAristotle long ago remarked, that

contradictory.

we

are compelled

to philosophize iu order to prove that

philosophy itself
and vain.
Skepticism is as much a speculation and a

dogmatism

How

basis.

either

is

happens

is

illusory

system as

a nullity, if it does not rest on a

philosophical
it, that the endeavor which is always baffled

has yet been constantly repeated for the last three thousand
years ?
The only possible answer is, that the effort itself is so
irresistibly
attractive that it must be reckoned a
necessity of our nature.
First principles and ultimate principles mean
precisely the same
thing, the nominal difference between them arising merely from
that end or aspect of the
subject which happens to come first into
view.

Hence

final

its

it

is

that every science, either in its initial

steps or
infallibly to those higher truths, those

results, leads us

laws of broadest generalization, those

necessary and universal
ideas, with which philosophy is specially concerned.
Hence is it
that the adepts in any of the special sciences never come to a full
understanding of their

own

subjects of inquiry without encroach

and even our physicists find them
;

ing upon metaphysical ground

and teaching metaphysics unawares. The ideas of

those of
space and time form the groundwork of mathematics
substance and causality enter into
every investigation of physics ;
selves studying

personality and obligation are conditions of morals ; right is the

foundation of law, beauty is the essence of art,
supreme goodness
is the
When the doctrine of
inspiration of religion.

morphology

was
is

This
explained to Schiller, he immediately exclaimed,
not an observation, but an idea."
These discussions about the
first

"

Law, the Origin of Species (which is but another name

Cosmogony), Pangenesis and Epigenesis, the Conservation and
the Unity of Force,
Morphology, liomology, and Development,
these discussions, which have been so far
popularized by the
savans that already they are carried on in the
all
newspapers,
belong to the border ground between facts cognized by sense, and
the higher truths,
independent of experience, which can be grasped
only by pure reason. In them mere inductive science gives place
to the
and Plato s subordination of
anticipations of the intellect
Iteign of
for

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.

10

of
the sensible to the intelligible world, the world of pure ideas,
is realized in the
TO OITWS ov
forms
self-existent
and
typical
It is the
most advanced speculations of modern physical science.
the
hard
steps of
upon
of ancient
following

Nemesis
metaphysics
the Baconian reform.

At the outset of every enterprise, especially in undertaking a

new study, we need to know which field it is that we desire to
limits in every direction,
survey, what are its precise
Other
the
to
its
relations
surrounding territory.
and what are
effort, and each step
be
shall
we
away
throwing
continually
wise,
Nowhere is
lead us farther away from the goal.
taken

enter and

may

only

this difficulty

more

felt

than

in

defini
Philosophy, in respect to the

and boundaries of which hardly any two writers or students

The word itself has a different use in England and
are agreed.
America from what it has on the continent of Europe. Through
as to ex
out Germany and France, it is at least so far restricted
or
clude physics, or the study of material things, whether organic
or
lead
which
to,
those
up
and is limited to
inquiries
tion

inorganic
grow out

At most, the physical sciences

of, the science of mind.
into view so far only as the philosopher seeks to determine
interde
their relations with each other, and thereby their filiation,
classification in a universal scheme of human
and

come

pendence,

proper

this is more properly a special philosophy,

ab
a philosophy of the sciences, than Philosophy itself, in the
Hence we have the seeming contradiction and absurdity,
stract.
that Comte and his followers write voluminous and ponderous
works, one leading purpose of which is to prove that Philosophy
and null, a delusion and a nonentity, consist
as such is

knowledge; and even

impossible

ing of

that exclude the light,

to nothing."
passages that lead

"\Vindows

And

remind us of
the very name of these gigantic treatises, which
reiterated
and
their
on
borne
title-pages
media:val folios, the name
The Positive Philosophy." So true is it, as
in every chapter, is
a neces
I have already said, that Philosophy itself is inevitable,
nature.
of human

And

"

sity

means almost
English language, unluckily, philosophy
to a phil
down
absolute
the
of
from a philosophy
anything,
Even our
of shipbuilding, and of cookery.
of
gymnastics,
osophy
but
science
own
their
for
name
till very recently had no
In the

physicists

the very thing which it is not, and, since

Hence the
the Baconian reform, does not even pretend to be.

"Natural Philosophy,"

11

INTRODUCTORY.

sarcasm of Hegel, that Socrates indeed brought down philosophy

from the clouds but the English have degraded her to the
;

kitchen.

Now we

make some progress towards clearing up

relegate at once all these special philosophies
to the special sciences and arts which they constitute or enter into.
Suum cuique. The philosophy of law is a constituent part of the
shall at least

this confusion,

if

we

of law, either its foreporch or its adytum, the interior

In like manner, the philosophy of medi
shrine of the goddess.
and I think it would
cine is a part of the science of medicine

science

have conduced much

had been admitted on

peace both of state and church, if

hands that the philosophy of theology

to the

it

all

is

a part of the science of theology.

When we attempt to go further than this, and to make our defi
nition precise and adequate, we encounter a formidable difficulty.
definition presupposes a knowledge of the nature and limits of

the thing defined, and as such would seem to be the latest result of
must
philosophical inquiry, instead of an introduction to it.
proceed on trust then, accepting a definition only provisionally, and

We

be verified by the results of our subsequent studies.

concerns the relations of our subject to two
cognate sciences, on which Philosophy in great part is based, if
indeed it does not comprehend them.
Taken in its broader sense,
leaving

it

to

A preliminary question

Philosophy includes both Psychology and Logic, and by some

thinkers is limited to them, it being denied that there is any prac
ticable ground beyond, into which research can be carried with any
hope of success. Others maintain, and it is my own opinion, that
these are preliminary or derivative sciences
and that Philosophy
in
its narrower sense, stands beside
so
or
taken
called,
properly
them, both giving and receiving aid, and yet having a perfectly
well defined province of its own.
We must begin, then, by ascer
taining the purpose, scope, and limitations of these two allied
;

subjects.

The name given by John Locke himself

"

An

Essay concerning

Human

omission of the definite article,

to his great

work, is
Observe the
which could not have been acci
Understanding."

it is adhered to in all the editions

published during his
and his smaller posthumous work, purporting to treat
v Of the Conduct of the
Understanding," relates to a very differ
ent subject.
This title of the Essay is generally misquoted, and,
as it seems to me, misunderstood, by nearly all later English writ
The difference
ers, as an Essay on the Human Understanding.

dental, as
lifetime,

12

RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY.

may seem

a small one, but

Human

it is

by no means unimportant.

"

T7te

Understanding is a synonyme for the human mind, and in

an essay on it we should expect to lind a treatise on
Psychology
that is, an analytical account of our mental faculties, and an enu
meration of the phenomena of consciousness, together with the
laws to which these phenomena appear to be subject.
This sci
ence is properly designated by Dugald Stewart, the experimental
"

"

science of the

human

mind,"

though

its

more common name

since

All parties, even the skeptics and the

materialists, admit that this is strictly an inductive science, based
his

is

day

Psychology."

on actual observation, and capable of being treated with strict re

John Stuart Mill says of it, Psy
gard to the Baconian method.
chology, in truth, is simply the knowledge of the laws of human
nature.
If there is
anything that deserves to be studied by man,
it is his own nature and that of his fellow men
and if it is worth
studying at all, it is worth studying scientifically, so as to reach the
fundamental laws which underlie and govern all the rest.
There
are certain observed laws of our thoughts and of our feelings
which rest upon experimental evidence, and, once seized, are a
clew to the interpretation of much that we are conscious of in
"

ourselves,

and observe

one another.
Such, for example, are
Psychology, so far as it consists of such

in

the laws of association.

is

laws,

as positive

be taught as
two,

and certain a science

as chemistry,

and

fit

to

Among writers of our own day, I know only

Mr. De Morgan, who have directly denied the

such."

Comte and

such a science.

Their objection

rests on the as
same faculty can be at once
both subject and object,
observer and observed,
can at the
same moment manifest the phenomenon, and observe and analyze

possibility of

sumed absurdity

of supposing that the

such manifestation.

In regard to introspective observation, says

nothing can be more absurd than the supposition of a
And De Morgan, with his usual at
seeing himself think."

Comte,

man

when he
tempt at smartness, warns the student of such a science,
tries to look down his own throat with a candle in his hand, to
take care that he does not set his head on
In reply, we
need only appeal to the notorious fact, be it comprehensible or
"

fire."

not, that every

man

is

conscious of what

is

passing in his

own

mind, and often attempts with good success to render an account

of

what he

Be
it

sees there.

this as

it

may,

it is

certain that

Locke

Essay

has very generally of late been supposed to be

cal treatise

on

the

human understanding.

is

not

what

a psychologi
Psychology, as a distinct

INTRODUCTORY.
had not come into existence in the seventeenth century.
from metaphysics, with which,
It had not yet been separated
Its
blended.
was
it
later
much
always confusedly
day,
down to a
writ
the
to
than
back
be traced farther
separate existence cannot
Reid in England, or of D Alembert and Conings of Hartley and
science,

The great thinkers of the seventeenth century

France.
the fragments of psychonever dreamed of such a science and

diilac in

we find interspersed in their writings, as

analysis which
main purpose, are brief and imperfect. Locke s
subsidiary to their
the article),
Human

loo-ical

"Es^ay

is

an

concerning
concerning

"inquiry

and

certainty.
ideas of which

Hence

Understanding"

(without

human knowledge,

it is

its

origin, nature,

almost exclusively metaphysical,

treats are not considered chiefly as

it

phenomena

His question was not,

laws
what
and
govern the succession
AVlnt do we think and feel,
we know? Whence
do
What
but
?
and
of our thoughts
feelings
it from experi
comes
or
with
us,
comes our knowledge ? Is it born
how far is it
and
limit
that
it,
boundaries
the
are
ence ? What
these
l
answer
questions
Of course, the attempt to
?

of the mind, but as elements of cognition.

trustworthy
of psychological observa
involved and required a certain amount
and as a means for a
the
this
but
way,
and
by
only
tion
analysis
;

higher purpose.

AVe see
easily

it

plainly, then,

may

defined, and how

Here we are con
observation and ex

how Psychology may be

be kept within

its

proper

limits.

cerned with the human mind as a subject of

as the supposed seat or origin of certain phenomena
periment, and
These
classification.
which admit of number, arrangement, and
re
and
be
to
need
and
analyzed
often
complex,
phenomena are
Moreover, they are not pro
duced to their simplest elements.
to fixed laws,
duced fortuitously or at random, but are subject
and veri
be
which
expressed
definitely
less
or
more
obvious,
may
as to the
Avoiding all hypotheses, then,
it may be
or
mind
of
matter,
either
essence
real
or
inmost nature
we
treats of those properties or facts which
said that

fied

by experiment.

Psychology

and extent
my purpose, to inquire into the original, certainty,
and degrees of belief, opinion, and as
together with the grounds
the physical consideration ot the mind, or
I shall not at present meddle with
sent
essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits
trouble myself to examine wherein its
have any sensation by our organs or any ideas 11
or alterations of our bodies, we come to
consider tl
It shall suffice to my present purpose to
our understandings
about the objects which they have to
discernin. faculties of a man as they are employed
3 of the same chapter.
See also
2.
Locke s Assay, Book I., chap, i.,
do W ith."
his Critique of 1 we Itea
This also is precisely what Kant proposes to accomplish by
and rival of Locke.
ton wherein he appears as the contiuuator
1

of

"

This therefore beincr

human knowledge,

14

RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY.

learn directly from

consciousness; physical science, of those which
we know through the senses.

single illustration may here be given of the

characteristic
features ot the two different classes of
phenomena now referred to
_

by means

which they can be

clearly distinguished from each
opposite effects of repeated and continuous
use on matter and mind.
Every mate-rial contrivance, every tool
and machine of man s
device, deteriorates by use.
All wear of
the engine more or less wears it out.
Every cut made with a
e dulls it.
Each time the watch ticks, it becomes a less
perfeet measure of time.
Every discharge of a -un increases its lia
bility to burst.
Every foot which a locomotive travels impairs its
machinery, and grinds down the rail on which it moves.
All our
material implements, if not
frequently mended, soon become un
ot

I refer to the

serviceable.

Not so is it with any exercise of mind.

Here, use reln.es and
invigorates, disuse weakens and
It has even become a
destroys.
proverb that practice make> perfect, habit renders all thiu-s
easy

work becomes play.

umns of Iigures so

The practised accountant sums

up Ion- col
swiftly that the result appears to come bv lntui-

while the
school-boy boggles in attempting to add nine to
The trained musician attains a
delicacy and precision o f
touch which
Erom the quickened apprehen
appear miraculous.
sions ot
hearing and feeling, the blind man learns almost enou-h
ion,

to compensate him for the loss

of sight. The
juggler and the skilled
mechanic attain a sleight of hand which no
quickness of eye can
follow.
Those only who have educated the
memory by repeated
effort

can

know how

Each

quickly it may act, or

turn may be so

how

vast

may

be

its

faculty in

improved by use that it

eems to dominate and take
possession of the whole mind.
Acci
dent or sickness, it is
true, may impair and even disable the men
tal

faculties, or, as is

more probable, may obscure

or hinder the

outward manifestation of them; but in the

normal exercise of
their functions,
they never need mending or repair.
On the con

trary, all our spiritual powers gain so much

by exercise
vation hen-, as to
promise a future boundless

and

development

in

culti

some

higher state of being.

Psychology, since it depends on observation and
experiment,
properly be ranked with the physical sciences.
JUit Phi:>ay

u>se

in the strict

sense of the term, as it abandons

alto-ether
empirical modes of research, because it looks to
questions
behind or above them,
because, as Kant says, it has first to

>sophy,

15

INTRODUCTORY.
consider what

makes experience

possible,

is

often

named meta

understood
I hold that the definition of philosophy thus
physics.
that it is what the Ger
Fichte
and
;
Locke
was correctly given by
foe Theory of Knowledge consid
mans call flrkenntnisslehre,
the
in
or
abstract,
as
irrespective of the things
ered simply
such,
known. Hence it includes a discussion of the origin, the conditions,

human knowledge
the limits, the principles, and the certainty of
at once a division of
its
of
enumeration
supplies
this
and
parts
these parts should
the subject, and determines the order in which
other science has its special object, or class of
;

be treated.

Every

which it is exclusively devoted.

investigation of
of
number, geometry of position and ex
Thus, arithmetic treats
of matter, and psychol
the
of
general properties
tension, physics
the modes of action of the human mind.
and
the
of
phenomena
ogy
has the
But each of these special sciences presupposes that man
other things, which
of acquiring knowledge of himself and

objects,

to

the

power

its peculiar nature, its conditions, boundaries,

power, indeed, has
when duly exercised within these limits, is
but
and imperfections,
knowl
more or less trustworthy. Because Philosophy treats of

science.
technically called a pure
is, the
the doctrine or theory of science
Wissenschaftslchre
of
a
of
metaphysics,
system
name uiven by Fichte to his exposition

edge simply as such,

it is

and science, inasmuch

is a difference between knowledge
All sci
one of these terms is generic, and the other specific.
is
Science
is not science.
all
but
knowledge
ence is knowledge,
reduced to order, pre
that portion of knowledge which has been
and it aims at, though it does
classification, and method

liut there
as

cision,

I may know many things

not always accomplish, completeness.
of the science of those classes
ignorant
wholly
individually, though
Hence Fichte s
belong.
which these individual
of things to
definition is

things

open

to

criticism, in

so far as he limits metaphysical

possessed by comparatively few,

more or less
knowledge, which, whether
insteacf of extending
This does not mean that Philosophy
is common to all.
complete,
The doctrine or theory
itself is unscientific ; quite the contrary.
while the subject-matter of that doc
be
scientific,
eminently
may
it is universal or common
trine or theory, for the very reason that
and unscientific.
immethodical,
is
to all men,
generally vague,
will become more clear if we state that
distinction
the
Perhaps
of the cognitive and other faculties of
Psychology is the analysis
is the analysis of the
mind
human
the
;
Philosophy or metaphysics
As all the
formed.
as
considered
already
cognitions themselves

investigation to science, which

it

to

is

16

RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO PHILOSOPHY.

other sciences are particular, each

being the knowledge only of a
and limited class of
things, while Philosophy alone is gen
eral, its object being knowledge in the
abstract, or as such, irre
spective of the tilings known, it is obvious that
cannot
special

Philosophy

from the other sciences, but must

borrow^its principles
impose its
Its function is to make
principles upon them.
laws, and not
to receive them,
The truths
except from its own dictation.

own

of any
particular science must conform not only to the special character
istics of the limited class of
objects with which it deals, but to all
the limitations and conditions which result from the
very nature of
knowledge considered simply as such. It is the business of Philosophy to determine these universal limitations and conditions, and
to determine them from the nature of
knowledge per se. To
borrow any of them from a special science would be
illogical, as
these would be vitiated
by the special conditions of this particular
science.

Hence Philosophy has sometimes been

appropriately

called the science of first

principles.
have examples of pure science both

We

The former

in

Mathematics and

the science of pure

magnitude, or of meas
urement and numeration
irrespective of the tilings measured and
numbered; the latter is the science of pure thought,
that is, of
thought irrespective of the subjects which we are
thinking about.
This is Logic as understood
by Aristotle and Kant that is, the
science of the
necessary laws of pure Thought, or of thinking in
the abstract.

Logic.

is

Throughout the Middle Ages, by a great

misunderstanding of
meaning of Aristotle, Logic was held to be the science, or
rather the art, of argumentation, and hence as a means
a
the

(certainly

very poor one) for the discovery of truth.

This perversion of its
proper signification and use continued through the .seventeenth
and even the greater part of the
and was the
eighteenth, century
chief reason why it
degenerated into a mere jargon of technicali
ties, and came to be almost
universally decried and neglected.
mere art of disputing would be a
poor organon for
out
;

finding

new truths; for, as Locke remarked, we must know a thin

first,
and then only can we prove it
A vestige of this
syllogistically.
mistaken purpose of the science still exists in what is
sometimes
called inductive
Logic, sometimes the logic of discovery and in
vention, as treated by Lord Bacon, Dr. Whewell, and Mr. Mill,
"

if this be understood as a
merely speculative science, a rationale,
or generalized
analysis, of the successive steps of procedure
whereby
physical laws are discovered and processes invented, it is a

legiti-

17

INTRODUCTORY.

But re
mate investigation, though one of no practical utility.
of rules to direct future effort, it is
a
as
an
as
art,
system
garded
mere brandishing of syllogisms would
certainly as futile as the
In the physical sciences,
be for the discovery of abstract truth.
one guess is tried
the process of invention is essentially tentative
and success
a
Chinese
in
as
after another,
puzzle
solving
:

just

a union of good luck with fertility of imagina

finally depends on
indescribable tact, which can no
tion, quickness of insight, and an

more be imparted or improved by a system of rules than the

art

Successive hypotheses may be verified, indeed, by

mathematical computation,
by a precise determination of the
that is,
of the phenomena which are studied
relations
quantitative
measure
determine
and
after
we may try on one coat
another,
by
ment which comes the nearest to an exact fit. Just so in regard to
of lyric poetry.

Pure, or what

is

only to teach us

mode

Its purpose is
sometimes called Formal Logic.
how we always have thought, and not any new
or new
through which we may avoid

of thinking,
the errors to which

precautions

we were formerly

liable, or

by which we may

discover truths that were formerly unattainable.

When Logic is said to be the science of Thought, it is evident
that the word
Thought is not taken in the loose and vague
sense in which it is a synonyme for any action whatever of the
"

"

human mind.
ceives

man

does not properly think

some one impression through a

single

when he merely
sense, such

re

as red

nor when he is merely con

his
of
affection
one
mind, such as hunger, pain, or
scious of some
is only a single presentation to sense, an in
Each
of
these
joy.
tuition of our receptive faculty, the mind exerting no conscious
an impression as perceived
activity in it, but passively receiving
now and here, and single, without reference to any thing else, and

light, a

sour taste, or a shrill sound

We

must suppose
without any distinction of parts or attributes.
the lowest brute, as an oyster, if sentient, to be capable of such in
and what is received in them may be called the mere
tuitions
but it is matter without form, and so
brute matter of
;

knowledge;

not properly a cognition, but only the rough material, to be subse

To complete the process, the
quently worked up into knowledge.
understand
i. e. the
aid of the thinking or elaborative faculty
this impression with some
u s t be called in.
ing

We

compare

one received before, recognize its likeness or unlikeness, partial or

into its parts and attributes,
total, to that former object, analyze it
ind so refer it to a class of things formerly known, and thereby
In short, we
the common name of that class.
it a name,
give

18

RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO PHILOSOPHY.

reflect
"to

upon, or tfmd, the object long enough,

take

it

in,"

or

know

it

for

what

it

is.

in

common

phrase,

Comparison and the

discernment of relations may be said to be the essence, or common

element, of pure Thought
for it is only
by comparing one sensa
tion, or one object, with others, that we can
consciously recognize
it, through discriminating those
respects in which it is similar "from
those in which it is unlike them
and so know it, either as a red
or blue color, a soft or hard
a leaf, an
or a
;

object,

apple,

stone.

Sensation or intuition gives us

this
only individual impressions,
one feeling and no other.
On the other hand. Thought, and lan
guage, which is the expression of Thought, lias to do
only with
The imagination, like the senses,
groups or classes of things.
deals only with particular
intuitions, or individual
If I
things.

imagine a color, sound, or object, it is always single and definite,

this one shade of red, that note of the
canary or robin, that par
ticular
engraving a group or class, or rather the notion which
my mind has of a group or class, cannot be imagined it can only
be thn ught.
It was
long ago remarked by Hobbes, semper idem sentire, ac
non sentire, ad idem recidttnt,
always to have the same sensation,
is
precisely equivalent to having no conscious sensation at all.
Thus, if I pass out of strong light into an
dark room, I
;

feel or

utterly

am

conscious of that darkness,

through its contrast with the
perception of light a moment before
but if I were born in that
darkness, I should have no conscious perception of it, no sense of
my infinite loss. The same odor always in the nostrils is no sense
of odor at all.
He who has lived nowhere but on the very bor
ders of Niagara never hears the low thunder with which
the
waters constantly fill the air but let him
;

go away, though only

for an hour,
ble of

and when he returns he

will

instantly beconTe sensi

State this fact in

general terms, and

we have this law

necessary to make even feeling or sensation to be
coHsrioiiti
feeling or sensation; and Thought can take place only
through discrimination, or the perception of difference.
Now such
discrimination is the cognition of a
or attribute
in
it.

Thought

is

quality
(called
Logic, a mark), whereby this is distinguished from that..
Hence
Esser rightly gives as one definition of
Thought, that it is repre
senting an object to ourselves through its distinctive marks.

We

and thus know, an object

only through grasping together
and attributes, which make it what
unity^its separate qualities
by distinguishing it from what it is not. If it has no such

conceive,
^nto
it is.

attributes, there

thought of;

it is

nothing to be grasped together

an impossible conception
a

is

nothing to be

nonentity.

19

INTRODUCTORY.

if it did not manifest

I should not dwell so long on this point,
nil our
utter futility of that theory which resolves
run
sensations
of
and
together,
into sensations

BO clearly the

groups
mental chemistry, by the power of association.
through a process of

knowledge

True*

all

Locke and Kant

are at one.

from the world without,

But

life.

in this admission,
a breath of air
impulse,
foreign
conscious
necessary to wake the mind to

knowledge begins

the sensation

is

with

so far

is

sensation

from constituting the knowledge,

does not even enter into it, or form any portion of it.
we have seen, are
Sensation and the consciousness of sensation, as
that is, the first
The
same
not the
proper beginning
thing.
for the very phrase, uncon
of knowledge is consciousness
ste
Conscious knowl
scious knowledge, is a contradiction in terms.

that

it

p_

of the first sensation, for that is uncon

edge does not grow out
nor even out of the second sensation but out of a
scious
;

relation of the first sensation to the second. For

perception of the
of difference, and
this relation is thought ; it is a true cognition
and such
attribute
or
mark
distinctive
thereby a cognition of a
breath of
constitutes knowledge properly so called.
perception
and yet the music
air wakes the instrument within us to music
was previously
which
in
the
but
instrument,
is not in the breath,
constituted and attuned for its own peculiar harmonies.
;

in its
far I have explained the action of Thought only
called by
was
what
or
in
or
form
first
conception,
process, namely,
But there are two other
the older logicians, simple apprehension.
forms or processes of pure Thought, namely, judgment and reason-

Thus

we
simply affirmation or denial
two
These
B.
not
is
or
is B,
declare that
judge when we
that is, every
formulas are the universal expression of judgment
be its matter, must have just
whatever
may
particular judgment,
The mere succession or coexistence of
this form, and no other.

in

jr,

or inference.

Judgment

is

two thoughts
think

first

of

mind does not constitute a judgment. I may

takes
man, and then of animal; but no judgment
affirm in thought a perceived relation between the

in the

place until I
two, or until I think

man

is

animal.

And

the effect of this act

a sin
of judgment is to reduce
thought the two terms to one,
man.
animal
of
mind
or
the
of
namely,
thought,
object
gle concept
or human animal.
And this brings to light a chief function of the understanding or
it reduces
in our minds
thinking power it is the unifying faculty
of
act
the
is
As we have seen,
grasping
to one.
in

many

conception

attributes into the unity of thought which

together two or more

we

20

RELATIONS OF LOGIC TO PHILOSOPHY.

a single concept.

call

In

like manner,
judgment reduces its two
by affirming the predicate of the subject, it forces
them into one thought. Inference or
syllogism, the third actof
pure I hough t, also shows the tendency of the mind to
unity since
it sums
up the results of two judgments and three terms in a single

erms

to

one

conclusion.

Now

the distinctive feature of

Logic as a science

is its exposinecessary laws which underlie and govern these three

processes of Thought.
I call them laws in the
strictest sense of
word.
are not mere statements of
They
:hat_
general facts or
empirical laws, like those in
psychology and the natural sciences,
s and events
being thrown together into groups accordin- to
_

ion of the

r relations of
similarity or mutual dependence.
Neither are
they practical maxims, of limited and
contingent applicability, but
considered useful for the conduct of our
powers and the <n,idance

of research.
Such maxims are laid down in abundance
by writers
upon rhetoric and what is called inductive
Logic, though I suspect
no great good has ever resulted from
any conscious attempt at con
But these laws of pure
formity with them.
with which
we are now concerned, are as absolute as the Thought,
axioms of geometry
winch

indeed they closely resemble.

In one sense,
they contain
as we have been
acting upon them all our liveslough, perhaps on account of their
very obviousness, they have
T been
explicitly state,! or drawn out into

mg new,

"N

distinct consciousTliey do not admit of proof, as their truth is

presupposed
every act of reasoning, and therefore no
argument or proof is
unless their
validity is taken for granted.
The laws of
pun. hought are necessities of Thought, since a conscious
violation
them is impossible. It is true, that in what
Leibnitz calls the
symbolic use ot language, whereby, in order to shorten the
Intelrtual process, we substitute words for
thoughts, employing them
like algebraic
symbols without spreading out their meanino- before
the mind, we
may, through hurry and carelessness, violate these
fundamental laws.
But in such cases, as soon as we return
upon
Dur steps with an effort to think
it is
clearly and

>le,

distinctly,

imme-

lately percen-ed that we have been misled, not

merely into erro
neous or defective
thought, but into that confusion which is really
a negation of
thought, that is, an absurdity and a contradiction.
Some of these necessary laws of
Thought have a necessary bear
ing upon the great doctrines of theology and
Such is
philosophy.
one that I have
the law,
attempted to set forth,
namely, that con

ception or simple apprehension, since

it is

a perception of
relations,

21

INTRODUCTORY.

and difference. It is only an

no definition can be made, that
become
can
no
definite,
except by limitation and nega
is,
thought
Its scope is determined only by setting strict boundaries
tion.
which it cannot pass, and we set forth fully what it is only by
Omnis deter mi natio est negatio. If
ascertaining what it is not.
we give to any object of thought parts or attributes, and no defini
possible only through plurality
that
application of this law to say,
is

tion

is

or the other,
possible without one

we negative

its

unity.

This law of thought is the occult principle which, as we shall see

of Spinoza.
hereafter, determined all the peculiarities of the system
It lies at the root of all those discussions about the conceivableness
of the Infinite and the Absolute, and the objective reality of space
It gives the
and time, which have been so rife in our own day.

and semblance of validity to the arguments of

the Pantheists, which have caused their theory to appear, not as the
wild and extravagant speculation that it really is, but as the most
reasoned scheme of the universe which the
and

logical consecution

orderly

human

thoroughly

intellect has ever

framed

which has imparted

to

it,

in fact,

the strange fascination that it has seemed to possess in every age

that has developed any power of abstract thought.

CHAPTER

II.

DESCARTES.

RENE DESCARTES was

born on the last

day of March, 1596, at
Ilaye, a small town in France situated between Tours and
Poitiers.
He was of a noble family, which derived its territorial
name and dignity, Du Perron, from a small landed
estate which it
formerly owned in the province of Poitou.
lie was educated at
the newly founded
College of La Fleche, under the direction of
the Jesuits; but he showed no
liking or aptitude for any of the
sciences which they
to teach him

La

attempted
except pure mathemat
he studied with great
Is for
assiduity and success.
Philosophy, he found nothing in it which was nol
.subject to dis
pute, and judged that it must be entirely reformed before it could
ics,

which

become a foundation for the other sciences.

Ik-fore attempting
such a reform, however, he
thought best, by means of foreign travel
and by following the
profession of arms, to study the
great book
ot the world.
He served for some years, first under Prince
Maurice of Nassau, and afterwards under the
Elector of Bavaria
and it was while
engaged in garrison duty, according to his own
account, that he invented the earlier
portions of his system of
After quitting the
philosophy.
army, he lived for three years in
Pans, where he sought the society rather of
people of fashion and
men ot the world than of the
learned, and did not even addict
himself to books.
When his plans were ripe, however, he found a
quiet retreat in Holland, which was then an
asylum for free
thought, and there pursued his researches into science with
r reat
ardor.
Still he made little use of
books, but devoted himself
;

rather to scientific
experiments and to patient meditation.
into correspondence,
however, with the eminent

entered

He
men

throughout Europe who were engaged in similar

pursuits with
and soon acquired
high reputation among them as an
original and profound thinker.
After he was fifty
years old, he
himself,

went to Sweden at the invitation of

Queen
there, at Stockholm, in February, 1G50.

Christina,

and died

DESCARTES.
to regard
with some writers at the present day
as a proo
his
of
merits
philosophy
Descartes as a skeptic, and the
i. sy sbecause h is founded upo
of the excellence of skepticism,
i
he
the
On
contrary,
doubt,
tem of universal and systematic
and con cmethodical,
self-sufficient,
of
and
prince of dogmatists,
Descartes himse If rema k
It

is

common

The true skeptic, as

utive thinkers.
and therefore ends as he leg
doubts for the sake of doubting,
in order to
I
On the contrary, doubt, he says, only
with doubt.
of
certainty ;
attainment
whole design looks to the
believe.
and the quicksand
earth
movable
and
and I push aside the light
rock or clay upon which a founda
in order to find the solid
,

Mv

only

The doctrine winch he sought to csUbwas

human knowledge. His chief fault
,

tion can be safely built."

lish was the certainty of

He was

intellectual arrogance.

not content simply

out a

to.point

winch other minds and aft,

method of inquiry, by following
die neces
effort, accumulate by degrees
combined
mio-ht, through
I at
ruth.
of
structure
and slowly build up the
sary materials
work him
whole
the
do
to
Descartes
self

He

proposed

Bacon s plan.
Bacon invented

a syst m.
a method, while Descartes erected
a theory o
research
assumed to create at once by independent

science,

which should

mathematics, on

rest, like

indisputably

as in mathematics again
truths; with all the parts,
and fitly jointed an
its
each in
proper place,
duly arranged
defiance to decay or change,
bolted toother, so as to bid
more
executed by one band were
works
that
he
observed?
says,
better fitted to each
and
harmonious
more
the parts
regular, and
different minds
which united the contributions of_
other, than those
of Lacedconstitution
The
political
and successive centuries.
that of the other
excelled
his
in
opinion,
mon, for instance,
work of one man, and came per
of Greece, because it was the
Instead of choosin,
a
of
single artificer.
feet from the conception
I thought it right
of
others,
the
opinions
therefore, among

ioms or

first

an opinion for myself."

Tins language fully

be
the eulogy which has often
Philoso
Medieval
of
bestowed ujon him; that the characteristic
other authority than that of reason;
phy was submission to some
reason as the only_ authority ;
accepts
while Modern Philosophy
about this decisive change.
and it was Cartesianism which brought
merit in such an assumption o
justifies

There would have been

little

at a later day,

after

pemlence
it was an unprecedented step
century.

it

at the

had become the fashion

the sever
beginning of

but

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
Descartes had a
method, and devoted a whole treatise to its
and defence but it was not the
distinctive feature f ".
For this, we must look to its
philosophy.
application, to the
doctni.es evolved from it
by a clear-headed and invent ve thinker!
^ "
dedUC * Ve *"*** and a
prior
method
rnethod.
f\ not reason
He did
inductively, from facts upwards to
laws
but
causes,
from
first truths
pi
position

th<3

n"

deductively,
principles downwards to observed farts.
own tour rules:
(1.) To admit

or

More

self-evident

particularly he

hid

<

tain evidence.
.to

as

To proceed

nothing except upon clea7and ct

1

analytically, resoM ng eachprobdistinct questions as

To
possible.

(2.)

many

consider
(3.)
inquiry in a fixed order, beginning with the
simplest,
*ing by degrees to the more complex and abstruse
(on the
ground o this aphorism, it has been
maintained, and with ,ood
rc-nson, that he is the
proper original of that scheme of he
clasM ,cat,on of the sciences
L

,us

ot

which was

(4.) lo employ so
to make sure that

these are , u]

first

developed by Comte.)

much circumspection and exact

calculation as

nothing essential had been omitted.

the con(luct of inve8t

Obviously
oudy

-athematics.
t

There was no great merit in the mere

enunci tion
them, even at that early
IJ ut to adhere
day.
to them with

great closeness and

a

fidelity in

the exposition

of a

new

the r^ o

journey of exploration where he could be

pledge
guided by
no
footmarks, since no one had preceded
him, affords prfo of no
and
ordinary vigor
clearness of intellect.

The

and perhaps the most

difficult, thins to be done was
and establish the
starting-point of the inquiry
to fim
some truth or iact which should
be absolutely self-evident ad
un
questionable and still be fruitful, so that all
truths subsequently
elicited
be
shown to depend
might
upon it and be proved from H
by rigorous filiation of logic and doctrine.
He needed a fulTum
for his lever; and the
way to find it was to ascertain by ac
experiment whether the most comprehensive
skepticism could over
throw every
thing, or would leave something still
upright amid the
genera ruin, something which could not be
doubted or
first,

to ascertain

denied
ithout an evident contradiction
and absurdity.
I resolved he
to
says,
reject as absolutely false
every thing which was lubiect
even to the smallest doubt.
Every thing which I havv le
ed
came either from the senses or the
intellect; and as the senses
often deceive us,
falsely reporting both the visible and tangible
s
il; a we
imaine

m
mere

fancies for realities; as the

understanding often goes

25

DESCARTES.

and we blunder about even the simplest matters in geome

has so got
it is supposuble even that some malignant power
for false
truth
hold
to
up
the control over our minds as constantly
I will
in anything
believe
no
I
will
the
and
reverse,
longer
hood,
of mathematical evidence, and the existence of
the
validity
deny
a God, of external objects, of my own body, and even of myself.
Does anything remain ? Yes Thought, This very doubt and

astray,
try; as

Thought is present
denial exist only so far as they are thought.
as well as
as
well
as
Error
dreams.
truth,
in
imagination
even
think the nonTo
or they do not exist.
must
be
thought,
reality,
existence of thought itself is a manifest contradiction and ab
surdity.

Here we have a
able, but

first

principle, then,

Cogito, ergo sum.

fruitful.

and

The

not only unassail

reality of the thought

it is

Two steps, then,

of the thinker.
necessarily involves the existence
If there are any truths of
are already taken and solidly planted.
fact or concrete existence, as distinct from the mere relations of
truths which skepticism itself cannot doubt, these
philosophy of the last two centuries

abstract ideas,

On

this subject, the

are they.
and a half has not advanced an inch beyond Descartes, nor ren
On these two
dered nugatory the smallest portion of his work.
most certain of all propositions depends the certainty of all other
affirmations that can be made.

The one cannot be denied without

axiom of
self-contradiction, that is, without violating the primary
all thought must be consistent with itself ;
that
thought,

pure
thought

thought.

is

known, because both knowledge and skepticism are

The

other,

my

personal existence,

is

at

once the type of

measure of all certainty. The contrast be

reality, and the
tween the real and the apparent, as it is a relation between them,
must have a fandamentutn relationis, or a standard through which
This standard cannot be found in the appar
it; can be
thought.

all

mere negation, the opposite, of the real. There

and this can be noth
standard or type of reality
the relation, and without which,
ing but the Ego, which thinks
real and the apparent
consequently, the difference between the
could not even be thought. It is also the criterion and the measure
of all certainty, as well in the apprehension of the vulgar as in the
I am as sure
reasonings of the learned for the common remark,
of it as I am of my own existence," expresses the strongest con
ent, as this

must

is

the

be, then, a

"

viction of which the

"luman

mind

is

other assurance

is

referred.

Cartesianism

is

the proper origin

capable,

and that

to

and starting-point of

which
all

all

Mod-

26

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

era Philosophy, both because

it

first

erected the standard of in

dependence of the authority of all former times and thinkers, and

because these t\vo
primary data of Descartes have been borrowed
from him by all subsequent system-makers to serve as the
founda
tion stones of their own doctrines.
Fichte and all other
proper
Idealists or Egoists of the last two centuries found
their philoso
phy upon Cogito, ergo sum. And it may fairly be added that
Schelling, Hegel, and the whole school
those who have
upheld
the doctrine of Absolute
Identity, and have endeavored therefrom
to construct a
philosophy of the Absolute, have begun with tho
Cartesian datum of pure or blank
thought, and have assumed to
follow the equal and parallel
development of such thought in two
into object and
directions,
subject, nature and spirit, matter and
mind.
of"

But before commenting

any further upon these primary

let us

truths,

follow the subsequent evolution of the

system by Descartes
himself, in order to gain a connected idea of his
philosophy as a
whole.
As yet we have not advanced beyond the internal world
of consciousness, to which both
thought and the Ego unquestion
How shall we get beyond the Ego to the world
ably belong.
outside of us, and reconstruct that trust in the
testimony of the
senses and in the deductive conclusions of the
intellect which

was
swept away at the outset? The problem is ontologieal how, from
the two premises now
gained, shall we demonstrate the
;

objective

reality of

something external to ourselves, the existence of which

may serve as a corner-stone to the whole remaining fabric of
truth ?
There is but one such corner-stone,
Descartes and

says
the necessary existence of a
God, of an infinite and per
whom, because He is perfect in wisdom and good
ness, we
attribute any intention to deceive his
creatures.
^cannot
If his existence can be demonstrated
the two
;

that

is,

fect being, to

merely from
points
already established, then we are justified in relying with full con
fidence on those faculties which He has
can then
given
trust the evidence of our senses and the
conclusions of our under
standing in all cases whatsoever in which they afford us clear and
"us."

distinct ideas of their

respective objects.

We

The veracity of God is

the only bridge over which we can
pass from a knowledge of our
own existence to an unhesitating conviction of the
reality of things
without us and the trustworthiness of our intellectual
s.
How can we prove the being of a God merely from the power
knowl
edge of our own existence and of the thoughts or ideas which are
present to our consciousness ?

27

DESCARTES.

and purest form, the ontological argument for the

of such a being
a
of
existence
God, founded on the mere idea
which is present to our minds, may he very briefly stated. Our
In

first

its

and perfect being, who is selfof his own nature; for

a
necessity
by
existent,
finite
a
from
being, whose existence
thus only is He distinguished
it depends upon some other
since
or
is contingent
merely possible,
God alone exists per se.
itself.
power or person foreign from
self-caused
;
every other being exists per
since He is causa sui
of
then, is a part of the very idea

God

idea of

i.

aliud.

God

that of an infinite

is

e.

who

exists

Necessary existence,

He necessarily exists. Still more briefly In the

are contained all the attributes of a perfect being ;
existence is one of these attributes ; therefore God
:

therefore

idea of a

God

but necessary
exists.

Two other considerations were added by Descartes, when he

was pressed with objections by his opponents but these seem ^to
amount to little more than stating the same argument over again.
;

a greater perfection, he argues, to be present in the

than to be
idea that we form of him, and also to exist in reality,
the idea of God includes all perfec
but
in idea
merely present
This
tions ; therefore, this perfection also, that he really exists.^
s own
Anselm
in
St.
stated
best
be
form of the argument may

Thus,

it

is

words, since Descartes borrowed

non
cogitari nequit,
intellectu est, potest

it

from him.

"

Certe id

Si
intellectu solo.
potest esse in
in
et
majus
re,
quod
cogitari

quo^

enim

est.^

majus

in solo

Si ergo

est in solo intellectu, id ipsum quo

quo majus cogitari non potest
Sed certe
est quo majus cogitari potest.
non
potest,
cogitari
majus
is ens realissiof
God
idea
our
thus
Or
non
hoc esse
potest."
who includes all reality, or the highest kind of
a.

id

mum,

reality

being
then his reality

is

a necessary part of the

mere notion of

what he is.
This form of the argument, which is strictly a priori, was
from the necessities of the case,
adopted by Descartes not only
from the
because he had nothing but ideas to reason from, but
he
As
the
argues,
geometer,
analogy of reasoning in mathematics.
whence looks closely, in the very idea of a triangle finds the con
sequent

fact, that

the

sum

of

to two right angles, so in the

Jact of his necessary existence.

three angles is necessarily equal

contained the
very idea of God is

its

is a very lame one.

obvious, however, that this analogy
truth respecting the
abstract
an
is
discerns
the
What
geometer
I have a notion of the three
relation of two ideas to each other.

It

is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
angles of a triangle, and another notion of two right
angles and I
perceive that these two notions, both of which are
quantitative,
perfectly correspond, or are equal in magnitude.
Such reasoning
has nothing to do with the fact of real or
concrete existence.
Going back to the substance of the Cartesian argument a priori,
we observe that the fallacy iu it consists iii
the
;

substituting
phrase
the idea of
It
necessary existence."
is
perfectly correct to say, that the idea of necessary existence
enters into our complex notion of a God.
But the reality does
not follow from the idea,
any more than the reality of a winged
horse follows from
my conception of such an animal
still
<<

necessary existence

"

for

"

or,

more

pertinently, than the actual presence of a perfect circle on

the paper before me follows from the
mathematical, that
the
is,

perfect, conception of such a circle, which exists in

my

mind, and

which, strictly speaking, has no prototype whatever in the outward

Real existence is the very
opposite of ideal existence,
and it is therefore a contradiction in terms to ailirm that
the former
is contained in the latter.
universe.

Unable to answer this objection, Descartes took

refuge
form of the argument, or rather in a different

in another
argument, which is
inductive indeed, and, as it seems to
me, satisfactory, but by which
he lost hold of every vestige of demonstrative
reasoning a priori,

aucUame down
There

are,

he

to the old

argument from

effect to cause, thus

affirms, three sorts of ideas in

my

mind.

1.

There

are adventitious ideas, which come to me from

without, through
the agency of the senses.
2. There are factitious
ideas, co nstructed by myself out of the materials furnished
3.
by sense.
There are those which are native-born,
or
original,

among

the ideas in

innate.

Now

my mind

I find one of God,

understanding
thereby an infinite and eternal substance, immovable, independent^
and
omniscient,
omnipotent, by whom I and all things that exist
were created. Whence came this idea ?
Certainly not from the
senses.
These take cognizance only of what is fini
te, limited, im
The ideas in my mind are images or
perfect, and contingent.
pictures, which may want something of the perfection that is in
their archetype, but
certainly cannot go beyond the magnitude and
excellence of their cause.
Moreover, it did not rise unexpectedly,
creating a feeling of novelty or surprise, as the ideas of external
things do when they strike upon my senses for the first time.

Neither was it made by my own

agency, for I can neither enlarge
nor diminish it
not the former, for it is infinite, and therefore
cannot be increased; not the latter, since an idea of
:

perfection

DESCARTES.
be removed and another idea be
cannot be lessened, but can only
did not come from the senses,
idea
the
As
in its
substituted

place.

must be innate it bears the artificer s

who made it._ In fine, tc
own stamp put upon his work to show
inward upoi
"when I turn my attention

then, and

is

not factitious,

it

adopt his own language,

a being incomplete, dependent upon
myself I perceive that I am
and better than my
another, and reaching after something higher
I depend, enjoys all the per
whom
on
that
and
lie,
present state
them not merely
fections towards which I only aspire,- enjoys
in very truth and
but
extent,
indefinite
an
potentially and to
Now my nature could not be what it is, that is,
infinite degree.
of the Deity, unless he
could not possess this innate conception
;

actually

thoughts

by no

those

existed, and possessed

can in no wise picture forth or
all

attributes

my

which

comprehend, anc

defects."

in its theological,
are not concerned with this argument
a demonstrate:
of
as
portion
but only in its philosophical aspect,
human fac
or as a means of accrediting the

Now we

system of knowledge,
from universal doubt to a successful
ulties and of thereby rising
As such, it cannot be demonstrative and
search after truth.
can
or of actual concrete existence,
of fact,
priori, since matters
be made known only by direct

from
intuition, or by reasoning
AVe do know from
demonstrated.
be
cannot
but
probable evidence,
and of our own person
direct intuition the existence of thought,
no intuitive knowledge
surely we have
to demonstrate it must be a
and
attempt
any
Divine existence
idea to a reality except
is no passage from an
failure, since there
into the premises fact!
by smuggling
bv unfounded assumptions,
we have no right to consider
not yet proved, or judgments which
how difficult
consider
not
Descartes did
as axiomatic.
to present the mind
and
into
doubt,
revoke all our past opinions

ality or self.

But
;

of fresh
as a tabula rasa for the reception

and well accredit

not so easy to cancel ail

To adopt his own language,
truth
burn one s own house down.
our preconceived beliefs as it is to
it does not follow that
Granting even the idea to be innate,
some cause, we know not
that
but
in
our
minds,
only
implanted it
and not even tins can be postu
what, must have placed it there;
effect
the validity of reasoning from
lated, unless we assume
noi
which Descartes had not yet demonstrated,
a
it is

cause,

principle

this

inductive argument from experience,

the rea
the assurance that we need of
all
us
reasoning affords
nature as
same
the
of
of the Divine existence, the evidence being

even noticed.

As an

SO

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

by which we arc convinced that all men are mortal. It is

and it cannot be demonstrated, that I must die but
any one
would be insane who should refuse to believe it. Descartes
that

not,

prom

ised to lead us

up

to

the fundamental truth of

by a
nobly take the high priori road and reason down
wards
but after a little digression he conducts us back again to
the old travelled way, where alone we can iind sure
footing, arid
reasons upward from effect to cause.

new

to

path,

all

religion

"

;"

Indeed, the great defect of the Cartesian philosophy is, that it

takes little notice of the idea of Cause, and does not
disentangle or

present to distinct consciousness the great Law of Causality, though

the whole system
unconsciously presupposes the validity of this
principle, not only as a law of thought, but also as a law of things.
Descartes saw only half of what Mr. JMansel calls the
great meta
What is the origin and import of these two
physical problem.
necessary conceptions, Substance as distinct from phenomenon,
"

Cause as distinct from change; or rather, of these two different

one and the same conception, for Cause is but Substance iu
operation, as Substance is but Cause resting after its labor."
A
Cause must be a Substance, or being in energy but a Substance is
sides of

not necessarily, or always, an active Cause

and, in fact, is never
so except so far as it is, at least for the time, endowed with
power,
or has power as one of its attributes.
Descartes confounded the
;

two altogether, or

at most, misled in spite of himself

by the Schohe
introduced only the conception of immanent
philosophy,
cause, which, properly speaking, is no cause at all.
In a certain
sense, a Substance is the Cause of its attributes, inasmuch as it is a
la>tic

condition or prerequisite of the manifestation of those attributes.

J5ut as Mich, it is a dead, or
inbiding (indwelling, immanent, ) Cause,

operating only on itself, and not a living and conscious energy

going forth beyond its seat (transeunf), and so operating on other
Thus, iron is an immanent cause of its own
things ab
hardness and malleability, whilst mind or self is a tnoiseioit cause,
<.rtrn.

going out beyond itself in volitions, and subduing matter to its

own will. Substance and attribute are as indissolubly united as
matter and form, since the one cannot even be conceived without
the other; but the only Cause which we
directly know, the human
will, is

often dormant, and only rouses itself into

activity

when

it

sees occasion.
also how Descartes expresses himself on this
subject,
these expressions are found the germs which Spinoza soon
conceive
expanded into a demonstrated system of Pantheism.

Observe

for in

We

31

DESCARTES.

which has need of nothse ; i.

Substance, he says, as existing per
exist.
to
in
order
speaking, therefore,
Strictly
itself
else than
created thing, he
God only is such a substance for there is no
without
moment
upheld and
a
being
exist
maintains, which can
he asserts that creation is not a
Hence
his
power.
preserved by
of divine agency, without
sin.de act, but a continuous exertion
.,

in<r

whence
which everything would instantly lapse into the nothingness
Then the name Substance can be applied only in a
it was drawn.
we
sense to any created thing whatever
secondary ami derivative
else than the
it has no need of anything
that
he
mean,
says,
;

in order to continue in being.

ordinary Divine assistance
of the relation between Substance
confusion
a
is
Evidently here
Cause and Effect. In the former,
between
that
with
Attribute
and
the Substance
exists
only in and through
we say that the Attribute
thus
upon it;
is
and
dependent
absolutely
it
inheres,
in which
to us only through its
while the Substance, though it is manifested
is yet, as their substratum, really
phenomena, i. e., its Attributes,
and would continue to be though
of
them,
one
of
any
independent
between them is continuous
relation
At any rate, the
it were not.
In
either
activity, or power.
not
change,
and perpetual,
implying
an
is only change,
event,
the latter, the effect begins to exist, as it
does not exist
which requires a cause; and even then the effect
when, being
the cause, but is produced by it
only in and through
exertion of power,
it continues to be without further
;

once created,

To assume
a subsequent change requires another cause.
is the same as that of
that the relation of creatures to a Creator

until

and
Attributes to a Substance, is to negative any change whatsoever,
but it is a wholly un
Pantheism
to
;
lead
to
inevitably
thereby
founded assumption.

con
doctrine of continuous creation occupies a very
The chief
of metaphysics.
Cartesian
in
the
system
spicuous place
in its favor is founded upon the mutual
which is

Yet

tliis

argument
independence
a given

urged

of all the parts, infinite in number, which constitute

As no one moment has any connection
portion of time.

follows it,
whatever with the one which immediately precedes or
as one comes after the other
fact of mere succession,
the
beyond
so it by
without being in any way tied or fastened to that other,
the
moment,
at
I
exist
that
fact
the
from
present
means follows,
If I had
1 must continue to exist the moment afterwards.
\u>

that

I
of continuing myself in existence, I should know it,
I do not know
But
thinks.
that
a
I
am
for
think
it,
being
ihould
I do not think it; then I do not possess it, and I am constantly
it,

this

power

32

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

dependent upon some being distinct from myself.

tion, then, is

My preserva
but a continual repetition of the act which created

me and the fact of my duration, just as much as the fact of

my
lie even avails himself, for
existence, proves the being of a God.
the purposes of this argument, of the old Scholastic distinction be
tween a cause sccundum Jieri and a cause secundum cssc.
In the
case of the former, which is such a cause as an architect is of a
house, or a printer of a book, there is no proper creation, but
only
a new arrangement of
preexisting materials; therefore the effect
endures after the cause sccundum
But
fcri has ceased to operate.
a cause sccundum cssc
really creates, and if it did not continue in.
action, the effect would instantly disappear.
Such is the relation
of the sun to light, and such the relation of God to the universe.
If the sun were struck out of the
heavens, all would
;

immediately

become dark.

Although every attribute, continues Descartes, is sufficient to

manifest or make known the substance in which it
inheres, still
there is one attribute in each which constitutes the nature and
essence of its substance, and on which all the other attributes de
Thus, extension constitutes the essence of every corporeal,
pend.
as thought forms the essence of
every thinking thing; since every
other attribute of body
presupposes extension and is dependent
upon

it;

and

in

like

manner memory, imagination, perception,

affirmation, and denial are only different modes of thought. There

is no color
except of an extended surface, no shape or figure ex
cept of that which has length and breadth, no movement

except

of an extended thing in an extended

Thus, also, sentiment,
space.
feeling, and will exist only in a being who thinks, and cannot even

be conceived except through

thought.
Here the bias of the mathematician shows

itself.
To the eomevery property of a circle or a triangle is a necessary conse
quence of that one genetic property or attribute which forms the
definition of a circle or
triangle, and can be deduced from it
i

"

eter,

by

demonstrative reasoning.

strict

In like manner, we

may

believe

among all the attributes of any particular substance, there is

some one which is primitive, essential, and
genetic of all the rest.
But there is no proof that there is any one thus
genetic of the
that,

and if there were, only omnipotence could know which it

Extension, it is true, is necessary to body, which cannot even
be conceived to exist without it but so also is
others

is.

impenetrability.
genetic of the other, nor of any of the
In like manner, thought is necesremaining attributes of matter.

And

neither of these

is

DESCARTES.

33

sary to mind, for that would not be mind which is not capable of
thought. But thought is not genetic of perception, feeling, or will,
neither of which can be deduced from it a priori or by demonstra
tive reasoning.
Locke properly distinguishes between the Real
and the Nominal Essences of things.
The former, he says, is the
real internal constitution of things, on which all their discoverable
This is the proper original signification of the
qualities depend.

\vord,essentia, in

its

In substances

is

primary notation, signifying, properly,

being"

unknown, being evidently beyond the reach of

the human faculties, which can take cognizance only of the phe
nomena of things. The Nominal Essence depends not on the real
it

constitution of things, since this is undiscoverable, but on the arti

ficial constitution of
genera and species, i. e., on the arbitrary classi
fication of things which we make for our own convenience, and to

this the name is attached.

A change of the Real Essence would
change all the attributes or properties of the thing, as these de
But a change of the Nominal Essence would alter
pend upon it.
only our classification of them it would be only changing the
But while this is so in respect to substances
significance of names.
or real things, the case is different with simple ideas and modes,
the figures in geometry, for instance, or the numbers in arithmetic
for in respect to these, the Real and the Nominal Essences coin
cide.
Locke s whole discussion of this subject, contained in his
It was the best explica
chapter on General Terms, is admirable.
;

tion for the time of the questions lying at the root of the old dis

pute between Nominalism and Realism, a controversy which has

occupied the schools ever since the birthtime of philosophy.
Against those opponents of his system who maintained that we
have no clear idea of the Infinite, and that the being of a God

cannot safely be inferred from the vague and confused notion

which we have of it, Descartes stoutly argued
On the contrary,
:

the idea of the Infinite

my mind

is

very clear and very

distinct, since all that

and distinctly conceives as real and true, or as

having any perfection, is wholly wrapped up and contained in this
idea."
He denies also that it is only a negative idea made up by
a negation of the finite, just as rest and darkness are only the
On the contrary, I plainly see that
negation of motion and light.
there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one,
since to conceive the latter, we must take away something from our
idea of the former, and so far limit and restrict it. Hence, in some
way, my mind must conceive the Infinite before it can have any
clearly

"

uotion of the

finite."

34

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Having finished this brief review of the 1 earl ing doctrines in the
philosophy of Descartes in which I have selected those which
have had most influence on the subsequent course of
speculation,
let us go back for a moment to the initial
of his system.

stage
But it "was soon
says Descartes.
for the conclusion
objected that this is a begging of the question
here is not an inference from the premise, but is contained, bein<*
already assumed, in that premise.
Coyito is equivalent to rr/o sum
cogitans.
Very true, answered Descartes that is precisely what
I mean.
Instead of ergo, substitute scilicet, or in French, c pst a
I

think, therefore

am."

dire ; I think, that is to sen/. I am.

Because the existence of the
thought involves and carries along with it the existence of the
thinking being, you cannot dispute the reality of the latter with

out also denying the consciousness of thought itself, and

thereby
since that denial itself is thought.
denying your. own denial
My
original statement was not argumentative, but
Per
;

explicative.

sonal existence, the reality of the

Ego. is not a truth of inference,
or a fact resting upon circumstantial evidence
it is an immediate
a fact of internal experience,
intuition,
a
datum of
;

primary
Locke s own doctrine, though it is the last
that would be expected of him
according to the common notion
consciousness.

This

is

that his system traces the origin of all our

knowledge to sensation.
may even be doubted whether the relation of the thinker to the

It

is

properly expressed as that of a substance to its attri

rather that of an agent to his actions; so that to as
sert the reality of the
thought, and deny that of the f/n
is as
absurd as to affirm motion, and yet
deny that anything is moved.
Or to take an illustration from geometry, parallelism is
impossible,
if there are not two lines or surfaces to be
Just so. con
parallel.

thought

butes

it is

id;>r,

scious thought

somebody knows

that
it.

is,

And

known thought
this is

what

is
impossible except
Descartes means
cot/ito,
;

not an enthymeme, or imperfect

syllogism, as
have imagined; it is the statement of a fact, an intuition
erf/o

sum,

is

many

expressed

in language.
I dwell upon this
point, because it is the fashion nowadays,
under the doctrine of the Relativity of
Knowledge, to affirm that
an ontology, or doctrine of real
being, is impossible, all our knowl
edge being limited to phenomena, or apparent being.
And the
history of all the attempts that have been made for the last three
thousand years demonstrates at least as much as
that the
this,

of

pos

ontological science depends on the doctrine of intui

tive
knowledge of the Ego as real and causative existence, and

sibility

35

DESCARTES.
not merely as a substance inferred from the presence of

its

attri

butes.

Descartes is also entitled to credit for being the first to point

out with great clearness the radical difference between the Ego,
or self, and corporeal substance, that is, between mind and matter.
while
is
always divisible!
Body, of its own nature, he argues,
mind is entirely indivisible. For when I consider myself merely
as a being that thinks, I cannot find in myself any distinction of
for I know and conceive myself very clearly as an exist
parts
And although my whole
ence which is absolutely one and entire.
mind seems to be united to my whole body,
being all in every
or any other part has been
an
a
when
of
arm,
foot,
it,
yet
part
cut off from my body, I know very well that nothing has thereby
been taken away from my mind, or proper self, since it remains
Neither can the faculties of will, feeling, conception, and
entire.
;

for it is
the like, properly be called parts or portions of my mind
the whole mind or self which wills, the whole mind which feels,
These are not so much distinct faculties, as differ
conceives, etc.
ent modes of operation of one and the same power or active sub
Now it is just the contrary with corporeal and extended
stance.
;

things

may

for I cannot imagine

be,

which

any one of

these,

however small

it

thought, if not in
it to be divisible.
parts, so that I know
to me that the mind or soul of mau

my

cannot easily, through

reality, separate into many

this is enough to prove

And
is

essentially different
It appears,

upon

from material substance.

moreover, that thought

is

not in any wise dependent

I have
already

after
body for the thought continues to exist
the annihilation or non-existence of body.
;

supposed

also, that

It is evident,
clearer conception of what mind is, than
for the two have not a single attribute in com

we have even a

what body is
mon, every property of body presupposing extension, while every
function and act of mind presupposes thought, which we cannot
even imagine to be extended. Now I clearly conceive what these
mental acts and functions are, and that they are independent of
extension, which enters into or constitutes every attribute of body.
In vain does one excite his imagination in order to see if he is not

OL

of
"Nothing
something more, or something other, than thought.
he says,
what the imagination gives
belongs to that knowl
in order to know its own
edge which we have of ourselves and
exercise of imagination."
the
mind
must
the
nature,
wholly give up
I am not that assemblage of limbs which is called the human
"

us,"

body

am

iiot

a subtile and penetrating air diffused through

all

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

36

am

not a wind, a breath, a vapor, or anything

for I have already supposed all these
things
to cease to exist; yet in spite of that supposition, I do not find
that I cease to exist as a thinking being."
So far, Descartes is unquestionably right, and his doctrine rests
these limbs

which

can imagine

But he

upon as firm a basis as the first truths of geometry.

lowed the discussion to carry him too far, when he so
the action with

al

far identifies

the agent, or the attribute with the substance, as

the Ego consists in thought, so

to aflinn that the very essence of

think would be

In point of
but this
is not
that
it
must
else
it
would
think,
no
maintaining
always
This is the Cartesian doctrine, which to many seems
longer be.
that even in pro
paradoxical, and was stoutly denied by Locke
found sleep, in a fainting fit or swoon, the soul cannot intermit its
The thought may be unconscious, or
activity, which is its life.
may be forgotten the moment afterwards but the actual cessation
of thought, though but for one moment, would be, according to
Descartes, not merely death, but annihilation.
Awakening would
be the creation of a new life, not the restoration of the old one.
that to

cease to

to

cease

to

exist.

with him, that the soul always docs think;

fact, I believe

more important consequence of this identification of personal

existence with thought is, that we thereby attribute to the former
the changeableness, the plurality, the perpetual flux, which charac
terize the latter.
It my thought is myself, then I am not the
same

self at

any two suceessiye moments; and thus another car

dinal doctrine of the Cartesian system falls to the ground.

Cartesianism was first published to the world in the author

In this work, how

upon Method," printed in Ki. iT.
ever, the system is very briefly and imperfectly sketched out, much
space being giyen to some autobiographical details, in which he
"Discourse

describes the experiences of his earlier life, and the processes of

thought which led to the formation of his opinions, and which he

In IGi-I he
proposes as general rules for the search after truth.
in
his
four
the first
of
books,
published
Philosophy,"
Principles
of which sets forth a complete and well digested summary of his
metaphysical system, the other three being devoted to physics.
This arrangement results from his doctrine that Philosophy is the
"

whole of

science,

and may be conceived

as a

tree, of

which meta

physics are the roots, while physics are the trunk, and the other
The first book of these Principles may
sciences are the branches.
be recommended to those who seek for a succinct, and at the same
time, full

and orderly exposition of

his

system.

In

1G41, ap-

37

DESCARTES.
peared his

"

Metaphysical

Meditations," in

which

his

philosophy

is

worked out and elaborated, with some modifications of those

most liable to objection. This was his favorite
points which were
work he had submitted it in manuscript to the most eminent
and a
thinkers and learned men in Europe for their criticism
was
to
answers
his
with
them,
ap
summary of their objections,
This step was an additional means
to the later editions.
further

pended

of securing for his philosophy the notice, consideration, and in

In purely
fluence which it soon acquired throughout Europe.
of the
science, it was far the most important work

speculative

it shaped and modified the whole course of European thought

more than a century. Among the correspondents to whom it
was submitted, and whose objections, with the replies to them,
were subsequently published, were Cater, Mersenne, Arnauld,
The correspondence was conducted in
Gassendi, and Hobbes.
the whole forming
good taste and temper, and with great ability,
one of the most interesting discussions of purely metaphysical sub
in modern times.
jects that have appeared

age
for

CHAPTER

III.

THE IDEA OF GOD

INNATE IDEAS.

IN

THE MIND OF MAN.

IN considering the philosophy of Descartes, two

important sub
view which deserve a more thorough examination
than it was possible to give them in the last
chapter; I mean the

jects c;une into

questions

human

roped ing

soul.

Under

innate knowledge, and the idea of

the authority of Locke, who, in his

Human

God
"

in tho

Essay on

Understanding," argued stoutly against Cartesianism, the

theory of the empiricists in respect to both of these subjects lias
always been the predominant one on English ground, while the
opposite doctrine has prevailed both in Era nee and Germany, under
the influence of Descartes and Leibnit/.

The

question respecting the oriyln of knowledge is one that has

in the
history of abstract
science.
Even at the present day, in all countries where philoso

been discussed during every period

any disciples, it is still debated witli as fresh an interest,

keen a use of all the weapons of dialectics, as when it was
mooted in the schools of Greece nearly three thousand

phy

lias

and

as

first

The

years

one of permanent and engrossing interest,

because on the answer to it depend the opinions that we mav enter
tain on subjects of the
gravest moment, not. only in psychology and
What are the
metaphysics, but in theology and physical science.
natural and original characteristics of the human mind at the mo
ago.

ment

of

question

is

creation, before

it
began to be modified and informed
a mere tabula rasa
a blank sheet of
white paper
a clean slate, on which any characters whatever
might be impressed by future events, having no inborn aptitude or

its

by experience?

Was

it

predisposition for any one impression rather than for any other ?
this blank been
written,
already touched by a Divine hand,

Or had
all

over, in fact, with the hieroglyphics of eternal and necessary

invisible indeed at first, but invariably
brought out into

truths,

clear vision through

subsequent experience, though such experience
could no more have first impressed these characters, than the
vaporbath of iodine could originally have traced the
sun-picture which it

39

INNATE IDEAS.

of our
Have we any Innate Ideas, or are the limits
?
of our knowledge, so that every
boundaries
the
also
senses
external
which cannot find an external and
expression in our vocabulary
thus establish its affinity, is destitute
can
it
which
sensible object, to
Tell me your answer to these questions,
?
real
first

reveals

any
and I will
of

science,

significance

of your whole

features
you the leading
and
religion.
philosophy,
tell

of the soul, and hence that

Plato believed in the preexistence
of science and philosophy,
truths
the
of
higher
most of the glimpses
are but vague and shadowy
mortal
our
life,
in
this
obtain
we
which
of
recollections of the eternal verities
that
of
realms
distant
spirit
vision in the

which we had immediate

we have

leit.

Our mode

ot

him is neither
truths, according to
apprehending ideas and general
the soul
which
those
of
things
more nor less than the recollecting
the gods, and, disregarding
sojourned with
itself t
things, applied
But I need
S ov
TO
of
the apprehension
pure beinghas
of a theory which Wordsworth
spend words on the explanation

formerly saw when

what we now

it

phenomenal or apparent

call

3vru>

expounded with

so

of diction

much splendor

and imagery

immortal ode.
"

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:

The soul that rises with us, our life s star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,

And
Not

conieth from afar.

And

in entire forgetfulness,
not in utter nakedness,

But

of glory
trailing clouds

From God who

Yet not

do we coine

our home.

is

for these I raise

The song of thanks and praise

But for those obstinate questiomngs
Of sense and outward things,
;

Fallings from us, vanishings ;

of a creature
Blank

misgivings

Moving about in worlds not

our mortal nature
High instincts, before which
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised
But for those first affections,
realized

Those shadowy

recollections,

Which, be they what they may,

Are yet the fountain light of all our day,
Are yet a master light of all our seeing
;

truths that wake

To perish never,
Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor
Can utterly abolish or destroy."

That very leavued and devout theologians consider

this doctrine

40

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

to be
perfectly consistent with the teachings of Christianity, is
proved by the following quotation from the Lectures on Poetry,"
delivered at the
University of Oxford by the amiable and pious
Dr. Keble, the associate and friend of Dr.
Pusey and Dr. Newman,
and, like them, one of the leaders of the Tractarian
party in the
After the fashion at Oxford in the
English church.
early part of
this century, his lectures were delivered and
published in Latin, so
that I must cite
only my own bald and feeble version of them into
"

English.

Strange if we should not sometimes be tempted to believe the

doctrine of Pythagoras, who held that our souls did not then
first
begin to be when we were born into this world, but rather that,
coming from some unknown distant region, they then iirst assumed
each a body of its own
nor had they been so
steeped in the waters
of Lethe, but that there still
lingered in them, as it were, some
tang and relish of their former state, by what sense now perceived
I know not, but
moments really co^ni/ed.
yet somehow at
"

happy

And

thus are the memories of childhood flavored with their well

known exquisite delight only because of >omo faint sense
yet

abiding in them of

man

earlier

abode nearer

to

God."

Aristotle, the personification of cold, abstract

thought, rejected
the whole of Plato s
mystic doctrine of Ideas, argued stoutly
against it, and established po>itive science on the basis of

empiri
In one of his treatises, we find a
precise statement of that
doctrine which has since been so
pithily expressed in the famous
Latin adage, nihil est in intellects,
quod non fait pr/us in sensu.
The Schoolmen were divided on the subject, the more mystical and
devout among them following Plato s
guidance, especially in main
taining the innateness of the idea of God to the soul of man, while
their more subtle analysts and
logicians adopted the doctrine of
Aristotle, that all our knowledge has its
origin in experience.
If the doctrine of Innate Ideas
appears to border too
cism.

closely

upon the realms of mysticism and fanciful speculation, to be al

lied rather to the
poetical dreams of a Plato or a Wordsworth than
to the patient investigations of an earnest seeker after
truth, we
have only to remember that Descartes and Leilmit/ were far the
greatest mathematicians of their times,
in
among the

greatest,

deed, of

all

time

the discovery of analytic

geometry by the former

being surpassed in importance and brilliancy only by the inven
tion of the differential and
integral calculus, which was made
Thus proficient in the
simultaneously by Newton and Leibnitz.
most rigorous of all sciences,
they were the last persons in the
;

41

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE MIND OF MAN.

fancies
world to amuse themselves with building up metaphysical
in the clouds.

innateness of
In further elucidation of the leading doctrine, the
God to the soul of man, let me present the same dogma
thinkers and most
as set forth and defended by one of the ablest
I mean Cardinal Manning,
of our own day,
writers
eloquent
of the English, now of the Komish church.
the idea of

formerly

is to
revelation," he observes,
^
It is like the relation of
intellectual
apprehension.
by
There are, I may say, two kinds of sight, the
to sight.
and the active ; that is, in plain words, there is a differ

The

"

receive

the eye
passive

ence

relation of reason to

first

it

between seeing and looking.

quiescent; in

the latter,

is

it

in

In

the

activity.

former, the will is

see a thousand

We

see the light, even when we

the
do not fix the eye upon any particular object by an act of
sensa
between
further
I
remark,
This difference,
will."
may
attention that is
tion alone, and sensation accompanied by the
be
can
expressed better
induced by effort and directed by will,
these sep
to
words
different
are
there
express
where
in French,
things,

when we look

at only

one

we

on voit, et Von resays Laromiguiere,

Ton
et
on
on
et
gcoute ;
sent,
flair e ; on goute,
garde ; on entcnd,
So the intellect is both active and passive.
et Von savoure"
And the intellect must first be in some degree passively replen
itself
ished or illuminated by an object, before it can actively apply
"

arate acts.

"

Partout"
I

"

to

it."

more than we look

Perhaps the most striking instance of seeing
s experience on first
afforded
is
attend
or
by every person
to,
at,
if
Undoubtedly we see at once the whole page,
opening a book.
it
of
the
entire
impressed
being
image
it be not a very large one,
that we
at once on the retina of the eye; and so distinctly also,
of
seconds
two
or
in
one
time,
can often tell by a single glance, or
in search
are
we
which
or
word
the
sentence,
whether
particular

But in order fairly to read

contained on that page or not.
what it
in
or
that page, and to take
comprehend the full sense of
or three
two
novel
and
abstruse
matter,
if
it
be
contains,

of, is

especially

minutes are necessary for we must successively look at, and at

tend to, not only every word, but every letter, on that page and
the only wonder is, how we can do this so quickly.
Just so may we consider that Innate Ideas are actually present
visible
io the mind.
They are really there, and so to speak, truly
;

to

the inner

sense.

But

unless

some experience, suggestion, or

our attention to them, we do not look at them,

instruction
and consequently they are to us as if they were not.
calls

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

42
"

Though

from

the existence of

lights of the natural

God

existence anticipated
the world was not a discovery.
of

God may

order,

it

all

is

be proved by reason and

certain that the

knowledge

The theism

such reasoning.

of

Mankind

possessed it by primeval
pervaded by it, before any one

penetrated and
and reasoning did not precede, but followed the
Theists came before philosophers, and Theism before
doubt.
St. Paul
Atheism, or even a doubt about the existence of God.
invisible things of him from the creation of the world
says, the
are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,
even his eternal power and Godhead so that they are without
revelation, were
doubted of it
;

excuse
This passage, as it seems to me, throws light on the manner in
which a priori knowledge, or Innate Ideas, exist in the mind,
before they are developed by experience or distinctly recognized
Certainly
and explicated by conscious exertion of the intellect.
to believe that the ideas of a Divinity, of space, of
of
efficient
causation, of substance, of right and wrong, and
time,
some others, are truly a priori, or in some way, innate that is,

we have reason

not alolutely born with us, they are native to the mind, being
to form
inwrought into its inmost structure, and necessary in order

if

the very experience which appears to develop them: so that, when

are not merely cognized
taught to us by others, they
as new, but recognized as old and familiar truths, portions of the
You have not learned from
very framework of our mental being.
a book, nobody ever taught you, or can teach you, what time and
that they exist without
or that they are indestructible
space are
break or interval, in absolute and indivisible continuity, an un
and that they
rent or division
without
seamed
first distinctly

garment

possible

Neither were they

are infinite in the strictest sense of this term.
received from the senses, for they are altogether imperceptible to
Yet no one is ignorant of these ideas or truths, or doubts
sense.
or needs to be convinced that it is reasonable to
their
reality,

No metaphysician can teach you one jot more

than what you have
about them than what you know already,
induce you to look at them steadily
can
He
known.
only
always
instead of being content merely with passively
and
believe in them.

"inquiringly,

He can help you to bring them out into clearer

seeing them.
and more definite manner the
consciousness, and to state in a fuller
conclusions respecting them which your own minds instinctively
and necessarily suggest, and which admit of no more doubt or
or the truths of the multi
question than the axioms of geometry
plication table.

43

INNATE IDEAS.

To

Leibnitz belongs the credit of being the

first

and proofs,

establish these two criteria, or tests

Whatever

is

to point out

and

of Innate Ideas, to

universally true, true

experience of the

wit, universality and necessity.

the
experience, or as
not merely so far as

my

and at all times,

whole human race, has gone, but true everywhere
and without any excep
true under all circumstances and conditions,
that is an innate truth, or one
tions or limitations whatsoever,
and was not impressed upon
soul
the
in
itself,
its
had
which
origin
without. Again, whatever
us through the senses, or from the world
true that neither
that
is, so
and
is necessarily
absolutely true,
circumstances
I can even imagine it to be false under any
nor
you
in
the
its
had
or
very consti
that also is innate,
origin
whatever,
are found always to go
criteria
two
these
Now
mind.
the
of
tution
the other, so that, in fact, they coincide
together, each involving
Whatever cognition is necessary must,
test.
and form but a single
it could
and, in like manner,
for that
reason, be universal

very
And the
not be absolutely universal, if it were not also necessary.
decisive
two
these
which
small
not
is
truths
possess
number of
All
of them alone.
whole sciences are made
;

characteristics

up

the truths of pure Logic, pure Mathematics, and pure Metaphysics

what is called
are of this character. For instances, take from Logic
of
is not B
is 13, or
either
the law of Excluded Middle,
the other
be
must
one
true,
these two contradictory propositions
no compromise or half-way
and no third

must be false,
truth between them,

judgment,

is

take the geometrical

conceivable or possible. From Mathematics,

be
theorem, that a tangent to a circle must

From
to the radius drawn to the point of contact.
perpendicular
is
indestructible,
that
space
even^in
Metaphysics, take these truths,
in
is necessarily continuous, its parts being
thought; and that it
these
not
Are
immovable.
and also
separable from each other,
both universally and neces
assertions, and all others like them,
sarily true?

be true?

Do

edge, that

we

Can you even imagine

the contradictory of

them

to

knowl
proper definition of
they not conform
convinced of their truth on perfectly
are
to the

irresistibly

that
satisfactory evidence, so
that they are true ? Would

we do

not merely believe, but

any experience, any number

we

know.,

of experi

between
ments, any actual measurements, for instance, of the angle
to
be
case
each
it
in
equal to a
a tangent and its radius, showing
their truth
of
conviction
the
unhesitating
right angle, give you
Contrast them with a fact of experience
which you now possess ?
resting on the largest possible
It is a fact confirmed
3ence.

of merely empirical evi

united experience of
the
daily
by

amount

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
the whole human race ever since the creation of
animal life, that,
everywhere within the tropics and the two temperate zones of this
globe, daylight and darkness have always succeeded each other
within every twenty-four hours.
And yet no one has the
difficulty in

to-morrow
peated

slightest

conceiving or imagining that the sun should nJt rise

that the miracle attributed to Joshua should
be re

that daylight should last

continuously

more than one day.

a broad and impassable distinction between
empirical and contingent truths on the one hand, and
necessary
cognitions a priori on the other.
And yet it is a fact that most of these necessary and
universal
truths, whether in
logic, metaphysics, or mathematics, were prob
ably first learned by you when you first studied these
sciences,
If not, then there

is

perhaps after you were twenty years old.

]5ut what of that?
When you learned them, did you
accept them as true merely be
cause the book, or
your teacher, said so, or did the instruction so
received merely direct
your attention
distinct consciousness,

towards, and bring out into

what was already
implicitly in your mind,

and what was then first

recognized or known over again, as restiii"
on its own evidence,
shining by its own li-ht, far down in the in*
most recesses of your intellect!
I admit that the human mind
may he fairly considered as a dark chamber, into which the IHit of
experience must be introduced before we can read what is
already
written on its walls, and which, once
read, are
"truths

that wake,

To perish never,
Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor
Can utterly abolish or destroy."

All I maintain

that

the illuminating rays did not write the in

is,
scription, but only enabled us to find it there and read it.
The
innateness of a truth does not refer to the
time, hut to the place, of
its
The question is not whether it was alreadv with us in
origin.

our callow infancy, but whether it had its source within

or without.
- whether it is native to the
soul, spontaneous and inwrought in its
inmost being, or adventitious and
foreign, a communication from
the senses.
To recur to Cardinal Manning s
distinction, though
the book or the teacher first
taught us where to look for it, y^et
when once perceived we
immediately recognize and accept it, and
know that it has been within our reach, that we have in a certain
sense been seeing it all our lives.
If you will
accept a semi-ludi
crous illustration, we do not cut our wisdom teeth till
about eighteen
years of age and yet they do not come to us from without
by any
;

45

INNATE IDEAS.

were preformed in the original

first brought out to
and
our
bodies,
long afterwards
constitution of
use and sight when needed.
art of dentistry, but they

human

think of it, the more that doctrine of Leibnitz,

and fanciful at first, that every Monad has in
wild
so
which appears
number of confused unconscious
it from its first creation an infinite
successive, stages of its being,
the
in
that
and
these,
perceptions
in regular order, and so rise
other
each
from
evolved
are slowly
or impulse from things
contact
into consciousness, not through any
the occasion on
furnishes
or
contact
such
impulse
without, thousrh
soul s, own inter
which they rise, but only through the Monad s, or
the more, I say, this doctrine appears
nal law of development,
Of course, these perceptions appear novel
credible.
and
plausible
but on this
of them
or first created when we first become conscious
the be
from
us
in
wisdom
teeth, they preexisted
theory, like the

The more we

dim and unconscious,

ginning, though
"Fallings

from

"

recollections,"

shadowy

us, vanishing*,

Blank misgivings of a creature

not realized."
Moving about in worlds

not infrequently troubled, on first reading

persons are
or
some interesting passage in a book, first learning some truth,
con
an
indistinct
with
novel vein of thought,
striking into some
that they have somewhere
sciousness that it is not entirely novel,
I think, also, we must be
read or thought the same thing before.
the
proper mental action of
struck with "some analogy between
brutes.
of
Instincts
the
and
Why should all the
human beings

Many

knowledge or

call it

skill

of the bird, the bee,

what you please

innate, or

to

experience,
prior
unquestionably
is a day, or even an hour,
the
creature
before
manifested
since
the slow
is compelled to learn every lesson from
old, while man
oriole
Baltimore
The
?
of
and imperfect teachings
experience
the bee
cradle
and
nest
procreant
weaves its curious
pendent
the spider invents, and
constructs its marvellous geometric cell
all without
its own bowels, its ingenious trap for flies,
from
spins
with no guiding pattern or example, before any
instruction,
any
or experiment, and they make
opportunity for observation

or

the

spider be

it is

"

"

possible
no mistakes.

AVhy, then, should

it

be thought incredible, that

be
the human mind learns its lessons so easily and so well only
first time, because
the
for
not
learned
now
are
cause they
really
set forth, faintly inscribed on the tablets of
were

mem

dimly

Uiey

ory,

when

call

learning

that
is

mind was

first

constituted

in fact reminiscence ?

and

thus, that

what we

46

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

In farther illustration of tins doctrine, I borrow, from his criti

cism of Locke s theory of knowledge. Cousin s lucid distinction be

tween the logical and the chronological order of our ideas. In the
order of time, indeed, the child learns what
body is before he comes
to know extension or
space and he also has experience of succes
sion, that is, of one thought coining after another, before he forms
;

the abstract idea of time.

is

reversed; that which

But, ii; t!:e logical order, this

precedence
the logical condition or
prerequisite must
is tin.: condition,
just as we must conceive,

is

precede that of which it

the cause to be antecedent to the effect,
though, practically, the two
are simultaneous. Extension is an essential attribute of
body; and
thus I could not know body to be
body, if the idea of space were
not already in my mind, if it did not exist there a
In like
prior!.
manner, time is a logical condition or prerequisite of succession,
since there cannot be succession

succession

may

take place.

precede the conception of

if

there be not time in which this

Logically, then, the idea of time must

tore and after, which i.s the essence of

succession.

Leibnitz himself remarks:

are inscribed in the

mind

do not maintain that Innate Ideas

such wise that one can read them

I
in

on Jirst opening the book

there, as it were, ad apcrtnram Ubri
as the edict of the pra-tor could be read
upon his album, with

just

out pains and without research but only that one can discover them
there by dint of attention, occasions for which are furnished
the
;

by

senses."

Making experiments

in individual cases serves to

confirm

these primitive truths of the intellect,

just as we prove a sum in
arithmetic, the better to avoid error when the calculation is lon-.
have compared the mind," he adds, rather to a block of marble
which has veins marked out in it, than to a block which is
"I

homoge

neous and pure throughout, corresponding to the tabula rasa of

Locke and his followers. In the latter case, the truths would be
in us only as a statue of Hercules is in
any block which is largo
enough to contain it, the marble being indifferent to receive this
But if there were veins in the stone, which
shape or any other.
gave the outline of this statue rather than of any other iigure, then
it
might be said that Hercules was in some sense innate in the
marble, though the chisel were necessary to find him there by cut
ting oil the superfluities."
Often, as in attempts to remember what
has been partially forgotten, we know that truths and ideas are
actually present in the mind, though they cannot be discovered and
brought into distinct consciousness except by attention and repeated
eiiort.

"

Hence,

to the well

known adage

of Aristotle, nikil est in

47

INNATE IDEAS.
intcllcctu

quod non fuit prius in

nisi intellectus

tion,

sensu, I have added this qualifica

ipse."

and bearing upon it as argu

Closely allied with this subject,
the Primum Cognitum,
Leibnitz
of
doctrine
the
is
respecting
ment,
come first from,
or the origin both of ideas and names whether they
and
objects, or
individual
particular
things
and are first applied to,
and whole
whether they originate with general terms, universal,
The theory of the empiricists, of those who hold
classes of things.
derived from the
that all our knowledge begins with information
names to, particular
senses, is, that we first know, and first give
we first
this or that one tree, house, or river, with which
things,
the name thus given being a proper noun.
become acquainted,
when we come to know other objects of the same
;

Afterwards,

on account

we transfer the same appellation to them also,

and thus the proper noun becomes a common
of their similarity
Thus the young child first calls one per
one, the name of many.
to several
son nurse or mamma; then it transfers these names
and
or
;
each nurse
finally, as its
persons, calling them
and
the
it
idea,
employs the
generic
acquires
experience extends,

class,

mamma

woman.
generic term,
Not so, says Leibnitz we begin with generals, with names of
few attributes, and so are
classes, because these connote oidy
;

knowledge increases, we
whereby to distinguish
come to
from each other successively smaller and smaller classes; and
learn enough to distinguish even individuals, and give
finally, we
name. Thus, you or I, with little knowl
each of them a
learned
quickly and easily

afterwards, as

know more and more

attributes,

proper
have but one name for a multitude, say
edge of Hocks and herds,
Their
owner, knowing them longer and ^better,
sheep or cattle.
names his Merinoes and Saxonies, his
and
readily distinguishes
And the herdsman, who has
Alderneys, Durhams, and shorthorns.
and
tended them every day for a year or more, easily recognizes
Every object that^the
has a pet name for every head in the flock.
hard things
something ; next it knows
young child sees is thing
stone ; next, tables, chairs,
and
iron,
wood,
and
next,
things;
loft
clocks ; and last

Naming begin
papas own armchair.
that sur
Why, among the infinity of objects
we have not yet invented a proper name for one out of
"

of

all,

"

with individuals

round

us,

Who ever thought of naming any one blade of grass,

from a bush, or tree in a forest ? Most, if not^ nil, of our
terms
thus, Smith, Carpen
proper names, were originally general

a million.
.eaf

ter,

Mason, Stone, Wood, Green, Brown,

etc.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

48

Now observe that classes and class-names exist only in the mind
they are products of thought, or at most, results of generalization
while all existing material objects, each and every thing of which
the senses take cognizance, is an individual,
a particular thing.

Then knowledge and language both originate from the mind, not
from the senses.
Plato s doctrine of abstract Ideas no longer ap
pears fanciful or mystical. The objects of the senses, the phe
nomena of the visible and tangible world, give only individual
But
knowledge, which does not deserve the name of science.
fleeting and imperfect as these are, they afford indications, they
are shadows, of the Intelligible world which lies beyond, and which
contains the general Ideas, the archetypes, that are the truth of
The transitory phenomena are not true existences, but
things.
tlu-y are

images of true existences.

Our

object

is

to

interrogate

them, to classify them, to disentangle what is invariable and nec

essary from the variable and contingent; to discover the One in
the Many.
The object of philosophv is to reduce the multitude to
unity.
Philosophy, which is deductive, has nothing to do with
It seeks to cognize
individuals; it is occupied solely with classes.
directly the good, the beautiful, and the true, in their eternal
archetypes, as these exist in the mind of God, and not merely in

dividual instances, imperfect and transitory because individual, of

The mind of man, instructed by
goodness, beauty, and truth.

philosophy, is lilted to discourse immediately with these Ideas,

which are the patterns of all created things, if it can only be freed
from the dominion of the senses.

The next

subject which I propose to discuss

the Idea of

God

Man

belongs at least as much to philosophy as

student
of philosophy knows that the systems
to theology.
Every
of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranclie are based upon this Idea
as their point of departure, and are colored throughout by the in
in the

Soul of

and nearly as much may be said of

terpretation given to it
Leibnitz and the later German metaphysicians, as well as of the
;

most eminent speculatists of our own day though they often veil
His ineffable being and essence under the names of "the Absolute,"
-the Unknowable.
"the Universal
"the Unconscious," and
All alike bear testimony to the fact that this Idea, in some one of
its forms, is primitive in the mind, and upon our conception of it
must depend any theory which we may form concerning the nature
of pure being, the origin of existence, the source and certainty of
Let us en
knowledge, and the relations of man to the universe.
deavor, then, to bring together and compare with each other the
;

"Will,"

THE IDEA OF GOD

IN

THE SOUL OF MAN.

49

it, and the man

which philosophy and theology will be affected by adopting
either one of them to the exclusion of the others.
There are, I think, three leading forms of this Idea, with which
all who have given much thought to the subject are already more
or less conversant, and to which all the less prominent varieties of
Let me enumerate these briefly at the
it rnav easily be reduced.

various interpretations which have been given to

ner

in

the

outset, in order to prepare

way

for a subsequent fuller consid

eration of them.
First, there

is

the primitive idea of God, which

human mind, which lies far down and indistinct

man s primitive consciousness, which we all at

is

in

innate in the
the depths of

first see, though

and which, as such, is the true light which
Of course, this
lighteth every man that cometh into the world."
all
the
theories
which
is the
of
may subsequently be formed
germ
like those of
upon the subject. Like our other Innate Ideas,
it
may, sooner or later, more or less,
space and time, for instance,
or even not at all, be developed by reflection, instruction, or reve

without looking at

lation,

though these

entirely
first

"

it,

all

presuppose

eil ace its

imparted

it

it,

it, never
and could no more have
have taught geometry to

virtually appeal to

original characteristics,
to man than they could

a brute.

Secondly, this germ

is

often developed, as

we have

too often

seen, by reflection and deductive reasoning, into what may be

called the metaphysician s or philosopher s idea of God, as the
as such,
Infinite and the Absolute, First Cause and Causa sui,

necessarily existent, eternal, immutable, and impassive ; creating,

indeed, because his very being is actus purus (action without pas
sion), and therefore necessarily evolving creation from his own

without designing it, as he is without purpose,

without affection, and even without consciousness, or any distinct

essence, though

ive attribute of personality.

espec
Thirdly and lastly, experience and inductive reasoning
have evolved from
ially experience of sorrow, weakness, and sin
this innate germ what I
content to call the child s idea of God,

am

and the Christian conception of Him,

and all-gracious Providence and Moral Governor
of the universe, who hears and answers prayer, who rewards jus
tice and punishes iniquity, is offended by sin and propitiated by
worship and obedience, and who makes known his will to man by
iirect and special revelation and by working miracles, as well as
the inward teachings of his Spirit, and by the numberless mauifor

it

as an

\>y

is

also the traditional

all-wise

50

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

festations of artistic and specific

design in the visible universe,
a Father in heaven, with a personality as distinct and as conscious
as that which he has imparted to
you and rue, and to all our human

brethren.

Now, it is obvious that each of these three forms of the Idea, if

taken entirely by itself, to the exclusion of both the others, is an
inadequate and unworthy conception of Him whom it partially
represents; and is even illusory and deceptive, as leading, either
plain implication or inevitable inference, to consequences which
the heart, at least, if not the reason,
And
instinctively rejects.

by

may be easily shown, each of them contains some

phase or aspect of the truth which is wanting in both the others
and hence, both reason and revelation
imperatively require that all

yet. as I believe

three of these representations be combined, before

we can attain any

and worthy conception of the Infinite and
Holy One whom we
all seek to know and to adore.
But no sooner do we attempt such
combination than we are beset with dilliculties.
Many of the attri
butes which we strive to grasp together
appear, on closer exami
full

nation, to be inconceivable to thought and irreconcilable with each

other.
The conclusions to which we are. led seem at variance with
established facts, or with our most cherished convictions and
hopes,
or with those necessary laws of thought on which all our reason
find ourselves
ings and investigations in other eases depend.

We

either groping in the dark, or blinded

by excess of light; and in
either case, we are compelled to echo the sublime exclamation of
the Hebrew seer: "Canst thou by
find out God?
Canst

searching

thou iind out the Almighty unto perfection ? It is

high as heaven
what canst thou do? Deeper than hell; what canst thou know?"

But here, philosophy and revelation alike come to our aid, and
assure us that these perplexities and contradictions result from the
finiteness of our capacities and the necessary limitations of the
human intellect. These difficulties are not inherent in this one
object of thought, or peculiar to a single line of inquiry.

They

meet and repel us on every hand, whenever we

attempt to tran
scend the sphere of the limited and the finite, to
grasp the immeas
urable, to descend to the atom, or mount to the absolute be nnninoof things

know anything whatever

to

inmost essence.

as

it

really

is,

or in

its

Granted, that we cannot fully comprehend God

as He really is
so neither, if our
knowledge be weighed in the
same balance, can we understand ourselves. Space and time and
causation, pure being and personal being, man and God, must be
We do not merely
accepted as ultimate and inexplicable facts.
;

51

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE SOUL OF MAX.

are.
As
that they are, but cannot tell how they
forever deducing one
inlinite
an
in
back
regress,
we cannot go
from a preceding one, all that is comprehensible
proposition or idea
mlast analysis, on that which is
an.l provable must rest, in the
thus learn, to adopt the
We
S and improvable.
comprehensibl
the capacities ot our
of Sir William Hamilton, that
Hnin<re
of existence, and
measure
the
into
erected
be
thought are not to
had not previously
which
in
theology
that
difficulty emerges
of mathematical and
The first

believe,

we know,

"no

in

emerged

principles
and inscrutable as the

philosophy.

science are as inconceivable

physical

first

principles of theology.
crude, indistinct,
The first or innate form of the idea of God is
to the exclusion ot both the
itself,
taken
If
by
and wavering.
to
the aid of revelation, it is as likely

other forms,and without

into fetichbecome the basis of gross superstition, to be developed
The second or
monotheism.
to
lead
to
as
pure
or
ism
polytheism,
of God, as we may learn from Spinoza,
metaphysical conception
Pushed to its ulti
fatalism.
to
road
onlv opens the
pantheism and
either
unchecked
by the promptmate results by pure reasoning,
word revealed
the
or
of
nature,
in^ of conscience, the observation
other iorm of miracle,
it denies creation and every
inScripture,
moral government of
the doctrine of a providence or the
rejects

both of man and God,

the world, annihilates the distinct personality
of an efficient, cause ot the
instead
an
immanent,
and, by setting up
leaves us precisely where
universe, really accounts for nothing, but
and Christian idea
childlike
the
The
outset.
third,
the
we were at
and furnishes an
indeed,
of God satisfies the heart and conscience
faith
submissive
if
by
to life

unsupported
it does not answer all
the teachings of Scripture and the Church,
Its
tendency is to anthropo
the claims of the cultivated intellect.
Author and Finisher
the
Perfect
and
Inlinite
One,
morphism. The
the similitude of a glorified
of all things, appears too much under
the passions,
human being, with many of the attributes, and even
and purposes,
desires,
He
wills,
in
ourselves.
which we recognize
not yet within his
thus apparently laboring to accomplish something

adequate

<niide

but,

He

mutable,
inlinite perfections.
reach, instead of resting in his
with his people, mflicti
a jealous God, in turn an-ry and pleased
11
then a-ain repenting him of the evil which
punishment, and
the evil which is in the
reconcile
to
hard
it
find
caused.
of happiness between the rig
world, the inequitable distribution
his perfect wisdom,
his
with
the

We

eons and
justice,

wicked,

and goodness.

omnipotence,

is

52

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

But what then ? Are we to rest satisfied with either of these

three forms of the Idea, taken separately? or ought we to seek
rather to mould them into one. thus eliminating what is crude and
unsound, supplying what is imperfect and defective in each, and
appealing to the well-known limitations of human thought to ac
count for what might otherwise seem inexplicable, and to lead us
to accept different a.-pects of the same truth, even when
they may
In order to answer this
appear irreconcilable with each other?
question, we must examine each of the three forms of the Idea

more
from

particularly, and show how the second

the elements of the first.

The Innate
nature:
his

fir>t,

sensibility

Idea of (Jod has,

in

man

I think, a

and

third are evolved

threefold root in

human

intellect or cognitive faculties;

and affections

and

thirdly,

in

his

secondly, in
conscience or

moral nature.
The first of these has been clearly and fully stated
and illustrated by Descartes.
Man needs but little reflection and
experience, in order to become

ullv

aware that he

is

finite,

lim

imperfect, and dependent being. In the eloquent language of

Pascal
Man is the feeblest branch of nature but he is a branch
ited,

and

thought soon teaches him the feebleness of

his powers, the contingency and >hortne.vs of his life, and the lim
itations of his knowledge.
Yet, by that wonderful law of mind
which ordains that no one idea can be fullv grasped without reveal
chat

thinks;"

this

ing to us its oppo.-ite or contradictory, man cannot know himself

without also knowing (Jod; he cannot recognize his own weakness

without contrasting it with omnipotence, or the shortness of his

life without setting over
against it an eternity, or the uncertainty
alike of his continuance and his knowledge without having a
glimpse of the necessary existence and omniscience of Him from
whom his own being is derived. In a word, the imperfections of

man reveal the perfections of his Creator; and as these perfections

cannot be suggested by outward nature,
where also every thing
is finite, limited, and
it must lie God s own act which
contingent,
thu>

lights

up

in the

human

soul a revelation of himself.

It

is

this

root of the Innate Idea which, when taken by itself to the ex

clusion of the other elements, and rigorously developed, by strict
deduct ice reasoning, into all its logical consequences, constitutes
first

what

I have called the

metaphysician s idea of God.
Again, the sensitive or emotional part of our nature is marvel
lously adapted to the condition in which we are placed, and to the
relations in which we stand to other beings.
The love of society,

ihe affections of kindred, the thirst for knowledge, the stirrings of

THE IDEA OF GOD

THE SOUL OF MAN.

IN

53

all
ambition, emulation, wonder, sympathy, pity, the appetites,
are desires and needs ichich have their appropriate objects, and in
that these objects may be attained
cessantly spur us to exertion,
Foremost among
and these necessities of our nature be gratified.
the
be
must
emotions
these primitive
religious sentiment
placed
that mingled feeling of awe. veneration, trust, and worship, for
can be an adequate object, and
which, certainly, no finite being
which cannot be of artificial or arbitrary growth since all religious
to it, is based upon it, and without
training, all theology, appeals
itself
In
considered, and without culture,
it would be impossible.
and is the
it is but a blind impulse or craving, is easily perverted,
But it is as ineradicable
fruitful mother of countless superstitions.
as any of the primitive affections; and the very evils which have
or ill-regulated, attest alike its
grown out of it when unregulated,
Of course, when acting separately, or even.
fervor and its force.
;

when somewhat
to consider,

of

is

it

modified by the third root, which we have still

of what may be called the child s idea
the

germ

God.
moral nature reveals to us a law of
Lastly, conscience or our
all considerations of

inherent and imperative obligation, overriding

to bridle our most vehement

prudence or expediency, assuming
desires and strongest passions, and asserting its own supreme
It speaks
whatsoever.
authority over all other laws and precepts
not to compel it has no constraining force, no outward sanction
We may dis
It recognizes our absolute free-will.
it needs none.
we
still recog
in
our
even
But
will.
we
disobedience,
if
obey it,
and remorse, the stings of con
nize its majesty, its rightful rule
It seeks no
science, inevitably come to punish the transgression.
the contrary, all human and
On
sources.
from
extraneous
support
divine law is based upon it, presupposes it, appeals to it, and with
It is not infused by edu
out it has no binding force whatsoever.
I do not admit the precept, Fiat
it cannot be taught.
cation
mat ccelum, because I find it written in a book, or because
;

justitia.,

elders and betters have enjoined it upon me, any more

theorems of geometry.
accept for such reasons the axioms and the
for observation can only teach
It is not derived from observation
than.

my

me what

while this law proclaims something entirely different,

what ought to be. Its demands are very broad it simply re
not only in outward act
quires perfect honesty, purity, and truth,
There is no such thing as half
or speech, but in inward purpose.
is
way justice or qualified veracity for what is wrongly so called
Now what is the very nature of a
not honesty or veracity at all.
is;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
law ? It is a command, the
it
expression of a will
presupposes
a lawgiver and a
That is the very
government.
of the
meaning
word.
Then the voice of conscience is
;

the voice of God or

rather of a Providence,
that is, of a God who
governs the world,
and who, by the contents of this
law, reveals to man His own
nature and attributes, even
perfect holiness, justice, and truth.
Tins might,
perhaps, be regarded as a fourth, the moralist
s,
idea ot God.
As it seems to me, however, its distinctive function
is not so much to furnish an
independent conception of Deity, as
under its peculiar form of a
supreme law and ultimate standard, to
modify and regulate the development of the other roots, and to be
the tribunal of final
appeal in determining their relative preten
sions.
Exclusive attention to its dictates,
not modified by any
consideration of its extreme
diverted from its
fallibility, when

proper office of regulating one s own

thoughts and actions to that
ot passing
judgment upon the conduct of others,
is the source
of that fretful criticism of the
ways of God with man, that discon
tent with the moral
government of the world, which so frequently
constitutes the skeptic s
argument, or rather his excuse.
These are the three
germs which constitute the Innate Idea of
God in the human soul, and without which, as well
as when with
out reason or
language, man would not be man, but a brute.
Left
to themselves, without culture or
reflection, their joint
product is
only some crude form of religious faith and
observance, which,
bad or imperfect as it is, still embraces
some belief

human power, who

to

whom

in a

super

directs

the conduct and

destiny of man, and
and obedience, sacrifice and
prayer, are due.

worship
an enlightened
country and age, with all the aids of scieninquiry and philosophical thought, they
may receive only a
tial and one-sided
Their obvious
development.
meaning may
be more or less
perverted, in order to buttress dogmas or till out
of
systems
speculation.
Such, in truth, has been their
history,
have called the
metaphysician s conception of God, as
wrought out by Spinoza and Schelling, is drawn
exclusively from
irst of the roots here
from that which has its
mentioned,

Even

in

origin in the intellect alone,

leaving wholly out of view the two
others, of at least equal
authority, which are supplied by the heart
and the conscience.
Pure reasoning about such abstract
concep
tions as those of the Infinite and the
Absolute, neither of which
can be comprehended or
the
fully
be

grasped by
ex
mind, might
pected to lead up to consequences as dreary and
appallino- as
fatalism and pantheism combined.
On the other hand, the exclu-

THE IDEA OF GOD

IN

55

THE SOUL OF MAN.

what I have called the second root, the religious

consciousness of the omni
sentiment, that vague and awe-struck
move and have our being,
and
live
we
whom
in
Him
presence of
and quietism,
if not immoral, mysticism
in an
sivc cultivation of

"

irrational,
can only end
Purest and least perverted is that
perhaps in a rabid fanaticism.
con
is furnished or regulated by
which
the
of
Deity
conception
have
we
at
least,
Idea.
Here,
the Innate
science, the third root of
which is above all other
the unmistakable announcement of a law
whose absolute holiness is
laws, and of a supreme Lawgiver,
and truth winch he

in the perfect justice, purity,

clearly indicated
and
Herein lies the proof of the conscious personality
ordains.
that
in
the
of
universe,
will of a supreme Governor and Judge
written law of
even the Gentiles, who have not the externally
in the law," and
u do
contained
the
nature
things
God. yet
by
their
show the work of the law written in their hearts
;

"

thereby
the meanwhile
conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts
I am not afraid of the
else excusing one another."
or
accusing
involved in such an idea of God, as I
anthropomorphism which is
reveal himself to a
Infinite
an
otherwise
how
Spirit could
not
s^e
finite

consciousness.
that

In some sense or other, God must become

This is the probable
made in his imdeclares that we are

man may know God.

in order
meanino- O f the text which

man,
acre,

after

his

likeness

;"

and

"

also

of

that which Paul cites and

we are also his offspring,

old Greek poet, that
approves, from an
he be not
and that we should seek after him and find him, though
"

"

from every one of

which
This conception harmonizes perfectly with that

far

us."

For

we form

instance, in those

him through the argument from design.

the human eye
two miracles of creative wisdom and adaptive skill,
and the human hand, we find a great number of parts, agencies,
and functions, nicely fitted to each other, and all working together
towards the at
by a complex and intricate, yet orderly, process
we argue with
and
tainment of a definite and highly useful end;
active Being,
and
an
exist
must
there
that
intelligent
confidence

of

the
end in view, and who made this disposition of
who
God
the
Of
course,
means for its accomplishment.
parts as a
an intelligent and conscious
is thus revealed to us by his works is
with a definite purpose,
Being, having foresight and will, acting
How he
as our own.
distinct
as
a
and thus having
personality
cannot
we
tell,
can be at the same time both infinite and absolute,
us
enable
not
do
human
of
the limitations
thought
Bolely because
But what then ? In like
of these attributes.
co>nize either

who had

U>

this

56

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

manner, we cannot conceive either the

infinity of space or the

In spite of this
inability, however, we not
only believe, but we know, that space is infinite and duration is
a beginning or an end to either
eternal,
As
being impossible.
elsewhere, so here, we find ourselves situated at the confluence
of
three immensities and two eternities
and as this incomprehensi
bility of our position in the universe does not lead ns to doubt our

eternity of duration.

own

existence, so the perfectly similar

incapacity of human thoi.o-ht
to question either the existence or
the perfec
tions of Him who made and
us here.

must not induce us

placed

We

must supplement and correct the

imperfect conception of
God which is drawn from either of the three
germs of the Innate
Idea taken singly,
by adding to it each of the others. We must
not sublimate him into a more abstract
idea, aUqnid immensum
infinitumque, nor humanize him into a likeness of
any of the im
We must believe that God is both Infinite
perfections of man.
and Absolute, at the same time that he is
though we
personal
know not how he is so. To believe this, as Mr. Mansel
remarks,
^

simply to believe that God made the world.

Before the
mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst
formed the earth
and the world, even from
everlasting to everlasting, thou art God."
Then, before anything was created, he was All in
All, Infinite and
Absolute, because nothing then existed which could limit his
per
fections, or to which he could be in relation
One, because the
Infinite and Absolute cannot be
plural or consist of parts; Cause
of all things, because he existed before all
Causa
"

things

sni\ or

because there was

nothing before him
whence his being could be derived
All-holy or perfect, because
evil or sin is an
imperfection, and therefore cannot coexist with
self-existent,

necessarily

the Infinite.
Hence it is, as Hegel declared, that
any philosophy
of the Absolute assumes to know God as he
is in his* eternal es
sence, before the creation of nature and of a finite
But
spirit.
then creation at
any particular moment of time

becomes incon

human thought;

ceivable to

for

if

causation

mode of
existence, then that which exists before
causing is not infinite; and
that which becomes a cause has
passed beyond" that which formerly
limited its modes of beiiif.
But again,
that

civHtion

limited

tory

for

it

is

a possible

I ask,

Is this
inconceivability of creation a proof
really impossible, or merely that human thought
If the former, then the doctrine is
self-contradic
asserts that there is
which even

Power cannot

is

do, namely, create.

Infinite
something
assumes to know what

He who

57

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE SOUL OF MAN.

cannot do, really de

an omniscient and omnipotent God can or
like
In
manner, I cannot see
clares that he is omniscient himself.
in
world
a
in
exist
can
sin
and
governed by an
how suffering
this is only an
but
and infinitely powerful Being
finitely good
an Infinite God can
assertion of what I cannot think, not of what
coexist with
I cannot see even how infinite justice can
not do.
;

infinite

for sin is absolutely re

mercy, inasmuch as punishment
forbidden
and
by the other. But
the one,
absolutely

quired by
their coexistence
since

thought;

is

this inability of my
surely not prevented by
not both be
would
or
must coexist,
they

they

infinite.

to maintain
the doctrine which we are specially interested
has any
God
of
idea
the
of
forms
three
these
is. that neither of
to constitute the ultimate stand
as
so
claim to
authority,

But

paramount

to be tried.
They
ard by which either or both of the others is
and
attention
to
claims
respect.
with
stand side by side,
equal
constitution
Each is primitive, innate, having its root in the inmost
the
corroborated
teachings of nature
by
of our being, and equally
what we may, we
Do
writ.
of
declarations
the
holy
and
express
of the divine
utterances
three
cannot entirely silence either of the
eliminate or
cannot
man.
of
soul
the
to
voice speaking
of the aspects under which God is
to
our
shut
any
eyes
wholly
Each is needed to supple
manifested to human consciousness.
is but a mutilated
taken
for
either,
the
separately,
others;
ment
Each organ of our
of the Divine Essence.

We

and unworthy image

by its own laws, and repudiates

The
domain.
encroachments by a foreign power upon its own

spiritual

life

intellect,

acts independently,

assent to conclusions

refuses its
acting deliberately,
stout
the tastes and desires, and, in turn, experiences

when

prompted by

to eradicate primitive impulses or

Conscience rebels when^ casu
emotions.
the
change the objects of
or
and when
istical reasoning seeks to pervert its dictates,
appetite^
shifts
of
balance
the
but
authority
affection lures ?t to go astray
convictions
to the other side, when our matured and well-reasoned
so
declare that the moral nature is acting hastily and impulsively,
its due.
of
reason
and
boundaries
deprive
as to overleap its natural
to regard man as exclusively a reasoning
It is mere

resistance

when attempting

pedantry

truth and right.

Frequently
animal, and logic as the sole guide to
affection or by
are
actions
our best
suddenly prompted by strong
truths arc
intuitive perceptions of honor and duty; and the highest
is baffled, or lags
intellect
the
where
often spiritually discerned, just
True, we canbehind with a feeble step and an uncertain speech.

58

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

not precisely mark out the boundaries of the

provinces within
which each of these faculties reigns supreme but we can still see
;

that their provinces are

really distinct, and any decided encroach
ment upon either of them is both a harm and a
wron<>-.

That conception of Deity which

is

worked out by the

intellect

alone has no claim to be considered a fairer likeness of Him than

the far different picture presented
by the sensibility and the con
science.
are not to throw out the attribute of
personality
because it is inconsistent with the
metaphysician s idea of God, or
refuse to believe that he is immutable because he hears and an
swers prayer, or deny either his omnipotence or his benevolence
because there is evil in the world.
In either case, the attribute
which we vainly seek to eliminate rests
the same
upon

We

precisely

basis of evidence as

the whole idea.

the fact that

we

we wrongfully permit

that which

dominate

truth presents itself under a

triple aspect ;
cannot reconcile them argues
only our ignorance

and incompetency, not our power

Pure

to

The

ideas, as

to set

bounds

to

omnipotence.

admitted, can never have objective

reality, as they represent a completeness and perfection to which
no phenomenon of experience,
existing under all the limitations of
time and space, can possibly
correspond.
Thus, virtue and wis
dom in their perfect purity can never be presented in the world of
sense, but exist only in contemplation, as aims of effort or
guiding
stars pointing out directions of
But it is otherwise with
progress.
ideals, considered as actually existing in the concrete, and there
fore as individual beings or entities,
though determinable or deter
mined by the idea alone which shines out
As
through their acts.
the idea provides only a rule in the abstract, so the ideal serves
such,

it

is

as an archetype for the perfect determination of the

But
copy.
here the Divine must be
mingled with the human, before there
can be an adequate presentation of the
great pattern and exemplar.
The Saviour of the world is the only actual ideal that has ever
ap
And it is precisely on account of his
peared to human vision.
divine character and mission, because he is God manifest in
man,
that he is at once the perfect
archetype and the most real of

Pure ideas are abstractions, formed by

throwing out at
such exclusion removing them from the world of reali
ties into the world of
But God, considered as ens
pure thought.
realissimum, as the source of being, containing in himself not only
the sum, but the unity, of all attributes, is the most real of all that
beings.

tributes,

the

human mind can

ym abstraction

conceive of he is the farthest removed from

no predicate can be denied of him without defacin^
;

THE IDEA OF GOD

IN

59

THE SOUL OF MAN.

He is not merely the

man.
image in the soul of
but
immensum
infinit unique},
Absolute
the
and
Infinite
(aliquid
all
of
most
the
personal
he is also the most real of all realities,
who
answers
and
hears
who
prayer,
a
God
conscious
or breaking his

beings,
created and governs the universe.
Pascal and Hamilton and
I accept, therefore, the doctrine of

of
absolute necessity, under any system
a
of
existence
sphere
of acknowledging the
philosophy whatever,
must
of thought.
of belief beyond the limits of the sphere
much that we cannot positively conceive as ever

There

Mansel.

is

an

We

believe, as actual,

mere intellectual speculations ou the nature and

universe form a common ground on which
material
the
even the atheist, may alike expatiate,
the
thetheist,
pantheist, and
those facts of conscious
of man
the moral and
If

possible.
origin of

religious feelings
sense of personality and
ness which have their direct source in the
evidence in behalf of a per
free-will
plead with overwhelming
as a person to a person.
him
to
relation
s
sonal God, and of man
we are led to the
Unconditioned
the
of
our
And by
ignorance
of
and
personal manifestation
further belief, that behind that moral
Absolute
the
of
the
a
concealed
mystery
mystery.
God, there lies
and the Infinite that our intellectual and moral qualities, though
to the Divine perfections which we
indicating the nearest approach
them as analogous, not as
indicate
of
are capable
conceiving, yet
in
and that, consequently, we shall be liable to error
identical
manifested
whether
of
the
of
God,
ways
by human rules
;

judging
in nature or in

revelation."

CHAPTER

IV.

SPINOZA.

BARUCII

or Benedict Spinoza

was born

in

Amsterdam

in 1632,

just five years before the publication of Descartes first work, the
treatise on Method.
lie was a Jew by birth, but soon ceased to be

Jew by religion, though without thereby becoming a Christian.

Hence he was wittily compared to the blank leaf, which, in most

editions of the Bible, separates the Old from the New Testament.
Yet lie was far from being an immoral, or even an irreligious, man.

He

was rather a religious mystic, a speculative dreamer, so ab

sorbed in meditation on abstract ideas and following them out to
their logical consequences, that the world around him, the world
of real things, had not only ceased to have any interest for him,
but had become enveloped in a ha/e, had been sublimated into

pure thought, and he seemed

to

hi HIM.- If

shadow moving about

Leibnitz called him un moult n de raisonnement,

an intellectual machine for grinding out syllogisms.
Frail and

among shadows.

in body (he died of consumption when only

forty-five
leading the life of an anchorite, not from principle,
years old)
or by any effort of self-denial, but simply from want of liking for

delicate

of the ordinary enjoyments of mankind

irreproachable in
character and conduct, gentle and unpretending in manners and con
versation, he conciliated not only the good-will, but even the strong
tiny

affection, of the

his life allowed

few ordinary persons with

him

to

come

in contact.

whom

One

good orthodox clergyman, though regarding

the .seclusion of

of his

townsmen, a

pantheistic doc
trines with horror, still conceived a strong affection and admira
tion for him as a man, and wrote his biography as if he were a
saint.
Less than sixpence a day sufficed for all his personal wants,

and he earned that

his

at his trade of grinding lenses for

telescopes.

pension, a considerable bequest, a professorship, were offered

should he trouble himself
to him, but he declined them all.
He had the gentle
with the possession of what he did not want?

Why

toleration- for

any

religious sect or church,

which arose from per-

61

SPINOZA.

Ho
all.
and perhaps a little contempt, for them
con
had
and
well-nigh
was almost devoid of passions and appetite,

feet indifference,

quered the

last infirmity of

noble

-the only one

greatest work-

minds,-

the love of fame,

that contains a lull

have been

left in his

desk

development of

in a finished state

seems to
and was only published after his death.
interview and con
From Leibnitz, who had at least one brief
other
from
sources, we learn
and
the
at
Hague,
versation with him
and consumptive in aptb-it he was slender, olive-complexioned,
that
a
of
the
Spanish Jew and
aspect
peurance, bavin- somewhat

his system

for several years,

in his

furnished

cham

poorly
he spent nearly all his time solitary
who lived in the
There be died, alone, while the family
ber.
church.
at
same house were absent
with such opinions, ap
Such a life and character, in connection
not seem so to me.
does
It
pear to many a strange phenomenon.
ill-health or other
when
cast,
and
a
reflecting
To a mind of
quiet

for out-door pursuits, there is a

causes have created a disinclination
in metaphysics
abstruse
in
studies,
especially
strano-e fascination
and the vein of mysticism that lurks in every

and mathematics

inevitable concomitant, an insufficient apprecia

Spinoza s peculiar
fact, is soon developed.
tion of matters
than of his
his
of
intellect,
the outcome
opinions were not more
Pantheism is a doctrine of the un

intellect

with

its

of

character and temperament.

and

around us, the illusions of the phenomenal

of all individual existences into
th* transitory, and the absorption
It feeds our wonder, our
abstract
of
being.
the universality
indolence and dreamy
of
our
reality of thino-s

va<me

physical

spirit

aspirations,

which always
It teaches not merely self-abnegation,
contentment.
of self, which is spontane
annihilation
the
but
an
effort,
requires
and when held in full be
It is a doctrine of fatalism, also,
ous
of passion and
cessation
the
lief, it nourishes acquiescence,
and a

sore of religious quietism.

the characters of the

two men, and the tendencies o

was indebted to
the two philosophies, were so unlike, Spinoza
whole
foundation,
the
for
but
first
for the
hints,
not

Though

Desc-irtes

of his system.

the

only

man whose fame

earliest

a zealous disciple ot
boyhood, he became
and his
the zenith
to
was

Even

in

already mounting

Ui
sort of synopsis of the principles of
of
admixture
conscious
origin!
without

was a
publication

Cartesian philosophy,
speculation.

But

his

any

and
mind, once aroused, was too thoughtful
(

of another.
Large portions
long in the doctrines
out of his view altogether, and
the Cartesian system soon dropped

fertile to rest

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
his attention became
eagerly concentrated on what was left, which
seemed to lead by
necessary implication and logical sequence to a
Jong tram of startling conclusions.
Spinozism is an exa -Tented
development of one side of Cartesianism.
Descartes be an at
east with two concrete
facts, Thought and Self.
Spino/a dropped
both, and commenced with a definition, an
arbitrary one, of a pure
idea.
His whole
philosophy is founded on Descartes definition
somewhat modified and expanded, of
Substance, as "that which
s in se
(or without a cause), and is conceived
in
per se

that is, which, in order to be

conceived, does not need a
conception of anything else."
Another of his definitions,
leading one of his system, is borrowed in part from the
Cartesian argument for the
"A thii.o- which i
being of a God.
s
its own
Cause, or is self-caused, /. e., which exists in
se? he says,
s
that the essence of which involves
existence, or whose nature
cannot be known
except as existing."
Obviously, the former of
iese is so framed as to exclude
in the outset all individual
and
self;

prior

>

real objects from the definition of

Substance, and thereby to fike
for granted his whole doctrine.
First assume the
unreality of our
own minds and of
every thing around us, by limiting the definition
tance to
being in ct per se, and thereby denyin- the sub
stantiality of an ens cansatum or ens per atiurl, and it follows im
mediately that the Infinite First Cause is the
only true Substance,
and hence that God is
every thing and every thing is God. What
need, then, of all the
definitions,

remaining
other apparatus of
geometrical proof?
1 antheism in a nutshell.

axioms, theorems, and

This definition alone is

When we w ish

to
distinguish a Substance from its Attributes, it
course, correct to say, that the latter can be conceived
only
through the former, that is, through
something in which they
inhere.
ahud
; whereas the
per
is.

of

former, Substance,

is

conceived

per se, as a ground of the Attributes, but a

ground which is in
JJut what authorizes
dependent of them.
Spinoza to affirm that
Substance not only must be conceived
per se, but must exist in
se ; that it does not need a
prior conception of anythin^ as i ts
Cause, the origin of its being; and hence, that the
only true
stance is self-caused, the essence of which
involves existence,
that

is,

God

We

are

immediately conscious, as Descartes says

personal existence, conscious of it inde
pendently of its manifestations
we can conceive of it not
only
as
not only as
acting, but as at rest
thinking, but in the inter
vals of
thought, feeling, or action.
Then I am myself a true
;lves,

of our

own

SPINOZA.
can be conceived per

Substance, which

se,

but certainly cannot

and dependent, so that ther.

exist in se; for I am finite, limited,
a
be
Cause, or I should instantly
must
there
must have been
The initial and
I was drawn.
whence
the
into
nothingness
lapse
is the unfounded assump
pervading fallacy of Spinozistic reasoning
and continued throughout the argumenta
tion, made at the outset,
be con
to be Substance, must both
tion, that Substance, in order
a Cause
without
exist
must
that
se
in
is,
exist
;
ceived per sc and

But

it

what

make
be said that Spinoza has a right to
he
that
terms
provided
employs
of the technical

may

del

nitions he pleases
to these definitions
he is consistent in the use of them, adhering
consider
to
God, becaus
He has a right, for instance,
throughout.

or Subonly true Substance,

is pre
this
term.
Very true;
stance in the highest sense of the
and other
human
admitted
beings
who
cisely what Descartes did,
in a secondary and
existences to be substances only

He

isinfinite

self-existent, as the

and

continent

derivative sense.

the conclusion of

as
But then Spinoza has no right subsequently,
his ideal distinctions
from
to
his
pass

philosophy,
and take for granted that he has proved
to be Substance in
human beings and other finite existences not
has shown that they
he
because
be
to
not
realities,
ami sense i. e.,
He ought not to deny the reality
aiv not Substance in his sense.
not come within his definition
does
it
because
of the es cansattim,
There is a wide difference between subjective
the ens in se.
to the world of real things,

of

deiinitinns

assumed,
verse of

it

and objective
is

illogical

to

facts.

From

premises

hypothetically

draw any conclusion respecting the uni

realities.

which I have quoted is based upon t

a
Cause is necessary, not only for the
that
Cartesian doctrine,
of existence; and this,
Ix-iiiiiiiiir, but also for the continuance,

The second

definition

relation
as "already observed, confounds the

between Cause and

that between Substance and Attribute.

In order to

Effect with
was obliged to
of continuous creation, Descartes
prove his doctrine
in a
because they are Substances only
that created

assume

things,

have no virtue in themselves which

secondary and derivative sense,
have no continuous existence,
therefore
and
enables them to exist,
like the light ot
but are perpetually fading out into nothingness
undulations
fresh
renewed
by
die sun, if not at every moment
the great central luminary, they not only disap
from
proceeding
Then they have only a sort
cease to be.
pear, but really
but never
counterfeit
being; they are always becoming,
shadowy or
TO
TI
yiyvo/iov /*
As Plato expresses it, they are
really being.
;

64

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

0^5

o^eVore ov.
airolXvpcvov,
Then, too, like the sunlio-ht
again, they are not Substances in themselves, but
only the chant
ing manifestation of an attribute of the
real Substance.
K<U

8t

only
Here
not exaggerating one of the doctrines of
his prede
cessor, but onlj drawing an inference from
it,
which, however
logical and obvious, Descartes failed to see.
Still buildm*
upon
Cartesian foundations,
next avails himself

Spinoza

is

Spinoza

of the

ontolo<n-

cal

argument for the being of a God, by converting it into a defi

nition of Causa sui, or that
which, as self-caused"; does not need
to be created, but exists in se.
That, he says, is Causa sui,
the
essence of which involves
existence, or whose nature cannot be

known except

as

This alone he assumes

existing."

to

be Sub

stance properly so called.

But strictly speaking,

nothing can be
for in order to be caused at
all, it must
before the
beginning of its existence,
cause of anything, not even of itself.
it
is,

self-caused
that

it

it

causa sui, self-caused

have begun to be; and
cannot have been the

What

meant by

is

"

is

simply, that

was not caused

it

at all.

is

self-existent or eternal

callin*
;

tluft

Otherwise interpreted, Causa sui

First Cause of
every thin* else

is
merely First Cause; that is,
but not of itself, for that is absurd.

definition

more

the essence of

And we do not make the

by adding the Cartesian doctrine, that
involves existence
for it must exist before it

intelligible
it

can have any essence, so that,

the Cause nor the reason of

logically, the essence

its

being.

can neither be
Non-entis nulla stint at-

tributa; there are no attributes, and

consequently no essence, of a
nonentity.

Hence, as Schelling remarks, Spinoza s system, and

every other
pantheistic system, maintains that
i
Deo, essentia et exislentia
unum idemque sunt." His existence is not
different

something

from his essence, but

would say, Cehii qui

is

that essence itself.

or in

Hebrew

He

is,

as the

French

am that I am."
phrase,
This is the proper idea of him, for it is what the
word, God, mean s.
Because he is nothing else than the
Existing," we must hold that
existence is not one of his
peculiarities or attributes,
is not an
attribute at all, or in
but is his inmost
any sense,
est ;

"1

"

Being.

ineffable

This

Being is expressed in the two attributes, extension and

thought, one or the other of which we apprehend as the
necessary
form of all existence and each of these
;

ifested in an
infinity of particular

attributes, again, is

man

and transitory Modes.

Spinoza s
whole system, indeed, is
only an expansion of the two ideas, priuarilj derived by him from Descartes, of Substance and
Necessary

65

SPINOZA.
Existence

and these two

reduces to unity by identifying each

lie

will) the other.

artificial
fallacy of this

The fundamental
inav be pointed out

in

and elaborate system

another manner.

still

Substance, in the

idea or class-name
merely an abstract general
Spinu/an
ens is
it
for
pure being
what the Logicians call a Concept
that is, anterior to and apart
considered both in se and per se,
sense,

is

therefore is one,
from its modes or particularizing attributes, and
idea or concept,
abstract
so
is
But
and not many.
every general
as man, apart from
considered
simply
for
instance;
for,
man,
man from
or accidents which distinguish one particular
the
qualities

one

humanity, human
is man in general
common human element manifesting itself alike

ual

men.

another, he

mere

Of humanity

idea,

nature

the

in all individ

as thus considered, precisely because^t is

to time or space, neither

and therefore has no relation

neither beginning nor end, can be predicated.

unity nor plurality,
defi
to any one determinate place, or to any
it
cannot assign
we do not even attribute
nite time, more than to another, because
in which we attribute
to it actual existence in the same sense
In like manner, circle, considered in
individual

We

reality to

things.
abstract geometrical definition of it,
is, in the
neither begins to be nor ceases to be, for

that

se

and per

is

neither one nor many,

se,

him who con

except in the mind of
to any and
is
it
but as a class-name,
equally applicable
ceives it
Now
of.
circle which you can draw or think
every particular
the
not
his
concept of
foundation of
system,
Spinoza takes as the
or
man
as
circle, but
such
of
class
things,
a deiinite and limited

in truth

it

does not exist at

all,

that which includes all

the most comprehensive of all concepts
ens or
the
in
abstractor pure being
others, namely, substance

Of course, every thing

esse.

is

substance, for this

is

only saying

Hence he rightly says, in rerumnaI his

substantias
earumque affectiones.
tura, nl/iil datur prater
which declares
follows from the logical axiom of Excluded Middle,
that every thing

is

or exists.

universe.
and not-A, horse and not-horse," include the
exists per se, and mode
which
that
as
substance
he
defines
For
as that which does
or affection (what we call quality or attribute)
substance and
that
evident
is
it
but
not exist per se,
per aliud,
But this holds true
taken together, include the universe.
of the classnot of any individual substance and mode, but only
this class-name
of
class-name
modes,
the
and
substances
of
name

that

"

"

as

>de,

to the class are indefinitely

being single, while the things belonging
numerous.
5

66

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

What

calls the

Attributes of a thing arc what we should

necessary attributes; since these alone "express," or are
the necessary results of its essence. The other
attributes
acci
dents"
the old logicians call them
are merely its
temporary
forms or - Modes." Thus, if a
lump of wax be taken as an exam
ple of material substance, its extension and
impenetrability are its
necessary attributes, or Attributes in the Spinozan sense; for,
without these, if it were not extended and
impenetrable, it would
not be wax, it would not be material
substance, it would not exist
at all.
On the other hand, its particular color, its
liquid or solid
slate, its hot or cold condition, its
spherical, elongated, or cubical
Thus Spinoza and Malebranche,
shape, are its Modes.
following
St. Augustine and St. Anselm. will not even
allow us to say
God
is good,"
God is just," etc.; as this would seem to
imply that the
qualities in question are mere accidents or modes, and therefore
might be changed without his ceasing to be God.
But they say
God is goodness, God is justice, and the like, which
implies that
he cannot be
anything else than this without ceasing to be Deity.
Hence, also, comes the Scholastic dogma, that
one of
call

Spinoza

its

"

"

these

any

necessary attributes
the essence of
perfectly expresses
Divinity, so
that, in him, all attributes are
there is no
owe,
of
tributes or

plurality

plurality of essence

but ho

at

absolute unity, which

one necessary attribute,
again, expresses his whole essence or in
most being.
When we say. argues St. Anselni, that a
particular
man is just, we mean simply that he
participates in justice, or has
a share in this virtue
with others, who also
;

is

along
partake of it.
and perfect Being does not share his
perfections
with others, as this would be to diminish their
completeness in
himself.
Then he must be justice itself; he has it not, but he
is it.
As much can be said of
every quality or
which is

But

the

attributed

infinite

to

him;

all

stance, not as Attribute.

that he

This

is,

is

quantity
he is
substantially, or as Sub
not saying that he is an assem

blage or aggregate of all good qualities"; for a

compound is in
debted to its elements for all that it
is; it is formed by them and
exists only in relation to them.
But God is the one supreme
good
expressed under different names.
He is absolutely one.
s
sixth
definition
is
of God, by which, he
Spinoza
I un
says,
derstand an
that is to say, a
absolutely Infinite Being
Being con
sisting of an infinity of attributes, each one of them
expressing an
eternal and infinite essence;"
absolutely infinite," he explains
nd not merely infinite in its own
kind," or in certain
respects.
Thus, a geometrical line may be infinite in one
in
"

"

respect, namely,

67

SPIXOZA.
hut not

lencrth,

in

infinite
breadth or thickness; a surface may be
and breadth, but not in thickness and so
;

two
But the absolutely infinite
on for any finite number of respects.
of respects or attributes,
number
infinite
an
has
Bein<r or Substance
and does not, involve
an
essence,
which
expresses
since every thing
this
in
its
to
essence;
every light m which
any negation, belongs
viewed, he is infinite.
be
can
Substance
or
eternal Being
revealed only
To our finite comprehension, however, there are
To
us,
and
consequently,
extension
thought.
two attributes, namely,
of infinite extension and infinite
attributes
the
under
God appears
and so negative,
These two. though infinite, do not limit,
thought,
in his second definition,
as
because,
explains
Spinoza
each other;
respects, Icnjrth

in

"a

thin-

is

said to be finite in its

another
of the

bounded by
bodv is called a

own

kind,

when

same nature.

thing

it

is

limited or

For example, a

because we can always conceive it as

kind in like manner, a thought
<n-eater
body of the same
p-irt of a
But body is not lim
another
limited
thought.
by
is finite because
finite thing,

ited

since these are of different

by thought, nor thought by body,

kinds."

Both may be

infinite together.

noted
borrowing from Descartes the
nothhave
that
and
matter,
they
radical distinction between mind
extension
and
one
of
essence
the
is
ino- in common, since thought
maims and defaces the doc
the essence of the other. But Spinoza
out the two separate sub
strikes
he
for
trine in the borrowing
in which Descartes conceived
and
mind
matter,
stances, namely,
to inhere, and gives them one
thought and extension respectively
Here, of course, Spinoza

is

still
great dispute
universal substance, as their common ground.
the universe, by resolving it
annihilates
whether
Spinozism
exists,
or Acosmin which case the system is pure Pantheism,
into Deity,
it annihilates Deity,
whether
it
or
call
to
ism, as Coleridge prefers
in which case the joint con
into the universe,
by resolving God
The true interpretation is,
Materialism.
and
clusion is Atheism
the universe, by resolving both
and
God
loth
annihilates
it
that
a universal Substance, which
into the inconceivable abstraction of
and thus the
a
inconceivable,
nonentity
is to us, because
proper
Just so with thb later German
is Nihilism.
result of the
;

system
and object,
Schelling teaches that subject
forms of the doctrine.
of their
and
are
developments
matter,
and
parallel
mind
equal
or
he
and
frankly admits
common ground, which is "the Absolute;"
And
to
Hegel in fact
is
inconceivable
thought.
that the Absolute
of the
comes to the same result, when he explicates the ground
causes
and
and
of
nothing,
pure being
two as the Indifferentism

68

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

to oscillate between them

through the notion of becoming;
when, by one swing of the pendulum, nothing becomes
pure being,
which is creation, and by the
opposite swing, pure being becomes
nothing, which is annihilation.

thought

As we

now

are

me

physics, let

in the seventh heaven of

transcendental meta
attempt to construct a ladder, on which common

understandings may rise to some faint apprehension of what we

are talking about.
Logic teaches us this law of thought, that as
we diminish the intension of a
concept or class-notion by abstract
ing attributes, we thereby enlarge its extension
by admitting more
objects, thus taking successive steps of higher and
higher generali
zation.
For example: from tin:
concept of the class Mammalia,
take away the attribute
and we have the
"suckling their
young,"

larger

class

"having

Vertebrates; from

a spinal

column,"

Vertebrate, abstract the attribute

and there results the still
larger class

Animals; from Animal remove

sentient

yet broader notion Onjanlc Substance

and

life,"

from

and we have the

this

take

away

or-

more abstract and comprehen

sive term material substance, or
matter; now remove solidity or
impenetrability, and the notion rises and broadens to something ex
tended, geometrical form
then take away abstract extension
ganiMii,"

th.-re

is

left the still

last attribute there

existence ^er
nite Being,

se,

is

to

what Spino/a

God.

(the

abstract) and
calls

we have anything,

all

things,

Substance, or absolutely Infi

Now

reverse the process, and

begin to endow, though sparingly,
sublimated notion with attributes
Give it thought,
again.
and we have f/n ii/cfiig substance ;
it
extension and we
this

have

give

ejcti

ti<U;l

But what we ha\v

substance.

n,,\v

given is only attri

butes
the substance in which both
thought aiid extension inhere
is still one and universal.
For, argue., Spino/a. in his fifth theo
rem. "There cannot in the nature of
things be two substances of
;

same nature;" for then the essence of this common

nature
would express itself in the same
attributes; and identity both of
nature and attribute can exist and be conceived
only u s identity of
MI! ..stance.
Neither can diversity be
proved by difference of
modes or accidents for substance
being logically anterior in na
ture to its affections,
(for instance, the substance of wax must exist
before it can be moulded into
any particular form.) if we abstract
from the modes, there will be
nothing to differentiate this from
The ground must be common, must be one.
any other substance.
Take away the modes or particular affections from wax and
iron,
for instance, and
they become (to our conception, at least) one
the

69

SPINOZA.

attribute of exten
substance, matter, having the single

common
sion.

theorem, Spinoza proves that this one substance

for then
It cannot be finite," he says,
same
the
of
another
nature,
limited
be
would
this substance
by
and we should have two substances of the same nature and attri
Then it must
to be impossible.
butes, which has just been shown
It must also be eternal, for there is no other sub
be infinite."

In

his eighth

"

is

necessarily infinite.

"

and indeed, by the definition already given,

exists and is conceived per se, not need
which
substance is that
a cause, or of anything else, in order to
of
a
ing
prior conception
stance to be

exist.

its

Then

cause

it is

self-caused

its

essence involves existence

it is

eternal.

It can only be
see then, the general result of Spinozism.
than I
of
use
a larger
figurative language
symbolized, and with
All individual things, whether of mind or body,
like to employ.
a
and the broad universe which
people, are dissolved

We

they
into^
Waves rise upon its
boundless and eternal ocean of pure being.
the broad expanse from which they
surface, only to fall again into
were uplifted, and with which they are, in substance, identical.
Whether they take the form of extension or thought, it matters
of one and the
in either case, they are but manifestations
not
;

All particular existences, all that seems

or vapors that rise
only bubbles that fret,
and
sea
they will soon break,
from, this ever-heaving and shoreless
to identity with
back
their
find
and
in
way
or be collected
drops,
The dif
their tomb.
that which is at once their birthplace and
each
other
from
be
to
seem
distinguished
ferences by which they
and rain, which
are but fleeting modes or accidents of mist, cloud,
and then with
the common element puts forth for a brief while,
the
and
The
phenomenal
subsiding,
itself.
into

same nature and essence.

individual being, are

draws

heaving
case of the real
produced, as in the
from
mass
without; for
the
ocean, by any cause operating upon
is foreign or
which
existence
no
whatever,
such
no
is
there
cause,

movement

arid change, are not

An internal princi
its own being is one and all.
or
cause,
immanent
keeps up the cease
an
inbiding
ple of change,
These infinite mutations of
less agitation which is its nature.
in
form with ceaseless persistency of matter are vividly imagined
I quote a single
The
Cloud," of which
s striking poem,
Shelley
external to

it

"

stanza

"

am

the daughter of earth and water,

the nursling of the sky;

And

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

70
I pass
I

For

through the pores of the ocean and shores,

change, Init I cannot die.

after the rain,

The pa

And

when with never a

ilion of

heaven

is

stain

Imre,

the wii ds and sunbeams, witli their convex gleams,

Build i
the Line dome of air,
[>

I silentlv lai

And

01 t

of the caverns of rain,

Like a child lr:n the womb, like a ghost from the tomh,
I arise and unbuild it again."

This conception of Immanent Cause brings out the doctrine of

which is the grand, charac

necessity, or the absence of freedom,

teristic of

the development of Spinoza

system.

The phenome

what appears to us
is an endless
nal aspect of the universe
succession of changes, not occurring at random, but uniform in
give the name of
sequence, or, as we say. subject to law.

We

cause to the regular antecedent, and that of eil ect to its uniform
but we nowhere discern, we never can discern, any
coiiM-quent
rausal connection, any real bond of union, between the two. There
is nothing but invariable, eternal antecedence and consequence
;

everywhere

the immutability of law.

Every

event, of course,

is

surrounded by other events, and must be viewed as necessarily fol

lowing those which preceded, and necessuri/t/ followed by those
which come after ir. and thus as forming one link in an adaman
Each and
tine chain which stretches from eternity to eternity.
all are but the immanent movement, the internal law of change,

which

is

stance

the inmost being of nature or the absolutely iniiuite Sub

is the
groundswell of the vast ocean, the self-produced

it

agitation of the fathomless depths, the panting of the mighty

of the universal mother.
Every volition even, every act

bosom

is preceded by certain states of mind, all

it is
which
on
necessarily consequent; and these
involuntary,
mental states are the inevitable results of physical changes in the
world without, and these again of others, all entering into the line
which stretches from infinitude to infinitude. The power or neces
has existed from eternity, and lias come down
sity, which now is,
to us through an interminable series of events, never relaxing its
a blind and unconscious
iron grasp, never varying in intensity,

of a conscious agent,

God.

And yet Spinoza has his notion of what Freedom is. In his
seventh definition, he says,
thing is free when it exists from
"a

mere necessity of its own nature, and is determined to act

a thing is necessary, or rather constrained, when it
only by itself
is determined by something else both to exist and to act according
the

71

SPINOZA.
to a

determinate

As

law."

if

one were any the more free^when

than if he were irresistibly

determined by an internal necessity,
a
In this sense, nature is a cause, but
without
from
impelled
natura
naturans,
cause only of itself; it is, in Spinozau phrase,
It is
contemplating the other
!

only
or nature working out itself.
natura nanature as an effect
side of the same idea, to regard
In truth,
laws.
inherent
own
its
out
nature worked
by
turata
and
of the relation between cause
notion
all
the theory destroys
that
into
terms
one,
two
the
of
the notion
effect,

by merging

inevitable sequence.
However others may regard

it,

this

absolute
conception of the

to me not more sublime, than

universality of immutable law seems
be worth having in such a
not
would
Existence
it is appalling.
and a heart of stone
brass
of
sheet-iron universe, with heavens
I do not !- it would
that
God
thank
it
believe
If one could
one bubbli
for what would it matter, when
drive him to suicide
of waters,
waste
cruel
that
of
surface
the
more should break on
?
soulless
of
dark
being
that
abyss
as possible a few of Spinoza a
I will now translate as literally
and to show that I have tairly
of
recapitulation,
theorems, by way
The Hth: "No other substance can

his

represented

theory.

All that is, is in

even be conceived, except God," and
he
God.
God and nothing can be, or be conceived, without
cause ot
transeunt
the
not
but
God is the immanent,
18th
to this
The 26th:
Every thing which is determined
all thiiK
and
it
to
God;
determined
by
or that "action, has been necessarily
it could not determine
to
act,
a
thing
if God did not determine
what
The 28th
Every individual object, every thing,
it-elf
can
existence,
determinate
a
has
ever it may be, which is finite and
it be determined to
to
determined
act,
except
be
neither exist nor
which is also finite and has a
existence and action by a cause,
itself can only exist and
cause
this
determined existence; and
finite like the others, and deter
a
new
act
cause,
to
determined
by
The 32d:
mined as they are; and so on to infinity."
and
cause
a
but
a
necessary
free,
only
cannot be called
God does not act by virtue of a free will
as a corollary,
the divine nature, any
and consequently, will does not belong to
the will has the same
but
natural
other
all
than
things
more
that movement and repose have, and every
to the divine

exist, or
;

"

"

s."

"

"

"

tion

being

from the necessity of the divine nature.

thinS else which results
co
The things which have been produced by God
The 33d
or in a d:
other
manner,
in
any
not have been so produced
"

order."

72

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Absolute being is identical with absolute

To be, is for
activity.
^
God, to act to act is to produce
to produce is to run through
and to fill out all the
degrees of existence; just as any one
;

material substance
unceasingly manifests all its attributes.
God
produces at first thought and extension, which are the
necessary
expression of his essence.
From thought and extension
eternally
proceed infinite modes or affections of thought and
extension,
which contain in themselves other
modes, though of a lower degree
of perfection; since
every mode is more or less perfect according
to the
longer or shorter line which unites it to the source of
being.

Body, according to Spinoza, is a mode which expresses in a determinute lonn the essence of
God, so far as God is regarded as an
extended being.
The human soul is a succession of modes of
thought which represent his essence so far as he is a

Man

being.

himself

thinking

the identity of a

is

human

soul

human body.

with a

closely united

The two perfectly correspond with each

impressions on the organs with sensations in the mind,
and volitions in the mind with movements of the
be
muscles,
cause the one expresses the
thought, and the other the extension,
of one and the same substance.
What God is as body, at a deter
minate moment of his
development, that he thinks as soul
and
the result is man.
liody and soul are but one and the same being
with two aspects, or, so to
speak, a single ray of light, which is
decomposed and doubled when it reflects itself in consciousness.
There is no physical action between soul and
there is only
body
a metaphysical union of them in God.
The human soul is not
a thing; it is not substance which
properly a being
constitutes
the form or essence of man.
The human soul is a pure mode
a
the body is a
pure collection of ideas
pure mode or aggregate of
the forms of extension.
The reality of an aggregate is resolved
into that of the elements of which it is made
-"The
in so
other,

up.

far as

it

-that

knows the body and

is,

itself

as necessarily
existing,

edge of God, and knows that

him."

it

soul,

under the character of

eternity
necessarily possesses the knowl
is iu
is conceived
God," and
by

CHAPTER

V.

MALEBRANCIIE.
immediate disciples and continuaSTILL following
S the line of the
the
from
we
mystical pantheism of Spinoza
of
tors
Descartes,
pass
of the Christian
to the gorgeous imaginations and fervid eloquence
modified
Cartesianism
found
We
by theoPlato, Malebranche.
shall find it still
loncal indilference or unbelief in the former we
;

the latter by religious enthusiasm, by a fervent

seclusion and study into a beatific
meditative
and
piety, nursed by
AVith
with God.
vision of the intimate union of the human soul

more changed

in

and even opposite tastes and predilec

very dissimilar antecedents,
of the
tions, the speculations
to identical results.

respects,

two

still

led to parallel, and, in many

of the one was

The God-universe

the activity of
dissolved into the infinitude of universal substance
into a mystical per
the human intellect was merged by the other
;

in God, his philosophy adopting in its literal

ception of all things
In him we live, and
sense the fervent saying of the Apostle,
"

move, and have our being."

Born one year after the publication of Descartes first work,
from, the pursuits
in a family of some rank and wealth, but cut off
and
feeble
a
not
more
ambition
sickly body, pro
by
of temporal
than by strong attachment to let
distorted
a
from
spine,
ceeding
and religion, Malebranche found in early life a
ters, philosophy,
retirement
among the Fathers of the Oratory. The
congenial
members of this remarkable association, one of the best belonging
order by perpetual
to the Romish Church, were not bound to their
vows like the monks, but were attached to the secular priesthood
were free to
in full standing, though without parochial duties, and
back
leave their retreat at any time when inclination called them
The cultivation of letters and philosophy, the
to the outer world.
were
instruction of the young, and the exercises of practical piety,
Such
their only employments while they remained in the Oratory.
had
he
After
Malebranche.
for
home
was a
a fraternity

been

tet years a

fitting

member

of

it,

accident

made him acquainted with

74

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Descartes first publication

and the study of this work
developed
lulus mind a system of Christian
philosophy, the exposition and
defence of which
occupied the remainder of his life.
His writing
which are voluminous, had
great popularity and success, for he
the founders and masters of
ornate and eloquent French
the
contemporary and rival of Pascal,
and
;

>se,

FeneBossuet,
and perhaps superior to them all in
lofty flights of the inrunnation and in the wealth and
vivacity of his illustrations,
lieJigious enthusiasm and the thirst for
knowledge in the world of
pure and abstract ideas seem
constantly striving in hi m f or the
mastery, clothing the most abstruse speculations of
metaphysics
with
ervent aspirations and
prayer, of
sentiment and
lon,

pious

"

Lord

Jesus," he
exclaims,
my strength and my li-rht !
obtain from thee to know what I
am, and what is this substance in me which is
capable of knowing the truth and
loving the
good? I am; but for bow long?
I eternal, or shall 1
cease
am, but what am I? I think, but how? AVhen I
think of
see u,ll what
they are capable of; I
them

Can

Am

with
compare
each other, and discover their mutual
relations.
But whatever ef1 make to
represent me to myself, I cannot discover what I
I suffer
any pain, I am conscious of it but I cannot
comprehend what the pain is, nor what relation it can have
either
with me, or with that which
surrounds me.
In a word, I am but
darkness,,, myself, and
my own being appears to me unintelli.-ible
thou dost not
enlighten me with thy light, the
very love which
have for the truth will
;

only precipitate me into error; for 1 feel

inclined to believe that
my substance is eternal, that I am
part of the Divine Being, and that all
my thoughts are but indi
vidual modes of the universal reason."
If

There can be little doubt what will be the

issues of a philosophy
onceived in such a
spirit and directed by such a
Its
purpose.
conclusions wiH be, that we do not
directly know
sensible objects

we know them only

by

particular things

ideas.

It

is

intelliqi-

extension, and not material extension that we

immediately per
ceive.
In vision, the
proper object of the mind is the universal
the idea
and as the idea is in
God, it is in God that we see all
;

lity in

but only
Creator.
:

Ihe outward world exists, since God

assures us
his revealed word
but we never perceive it in

lts

idea, as this exists in

the omnipresent

Malebranche were only a

religious mystic,

his

mind

of its
itself

of

its

theory would

75

MALEBRANCHE.

a philosopher,
But he is something more,
not concern us here.
subtle in argument and
at once acute, ingenious, and profound,
wmand comprehensive in his generalizations, and
analysis, bold
and command of
assent as much by his breadth of reasoning
Let us endeavor, then, to follow
facts as by his fervid eloquence.
his
of
perhaps no other writer,
thread
though
the
speculations,
so much by cold analysis and abridgment.
suffers
Plato,
except
Two leadino- doctrines of the Cartesian philosophy form the
nin<>-

The first is the

of Malebranche.
starting points" of the theory
the very es
that
and
matter
mind,
noted distinction between
of the latter
and
in
consists
extension,
former
the
of
sence
be
is no parity or community of being
thought,; so that there
second is the mathematical doctrine, that the

tween them.

The

criterion of truth

found in clear and

is

distinct

ideas,

be suspected of falsehood without

and cannot
veracity of God.
true,

How,

which are

impeaching the

and
then, asks Malebranche,

all

subse

has continually repeated the question, how, then,

quent philosophy
which are set
can there be any communication between two things
a single
over against each other as radically unlike, not having

common ? How can that which is inextended come

Mind is not
it ?
with
in contact
extension, so as to be affected by
of extension,
even a mathematical point, since that is an element
curves
and can be touched by a line or surface, two osculating
has no such point of con
mind
But
a
such
at
point.
meeting
Neither can it be operated upon, or
ft cannot be touched.
tact
as this would im
or
affected
wise
in
changed without contact,
attribute in

any

can act where it is not ; and as action is a^mode

ply that matter
it can be where it is not,
of beiii^, this is equivalent to saying that
which Is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, impulse through
as it de
contact can produce nothing but motion ; and motion,
can
of
mode
is
a
extension,
which
of
distance,
pends on relations
of inextended
be predicated only of extended substance, but not
Extension cannot even be imaged, imagined, or repre
thought.
since in this respect only can the
sented, except through extension,
I can rep
resemblance whatever to the reality.
picture bear any
relative
the
feet
two
mag
blackboard
a
on
square
resent by lines
all the bodies in the solar sysof
distances
and
nitudes, positions,
such a
Lem but without lines, and a surface to draw them on,
the intelligible extension,
Then
is inconceivable.
representation
a perfectly
which is present to my thought, and of which I have
cannot
of
criterion
the
truth,)
distinct
idea, (this being
?lear and
is an
feature in common with material extension, which
nave
;

any

affection of matter.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

76

The enigma becomes

pass from

still

more dark and profound when we

or perception, which is conceived as matter

acting upon mind, to the voluntary production of motion, as in
How can my
raising the arm, which is mind affecting matter.
sensation

or volition move an extended substance without touching

thought
o
o
or how, if not itself extended, can it touch any material sub

it ?

stance

According to the vulgar notion, the senses are the channels

which transmit impressions or images of the attributes of matter
to the thinking mind.
But we are continually mistaking the affec
tions of our minds, which are the consequences, for the qualities of
body, which are supposed to be the causal antecedents, though there
is no more resemblance between them than between fire, and the
Thus,
liquefaction of ice which results from contiguity to the fire.
sound is an affection of the soul, which cannot exist anywhere but
its essence consists in being felt
only phenomenon corresponding to
a vibration first of the air and then of

in mind, since

cause,

the

but
it

in

its

physical
the world

the, tvinpaimm of
AVe are conscious onlv of the sound, and not of the. vibra
tion which produces it. the former being in no conceivable sense
In like manner. irnrnitJt
an image or representation of the latter.
is felt, being purely an object of consciousness
whilst that which
affects our organs, and is supposed to create this sensation of
warmth, is an unknown fluid, or affection of matter, called ca/oric.
So it is with colors, tastes, and smells; they are all subjective affec
Yet be
tions, or modifications of that within us which thinks.

without,
the ear.

is

cause the mind does not perceive the movements of its own bodily
organs, but only its own sensations, and because it knows that these
produc"d by its own agency, it habitually refers
material and divisible what really belongs to a sub

sensations are not

to a substance

stance spiritual and

Alembert, "is
simple.
says
"Nothing,"
the operations of mind, than to see it
sensations out of itself, and spread them, as it were,

more extraordinary,
transport

its

in

over a substance to which they cannot possibly belong."

Malebranche even distinguishes with great acuteness between

two

classes of these sensations.

pain and

we

of

heat,"

"In

the case of the sensations of

it was much more advantageous that

says,
feel them in those parts of the body which are

he

"

should think we
immediately affected by them, than that we should associate them
because
with the external objects by which they are occasioned
pain and heat having the power to injure our members, we needed
whereas colors
to be warned in what place to apply the remedy
;

77

MALEBRANCHE.

the eye, it would be

not being likely, in ordinary cases, to hurt
On
on the retina.
are
that
know
to
us
painted
for
they
useless
re
us
instruct
as
far
so
they
the contrary, as they are useful only
con
should
we
that
essential
was
it
be^so
specting things external,
them in, the objects on
stituted as to attach them to, or perceive
we are conscious as
which they depend." The color of which
or even painted on
it is not spread over the object,
really seeing
as unlike the mo
is
and
the retina, but exists solely in the mind,
is unlike the
blow
a
caused
the
as
by
tion that produces it,
pain
Hence a person who is stone-blind,
stick by which it is inflicted.
nerve be not destroyed, may, from a sharp concussion
if the
optic

Paradoxical

of the head, actually see a flash of light.

vision is actually independent of light.
seem,
may
The first step which Malebranche takes to solve this great prob

on the back
as

it

Matter is
lem respecting the communication between Mind and
external
objects in them
the obvious one, that we do not perceive
in our minds.
them
of
or
ideas
the
but
representations
only

selves,

This is the ideal theory, or the doctrine of mediate^ perception

main object of
through the intervention of ideas, which it is the
to disprove.
the Scotch school, of Dr. Reid and Sir W. Hamilton,
The proper author of it, or rather its originator in modern times,

He argues, that when we see the sun, the stars,

Malebranche.
is not proba
and a multitude of other objects out of ourselves, it
in
the heavens,
abroad
and
the
goes
ble that the mind leaves
body,
"

is

to

contemplate these objects

there."

And

it is

a gross, improbable,

and the
and improvable hypothesis to suppose, as the Peripatetics
half immaterial
and
subtle
or
sensible
that
Schoolmen did,
species,
from every object, and flying
simulacra, are constantly peeling off
which come in contact with
of
some
everywhere through space,
channels are introduced to
these
and
of
sense,
our "organs
through
were it so,
our minds.
No, says Malebranche, this is incredible
mere
as
not
are,
subject
would
be,
they
colors, tastes, sounds, etc.,
ive affections, but true similitudes or copies of what they represent.
;

for
the immediate object of our minds, when we see the sun,
is intimately
is not the sun itself, but something which
example,
In percep
united with our souls and this is what I call idea.

Then

cannot be doubted that the idea of what we perceive is

minds but there need not be anything ex
actually present to our
tion,

it

ternal which

is

similar to this idea.

such a mountain does not

exist,

may

but I

think of a mountain of
not therefore think

am

gold
There is something there, actually present to
ing of nothing.
ideas are there, as vivid, as
in
So
dreaming, in delirium,
thought.
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

78
lifelike, as

firmly trusted for the

moment,

as in our sober

waking

hours.

Whatever

is

our mind, however, as a mere modification of

in

that mind, such as sensations, feelings, appetites joy, sorrow, and

the like, these we are conscious of, and immediately perceive with
for they are actually present.
But
external objects are not present; the material causes of these sen
sations are not present.
Such objects, such causes, can be known
Besides external material objects, there arc
onlv through ideas.

out the intervention of ideas

also spiritual objects,

principalities,

the

minds of

God

powers.

says Malebranche, it
may make themselves

is

other men, angels, celestial

himself.

probable,

These

may be

spiritual

spiritually

objects,

discerned,

known

to us in themselves, per se, without

For though we are taught by experi
ence that we cannot immediately, and of ourselves, make known

the intervention

of ideas.

to each other, but must use u-onh, or other sensible

which ideas are, attached, this proceeds onlv from the dis
orders and imperfections of our present state.
God has so ordered
it for this life only.
But when justice and order shall reign,
and we shall be delivered from the captivitv of the bodv, we shall
be able to understand each other through the intimate union of
spirit with spirit, as now do the angels in heaven."
But I speak here principally of material things, which certainly
cannot be so united to our minds as to be directly perceived
since thev are extended, and the mind is not, so that there is no
Then they must be perceived through
relation between them.

our thoughts
signs, to

"

ideas.

The

next question is. whence come these ideas?

Xot from the
of
themselves
this
the
as we have
Schoolmen,
hypothesis
objects
;

and improbable. Not from any power

for then they
which our own minds have of producing them
would be arbitrary,
formed to our liking; whereas they come
and go. they fade and brighten, without our will and even contrary
They were not born with us, the sold being stocked
to our will.
with them at its birth; for then they would be always present, and
being infinite in number, and bearing countless relations to each
other, nothing but confusion and disorder would result, and there
would be nothing to determine, at any one moment, which should
seen,

is

utterly extravagant

be irresistibly chief objects of attention*

Herein, of course, by
rejecting innate ideas, Malebranche dissents from the Cartesian
doctrine.

Neither does God, by his direct action, produce these

minds when they first appear there. This is the

ideas in our

79

MALEBEANCHE.
Berkeleian hypothesis, and

is

denied by Malebranche, on the ground

and it would be a
that God always
by the simplest means,
of
waste
mere
a
energy, to create
complicated and operose system,
occasion
as
by inces
and
over
required,
the same ideas over
again,
individual minds.
sant action on a countless multitude of
is that
come then to the only remaining hypothesis, which
exist in God, and human
ideas
these
that
Malebranche,
acts

We

adopted by
with Him. In truth,
minds behold them there, through their union
of God,
the
of
have
we
can
omnipresence
what other conception
all minds, and that
than that he is present to all things and to
his intinite substance

is

the place or

home

of spirits, just as

bound

one sense, the place of bodies. All things preex

less space is,
he created them and all
isted in idea in the Divine mind, before
and power,
are
produced by his will
changes which they undergo
Mind
in his infinite being.
and
are
and
preordained
prefigured
in

since these are

can have intercourse with mind, spirit with spirit,
with matter, for
intercourse
have
cannot
mind
but
of like nature;
other by the whole
are
unlike,
separated from each

these

totally

Thus our minds can

diameter of being.
God, provided he

God

see in

the

works^of

discover to us that in him which

willing to
Even in our perception of external objects,

is

represents them.
God since we perceive
then, we are entirely dependent upon
For,
as he vouchsafes to make known to us.
them
of
much
as
only
of ourselves to think
as the Apostle says, we are not sufficient
All the
but our sufficiency is of God."
anything as of ourselves,
when we wisli to think of
woi-hl knows from experience, that
from a crowd of other beings
:inv particular tiling, we single it out
Now we could not
our minds to it.
and then
;

"

anil

apply

things,

it were not
if
thus wish to single out and examine this one,
confused
to our minds, though in a general and
already present
us ;
All things lie thus confusedly and indistinctly before
manner.
who
to
not
us,
were
himself
if
God
present
could not be,

which

of his essence.
incloses all beings in the infinitude and simplicity
universal
ourselves
to
also are capable of representing
For in
in
all
thus
and
beholding
species,
one.^
ideas, genera
we think triangle in general, including in this idea all
stance
and we discern the relations between this and
possible triangles
But our senses appear to give us only this
ideas.

We

other general
and we could not
as this one triangle
or that particular thing,
abstract and
not
could
we
in
recognize
one,
thus discern many
which are immutable and eternal, as are the truths
truths,
general
him who can impart to
of geometry, but through the presence of
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
us glimpses from his
omniscience.

St.

Augustine

says,

Truth

is

ncreate, immutable, immense, eternal, above all

It i s true
things.
itself
it does not derive its
perfection from anytime else
It
renders created
beings more perfect, and all minds natural] V seek
;

know

to

it.

Nothing can have

Uth

fi

truths,

?
we Tbehold
"we

!S

<L

all

these perfections but God himSee immi^able and eter-

WheU W

Him."
Malebranche adds this
qualification,
behold him, not because these truths
are God but

because the ideas on which these truths

depend are in God
lie second
leading feature of the philosophy of Malebranche
he doctrine of Occasional
Causes, is only an obvious
consequence
and extension of the
principles already established.
Thus far we
have considered
only the theory of perception, and,
that
Of cognition in
Now we are not merely through but
general.
"

efficient

in

cognitive,

some

free, and,
sense, creative beings.
We are someenabled not only to know, but to will
and to do, according to
his righteous
As God is the light of all our
pleasure.
seeing so
so, says Malebranche, he is the cause of all
our doin-.
I will to

how

raise rny

arm and my arm

is

lifted up.

Does

it

my mere

will

move

Certainly not; for will is but one phenomenal manifestation

that whose essence is
pure thought, and which, as
unextended,
intangible, and self-involved, cannot act out of itself

and impenetrable substance.

Putting forth a
occasion on which
my arm rises. Just
the

upon extended

volition

is only the
hands of the clock
occasion on which I in

so,

marking six in the morning may be the

variably wake up; but it certainly is not the cause of
for there
may not be any clock within the

my wakin^

range of my senses
Any change in the material universe can result
only from the action
f its omniscient and
omnipotent Creator. As it was created by
him alone, so it can be
affected, moved, or changed
only through
J rue, man is free to will
any action whatsoever for in this
his
responsibility, the measure of his virtue or his -milt
"in.

But the movement or act is the mere

consequent of the volhion
the contingent
effect, which may or
may not happen and whether"
s or
not, my accountability is the same.
All moralists a^ee
t
or demerit consists
in the "will
only in the intent
lomicide is not
murder, without malice prepense.
But if I will
:o commit murder
then, before God, I am guilty of
murder, though
blow should fall short, the
dagger should break, or the pistol
should miss fire.
God sometimes overrules our wicked
purposes,
far as the mere outward act is
;

concerned; though far more fre

quently, under that system of general laws

through which the uni-

81

MALEBRANCHE.

the expression of infinite

is administered, and which are
wisdom acting always by the simplest means,
through which,
their
also, men are taught what to expect, and thereby to guide

verse

is car
conduct,
through these laws, I say, the criminal purpose
ried out in act, that so its deplorable consequences may stun ineu

remorse and repentance.

Here, 1 confess, is the main difference between the philosophy
but it is a distinction which
of Spinoza and that of Malebranche
Both alike resolve all phenomenal action and
world-wide.
is
into

change

in the physical universe,

cluded, and

all

outward human agency

itself

in

manifestations of that universe, into the mind of God ;

substance, so far as we know, into the infinite action

and so its very

God alone moves and
and sole efficiency of the Divine Nature.
would not be infinite or abso
acts, else he would not be God,

the unfettered
But the Christian Plato reserves free will
and so the proper individual being, of
purpose and intention
man. as that with which he was endowed at creation, and which,
in fact, constitutes creation ; while the remorseless Jew merges this

lute.

phantom of infinite substance, and linking all together

erects his vision of a blind God-universe, which is
blind
fate,
by
also into the

one and

all.

According to Malebranche, there are three systems of general

laws, through which God governs the universe, or rather maintains
it in being and activity, creation not being a single act, but a con
First, there
tinuous and incessant manifestation of his power.
are the general laws of the communication of motion, of which laws
the shock or impulse of bodies is the occasional or natural cause.
In other words, the impinging of one body upon another marks
the occasion or time at which divine power moves them both
By establish
through a distance which is inversely as their mass.
call the power
ing these laws, God has given to the sun what we
of illuminating and warming the earth, to the fire that of burning,
and to bodies generally the properties by which they seem to us

And

it is by obeying these, his own laws,

which we attribute to secondary causes, or
Secondly, there are the laws of the union of mind
physical law.
and body, the respective modes of which are reciprocally the occa
Thus the
sional causes of the changes which take place in them.
the
colored
of
of
the
and
the
rays of light
eye,
impact
opening
raises in my mind
are
the
which
God
the
occasion
on
retina,
tpon
and in return, the exercise of my will
the vision of the landscape
in a conscious effort determines the moment at which divine power

to act

that

on each other.

God performs

all

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
opens my eyelids or closes my
Malebranche, that God unites

It is
by these laws, says
with his other
works, and ac
cording to the common opinion, gives me the
power of speakin^
walking feeling, imagining, and the like and to other bodies tlfe
fingers.

me

power

ot

affecting my organs of sense.

Thirdly, there are the laws
of the union of the soul with
with the
God,

intelligible substance

the universal reason

and of these laws our attention is
the oc
casional cause.
When I will to reflect, and by
patient thought to
find out the relations of abstract
and universal ideas to each other
God makes known to me, to the extent of his
good pleasure the
truth as it is in him.
If the
inquiry is vain, and I follow error
instead of truth, it is because,
through failing effort and insufficient
attention, I do not sufficiently discriminate clear and
distinct from
;

vague and confused ideas.

Form what judgment you

of

this
may
theory, which appears so
extravagant at the first glance ;- accuse it of
mysticism, if you
will
there can be no doubt, not
only that Malebranche accented it
in good faith, and believed it
with his whole soul, but that it
rested
in us mind on a solid basis of
evidence ami cogent
argumentation,
f he chose his
ground like a religious fanatic/he defended it like
a philosopher.
Moreover, the latest results of modern physical
science, by the confession of the
physicists themselves, tend rather
to confirm than to weaken it.
What mean
;

you, asks Malebranche

by saying that one body can act upon another, and move it ?
I

say

it is

contradictory to suppose that

it does so.
The first prin
necessary law of the human mind which
that every event,
every change, must have a cause.
Then
a glares
body cannot even move itself; and if so, it is a contradiction to
o that it can make another
The es^erce of
body move.
body, according to the Cartesians, is impenetrable
extension, which
susceptible of a change of place, that
of a

ciple of science is that

is,

lations of distance

onts

from other

change

in its

re

bodies, or in

the relative positions

several parts.
Any other change in it than this is inconThen it can be moved, but cannot move
as there

would be nothing

itself,

determine whether such motion should be

to
the right or left,
upward or downward. Moreover, according to
Cartesian doctrine
already explained, the work of creation
; incessant and continuous, or
constantly repeated, every body
being at every moment created anew here or
there, in one place or
another, it follows that it is not
properly moved thither, but only
that it ceases to exist in one
locality and is created
in a
fferent one; therefore
God, who is its
also
to

a<min

Creator,

necessarily

#6

MALEBRANCHE.
determines

What

its

change

of

place, or, in

other

words, moves

it.

moving force of bodies being only the will of

anew successively in different localities, they
them
God creating
cannot communicate to others a power which they have not in
is

called the

Now

all other corporeal change, such as generation,

or
decay, being reducible to local movement, either
development,
of the whole or of its parts, what cannot produce the latter must
All motion,
be equally incapable of bringing about the former.
is thus resolved into the doings of the Infinite One, into
all

themselves.

change,
a single force omnipresent in the universe and boundless space ;
and this, directed by absolute wisdom and goodness, keeps up that

uniform succession of antecedents and consequents which we de

nominate physical law.
Now let these arguments pass for what they are worth I say
the conclusions to which they point are virtually accepted, though
under different phraseology, by modern physicists, and fairly
;

The inertness of matter,

adopted into the science of our own day.
its absolute incapacity of producing or initiating change, either in
itself -u- in that with which it is in contact, is now universally ad
What the chemist analyzes, the naturalist observes, and
mitted.
the mathematician measures and computes, is the phenomenon
created or effect produced, never the force or power whicli produces
The conclusions forced upon
it.
says one who speaks with
authority on such a subject, the Duke of Argyll, -are these:
"

us,"

1. That the more we know of nature, the more certain it appears

that a multiplicity of separate forces does not exist, but that all
her forces pass into each other, and are but modifications of some

one force, which

is

the source and centre of the rest.

2.

That

all

mutual relations by principles of

3. That of the ultimate
arrangement which are purely mental.
but the
seat of force in any form, we know nothing directly
nearest conception we can have of it is derived from our own con
sciousness of vital power." In other words, all force is one. and we

of

them are governed

in

their

nowhere have any immediate knowledge of it except

in volition, directed by intelligence, and manifested

as originating
in

conscious

ness.

In respect to the charge of Pantheism which has been brought

than to cite his own lan
against Malebranche, I cannot do better

Created extension,"
guage translated as literally as possible.
ne says, u is to the divine immensity, what time is to eternity.
All bodies are extended in the immensity of God, as all different
God is always all that
times succeed each other in his eternity.
"

84

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

he

is, without succession of time.

He fills all with his substance
without local extension.
In his existence, there is neither
past nor
all is
present, immutable, eternal.
In his substance, there
future
s neither
great nor small all is simple, equal, infinite.
God has
reated the world; but the will to
create it is not
past and -one
He will change the world but the will to
change it is not future.
I he \V1 H O f God, which has
created and will create, is an
eternal
and immutable act of which the eifects
change, without there be
ing any change in God.
In a word, God has not
been, he will
not be, but he is.
His existence and his duration
(if it is proper
to make use of that
term) is an undivided whole in eternity and
an undivided whole in
every moment that passes in that eternity
Just so, God is not
divided, so that a part of him is in
heaven, and
another part on earth but he is an
unbroken whole in his im
mensity, and an unbroken whole in all the bodies which are
locally
extended in his
immensity he is as a whole in all the
of
;

parts

matter, although these are

infinitely divisible.
Or, to speak more
:tly, God is not so much in the
world, as the world is in him
or
his
immensity just as eternity is not so much in time, as

time

is

in

If

you

ns,

let

eternity."

find

n*e

it hard to rise to these

lofty and abstract concepremind you of the parallel case of the

ubiquitous

own mind, your undivided and indivisible

self to
your whole body or extended sentient organism.
Consciousness
assures me that I am an absolute
unit, an indivisible whole, with
out distinction of
It is not a
parts.
part of my real self that feels
another part that thinks, another that
remembers, and another that
wills.
But my whole individual
being feels, my whole beinothinks, remembers, or wills.
It is
equally evident that this indfpresence of your

:\go
or, as

of consciousness

is,

or exists, wherever
is a mode of

already explained, action

where one is
s not, which
this absolute

not, is equivalent to saying that

is

a contradiction.

unit, is

every part which

is

it

feels or acts

being, so that to act

Then

one can be where he

follows that the soul

all in
every part of the body; at least, in

sentient.

I cannot

it

comprehend how

know from consciousness that it is so. Then

winch I know to exist between
my indivisible self and

this is

the relation

my

extended

body, I can have no difficulty in believing exists also between God

and the universe which he has created. As
I am not identified
with my body, so neither is God
identified with the universe.

The

doctrine of the

anima mundi must be sharply

from that of Pantheism.

distinguished

85

MALEBRAXCHE.

The system

of

Malebranche

is

compound

of Cartesianism with

we have seen, the

Platoiiism.
doctrines of the essential duality of mind and matter, and that the
essence of material things is pure extension. But he learned from
is not the sensible,
Plato, that the proper object of the intellect
but the
world, and that its proper function is the

From

the former he borrows, as

intelligible
vision of eternal and

immutable Ideas, the prototypes of all that

as these exist in their divine source, the bosom of God.
to 3Ialebranche, what we call the idea of the Infinite

is real,

According
in the

human

soul

is

God

the direct immediate vision of

himself.

does not, then, like Descartes, proceed from this idea to the
from effect
great truth of the being of a God through reasoning
but he holds that there is properly no idea which repre
to cause
arid therefore, in
sents the Infinite One, as he is his own idea
the Infinite, which is constantly present to our minds,

He

beholding

since the Finite

is

only a limitation of

it,

we have

intuitive

knowl

edge, and not merely argumentative proof, that God exists.

Arnauld accused him of imputing imperfections to God, by
and corruptible things in him ;
teaching that we behold all finite
and it is in defending himself against this charge that the Platonism of Malebranche becomes manifest. The world inhabited by
is the
he
our
world, the world of ideas.
intellect,

Hence

it

is

says,

intelligible

not the actual and

material man, horse, or tree, but

the intelligible man, the intelligible object, the type of the species,
which we behold in God. The intellect beholds them there in
their essence, without any of the limits and imperfections which
What is
to all objects within the domain of the senses.

belong

?
It is extension, which, as beheld in God, is pure
or intelligible extension ; that is, it is the one eternal, immutable,
and infinite space, within which are contained all material things,
their finite extensions being only such limited and definite portions
Pure space is the omni
of it as a finite mind can apprehend.

their essence

and it is the
his being
presence of God who fills immensity with
the infinite canvas on which
mirror in which we see all things,
;

are portrayed all particular and sensible forms, as they become

visible to us when touched with color and other material qualities
All intelligible
on occasion of impressions made upon the senses.
and are made
in
are
contained
extension,
then,
intelligible
things,

to us through the senses, just as all statues are contained

a block of marble whence they are drawn by the chisel of
In the knowledge of sensible objects there are al
the sculptor.
two factors, the idea and the mere feeling or sensation ; the

known
in

ways

86

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

latter

is

sible,

the

what we

in

us,

while the idea alone

general, the typical form,

in

God.

is

in

God.

Thus

the sen

particular, the contingent, belongs to sensation and is

see in ourselves.
On the contrary, the immutable, the
is

the idea, and this

is

what we behold

CHAPTER

VI.

PASCAL.
no prominent place in the
the writings of Pascal occupy
I should not discuss them
of
Descartes,
the
of
system

As

development

about in our own day a

circumstances had not brought
which
unquestionably origi
in
philosophy
revival of those doctrines
and most
is still by far the clearest
he
which
of
and
nated with him,
neither Mr.
that
curious
is
It
and advocate.
eloquent exponent
that
his critics seems to have been aware,
J. S. Mill nor any of
s only
Hamilton
W.
Sir
was
of the Conditioned"

here

"the

if

Philosophy

two centuries old, having been set

even in the theological application
forth in all its essential features,
Hamilton could not
Pascal.
which Mr. Mansel has made of it, by
since Pascal was one of his favorite
this
fact,
of
have been ignorant
borrows from the Pensees arguments
authors, and he frequently
which stand in close
the
theory itself, or
and illustrations either of
set
in which the theory is explicitly
with

by adoption,

since

it

is

at least

passages
his obligations to that marvellous
probably regarded
not to need mention,
as
obvious
child of genius as so
the paralo
Mill
Mr.
since
openly attributes
of some importance,
in attempting
was
Hamilton
betrayed,
gisms into which he thinks
in
and the Infinitely Divisible arc both
to prove that the Infinite
these
*ow
puzzles
of mathematics.
conceivable, to his ignorance
borrowed
to a considerable extent, directly
concerning infinity" are,
mathematical geniui
the
was
juxtaposition

forth.

He

"

from Pascal, who

certainly

greatest

of the Con
BuYlefore we can fairly estimate this Philosophy
of the
circumstances
and
at the character
ditioned, we must glance
Lorn
enounced
and
out
first
thought
man by whom it was
Pascal was
i:

of thirty-nine years,
1623, and dying at the early age
than the follower, of Descartes.
rather the contemporary and rival,
or Leibnitz had
of
Spinoza, Malebranche,
None of the writings
and Descartes
Arnauld
Only
of his death.
appeared at the time
his mind; and
of
the
over
growth
could have had any influence

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

88
these not

but

by imparting doctrines,
by exciting controversy and
After running a brilliant career in mathe
stimulating thought.
matics and physical science, making some of the most important
discoveries of his century at an age when most men have not com
pleted their preliminary studies, Pascal suddenly abandoned the
pursuits in which he had gained so much renown, renounced his
youthful ambition, and devoted his whole soul to the contemplation
of God and a future life,
lie became an ascetic and an enthu
siast

I will not say a fanatic, as his cruelties

on himself.

But few years remained

were lavished only

him, and these were sorely

but during this short period,

to

crossed by bodily pain and disease

his achievements in defence of persecuted truth and
religious phi
losophy were destined to surpass in splendor his early contributions
to human science.
Apart from his merits as a thinker, his writings
contributed to the fixation of the French lanjnia^e,
and are still
O O
;

unrivalled for vigor, terseness, and eloquence.

As a philosopher
is most
naturally compared with Malebranche, though they do

he

not seem to have had any personal intercourse.

Both were men
of ardent minds, endowed with strong imagination and lively wit,
severe, sarcastic, and fearless; distrustful of human science beyond
the bounds of mathematics; disposed to underrate what man has

accomplished and the powers of

his

understanding; and carrying a

fervid piety so far as to accept even with gratitude some of the

most appalling conclusions which theologian* have ever evolved from
But Malebranche was more serene and expansive in the
Scripture.

contemplation of religious truth, and less overwhelmed with awe

in the presence of God, and in view of the
he has
destiny of man
not so much vigor, but more copiousness and variety of thought.
Pascal has more passionate energy in working out the truth, and
;

He rises almost to the gran

greater vehemence in inculcating it.
deur of a Hebrew prophet in denouncing the deceptions and
wickedness of man s heart and the vain pretensions of his under

He seems to triumph in exposing the weakness and

standing.
imperfection of human nature, and the vanity of human pursuits.
But it is not witli the mocking spirit of a satirist that he dilates
upon the

fallen

and wretched condition of our

race.

In

his eyes,

man is weak and degraded, but not contemptible his view is fixed
as much upon the heights from which he has fallen, as upon the
;

His magnificent lamentations are

abyss into which he is plunged.
uttered in the spirit of Jeremiah weeping over the sins of his nation,
and pointing out the ruin with which it is menaced,
lie seeks to

bumble only that he may exalt

to point out the frailty

and wretch-

89

PASCAL.

that his attention may

edness of man s condition in this world, only
the
turned
and
from
grandeur of the Last
it,
upon
be diverted
life to come.
the
of
Judgment and the unutterable splendors
even
his
that
he
is so great,
grandeur appears
"Man
says,
tree does
that he has of his own misery.
"

"

from the knowledge

not

know

miserable

that

it

but

is

that we are
wretched.
True,
this
also a mark of greatness to be aware of
nobleness
his
man
the wretchedness of
proves
it is

sad to

know

it is

Thus all
misery.
of a dethroned
It is the unhappiness of a great lord, the misery
condition is aggravated by the
our
of
The
present
misery
king."
innocence and
consciousness that we have fallen from a state of
finds there is no greater grief than
Pascal
the
Like
poet,
peace.
Who, but a dis
the recollection of happiness formerly enjoyed.
not possess a
does
he
that
he
asks,
crowned monarch,"
grieved
Who thinks himself unhappy, because he has but one
throne ?
No
if he has but one eye ?
mouth ? And who is not
"

"is

unhappy,
but
one ever thought of sorrowing, because he has not three eyes
he is inconsolable, if he has but one."
With this striking revelation of our causes of discontent, con
;

of our
the following sublime reflection upon the grandeur
branch
feeblest
the
is
Man
soul.
a thinking
being, considered as
It needs not that the
of nature but he is a branch that thinks.
vapor, a drop
should rise in arms to crush him.
trast

"

whole universe
of water,

is

enough

to slay him.

But though the universe should

be nobler than that which causes his

the universe knows
death; for he knows that he is dying; and
It is in view of contrarieties like
its power over him."
of
nothing
Pascal exclaims, "What an enigma, then, is man!
"that
crush him, he would

still

these,

Judge of all
a strange, chaotic, and contradictory being
mass of un
of the truth
earthworm
feeble
depositary
things
boasts
he
if
himself,
the
universe;
and butt of

What

certaintyglory
I abase "him I

if

contradict him,

he humbles himself, I glory in him ; and I always

he comprehends that he is an incomprehensible

till

monster."

I suspect he
thought so accurately, that
him.
wrote with Pascal open before

Pope has

versified this

"

Chaos of thought and passion all confused,

Still by himself abused, or disabused;
In doubt his mind or body to prefer,
Born but to die, and reasoning but to err;
Created half to rise and half to fall,
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurled,
riddle of the world."
The
jest, and
glory,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

90
"

Our

so magnifies the present hour,

constantly spending thought upon it, and so belittles eter
not thinking about it at all, that we make an eternity
imagination,"

"

says Pascal,

through
through

nity,

of nothing,

and a nothing

deeply implanted

and all this lias its roots so

though put on its guard, can

of eternity

in us, that reason,

not protect us against the double error."

I know not who put me into the world, nor what the world is,
I am in a terrible ignorance of all things.
nor what I myself am.
I know not what my body is, what my senses are, what my soul
"

is,

or even what

now

is

that very part of nie which thinks what I am

itself just as little as anything else.

saying, and which knows

I see these frightful immensities of the universe which enclose me,

and I find myself tied down to a little corner of this vast exten
I am placed on this spot rather than on
time during which it is permitted me to
live is assigned to one point rather than another of the whole eter
whole eternity which will fol
nity which preceded me, or of the
I see only infinities in all directions, which envelope
low me.
me like an atom, and like a shadow which endures only for a

sion, without
that, nor

knowing why

why

moment, and
soon die
I cannot
frightens

the

will

little

never return.

All that I

know the least of

The eternal silence

but what I
"

avoid."

know

is,

that I

must

that very death which

of these infinite spaces

is

me."

can now comprehend the source, the materials, and the pur
His gloomy but grand conception
pose of Pascal s philosophy.
of the present state of the human soul proceeds from his accept
ance of the Augustinian dogma of the fall of man, through the
sin of Adam, from innocence and happiness to depravity and ruin,
and his consequent helplessness and need of a Saviour. In his
"VVe

His conviction of sin, his con

eyes, man is a ruined archangel.
sciousness of present misery, is aggravated by a dim recollection
His condition is
of the purity and bliss which he has forfeited.
he cannot make even an effort to save himself, ex
This inability is
the prevenient grace of God.
his
and
his
conscience,
alike
upon
understanding
upon
stamped
the contradictions in which he is involved when he searches after
him down
truth, and the depravity of his own heart which drags
wards when he fain would rise. The strongest proof of Chris

irremediable

cept through

to himself; that it explains the enig

tianity is, that it reveals man
of his being, the mixture of good and evil in his present lot,
and the only cure of his unhappiiiess.
out the
and

mas

points

origin

Jansenism was the development

within,

the

Romish church

of the

91

PASCAL.

same system

as

Calvinism among Protestants.

Both are expo

of the

the fervid

genius
metaphysical theory which
constructed out of the writings
great African bishop, Augustine,
This system has always had a strange fascination for
of St. Paul.
united with a meditative disposi
dialectical
minds of
sitions of the

ability,

great

and intense convictions of religious truth. It has been worked

of the Old
out by some of the most distinguished metaphysicians
Port
Arnauld,
the
Since
World.
Royalists,
and the New
great
of this philosophy is our
Nicole, and Pascal, far the ablest teacher
own Jonathan Edwards. The system had no natural home nmong
the
French Catholics, and was soon persecuted out of existence by
tion

opposition of

bitter

the Jesuits.

But

in

Switzerland, Scotland,

the
and New England, Calvinism has found firm foothold among
a strong
and
either as its cause or its consequence, we find
people,

and capacity for metaphysical

taste

Pascal

studies.

a
philosophy exists only in

fragmentary

state,

a col

him upon
lection of detached thoughts and aphorisms, scribbled by
and
sickness
of
intervals
the
great
loose scraps of paper during
These were
last three years of his life.
the
clouded
which
suffering
at the time of his
merely shuffled together without arrangement
his editors have endeavored to distribute them into
^

death, though
I bring
such order as to preserve some connection of thought.
which
them
of
those
as
as
possible,
literally
together, translating
of the
and
forcible outline of that
Philosophy
a
distinct
present
which now passes under the
Conditioned," as it is usually called,
"

William Hamilton.
to believe
weakness natural to man," argues Pascal,
it
hence
truth
happens, that he is
that he possesses the
directly
is incomprehensible to
which
to
deny every thing
always disposed
him whereas, in fact, he is naturally conversant only with false

name

of

Sir

"

"

It is a

those propositions of
hood, and he ought to accept as true only
which the contradictory seems to be false. This is why we ought
is inconceivable, to suspend our judg
always, when a proposition
ment concerning it, and not to deny it on this account,^ but ex

and if we find this is necessarily false,

former one, incomprehensible as it is.
affirm
the
may boldly
us apply this rule to our subject."

amine

we
Let

its

contradictory

no mathematician who does not believe that space is

and yet there is no one who comprehends an
We comprehend perfectly well, that by dividing
ever so many times, we can never arrive at a
extension
a given
that is, which has no extension.
of it which is indivisible,
"

There

is

infinitely divisible
infinite division.

portion

92

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

For what is more absurd than to maintain

that, when a portion of
space is divided, its two halves should remain indivisible and with
out any extension, so that these two
nothings of extension, when
taken together, should constitute an extension ?
For I would ask
those who think
they have this idea, whether they conceive
clearly
that the two indivisibles touch each
other; if they touch throu^hout, then they constitute
only one and the same thing, and yet the
two together are indivisible; if not
throughout, then they touch
only in part then they have parts then they are not indivisible."
Let them confess, then, as in truth
they do when they are
pressed, that their proposition [that space is not
infinitely divisible]
is just as inconceivable as the
other [that
space is infinitely divisi
and
let them
ble];
acknowledge that it is not by our capacity of
conceiving things, that we ought to judge of their truth since the
two contradictories
being both inconceivable, it is still absolutely
;

certain that one of

them

is

true."

In like manner, he
argues

However

great a number may be, we may always conceive a

greater one, and then one which is greater than this
last, and so on
to infinity, without ever
arriving at one which cannot be any far
ther augmented.
And, on the contrary, however small a number
may be, as the hundredth or ten thousandth part, we
may always
conceive a smaller one, and so on to
infinity, without arriving at
zero or nothing
O
1

."

In a word, for
any movement, any number, any space, and any
time whatsoever, there is
always a greater and a less; so that they
are all sustained between
nothing and infinity, bein- always in

remote from these extremes."

these truths cannot be
demonstrated; and yet they are
the very foundations and
principles of mathematics.
But as the
reason which makes them
of demonstration is

finitely

"All

incapable

obscurity, but their extreme evidence, this

fault, but rather a perfection."

not their

want of proof

is

not a

Those who see clearly these truths, will be able to

admire the
grandeur and the power of nature, in this double
infinity which
surrounds us on all hands, and learn from this
marvellous
"

consid
themselves, by regarding themselves as placed be
tween an infinity and a
nothing of extension, between an infinity
and a nothing of number, between an
infinity and a nothino- o f
motion, between an infinity and a nothing of time ; and
thereby
one may learn to estimate himself at his true
value, and form
reflections which are worth more even than all
the rest of
eration to

know

mathe

matics."

93

PASCAL.

For

in fine,

the infinite, an

nothin- and

is

in

all

all.

nothing in regard to
term betwixt
middle
a
regard to nothing,
removed from comprehending the ex

what

man

in nature ?

Infinitely

and their beginning are for him, veiled

tremes? the end of things
and he is equally incapable pi
forever in impenetrable secrecy;
was drawn, and the infinite
he
whence
seeing the nothingness
which he

is

"Unity

ingulfed."

added

to

infinity does

not at

all

augment

it,

any more

The finite is annihi

than a foot increases an infinite measure.
So
a pure nothing.
becomes
and
lated in pr.-sence of the infinite,
before the Di
our
with
so
justice
before
God;
it with our
is

spirit

There is not so great a disproportion between unity

that of God."
and infinity, as between our justice and
are ignorant of its
AVe know that there is an infinite, and we
then
are finite
numbers
that
true
not
nature, since we know it is
in number, but we know not
infinite
is
an
there
that
we know
to it does
It is neither odd nor even, for adding unity
wrat it is
number
and
a
it
is
number,
every
And
yet
not change its nature.
even."
or
odd
is either
Thus we may well know that there is a God, without knowing

vine justice.

"

what he
Think you
is."

yet without parts

infinite

an

and

infinite

But

indivisible

swiftness

God should be infinite, and

show you a thing which is both
directions wit
it is a point moving in all
is all m each
it
and
all
for it is in
places,

impossible that

it is

I will

place."

of the Conditioned is
In these eloquent fragments, the Law
In every
is
it
than
by Hamilton.
even more correctly enunciated
whether it be
is quantitatively conceived,
which
existence
of
form
wa
or motion, all that is positively thinkable
space, time, number,
the infinitely
two
extremes,
these
between
mean
determinate
both of which are inconceivable
great and the infinitely small,
is
be
must
true, because its contradictory
one
and
to

thought,

yet

equallyinconceivable.
in- novel or doubtful,

of reasoning, far from bead absurdum of the

reductio
the familiar

And
is

this

mode

is not directly provabl

mathematicians, whereby a proposition that
that its contradictory must be
is still demonstrated by showing
in the Ap
But everywhere in his writings, except perhaps
false.

pendix

to his

"

Discussions,"

Hamilton

partially

misstates this truth,

two extremes, between which all positive

by affirming that the
instead of each hav
contradictories
are
of each other,
thought lies,
thes
that
only one of
a contradictory of its own; and hence,
ing

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
two extremes

true or real, the other

being necessarily false.
be very briefly answered, that the
infinitely great
is not the
and even if it
contradictory of the infinitely small
were, there would not be any
mean between them, any neutral
ground to be occupied by what is positive in human thought; since
the very nature of the mathematician s rcductio ad
a/^nn/itm, or

To

this

it

is

may

"

the

logician s law of

mean between two

there

Excluded .Middle,

The

contradictories.

no mean, no

is

the exclusion

thing

is so.

or

is

of

any

not so

And to say of
possible.
the two extremes, the
infinitely great and the infinitely small, that
only one of them is true, and the other false, is the very
is

of the doctrine which

both are inconceivable

third

proposition,

opposite

Hamilton has

we know

in view.

that this

lioth are* true, hut

is so,

but

we know not

how it is so.
Of course,

this system is destructive of

All the
empiricism.
space of which we have had experience, either through the senses
or by the imagination, is finite or limited.
But
limits,

beyond

existence of an

finiteness, we have certain

infinite space, of wlii.-h we have

this

beyond these
knowledge of the
had no experience.

Pass in imagination to the outer hounds of the stellar

universe,
and there ask yourself, if
you are not absolutely certain that you
could thrust out your arm into the void
lies beyond.
space" that
Place the boundary where we
sure
may in thought, we are
still"

that this experiment

Then there is no boundmight be repeated.
ary, no end, to space.
Obliged to admit this. Mr. Mill and other
empiricists still strove to escape from Pascal s dilemma,
that this infinite
space
that our conception of

and

that

by denying

is
it

inconceivable to thought.
Mill affirmed
is both "real and
perfectly definite;"

as
completely as we possess any of our
dearest conceptions, and can avail ourselves of it as well for ulte
rior mental
But his doctrine, as thus
operations."
in
"we

possess

it

explained,
volves him in a worse
difficulty than that which he strives to slum.
The want of experience, he tells us, is all that
prevents us from
conceiving space as finite.
want
Ought not, then, a

corresponding
experience to prevent us from conceiving space as infinite? Or
did Mr. Mill intend to maintain the not
very intelligible proposi
tion, that finite man has had
experience of infinite space as infi/
Q
of

nite

Mr. Mill

s farther
attempt to characterize this
perfectly defi
conception, by saying that it is greater than any finite space,"
simply confounds the infinite with the indefinite: for the question
If you cannot tell how
immediately arises, how much greater ?

nite

"

"

"

95

PASCAL.
ranch greater, then

it

simply the indefinite

the answer is not true

is

Borne finite magnitude,

the answer is a silly truism, for
Infinite

Space

=x

-\- Infinite

it is

if
if

summed up

greater only by
infinitely greater,

in this equation

Space.
"
"

The mathematician

"

infinite

and

"

are merely

infinitesimal

and indefinitely small

that

quantities
as great or as small as we please, without
Thus defined,
which we are to make of them.
affecting the use
has a perfect right
or rather thus left indefinite, the mathematician
of the second or third power,
infinitesimal
to speak of an
ridiculed as absurd, when
which
very properly

this indefinitely great

which

is,

may be made

"

expressions
applied to the

Berkeley

which is simply
strictly so called,
to an infinite power.
raised
infinitesimal
mathematical
the
said is just as applica
It is obvious that all which has now been
to the be
in
back
Go
to
is
it
imagination
ble to time, as
space.
"

"

infinitely small

of that long roll of ages in which the geologists

ginning even
world s crust
endeavor to express their ideas of the history of the
is a void time beyond this vast
there
that
sure
still
are
and you
a length of time in comparison with which
lapse of centuries,
or
even geological chronology shrinks to an indivisible moment,
In reference also to infinite time, as
is reduced to nothingness.
ex
well as to infinite space, the mind does not merely, through
is sure that it has no end,
but
of
end
an
it,
to
see
fail
haustion,
In other words, it is not by
that a termination of it is impossible.
that we have
of
failure
the
after
or
repeated efforts,
induction,
but
found
satisfied ourselves that a limit is not to be
gradually
its failure,
after
as
trial
the
before
as well
making
immediately,
after we have in
as well when we have passed over one mile as
to us, that
comes
conviction
the
accomplished a thousand,
thought
5
to
out
stretches
line
the
Again,
that
no
is
there
limit,
infinity.^
;

and Space contain in their ample bosom

contained in any or
ences, and are not themselves

"Time

exist

all

finite

all

of these

ex

All created things are situated in Space, arid also have

and Space is
their own moment in Time; but Time is everywhere,
its entirety in every part
in
exists
them
Each
of
Time.
as
old
as

istences.

of the

The

other."

be derived
practical lesson to

from

this

Philosophy of the

is

thus

the

expressed by Hamilton
not to be constituted into the measure of
"

Conditioned

well

that

capacity of thought is
we know that there are realities all around us, which
existence ;
stand, as
the human mind cannot comprehend or conceive.
and two
immensities
three
of
confluence
at
the
well
bas been
said,
^

"

We

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
eternities.

Above

and below us, and on either

hand, stretches
the infinitude of
before and after the
space
present moment
reaches the infinitude of time.
Thus encompassed
by the incon
ceivable compelled to assert its
reality in the very act of acknowl
edging that it goes beyond the grasp both of the
imagination and
the intellect, we are
taught at once a lesson of humility and of
In the mere consciousness of our
inability to conceive
aught beyond the relative and the finite, we are
inspired with the
in the existence of
something unconditioned, beyond the
sphere of all imaginable reality.
know that He is. though wo
comprehend Him not; for who can by
searching find ouC God
who can understand the
;
Almighty to perfection. I do not say,
with Descartes and
Malebranche, that these considerations, these
eternal and immutable
truths, prove the being of a God
but they
suggest, they bring home to the mind, his
necessary and omni
present existence with a force which mere
argument could only
J
;

We

weaken.

The
is

lesson of

enforced

humility which is taught by these considerations

by Pascal with marvellous richness of illustration.

1 his condition of
occupying intermediate ground," he says, holds
true of all our faculties.
Our senses take cognizance of nothing
&
that is extreme.
Too much noise deafens us too much li-ht
daz sus; too great distance and too near
proximity impede vision
o great
length and too much brevity make discourse obscure
3 much
pleasure wearies, and
harmony too long continued be
"

comes monotonous and

Excessive qualities are hostile
unpleasant.
to us, and not
subject to the senses."
Sounds of too hMi or too
low a pitch become inaudible.
To us, extreme things are as if
they were not, or as if we were not in
respect to them.

our

condition.

This

This

is

what keeps our

knowledge within
fixed hunts, and makes us alike
incapable of knowing every thintrue_

is

being totally ignorant of every thing.

This is our natural
and yet it is the most
opposite to our inclination.
We
burn with desire to know
every thing thoroughly, and to build a
tower which shall rise even to the
infinite.
But our whole
:

Condition,

cracks,

and the earth opens beneath us even

edifice

to the

abyss."

"Instead of
perceiving things as they really are, we stain with
the qualities of our own
compound being all the simple ami unithings that are presented to us.
would not

Who

>rm

seeing that we reduce all things to body and

these two would be of all
things the most
t

is

the very
thing which

is

most

believe,

spirit, that

on

the union

comprehensible ? And
to be understood.

difficult

97

PASCAL.

Man

is to

himself the most marvellous object in nature

cannot conceive what body is,

all, how body can be united
diific-ulties,

and yet

This, then,

is

it is his

still

to

what

less

spirit.

proper

is

This

spirit,
is

and

for

he

than

less

the height of his

being."

the conclusion of the whole

matter.

"

The

sci

ences have two extremities, which come together and end in the
The first is the pure natural ignorance, in which all
same thing.
men find themselves at birth. The other extremity is the conclu
sion which all great minds come to, when, having run through all
that man can know, they find that they know nothing, and meet in

But it is a learned igno

the same ignorance whence they set out.
itself."
of
conscious
become
which
has
rance,
Sir William Hamilton expresses the same result so nearly in
Pensees
the same words, that we must suppose that he had the
"

"

There are," he says, two

at this passage.
we philosophize to escape ignorance, and the
sorts of ignorance
start from the
consummation of our philosophy is ignorance

opened before him

"

"

We

we repose in the other.

and the
which, we tend

one,
to

are the goals from which, and

pursuit of knowledge is but a course

They

between two ignorances, as human life itself

from grave to grave.
If, as living creatures,
As dreams
Is

are

we are such stuff

made of, and our little

rounded with a

is

only a wayfaring

life

sleep;

is a little
cognizant intelligences, our dream of knowledge
is a drop, nescience is
The highest reach of

so, as

Science
rounded with a darkness.
the ocean in which that drop is whelmed.

light

human
rance
rance

of human igno
is, indeed, the scientific recognition
This learned igno
nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.
the rational conviction by the human mind of its ina

science

Qui

is

bility to

transcend certain limits.

the science of

It is the

knowledge of ourselves,

man."

To prevent this doctrine of the limitations of human knowledge,

however, from being pushed to an injurious excess, it behooves us to
remember that the unthinkable is not necessarily the non-existent.
There may be a direct presentation of it to consciousness, and
even to the senses, while we are wholly unable to conceive how it
or even what
originated, or what is its inmost nature or essence,
are

its

relations to the other facts of consciousness.

We may

cog

existence as a reality unquestionably present to our minds,

even when we cannot think its particular mode of existence, or
Even as a phenomenon,
classify it with any other forms of being.

nize

its

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
or mere appearance, there must be
something behind it for, as
Kant remarked, if nothing is,
nothing would appear.
Thus, Time
;

certainly a mode or form of consciousness, and we

apprehend it
even as necessarily existent,
being unable to imagine its non-exist
ence though Time as such,
irrespective of the events happening
;^
in it, is
It is
absolutely unthinkable.
unique and sui generis ; we
can neither think it as
substance, nor as a nonentity or the absence
of substance.
In like manner, Self, the indivisible
of con
is

Ego

sciousness, always identical with itself in

its

successive manifesta

tions,
quite unthinkable in its essence or inmost nature, and also
in its relations either to the
body, or to the other modes of con
is

sciousness

viction of

yet this inconceivableness does not prevent our con

reality from being to every one a type of what is

its

most real and positive, and the

strongest expression of certitude

of which the

human mind

is
capable.
thus clearly set forth
by Mr. Mansel "We
cannot conceive creation at all, either as a
springing of nothing
into
something, or as an evolution of the relative from the abso*
lute; for the simple reason that the first terms of both
hypotheses
are equally
nothing and the absolute
beyond the reach of
human conception. Hut while creation as a
process in the act oj

Another instance

is

being accomplished is equally inconceivable on

every hypothesis,
creation as a result
already completed presents no insurmountable
lifficulty to

to

human

thought,

apprehend the absolute.

that the

amount

if

we consent
There

is

no

to

of existence in the universe

A, and at another,

abandon the attempt

difficulty in

may,

at

conceiving

one time, be

represented by
by
-f H though we are
equally unable to conceive how H can come out of
nothing, and
how A, or any part of A, can become H while
is
;

undiminished."

Indeed, in tin: familiar phenomenon of birth, creation as thus under

stood is constantly
Jn some manner
taking place before our eyes.
inscrutable and inconceivable
or individual
by us, what was a
hie, represented

by an

two independent

lives,

In this
^

single
indivisible consciousness,
suddenly

becomes

each attended by its

separate consciousness.
way, the birth of every human being is the addition of a

unit to the

sum

of existence.

CHAPTER

VII.

LEIBNITZ.

WITH

the single exception of Aristotle, I suppose that Leibnitz

was the most comprehensive genius that ever lived. Other men
have been as industrious, and have become as learned, as he they
;

at original speculation on as great a variety of

to
they have sacrificed success in any one department

have also aimed

But
topics.
this dream of universal

empire they might have accomplished

Leibnitz alone, in modern times,
more, had they attempted less.
he undertook.
attempted every tiling, and left his mark on all that
Even at the present day, there is hardly a science, hardly a field
for study, research, or speculation, which does not bear the im
could be fully written
press of his labors, or the history of which
;

As some of the ancient

without frequent mention of his name.
could guide eight horses yoked side
charioteers," said Fontenelle,
by side, so Leibnitz drove forward all the sciences abreast."
Historian, jurisprudent, philologist, mathematician, physicist, theo
moralist, and philosopher, even those who began by censur
"

"

logian,
what he actually
ing the multiplicity of his pursuits, after reviewing
the many
accomplished, the new problems that he started, and

indebted
pregnant hints of future discoveries for which science is
to him, have been compelled at last to doubt, as Dugald Stewart
whether he could have accelerated the advancement of
says,
"

knowledge by the concentration of his studies more than he has

and whether he
actually done by the universality of his aims
does not afford one of the few instances to which the words of the
si non errassct, fecerat Hie minus."
poet may literally be applied
;

He

shares equally with Sir Isaac Newton the glory of inventing

the Differential and Integral Calculus; his doctrine, that the force
is not simply as the velocity, but as the square of the velocity,
after raising a controversy

time,

ment

is

now admitted

of the

saltum, and

Law

its

that

lasted over a century after his

as a first principle in science

his

announce

of Continuity, that nature never proceeds per

a scale of beings varycorollary, of the existence of

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

100

ing by imperceptible gradations, accepted almost at once in a large

department of research, was adopted as late as I860 by Mi
R. Grove, the president of the British Association, as the latest
and broadest generalization of all the science of our own day;
1

"NV.

first proclaimed by him, of the Sameness of Indisand of the need of a Sufficient Reason for all things, are
among the most comprehensive and fruitful principles ever intro
duced into the field of purely speculative philosophy his theory
of Monads, in at least one of its many phases, is probably admitted
by the most scientific minds of the present time his system of
and Voltaire,
Optimism, versified by Pope and ridiculed by

the doctrines,
cernibles,

P>ayle

yet. ceased to be eagerly discussed in the schools of sys

and his purely metaphysical princi
tematic ethics and theology
ples, of Preestablished Harmony and the criteria of Innate Ideas,

has not

created the modern philosophy of Germany, and, through that, are

even now largely affecting the course; of thought in cultivated

minds throughout Kurope and America.

lie has been accused,
and not without reason, of a not uncommon weakness of great
and a consciousness of
minds, the pride of conquering difficulties
;

this

own remark,

his

fault appears in

that, to

him,

"

all difficult

things were easy, and all easy things difficult."

Godfrey William Leibnitz was born in Leipsic, on the 21st of

June, 10

10.

and died

in

Hanover. November

14, 171G.

His father,

the University, died when the

six
and
the
was
care of his early education
old,
only
years
boy
devolved on his mother, an accomplished and excellent woman, the

who was

Professor of

hies

in

Leibnitz showed great

daughter of a distinguished jurisprudent.
precocity of talent and eagerness for learning; and as he inherited

from his father a considerable library of well-chosen works, lie

became a devonrer of books, and the study of the Latin and Greek
classics formed the amusement rather than the task of his boyhood.

He

Latin verses,
one of his letters that, when he was only thirteen
years of age. he wrote three hundred hexameter lines in one day,
He also occa
without admitting the elision of a single syllable.
but his
sionally wrote verses both in German and in French
native tongue does not appear to have been a favorite with him,
for with one or two trifling exceptions, he wrote all his philosoph
At the University of
ical works either in French or Latin.
Leipsic, where he graduated at an early age, he studied philosophy
under Thomasius, and mathematics under Professor Kiihn, paying
much attention also to philology, history, and jurisprudence. No
acquired a singular facility in the composition of

and he boasts

in

101

LEIBNITZ.

remark of
change of ob
Before he had been
in a suspension of mental labor.
jects, than
two years out of college, he published four elaborate essays, one of
which was on a ne\v method of studying jurisprudence, and another
was a treatise against atheism. Baron Boineburg, who was high
one

ever

verified

D Aguesseau,

in

more

by seeking

completely the

his

often

amusement rather

cited

in a

under the Elector of Mayence, conceived a favorable

abilities, and held out to him the hope

office

opinion of his character and

employment in affairs of state. Under encouragement received

from this minister, Leibnitz published at Frankfort, in 1G70, his
De
first considerable philosophical work, an edition of Ni/olius
of

"

veris Principiis et vera Ratione philosophandi," with supplementary

Two years afterwards, he went to Paris, on a
essays and notes.
sort of diplomatic mission

make an
menacing

from Boineburg,

to

induce Louis

XIV.

to

expedition against Egypt, and thereby counteract the

attitude of the Turkish power in Europe, instead of

turning his arms against Germany, which would be to cooperate

The negotiation failed, but the history of it is
with the Turks.
curious, when considered as an anticipation of the project which
was brought nearly to a successful result more than a century after
wards by Napoleon. Leibnitz remained over four years in Paris,

and also visited London, making the acquaintance of the most

eminent men of letters and science in the two cities, among whom
were Arnauld, Huyghens, Oldenburg, Boyle, and two distinguished
mathematicians, Collins and Tschirnhausen. Intercourse with these
men did much to shape and develop his subsequent speculations
and endeavors.

The difficulty is great of rendering any connected account of

for he published no one work of any
the opinions of Leibnitz
length or method, giving a consecutive view of his system as a
whole probably from a consciousness that all his doctrines could
;

His writ
not be forced into complete harmony with each other.
ings consist of a huge mass of correspondence with nearly all the
of short papers communi
and of a few occasional and hasty
publications of greater length, which are so carelessly executed that
they might be termed ephemeral, were it not for the importance
and novelty of some of the theories therein set forth. After his
opinions were matured, he prepared only two treatises of consid
erable length, on purely philosophical subjects, apart from his
These are his
contributions to mathematical and physical science.
and Reason,
Faith
of
or
a
Discourse
on
the
Conformity
Theodicy,

literary

and

scientific

men

in

cated to philosophical societies

"

Europe
;

102

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

and Essays on the Goodness of God, Human Free

Will, and the
a work written in answer to
Origin of Evil,"
Bayle, and con
taining in outline his system of Optimism, and his doctrines of the
Sameness of Indiscernibles and the need of a Sufficient
Reason ;
and his Nouveaux Essais sur V Entendement
Humuin, a work
which was not published till about half a
century after the death
of its author.
It is a criticism on Locke,
setting forth the writer s
theory of Innate Ideas, with incidental mention of his other meta
In his busy life, Leibnitz had no leisure
thoroughly to digest his opinions into method and system.
He
was by no means a mere student of science and
lie
philosophy
was also a diplomatist, a statesman with all the cares of
office, a
courtier, and a man of the world; he stood
high in the favor of
princes, and was connected with some of the most
important nego
tiations of his time.
In a large sense, his career
belongs to the
of
history
Europe.
The logic and method of Leibnitz differ
considerably from those
of Descartes,
though both are Nationalists, rejecting empiricism,
as affording no sure foundation for science
in other words,
they
place the intuitions of reason and the deductive conclusions of the
physical speculations.

understanding far above the gcnerali/ations of experience.

Facts
obtained by observation
may be used to verify, but never to orinnate or supersede, the
primary truths of philosophy and science,
which can be evolved
only by meditation and the rigorous pro-

cesses of logic; that is to

say, mathematical reasoning affords the
only type of certainty and precision.
Leibnitz begins an exposition of his method
by saying that ideas
are clear or obscure,
according as they do, or do not, enable us to
distinguish objects as wholes from each other; they are distinct or

confused, according as

we

can, or cannot, discern the

marks or at
distinguished from another; they
are adequate or
inadequate, in so far as we have, or have not, a clear
and distinct notion of each of these marks or
attributes, as well as
of the substances in which
they inhere. Now the senses often give
us clear notions, less
frequently distinct ones, and never adequate
ideas of the objects
perceived.
Thus, even a child clearly distin
guishes a circle from a triangle, each figure being
roughly consid
ered as a whole ; but he has no distinct notion of the
many o- eo metrical properties or attributes, which are
peculiar to each of these
tributes

whereby one object

is

forms; and still less can he adequately conceive all the conse
quences, which the mathematician perceives to flow
necessarily from
each of these properties or attributes.
Only the intuitions of

pure

LEIBNITZ.
the undialectical processes of
.milled or restricted by the
and
adequate
distinct,
to perfectly clear,
taucli ^, can attain

son

can be derived from sense

alone are perfect, and never
be
the only instance that can
the abstract, is perhaps
Nnmlr,
as a piece
such
given object,
of an idea perfect ami pure.
an indenmte
observed by the senses for
o Iron may lave been
it is magnetic.
that
aware
us
tLe mUUlast, only accident makes
as yet
does not possess many other,
can neve be ure that it
consethe
all
trace
we
can
^known properties; and still less
its
attributes,
iit might follow from

de"

?de

e-

We

qLs
known

An

*^*^

would have

infinitude of

experiments
Sensible ideas, as they are
Lforc thete could all be determined.
definition which doe
Nominal
a
of
never adequate, admit only
but few of their
at all, and enumerates
express their essence
and intuitive
of
adequate
Heal definition is possible only
nv
his various figures, and which,
of
frames
k eat such as the geometer
with each other of the vantou grestablishing the compatibility
a priori or antecedently
know
to
us
elements of the idea, gives
Ihus tiie
of the idea as a whole.
vk"

to experience, the possibility

knows at once, by intuition

that a triangle, or a
hat a
a possible conception; and
sided figure enclosing spacers
is impossible.
thus enclosing space
bmnearfor two-sided, figure,
is true when it is possible,
lc ordTng to Leibnitz, again, an idea
of the twocontradiction, as in the case
and false when it implies a
the resoluand
of
possible premises,
Pure intuition
"are.
s d d
the
or irreducible notions, form
on o complex ideas into simple
In other
truth.
demonstrative
source of all absolute and

geometer

only
from conceivable premises;
words, deductive syllogistic reasoning
and adeconceived
clearly, distinctly
from
premises
d at is to say,
mathematics,
universal
that
the arJ of infallibility,
is the
the syllogistic machine, which
which Descartes dreamed of,
is the only form
in
fact,
onW ad to necessary truth. Syllogism,
the evidence of the senses,
Experience,
o necessary reasoning.
to merely probable conclucan kad only to contingent results,

quly-is

8i

in its

intuition and governed

beginning with
or the
of thought, is sulhcient
course by the necessary laws
conduct us to
itselt
alone,
in
it
cannot,
covery of the true,
the real is

But though

real

actual
la

hi

wU

logic,

The true is the

The former,

the real
i

or the conceivable

possible,
the true, is

what God eternally thinks

of his thought as of
the product not so much
he has chosen,
which
world
the
what he has created,
is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

104

out of all possible worlds, to bring into existence by the decree

of his omnipotent will.
then can the human mind,
among
all the possible worlds which it can conceive, detect that one which

How

God

made

has

from a
by the light of an a priori
nates, enlightens, and regulates experience;

By

actual, or lias reduced

reason again

possibility to a fact?
principle,

which domi

the principle that

nothing exists, or can exist, without a sufficient reason for its exist
ence.
Now the only conceivable suflieient reason why this uni

we inhabit, and of which we are a part, has been

created by an infinitely wise and good God, is, that it is the best
of all possible worlds.
An infinitely wise and good being could
choose only the best. And what is the best? Evidently that world
verse which

which there is the utmost possible order, harmony, perfection,

and beauty. This world in which we live must unite all these per
fections, whether our poor Unite understandings can detect and be

in

convinced of them, or not.

This is Leibnitz s famous system of Optimism.
It is a bold at
tempt to sound to the very bottom the deep and dark problem of
the origin of evil, to demonstrate the
conformity of faith with reason,

and

to reconcile the

six lines

ways

of

God

to

man.

Tope sums

it all

up

in

nature is but art unknown to thee;

All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal jjood

"All

And,

One

spite of pride, in erring reason s spite,

truth

is clear,

whatever

is is

right."

Pope, as is commonly supposed, got his philosophy from Bolingand if so, Bolingbroke certainly took it from Leibnitz.
broke
Read the Essay on Man over again, and you will lind the whole
;

"

"

be this doctrine of Optimism, founded

Reason, and the theory of a scale of
beings passing into each other by imperceptible gradations, and so
bound together as one whole, deduced from the Law of Continuity.
If you would have a bitter, mocking satire on it,
containing also
about all the facts and arguments that can be urged against it, read
Voltaire s
Candida."
Bayle, the contemporary of Leibnitz, and

system expounded
on the Principle of

in

it

to

Sufficient

"

the Voltaire of the seventeenth century, argued against and ridiAiled it from the outset; and the
Theodicy of Leibnitz, occa
"

"

most of his other publications, is his reply to Bayle.

Crousaz, the Swiss philosopher, attacked Pope s
Essay on Man,"
as an indirect mode of attacking Leibnitz Warburton in England,
sional, like

"

and Vattel

in Switzerland, replied to

Crousaz and defended Pope.

LEIBNITZ.
the world," as here underthat
Leibnitz is careful to explain
of objects existmean merely the total arrangement
stood, does not
but includes also the
one
ttme,
at
any
no- and events taking place
of any such arrangement,
nev able antecedent and consequences
all time, or throughout
he,,
onsidered as extending throughout
he
I mean by world
What
universe.
saj^
the
of
whole history
of all existmg things,
succession, as well as collection
s
be
there
many worlds in difthat
said
might
o tint it may not be
be
necessary to take these
for it would
"rent times ^nd places;
* uni
or if you
a
world,"
constitute
all together, in order to
still
would
it
were
idled,
And even if all times and all places
verse
"

Me

w,

of
been filled in an infinite number
be true that they might have
of
number
possible
an infinite
and thus, there would still be
way
chosen the best smce otherwise
have
must
God
which
of
^ Ids,
Reason.
have acted without a Sufficient
perfect wisdom would
the
in
and
long run,
on the whole,
AV fis truly best must be best
both in
circumstances
connected
the
all
full regard being had to
it by
with
are indissolubly bound up
the past and the future, which
;

an absolute or metaphysical necessity.

a world
that there might have been
"Some may object by saying
here
and
now
which are apparent
without the sin and suffering
d
wor
better
a
been
have
would
Granted but I deny that such
he
;

are connected

together;
in every possible world, all things
a piece, like an ocean ; the
it may be, is all of
whatever
universe,
the effect
extends its effect to any distance, though

For

"east

movement

,ecomes

less

everything

in

to

its

distance.

proportion
for
there beforehand, once

and bad actions, and

prayers, the good

has contributed ideally, before

God

has regulated

having foreseen the

so that every
the rest

all,

all

existence, to the resolution

existence of all
the
concerning
than in
in the universe, any more

whidi has been formed

Thus, nothing could be changed
a given number, without changing

its

its

essence by destroying

in

he

which

happens
Thus, if the least evil
numerical identity.
be>tte
it would no longer
taken
be
away,
should
world
jworid
has been found the
which, all counted, all taken together,
it.
who has chosen
possible world bv the Deity
P
worlds without sin and withou
-True, we can imagine possible
but
Severambias, of them
make
romances,
Utopias,
and
.

offering,
be very inferior in good to ours
these same worlds would still
for how can I know and repre
in
this
detail,
see
cannot make you
them with each other? But you
sent infinite worlds, and compare
the effect, because
is
it
that
so, from
as I do,
lught to judge,
<

106

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

has chosen this world such as

evil often
this evil.

it is.

Moreover, we know that an

produces a good which could not have happened without

Even two evils have often made a great "ood
o
o
"

So two

liquids

bodies

may make

Et

si

fata volant, bina

venena juvant.

sometimes produce a
a

fire.

solid,

and two cold and

opaque

general sometimes makes a happy

blunder, which wins a great battle ; and in the Romish
church, on
Easter eve, don t they
sing,
"

certe necessarium

Quod

A doe

peecatum,

Christ! niorte dele turn est?

felix culpa,

quse telem ac

tantum

Meruit habere Kedemptorem

"

The whole force of the argument here depends

upon the doctrine
of the absolute
necessity inherent in the nature of finite things,
whereby a greater good could not be produced without the permis
sion of temporary or
apparent evil as a means for its
production,

any more than two mountains could exist without a valley between

them.

Created things, argues Leibnitz, for the

very reason that
they were created, must be devoid of the infinity and
perfection
which can exist only in Him who is increate and

eternal; and
hence they are necessarily subject to all the evils which are
inher
ent in finitude and imperfection.
This is what he calls the Meta
physical evil inseparable from this world s affairs, which even om
nipotence cannot remove, since the supposition of its removal would
be a contradiction and an
and it is easy to show, that
absurdity
what are called Physical and Moral evils are
its
;

among
necessary
a greater good than the
mere attainment of happiness;
well-being is subordinate to well
doing, and must often be sacrificed in order that the latter
may be
possible.
Thus, each individual virtue presupposes the existence
either of unhappiness or
wrong.
Courage cannot even be con
ceived to exist without
danger, nor fortitude without pain.
There
could be no temperance without the
liability to excess, and no
benevolence unless there were wants to
or
to
coiiM-qut iices.

lieve.

But progress

in virtue

is

satisfy

Even

sufferings

re

veracity would be no virtue, if one could not

help
He who could not do harm or
telling the truth.
wrong might still
be innocent, it is true but there would be no
meritln

his inno
In short, merit consists in
withstanding temptation, alle
so that, without the
viating pain, and opposing wrong
presence of
these evils, there would be
nothing to praise and nothing to blame.
;

cence.

We may

boldly affirm the optimistic doctrine, then, that a world

107

LEIBNITZ.

without either suffering or sin would not be an improvement on

the world as

now

constituted.

Leibnitz s system is the sharp distinc

truths on the one hand, and
immutable
and
between necessary

The key
tion

to the proof of

truths of fact or physical

empirical or contingent considerations,
The former consist
on the other.
laws, as we should call them,
of the original intuitions of pure reason, like the Principle of Suffi
cient Reason, the necessary laws of Thought as set forth in pure
These, with the
the axioms of Mathematics, and the like.

Logic,
from them, are metaphysical verities,
necessary syllogistic deductions
which cannot be overruled by God himself, any more than he could
make two and two to be five, or a dishonest action to be right and
he eternally
They are God s truths, for they are what
obligatory.
he
would or
that
to
his
nature
constitute
and
suppose
thinks,
they
could abrogate them, would be to suppose that he should act con
that is, that he should cease to be God.
to his own nature
;

trary

between truths is applied also to existences.

There are absolute and necessary existences, such as those of God
of time, of everlasting right or the moral law.
himself, of

And

this distinction

space,
the Almighty could annihilate space, or stop the flight of
or reverse the obliga
ttme, or contradict the truths of mathematics,
tions of the moral law, is to ask if God could annihilate himself,

To

if

ask

if

he could cease to be.

the other hand, there are contingent existences, such as that

and there are empirical truths, such as physical
and the broadest
laws, even those of the highest generalization
the Laws of Motion, for instance, being included.
SCO pe,
These are the results of God s free will and creative agency, and

On

of all real objects

are continued only during his good pleasure.

They are discovered
Infinite power could
induction.
and
observation
by
generalized
by
were
the
reduce all created things to
nothingness whence they
could reverse the laws of nature, cause stones to fly up
drawn
;

be not in right lines, but in curves

particles of
other
each
instead
of
;
matter
grapes to growattracting
repel
on thorns and figs on thistles. Nay, we have not the slightest
next hour only we are
assurance that he will not do so the

ward

motion

to

to

very

the slaves of habit, so prone to think that what has been

will be, though there is not the slightest necessity for so thinking,
Let the Empiricists
that we find it hard to believe that he will.
about the universality and the
the Positivists talk as

so

much

and

they

may

mean thereby the necessary

if they
of physical law
continuance of such law one hour beyond the present time, their

certainty

108

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

assertion rests

an innate

upon no

scientific evidence whatever, but

merely on
au acquired though persistent habit of thought.

belief, or

Infinite power could instantly destroy every object in this room,

you and me included. But there is something which even infinite
power cannot do annihilate the space which this room now oc
cupies, or call back the hour which has just elapsed.
:

Now

observe, Leibnitz rests his system of Optimism, his proof

is the best of all
possible worlds, on principles and reason
ing of the former sort, that is, on necessary and immutable truths.
Accordingly, any argument against that system drawn from facts,
that this

from

sensible evidence, from citing instances of actual sin and

is
misery, corruption and death,
simply irrelevant and illogical.
If facts seem to contradict mathematical conclusions, so much the
worse for the facts correct your observations of them
try your
experiments over again, for t/iey may be wrong mathematics and
;

metaphysics must be right.

The

of observing facts

ollice

is

to

One who
verify theoretical conclusions, never to contradict them.
should attempt to invalidate the geometrical proof, that the three
angles of every triangle are precisely equal to two right angles,
by cutting a triangle out of wood, actually measuring its three
angles, and finding that they did not sum up just 180 degrees,
would very properly be laughed at.
at the
This," said Euler,
close of a long and abstruse mathematical investigation,
this is
"

"

and

Professor Peirce
yet
showed an equally daring confidence in his mathematical analysis,
on occasion of the discovery of the planet Neptune. The calcula

contrary to all experience

it

is

true."

tions of Adams and Le Verrier proved that a new planet

ought
to be found at a certain precise spot in the heavens ; the astrono
mers pointed their telescopes to the spot, and there it was. Mr

Peirce went over the computations again more carefully, and found
that the theory and the fact did not coincide after all.
The agree
ment between the prediction and the fact was merely accidental
;

the observed planet was not the same with the predicted planet.
No matter about the former being seen just at the right spot it
had no business to be there. That one was found there was only
;

Le Verrier s good luck. And further investigation showed that

Mr. Peirce was right. Just at that epoch
the only time, I be
lieve, in a period of

seventy or eighty years

the observed planet

and the calculated planet happened to be nearly in the same line

of vision as seen from this earth
but the one was not the same as
the other, for the one was at the distance of thirty, and the other
;

at the distance of thirty-six.

With an

equally lofty confidence, a

109

LEIBNITZ.

aside the sarcasms

follower of Leibnitz might contemptuously put
of sin and
of Bayle and Voltaire, founded on the observed presence
be
must
contradiction
capable
The
men.

apparent
misery among
succeed in so explaining it, or
of being explained away, whether we
The "Theodicy" contains Leibnitz s attempt at an explana
not.
tion of the facts, most of which was repeated by Pope.
This contemptuous estimate of mere empiricism, when
in
with the deductions of pure reason, is one of the characteristics
of Germany.
modern
the
all
Leibnitz
from
philosophy
herited
by
French school,
Descartes is not more evidently the founder of the
of Malebranche and Cousin, than Spinoza and Leib
it

the progenitor
nitz are of the

German

conflicts

transcendentalists. of the philosophy that

of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

transcends experience,
sensualism or empiri
a
with
The English school,
strong tendency to
Locke. Truths made known
and
Ilobbes
established
was
by
cism,
with their attributes
to us a priori, or antecedently to experience,
have been the fundamental doctrines
and

of universality
necessity,
of German philosophy ever since the time of Leibnitz.
and self-confidence
It was of a piece with the towering ambition
this system of Optimism, and this mode of
of Leibnitz, to

regard

and demonstration all the truths, not only

establishing by intuition
means of reconciling
of philosophy, but of theology, as a possible
the schism between
all differences among Christians, of healing
of once more unitand
churches,
Catholic
the
and
the Reformed
in- all true-hearted believers into one fold and under one Shepherd.
of the
lie had power and consideration enough to interest many
he was actively
in this scheme
of
minds
and
Europe
great
princes
in negotiations for the purpose, all his skill as a diplom
;

employed

he corresponded with the great

being brought into play
and at one time, seems
Catholic bishop, Bossuet, on the subject
the pride, the obsti
But
success.
of
to have had

atist

hopes
actually
of men
nacy, the selfishness, and the ignorance
Another proof of the unequalled presumption, as well as the
of Leibnitz, was his scheme of a universal and
marvellous
!

real

genius
that is, of a writing which should express all
character;
but of natural
by a series, not merely of conventional,

thought

the utmost brevity and precision, and equally in

symbols, having
Clnto men of all nations and tongues under heaven.
telligible
in
denied
be
it
cannot
that,
a
scheme
such
merical as
appear,

may

and
the Arabic numerals and the symbolic notation of Algebra
in some
and
of
that
which
to
Chemistry,
the Infinitesimal Calculus,
has recently been added, we have approximations
degree of Logic,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

to such a
character, carried out on a small
scale, indeed
mainly
limited to the relation, of
quantity, but of marvellous power in aband
breviatmg
facilitating the most abstruse
processes of thought
well as the communication of it
to
.

others.
In fact, could Leib
he might well
say of these very improve
ments in the
language of Chemistry and Logic, the vast
importance
wllich
the adepts in tlu.se two
sciences can
-oJy
thoroughly ap
tz

now

revisit the earth,

i us

preciate,
r

of

the
action
means of

from

its

is

my

my

scheme; so far as

solving
solution
and

it,

it

has

gone, it is ilu/ve y
gave out the problem, I indicated
and the
advantages which would follow

endeavor.

only the multifarious occupations of

my busy
prevent,, me from
accomplishing more in this direction, by
unassisted efforts, than all the
savans of Europe have done
;

We
my

ueontnryandahalf,,
011

one

odier

,ab ,.(

lustration

of

A.

it

w^

by

the project

fobbed

the

philological attainments, the

Phi osophical genius and the Titanic aims of the
man who could
thus strive to unite all the nations
of the earth in the bonds of ,
common religious faith and a universal
If the
language.
person
ever lived who could have
remedied the
at Babel furcatastrophe
ished a common method for all
the sciences, and blotted ou t
all
differences
among the churches, that man was Leibnitz. It
should be mentioned that he wrote
equally well in three
addition to large attainments in
many others, and that the Con
trivance ot an admirable notation
for the Infinitesimal
Calculus
far superior to that of Sir
Isaac Newton, and now
universally
even
adopted
by the English, was exclusively his work
Monadology of Leibnitz, which includes most of what is

lances

al

Peculiar in his system of

philosophy, is. in the main, a
deduction from his doctrine of
Innate Ideas, and from his three
fundamental axioms, the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, the S-une"

*"!

Indiscernibles and the

Law

of

Continuity.
Indeed, these
properly be considered as one, since it can be
easily
that
the
vn,
second and thinl are
necessary corollaries from the
Ihe full enouncement of this
single axiom is, that no phe
nomenon can exist or take
place, and no judgment be valid, vJithSufficient Reason
why it is so rather than otherwise. Then
the Law of
Continuity necessarily follows, since there is no SufliMen t Reason
why a series should be broken at one point rather than
3ther, or why two places should be
filled, while the intermediate
s vacant.
We are also compelled to admit the
remaining axthat there are not in the
universe two
perfectly similar- that
is, absolutely indiscernible
beings or objects; if there were, God

hree

may

>m

LEIBNITZ.

Reason in assigning them to different places and

must be done if they are numerically distinct, since two
same place at the same time. Hence we
things cannot occupy the
or
are justified in assuming that nature does nothing per saltuin,
all events, all objects, proceed from in
but
transitions
by abrupt
finitesimal germs, develop by successive and extremely minute steps,
and pass in^o each other by imperceptible gradations the process
the counter principle, of the Samebeing all the while checked by
no two
so
ness of Indiscernibles,
that, however near each other,
are ever absolutely indistinguishable, for then they would coalesce,
and become one and the same thing. In the whole realm of nature
there cannot be found two portions of matter, two minds, two
and similar. No
events, two anythings, that are perfectly equal
characters in
two
or
faces
no
two
the
same
tree,
of
two leaves
however vast a multitude of persons, no two roses on one stalk, no
troukl act without

times, as

two drops of water, ever are perfect counterparts of each other.

the a priori
is a fact of experience, which confirms and justifies

This

God
dent
to

it

experience

History

principle.

puts his individual

never exactly repeats

itself.

inci
particular thing and
and shades into that which is nearest

mark upon each

and yet each one slides

without shock or leap, but with a delicacy surpassing the nicest

discrimination.

Here
culus,

once is the germinal principle of the Infinitesimal Cal

either that which put Leibnitz upon the track of this grand

at

he deduced or
perhaps more probable, which
was per
contrivance
mathematical
the
generalized from it, after
The infinitesimal element of every curve may be regarded
fected.
invention, or, what

is

line, into which it passes by imperceptible

not straight, for if it were, integrating it
gradations
would not reproduce the curve, but would generate a straight line.
In like manner, a body never passes from rest to motion, or from
motion to rest, except by imperceptibly fine degrees, though an
Even
infinitude of these may take place in a moment of time.
when a bullet is propelled by the explosion of gunpowder, the ve
to the maximum by uniform increase.
locity rises from the minimum
I believe is now universally ad
what
Leibnitz, indeed, maintains,
and he is
that there is no absolute rest in the universe

without error as a straight

;

and yet

it is

mitted,
also the author of

what has been claimed as a very recent discovery

\n science, the conservation of the same amount of force forever,
none ever being properly generated, and none really destroyed.
A
is to body.
Thought is to the soul," he says, what motion
BOU! absolutely without thought, and a body absolutely without
"

"

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

112

motion, appear to me equally contrary to nature and without ex

This follows, indeed, from his Law of Con
ample in the world."

from one to the other would be a positive

shock of entire change from one thing to its opposite or
"A substance
once in action," he argues, -will be
contradictory.
always in action for all impressions on it, or impulses of it, con
tinue, and are only mingled with new ones, as in the parallelogram
tinuity

as the transition

saltus, or

Bv striking a body, we excite in it an infinity of little

for in fact, every solid has a degree of
whirlpools, as in a liquid
and
every liquid a degree of solidity, and these internal
liquidity,

of forces.

whirlings can never be entirely stopped. I should prefer the word

firmness, or still better, consistency or cohesion, to hardness; all
bodies have some degree of cii/n sioti, as we see from the drops of

water or mercury as they also have some degree oi fluidity. Thus,

wax is always somewhat soft, even before heat has reduced it to a
fluid.
Thus, in my opinion, the atoms of Epicurus, the hardness of
which is supposed to be invincible, cannot exist, any more than the
;

perfectly fluid, of

subtle matter,

Descartes."

only the modern chemical doctrine of molecular action,

and that heat is merely a form of motion.
Body is never without
some heat, as none is ever found at an absolute xero of tempera
All this

Then

ture.
this

is

the

is

there

motion

is

in

always some molecular action within it, and

an infinity of little whirlpools, which was

We are not so much struck here, I think,

conceived by Leibnitz.
with the anticipation of some of the must renowned scientific dis
own day, though this is sufficiently remarkable, as
are with the fact, that these doctrines are now claimed as the
of experimentation
legitimate results of the Baconian method,
coveries of our

we

and the logic of induction whereas they were anticipated by Leib

nitz through rigorous deduction from his three a priori axioms,
and therefore they appear, in his view of them, not as isolated
;

contributions to a loose aggregate of scientific facts, but as articu

lated and intertwined with each other, and as necessary component
They are not generalized from
parts of one system of philosophy.

experience, but demonstrated by reasoning from abstract principles,

theorems of geometry.
is no body without movement, argues Leibnitz, so there
The doctrine of a plenum, or the
can be no space without body.
denial of the possibility of a perfect vacuum, is another consequence
Were there an absolutely void space,
of the Leibuitziau axioms.
like the

As

there

there would be a saltus, a shock of transition, from this to pure

body or corporeity, which is impossible. This mode of reasoning

113

LEIBNITZ.

is carried further, to a denial of the objective existence both of

Both are only relations, and
time and space as separate entities.
as such, are mere conceptions of the mind, which have nothing an
This is a
swering to them externally, or apart from the intellect.

very close approximation to the doctrine which Kant long after

wards made so famous.
Time and space are necessities of the in
tellect, or forms of sense necessary for bringing about an intelli
Space, says Leibnitz, is the
gible conception of existing things.
relation of coexistent things to each other, just as time is the rela
tion

of

successive existences.

existences contained in them.

power and wisdom of

in

sin-cession

for if

They are nothing apart from

The universe is infinite, as are

the
the

infinite both in extension and

Creator,
were limited and finite, there would be no

its
it

Keason why it should be //ere rather than there, or now

rather than at any preceding or subsequent moment.
There may
and
be development and change,
towards
from,
passages
through,
infinitely varied forms of being; but there can be no saltus, no
leap, such as would be creation or annihilation at any one time.
The soul is necessarily immortal. Again, were there a void space
or a void time, two equal contiguous portions of either would be
periectlv similar to each other, and there would be nothing whereby
the first could be distinguished from the second; and this, by the
Sufficient

law

oi!

To

the Identity of Indiscernibles, is impossible.

diminish the quantity of matter in the universe,

suppose

it

less

than

infinite,

would be

of objects

upon which God might exercise

would be

to

to

that

is,

to

diminish the number

his goodness; and this

There is no
derogate from the perfection of his act.
reason
for
if we
the
of
matter
and
sup
possible
limiting
quantity
pose the limitation of it to be arbitrary, we affirm that God could
act without a reason, which would be inconsistent with his infinite
In like manner, if active force were lost or dissipated in
wisdom.
;

of the universe, through the physical laws which God has

established there, then a new act would be necessary to restore
this force, just as a workman must make a fresh effort to remedy

any part

the imperfection, or the wear and tear, of his machine

and this
would be a disorder or defect, in relation not only to us as human
;

beings, but to

God

But we

himself.

are not justified in imputing

When
^ny imperfection to the author and finisher of all things.
I say," continues Leibnitz,
that God has opposed to such disor
ders sufficient remedies taken beforehand, I do not mean that he
"

Buffered the disorders to

8

come

first,

and then applied the remedies

114
but

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

my

doctrine

is,

occurrence of the

that

he found means beforehand

to

prevent the

disorders."

The purpo. ? of Leibnitz in the

Monadology is to ascertain the
existence, and determine the nature, of the first or
simplest ele
ments of substance, the primal units of
being, into which all things
may be resolved. There must be such units, he argues, as other
wise there could be no
compound or aggregate, since the very idea
of a compound is that it consists
an
of what is
of"

aggregation

These primary elements of

being, which in themselves are
absolutely simple and indivisible, he calls Monads.
are
simple.

They

metaphysical units, or the units both of matter and mind, both of

organic and inorganic substance.
They are not only the seeds or
germs of all things, but they constitute all things, as all
composite
being is made up of them, and can be resolved into them.
Life is
inherent in them, since, in the
ordinary course of nature, they
never really begin or cease to be.
Originating only in the primi
tive act of creation, and
incapable of dissolution because they do
not consist of parts,
they cannot perish except
annihilation.

by

Though

the action of all of

them

harmonious, each conspiring,

so to speak, with all the
others, so as to keep up not only the in
dividual harmony of each
separate living organism that is constitu
ted by them, but also the
general harmony of the universe, yet no
one Monad ever directly acts
upon another, so as to produce any
is

change in it, or in any way to affect its mode of existence.

Each
is an
independent creation, the whole series of its modes and acts
throughout its history being determined solely from within,
being
only the development of those inherent energies and
propensitiel
witli which God endowed it at the moment of
its emanation from
him.
Each would run through its whole
appointed cycle of acts
and developments,
precisely as it now does, though it were alone
in the universe.
Innate force, incessant
activity, is its essence, its
nature; it always acts, it is never acted upon.
It is never passive.
One Monad cannot act on any other
by impact,

argues Leibnitz,
because being absolutely indivisible, no such
transposition or altered
relation of parts can take
place within it as is possible in a com
No change, then, can be produced in its external
posite body.
state ; and as
has no windows,"
perfectly simple,
through which
any foreign agency could enter or go out, so as to affect Its inter
nal condition.
No two Monads are perfectly alike, this
being for
bidden by the Law of Indiscernibles ; the
only difference between
them consists in the greater or less
development of their internal
"it

and innate energies.

Inorganic nature

is an.

aggregate of undevel-

115

LEIBNITZ.

is a dreaming Monad ;
These are not distinguish
the difference between them, im

an animal s
oped or sleeping Monads
man is a Monad that has been waked up.
;

able in kind, but only in degree

life

the widely separated stages of

appears, consists only in
have
which
respectively attained.
they
development
The doctrine of Preestablished Harmony is pithily expressed
acts as if there was no
by Leibnitz, \vhen he says, -every body
soul acts as if there was no body, and yet both act
soul, and

mense

as

it

every
And in like manner,
each was influenced by the other."
with every other part, though
harmonizes
universe
of
the
every part
The doc
mutual dependence or interaction.
without the
as

if

.slightest

trine of a -plenum leads us to conceive each Monad as standing in

definite relations to every other Monad, and hence that every change,

wherever produced,

is

propagated through the whole mass, though

in a ratio diminishing with

the distance.

Each Monad,

then,

un

dergoes some corresponding change, and thus each becomes a

microcosm reflecting the macrocosm, or a perfect mirror of the
The same conclusion follows from the doctrine, that the
universe.
boundless knowledge which may be developed in the highest state
of being, and which, as such, includes a comprehension of all things
in their relations to each other, is all really innate in every Monad,
Creation, in fact,
even in its lowest and most rudimental stage.
consisted in first establishing, once for all, the laws of this perfect

The drama of the universe was entirely ar

unity and harmony.
all the parts were assigned, and every incident, thought, and
ranged,
motion foreseen and provided for, when that universe was first
called into being
otherwise, the prescience and omnipotence which
;

Creator would be words without meaning.

we have seen, the universe is made
which
have
and
of
matter
mind,
nothing in common, the essence
up
of the former consisting in extension, and of the latter in thought.
Between these two there is an unfathomable abyss, which can be

we

attribute to

According

its

to Descartes, as

over only by the incessant action of God, as in Maledoctrine of Occasional Causes, since otherwise there
branche
would be no possible communication between them. But accordinf to the Law of Continuity, argues Leibnitz, there cannot be
bridged

such a gulf, or saltus, between unthinking Matter and unextended

Moreover, as extension is only limited space, the unity
Thought.
of
and
space lead directly to the doctrine of One infinite sub
infinity

stance,

whose immanent action produces the world

of

phenomena

pantheism of Spinoza, who takes away the necessity

of a bridge by maintaining that thought and extension are both

that

is,

to the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

116

We

attributes of one Substance.

must begin, then, says Leibnitz,

by reforming the Cartesian notion

of

Substance.

It is

not true

the attributes of matter can be derived from motion and

The latter, indeterminate in itself, receives figure or
extension.

that

all

shape onlv from motion

not

lie

and space

from mere extension, \vhich

have, either in

itself,

being immovable, can

There must be something, apart

can be moved, and also which can

of motion.

the principle
itself

or

iies nles extrusion, then,

al)

extra, a cause or principle of motion,

Substance must contain force

an active

an indwelling cau-e, not susceptible

corruption or exa true vital force, with which God
haustion. but enduring forever.
endowed it at creation. According to Leibnitz, the essence of
()

j)

\ver

>!

corporeal substance

is

ever-during Force.

Thus only can we ex

and many other phenomena of corporeal substance.

plain
To Descartes, the universe is a mere geometrical conception, and
inertia,

he reasons about
it

it

Leibnitz regards
like a pure mathematician.
The
it to a
purely dynamical system.

as a physicist, reducing

Force with which he endows it is a power not only to move, but to

In both cases, the Force may be concealed, but it always

think.

exists, as

or a bent

we see in the case of a taut cord stretched by a weight,

bow; or even in the cases of impenetrability and gravity.

It is not a Force which needs an impulse from without before it

can come into activity: but its action is self-produced and continu
Matter has
ous, a restless vital energy, which is never spent.
which will
always a tendency to motion, repulsion, or attraction,
In like manner,
manifest itself when obstacles are withdrawn.

according to Leibnitz,

it

has

susceptibility, or

rather an original

stock, of sensations, perceptions, and appetitions, which exist, how

ever, onlv in a confused and latent state, and never rise to con

sciousness, except in advanced stages of corporeal existence.

the knowledge which the soul ever obtains was innate in it

the

heuiimiii"

word imports,

All

from

and education, as the etymological meaning of the

is

not putting information into the mind, but only

This mental evolution is constantly

dntiriiKj nut its latent stores.
the <!/>petitions,as Leibnitz calls them, are the primitive
goini; on
desires and inclinations, which are the springs of our mental activity,
;

hur
keeping up the series of our intellectual states by constantly
another.
or
to
one
from
the
mind
Many
thought
perception
rying
familiar facts evince the presence and the action of a multitude of
these unconscious
Thus, when at some distance from
perceptions.

we hear only one uniform murmur

or roar from the

but cannot distinguish the sound
dashing of the sea upoii the rocks,

the shore,

117

LEIBNITZ.

made by any one wave.

Yet this general effect could not be pro

each
did not contribute to it its own por
wave
duced,
particular
tion of sound.
Thus, also, a forest at a distance appears only as
an indistinct mass of green, to which each leaf, however, though
if

separately invisible, must impart its own share of color.

may even say," Leibnitz argues further, that it is through
these minute latent perceptions, that the present is big with the
"

We

future and loaded witli the past

that all things conspire together
and that in the smallest substances, eyes as
avfjiTTvoLa -n-tiira
;

piercing as those of
the universe,
Qua;

God might

sint,

read the whole series of events in

quie fuerint, quae

These unconscious perceptions

mox ventura

also

mark

trahaiitur.

and. constitute

the indi

viduality of each person, through the traces which they preserve

and they
of his former states as connected with his present being
;

might be observed by a superior intelligence, even when the man

himself had no express remembrance of them."
The will of God needs not to be incessantly applied, as it were

by a continual miracle, to produce all the movements of matter,

and all the communication between soul and body, these two re
maining eternally inefficient and incapable of affecting each other.
Such a theory degrades the Deity into an unskilful workman, who
must be constantly remedying the deficiencies of his work,
push
ing the hands of his clock, in order to make it go and mark true
a God of occa
This would be a mere deus ex machina,
time.
sional interference, compelled to act on all emergencies, even the
In the view of Leibnitz, ours is a mechanical universe,
up, once for all, at the creation, and manifesting the per
fections of its author by never afterwards needing his intervention
slightest.

wound

or aid, in order to do perfectly its destined work.

This, according
to him, does not contradict the doctrine of the eternal oversight
and kind Providence of God since all occasions were foreseen,
and all emergencies provided for, in the plan of creation at the
;

a
What appears to us as supernatural intervention,
outset.
revelation, for instance, or an answer to prayer, the fall of Adam,
and the subsequent redemption of the world by Jesus Christ,

were preordained and first constituted in the immutable counsels

of God, when he called the universe into being.
In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth, not
merely in the state in which they first appeared, but in their whole
But it will be objected, then, says Leibnitz,
subsequent history.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

118

that
our prayers and vows, our merits or demerits, our good or
bad actions, are of no avail, since nothing can be changed.
This
objection is most embarrassing to the vulgar, and yet it is a pure
The prayers and vows which are now uttered, the good
sophism.
or bad actions which are done to-day, were already before God
when he resolved to create; this particular world. All that now
happens was represented in the idea of the world, when as yet it
"

was only a possible universe; every action appeared there as

drawing upon it-elf its legitimate consequences of reward or pun
ishment, through the ordinary or special grace of God
and all
;

actually carried out in the world as it now exists."

This, indeed, is the distinctive feature of the philosophy of

this

is

it
completely harmoni/es the mechanical with tho
the universe.
view
of
What is called the uniformity
teleological
of physical law i.s never broken, yet everv event conforms to the
purposes of the moral government of God, as it was intended to
do from tin: beginning.

Leibnilx, that

All created substances, according to Descartes, are passive; all,

according to Leibnitz, are active, and their activity even constitutes
their es.-ence.

namism

The proper

.Mattel-

is

force,

designation
is

activity,

of
is

his

philosophy

(tcfn.l/ fy.

is

Dy

That which

does not act, he says, does not merit the name of substance.
To
alii na that God cannot extend or
prolong his action beyond tho
present moment, so that the elfect can be continued only by con
stant repetition of the cause, is to deny the efficacy of the Divine
uill. and even to misconceive the nature of force, which, once con

must be permanent.
The Deity conferred upon his crea
from the first a certain measure of efficiency, which is the

stituted,

tures

ultimate principle of all the various phenomena that they produce.

The force with which they are endowed, as we have said, is not a

simple potentiality, which would need excitement from abroad be

fore it could be brought into play
but it is a true entelechia,
or active force, involving effort, and having in itself all that is
;

necessary

in

order to produce action.

To

get rid of the difficulty of explaining the reciprocal action of

matter and mind, that stumbling-block of all systems of meta

physics .Monads are conceived to be a sort of intermediate existences

between pure hard atoms, which, as elements of Matter, are in
capable of thought, and pure ideas, which, as products of thought,
have no reality outside of the mind which conceives them. As a
real existence manifested to sense, Matter is
always a complex or
aggregate, consisting of

many

simple indivisible elements

other-

119

LEIBNITZ.

would be a plurality
a contradiction.
is
which
units,
mathematical points; for as such
of them, any more
multiplication
wise,

there

or multitude not consisting of

units cannot

These

mere

be

no magnitude, no
points have
than of zeros, could make up a
Then the elements or primary con
visible or tangible extension.
are, not mathe
in
fact, of all existence,
stituents of matter,
not hard
matical points, as the geometer would have it,
atoms,_as
to the chemist,
the physicists would say, not molecules, according
doctrine of a plenum
but Monads, infinite in number, because the
is
makes them fill the universe. What we call a particular body
with
and
or
order,
lower
a
of
Monads
higher
an ao-grecrate of these
more or less unity to
or without a governing Monad, which gives
is an aggregate of
This
?
stone
Is it a mere
such an aggregate.
no other force than what
low

order, manifesting
Monads of a very
and impenetrability for though vir
appears in cohesion, gravity,
sensation and thought, this is only
of
the force
;

tually possessing
latent,

and never

rises to consciousness.

Is

it

lump

of iron ore

has malleability, ductil

Then, besides the forces just mentioned,
Go a little higher
etc.
force,
ity, imperfect elasticity, magnetic

it

is"

it

a crystal?

element, there

Then, besides the above mentioned powers

is

a governing
its

Monad

in each

to the mass,
giving unity
in one pecul

elements to come together only

through allowing
Of course, since no one
iar shape with definite sides and angles.
to govern the others
said
it
is
on
acts
another,
Monad ever really
as if they
all the parts act together harmoniously,
because
only
it has
Then
?
it
a
Is
plant
were directed by one central power.

what the botanist would

which vivifies and
call Its specific vegetable life and character,
its
determines
and
shape and
peculiar
animates the whole organism,
Go higher still is it an animal? Then, locomotive
functions.
named forces, and sensations and
energy is added to the previously
Is
before latent, are developed and become manifest.

one o-overning Monad of a higher order,

perceptions,
it

in

the governing Monad is the human soul,

which
and
which sensation
thought rise to full consciousness,

man

himself?

Then

of
has not only perception of outer things, but apperception

and a cognition of moral law and responsibility.

Further

itself,

still:

transition anywhere, re
Continuity, forbidding sharp
still higher governing
of
in an infinite series
quires us to believe
and archangels, a celestial hierarchy ris

the

Law

of

Monads,

spirits, angels,

And of God, we
the throne of God himself.
ing up even to
one
the
is
he
governing and creating
must think reverently that
himself infinite power
alone
the
of
combining
universe,
Monad

perfection,

and goodness.

120

We

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
can

now understand

whence Pope obtained his conception

of a scale of existences, acting
together in the best possible order,
and thus constituting the universe which Infinite Wisdom and
Goodness originated and governs.
"

See through this

air, this ocean, and this earth.

and bursting into birth.
All matter
Above, how hi^li progressive life may u o
how deep extend below!
Around, how wide.
Vast chain of licin^. which from (iod began,
Xatures ethereal, Iniinan. anu e!, man,
liird, tish. insect, what no eye can see,
No t;la.ss can reach; from Infinite to thee,
<|iiick

l>ea-t,

From thee to nothing.

)n superior powers
Were we to press, inferior miirht on ouis;
Or in the full riv.it
leave a void,
(

i<>n

"Where,

one step broken, the

i;reat

*ealu

destroyed,

rom nature s chain whatever link you strike,

Tenth or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike."
l-

1 quote Leibnitz s own language, to .-how how

precisely he an
ticipated the speculative thrones \\hich arc now absorbing the

attention of our botanists and zoologists.

-All beings," he says,
"form but a
single chain, in which the different species, like so
into and are fastened to each other, that it is
many rings, so
pa<s

sen.-es, or even for the imagination, to fix pre

the
where
All the classes
cisely
point
any one begins or ends.
which border on each other, or which occupy, so to speak, the
points of divergence or alteration, must be equivocal, nnd have at

impossible for the

tributes which

can

be referred equally well to either of the two

Thus the existence of Zoophytes, or I lantneighboring species.

animals, is nothing monstrous or unnatural, but is strictly conformed
to the whole existing order of nature.
And such, in my opinion,
the force of the Law of Continuity, that not onlv I should not
be astonished to learn of the discovery of animate beings which, in
for example, those of nutrition and prop
many of their properties.
is

agation,
might pass for vegetables just as well as for animals,
but I am even convinced that there inu-t be such, and that natural

bolder
history will, at some future day, point them out to us."
prophecy, or one more exactly veritied, after the lapse of more
than a century, it would be difficult to find in all the annuls of
science.

According to this theory, what we call death is the mere disso

lution or resolution of a corporate body into its elementary Monads,
these last being essentially indestructible, and subsequently uniting
themselves, with larger and more fully developed powers and ca
pacities, into

new compounds,

therein to pass through higher stages

121

LEIBNITZ.

is a law of the
Thus, progress, as well as continuity,
it had risen
before
of
Monad
man,
Thus the governing
universe.
self-consciousness, had passed
to its present state of apperception or
of being.
Originally
through a long series of connected stages
it was one of the constituent,
of the dust of the

of existence.

formed

ground,"

mere inorganic substance, before God "breathed into,

man became a living soul." The
his nostrils the breath of life, and
brief
of Genesis, of the order of creation,
book
the
in
history, given
it
which
conditions
through
of the intermediate
ly indicates some
but
animal
in
rising
then
life,
always
and
in
vegetable
passed, first
And alter its separation from the present body, it will
in the scale.

Monads

of

into other
higher energies and aspirations, successively
it dim memories and adumbra
with
along
corporeal forms, carrying
of what it had learned in previ
ideas now innate

pass, with

tionsthat

is,

to play a higher part, to

ous earthly homes. It will thus be enabled
on the great thea
exercise a more stirring and ennobling influence,
to a higher stage,
mount
to
it
is
and then, again,
tre of humanity
to ascend gradually through
or
archangel,
as
and
pure spirit, angel
but never attains, the per
the infinite, scale which points towards,
incessant thought, is
Incessant
activity,
the
fections of
Almighty.
even to the highest
round
a necessity of its being, from the lowest
are
dim,
vague, and unconscious,
The perceptions, the thoughts,
but they gradually
Monads
lower
the
in
were
not,
if
as
are
they
and adequate, and
eliminate obstructions, become clear, distinct,
in swoons, in death, the
In
celestial
sleep,
soar into
cognitions.
and may even be
succession of thought is never entirely broken,
as the outward scene
and
more
intense,
rapid
come more crowded,
are sev
and the connections with lower forms of existence
;

shifts,

ered/

Memory

is

an
a sensitive plate, which never entirely loses
but
it
myriads of these be

made upon

impression

outre

come

while too

are

for

still

dim

though

be

to consciousness, yet they

the
there, iueffaceably engraved,
germs of our subsequent
:i

to

visible

distinct cognitions.

of metempsychosis
Lcihnii/ repudiates, however, the doctrine
His theory, he says, is that of metamorof souls.
transmigration
as exemplified in the transmutation of the
pho-is and development,
For as all bodies, he argues, are in a state
butter.
ly.
grub into the
and
of perpetual flux, like a river, particles continually entering
and
little
little,
its
by
soul changes
body only
leaving them, so the
is

never deprived altogether of

nation of

its

perceptible

this
grosser parts,
sense, just as it

to

embodiment; though by elimi

im
may become so small as to be
was before birth. There are no

its

122

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

from a body.
God alone is absolutely de
but development and accretion from
preexisting germs, and death is only involution into forms which
have become exceedingly minute. As there was
undoubtedly preformation in the germ even before conception, there was also an
embodied soul lodged in it, and waiting to be evolved. In a word,
the animal itself was there already, and by
conception was only
souls wholly separated

tached.

What we

made ready

to be

call birth is

transformed into a creature of a higher type.

Law of Continuity, to a considerable

degree, anticipated, of all persons in the world, by homely John
It is a hard matter to
Locke, who writes:
say where sensible and
rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end
and who
It

is

curious to iiud the

"

there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the

lowest species of living things, and which is the first of those which,
is

have no life ? Things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment

as the quantity does in a regular cone, where, though there be a
manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameters at a remote dis

between the upper and under, where they

Those who are curious
"The
Spectator," where
will be found a further citation from Locke, and the whole subject
adorned and illustrated by the line genius and earnest Christian
tance, yet the difference

touch one another, is hardly discernible."

may be referred to the ol Jth number of

Addison.

faith of

What Lcibniu and

others confidently prophesied, though they

had no lamp to guide their steps save their a priori anticipations
of what must be the course of nature as evolved by an all-wise
Providence, has been amply verified by the researches of modern
science.
"One word,"
says Mr. W. R. Grove, in his Address to
the British Association in 18GG, "one
what I am about to discourse on

new word, and used

word

will

give you the key

word

is
continuity, no
no new sense, but perhaps applied more

to

in

that

it has hitherto been."

The more we investigate,"
he says, "the more we find that, in existing phenomena, graduation
from the like to the seemingly uidike prevails, and in the changes
which take place in time, gradual progress is, and apparently must
And he proceeds to apply this view to
be, the course of nature."

generally than

more prominent branches of science,

to
astronomy, geology, biology, the origin and nature of species, the
the recent progress of the

history and social institutions of man, finding everywhere proofs

that recently discovered intermediate links fill up or bridge over
what once appeared to be breaks and chasms, thus satisfying us
that

continuity

tion of

Almighty

is

a law of nature, the true expression, of the ac

Power."

123

LEIBNITZ.

Applying

this

of Continuity to animate nature, Leibnitz

or nat
organism is a sort of divine machine,

Law

says: "Every living

ural automaton, infinitely superior to any engine of man s device.
For a machine made by human art is not a machine in each of its
of a ratchet-wheel, for instance, has
parts; a fragment of the tooth
which indicates its relation to the
in it

nothing artificial, nothing

was contrived. But nature s
purpose for which the whole machine
even to their
machines, i. e. living organisms, are machines down
be conceived
matter
of
infinitesimal
may
Every portion
More
as a garden full of plants and as a pool stocked with fish.
ani
of
these
one
of
a
plant, every part
over, every branch of such
in its body, is again
the
of
and
circulating
mals,
liquids
every drop
Thus there is nothing crude,
such a garden and such a pool."
chaos or confusion, though
no
in
the
dead
or
universe,
sterile,
as in a pool, if viewed from a
be what seems such
there
"

parts.""

"

just
may
and stir produced
distance, one may see a confused movement
Thus
the fish, though he cannot discern the fishes themselves."
;

little

"

by

a dominant
it appears, not only that every living organism has
each of its
that
also
but
that
soul
of
is
the
which
Monad
animal,
limbs and parts is full of other living things, plants and animals,
Monad."
every one of which, again, has its entelechia or dominant
When these doctrines were first published, nearly two hundred
o. they must have been regarded as the wild speculations
) -ars ai.
f

for the microscope was then in its infancy,

theorist
Bat as
and the science of histology had not yet come into being.
latest
the
of
now read, we find in them an astonishing anticipation
The
discoveries and theories of the biologists of our own day.
of Mr. Charles Darwin, and the
physiological
"cell-gemmules"
of Mr. Herbert Spencer, so minute as to be descried only
units
the highest powers
the
eye of theory, for they are far beyond
by

of a fanciful

"

improved microscopes, are only the modern representatives

Monads. They are now held up as the most
advanced results of inductive science, or, if you will, as the supposed
towards which the sciences depending on observation
limits or
of our
of

.he Leibnit/ian

goals,

and analysis are tending and preparing the way. But to the eagledeductions from the
eyed thought of Leibnitz, they were necessary
first propounded by him as dominating the universe of
axiom,
single
Reason.
existing things, the Principle of Sufficient
Mr. Darwin, that the whole organ
"

"

Physiologists agree," says

ism consists of a multitude of elemental parts, which are to a great
Each organ, says Claude Ber
extent independent of each other.
nard, has

its

proper

life, its

autonomy

it

can develop and repro-

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

124
duce

independently of the adjoining

itself

The

tissues.

great

Ger

still more emphatically that each

authority, Yirchow, asserts
or osseous system, or the blood, consists of
nervous
the
as
system,
an enormous mass of minute centres of action
Every ele

man

ment has

o\vn

its

and even though

action,

special

it

derive

its

stimulus to activity from other parts, yet alone effects the actual
Admitting, then, as the result of ob
performance of its duties.
servations made through the microscope, the cells or units of the
"

go one step further," continues Mr.

body to be autonomous,
Darwin, "and assume that they throw off reproductive gemmules.
"I

Thus an animal does

sole

agency

erates

"

its

not, as a whole, generate its kind

through the
gen

of the reproductive system, but each separate cell

kind."

We

cannot fathom the marvellous complexity of

but on the hypothesis here advanced, this com

an organic being
Each living creature must be looked at
is much increased.
plexity
as a microcosm, a little universe, formed of a host of self-propa
minute and as numerous as the
gating organisms, inconceivably
;

stars in

heaven."

At what precise point, then, do Leibnitz and Darwin begin to

that while the former main
Just here
diverge from each other?
the internal
tains that all the inherent energies and propensities
;

of each
machinery, so to speak
its Creator when the univer>e was

win says:

"According

to

prodiirrd at

all

!</!

first

view, the

my

were not or
separate part

Monad were preformed

unlit/

called into being.

in it by
Mr. Dar

germs or gemmules

preformed, but

of

each

tcere continually

icif/i x<ne liiuidrd tlmcn

ages during each generation,
1
not
But
rufionx
originally preformed ?
why
yetn
"

from preceding
or through

handed

hmr

I/KHII/

down?"

"preceding

Six, or

six

generations"

millions?

have they been

What

valid

scientific

reason can be ^iven for preferring either of these numbers to the

other?
Having thus gone along with us a good way on the road
towards the
out
by Leibnitz, which tends directly upward
pointed
throne of (iod, why do you suddenly strike off from it on a by
You have
the Unknowable
to
nowhere
path which leads
the dictum of Mr. Martineau;
surely nothing
virtually accepted
can be evolved which was not first involved;" or as Sir William
Thomson, one of the highest authorities in physical science, ex
of atoms can explain no property of
presses it, "the assumption
been attributed to the atoms themnot
has
which
previously
body
"

?"

"

Darwin

Variation of Animals

and Plants under Domestication. Am.

483.
pp. 441. 482,
2

Ibid., p. 441).

The

italics are

mine.

ed., vol.

ii..

125

LEIBNITZ.

are still visible

cell-germs, though extremely minute,
distinctive
The
properties
under high powers of the microscope.
and definite aims of each of these germs, you have admitted to be

The

selves."

a fact needing explanation, and have framed this -provisional hy

ever has seen, or can
which no mortal
ii/,
of
pothesis"

</t

see, in order to

eye

nit/ex,

account for them.

and account for the equally

each uvmmule?

Hither the

not go one step farther,

character and tendencies of
are veritable Leibnitzian

Why

definite

gemmules"

Monads, or are marvellously near approximations to them. If the

of Mr.
the
physiological unit"
Panuenesis" of Mr. Darwin, or
"

"

a legitimate scientific hypothesis, so also is the Monadology of their great predecessor.

a broad range of view are striking
Catholicity of doctrine and
of Leibnitz, rendering it a fit expression
features of the

Spencer,

is

philosophy

His chief pur

man.
to be impassable,
deemed
chasms
over
to
was
formerly
bridge
pose
He
and thereby to reconcile conflicting doctrines and systems.
filled the gap made by the Cartesians between matter and mind
of the bold and comprehensive genius of the

he harmonized the mechanical theory of the universe, its govern

ment by universal and immutable laws, with the doctrine of a moral
in the minutest events; he
purpose and a special providence even
dif
recoi riled Monism with Individualism, regarding them only as
ferent aspects of the same fact, the universe on either view fitly
the unity of its Creator and the immensity of his work.
expresScience and theology, adopting the same principles, moved amicably
inn"

New

In the
Essays on
goal.
Human Understanding," perhaps in too boastful a tone, Leibnitz
thus characterizes his own philosophy.

in

his

system towards a

common

"

of Plato with
system appears to establish an alliance
with the
the
Scholastics
of
Dcmoc.ritus, of Aristotle with Descartes,
moderns, of theology and morality with reason. It appears to take
what is best from all sources, and then to advance farther than
"This

any one hud gone

before.

I find in

it

an intelligible explanation

of the union of the soul with the body, a result which I had before
I lind the true principles of things in the units of
despaired of.

substance, which this system brings into view, and in the harmony
them preestablished by the primitive substance. 1 lind
it
may be said
it a simplicity and a surprising uniformity, so that

"between

of ex
always and everywhere the same thing, some degrees
held
he
when
meant
Plato
I now see what
cellence
to be

excepted.

Matter to be an imperfect and transitory being what Aristotle

meant by his entelechia; how even Democritus, according to Pliny,
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
held out the
promise of a future life; how far the
skeptics were
right in declaiming against the senses
how animals, according to
escartes, are automata, and yet how
they have souls and ieefinaccording to the opinion of the vulgar; how we can
ex
;

plain the doctrine of those, like

Cardan, Campanella,

rationally

More

Henry
and others, who
give life and perception to all
how the laws
things
nature, many of which were unknown before this
system
pointed
them out derive their
from
;

>t

origin
higher principles than those of
although every change in matter takes place
mechanically
ally, it ls only since 1 have meditated
upon this system that I
stand how it is, that the endowment
of brute animals with
does not impair our trust in the
immortality of the soul of
an, but rather confirms and
strengthens it, by leading us to see
that all souls are
imperishable."
cr,

CHAPTER

VIII.

REALISM, NOMINALISM, AND CONCEPTUALISE.

Kant and the later German

be convenient to point out more fully than has
functions of the Understanding and
yet been done the distinctive
The Imagination, also, regarded as the faculty which
the Sense.
mediates between the Understanding and the Sense, needs to be
determine its precise boundaries
carefully considered, in order to
and the limitations of its use. Perhaps these ends can best be ob
tained indirectly, while we are reviewing at some length one of

As

a preparation for the study of

philosophy,

it

will

those old questions, the discussion of which so often recurs at dif

ferent epochs in the world s history.

One of the most remarkable controversies which have ever agi

tated the schools of speculative theology, and which also occupies a
of Philosophy, is that which was waged
large place in the history
over the abstruse, and, as many would now consider it, the fantas
tical and absurd, question between the Realists, the Nominalists,
and the Conceptualists. I do not agree with those who speak
as one curious chapter in the hislightly of it, and regard it only

That
torv of the follies and aberrations of the human intellect.
cannot be a merely frivolous or meaningless dispute, which the

man inevitably stumbles upon at every stage of its in

in abstract speculation and physical science; which is
both
quiries
debated in our own day with as keen an interest between Mill and
Hamilton, between Agassiz and Darwin, as it was, over two thou

mind

of

sand years ago, between the followers of Plato, Zeno, and Aristotle,
or in mediaeval times, between St. Bernard and Abelard, between
Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas ; which agitated alike the uni
versities,

the

Church, and

the

politics

of

Europe

which was

the pen and the bloodless weapons of diplo

macy, but with the club and the sword ; and which is now just as
far from a final settlement as ever.

waged not only with

In successive ages, it is true, the question has come up under

and theories have been formed in relation to it

different aspects,

128

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

for widely dissimilar purposes.

Yet at bottom it is always one and
the same subject, the discussion of which must affect any
theory
that we may form respecting the nature of human
It

knowledge.
terms so technical and abstruse, that it shall seem
to concern
only the subtle and profitless distinctions of an obsolete
Scholastic phibsophy; or it may be so phrased that every botanist
and zoologist, and even every chemist, of the present, time, will

may

be Mated

in

recognize it as the topic toward which his thoughts are most fre
quently turned when he is occupied with the latest and farthest

advanced

and speculations of his favorite science.

The
present undertaking will allow only a hurried glance
round the outskirts of the subject.
re.-earches

limits of the

A\ hat

is it

our attention

which
is

is

what is it towards which

about which our thoughts are oc

before the mind,

directed, and

when we use General Terms; that is, when we are either

speaking or thinking, not about this or that individual object or
event, but about whole classes of things?
It is easy enough to
cupied,

what we are thinking about, if this be some one thini;. haviii"

a definite and clearly perceived aspect to our senses.
as this
man, that tree, the one triangle delineated on the blackboard. It
is an idea or mental
picture of this one thing, either as it is now
tell

presented to sense, or represented in the imagination.

per
ception and imagination deal only with individuals, as presented or
portrayed with the distinct attributes which belong to this one, and
P>oth

to

no other

picture,

since no two individuals

perfectly resemble each other.
whether on canvas or in the
mind s eye," which is
imagination, must be of this one (say) man or horse;
perhaps
an imaginary one, Hercules or Bucephalus
but still one and not
an individual and not a class.
Now, all the objects
many
around us in nature, without exception, are individual
objects, each
and at least two
having a character and attributes of its own
great powers of the mind, as I have said, perception and imagina
tion, are concerned solely with these
But all
particular things.
the words of a
language are General Terms, the names of classes,
What are we thinking about, then, what
genera and species.
is before the mind, when we use words?
mere sounds,
Nothing but words, answers the Nominalist;
which are conventional or arbitrary signs, and which have no
meaning or significance, except as they suggest other words, or,
when we wish to be more definite, as they call up in
imagination a
picture of some one individual belonging to the class of which that
word is an arbitrary sign.
;

"

KEALISM, NOMINALISM,

Not

129

AND CONCEPTUALISM.

the word is a name for

eagerly responds the Realist
which the whole class of tilings

so,

the archetype or pattern, after

for the Idea of that class, which

which it denotes was formed;
was in the mind of God before he made the world, and which is
The word, moreover,
therefore a part of the plan of creation.
nature
and indi
inmost
its
or
the
of
the
essence
class,
signifies
;

vidual objects belong each to its own class only through partici
that Idea. An individual
pating in that common nature, or sharing
he lias the characteristic
is
John or William
man," because
"

because he partakes of the human

and essential attribute of man,
his
whole
to
class, which makes man to be man,
ity which belongs
and uhich, therefore, must have been in the mind of the Creator
when he formed men as a class or genus entirely distinct from all
virtue," or
In like manner,
other creatures which he has made.
one individual action,
holiness," is neither a proper name of some
nor a mere abstract name, flatus rods, articulate sound without
"

to the whole class of virtuous or holy

by participating in which any act becomes holy.
The distinction be
it is a, reality.
is not a mere name
Virtue
is
not merely nominal, but real.
tween "virtue" and
When Scripture commands you to u do justly, love mercy, and
walk humbly with thy God," it does not utter mere words, but en
and real, something which God approved
joins something positive
from all eternity, before any act was done whereby this command

sense

but

actions,

and

common

it

is

is

that

"

"

"vice"

was executed.
distinctions

that

(<:

n era

To deny

this

is

to

deny that there are any

and things

different classes of actions

between
and species are really constituted

in

essential
;

to

deny

the nature of

more than fabrications for man s conven

names being applied, not indeed at random, but yet
common consent, and so
arbitrarily and by convention, through
convenience
when
liable to be changed
may require. Real
greater
ism asserts that there was a plan of creation, and that there is a
thinu s, or are anything

ience;.

their

moral law and a natural law, according to which individual things

are divided into real classes, and set over against each
and
other by inherent and essential distinctions, so that these are good
and those evil, these are men and those brutes, this is life and
With this view of the matter, I think we can un
that is death.
derstand how Realism came to be a substantive and earnest belief,
:>cts

and men became fanatics

to be infidels and atheists.

Then come
"

Realist,

you

in support of

it,

judging their opponents

Nominalist and
lies about

the Conceptualists, and say

are both wrong, and the truth, as usual,
to

130

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

halfway between the two extreme opinions." Universals

abstract
are something m0 re than mere
general ideas
words, and some
thing less than real substantive entities, having a distinct and independent existence.

abstract general ideas.

They are
The
question concerns the nature and powers of the human mind, and
the different classes of ideas which are
relates^to
presented to it, or
which it is able to form.
Our cognitive faculties are not limited to
the senses and the
imagination ; if they were, then indeed our
knowledge would be confined to particulars, and not only should
we be incapable of rising to Universals
to General Ideas, hut
we should not even have names for such ideas.
Words, which are
general names, could never have been invented, and we should
be incapable of
Besides the senses and
language, like the brutes.
the imagination, which take note
only of particulars, and which
dogs and cats possess equally well, sometimes better, than men, we
have intellect
the
the faculty of
Understanding proper
pure
Thought; and the special function of this faculty is to form jr en .
eral ideas.
And the process of so doing can be
easily and quickly
The oilice of the
analyzed.
Understanding is to compare partic
ulars with each other,
to discern relations

between them,
thereby
through becoming aware that one or more of
such relations exist not
only between the two particulars that were
first compared, but are common to a crowd
of
to so

and so

to generalize,

others,

many

for convenience,

we put them into a class

by
themselves.
Then we give a name to that class, which
is, of
a
course,
general name, or word; and we think the general idea,
or universal, denoted
by that word, when we think the common
relation which exists between all the members of
that class,
namely, the relation of similarity in some of their attributes.
The
particulars,

that,

between things are not

perceptible by sense, which takes
cognizance of the things alone
neither can they be pictured
by
the imagination, for
they have neither shape nor color; but they
are discerned by the intellect,
I know not how
virtue
relations

"

cannot draw

know what

"goodness"

on the blackboard.

But what

"

looks.

of that?

these words mean.

definite concept, of
their
and

I have, not a
picture, but a
mind, formed by grasping together
apprehending the relations which they bear to

them

in

my

Attributes,
certain individual acts.

After

view of their leading characteristics, we are

pre
follow understandingly the conflict of the three theories
in the
of
Of course, there are modifications
history
Philosophy.
and subdivisions of each of these schools ; there are
moderate
pared

to

this brief

REALISM, NOMINALISM,

131

AND CONCEPTUALISE.

Nominalists, and ultra Nominalists

and so of each of

tlic

other

Ilobbes, Berkeley, Dugald Stewart, and John S. Mill are

Sir \V. Hamilton is a moderate one and a mod
ultra Nominalists
Plato and the orthodox Schoolmen are Real
erate Conceptualist
Beets.

ists:

Locke, Dr. Reid, and nearly

all

German
own opinion

the

logicians arid
is in favor of

My
metaphysicians are Conceptnalists.
all three, as I hold that the Realist, the Nominalist, and the Con
some shade or aspect of the truth,
ceptualist has each caught
neither being wholly right or wholly wrong.
Among the ancients, Plato and his followers held, that, although
universal ideas are not copied from objects observed by the senses,

of the human mind, and

yet they have an existence independent
are no more to be confounded with the Understanding which thinks
them, than material things are to be confounded with the senses

The individuals which make up a species

which perceive them.
some leading element
or nemis must have something in common.
or attribute on which all their other elements and attributes de
And the mind is capable of discerning this common ele
pend.
ment, though it is unpicturable to imagination or sense, and thereby
of reasoning about the whole class as easily as about one indi
is that
"The Idea of a
vidual of that class.
thing," says Plato,
which makes one of the many which, preserving the unity and
;

own nature, runs through and mixes with things

number; and yet, however multiform it may appear, is

integrity of
infinite; in

its

He held that of every species of things there

always the same."
is the
is an Idea which has existed from all eternity, and that this
of the spe
individuals
the
to
which
or
model,
according
exemplar
This theory is summed up by the Schoolmen in
cies were made.
the phrase universalia ante ran.
The Platonic Idea has its modern representative in what our
naturalists call the Type of each species or class.
Speaking of
here, as is so
the cell of the hive-bee, Dr. Jeffries "\Vyman says,
often the case elsewhere in nature, the type-form is an ideal one,
"

And
and with this real forms seldom or never exactly coincide."
Natural groups are
Dr. Whewell remarks still more explicitly
best described not by any definition which marks their boundaries,
The type of any natural
but by a type which marks their centre.
is an example which possesses in a marked degree all the
group
"

Then
leading characters of the class."
it
fixed, though not precisely limited
;

riot

circumscribed

it

is

determined

but by a central point within,

"a

is

riot

natural group

is

steadily

given in position, though

by a boundary without,

not by what

it

strictly excludes,

132

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

but by what

eminently includes by .1 Type, not by a Definition.

us also, that Idea and Law are the same
thing seen
from opposite points.
That which contemplated
objectively, 01
as existing in the world without, we call a
Law, the same contem
Coleridge

it

tells

"

plated subjectively, or as existing only in the mind, is an Idea.

Quod in nafura ntttnrata Lex, in natura naturante Idea dicitur."
The doctrine of Aristotle and the Peripatetics generally was
expressed in a similar manner, as that of univcrsalla in re.
They

adopted the Aristotelic distinction between Material and Formal

Cause, or, more generally, between Matter and Form; as, for in
stance, between the marble and the special shape which makes
this marble to be a. statue of Hercules, or a
Dancing Faun. The
Peripatetics held that every individual object consists of Matter
special or peculiar to it, the latter
The Forms do not exist
being common to it with its whole class.

and Form, the former being

Matter can
separately, but are, so to speak, immersed in Matter.
Form, as in chaos, before the Divine Architect fash
ioned the Cosmos or universe
but as Form must be of some Mat
exist without

ter, Aristotle rejected

Still,

the

Platonic doctrine of preexistent Ideas.

these universal forms are not, as the
Conceptualists taught,

mere conceptions

of the mind, formed

through a comparison of par
are real, and the proper business of science is to
discern and compare them, thus arriving at
a
general truths.
mere acquaintance with particular objects not meriting the name of
ticulars.

They

science.

word Form always has an

which forms, and thereby acts
and
we find this meaning generally adopted ,-dso in the Novum OrA Substan
ganon," and throughout Lord Uacon s other works.
tial Form" is the inherent and
permanent principle of action which
makes any one substance, or
of substances, such as water or
iron, to be the particular substance which it is, or which imparts to
\\ ith

the

Scholastics, the

active sense.

It

means

technical

that

"

"

cla>s

it its

distinctive

modern

and essential attributes as such. Assumiii", as our

seem to do universally, the primitive atoms, which

physicists

are the ultimate elements of

each other

in

all material tilings, to be identical with

nature and essence, these atoms represent the
Mat

"

ter

"

"

Germans would call it Urstojf. Then

would be the force, or agency, which brings
such atoms, and imparts to them the distinc

of the Peripatetics; the

Substantial

Form

"

together a group of
tive properties of carbon, iron, or
hydrogen.
The Nominalists, immediately on their appearance as a sect in
the eleventh century, were involved in a
charge of heresy.
They

REALISM, NOMINALISM,

seemed

to

133

attack the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, arguing

Godhead might be spoken

the essence of the

if

that,

AND CONCEPTUALISE!.

of as

0110

three Persons would be lost.

They
charged their opponents with Sabellianism. that is, with maintain
the one.
ing that the three are merely so many different aspects of
of making
The Realists retorted by accusing them of Tritheism,
the unity merely nominal, by teaching that real oneness of sub
reality, the

distinction

of

We

need
stance was incompatible with distinction of Persons.
I have
not enter here into the particulars of such a controversy.
alluded to it only in order to explain how the discussion became so
In these modern .days, of
prominent and absorbing.
is one of mere science, the answer to it inti
mately affecting our notions of the essential character of classifica
tion, the nature and uses of language, and our power of thought
and capacity of really knowing anything more than individual ob

hot,

and

so

course, the question

and events.

jects

The Nominalists say

there

nothing universal but names

is

that

invent names for such groups or classes of things as we iind it

that a talent for reasoning consists in
convenient to put together
and hence, that Logic is entirely con
a skilful use of language
versant with language.
Ratiocination, says Ilobbes, is computa
Hence the truth
it is the addition or subtraction of names.
tion

we

and

falsity

of general propositions belong to speech, and not to

is a standard of truth or falsehood for singular

There

things.

this bit of
for I may say
propositions about individual things
but there is no such standard
iron is soft," when in fact it is hard
"

All iron is hard, as

for the universal proposition
a matter of agreement among men
conventional
"

shall be called iron, or shall be

name

is

being

many

given.

it is

merely
what things
which that

put into the class to

and naming being arbitrary, there

systems of classification, and different lan

Classification

different

guages or sets of names, the truth or falsity of general proposi

also arbitrary.
of the three systems, Realism, Nominalism, and Conceptualism, has already been said to contain some aspect or portion of

tions

is

Each

It
the truth, neither being wholly right or wholly wrong.
may
now be added, in respect to the doctrine just indicated, that Realism
Science is not mere naming;
is right and Nominalism is wrong.

truth is not mere truth of

not wholly arbitrary
that is, he
created each thing after its own kind
other by
each
from
off
them
kinds
the
or
Created
classes, marking
essential and ineffaceable distinctions.
Species and genera exist in

classification

words.

God

is

134

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

nature, whether we are able to find them there or not.

are
not able to decipher all of God s plan of creation. We often make
great mistakes in endeavoring to conform our systems of classifica

We

tion

to

nature

successful,

And even when this endeavor

systems.
be often puzzled to tell where the

we may

is

most

boundary

is

placed, where one species ends and another begins.

Plant-animals,
as Leibnitz calls them,
sponges, for instance,
may be plants or
animals, we don t know which.
But the typical plant is
radically,

from the typical animal, the difference between

them being established by God and nature. In like manner, man
is man. and not a brute, the two kinds
being created distinct. Per
essentially, different

haps it* is a mystical use of language to say, as the Realists did,

that all the individuals in
any one class share or participate in one

common nature; for what is numerically one and indivisible cannot

be shared by many.
But interpret such language with a reason
able allowance for metaphor, and it
a reat
expresses
truth.

On

this

point, 1

hold with

Aga>siz,

fairly enough
and not with Darwin.

And when we pass out of physics and natural history, this one
aspect of truth, which Realism has seized, seems to me to be at
once more evident and more vital. -Justice,
veracity, purity, benev
olence, are something more than mere names.
Actions are not
arbitrarily classified,

when they

are put under these heads or their

Here, surely, God s law and the law of our own con
opposites.
sciences have created real and essential
distinctions, which we can

not overlook.

And
inali.-m.

yet there is a large share of truth in the doctrine of XomWe often use words as substitutes for thoughts such a
;

mental process is frequent, legitimate, and

We rea
highly useful.
son, going through long processes of
argumentation, by the use only
of words or other mere symbols, or
in
by means of one
particular
consider as representative of the
rest
and in considering this specimen, we confine our attention to
those attributes which it has in common with the class, leavin"- out

dividual of the class, which

we

view what is peculiar to it as an individual.

In Geometry, we
reason in the latter fashion, making the one
triangle or circle drawn
on paper or the blackboard, or in the mind s
eye, a representative
ol all possible circles and
In Algebra, we employ the
triangles.
of

former process, and conduct very long and intricate trains of rea
soning by mere letters and other symbols,
strange hieroglyphics
and never once think of the
they are to the uninitiated eye,
meaning or interpretation of one of these symbols, till we reach the
final formula that
To
what I
expresses the desired result.
repeat

13o

REALISM, NOMINALISM, AND CONCKPTUALISM.

ourselves, by spreading
have said elsewhere: Having once satisfied
combined in any con
are
which
attributes
the
all
out in thought
once culled up in
still more careful, by having
r, to be
cept
all these
individual
one
some
possessing
of
imagination a

picture

the

that
meaning
and therefore contained in the class,
the common
and
that
of
concept
of the word, which is the sign
to use that word
name of that class, is within our power, we proceed
with much
therefore
and
tint is, as a mere sign,

attributes,

symbolically,

each time
if it were necessary to stop,
rapidity than
Hence,
its meaning.
of
the
verifying
and
process
repeat
recurs,
thinkof
the
us
power
may be said that the use of language gives
Moreover,
are
thoughts.
words
stenographic
in short-hand;

more ease and

it

it

to the mem
thought is a great help
relation of various
the
Election
ascertained
ll-ivin"- once
by
ory
and
that is, having formed judgments
other,
concepts to each
it is a far easw
in
propositions,
reasonings, and expressed them
the few words which const]
uul shorter method to remember
the mental
to recall successively each of
Bii,-h a proposition, than
it was
winch
and
in
embodied
through
it,
now
processes which are
of
thought,
is thus the great repository
obtained.

in"

of
thts abbreviated expression

Language

first

not onlv

in

Havin"

books, but in our

shown that there

own
is

minds.

at least

some truth both

in

Realism

do as much for Conceptualism,

vnd Nominalism, I now proceed to
seems to me perfectly wellwhich
of
or
the whole theory
system
in favor of the other two
made
admissions
the
already
founded,
to it, being
but
of
it,
only additions
theories not being contradictory
The principal,
whole
the
of
view
full
a
subject.
make
to
needed

up

indeed the only, argument of the Nominalists against Conceptualan

abstracting
ism is the assumed impossibility of presenting
must possess contradictory
idea to the mind, because such an idea
idea of
There may be, they say, an individual concrete
attributes.

and ot particular
as John, Thomas, or William
particular men,
three
square inches, or
as of a right-angled one, enclosing
triangles,
But they
definite
some
of
one
isosceles
an
three* acres, or
area.^
in general,
Man
idea of
insist that there cannot be an abstract
a tall and a short man, a
because such an idea must be, at once, of
naked. One idea
and a white man, fat and thin, clothed and
;

"

"

black

what we call such

cannot present all these contradictory attributes
a
or
image ot
mere
particular
a
man,
be
word,
can
an idea
only
whole
the
of
or representative
John or William, taken as a specimen
the possibility
same
the
in
reason
against
way
class of men.
They
;

of

f\

general

idea of triangle, or anything else.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

136
Now,
form a
like

but

we ever

we cannot have imagination

I have admitted that

definite picture in the
I

mind

eye

of

man,

e.

i.

triangle, or the

maintain that we can think or conceive it.

First, can
we cannot imagine ? Yes, unquestionably.

We

think what

can think a relation or

ratio,

though

this conception is absolutely

Take the simplest of all relations,

unimaginable
unpicturable.
You certainly cannot
similarity, and difference or contrariety.
But the
imagine either, though you can imagine similar objects.
similarity is not in either object taken separately, and therefore is
not perceived by sense, but. is apprehended by the mind as existing
between the objects.
Look at John separately you see no simi
;

larity.

Now

Look

again, you see no similarity.

and AVilliam together, as standing side by side;

at AVilliam separately

look at John

and you say, you now see the similarity of one to the other, in that
they both have the common features of human beings. But I main
tain that you do not literally see this similarity, but only apprehend
it in
For is it not evident, that you do
pure thought.
not actually see any more in either one of them, now that they
stand side by side, than you did a minute ago, when you saw each

or conceive

separately? Surely, then, similarity, or any other relation between

two or more objects, is not perceptible by the senses, but is appre

hended or conceived by an act of pure thought.

Qualities," says
Adam Smith, are almost always the objects of our external senses
relations never
Moreover, what is not presentable to sense
"

"

are."

cannot be pictured by the imagination

since the only function of
the imagination is to reproduce impressions made on the senses.
Hence, similarity as such, distinguished from similar objects, cannot
be imagined, but can only be conceived, or thought.
This argument is as old as Plato, from whose
Tliecetetus
I
borrow this illustration of it.
If, he says, by the side of six dice
;

"

we put four other dice, we say that the six are more, are half as
large again, as the others; but if we put twelve by the side of
them, then we say that the six tire feicer, are only half of the others.
But to the senses, the six dice have remained all the time unaltered
and equal

Having been neither increased nor dimin

from more, have become feiver, or, from half
as large again, have become only half as many, if the intellect, or
pure thought, did not apprehend something in them which mere
ished,

to themselves.

how can

they,

sense cannot perceive, nor imagination represent ?

Thea^tetus,"
Again, still borrowing from Plato s

we say there
some matters which the mind apprehends through itself, and
do
others which it perceives only through the bodily organs.
"

are

"We

REALISM, NOMINALISM,

AND CONCEl TUALISM.

137

not perceive white and black with the eyes, or shrill and grave with
the ears, but we see the former through our eyes, and we, hoar the
All sensible perceptions must surely con
latter through our ears.
common centre, (call it mind, or soul, or
one
some
verge towards
what yon please,) which perceives through them as its instruments.
The various percepts of sight, hearing, touch, etc., have each its own
or instrument, through which the mind receives
special bodily organ
one of them can be received through the organ ap
But
them.
hear with our eyes, or see with
propriate to another we cannot
whatever we conceive or judge respecting any two
our ears.
"no

Then,

the organ special to cither.

of tit cm, cannot be performed through
If we conceive any thing common both to sound and color, we can
not conceive it either through the auditory, or the visual, nerve.
Now, there are judgments common to the two namely, of their
number, existence, likeness or unlikeness, degrees of beauty or de
or less aptitude to give pleasure or pain, and count
;

formity, greater
less other relations.

All these are cognizable by mind or thought,

but are not perceptible through sense, or picturable through imagi
nation.

In music, what is merely sensuous is the quality of the note, or

the dilference perceived by the ear when a note of the same pitch
accord
is sounded on a violin, a flute, or a clarionet, and the pitch,

But music, properly so called, con

ing as it is acute or grave.
in the
sists not at all in this mere quality or pitch of the notes, but
the melody, the apprehension of which is purely in
it is an apprehension of the relations between the
or successive, as in
whether simultaneous, as in

harmony and

tellectual, since

notes,

harmony,

Hence, music cannot be written or expressed to the eye,

melody.
and conventional notation.
except by a system of purely arbitrary
Even the application of the epithets high and low, which is the
and there is
basis of our present system of notation, is arbitrary
;

was reversed by the ancients,

and the grave one high.
acute
sound
the
called
low,
they
rate, music is not the mere perception of high and low, but

some reason
.

that

At any

to believe that their use

that is, of
the pin-civ intellectual cognition of musical intervals,
the di>tanre between two simultaneous notes, and of the melodious
Sounds in themselves harsh and
arrangement of successive notes.
some
still
pleasure, if thus skilfully arranged
give
unpleasant may

and combined.
I

to prove, that the relation or ratio, which is thus

not a particular, but always a general idea, being al

now proceed

thought,

ways

is

common

to

an indefinite number of related objects or

ideas.

138

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

And

here I

John

S.

am

Mill,

sorry to differ, not only from Dugald Stewart,

all other
Nominalists, but even from Sir W.

and

Hamilton, who, very inconsistently, as it seems to

me, with other
his
philosophy, argues stoutly, in opposition to Dr.
Thomas Brown, that the relation apprehended between
any two
objects or ideas is always a particular relation,
special to that one
case, and only similar, at most, to a relation
apprehended iu some
portions of

On the contrary, 1 hold, with Dr.

Brown, that a re
always apprehended as general, or common to an indefi
nite number, if not of
actual, at least of conceivable or
>ther

lation

case.
is

For

cases.

imaginable,

instance,

take the

mathematical

which is
Consider the ratio of 2 to 4, of
1) to
18,
etc.
we do not say or think that the ratio in the first of
these
cases is merely similar to that in the second
but we know it is
the .-a me
the ratio is just L neither more nor
less, in all the cases
cited, and in an indefinite number of others.
Take the
relation,
G to 12, of

called ratio.
;

a: b:

proportion,

d; here, we do not say the ratio of a to b is similar to

that of c to d, but it is
it is the same ratio:
equal
the quanti
ties are different, the ratio is the same.
Take next the relation of
there can be but one measure of absolute
equality
and
equality
that is general, or common to an infinite
number of conceivable
if x
equations
a, then
a, x*
a^ and so on indefi
:

2x=2

We

say the like of identity; for the very idea of

identity
is one and the same.
True, to recur to a former instance, there
are many different
degrees of similarity yet no one of them is
particular.
Any one measure or degree of similarity, though ap
prehended as actual in but one case, may be conceived as common
to an infinite, number of
cases.
It

miely.

argument amounts

to

seems to me, this

imaginable
a demonstration of the
possibility of abstract

general ideas.
Individuals belong to, and are limited
by, space and time; they
cannot even be imagined cut of some
particular space and time.
This man
that man
belongs here and now
belongs there
and then.
You cannot even imagine any particular
thing out of
its own
place and moment.
Hence, space and time are
properly
"

"

"

regarded as principia indwiduutionis

and means

of

the elements,
principles,

But the Universal

Man,
in general
is
emancipated from any particular time and space
he belongs nowhere in
particular, and to no particular date.
Euro
pean, Asiatic, African, American, is equally Man
the hero of the
first, the third, the tenth, the
present, century, is equally Man.
And for this reason, even if for no other, relations and
attributes,
individualizing objects.

REALISM, NOMINALISM,

139

AND CONCEPTUALISM.
Uuiversals.

The

taken abstractly, are general ideas, Concepts,

be observed anywhere,
similarity or contrast of two things may
this defi
this
and at any time.
So, also,
particular shade of red,
nite degree of hardness or softness.

which we
Apart from argument, however, I think the theory
now combating is evidently extravagant and incredible. The
Nominalist would have us believe, that, in reading a book or in
are introduced, and
hearing a lecture, wherein no proper names
such are plainly of very infrequent occurrence, the mind of the
before it, from beginning to end, ex
reader or hearer has
are

nothing

that is, imagination of a succession of sounds,

cept mere words,
except
or of combinations of letters as they appear to the eye
that, from time to time, we arrest this succession of mere symbols
;

or signs, which, on his hypothesis, are symbols without archetypes,

and

in

mind an

imagina
up
signs without anything signified,
tion of an individual, and consider this as a specimen or represen
tative of the whole class which the word denotes. For instance in
call

The proper study of mankind is man," we think these

saying
more nor
The
words,
proper study of mankind is man," neither
we call up
less
except that, when we wish to be very accurate,
an image of some one man in an attitude of deep thought or study
of some particular crowd of men, which crowd, also, we consider
lor the moment as representing a much larger crowd, all men,
the
humanity itself. Still farther, on this theory, we particularize
word proper by an image of some one man doing one thing
"

"

"

<

to do, which is fit or becoming in him, by con

with
an image of some other man doing what he ought
trasting
not to do, and thus come to an accurate knowledge of what the
word "proper" signifies. Now the imagination can reproduce
only definite combinations of lines, shapes, colors, smells, sounds,
what
and tastes. Pray what combination of such elements,
of the words
the
does
meaning
etc.,
color,
sound,
represent
shape,
or the metaphysical ideas of time, space,
ought, jit, becoming,
Why, in making any in
cause, substance, infinity, and the like ?
dividual a specimen or representative of its class, we are obliged
the relation, namely, of that one to its class
to think a relation
and as I have shown, a relation is unimaginable, cannot be pictoAnd that relation is
rially represented, but can only be thought.
for
all the individuals in the class bear the same relation
general
of
to the concept or class-notion.
Surely, the most extravagant
all philosophical theories is that doctrine, first taught on English
and since too much favored by J. S. Mill and

which he ought
tills

ground by Ilobbes,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

140

other Positivists and ultra Nominalists, that all our knowledge be

is derived from mere sensations, so that,
gins with particulars, and
there is no conception in a
to quote Hobbes s own language,
man s mind, which hath not at iirst, totally or by parts, been be

and
a
of sense
gotten upon the organs
thought representing anything not subject to
quote against him his own pithy aphorism,
men s counters they do but reckon by them
"

"

money

of

fools."

man
"

have no

can

sense."

We

Words

might

are wise

but they are the

CHAPTER

IX.

BERKELETANISM.

PinmArs the only

may fairly

which we

fruitful

in

and important truth

claim to have been

first

Psychology

discovered in these

both by physicists and

times, and, as universally accepted
established beyond all doubt or question,
no\v
be
to
metaphysicians,
New Theory of Vision,"
s
is that contained in

modern

"

first,

Bishop Berkeley
when its author was only twenty-five years
The iicrms of it were certainly to be found in the metaphys
of Malebranche, especially in the first book of the

published iu 1709,

old.

ical speculations

Search after Truth," and in a brief paragraph of Locke s "Essay

But these were mere hints, the full
on Human Understanding."
were not even suspected by those
which
of
and
significance
bearing
their priority of publication no
who made them.
Consequently,

lessens the merit of Berkeley s grand discovery, than the

shrewd anticipations of the true theory of gravity by Kepler,
of Newton in first
and Jlookc detract from the

more

Huviihens.
tracing out that theory to
it by mathematical proofs,

glory

its

farthest consequences,

in his

immortal

and verifying

u
Principia."

so novel

When

first

and improbable

s doctrine appeared
was regarded as a paradox, or a sort of philosophical ro
mance. But it is now formally taught even in elementary treatises
and is adapted into every scientific creed; though few
on

published, Berkeley
tluir it

;>ptics,

to put the several portions of it together,

persons take the trouble
or as
so as to be able to contemplate its results in the aggregate,
whole.
one
Yet the doctrine may be easily summed up in one short state
whatever
ment.
Berkeley proved, that there is no resemblance
material things
between the visible and the
qualities of
;

tangible
that colors are the only objects of sight, while the distances, fig
not seen, but only in
ures, and magnitudes of external objects are
that
are really visible,
ferred, or estimated, from qualities which
of
and
tints
of
a
from
and
of color,
gradation
is, from variations
other
to experience, without the aid of the
Prior
shade.
and
light

142

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

senses, our eyes could not inform us that anything existed out of
ourselves.
do not see the outward world.
The visible land

We

scape exists only in imagination, being constructed or put together

there by the intellect, out of materials furnished to the

memory by

the sense of touch, and by

experience of resistance to muscular
motion.
The mind invests the colors and gradations of
light and
shade, which are all that are actually seen, with the various modi
fications of size, shape, and
position, disposes thetfi at appropriate
distances, and literally
"

L ives to airy nothing

local habitation

and a

name."

At no

period of life do we gain, by one step, so great an accession

of knowledge, as when, in
a process of
infancy, we learn to sec.
education just as necessary, as
gradually acquired, and as clearly
the result of experience, as that
whereby we (corn to icalk.

Perceptions by the other senses, also, are frequently altered and

enlarged by the judgment and imagination; though the process
of thus enlarging them, through
long habit, is made so quick and
All the information is then
easy that we do not remember it.
attributed directly to the sense,
though, in fact, it is a joint result,
(1) of perception by sense, (2) of remembered experience, and (. J)
of reasoning.
Thus, we speak of hearing a bell, the crying of a
child, or the rattling of a cart in the street.
Jn truth", we hear

only certain sounds, at first unmeaning, but which experience has

now enabled us to recognize as proceeding from those causes.
Without such experience, we certainly could not tell even the
direction whence the sounds carne
for direction also is, not a
direct perception, but an inference, based
on the sound be
;

chiefly

ing a

little

more

distinct to

one ear than the other.

.Returning to vision,

it is
plain that the utim. -,t which we could
We must
any object is its length and breadth.
infi-r the thickness from slight differences of shading, or deepened
tints.
Hence, when this shading and tinting are skilfully imitated
we are deceived, and think that the visible object is a
by an

to set

expect

of

arti>t,

sphere, when in truth it is only a flat disc, or other plain surface.

Jn such cases, we usually
But it is
say that the eye deceives us.
not so for the eye tells us
only that there is a certain shading
;

and tinting; and

But the mind rashly judges that

produced, as it usually is, by the
sphericity or thickness of the object
whereas, in this case, it was
produced by a skilful artist.
In a similar way we can
explain the phenomena of the stereothis variety of

this is

true.

shade and tint

is

BERKELEYAXISM.
have led
scope, which

Berkeley

is

theory

some

superficial

thinkers to believe that

On

thereby disproved.

the

contrary,

it

is

Because the two eyes in a man s head are

therein- "demonstrated.
our
two or three inches apart, some persons seem to think that
he
constructed,
so
was
which
vision is like the Irishman s gun.
said, that

would shoot round a corner.

it

But they

are

wrong

from a straight
for the vision of either eye can no more be deflected
when
solid object is
a
But
a
from
fired"
line than a bullet
gun.
than its
held quite near the face, the riirht eye sees a little more
the
left
and
eye a little
fellow .lues of the right side of that object,
surface-sec
two
see
two
the
is.
that
left
the
of
side;
eyes

more

because seen from

tions of the object, which do not exactly coincide,
mind,
The
view.
of
enlightened by knowl
slightly different points
dif

uses the

slight
edge previously trained from tactual experience,
solid objects
ference now explained as one means of distinguishing
from flat surfaces and whenever the object seen by the right eye
left eye. it infers or
differs a little from the same as seen by the
;

the object
jud-.:= th:it
rect

But

is

And

solid.

the

is

usually this

means

judgment

of deceiving

it

is

cor

for in this

stereoscope
the
instrument, two pictures, both on flat surfaces, are presented,
a
other
the
and
sees,
the
what
of
one a picture
right eye usually
These two flat pictures
left eye.
the
for
picture
.

corresponding
beine both presented

at once,

and

v infers that they are only

wron_
same solid.
r

The
thoiurh

at the

mind
proper distance, the
of one and the

two presentations

i eneral principle is. that what is called

it is really an illusion of the judgment,

an illusion of sense,

always arises when

same effect may be produced on a sense-organ,

ever "one and
two totally different causes or combinations
retina,
the
as
such
the"

by

chx-um-tances. die one of which

/ther of very infrequent, occurrence.
of

is

of very frequent,

and the

The mind, having no imme

which of these two causes is at work,

in both cases,
since the sensation produced is precisely the same
that is. to
well-known
the
to
cause,
sensation
this
refers
ahvavs
and therefore the judgment is mis
the one which usually operates
as the phe
taken, or in other words, an illusion arises, as often
diate

means

of determining

nomenon

is

circumstance.

produced by the second, or infrequently operating,

Thus, falntness of coloring and indistinctness of

of the object
outline are ordinarily produced by the great distance
or fog; and when
seen: but they may" also be caused by a mist
of
this is the case, we are deluded into an immense exaggeration
of the object
both the distance and the

magnitude

144

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

As thickness or solidity, then, is not directly seen, so neither is

The distance of any object from the ob
distance, nor magnitude.
server being a line directed endwi.se to his eye, it must make the
same impression on the retina whether the line be longer or shorter.
We infer the distance from the distinctness or aintness with which
the colors are seen, from the relative position of the object to other
objects whose distances are already known, from the muscular sen
sations attendant on the axes of vision of the two eyes being in
clined to an angle with each other or kept sensibly parallel, and
from other circumstances, all of which are mere sif/tis, the distance
of the object being the tliimj si</nified, or inferred from the pres
ence of the sign.
In the
of near and familiar objects, as the
estimate is frequently made, it is usually very accurate.
But as
the object is more remote, the judgment becomes uncertain
and
such
as
of
we
those
the
fixed
do
not
even
distances,
stars,
great
If, when travelling on an unfamiliar road by
attempt to estimate.
i

ea>e

night, I see a light before

me

appearing only as a fixed luminous

point, I cannot tell whether it is a few feet, or a few miles, dis

tant
whether it be not even a star on the edge of the horizon.
;

But

if distances are not seen, so neither are

magnitudes, since
the visible magnitude evidently depends on the supposed distance.
Since the real sphere of our vision is always equally large, or con
tains an equal number of visible points, every visible object, which

covers from the eye any other visible object, must, to the eye alone,
Thus, before experience got
appear as large as that other object.
by locomotion, a man s thumb, which, placed just before his eye,

might hide a church, must equal that church in si/e or his hand,
which might cover up his sight of the firmament, must be as large
as that firmament.
But the mind, instructed by experience and
science, projects off that firmament so far, that, as its magnitude
must inerra.M! in proportion to the distance, or rather to the square
of the distance, it swells in our conception to immensity.
But
immense as it is, we may still see the whole of it reflected in a
teacup full of water and then, though certainly bounded by the
rim of that little cup, it still seems to us as large and as distant as
;

ever.
If,"
you shut one eye, and hold imme
says Adam Smith,
diately before the other a small circle of plain glass, not more than
half an inch in diameter, you may see through that little circle the
"

"

most extensive prospect,

green fields, and woods, and arms of the
But the visible picture which repre
sea, and distant mountains.
sents

this

vast prospect cannot be

greater than the

little

circle

BKRKKLKYAXISM.

145

If you could conceive a fairy hand

through which you see them.
and a fairy pencil to come between your eye and tin; glass, that
pencil could delineate upon that little glass the outlines and colors
of all those fields, woods, and mountains, in the full and exact dimensions in which your eye rmVy sees them."

Common

facts show the necessity of experience and judgment,

wo can obtain correct notions by vision alone. Thus, we
ire not so much accustomed to see objects distant from us in a
vertical line, as in a horizontal one.
Hence, the same visible object,
u placed directly below or above us, will not by any means suggest
the same magnitude as when seen at an equal distance on a level
with the eye.
Look down from the interior of the cupola of St.

before

Peter

at

Rome upon

the floor of the church immediately below,

some four hundred feet, and the men and women walk
But
ing about on that iloor appear no larger than flies or ants.
look at the same persons from the doors at the lower end of the
a distance of some four hundred feet, and then, the spec
nave.
tator and the objects being on the same level, the latter appear as
a depth of

al>o

large as
It

is

life.

often objected, however, that the image formed on the

least, is directly seen ; and as this image has sensible

retin-i, at

magnitude, form, and a relative position of its parts perfectly cor

responding to its archetype, that we do in fact see magnitude,
The answer is, we do not see even
shape, and relative position.
the image on the retina, since this would require another eye, be
hind the retina, with which to see the image
and then a third
;

eye

farther back, to see the image on the retina of the second

and so on to infinity.
Moreover, the image is inverted, has

still

eye,
;

right and left sides transposed, and is double, being

the retina of either eye
whereas the object seen
its

and without transposition of

formed ou
is

upright,

Again, that a visible

should be transmitted, in the darkness within the skull,
imag
through the optic nerve and the substance of the brain, to the
prese ace-chamber of the mind, wherever that may be, is an un
meaning and absurd supposition.

single,

its sides.

And now, thickness or solidity, distance, magnitude, and posi

tion being thus eliminated, because
they are not seen, but oidy
inferred and imagined, it is obvious that the visible world is al
It seems to consist only of color,
ready reduced to very little.
and this is seen only as if in contact with the eye, and not as
But even this concession is too much
spread out over a surface.
;

tric:ly

speaking, the colors seen do not belong to the external

10

146

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

world, but exist only in the mind. They are merely effects
produced
in us by some occult causes existing out
And those effects
of us.

do not even resemble their causes,

the

air,

or of the

tympanum

any more than vibrations of

of the ear, resemble the sensation

of

sound; anymore than the pleasant feeling of warmth resembles

that molecular motion or
agitation, which chemists term heat or
caloric; any more than the pain which follows the prick of a pin
resembles the pin or the puncture which produces it or to take a
case more directly in point, any more than the Hash of
light seen
resembles the heavy blow on the back of the head which caused
;

to be seen.
Sensations. feelings, pains, pleasures, exist
only in
a sentient mind, and depend, for their nature and
degree, exclu
sively on the constitution of the nervous organism within which
it

that

mind

is

lodged, the various parts of

roused each to

its

own

that

organism being

peculiar activity by contact with external

Aristotle lirst observed, what modern

physiology has
amply confirmed, that all the senses are only modifications of the
sense of touch.
Let anything touch, and so agitate, the olfactory
touch the palate, and
nerve, and the sensation of smell follows
we have the sensation of taste touch almost any part of the body
with ice, and we feel a chill. Just so, when the undulations of the
ether reach the retina, we see
But
light, either white or colored.
stimuli.

the sensation produced

which causes

it.

is

Sugar

never an image or resemblance of that

not like sweetness, a chill is not like

is

a vibration or undulation is not like sound or color

any more
than nausea is like tartar emetic.
All the
secondary qualities
of body, as they are called, such as sounds, tastes, smells,
colors,
and the many and various sensations of touch proper, or mere con
ice,

"

tact with the skin

mere

feelings

or mucous membrane, are purely subjective,

or sensations

in

marked, nothing in the world

the

mind;

can be

and

as

Berkeley re

like a sensation

or idea,

except another sensation or idea.

We
his

may accept, then,

own words that, to
;

as demonstrated, Berkeley

man born

blind,

conclusion in

and afterwards restored

the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the

nearest, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind."
And I may add that the experiments of oculists in couching those
to sight,

"

born blind, made since Berkeley published his

verified this conclusion.

Theory, have amply

This account of vision does not shake our confidence in the

knowledge apparently obtained from sight. It merely

knowledge to its proper source, showing that it is not

traces this
direct, but

BERKELEYANISM.

147

The process is not so mechanical as it

The agency of
alone cannot perform the work.
mind must be added to the opening of the eyelids, before the
To recur to a former illustration, we are apt to
scene enters.
think that the ideas acquired by looking at a page of print are re
mediate or inferential.

The eye

seems.

ceived by siijfht
when, in truth, nothing is seen by the eye but
on white paper, not one of which has any
black
strokes
many
natural affinity or resemblance to the sound or the idea which it
:

Now the outward visible world is a book, and the first

There is no more a nat
which the infant learns to spell.
ural or necessary connection between visible and tangible ideas,
between varieties of light, shade, and color, and the figures, dis
tances, and positions suggested by them, than there is between the
and the rational biped without
man."
written or spoken word
The particles or undulations im
feathers whom it designates.
pinging upon the retina of one opening his eyes for the first time
The mind, taught by ex
are mere, words in an unknown tongue.
with significance, makes
them
them
invests
off,
perience, projects
them messengers and interpreters between the outward world and
itself, and learns from them more in a moment than years could
convey by the slow steps of the original process. If man had only
the sense of touch, how long would he be applying his hands suc
cessively to every part, before he could form a notion of the front
of a great cathedral, with all its minute tracery and multitude of
Yet in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the mind
details ?
represents.

one

in

"

receives the sensations of various

colors, infers

figures, positions, and distances signified

pictures to itself as external that complex

frieze, buttress,

and coigne

of

vantage."

the magnitudes,

by these sensations, and

whole, with every jutty,
And we need not wonder

that these many inferences are made without our noticing or re

membering them, when we consider how quick is the action of
How
mind if long habit has made the process easy and familiar.
rapidly, for instance, does the practised eye run over

a printed
page, many letters, and even words, not being actually perceived,
Remember that
but supplied by the judgment from the context.

at least three acts of the

mind are needed

for every letter

first,

that the letter itself must be recognized and distinguished from

very other letter
secondly, that the sound must be remembered
;

and thirdly, that the idea must be recalled

sound represents.
And after all, these separate ideas
must be framed together into propositions, and the whole arranged
and judged as one piece of reasoning, narrative, or description.
of which

which

it is

this

a symbol

148

MOI)F.i;X

PHILOSOPHY.

Yet the eye and mind together run over such

perhaps two thousand

letters, in less

a p.-i^e,

than a niinnie.

containing

What wonder^

then, that the contents of nature s hook, which we have, been

study
ing every hour since our birth, should be mastered with so much
ease and quickness ?

Berkeley was led to doubt the existence of matter by the same

thought which is expressed in his theory of vision.
If the
visible world is a
phantasm, and exists only in the mind, what, bet
train of

ter evidence of
reality has the tangible
but one of the live senses, of which

world?
it

In truth, there is
can be alleged with
any

show ol reason, that it bears testimony to the

objective outward
existence of material things.
Sight, as we have now proved, pri
and the same may be said of
marily tells us nothing
hearing,
;

smell,

and taste

Mnmds, odors, and

produced on the mind.

for

also are mere sen

take cognizance of
these effects
but of their causes, the only
things which are sup
posed to exist externally, and which bear no resemblance to their
effects, we know little or nothing; and it is vain even to
inquire, till
we can assign some rcaxni why one nerve, when touched or
;

sations, or effects

tastes

We

agi

tated, gives us a

>ensation

of color,

and another, similarly

affected,

a sensation of smell, and a third, when shaken,

gives sound.
Why
does an orange taste sweet, and a lemon sour ?
Why does a drum
sound hollow, and gla.-s .-brill ?
We do not know. We can only
say, that we are so constituted as to be thus affected; we cannot

how that is constituted which so affects us. The nature of

the effect produced depends
vastly more on the constitution of the
thing acted upon, than on that of the thing acting.
Thus, wax
uielts in the lire,
clay contracts and hardens, water evaporates,
powder explodes. Here, one and the same agent, lire or heat,
tell

produces a great variety of effects, depending on the nature of the

thing exposed to its influence.
Then, what can such various ef
fects as .-ensations are, teach us as to the nature of the cause which
produces them

Strictly speaking, there is no sound in the outward universe, but

only a vibration of the air or some other substance, which would

never become audible,

cipient

mind

to receive

if
it.

there were not a

hearing ear and a per
So, also, there is no smell in the mate

world, but only, as is supposed, particles of effluvia floating in

the atmosphere, which, when
they come in contact with the nose,
excite in the mind the sensation of odor.
The assertion may ap
rial

pear strange, but a

truth, that,

if

moment

there were no

satisfy any one of its

in the universe to be aii jcu d by

reflection will

mind

149

BF.nivKLEYAXISM.
it,

mat tor would bo absolutely dead,

the world of

dark, inodorous, and tasteless.

it,

then, which

What

sort of a

silent, colorless,

material world

is

YOU contend for?

Conceive or imagine, if you can. such a universe, thus stripped

all secondary qualities, and
you will then have an idea of Mat
ter pure and simple, or as it is supposed to exist per $r, in itself,
absolutely, independent of the action of mind, which invests it witli
What is Matter as thus con
supposititious and unreal qualities.
of

?
It is simply what the
physicists call
impenetrability
within certain limits of extension
that is, it is a certain
length,

ceived

"

"

breadth, and thickness,

which repels or pre
say of this book.
vents anything else from entering into its own limits.
It is not
merely the limited extension itself, together with the lines which

form

shape; for this alone is mere empty space, not

it
is such
occupied with matter or anything else.
limited extension made impenetrable, or so occupied that, unless
filled

limits or

its

or

]>nt

to occupy another and equivalent por

the attempt of anything else, any other
force or other matter, to enter into its own space.
This resistance
of impenetrability exists, or is known to exist, only at the surface

pushed
tion

of

aside, or

compelled

it

space,

resists

for, as Schelling
rior, no inside.

we know, matter lias no inte

line as you please, we still know

remarks, so far as

Cut

it

up

as

the surfaces either of the whole or of

only
v
at the surface

is this

its

fragments
O

know, or ever can know, Matter

is

mere hollow

for

only
/

For aught we

force of resistance manifested.

shell.

the shell, at the surface, so far as we know, there

Force
namely, the Force of resistance.

is

And

at

nothing but

But what

is

mind, exerted as

We

know of none except the force of

witnessed by consciousness, and directed by
ith a mental and conscious force, I
push against

force

will,

intelligence.
the table ; and, action
"U

and reaction being equal, the table pushes

back against me, with a force equivalent to my own, and so far as
I know, perfectly similar to my own.
This force of resistance is
perfectly uniform in its action, always subject to physical law.
that is, orderly and regular in its manifestations; and such, surely,
are the characteristics of conscious and intelligent force.
AVhat is
this force, or rather, whose is it,
except the will and power of the
infinite

mind, here brought directly

sense, with

forces are

the

will

and power of

known with
se,

the

contact, at
finite

mind

point of

These two

not one
equal directness and immediacy,
from that other but both at

after the other, or as an inference

once, and per

in

my

or in themselves.

In the consciousness of

effort,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

150
become aware

of myself, the Ego. as putting forth power or ex

and, at the same moment, I become aware of some
thing not myself, a ^son-Ego, exerting an equivalent amount of
One of these forces, my own, is,
energy in the opposite direction.
I

erting energy

know, mental and conscious

what shadow of evidence is

not equally mental and conscious?
Is it
even reasonable to attribute this second force to the brute, inert,
as

there that the other

is

hard, senseless atoms, which are

commonly supposed to exist, in

some inconceivable manner, within that mere shell, which 110 man
has ever penetrated, but which

men choose

to call

Mutter

please, and you will iind it to be

nothing but various manifestations of force, one of which, the force
of resistance witli its several modifications, is cognized immediately

Analyze any

that

lo<J>/

you

or presentatively, and is therefore called a primary quality, or is

supposed to exist whether your mind perceives it or not; while the
others, the so-called secondary qualities, are only the supposed and

causes of the known sensations, and are therefore only

mediately known, being inferred from their effects, which are not
even supposed to exist when no mind is present to experience
What we call an apple, for instance, is only, 1st, when
them.
taken into your hands, a power, directly or immediately known, of
occult

preventing the fingers from closing into a small spherical portion

of space
-Mly, an inferred or supposed power of raising in your
;

mind the sensation

of a rosy or russet color; (I say, this power,

and the others which are to follow, are only supposed to exist in
tlu ajtjt/e ; for
aught you know, this sensation may be excited ill
you by the Infinite Mind only on occasion of the apple being so
presented, and not in consequence of such presentation) Silly, pow
ers of exciting in your mind agreeable sensations of taste, smell, etc.
If we admit the Principle of Causality, namely, that every sensa
tion and every other event must have a cause, as an authoritative
and necessary law of belief, then we must also admit the existence,
out of our minds, of the various powers or causes which produce
the sensations called secondary qualities.
But whether we admit
the 1 rinciple of Causality or not, the existence out of our minds
of a force of resistance is directly and certainly known, for it is an
immediate datum of consciousness.
And this is enough to disprove
the monstrous Egoistic Idealism, or Solipsismus, of Fichte, John S.
Mill, ami the Positivists, who, by denying both substance arid
;

cause, thereby deny the existence of any Xon-Ego, and so, first,
leave one percipient mind alone in the universe, and then, sec
ondly, proceed to resolve this one mind into a mere group or series

151

BERKELEYAXISM.

of sensalions, so that the final result of their theory is Nihilism.

of Berkeley, who
Very unlike this is the spiritualist philosophy
existence of a Non-Ego, that is, of other hu
the
asserts
expressly
man minds and of the Infinite Mind, and only spirituali/es Matter

by resolving
add, what is

it

I have merely to
a manifestation of Mind.
the universal admission of the physicists them
Matter as such, or as it is commonly conceived, no

into

now

selves, that, in

ever has been, or ever can be,

power, no causative force whatever,
it
It is nothing but a group of phenomenal effects
discovered.
This is merely a statement of
never acts, but is only acted upon.
the well-known mechanical law of inertia, that Matter is incapable
;

of changing
of changing

It is brute,

its state.

even

own

its

state,

dead, and passive.

a fortiori

it

It incapable

cannot change the

anything else.
the uniformity of
Berkeley does not deny, but strongly affirms,
nature and the universal reign of law; that is, that like antecedent

state of

And

therefore

will always be followed by like effects.

lie did not walk into the lire, or
he acted just like other men.
over a precipice, though he believed that both the one and the
But he also believed, that the idea of
other existed only in idea.
the idea of
walking into the lire would inevitably be followed by

phenomena

from a precipice would certainly result in

Therefore, like a
broken bones.
he
could
which
no
risks
possibly avoid ^of
prudent man, he ran
the essential
Hence
him.
forced
ideas
upon
having unpleasant
shallowness and impertinence of those who attempt to reason
Dr. Johnson did, who as Boswell tells us,
against idealism as
he
struck "his foot with mighty force against a large stone till
not
did
it
thus.
I
refute
from
Berkeley
rebounded
it, saying,
of the occasions on
deny the idea of solidity, or the uniformity
which it is manifested.
That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist," says Berkeley,
I do of
that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than
thus
see,
I
hear,
which
But
what
are
those
things
my own being."
and feel? They are sensible tilings; and sensible things cannot
is in any
be like those which are insensible.
Every thing which
but
is a real being on my principles
the
senses
way perceived by
unknown
an
is
not on yours. The Matter, which you contend for,

burning; and that a

fall

painful sensations or

ideas of

"

"

somewhat, without sensible

qualities,

but having a supposed occult

in the mind of the be

power of raising ideas of those qualities
sensible
rather
or
It
is
who
holder.
positively deny,
doubt,
you
and affirm that their essence or reality
existences ; I affirm

them,

152

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

consists in

being perceived,

that

in

is,

Their

being sensible.

The world which is immediately present to my

pcrcipi.
perceptive consciousness, and is therefore known to be as real as
esse

is

my own

existence, is a bright and beautiful world, stained with all

the colors of the rainbow, full of
ringing sounds and sweet odors,
exposed to perception as far as my range, or anybody s else range,
of vision, hearing, and touch extends; manifested in the same

manner, under perfectly similar aspects,

And

other mind.

to

mv

mind, and to every

world, confessedly, exists only in idea or

sensation, and is but the objective aspect of the beholder s own in
tellect.
It is not. however, the creature of his
it is
imagination
not constructed by his will and
fancy; it is not subject to his ca
t/t/

Hut it is orderly and permanent, subject, in all its parts to

price.
that unchangeable will of (iod which we call
-physical law." Hut
the world of .Matter, wl/ -h
you contend for, is not perceptible; to
is not colored; is silent and
cold; has neither smell nor
whether pleasant or unpleasant and is known, or supposed
be known, by me only in that infinitesimal
portion of it. which
in immediate contact with
my own body. It is even an incon

sense;
taste,

to
is

ceivable world; for

cannot so much as imagine what would

outward aspect of Matter when thus stripped

The

qualities.

of all

existence of a material world, then,

is,

its

lie

the

sensible

at best, only

from what, we actually perceive, and an unfounded in

ference.
It is certainly not
perceptible by sense.
The conclusion of the whole doctrine is, that .Matter is nothing
but Force; Force is nothing but Will; Will exists
only as ac
companied and directed by Intelligence and witnessed by Con
sciousness
and intelligent and conscious Will produces not
only
order, harmony, and law, but also inlinite variety, diversity, and
an

inference,

change.

The

senseless

Matter would

purely mechanical result of mere brute, inert, and

be, not order, not variety, not life, but
-I have no notion," Berkeley
chaos, inaction, silence, and death.
says,

"of

any action distinct from

anywhere but in a

volition to be

volition, neither

spirit
therefore,
am. obliged to mean a spirit
;

can

when

of an active being, I
as well as you, that since

conceive
I

speak

assert

we are affected from without, we must

allow powers to be ivithout, in a beiity distinct
from oursdt-rs. So
far we are agreed.
But then we differ as to the kind of this pow
erful being.

what
prove

(I
it

I will

may add

have

too,

to be spirit.

there are actions

it to be
spirit, you matter, or 1 know not
you know not what) third nature. Thus I

From

the effects I see produced,

and because

actions, volitions

conclude

and because there

BERKKLEYAXISM.
are volitions, there must be a Will.
Again, the things I pen-five
of in;/ mind;
must hare an extstc nee, they or their archetypes,
but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist other
There is then; tore an under
wise than in an understanding.
constitute in the strictest
and
Will
But
Understanding
standing.
<tt

Mind or Spirit." And this is precisely what Schopenhauer

and Ilartmann maintain, when they declare that Willc nnd Vurstelessence; of every phenomenon in nature, or
IIUKJ constitute the
that they are the principles of which the universe is the manifes
sense a

tation.

one can atiirm more distinctly and emphatically than Berke

does
the reality and permanence of all that we perceive as actu
ley
of course, the uniformity and immutability
ally exiting, including,
He says, all this^is present to
of "what we now call Physical Law.

Xo

and whatever is so present is, to him as well as

nay, it is the very
to the vulgar, really existent and steadfast
result of his system is both
the
In
fact,
of
general
reality.
type
You mistake me," he
to -nf a/i-e Matter, and to realize Ideas.

the mind in idea

"

not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas

says
since those immediate objects of perception, which,
into things
of things, I take to be the
according to you, are only appearances
Nor are they empty or incomplete,
real things themselves
that Matter is an essential
otherwise than
k -

am
;

upon your supposition,

It is your opinion, that the

part of all corporeal things
or
ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, hut images
than
real
farther
no
is
Our
them.
therefore,
knowledge,
copies of
But
as our ideas are the true representations of those originals.
it is im
as these supposed originals arc in themselves unknown,
AN e can
far our ideas resemble them at all.
how
know
to
possible
lhe
not, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge
most
the
into
thrown
are
we
that
hopeless
which
of
all
result
is,

and abandoned skepticism. Now give me leave to ask you, first,

whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperof all this
ceived substances, as their originals, be not the source
skepticism?

either by sense
Secondly, whether you are informed,

or reason, of the existence of those

you

are not, whether

it

unknown

originals;

be not absurd to suppose

and

them?"

in case

CHAPTER
TRANSITION TO KANT.
PURPOSE OF THE

X.

His LIFE AND CHARACTER.

OF PURE REASON."

THE

"CRITIQUE

UNDER the influence of Descartes, French philosophy in the

seventeenth century had been eminently spiritualistic, and confirm
Even Spinoza,
atory of the great truths of morality and religion.
pantheist and infidel Jew as he was, must still be called a pureminded mystic, who

partially spiritualixed matter by reducing- it to

an abstraction and identifying it with Deity. lut a reaction began,
and had already made considerable progress, even before Voltaire
had imported from England the physics of Newton and the philoso

Locke, both perverted to suit his own purposes.

Theolog
bigotry and persecution, under Madame de ALaintenon and
Louis XIV., provoked fierce opposition, first, against the Jesuits
and the Church, both identified with the State, and soon afterwards,

phy

of

ical

against the religious faith which some unhappy agencies had per
verted and dishonored.
Despotic government, the corruption of
morals in high places, and the oppression of the lower clashes pro

duced their

and worst

when they stimulated all the

order to wage its war against the
clergy and the other constituted authorities of the State, to shake
the belief of the people in all that it had
formerly held sacred.
The philosophy of the eighteenth century, in France and Germany,
and indeed through most of Europe, openly avowed infidel opin
literary

last,

ability of France,

results

in

under the name of free thought, preached the doctrines

of empiricism, skepticism, and
Descartes was forgot
immorality.
ten; Pascal and Malebranche were contemptuously pushed aside
ions, and.

as dreamy fanatics; the doctrines of Leibnitz,

though still taught
in a pedantic form by Wolff, were obscured and
perverted by those
who could not, or would not, understand them. Bayle and Voltaire
became lords of the ascendant; and their wit and vivacity made
more proselytes than their arguments. Even Rousseau, who still

preached a sort of sentimental deism, though he attacked all the

institutions of society, and violated
every principle of morality in

155

TRANSITION TO KANT.

still shocked by the excesses of

Diderot,
and others, who made the Encyclopedia a battering
rain against the altar and the throne.
and
Bolingbroke and Hume in England, Condillac, Ilelvetins,
Condorcet in France, were the professed authorities in speculative
at this epoch, which, by a strange metaphor, was called

his

own

conduct, was

D Holbach,

philosophy

in German, the Aufklarung or

the period of llluminationisin,
the breaking away from old prejudices and the in
Clearing-up,
In a similar spirit of selfof unbelief.
troduction of the
light

Age of Reason. Condillac taught that

our ideas are only transformed sensations, and the chief feature
of his work is an elaborate attempt to derive all our intellectual
This doctrine,
faculties from the operations of the external senses.
esteem,

it

called itself the

all

with some of its consequences, is expressed in very unequivocal

the last analysis," he says,
"In
terms by Diderot.
every idea is
resolved into a representation or picture addressed to the senses
and since everything in our understanding has come to it through
sensation, so everything from the understanding, which cannot re;

attach itself to some sensible archetype,

is

chimerical and void of

Hence, it is an important rule in philosophy, that every

for
which we cannot find an external and sensible object
expression
Condillac endeavors
must be rejected as having no significance."
to demonstrate his theory, by supposing a statue or automaton, fash
ioned internally like a man, but devoid at first of any impressions
He conceives one sense after another to
or cognitions whatever.
be gradually awakened in this wooden or stone image, and aims to
show how it might successively obtain all the knowledge and feel

meaning.

In perfect consistency
ings which human beings actually possess.
with other portions of his doctrine, he calls men perfected animals,
and the other brutes imperfect men. Ilelvetius, in conformity with
his principles of fatalism and selfishness as the only springs of
human conduct, makes the whole distinction between man and
brute to consist in the superiority of the former in physical organ
ization

so that, to

adopt his

own

illustration,

if

the

human

wrist

had terminated in a hoof, instead of a hand, man would still have

been wandering in the forests as a wild animal.
These opinions, and the demoralization of society which they
indicated and did much to enhance, produced their natural fruit in
It was meet that the
\he excesses of the first French Revolution.
Goddess of Reason, under the guise of a prostitute, should first bo

when the scaffold

publicly worshipped during the Age of Terror,
was daily streaming with the blood of the purest and noblest meu

156

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

and women

in

France.

do not dwell upon these doctrines here,

they amount to a rejection of all Philosophy, they are

indirectly considered and refuted throughout the writings of the
eminent men whom we have had. or shall have, occasion to con
sider.
I allude to them here,
only because their promulgation de
for since

termined sume of the leading features of the

metaphysics of Kant,
and. through him. of German
philosophy during the lirst half of
the present century.
Kant s great work, the Critique of Pure.
IJeason, was ;m attempt to hold the balance even between the
sys
tems of empiricism and irrational dogmatism
not so much to re
:

veal the truth or fals.-hood which either

might contain, as to rebuke
the pretensions of both, by -howing the
of the founda
insuiliciency

which they appeared to rest, and the groundless character

of the assumptions whence thev proceeded.
It is with diffidence and
many misgivings that I undertake an
analysis and exposition of the leading features of the philosophy
of Kant.
The difficulties of the ta-k are great. It is
too
tions on

much

hardly

say. that till within twenty years, not more than a dozen
scholars, either in this
country or in Knidand. had fairlv mastered

the

to

"Critique

of

Pure

Reason" in

;ill

its

parts, so as to be able

give an intelligible account and crmci.-m of

it

their

in

own

to

lan

guage, with such illustrations as >hoiild make the doctrine and the
course of the argument plain to ordinarv minds.
tran>lation of

by Mr. I ley wood was printed in Is:!*, nd another and better

in Holm s
one, by Mr. Meiklejohn, was publi-hed in
Library;
but for
who have any knowledge of German, if I may iud"-e
n
from my own experience, even this translation is far less
it

;l

18o.">,

tho>e

t.

*S

intelligible

than the original.

The ditliculties of the subject do not spring
merely from the demerits of the style, though, for a ivat thinker,
Kant was certainly one of the worst writers of German prose that
ever published a book; and that is saying a
deal.
One of
great

which sometimes extends over more

than a single printed page, is ludicrously compared
by Mr. De
Quincey to an old-fashioned English family coach, such as was in
use during the last century for
transporting half a dozen persons
a distance of one or two hundred miles.
-Pretty nearly upon
the model of such an old family coach, did Kant
pack and stuff one
of his regular sentences.
Every thing that could ever be needed
bis ill-compacted sentences,

.n

the

way

of

explanation, illustration, restraint,

clauses, or indirect

German

comment, was

philosopher

s taste,

to

inference,

be crammed, according

by-

to this

into the front pockets, side pockets, or

157

TRANSITION TO KANT.
rear pockets of the one original sentence.
tence will last in reading, whilst a man
Might reap an

acre of his neighbor

Hence

corn.

it is,

that a sen

"

But this, as 1 have hinted, was not the worst. Kant had a pas
sion for the use of technical terms and formulas of expression,
uncouth and barbarous, such as would have made, Quintilian
phrases

most of them having been, in the application which

and u
In the abstruse portions
he makes of them, invented by himself.
.stare

of

a>p.

to explain or illustrate his

subject, instead of stopping

liis

mean-

in these stereotyped
repeats over and over again, always
formula.-, what he has already said, till the wearied reader begins
The sub
to skip, and then loses the train of thought altogether.
work is one of vast compass and extreme intricacy, being
ject of the
no less than an attempt to analyze and map out, with great minute
in U\ lie

powers and processes of the human intellect, through

Jlis aim is to
works in the attainment of knowledge.
show what is original, and what acquired, in the mechanism and
furniture of the mind; how far it can go in the pursuit of truth,
and why no farther; what are its grounds of assurance in the va
and what are the illusions and
lidity of its legitimate conclusions,

ness, all the

which

it

which it is inevitably beset, when it tries to push its

researches beyond the unalterable limits of human thought.
The conception was a bold one, and even if carried out in the
fallacies with

favorable auspices, it could

happiest manner, and under the most
be mastered in all its details only by patient meditation and per
Kant had a
But it was not happily carried out.
sistent effort.
not only for completeness, but for system and
morbid
predilection,

symmetry.

In order to satisfy him, the whole inquiry

must be

conducted upon one principle, all the results must perfectly corre
new
spond with each other, no gaps must anywhere remain, every
fact observed or new truth discovered must iind its appropriate
;ind the entire work must thus constitute as perfect an organ
place.

ism as the human body, in which, according to Kant s own defini

Most of the
means.
tion, all the parts are mutually ends and
errors and superfluities of his system, as Schopenhauer has ably
for system and
pointed out, have arisen from this morbid passion
He cannot accept a hint, an illustration, or an ancompleteness.
without pushing the
ulogy from the kindred science of pure Logic,
to its extreme limit, so that the correspondence shall be
parallel
as perfect as that

which exists between any

reflection in a mirror.

Hence

visible

object and

his table of just twelve

its

Categories

158
of

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Pure Thought, subdivided

into

the four classes of

Quantity,

Quality, Relation, and Modality, each comprising three

sub-species^
of which the lirst two unite in order to form the
the
third;
whole scheme being a forced reproduction, or
of the twelve
parallel,

possible forms of

Pure .Judgment.

Hence, also, his three Ideas of

Pure Reason, the Soul, the Universe, and
God, not only corre
sponding with, but directly evolved from, the three forms of syllo
gism,
namely, the Categorical, the Hypothetical, and the Dis
junctive.
In any other
portion of the world, except

physical work

thus conceived

from the

stillborn

Even

press.

in

Germany, a meta

and executed would

the

labor-loving

have fallen

Germans were

slow

to penetrate its
Six years
meaning and recognize its merits.
passed before it attained the honor of a second edition, the lirst
Yet Kant endeavored to facilitate the
having appeared in 17*1.

study of

it

in

by publishing,

Future System

of

17x:{, his

"Prolegomena

for

every

a sort of brief
compeiid, in a
synthetical form, of the leading doctrines of his great work, and a
fuller explication of its aim and
But he was ill-fitted to
purport.
Metaphysics,"

be his own commentator and his

system might have waited ten
years longer for a general acknowledgment of its merits, had it
not found at last two enthusiastic
disciples, in Sehiifz, the
;

philolo

who founded a journal in Jena, in

for its explanation
and defence; aiid in Reinhold. who.
by a series of letters published

gist,

7Sf>,

German .Mercury" in 17SC,. rescued it from

neglect and
furnished hints enough to render it
Then, indeed, the
intelligible.
learned \vorld in
Germany awoke from its apathv. Lectures were
delivered upon the new
End
philosophy in all the universities.
less diM u.-ions ensued
upon the application of its
to
in the

"

principles

theology, ethics, science, and

human thought.

new

"This

philosophy,"

magical eil eet upon

even among those

literature,

to

the

said Stiiudlin, in 171)4,

whole
"had

tield

of

an almost

the sciences, and found friends and

disciples
who had never before devoted themselves to
all

It awakened a
metaphysical studies.
spirit of philosophical in
quiry in Germany of which the age had not formerly been deemed
capable and it contained so vast a treasure of new views and
prin
ciples, that, as yet, but a small portion of them have been worked
:

up; and only in a distant future can

which it enfolds be fully

remarked,
tard seed

all

the seeds of knowledge

same year, Fichte

the Kantian
philosophy is as yet only a grain of mus
but it must soon become a tree which will overshadow
developed."

"

In the

159

TRANSITION TO KANT.

It will educate a new, nobler, and worthier

family.
the fundamental
Schiller
exclaimed, in 1805,
race of men."
are a rich possession for ever,
the
Critical
of
Philosophy
principles
and on their account alone, one must deem himself happy that he
More than any one before him," wrote
has lived in this

the

human

"

"

age."

William von
depths of

Humboldt,

each man

"

philosophy in the
has made so many
one
no
yet
the whole territory of knowledge."

Kant

consciousness

lias

isolated

and fruitful applications of it to

Measured by one test of power," says De Quincey, viz., by the
number of books written directly for or against himself, to say
there is no phil
nothing of those which he has indirectly modified,
"

"

if we except Aristotle, who can pretend

osophical writer whatever,
he has ex
to approach Kant in the extent of the influence which

ercised over the minds of

men."

And

in foreign countries, I

may

the United States, this influence

add, such as France, England, and
that is,
has immensely increased during the last twenty years,
over half a century since Kant s death.
These expressions may seem extravagant; yet it seems hardly
the influence of Kantian metaphysics upon
possible to overestimate
I know of
the teachings of the schools and the opinions of men.
no parallel to it, except in the dominion of Aristotle over the spec
ulations of all scholars and theologians throughout the Middle Ages,
Tennemann re-wrote the whole
and indeed down to our own

day.
Kant s point of view. The rationalistic
history of philosophy from
three quarters of a century,
tendency of theology during the last
of the critical spirit in the examination of the
the

predominance

He is the
to his influence.
Scriptures, is attributable almost solely
and
science
in
free
modern
called
relig
is
what
father ot!
thought
he has unsettled even more dogmas than he has established.
ion
;

of philosophy in Germany and elsewhere, which

in
the fashion of the hour, and in popularity, are
his
have eclipsed
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Herbart,
still built upon his foundations.
and
pushed their specu

The new systems

Schopenhauer, though they

which Kant never dreamed of, and from
with aversion
which, had he known them, he would have recoiled
and
his
method,
far
so
still
appeal to
and disgust,
principles
adopt
intel
his conclusions, and use his phraseology, that they are hardly
the
mastered
have
Critique
who
those
previously
ligible except to
efpure Reason." Kant, indeed, holds the key to all modern thought
his system, to adopt one of his own technicalities, is
in Germany
informa
the necessary propadeutik, the indispensable preliminary
of
tion and discipline, for the acquisition of the later philosophy
Schleierrnacher,

lations to consequences

"

160

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Germany, and even

Out

for a full

understanding of the tendencies of

throughout the world.

in the
philosophical schools

thought

of

it is true,
owing to the intrinsic dilliculties of
within the last
twenty years, Kant s influence was
but indirect, and his opinions were
Jt was
imperfectly known.
common enough to have a smattering of the
subject.
Any one,
who had a fair knowledge of German, could
quote and criticize a
few of the more prominent doctrines of the
great Transeendentalist,
taken out of connection with hi.
system as a whole, ;uid therefore

Germany,

the subject,

till

generally misunderstood.

Hence

was, that, misled b v the term

philosophy as a wlio le. and by
his doctrine of the
subjective character of .spare and time, the, opin
ion became general, that his
system was rather Platonic than Aris
totelian, placing the essence of
things and the characteristics of true
knowledge in the realm of pure ideas and super-sensual intuitions
of the truth,
the very region,
according to his philosophy, of
necessary illusions and abortive attempts of the intellect to over

Transcendentalism, applied

step

its

natural boundaries.

it

his

to

Only within the

limits of
experience,

he constantly teaches,
only within the dream-world of space and
time, is any legitimate application of the Catcgori.-s,
any proper
use of our faculties, possible.
Even Coleridge and DC
Quincey,
once held to be great authorities
have been

upon
proved by Mr. Stirling to have mistaken,
elements of Kantian metaphvM. s.

tin"

in

subject,

this respect, the

very

Recently, however, much real progress has been made.

Willm,
and Michelet in France. Hamilton, Mansel, and
Mahaffy
in England, have
supplied means for a fair knowledge and a crit
Remu>at.

ical appreciation of Kant s

leading doctrines, even by those who
are not able to
Those who un
study the subject in the original.
derstand German
be referred with confidence to

may

volume, published
ern
of

Philosophy,"

Pure

Reason."

in

the

1800, of

Kuno Fischer

the whole of which

Though somewhat

ner, the writer has the

very rare

is

"

devoted

diffuse

History of
to

the*

third

Mod

and pedantic

Critique
in

man

among German

professors of
philosophy of making himself perfectly intelligible, and of ade
quately translating the technicalities of metaphysics into the lan
guage of common life without loss of meaning or precision. An
English translation of this volume by Mr. J. P.
has been re
gift

Mahaffy

cently published in London, and

very well executed.

Immanuel Kant was born of poor, but honest and
pious, parents,
in the Prussian
His father
city of Konigsberg, April 22, 1724.
was n, saddler, of Scotch descent, who
his fourth
hoped that
is

this,

LIFE

AND CHARACTER OF KANT.

1G1

might become a clergyman, and with that view, placed him

s College at
Konigsberg, under the care of Dr.
Schulz, a Professor of Theology, and the spiritual adviser of ihe
It was a strange fate,
exclaims Kuuo Fischer,
boy s mother.
which caused the future leaders of the new philosophy to be com

child,
in

the Frederick

"

mitted for their education to the very influences of which, in mature

Descartes was trained
life, they became the most decided opponents.

by the Jesuits, Spino/a by the Rabbis, and Kant by the Pietists."

Rigorous principles of morality, and a stern sense of justice, were
the only fruits which endured throughout life of Kant s severe edu
cation in the schools of an austere theology.
A gentle boy, feeble
in body and bashful in manners, and an insatiable reader and
thinker, he seemed marked out for a life of meditation and study.
Yet lie was not sickly
either in mind or body; and his very
regular
V
v
O
habits, and strict temperance in food and drink,
gave him a long
life entirely free from disease.
He worked his way through the
schools and the University with little aid from his parents,
giving
his attention at first to the classics, and afterwards to mathematics
and physical science, for which he retained a great predilection
A respectable linguist, he wrote Latin with ease
throughout life.
and correctness, and acquired some knowledge of Kn dish and
French literature. His writings show a wide range of information
and excellent taste in the choice of authors, though he certainly
had but little appreciation of the merits of style. To satisfy his
*

parents, he attended the lectures of the theological faculty, though

with little profit; for he disliked the profession, and hoped to secure
some inferior academic office, which would supply his few wants

and enable him to prosecute his studies. In this hope he was dis
appointed and soon after obtaining his degree, the death of his
fattier having cut off his small resources at home, he was obliged
to leave the University, and seek a
meagre support for nine years
as domestic tutor in private families.
It seems that he
always
commanded the attachment and respect of his employers, though
he confesses that he was but a poor teacher, his theory
being much
better than his practice.
lie had neither a commanding person,
an attractive exterior, nor a fluent speech; and in spite of his
long
subsequent career as a Professor at the University, he seems never
to have been very successful in
His
imparting oral instruction.
pupils listened eagerly, for his fame was great; but if he lectured
in no better style than he wrote, it is not
car
probable that
;

they

ried

away much with them.

In 1755, having published and defended a small treatise on the

11

162

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

principles of metaphysical cognition, he was admitted to exercise

the modest function of a private lecturer, Privat-docent, in the
The gains of such an oilice are small
University of Konigsberg.

and precarious, depending O n the number of pupils \vlio

may offer
lie lectured on
themselves; and of these Kant had but few.
logic, metaphysics, physics, and mathematics; and at a later period,
on morals, anthropology, and physical geography.
This wide
range was taken probably to show the variety of his attainments,
and to enable him to become a candidate for any
professorship, in
which a vacancy might chance to occur. His probation was a
long
one
for fifteen years he held this
very humble post, the irains of
which, even with the strictest economy, hardly gave him bread
;

enough to eat.
During the last four of these years, however, he
was sub-librarian of the Royal Library, with the modest income of
a year.
Small as the salary was, it afforded at least
a safeguard against starvation. At last, in 1770, at the
ripe age of
forty-six, Kant was appointed ordinary Professor of Logic and
Metaphysics, the very post for which he had been an unsuccessful
candidate twelve years before. Eleven years afterwards, that is, in
1781, he published his "Critique of Pure Reason;" and even then
he had to wait six years longer, IK- fore the book and its author, then
iifty dollars

sixty-three years old, rose from obscurity, and he became by gen

eral consent the first metaphysician of his
age. The

concluding por

tions of his great work, the

Critique of Practical Reason," which
contains his theory of ethics or moral science, and the
Critique of
Judgment," which relates to the theory of taste and the idea of de
"

sign,

were published, the

first

in

Several works of less magnitude,

ment and application

noteworthy being

his

1788, and the second

in

1790.

occupied with the develop

of the principles of his
system, the most
Religion within the Limits of Mere Rea
all

"

a very rationalistic view of theology,

appeared at various
times before 17U7, when, the infirmities of
age having come upon
lie was never
him, li-e ceased either to lecture or to publish,

son,"

when young, he was too poor and when at ease in his

circumstances, he was too old and too fixed in his habits, to make
such a change in his mode of life at all desirable.
Though always
married

healthy, during the last year or two of his

life

he became exceed

Reduced to a mere
ingly feeble, and at last helpless and childish.
skeleton, he dried up rather than died, on the 12th of February,
1804, in the eightieth year of his age.
Dislike of change, perfect self-dependence, and a
rigid observ
tl e moral
law, were the leading traits of his character.

ance of

THE PURPOSE OF THE

His habits were so methodical, and

"

CRITIQUE."

103

his persistency of purpose so

Poor as he was
a slave to routine.
great, that he might be called
incurred a debt,
he
never
his
of
far
the
life,
larger portion
during
a favor which he had not richly earned.
or
Having se
accepted

cured, after waiting for many tedious years, the great object of his
life, a professorship of metaphysics in the university of his native
Calls to
town, he rejected all offers of removal or advancement.
out
of his
was
never
He
he
declined.
to
to
Halle,
Jena,
Erlangen,
native province, never so much as one hundred miles from the place
where he was born. His longest journeys, and these were short

and very infrequent, were to neighboring country-houses. Till

he was sixty-six years old, the narrowness of his circumstances
dine at a table d hote.
compelled him to live in lodgings, and to
Then, having accumulated a modest independence by savings from
income, he took a small private house, and every day entertained
at dinner a few friends, never less than two, nor more than seven.
was seated at his
Punctually at five o clock in the morning, he
breakfast table, where he drank a single cup of tea, made a light
the only one which he al
repast, and smoked a pipe of tobacco,
For fifteen years, he never failed to
lowed himself during the day.
be in his lecture room at the appointed hour, never being so much
He lectured two or three hours each day,
as five minutes late.

At
the rest of the forenoon being devoted to study or writing.
one precisely, he received his guests at dinner, all the arrangements
which were carried on like clockwork. The only subject to
which he never voluntarily alluded in conversation, was his own

at

system of philosophy.
As the first step towards understanding Kant, we must try to
ascertain what that system of philosophy or mode of philosophizino- is, which he stigmatizes as irrational dogmatism, and wherein
it differs from the empiricism which inevitably leads to skepticism.
Dogmatism is a method rather than a system, so that the doctrines which are ranked under this head have little affinity with
*

each other, except in the processes through which they are obtained,
Descartes,
and in the reasonings by which they are supported.
Malebranche, Leibnitz, may all be termed dogmatists, because, in
one manner or another, they seek to establish and confirm the con
clusions of experience and the earliest convictions of intelligence
by abstract reasoning, and by an appeal to the neces-ary and prim

which underlie all our knowledge, and which cannot

be denied, they say, without falling into self-contradiction and ab
affirms, and seeks, by the use of the deduc-

itive truths

surdity.

Dogmatism

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

164
tire

method,

to justify

and demonstrate

its

affirmations.

It affirms

the being of a (iod. the existence and immortality of the soul, the
reality of things out of our o\vn minds, the freedom of the will, the
It affirms that the intelligible
certainty of human knowledge.
world, of which J lato speaks, as seen by the light of pure ideas,
may be clearly discerned by the enlightened and purified intellect,

and that

it
may be regarded as the counterpart of the sensible
world, the neressarv relations of the former being the principles
and ground of the observed tacts of the latter.
It assumes to

penetrate beyond the world of

phenomena

to the

world of

realities,

of things as they actually are, which lies behind.

Man is capable,
it maintains, of a spiritual discernment of the truth, and of
purg

ing away the illusions of the senses, because the human partakes
of the divine intellect, and is enlightened and informed by innate

reminiscences, as I lato would have it. of knowledge ob

tained in a higher state of being.
by primitive and absolute con
victions, which prove themselves, because they are the ground of
ideas.

proof, and therefore cannot be doubted or denied, because that

very doubt or denial takes them for granted.
all

On
all

the other hand, empiricism, as its name imports, affirms that

our knowledge comes from experience, and is therefore subject

and limitations of experience.

It is strictly
phenomena, to \\hat. appears, never extending to the
We obtain our
ground of the appearance, or to what really is.
experience only through the smses. either through the external
senses, by which we observe what is passing in the world without,
to all the imperfections

limited

to

or the internal sense, otherwise called rellection or consciousness,

by which we observe what is going on within our own minds.

Let me here observe once for

much

that

is

all,

since

remark clears up

the

otherwise ambiguous and liable

to

be misunderstood

Philosophy, that whenever Kant speaks of Sinnthe faculty of sense, he means both these sources of

in the Critical
li

<///,

if.

knowledge,

both the bodily senses, and what,

IK; calls

-the inter

though it is denominated by other writers conscious

reflection."
and by John Locke,
I am conscious, says
ness,"
Kant, of an impression made on my mind, an impression which
is f/ii-cn to me as a mental phenomenon, without any volition or
agency of my own and this he calls a sensible impression, whether
it comes
through one of the external organs of sense, such as the
or
or from the notice which the mind takes of its own
ear,
eye
The notice
states and phenomena, such as pain, joy, or hatred.
which the mind takes of such a sensible impression, whether it be
nal

sense,"

"

THE PURPOSE OF THE

"CRITIQUE."

a color or a sound, a pain or an anxiety,

such is strictly limited to what is here and

mind

in

German, a

Vorstellitng, or

is

165

an Intuition, and as

now

placing

actually before the

a direct
before

presentation of consciousness.

Xow, experience
and

is

is

made up

of such intuitions,

therefore strictly limited

to the

is

phenomena

their aggregate,
of the present

to sensible impressions as they occur, and in the order in

which they occur.
AVe know nothing, the empiricists say. of the
these
of
ground
phenomena, of their ellicient cause, or of any
However freoiientnecessary connection existing between them.
ly one may have been repeated, we have no assurance that it will
ever occur again.
AVe know only that they come in succession,
that as one departs, another rises.
Of the source whence they
come, or the cause which produces them, we know nothing, liecause we have no intuition or experience of such a source or cause.

moment,

Empiricism, then, it is evident, terminates in utter skepticism.

The aim of Kant, as I have said, is to mediate between these
two methods.
He does not purpose to examine directly the doc
trines which are in dispute between the dogmatists and their op
ponents, so as to ascertain whether the evidence preponderates in
favor of or against them. This was the method of former metaphy
a mere
sicians, and he repudiates it as uncertain and hazardous,
groping in the dark, guided by no principle, and leading to no
positive or unquestionable result.

lie complains that metaphysics,

unlike logic and geometry, make no progress, but remain essen
The old questions
tially as they were three thousand years ago.

perpetually recur; not one of them has been definitively settled.

AYhat one builds up, another pulls down and this process is con
;

Giving up. therefore, at least for the present,

any examination of the main points at issue, Kant goes farther
back, and proposes to institute a critical examination of Pure
that is, of the mind as it exists a priori, as yet
Reason itself;
uninformed and uninfluenced by any experience whatsoever;
an
examination of the cognitive processes, through which we know
anything, in order to ascertain whether there be any a priori ele
that is. any elements which are not empirical,
ments iu them,
but transcend all experience
to make a perfect list of these ele
ments, if any such there be, and then to determine their limits
the field within which alone they are applicable, and the grounds
on which they must either be accepted as valid and trustworthy, or
oe banished into the realm of shadows and illusions.
Consequently,
Kant declares that his work is not properly metaphysical, but
tinually repeated.

1G6

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

a sort of preliminary examination of the

Critical,
ground, in
order to determine whether such a science as Metaphysics is
possi
ble.
Instead of asking how the objects affect, our
cognitive facul
ties, he proposed to inquire how our
cognitive faculties ait ect the
On account of the change
objects which are presented to them.
of method thus effected, Kant compares himself to

Copernicus,

who, finding that he could not explain the motions of the heavenly
bodies by .supposing the iirmament to turn round the
spectator,
tried the opposite hypothesis,
by supposing the spectator to turn,
and the stars to be at rest.
From the centre of the mind itself,

Kant observed

the action of our cognitive faculties on

surroundiii"

Jle looked upon the outward world, and

things.
upon all objects
of thought which are foreign to ourselves, as modilied
by our own

mental constitution.

modes

he says,

first/

the mind projecting, so to speak, its own

It sounds strange at
upon the external creation.
but it is none the less certain, that the mind does
own primitive cognitions from nature, but imposes

of being

not derive

its

them upon

nature."

Herein, as already remarked, Kant appears as the successor and

rival ot John Locke.
The purpose of both is to inquire into the
and as a
origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge
"

means

to this

end, to

make

a critical

examination of the faculties

of the human mind, and a careful

analysis of its principal ideas
and cognitions, in order to ascertain how far they are trustworthy.
This purpose seems a legitimate and reasonable one. though it is

open to the sarcastic objection brought against it bv Hegel, who

remarks, that an attempt to examine our mental faculties, before

employing them

in the search after truth, is as absurd as the deter

mination of old Scholasticus, never to go into the water till he had
learned how to swim.
Of course, this preliminary examination

must begin by taking for granted the very thing which we wish

to

that is, that they

namely, that our faculties are trustworthy,
are competent to examine themselves.
This objection is ingenious,
pr.ive.

and yet

great part sophistical.

Through consciousness and
mind somehow has the marvellous power of witness
own operations, of seeing itself think, and thereby of judg
r
own work as if it were the work of another
All
it

memory,
ing

it.s

ing

its

that

Hegel

able one,

is

in

the

bein<

fairly

proves

is.

that the

judgment so formed,

a favor

if

is not
infalli
necessarily infallible.
Certainly it is not
the attribute only of omniscience.
But limited and liuite
though it is, the human mind is abundantly capable of detecting
inconsistencies and contradictions iu its own work ; and as the

bility

is

THE PURPOSE OF THE

167

"CRITIQUE."

is well-nigh
these faults affords a presumption, which
presence of
of them fur
absence
the
so
is
work
the
that
wrong,

irresistible,

nishes at least

prima facie evidence

that the

work is right. To
Kant is legiti

of Locke and
this extent, at least, the undertaking
of
certitude, we
measure
For
mate.

any greater
as Descartes did, on the veracity of God.

must

fall

back,

When

the skeptic en
the truthful
of
evidence
this
deavors to impuu-n even
prima facie
need to
is all that Kant and Locke
which
our
of
ness
faculties,
was
which
the
of
fallacy
assume in the outset, he is himself guilty
vcnEtiam
net/at
Thomas
qui
out
Aquinas
by
ago
"

long
latcm

pointed

essc,

concedit veritatcm esse

si

enim

veritas

non

est,

He who

non

denies every assertion

verum cst non esse
himself.
his own denial, and so contradicts
denies
thereby
are
all
that
general remarks
cannot make a true general remark,
be pre
must
faculties
our
that
same
the
is
what
thing,
false ; or,
untruthful.
sumed in the first place, and before examination, to be
a priori
that
Kant
proves abundantly,
Against the Empiricists,
do enter
if you choose to call them so
Innate
Ideas,
elements
veritatem."

We

We can
our knowledge, even that of the simplest kind.
of stone or metal, not
a
bit
not
whatever
not lnoio any object
except by the aid of primitive
the simplest geometrical figure
be derived
and necessary ideas and principles, which never could
stores.
its own
from
mind
the
which
but
supplies
from sense,
the
To
be
not
possible.
Without these, experience itself would
of
its
to
impres
that
receiving
is,
of the mind,
power
receptivity
it is merely passive,
sions and intuitions, in regard to which
that is, its power
there must be added the spontaneity of mind,
of shaping
these
and
impressions,
of reacting upon
modifying
each other, and binding them
them, perceiving their relations to
that whole which we call au object of experience.
together into
Kant undertakes to
()n the other hand, against the Dogmatists,
and
elements
principles are appli
demonstrate that these a priori
if pushed beyond it,
or
of
field
the
within
experience,
cable only
The receptivity of mind, without
lead only to delusion and error.
of
and
useless, a mere heaping together
its spontaneity, is blind
than a shape
crude materials, which no more constitutes knowledge
But then, spontaneity without
of bricks does a house.

into

till

less

pile

receptivity

without Matter, un
empty and void, mere Form
derived.
can
abstractions, from which no cognition
be^

is

imaginable
are
To adopt the Kantian phraseology, Concepts without Intuitions
the union of
are blind.
without
Only
Intuitions
Concepts
empty
even this union is merely
the two makes experience possible. And
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
subjective, a

product of mental action, not

conesponding to any
thing in itself, irrespective of our cognition.
Kant. ft
is trne. calls this union
but be means
objectively valid
only
valid for all possible
valid not
experience \vbatsoever
only
lor tlie present, but for
past and future, experience; valid not only
lor my experience, but for
yours and bis. for (hat of all man
kind.
Jt is ealh-d "valid." because it is a
necessary element of
experience, lor with, HI! it no experience would be possible.
reality, or

"

;"

"

"

Previous systems differed from each other in the relative im

portance which they attached to the two cognitive faculties,
that
is. to the
faculty of Sense, by which we have Intuitions, and to the
Understanding or Intellect proper, by which we have Thoughts or

The Dogmatist-; say, these two differ onlv in

Concepts.
de-Tee,
and that the first, the evidence of
Sense, is incomplete, confused,
and indistinct; while the second, the
clears
tip this

Understanding,

confusion, removes this

vagueness, and gives us full. dear, and
certain
Thus. Descartes maintains, that the criterion
knowledge.
oi perfect
clear and distinct ideas
knowledge or certainty is

having
and Leibnitz allirms that an infinite number of confuted
perceptions
of sense exist even in the lowest Monad, and rise
successivelv to
distinct and conscious
knowledge only in the intellect of the higher
;

orders of creation.
Not so, say the Empiricists;
is true
that
the two differ
only in degree, but as all our knowledge is derived
from impressions on the Sense, it is most
distinct, vivid, and cer
tain when nearest its source.
The idea or conception, which re
mains alter the sensuous
impression ha* ceased, is onlv a faint and
diluted copy of that
All idea, which cannot be re
impression.
ferred back to a sensuous
origin are mere chimeras; and the im
it,

mediate testimony of

the senses

perfect conviction. All else

tic
says, neither faculty is

is

is

the only

mere opinion or

source of
belief.

both deceive.
trustworthy
oiten give us false
impressions, and the understanding
taken in the inferences which it draws from them.
;

full

and

The Skep
Our senses
is

often mis

Among these divergent opinions, the Critical Philosophy takes

intermediate ground.
Kant says the two faculties differ in kind,
each having its peculiar function to
perform; and the action of
the two must be united before
can result.
This is
any
knowledge

only saying that the human mind not only passively receives sensa
tions from
things, but apprehends relations between things; that
the former are
the senses and
the
appreciable

by

imagination;

picturable by

the latter are not.

they result from comparison.

My

They can only be conceived;

dog hears the successive and

THE PURPOSE OF THE

169

"CRITIQUE."

as well as I do, probably

the simultaneous notes in a complex tune
But he certainly
is more acute.
better, since his hearingthe melody.
or
the
of
harmony
Las no apprehension either

much

inharmonious sounds will make him howl; and he will

medley
or Mozart,
howl also at a grand orchestral movement by Haydn
in the one
music
of
much
as
appreciation
probably with just
of

case as in the other.

[

borrow an eloquent statement

of the

same doctrine from Dr.

human mind," he
and appropriate what meets the senses
use
and herein lies a chief distinction between man s and a brute s
but
Unites gaze on sights, they are arrested by sounds
of them.
sounds
and
are
hear
sights
what they see and what they
^only.
The intellect of man, on the contrary, energizes, as well as his eye
them.
or ear, and perceives in sights and sounds something beyond
it grasps and
it
to
senses
the
what
present
It seizes and unites
It dis
forms what need not be seen or heard except in detail.
what
and
is
what
beautiful,
cerns in lines and colors, or in tones,
idea.
an
with
them
invests
and
a
them
It gives
is not.
meaning

J.

II.

savs.

Newman.

"

is

"

One

of the first acts of the

to take hold of

as it were, into a point of time,

up a succession of notes,
and
a
keen
has
it
sensibility towards angles
and calls it a melody
It distinguishes
contours.
and
tints
and
shadows,
curves, lights
It as
between rule and exception, between accident and design.

It gathers

to a subject, acts to a
general law, qualities
In a word, it philosophizes ; for
principle,
are
I suppose Science and Philosophy, in their elementary idea,
of viewing, as it may be called, the ob
habit
this
than
else
nothing
sense conveys to the miLJ, of throwing them
sys
jects which
them with one form."
tem, and uniting and stamping

signs

phenomena
and

to a

effects to a cause.

iu*x>

CHAPTER XL
KANT

"CRITIQUE

OF PUKE

TRANSCENDENTAL

REASON."

-(ESTHETIC.

WHAT Kant calls an Analytical Judgment

mere explanation of tin;
meaning o f a

is

Wurd>

to

nothing
"

angles.

"a

only a definition,

ai)(1

therefore ad(lg

our knowledge.
When I say, a triangle has three
quadrilateral has four sides," the
is

proposition
merely
verbal and explicative; it tells \vhal I mean
by the use of certain
but
it
words,
expresses no new fact or truth.
But when I say,
I n,n is hard;
sugar is soluble," a stone, if left unsupported, falls
to the ground," the
proposition teaches a ne\v i act or truth
it
in
creases knowledge, and is therefore called a
Synthetical Judgment.
[t is so called because it
unites the attribute
hardness
or "solu
"

"

"

bility,"

expressed

in the
predicate, to the

-iron

"

or

"

which
sugar
All knowledge takes the form of
ajudgment ;
may be expressed by a proposition in which a
predicate is united by the copula with a
subject.
Hence, all
knowledge is a synthesis, a union, a putting together of two or more
and hence the phrase,
things
synthetical judgment."
All the facts which we learn from
experience are properly
termed
empirical Synthetical Judgments."
But when we assert,
as we do with absolute
certitude, that every change must have a
cause, every sensible quality must inhere in a
is
substance,
forms the subject.
every fact or truth

Space
and indestructible, etc., we
go entirely beyond experience;
we assert what experience is
utterly incompetent either to teach or
to
Such assertions are denominated
verify.
by Kant Synthetical
Judgments a priori" Hume directed his attention almost exclu
He saw clearly enough that the idea
sively to one of these cases.
of cause cannot be furnished
by experience, and therefore, natu
rally enough, asked what is its origin.
Whence did we obtain
infinite

"

ihis

is

Hume

it ?

Make

the question
universal, state it in
the broadest possible
form, and we have the great problem which
the Critical
Philosophy undertakes to solve: "How are Synthet

ical

problem.

Judgments a priori

possible?"

The phraseology

is

a fair

KANT

"CRITIQUE

OF PURE

171

REASON."

in which Kant s scul de

specimen of that jargon of technicalities
but
its meaning here is obvious enough
throwing aside
lighted
mere AnalyticalJudgments, which are evidently of no account, how
;

that, independently of experience, we are able to know any

the consideration of this ques
thing with absolute certainty ? To
is exclusively devoted.
Pure
Reason
of
the
tion,
Critique
first seek for a criterion or test by which we may securely

is it

"

"

We

knowledge from that which

distinguish a priori

Kant

is

founded on ex

finds such a test, already pointed out

by Leibnitz,
perience.
in the characteristics of universality and strict necessity, neither of
which can be attached to any propositions of empirical origin.
is never complete, never exhausts the possi
Human
experience

its judgments, therefore, are never universally

ble variety of cases
true or demonstratively certain
but, founded on an inductive pro
;

The
extended.
they are valid so far as our observation has
Not
so with all
and
conceivable.
is
always possible
contrary
the propositions of mathematics, with some axioms in physics, and
with many other truths, that are implied in all the forms of spec
These carry their own evidence along with
ulative
cess,

knowledge.

them, no case being supposable where absolute and universal cer

Therefore, they are not derived
tainty would fail to attend them.
from experience, and the question recurs with regard to their ori

Whence

does the mind obtain them ?

world to give any other answer to this query
that they are a priori forms of the mind itself,
than his own
the colored medium through which we look out upon the universe

gin,

Kant

defies the
;

The material world is deaf and dumb to

things.
The mind does not derive them from without, but
from its own stores, and, by its own inborn energy, imposes them
Our
as necessary and immutable laws upon the outward universe.
and therefore we
perceptive faculties have a peculiar organization,
know a priori, that the information received through the senses

of cognizable

such truths.

to this organization, receiving certain changes from

In what manner
passages through which it is transmitted.
of
a different con
to
are
would
as
appear
beings
they really
things
stitution and nature from ourselves, we cannot even conjecture.

must conform
the:

But we know how they must appear to us, and

experience, we can determine some particulars

therefore, prior to
in relation to

them

To

inquire into the actual constitution of

their
real
distinct from the appearances which
as
nature,
things,
It is seeking to
endeavor.
is a hopeless
they assume to us,

with absolute certainty.

know, without using the only means

of knowledge.

But

it is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

172
gross error, though

;i

natural one, to consider our

own modes

of

modes

of being inherent in things as they really are ;

to give objective validity to subjective laws.
As Kant so frequently speaks of the synthesis, which is necessary

knowing

as

in order to constitute;
it

let

knowledge,

me

illustrate the necc.-.Mty of

little farther.

An

is a
perception of some one impression now made
as referred to its origin in the faculty of
which,
mind,
upon
sense, is either an external impression of some quality in an out
ward object, as a blur color or a circular figure, or an internal im-

Intuition

the

pre-^ion of some affection of mind, as fear or aversion.

a bundle or j <ixctri//im of these qualities or attributes

is

calls

An

object

.Mr. Mill

a "synthesis of in
Kant, calls
group of sen.-ations;
Thus, a rosy color, a nearly spherical shape, a subacid
moderate hardness to the touch, etc., make up the object

it

it,

"a

tuitions."
ta>te,

which

\ve

call

an apple.

Still

farther: an object

not only of qualities or attributes, but

al.-o

is

an aggTegn;,-

The

of parts.

Intuitive

faculty apprehends by units, only one at a time; and therefore

takes in suceesMvely the smallest parts, the in unina visibilia, of the
outline, and the extent or magnitude, of every object. because every
:

intuitive perception, savs Kant, being contained absolutely in onemoment, can be only of an absolute unit, of extension and an ab

Kvery object exiting in space contains an

of such units of extension; every event taking
place in time, be it of lon-vr ^\- shorter duration, contains a mul
Tim.-, e\ cry object, and every event
tiplicity of such units of time.
solute unit of time.
indefinite

number

our apprehension, though not nerearily in itself, a mani

complex of many parts and can be apprehended as a
The
whole, or as one thing, only by a synthesis of these parts.

is,

t<>

fold, a

function of Sense, of the Intuitive faculty, is to perceive or take

in these units singly, and thus furnish us the Matter of knowledge;
the function of the Understanding, or thinking faculty, is to perform
the synthesis of these parts, through thinking them in their proper
relations to each other, thus enabling us to apprehend the object
as one whole.

We

now understand Kant s oft repeated phrase, grasping

together the manifold of intuition in the unity of apprehension."
also see how little single intuitions, mere perceptions of sense,
can
teach us.
True, they are the constituent elements, the
can

"

We

really

but without the cooperation of the

put them together into wholes, through discern
that
ing their relations to each other, they no more constitute

Matter, of our knowledge

Understanding

to

KANT

ITS

TRANSCENDENTAL /ESTHETIC.

Relations, as
knowledge than a pile of bricks constitutes a house.
discerned by sense,
be
cannot
I have already abundantly proved,

Thus, an angle is a relation

nor represented by the imagination.
I can see only
a relation.
is
surface
a
or
line
a
the direction of
but I can only think
the two lines and their point of junction;
for this is a general abstract idea, a
their angular divergence
the same as, the same
similar
not
to, but precisely
merely
Concept,
or surfaces.
amount of angular divergence of any other two lines
and cannot
individual
the
units,
the
singular,
Sense perceives only
;

the universal,

them; the Understanding thinks the general,

and makes a synthesis of the units.
Olerve now the mental process by which, according to Kant,
an
we form that object of thought which we believe to represent

unite

We

will suppose the unit of ex

external object,
say, a book.
In reality, it 13
an inch.
be
to
intuitive
the
for
faculty
tension
of
intuition,
manifold
a
just as
much smaller for a pin s head is
_

mountain since we readily apprehend many differences

a pin s head and a hemp-seed
in shape and other attributes between
We
do for an example.
will
inch
an
But
of about the same size.
inches that make up
intuit successively the six or eight
or
perceive
the relation of
of the book; and we apprehend also
the

much

as a

length
namely, that they are con
these successive inches to each other
10 form a straight
so
tinuous, and all lie in the same direction,
On
or a curve.
line
broken
a
from
line, being very different
successive
two
the
that
notice
we
the
of
one
corners,
coming to
in the same direction, are at right angles
units, Instead of being
the
with each other.
Continuing this process, we put together
action of the Intuitive
same
the
and
the
joint
of
book;
outline
by
we cognize successively the thick
faculty and the Understanding,
texture, and other attributes, and
the
the
color,
ness, the weight,
of knowledge, the whole
thus fashion a manifold into the one object
taken
these
steps are really
which we call a book.
Though
^sucthe whole is so quickly
of
moment
time,
own
its
in
each
cessivelv,
;

a>

for as Hobbes
appears to be done instantaneously
time really elapses in the
that
Uut
is
remarks,
quick."
thought
of the object is proved when we try the
gradual comprehension
some novel and interesting object, of irregular shape
process with
or
attributes, such as a newly discovered flower,
remarkable
and

execut Jd, that

it

effort of at
for then a perceptible length of time and
it.
understand
it in and
take
to
order
in
tention are necessary
a
faint and indistinct notion which we gain of
the
also
Compare
it
of
mere
a
us
to
glimpse

mineral

landscape that

is

new

by

momentary

174

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

through a window, with the full and correct knowledge which an

has formed of it, when he has studied it
long enough to re
produce it from memory on canvas.
Motion, also, can be appre
hended only by a synthesis in time of the units of intuition.
Any
artist

and limited space or

definite

tions, as a triangle, or

time, though not filled up with sensa

an hour, considered
abstractly, is a manifold
Remember, also, that most of the qualities

so grasped
together.
or attributes of the thing- around
us, which we loosely -peak of as
perceived all at once by our senses, are in truth not,
perceived by
sense at all, but only imagined or
mentally reproduced from the
recollection of former intuitions
suggested by the few qualities that
we really do have an intuition of at the moment. Thus I
may
have an intuitive perception
only of the shape and color of the
apple, and imagine, without actually perceiving, its wei-ht, taste,
smell, etc.
It

not denied that then-

is

sions on

may be

several simultaneous impres

my

one

different senses, or a very

complex impression on
of them. Thus, an intricate
be
geometrical figure

and

so do not

any

may

impressed
all at once on the retina of the
eye; and the palate, nostrils, hand,
and eye may all be affected at the same moment
by one external
But the essence of the doctrine here maintained is, that
object.
these mere sensations, in themselves considered, without attendant
and coordinate action of the
understanding upon them, whether they
come simultaneously or successively,
convey uo knowledge what
soever.
They are as if made upon the senses of a brute animal, or
upon our own senses when we are in a reverie or in

deep thought,
heed them, and are not even conscious of their occur
Attention is indivisible, and must be added to mere Sensa

rence.

(Emjifindung), before we can have Intuition, or a Vorstcllnnq,

is
a clear Presentation to consciousness,
( .m.-ciotisness,
argue- Kant, is the indispensable prerequisite for all
tion

which

am

conscious of the Presentation, then

then distinguish it,

"If

I can

Presentation;

"if

it

is

cognition.
that is,

cknr;"

through comparison, from some other

not conscious of it, it is obscure
that is,
Hence, every mental "object," which is per-

am

;"

mere Sensation.
ceived and clearly
thought as one whole, is really a manifold of in
tuitions and relations,
requiring time and effort for their cognition,
and grasped together by an act of the
into a
it is

concept.
the

The minimum

of intuition

is

understanding
single
actually an indivisible unit,

vanishing point alike of perception and thought.

is curious that
Dugald Stewart, who

It

Kant

argued stoutly against

philosophy, himself teaches, and illustrates with profusion

KANT

175

TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC.

the indivisibility of attention,

and elegance, this very doctrine of
are required to cognize
and of the time and successive efforts which
minimum
the
than
perceptible by sense.
is
larger
any object that
If the
He thus taught genuine Kantianism without knowing it.
con
immediate
an
were
he
of visible
argues,
"

"

figure,"

perception

on the retina, we should have, at the first

sequence of the picture
an idea of a figure of a thousand sides, as of a
glance, as distinct
The truth is, when the figure is very simple,
triangle or a square.
so rapid, that the perception seems to be in
is
mind
of
the process
a certain
stantaneous but when the sides are multiplied beyond
time necessary for these different acts of
of
interval
the
number,
Remember also what I have al
;

attention becomes perceptible."

not only every sensible object, but every judg
ready stated, that
because it expresses a union, through the
and
ment
proposition,
with a predicate, made in consequence of a
copula, of a subject
which we discern the relations between the two, is

comparison by
the understanding.
a synthesis, and every synthesis is a work of
the
and
minutely upon this portion of
I have dwelt thus long
it supplies a key to his whole system.
because
of
Kant,
doctrine
and the
The separate and peculiar functions of the Intuitive Faculty
their necessary conjoint action, each under its
and
Understanding,
to
own laws, informing any cognition whatsoever, will be found
na
the
whole
origin,
question respecting
throw much light on the
human knowledge. The Critical Philosophy
ture, and certainty of
the foundation the doctrine of the Sensualists, that all
uproots from
on the Sense, and that the
our ideas are derived from impressions
the
furnish the only criterion by which we can distinguish
senses

The mere recep

true from the false, the real from the imaginary.
action of nerve
the
on
physical
mind
proper
may depend
tivity of
knowl
and brain but what is thus received no more constitutes
s types,
of
the
of
letters
of
printer
alphabet,
edge than a heap
or an epic
taken at random, would spell out an algebraic treatise
the
of Thought,
coordinating power of the
poem. The spontaneity
and unite these scattered
must come in to
;

arrange
Understanding,
before
elements of cognition, binding them into an orderly whole,
conscious
of
the
even
perception.
simplest object
they can express

dream

Matter without Form is unmeaning and chaotic it is the

like mental state of a dog or cat.
The doctrine that all our knowledge is not derived from sensa
;

if we shall find that,

firmly established,
make
which
units
up the manifold of in
among the elements or
of knowledge, there are
the
constitute
and
objects
thereby
tuition,

tion will

become

still

more

"

176

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

some, which, since they arc universal and necessary, cannot be de

rived from our limited experience
since this extends
to a few
only

and therefore cannot tell us what must be

must have their origin in the mind itself,
cases,

in all cast

s.

These

antecedently to all expe

rience, though first developed on occasion of such experience.
Such
elements there are; and far from being
meagre in their nature or
restricted

in their application, whole sciences, of hir^e

import and
To prove their
priceless utility, are entirely founded upon them.
existence. Kant first
analy/es the intuitions of sense, in that portion
of his
which he calls "Transcendental
Critique
that
.Esthetic;"

is,

the determination

of the necessary

<i

priori elements of mere

perception.

The intuition of Space is not derived from

objects through ex
perience, but must preexist in the mind before we could have any
experience of an object. Thus. I do not first perceive a book, and
then derive from it an idea, of the
space which it occupies; for the
book would not be a book, if it were not extended in length,
breadth,
and thickness; that is. if it did not
.It
is true, that
occupy space.
I must perceive some external
before the idea of
can

object
Space
be, so to speak, brouyht out in the mind, or developed into distinct
consciousness.
Just so. I must see
before I can know

something,

what the po\ver of vision is; but then it is

of vision must previously have existed, or

certain that the

I

power

could not have seen

Objects could not have been perceived hv me as exter

could not have known what
externality or VH/IH SS was,
the idea of Space had not
already been in my mind.

anything.
nal.
if

Again: Space is necessary for the existence of objects; but

I
objects are not necessary for the existence of Space.
can think
imagining them all to have been annihilated; but
now occupy cannot be thought away; it will
not be annihilated, even in imagination.
Then it is a necessity of
I am not in it, but it is
thought, and not a product of experience.
in me.
"/myall

objects,

the space which they

Thirdly,
of

all

objects are finite or limited; I cannot even conceive

them except

But Space is neces

having limits and bounds.
by me as unlimited or infinite; I cannot imagine
that there are bounds
beyond which Space is not. Therefore, to
derive Space from Body would be to
suppose that the Finite in
as

sarily conceived

cludes the Infinite, or that the part is

greater than the whole.
Moreover, Space is one, a single object, and all particular definite
spaces are arbitrary and imaginary limitations of it, being carved
out of it by our finite
Hence it is a Percept, and not a
thought.

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC.

177

Concept; it is an individual presentation to consciousness, and not

a generalization from experience. To adopt Kant s
language. Space
is the form of the
faculty of sense, or the subjective condition under
which alone external perception is possible.

The reasoning is very similar in the case of Time.

explanation of the origin of our idea of Time is, that

The common
we obtain it

by abstraction and generalization, from observing the duration,

But Kant says the reverse
simultaneity, and succession of events.
if we did not first have the idea of Time, we could not know
is true
what duration, simultaneity, and succession are since these are
only
modes, or modifications, of Time.
Duration is the continuity, a
quantum, more or less, of Time. Simultaneity is coexistence at the
same Time. Succession is one event coming after another in Time.
Evidently, then, if I had not already known what Time is, I could
not have known what a quantum or measure of Time is, nor what
coexistence or succession is.
That is no definition which depends
on the presence of the very word which ought to be defined. Time
:

is

the

2>riiis

duration, simultaneity, or succession,

is

the posterius

cannot be derived from them, but they must be derived from it.
Neither can Time in general, or in the abstract, be derived from
our cognition of particular limited Times.
Days, hours, and min
utes would have no significance to me, if I had not
already a con
ception of Time, of which these are arbitrary divisions or measures.
it

So the

clock, or the place of the sun in the heavens, would not tell
time of day it is, if
previously instructed mind did not

me what

my

give them an

own

for to

artificial

significance, a

meaning which

is

not their

senses, directly, they show nothing but position

motion, or change.
Again, Time in general is one infinite and

my

and
un
divided whole, a continuity without break, a seamless
garment ex
Our division of it, our
tending to eternity both before and after.
portioning it out into definite limited times, is an arbitrary and
The slightest real division of it, the slightest
imaginary process.
separation of one part of it from its nearest part, is utterly incon
;

ceivable.

Equally inconceivable

is

any

limit or termination of

I can easily imagine the

Mississippi dried

up,

Time.
Niagara frozen into

no longer turning on its axis

but the river
flows on forever; not even in
thought can I put a limit
perpetual, its uniform, lapse.

silence, or the earth

of

Time

to its

"

Labitur et labetur in

omne

volubilis

sevum."

Surely, experience could not teach me these absolute and necessary

truths
they are necessities of thought, not necessities of real ob;

12

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

178

If they were the latter, the mind could never

jective existence.
have obtained that linn grasp of them which it now possesses.
Time, then, Kant concludes, is a priori in the mind; it is subjec
tive; it is a form of the faculty of sense, of the internal sense;
it is the colored
glass through which we behold all events, these

being manifested to us only as changes, as successive

own minds.

states, of

our

Now this doctrine, that Space and Time are only forms of human
perception, not modes of real existence, is the most comprehensive
and thorough-going system of skepticism that the wit of man has
ever devised.
The very constitution of our nature, a fundamental
law of

human

belief,

which compels us

to assert

their objective

reality, their necessary existence independent of our thoughts, is

held to be a proof that they do not exist except as
necessary illu

Then no other law of thought, not even that

which unites the conclusion of a syllogism with its premises, is valid.
The reasoning which impeaches one of the fundamental laws of
belief, one of the neces.siry principles on which all reasoning is
bused, thereby vitiates and destroys all those laws and principles,
sions of our minds.

In fact, the obvious result of the

and, in so doing, stultifies itself.
system is not so much Skepticism, as Nihilism it does not doubt,
it
dogmatically denies; and by atlirming such denial, it contradicts
It does not merely say, that the
itself.
objective reality of Space
;

and Time cannot

be

proved

every one admits

that.

J>ut

allirms

it

that such
as

it

This is not saying that existence

reality is impossible.
appears to us is unreal, but that existence itself, under

any

form whatsoever,

is

inconceivable.

For existence

is

continuity of

being, or being related to some other being either in Space or

if these are unreal, no
continuity, and no such relation,

and

Time

is

pos
sible.
Without Space, there is no coexistence, but the universe is
contracted to a mathematical point, which is nowhere, and there
fore has no relation to anything beyond itself; without Time, there

no successive existence, but the past and the future shrink into
moment which alone is present; and even this dis
appears as soon as it begins to be.
is

the indivisible

And
manner

Kant maintains the existence in some inconceivable

some inconceivable things, which he calls noumena, or
There must be, he main
they really are in themselves.

yet
of

things as
tains, a ground or reason for the phenomenal world, for the things

which appear
in their

being.

something which determines phenomena

to

appear

present forms, rather than in some other modes of apparent

Why there must be such a ground or reason, or how the

KANT
affirmation of

it is

TRANSCENDENTAL

justified

179

/ESTHETIC.

by any higher or stronger law

of belief

than that which guaranties the existence of Space and Time, he

He takes for granted the celebrated principle
does not inform us.
in reality,
of Leibnitz, that
exists, either in appearance or

nothing
I admit the validity
without a Sufficient Reason for its existence.
of this Leibnitzian axiom; but on this ground only, that the very
And I argue
constitution of my nature compels me to admit it.
that an imperative necessity of precisely the same character com
If
the objective reality of Space and Time.
pels me to admit also
in
are
bound
we
law
of
fundamental
belief,
one
consistency
we deny
One such principle cannot be saved from
all such laws.
to

deny

the wreck, in order to serve the purposes of a theorist. They must

for they all rest on essentially the same
stand or fall together
basis, a necessity of thought, and the suicidal consequences of re
;

jecting them.
AVe can admit the positive portion of Kant s theory, then, namely,
the a priori cognition or intuition of Space and Time, without ac

which he has needlessly and unrea

cepting the skeptical doctrine

the doctrine, that is, that Space and Time

sonably appended to it,
The a priori character of
illusive.
and
unreal
in themselves are
is strikingly illustrated by the
distinct original principles into which the idea of each of

our knowledge of them

number of
them may

a priori and neces

be explicated,
principles which are equally
in which they are all summed up,
the
with
cognition
primitive
sary
since it is impossible to doubt any one of them, or to derive it from
mere experience. Schopenhauer has made out in tabular form a
full list of these primitive axioms, which I here translate, as they
show the curious parallelism and symmetry which exist between
our notions of Space and Time.
SPACE.

TIMK.
1.

There

is l.ut

one Time, and

all differ-

ent times are parts of this one.

2. Different times are not coexistent or

simultaneous, hut successive.

;}.

Time cannot

lie

thought away, but

every tiling in Time can be thought away,

or imagined as non-existent.
4. Time has three divisions, Past, Pres-

and Future; and these three form two

directions (before and after), with one

ent,

indifference, an indivisible Now,

[n this respect, Time
at their junction,
be
compared to a magnet, with its
may

point of

north and south poles, and point of indif

ference half way between them.

1.

The same,

not successive,
2. Different spaces are
but are coexistent or simultaneous.
3. The same,

4.

Space has three dimensions, length,

breadth, and thickness,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

180
5.
(J.

Time is infinitely divisible.

Time is homogeneous and continuous

The same.
The same.

5.
;

6.

is. no part of it can lie separated from

another part by anything which is not

that

Time.

Time has no beginning

7.

or end; but

evorv hc^iimin^ and end are in Time.

8. l!v means of lime, \ve count.
J.

(or

liliytlmi

proportion)

only in

is

Time.

all

limits are in Space.

means of Space, we measure.

8.

lly

J.

Symmetry

trast, like

We know
Time can

10.
11.

the laws of

Time

a priori.

be intuited or prnvived
only under the linage of a

but

iri,

Space has no limits or boundaries,

7.

but

(or correspondence in con-

the right and

left

hand)

is

only

in Spaee.
10. The same.
11. Space can be immediately intuited
a priori.

straight line produced to infinity.

Time has no

12.

Booner exists than

it

but

persistence,
vanishes.

no

12.

Spaee

can

never

pass

away,

but

persists forever.

Time

has no rest.
Kverv thin .; in Time has duration.
lime it-elf has no duration. but all
duration is in it. and is the persistence of
which
abides or continue-:, in contrast
that

Space has no motion.

Kvery thing in Space has position.
Space has no movement, but all
movement is in it, and is the movable s
change of place, in contrast with the abso-

with Time s own restless lapse.

Id. .Movement ispo--iiile only
iftnevs
17. In equal spaces,

lute immobility of Space.

l- i.

14.
1.").

>\\

1-J.

14.

!">.

in

Time.

Iti.

The same.

is

in

17.

In

in-

proportion to the Time.

18. Time is not directly measurable, but

ver.-e

soli ,

the sun.

walk

indireetlv,

through

Time is everywhere present.

part of Time is tvervwhere.
in.

<

in

multaneousiy
In

_ (i.

//-<

/;.

.,

is

si-

even part of Space.

rime (i. e., in Time without

tiling woulil

every

Space>.

Kvery

be

successive.

Therefore Thought, which belongs to Time,

but. not to Space, must, always In: siiccessive: that is, one Thought must come be
fore or after another Thought.

Hence; Time makes the change of

Jl.
attributcs possible; from being black and
hard, for instance, a body can, in Time,
i

become white and

soft.

Kvery part of Time contains

22.

all

parts

of Matter.
2
tii

Time

i.

iii.<

i.

e..

is

j>rinci/>ium

individun-

two eren/s, perfectly alike

every other respect, are

still

in

perfectly dis-

tinguishable from each other, because one

takes place at one time, and the other at
another time.
24. Now, the present moment, is withit

duration.

is

in

di-

in it-

and only indirectly measurable through

inoiioii.
Thus, we speak of a given amount
of space as a day s journey, or an hour s

motion; so \ve
measure Time by the ino\ement ot the
hands of the clock, or by the movement of
onlv

equal times, swiftness

rect proportion to the Space.

18. Space is directly measurable

exists

Space is eternal; every part of

through all Time.

it

fn /we Space, every thing would be

simidtaneous: for there would be no Time,
in which anything could
begin to be, or
2".

cease to be.

21.

Space makes the persistence or un-

aii/ ttiijife.
rf
changeableness
possible.
Thus, it, is only as occupying Space, that
we can conceive- the substance of iron to
remain unchanged, that from a solid it
should become fluid, i. e., should be
melted

22. No part of Space contains the same

Matter with any other part of Space.
2- !. Space
is
a
mdinduatwin.-;; i. e., two tliiiiyx. perfectly alike in
ji>-in<-ij>!nm

every other respect, are still perfectly dis

tinguishable from each other, because they
cannot occupy absolutely the same place
at the
24.

same time.

The mathematical point

extension.

is

without

KANT
Time

25.

in

itself

is

TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC.

empty

or

25.

void,

The same,

perfectly indeterminate.

beiiii;

Every moment of Time

20.

tioned by the preceding

is

20. Every definitely bounded Space is

by means of its Position, strictly determined
throughout in reference to every other por-

condi-

moment, and

is,

only so far as this predecessor has ceased

tion of Space.
27. Space makes

to be.

Time makes Arithmetic

27.

The

28.
tic is

possible.

indivisible (single) of Arithnie-

28.

the unit.

Now
to

eight

is

The

Geometry possible.
indivisible (single) of Geometry

the mathematical point.

those fifty-six truths relative to

each, are primitive, necessary,

Time and Space, twentvuniversal,

Certainly they are not hased upon reasoning

now

are

181

lirst

slated as

embodied

in

and a priori.

for

although they
language, you recognize and
;

admit them without hesitation, as first principles which you have

always admitted and acted upon, and which need only to be enun
ciated in words in order to be brought into distinct consciousness.

new to you. Experience did not generate them,

it has
not necessary in order to prove them
only furnished
the light which enables you to read them as previously imprinted
in ineffaceable characters on the secret tablets of your mind. They
are not

They
and

is

are innate ideas, principles constitutive of experience, and without

which experience would not be possible.

Time and Space, according

that
all

is,

to

Kant, are

empirically real

"

"

they have

in thought for
"objective validity," or validity
ior all that appears to us.
They are universal and
conditions of all experience, not only of all present,

phenomena,

necessarv

all past and all future, experience, not only for mv experi
ence, but for yours, for everybody s, for the experience of all
mankind.
They are so, because they are subjective forms of the

but of

Intuitive faculty itself, and so are necessary conditions of all ex

perience, since without them, experience would not be; possible.

Hence, whatever we can affirm of the nature and relations of Space

and Time, must hold true, also, of all phenomena since all phe
nomena exist only in Space and Time, and appear onlv through
them.
Space is the form of the external sense therefore nothing
;

external can appear to us except as occupying space, or as mark

Time is the form of the internal

ing points and limits of space.
for whatever is presented in thought or consciousness is
sense
presented in its own definite time or moment, either before or
;

after

some other event. And because even external bodies and

known to me only through the mental acts by which

events can be

I take cognizance of them. Time, which is a form of these mental

acts, is a form also of the external phenomena which are known

through them

that

is,

Time

is

form

of all

phenomena whatso-

182

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ever, whether external or internal.

eciousness has its
time, at which

Every object
it

<>\vn

it

cannot even

lie

exists or

imagined out of Time.

of sense or con-

and
perceived
cannot imagine events
anymore than I can
is

occurring or objects existing out of Tintr ;

imagine bodies existing out of Sj/rc.
l.nt while Time and
Space are thus pure or a priori Intuitions,
If sensation be not
they are blanks, or mere Forms of Intuition.
added, tn till up these blank Forms with some .Matter, these Forms
are mere nonentities, which can neither be
perceived nor ima-mied.
1 can
perceive objects in Space and events in Time
but
;

apart

from these objects and events, I can

perceive nothing.
Sunlight
i- seen
Pure blank space,
only as reflected from real objects.
which has no limits or shape, because
is infinite and is not made
up of parts, because it is one and all-embracing, aiiv division of it
I can
being wholly arbitrary, is mere nothingness.
imagine geo
metrical figures and material objects in if, but I cannot
imagine it
apart trom these figures and objects; for there is nothing in it, so
to speak, for the mind to take hold of.
^foiif/itia tinlla sntit
pred
icate ; that which has no
diMinguishing attributes, except nega
tive our.-,, is alike
In like man
imperceptible and inconceivable.
ner, pure blank Time, in which no
event, no change, no mental
action, takes place, is mere
To our apprehension, at
nothingness.
and a thousand years are compressed into a
least, it ceases to
have a proof of this in perfect or dreamless
single moment.
of time, the
sleep, during which we are unconscious of the
moment of falling asleep and that of awaking appearing to be im
it,

e.\i>t.

"\Ye

lap>e

We are conscious of the succession of

mediately continuous.
thought, but not of the Time in which that succession takes place;
ye! \ve necearily perceive that Time is a condition of the suc
cession, tor without it. the very word "succession
is meaningless,
"

dreamless sleep, we cease to be conscious of the

lapse
lime, we have an irresistible conviction that Time continued to

lint while, in
ot

There cannot be a break or

in one uniform

elapse during that apparent interval.

interval in the lapse of moments, but

Time Hows on

and unbroken course forever.

.But while Time and
Space thus necessarily have empirical
reality, since without them no experience would be possible, Kant
that is, they have no
viys they are
transcendentally ideal
reality
out of or beyond experience.
For the very reason, that they nec
essarily exist in the mind, being part of its texture and frameA ork,
For the very reason
they do not exist out of the mind.
that they are forms of intuition, when intuition is
not, they are
"

"

KANT

183

TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC.

our perceptions
Their very essence consists in enveloping
also in which
that
take
and
away
you
take away the perceptions,
In short,
is really a part of them
which
and
they are infolded,
are not
is
which
ideal,
they
because they are forms of perception,
which are real.
an
sich,
as
are,
dingen
they
attributes of things
all
of the world of phenomena, oi
They are necessary elements
or things which
affect
noumcna,
not
do
but they
that appears
exist independently of our perceptions.
as it is called, seems
This doctrine of Transcendental Idealism,
in Kant s metaweak
the
point
said,
ID me as I have already
no
is
there
correspondence
He arbitrarily assumes that
physics
as they appear to us
as they really are, and things
between
;

not

things

this assumption.
but his premises afford no ground for
us from asserting
our
faculties, which prevents
of
incompetency
forbi
to
us,
equally
as
are
they appear
that things really
As Mr. Mansel reare not as they appear.
maintain that

they
him in asse;
utmost that his premises could warrant
Because ]
are so or not."
whether
tell
cannot
they
we
inr is that
is
book
the
whether
tell
therefor
cannot search the room, I cannot
is not to cri
But this is a digression our present purpose
not.
the system of Kant.
cise but to expound and illustrate,
enables us to solve
of
Space and Time
The subjective character
of the Kantian philosophy.
fundamental
the
of
problem
one portion
How are
judgments a priori

marks

"the

As

a part of the question

possible?

"we

may

ask ourselves,

synthetical
is the

How

science

oi

we

able, independently
Mathematics possible?" that is, how are
of
to establish a vast aggregate
of and before any experience,
in character, that
truths,
arithmetical
and
synthetic
oeometrical
and not merely explicating it
is amplifying our real knowledge
are necuniversal
and
judgments which
and absolutely certain
but for all mankind,
and
me,
for
not
you
e^sarilv true,
only
in which we have
true not merely in this or that particular case,
but true lor all
and
observation
direct
experiment,
tested them by
answer
s
Kant
is, because
instances?
possible and imaginable
as such,
and
and,
Time,
of
science
pure Space
Mathematics is the
itself, through which
of the Intuitive
;

faculty
Forms
before they can ente
the perceptions of experience must pass
conform to them.
must
necessarily
all
that
so
our minds,
experience
of
laws
the
Space, all numer
AH material objects must conform to
or mental, must con
material
whether
able and mensurable objects,
Time are innate anc
form to the laws of Time; since Space and
alone we take
which
original forms of the very faculty through

of the a priori
all

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

184

of these objects
they are the mental atmosphere
must come to us, and there
which
Intuition
possible
every
through
fore the Intuition must be subject to the conditions of that at
or before ex
mosphere through which it is transmitted. A
perience, we arc just as sure that every material object must
occupv Space, that is, must have extension, as we are that every
If it did
opaque object, f placed in the sun. muM ea.-t a shadow.
not. it would not be opaijue. This, indeed, is a mere analytical judg

cognizance

j>rlorl,

ment, since the word

casting a shadow.
the

judgments,

all

is

geometry

i>jtf/ii"

its

]>ut

means

intercepting the light," that is,

certainty is no greater than that of
"

unquestionably synthetical, and on which nearly

based, that two straight lines cannot inclose a.

space, but that three straight lines can.

Kantian doctrine,
In order to establi.-h
tlii>

proved:

1.

That Space and Time are pure

two points must be

intuitions, or

forms of

perceptive facultv, instead of being abstract conceptions or

forms of thought; in other words, they form the atmo.-phep which
modifies all the presentations of Sense, and are not general or ab
the

formed merely by disregarding other attributes of

and generalizing one attribute as found in many tilings.
Tins has
out and not many.
Kach is an individual intuition.
A\ e may speak, indeed, of particular >paces
been already proved.
stract

ideas,

things,

or particular times; but thoe are only parts, or arbitrary limita

tions lor convenience, of the one Inlinite Space and the one Inli-

Time, in neither of which is there ;my actual break or inter

These parts are not separable, but are contained in the one
whole; whereas particular men -John, Thomas, and William, for
are separable from each other, and are. not contained
instance
nite,

val.

in.

but are

<l

cuiprix<

under, the abstract conception

"man"

in

Besides, as Kant remarks, "different times cannot be

coexistent," but must be successive, every one necessarily coming
general.

another; hence, Time can be represented only

having but one dimension whereas differ

after, or preceding,
jis

a mathematical

line,

ent men, different horses, diiferent trees, may be coexistent, so that

we can have a general idea, formed by abstraction, of each class.

Space and Time are a priori Intuitions,

and not Concepts, or abstract general ideas.
To make what follows more intelligible, I must here explain one
To construct a Concept or ab
point in the Kantian phraseology.
It is certain, therefore, that

by bringing before our

We
by that Concept.
thus, so to speak, make the Concept sensuous, by bringing an instract general

idea

mind an example

is

to

individualize

it,

of the objects denoted

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC.

185

tlio imagination, before the senses.

when I
or
parabola, is constructed,
Concept, hexagon
imagine ho\v a particular hexagon or parabola would look if it

dividual c:xso of

Thus

it,

through

the

were placed before my eyes. I construct aversion, when I imagine

what my i eeling would be if a hateful object were suddenly pre
sented.

mathematical judgments arc universally and neces

because they relate exclusively to Space and Time,
and because Space and Time are a priori intuitions or forms of
not of the understanding, then mathematics
the
Secondly,

if

sarily true, only

perceptive faculty,
intuitive science

must be an

perceptions, though
and intuitively, that

that

is, it

must be based on individual

and known immediately

cognized as universal,
is,

without any reasoning or argument, to be

As this statement conflicts with the

absolutely true and valid.

ordinary theory respecting the nature of mathematical conclusions,

must be confirmed and illustrated at some length. Take the

it

a straight line is the

proposition on which all geometry rests, that
shortest distance between two points; or, what is about the same
that one side of a triangle must be less than the sum of the
thing,

This is usually stated as an axiom, since it is found to

other two.
be incapable of proof by reasoning, that is, by deduction from the
es
very idea or definition of straightness, or from any previously
it cannot be deduced from the definition
tablished truth.
Certainly
a quality of the line, while
since this
of

designates
a term of magnitude, indicating only the
in question.
Analyze the quality straightness as best you
determination of the quan
can never deduce from it

-straight."

"shortest,

distance"

is

quant if;/
may you
;

any

But we immediately and intuitively perceive the

that is, in Kant s
proposition to be true, when we construct, it;
take two points,
we
on
in
or
paper
imagination,
phraseology, when,
and draw two lines connecting them, the one straight, and the other
broken or curved, we directly see that the former is the shorter,
and in fact, is the shortest possible. And the truth thus intuitively
tity involved.

though only in the particular instance of this one

straight line,
immediately recognized as a universal truth, appli
cable to all straight lines; because the figure thus constructed is a
determination of pure Space, no other element entering into it;
and since Space is a form of our intuitive faculty itself, all other
similar intuitions must conform to it, or be subject to the same

kii .nvu

as

such,
is

law.

truth thus intuitively discerned is a truth not of this

that is, it is a perfect type
itself
It is universally and neces
similar constructions in Space.

The

one figure alone, but of Space

of

all

sarily true.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

186
In

manner we proceed, according

to Kant, in all geometrical

construct the required iigure in imagination or on
paper, and what is intuitively perceived to hold true of the rela
tions of its parts in this one case, is therehy recognized as a uni
like

reasoning.

We

owing to the uniform and catholic character of the

one all-pervading space, a mental form, in whieh it is perceived.
That the truths of Arithmetic are obtained in the same manner
will be readily admitted as soon as it is established that Arithmetic
is tlie science of Time, ju-t as
ieometry is that of Space. Primarily,
of course. Arithmetic is the science of number; but number itself
is obtained only by the repeated addition of one unit to another.
Time is needed for the successive apprehension, that is, for the
counting, of distinct uniform impressions upon the mind, no matter
of what nature these similar impressions are, or from what cause
they proceed; because we can attend to only one impression at one
versal truth,

The number fire mean-; to us

01113 indivisible instant.
the time required for the successive apprehension of live pulsations
at the wrist, live beats of the pendulum, live dots on paper, live
anything, no matter what the unit may be; because one unit or
time, or in

instant of time

is

This dependence of
perfectly like every other.
is indicated in most languages by multiplication

Number upon Time

being expressed as taking the multiplicand so many times;" thus,

Kveii when the numbers
sechsmal, six Jot s, six times, one is six.
indicate ratios between spaces, we still speak of the numbers in
terms of time as when \ve say that the sun is so man;/ times
"

not that it is .so tunny .vywv.s farther off.

farther off than the moon,
To perform arithmetical operations, we must, in Kantian phrase,
construct the numbers employed: that is. represent them in some

manner

to sense or to

blackboard, so

then

many

many dots on the

many marbles and
common phrase, we

the imagination, as by so
lingers of the hand,

we

directly or intuitively perceive

The
the answer to the question.

so
in

problem is thus solved by

Tims, if we
bv abstract reasoning, or by concepts.
no
for it,
no
reason
can
we
are asked why 5 -f- 7
12,
give
reason, I mean, dependent on any analysis of the two ideas, five
and seven, since their sum, twelve, is not contained in either of
But if we first construct the two numbers separately, but
them.

see

intuition, not

by side, as by dots on the blackboard, and then count, or ap

prehend them successively, not as two groups, but as a single one,
we intuitively perceive, or sec, without reasoning, that they con
side

stitute twelve.

And

in like

manner with

subtraction.

As

all

arith

metical operations are resolvable into repeated additions or subtrac-

KANT

187

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC.

as the artifice of the decimal notation relieves us from the

than ten units in any one group, all
necessity of constructing more
successive
the rest being performed by
groupings or constructions ;
tions

and

as

Algebra

is

arithmetic and geometry,

only a combination oi

and

visible

signs,
symbols
operations, again, being performed by
which are a kind of short-hand, it is obvious that pure mathematics

its

is

The whole difficulty in mas

extent to which it may be
immense
proceeds from the

exclu.-ively an
it.

tering

intuitive

science.

and the difficulty of

pushed, the infinite range of its applications,
all the intuitions on which
keeping steadily in view, or in memory,
arithmetical intu
anyone result depends. Each geometrical or
is
ition, though it is apparently only of one instance or example,
the
of
the
universality
in fact generalized, or made universal, by

Forms

of space and time, through which all intuitions

called u the process of Mathematical proof

must come.

"

AY hat

is

is,

in

truth,

of previous intuitions.
only remembering and applying the results
in further proof of the intuitive character of geometry, I borrow
an illustration from Schopenhauer.
AYhy is an equilateral rightis no incompatibility of either
There
angled triangle impossible?

of these predicates separately with the subject, since a triangle

may

be equilateral, or it may be right angled; but not both together.

So alftO the two predicates are not incompatible with each other,
The understanding,
as they are united in the case of a square.
can
and
mere
aid
of
the
supply no reason why
thought,
analysis
by
But as soon
united
in the case of a triangle.
not
be
should
they
is.
that
test
of
the
attempt actually to
us we apply
construction,
form such a figure in imagination or on paper, we see that it is

Assume that the person making the experiment has, as

still, he can, with
an
imperfect idea of what a triangle is
yet, only
out the aid of experience, by merely constructing a triangle in his
and convince himself of the impossi
fancy, perfect his idea of it,
This
the three ideas in one object.
of
to all
impossible.

uniting
eternity
a synthetical judgment a priori, through which, previous to all

bility
is

and all future experience,

experience, and yet regulating all past
valid, that
the mind establishes its own laws as objectively valid,
for
and
all
time.
is, for everybody
AYhat thing, asks Kant, more perfectly resembles another thing,
than a right-hand glove does the left-hand glove of the same per
mirror does that object?
son, or than the reflection of an object in a
IJut
left

that

held before a mirror, the right hand reflected becomes the

Intuitive perception shows that one is the counterpart,
hand.
if

is,

the reverse, of the other, a difference between

them which

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

188
the mere Sense

is

incompetent

The

will apply to both.

/"///*.

point out, as the same definition

taken separately, of the t\vo gloves

to

when compared one with

the other, precisely alike; but as

these pans are put together in a different manner, their relations
to each other are not the same: hence, as relations are
cognized
only by the understanding, the difference between ri^ht and left
can be thought, but cannot be perceived bv Sense, nor imagined.
thev are incapable of
Kmpirical intuitions are strictly personal
definition, and so cannot be communicated to another.
No one
are,

can impart to me his intuitions; no one can enable me to lookout

of his eyes.
He can only hold up before me the same object which
gives him certain intuition*, and tru-f. or take for in-anted, that I
shall

have the same intuitions from

person what the odor of

rose

it

that he has.

what the color bine is,

some other blue object.
But in the case of
relations of space, and the arithmetical relations
nostrils;

or

perceived by intuition,

same

we kno\v

can teach a

only by applving a rose to his

onlv by pointing him to the skv

is.

that,

the geometrical

of time, eipiallv
ihev are absolute and uni

minds, the same to all time.

What
stronger proof could be found that lliese are inborn in our very
nature, a portion of the framework of our mental bein^?
In like manner, it cannot be mad" known from mere
concepts
the

versal.

to

all

or definitions, but only from immediate

what tht! relations

Below, Right and
"When

we;

other,

we

>eek

find

space are which

or intuitive

we designate

perception,

Above and
Behind and Before, Inside and Outside.
to determine the relations of these relations to each
they constitute, an intuitive, not a demonstrable,
of

as

Left,

science; that is, they are immediately apprehended bv the faculty

of sense, but cannot be made out by deductions of the understand

Thus, the Bottom of a thing cannot be interchanged wiih

Top. without thcri liy interchanging cither its Behind and Before,
or its Right and Left.
Again, Inside cannot become Ont.-ide. ex
cept what was Above becomes Below, or what was Right becomes
ing.
its

If we introduce the relations of the

Left.
object to the posit inn
of the beholder, other interrelations become manifest.
Thus, A [
face the object from the north side of it, instead of the south, Ilight
becomes Left, and Behind becomes Before; but Up does not be

come Down, nor

Now

Inside

become Outside.

these theorems are so far from bcinf such cicncral truths

i/

as have been formed by previous observation, abstraction, and gen

eralization, that probably up to the moment of hearing them enun
ciated,

no one ever expressed them even

to

himself in general

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC.

189

terms.
Yet you have acted upon them all your lives. And you
have now admitted them as universal and necessary truths, not be

cause I have, reasoned

them

out, or offered

in their

any argument

support, for I have not done so but because I have invited

construct them in an actual example,
say, by this book
once you intuitively perceive, that what was thus stated
;

you
and
is

to
at

not

true in the one instance, of this book,

particular truth,
but a universal truth, true of all objects and for all time; that it
is iin intuition, not like that of the color blue, which
may be one

merely

tiling

to

blind, but

you and a very different thing to me, since I am color

an intuition which must be the same for you and me, for

human

all

minds.

Time and Space, then, (Kant would

of our apprehension of Time and Space.) that all their parts
stand in relations to each other which are absolutely determined
In Space, these
and conditioned by some other of these parts.
in Time, they are
relations are called Position and Magnitude
These relations are peculiar, wholly dif
Succession and Number.
ferent from the relations of all our other representations and ideas;
since the latter, as I have abundantly proved, cannot be perceived
It

is

the very nature of

say.

by Sense, but are discerned by the Understanding or thinking fac

ulty; whereas those of Space and Time are not thought out, but
In the coex
are immediately perceived by the intuitive faculty.
istence of the parts of Space, and in the successive existence of the
is precisely determined to be what it is
some
other
All Number, and therefore all Arith
through
part.
all Geometry,
metic, depends upon the nexus of the parts of Time

uarts of Time, every part

on the nexus of the parts of Space.

I
have but one remark to make on the theory here set forth,
which is certainly the most characteristic one, and the most fruit
in important conclusions, of all that are propounded in the
Kant s doctrine of Transcendental
Critique of Pure Reason."
that we know only the world of phenomena, or what
Idealism.
appears, that of noumenal existence, or things as they are in them

ful
"

from their appearance, being unimaginable and incon

an evident corollary from his doctrine of the subjec
tive character, or unreality, of Space and Time.
Certainly, if things
as they actually are cannot exist except out of Space and Time, the

selves, apart

ceivable,

is

attempt to cognize them must be at once abandoned as hopeless.

But I am now only concerned to remark, that the sole proof of the
reality of

them

in

Space and Time, apart from the mere representation of

our minds,

is

the

trustworthiness of

memory,

lie

who

190

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

affects to distrust the evidence of this

faculty must at once become
not only an Ideali-t, but an
Egoist, who exists only for the present
moment; that is, he must, give, up the existence both of matter

and

mind, and admit the reality only of the

momentary thought nonpresent to consciousness.
Without memory, there is to u neither
past nor future, since the latter is but a
shadowy adumbration and
repetition of the past, projected before us through a reliance on the
permanency of the laws of nature.
Without
there is

memory,

only the present moment, and existence for a thousand

years is
concentrated into the focus of the indivisible instant now
present
to consciousness.
Fichte s argument on this
point is irrefutable.
for us no past,
except so liar as
js
AVhatsoever was yesterday is not

"There

ent.

the past,
so far as I

it is

thought

to-day, for

we deny its present existence and even

now think that it was. If you ask, Has
;

the pres

in

b\ft

it

railing
icas,

<mly

not a time

really passed away ? by that very question you assume

istence of a past; otherwise the
question would have no

the ex

meaning.
If you do not assume a
past, you will not ask the question, and
then time has no past for yon."
In like manner, on Kant s
princi
ples, Space is only a synthesis of innumerable parts
and as but
one of these parts is cogni/ed as now
present to consciousness, the
;

synthesis of

all

the parts

is

possible only through

memory.

Hence,

we cannot trust memory. Kant s doctrine is true;"

Space and
Time are only subjective intuitions, airy nothings,
back
if

imaginary
grounds, on which are painted an unreal and fantastic world.
Nothing

An

there to come, and

nothing past.
Now doth ever last."

is

an eternal

lint

Our time

moment, and our space a dot;

reach of thought

instant

is all

our

lot.

Life, to

adopt a scholastic phrase, is but a nunc staas, a mathe

matical point, an instant that is forever
repeated.

But the Positivist doctrine, that

nothing exists to us but the
present state of consciousness, what we now feel or think, all else
being a baseless inference, annihilates memory, and therein- annihi
lates Space and Time.
The brute lives only in the present; and
man, according to this doctrine, is a brute. Birth is a fable, and
death has no
meaning; or rather, at every instant, our existence
both begins and ends.

Indeed, Kant s skepticism, which pervades his whole

He says, all our knowledge
very brief and summary.
empirical or a priori.
versal nor

necessary

Is
it

is

work,
is

is

either

the former? Then it is "neither uni

merely an impression on an individual

it

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC.

191

Is it the latter ?
Away with it
mind, without any guaranty.
and
universal
is
it
necessary, it is
that
reason
Then, for the very
Then the
it!
of thought.
form
a
Reject
of
a
mind,
phase
only
at
no
have
we
that
knowledge
conclusion of the whole matter is,
even, I
s theory preserves, and
Kant
name.
the
all deserving
of prim
of innate truths,
may say, demonstrates, the existence
the
But
a
limiting
by
priori.
itive ami irresistible cognitions
to the field of experience, by
them
of
exclusively
application
and thereby denying that they
asserting their subjective character,
he preserves
as
of
they really are,
things
give us liny knowledge
makes them the
them only in the interests of skepticism, and
resolves all our beliefs into
foundation, in fact, of a system which
result is aptly
This
dreams.
disheartening
and
illusions
mere
he caused
she
when
says that
described by Madame de Stael,
!

to set lire to the edifice on

Philosophy/like an enraged magician,
her skill.
which she had lavished all the prodigies of

CHAPTER
KAXT

-CKITIQUK"

continue, I.

XII.
TI;AX,SCK\DI:\TAL LOGIC.

WK

como now to Transcendental Logic, or the

analysis of the
thinking faculty of the rnder<tanding. our object beini: to ascertain
if this also contains a
priori elements, or Forms of cognition
and
;

if so.

to deline

their

number and

character, and prescribe the ter

ritory within which they can be legitimate! v used.
The science of
sensuous objects constructed a priori, that is. in the a.
priori intu
itions of Space; and Time, is
Mathematics; and we

have

pure

shown the nature, and proved

this science.
jects,

P,

which

is

then;

Physics.

is

the validity, of the conclusions of

also a science of ordinary sensuous ob

..,,1(1

Metaphysics, or Ontology.

of

Are

super-sensuous objects, which is

there any a jtrlnri elements in

the faculty of the

Understanding, which will perform tin; same
service for these two sciences as those of the
faculty of Sense did
lor Mathematics?
In order to answer this
question, we must
analyze minutely and carefully the mental process wherebv we

apprehend

in

thought any complex object of sense, such as a tree

t,,/:,
In, and understand it

or flower, and thus, in

vulgar phrase,
as one whole.

It,

The

function of the
Understanding, as I have said, is to com
pare, to apprehend relations, and through these to perform a synthe-is. that is. to unite
parts into a whole, and predicates to sub

There cannot be any knowledge

by means of judgments.
of knowledge, and
any such object must be a
whole, formed by that synthesis of the parts which follows from an
apprehension of such relations between these parts as will permit
their union with each other.
The faculty of Sense, as we have
jects,

without an

,,lijt>ct

seen, offers us only a manifold of intuition, a succession of units

separately perceived, only one of them being present to the mind

at one time.
Every intuition," says Kant, contains in itself a
Manifold, or plurality of constituent parts, though it would not
"

"

be presented to the mind as such,

if

we

did not distinguish the

KAXT

TRANSCENDENTAL

193

LOGIC.

were succeeding- each other;

lapse of time while the impressions
for as contained in a single moment, no Presentation can ever be
Even the a priori forms of
anything else than an absolute unit."
and Time, because they are mere Forms without Matter, can

Spa<v

in empty space, and aggre

give us only blank figures constructed
gates of units considered merely numerically, without any qualities

one unit from another

to distinguish

that

is.

they can give us

of sensible
only a synopsis of empty parts, but not a synthesis
to constitute an object of actual
qualiiies. such as is necessary

Such attributes as a definite weight, hardness, shape,

knowledge.
taste, and smell must be put together in order to construct a cog
But these attributes, or rather the
nizable object of experience.
sensations

which are

so

called,

are successively apprehended as

one being before the mind at

distinct states of consciousness, but

one time; and

can lollnw.

this

How

one necessarily disappearing before the next

we

can

put together a cognizable whole,

how

build a house, out of these minute disjointed fragments, no two of

must
which can be taken up, or can even exist, together?
call in the aid of another faculty, the Imagination or picture-form

We

ing power of the mind, and of another principle, which Kant de

the synthetical unity
nominates, in his usual uncouth phraseology,
"

of apperception."

Imagination can do what the intuitive faculty cannot

namely,
can take up together the parts of the manifold, and even hold
them together, or all at once, as one picture, before the mental ap
Thus I can have what may be called a synoptical
prehension.
:

it

of the cognizable object as one whole.

a coup d ceil
the Imagination only brings them together in mere juxtaposi
tion, and has no power to think t\\cm in their appropriate relations,
and so necessarily unite them firmly as one thinkable aggregate.

view

But

And

what assures

gether

me

that the parts thus reproduced, and put to

very same parts that I intuited or

in Imagination, are the

perceived a

work

moment ago

How

can I be sure that the power here

the productive Imagination, as employed in memory,

bringing up actual sensations out of the past, and not merely the
reproductive Imagination, as employed in pure fancy, building up
at

castles

is

in

?
I must not
only
former units of perception

the air out of dream-intuitions

unite the parts, but recognize

them

as

Such recognition is possi

Imagination alone cannot do.
ble only through Consciousness, through a comparison of the two
intuited a moment
presentations, the one of which was actually

and

it

^o,

this

and the other

is

13

now reproduced

as

its

legitimate represeu-

MODF.RX PHILOSOPHY.

194

Xo

tative.

of

result

other power than Consciousness can assure me. as the

But the

the two are identical.

comparison, that

>udi

one moment
empirical or a jtosfcr/ori Consciousness changes from
a Proteus who is never the samo for two successive
to another.

As

instants.

fleeting in

itself

the

as

units

of intuition

which

it

Then there must he

cannot certify to their identity.
another, an unchangeable Consciousness, the Consciousness of my
self, of my own mental identity, under all the fleeting states of
empirical Consciousness which make up my individual being. This
a word borrowed from LeibSelf-Consciousness, which Kant.
witne.-ses,

it

l>y

or a priori ; for, far from being

derived from experience, it precedes it, is a condition of it, for
without it experience would not be possible.
Experience, is the
rir re"ate
I could
not
and
cognition of objects
:i
cognize a single
J
were not at hand
object, if this pure and primitive Consciousness
nitx. calls

"

is

apperception,

pun

to aid
tion,"

me

in

putting together the parts of the "manifold of intui

to the identity of those pails with the

by bearing witness

units perceived a

only through

moment

asserting

bears witness to their identity

Thus the synthetical

It

ago.

own

its

identity.

unity of apprehension, in Kantian phrase, is possible only through

the transcendental unitv of Self-Consciousness.

Xow,

this

original

unity of Self-Consciousness is possible only

my presentations can be attended by

under the condition, that all

think
the Consciousness
"I

this

that

;"

Suppose the

thought.

is,

[am

person in
manifold of

the thinking

the

series

constituting

and that
C, 1)
to be represented by the letters A,
I have already arrived at the end of this manifold, that is, at the
Xow the condition of the synthesis is, that 1. who
letter 1).

intuition"

I>,

and
I), am the same I who formerly thought C, B, and A
become 7,
through the thought of this my manifold as unity, I first
1 first be
or first think myself as the identical in the manifold.
come conscious of my oicn unity and identity, through thinking
think

the manifold of experience into unity.

This, says Kant, is the highest principle of all exercise of the
Understanding, of all Thought; for, to adopt his own language,
the manifold representations which are given in an intuition
would not he all of them my representations, if they did not all
that is, as my representations,
belong to one Self-Consciousness
tliev must conform to the conditions under which alone they can
;

exist all together in a

they would not

belong

to

me

is,

all

common

belong

to

Self-Consciousness
me."

therefore, just the

since otherwise

The thought
same

that they do all

I unite, or
as the thought,
"

can unite, them

195

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

KAXT

all in

one

Consciousness."

Thus

the recognition
"

of

my own

remembering
myself
personal identity,
I myself" remem
is one and the same with the
that the

"

"

moment

at one

the foundation of

all experience,
is
bered at another moment,
be impossible
would
sin-le
of
a
the
object
cognition
without which
that,
the units making up the manifold constituting
for without
;

it,

be put together.
object could not possibly

truth

first

fruitful
admirably
Here, surely, is an important and
But with
illustrated and proved by the great Transcemlentalist.
a foregone
towards
bias
and
of
love
his usual perverse
system,
he proceeds immediately to pull down he
skeptical conclusion,
Just as he had before asserted
edifice which he has just built up.
character, of our intui
the
I

exclusively subjective

the unreality

reason that we cannot pos

Space and Time, for the very
for the very
be unreal
to
them
believe, or even imagine,
innate, primitive, universal, and
are a

tions of
sibly

that they
priori,
believ
so he now, on the ground that we cannot help
necessary
it is avouched by an
since
and
existence
identity,
ing our personal
all cogni
a priori self-consciousness, without which all experience,
that
he
asserts
I
this
on
say,
be
ground,

reason

tion,

would

impossible,

a
such consciousness exists only in behoof of experience, being
without
hut
any reality
sort of necessary illusion for that purpose,
the bounds
as a thing in itself, and without any applicability beyond
But I cannot dwell upon this criticism now, but
of experience.
connection in
must hasten on in order to preserve the thread of
forth Kant s system as a whole.

setting

this

order to

Kantian

complete
step more is needed
we cognize any object whatever
analysis of the process whereby
the action of
and it is a very important step, as it first introduces
are the
which
a
those
in

But one

"the

Categories,"

pure

priori Concepts

Forms ofthe Understanding, just as Time and Space

Forms of the Faculty of Sense. The nature and genesis

are

the

of these

here it is enough
at length
Categories are soon to be explained
them are found such Concepts as those of unify,
;

to say, that

among

cause, etc.
plurality, reality, substance,
intuition
of
units
the
ink
not
th
could

Now Kant

says rightly,

as mine, thereby bringing

also unite them into one

into a common consciousness, and

and experience, without the aid of such Catego
object of thought
For
mentioned.
the
of
or
Forms
Understanding, as are here
ries,
I must think
of
experience,
hi order to cognize any object
it^as
as a substance in which attributes inhere, as standing

them

pne, as real,
to

some other object

in the relation of cause or effect, etc.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

196

What Kant

Deduction of the

calls the

Categories" is

the jus

them, or the proof that the use which we make of

them in thinking an object is a legitimate, and not an arbitrary,
proceeding; just as a lawyer proves his point in court by deducin<*
some acknowledged legal principle.
it from
And such Deduc
or legitimation in this case is now obvious enough.
tion
Thus:
without Time and Spice, which are the universal and a priori
of

tification

"

"

Forms of Sense, no single intuitions,

In like
ception, would be po.-^ible.
ries, which are the a priori Forms of
ence, that is, no synthesis of the data

of perception into a thinkable

whole, would be possible.

justilied, then, in

\Ve are

Matter of per
manner, without the Catego
Thought, no object of experi

as the data or

using

them

so far a^ to constitute experience, or to render experience possible ;

\\ e are
but no farther.
ii(i,
justified in applying them to
j>//r/ton/<

that

mt

objects as they appear to our minds, but not to iioaor things as they n-allv arc.

is,

int.

to

Strictly speaking, the olijcct which we have been speaking of, as

constructed by >ynthe-is. is no; the individual or singular object,
since this is intuited by the fa -ul y of Sense
but it is the Con
to which this individual
cept, or abstract general idea, of the
;

cla>s

The conceived object, or Concept, is thought by the

understanding; the perceived object is intuited piecemeal by
Y\ e do not fliitt!: this ,,ne individual tree or book, but (he
Sense.
Concept free or hunk in general, under which this one is comprised.
Hence, we tit ink an individual object not directly, but only medi
as when we say, "This one individual
ately, under a Concept
belongs.

now see is a
and only when we are able to
say this, do we properly know or have a cognition of it. This fact
is recognized in common language; for when J
see a strange
and
o
o
thing which

tr<

,>

;"

peculiar object for the first time, not having any previously formed
don t know what this
Concept to which 1 can refer it. I say,
I

Hut when coming

is."

this

this

is

tree."

to

Now,

a familial object. I say.

Oh, I know
the mental operation of thus referring
O
"

an individual tiling to the Concept, or general idea of the class,

and of thinking it through that Con
under which it belongs,
cept, an operation essential to and constitutive of knowledge prop
is a Judgment.
To adopt Kantian phraseology,
er!) so called,
we judge, and thereby know, when we bring the manifold of
individual intuitions into the synthetic unity of apprehension, and
place it under a preformed Concept lying ready for it in the

Understanding.
I would not use this detestable jargon of technicalities at

all, if

KANT
:t

were not for the purpose of enabling others

His fondness for

writings for themselves.

was

197

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

it,

to

as his

study Kant

own

invention,

and his adoption of it has perplexed and

great weakness
for all time, not only his own philosophy, but that of all

liis

confused

German metaphysics

since his day, corrupted in this respect

by

his

example.

Of course, most of these preformed Concepts thus lying ready

the understanding for individual things to be subsumed under
1
have
them, are empirical Concepts, derived from experience.
learned from previous observation, or information derived from
others, what tree, (lower, book, etc., are; and I am therefore able to
in

recognize (!.
under these

e.,

know

over again) any individual thing belonging

Concepts, and thereby to call it by its right name.

never saw this individual thing before, I can si ill say,
But we
or whatever it may be.
J knoiv this
it is a book."
now come to the great problem of Transcendental Logic, and ask

Though

"

Are there, thus lying preformed in the Understanding,

or
a priori Concepts, not derived from experience, be
Any pure
The an
cause, without them, no experience would be possible i

ourselves,

swer to this question will lead to the discovery and complete

enumeration of the Categories but the answer must be postponed
a while longer.
What I have thus far explained is Kant s analysis of the act of
perception, and his Deduction of the Categories, as set forth in
;

the

iirst

1781.

Critique of Pure Reason," published iu

second revised edition, which appeared six years

edition of the

But

in the

these two important portions of his theory art; essentially

modified, the passages relating to them being almost entirely reIn the preface to this second edition, Kant declares that
\vritte.i.

later,

these alterations do not affect the substance of the doctrines or

opinions

first set forth,

or even the grounds of proof by which they

were supported, but were intended

the exposition of them, and thereby
misconceptions to which the want

solely to
to obviate

remove obscurity in
some difficulties and

of perspicuity

had given

rise.

as thus understood, this attempt to improve his work was cer

tainly a lamentable failure; for it is admitted on all hands, that the

But

revised exposition of the theory is ten times more obscure and

It
enigmatical than the form in which it was iirst propounded.

has led to endless disputes respecting the proper interpretation of

Kant

s
opinions, and some high authorities in Germany, Schopen
Kuno Fischer
hauer included, pronounce it utterly unintelligible.
puts it almost entirely aside, and restricts his analysis of the system

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
to the first edition.
The truth is, as it seems to me, that in the
second edition of his work, Kant is
endeavoring to answer his crit
ic^. \vlio had
pushed his premises to certain conclusions \vhieli lie
was by no means prepared to admit.
Without openly or con
sciously sliming his Around, he modifies his language, and rewrites
a considerable portion of his work,
hoping there oy to refute the
inferences and objections of his reviewers.
liut. lie succeeds
only
in impairing the
harmony between the various parts of his system,
in
loading it with ambiguities, and in
and

precision

sacrificing

deliniteness of statement altogether.

The inevitable conclusion from the
tal

Philosophy, said

Egoism or
mind of

principles of the Transcenden

a system of Idealism, and even of
that there
no real existence outside

its critics, is

Solipsismus,"

the

the

thinker.

i>

Kant was

particularly sensitive about

such a charge, and the

following passage from his
to

every future System of

alter

the

first

edition of his

"

Prolegomena

published only two years

is
his almost
passionate

Metaphysics."
"

Critique."

denial ot the fairness of the accusation. "Idealism," he

con
says,
sists in the assertion that
thinking beings an; the only ones, all the
"

other things, which

pressions

we suppose

made upon

the

that

we

perceive, being onlv im

mind without any

real object correspond

ing to them outside of the thinker.
On the contrary, I say, things
are given to us as real
objects of our senses outside of ourselves,
but we know nothing of what these things are in themselves,
j>cr

since

we know only

their p/iciiomaitf, that is, the

impressions
which they create in us when they affect our organs.
Surely, then,
I avo\v that there are bodies out of our
minds, and that the word
,v",

body signifies merely the appearance

though incognizable per se, is none the
trine be called Idealism?

Xay,

it

is

jus

to

us of an object which,

less real.

the

Can

reverse."

this

doc

He makes

a further attempt to
fortify this position, by inserting, in the second
edition of the
a long and obscure
Critique,"
passage which he
"

calls a

Refutation of

Idealism."

I>ut

he finds

it

very

difficult to

satisfy himself on this point, as he gives no less than three distinct

versions of this
in the same volume, one in a
Refutation
"

long

loot-note to the Preface, and another in a foot-note to the

passage as
And in spite of these reclamations,
originally inserted in the text.

believe every attentive reader of what

precedes will agree with
in
holding that the inevitable outcome of Kant s theory as a
tvhole, or the conclusion to which the admission of his premises

me

Idealism pure and simple.

His nouinenon or
a baseless supposition, a merely
arbitrary and in-

.Tresistibly leads, is

dmg-an-sich,

is

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

On this point, I agree with Kuno

Conceivable creation of thought.
a
the two who recently had
Fischer, and not with Trendelenburg,
terminated
by
was
only
which
fierce controversy about it,
long and
thedeath of one of the disputants.
second edition, when
his work still further in the
Kant damaged

to
he had once affirmed in respect
he attempted to retract what
lo thi
self-consciousness.
our
of
primitive
and identity
the

unity
all that
"Deduction of the Categories," omitting
end, he rewrote his
:s ot a
of the i
a
of
recognition
he had said about the necessity
and
essentially
of pure consciousness,
manifold by the identical Ego
Paralogisms ot
on what he calls the
fvincr

"

long chapter

Ho had summed up

RationalPsychology."

his

former

<

necessary for

any cogmti
threefold synthesis is
the
1. the synthesis of apprehending
in the act of perception ;
mind
the
of
eral units as modifications
them in the imagination and o,
2, the synthesis of reproducing
in the concept of the objec
same
the
the synthesis of recognizing
of the same theory in the
version
obscure
and
But hi the confused
act of the synthesis;
third
this
we hear no more of

bv

s-iyin* that

of

an object: namely.

"a

second edition,

but a sort of unity is given

is not even mentioned,
recognition
think, which neces
consciousness
the manifold through the
it is clearly brought
when
intuition
act of
sarily accompanies every
as ,ny act.
it would not be known
otherwise
since
before the mind,
and
primitive appei
he now calls "pure
think" is what
"1

This

"I

"

ception

but he holds that

Matter, and that

it is

it is

mere Form

of

Thought, without

itself generated
also a factitious product, being

it ^companies
the synthesis of a manifold which
very act of
eal
no
assurance, then ot the
us
It
gives
and renders possible.
of mind
act
in
every
same Ego present
existence of one and the
the pioThus in his second edition, Kant says, "only through
one
of given presentations
manifold
a
unite
can
I
cess whereby
a
into
pre
them
throw
group
I
that

in the

consciousness,"

is,

whereby

"

is

that

it

possible
sented by a single act of mind,
in first receiving these
consciousness
of
the
myself
identity
before
to saying, that the
is
this
equivalent
several presentations; and
the unity and identity o
.,
of
apperception [f.
analytical unity
by presuccessive states of mind] becomes possible only
in which a manifold has been pre-

iWin

sunnosincr a synthetical unity,"

That synthetical
And again
united into one whole.
"oTly
u
is
which
intuition,
given a priory
unity of the manifold of
reason of the identity of apperception
therefore the ground and
definite thinking.
which a
precedes all my
:

Itself

priori

200

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

it was the
which made the synthesis of
unity of apperception
intuitions possible,
through rccoginzin;/ them as previous states of
mind; jio\v. it is the synthesis of intuitions which makes the
of apperception
And in either case, the use of
"unity
possible.
the
is
in order to enable me
"

"

"

Categories
necessary
(me whole.

to

think a plu

rality as

The process of forming these two factitious units, one of which

the thinking Subject, or the
Kgo of self-consciousness, and the
other is the Object thought,
may be thus illustrated. In a series
oi distinct states of
my empirical consciousness, I intuit successively
a small spheroidal
shape, a yellow color, a peculiar odor, taste,
etc., which constitute the manifold of intuition called an
orange;
and through the same
unifying act of the Understanding whereby
with the aid of the Categories, I
synthesi/.e the sensible qualities
into one
Object. I also unite the four distinct Subjects of intuition
into the one pure Kgo of consciousness, which is now
as
is

identical

with

itself

co^ni/ed
throughout the process; since otherwise the

objective synthesis would

The pure
ness,

Iv, o

one

be possible.

not,

( ,f

conscious-

identical

=J

mid

with

itself.

"

tuit

Thus:

"^!
shape,
a yellow color.
A (1( rt:li
1

"

:""

>

}t

"

V K_

<>

"

"

lt

"

"

1(>r

intuit u curtain taste.

x
object
(= Theansingle
uran-e.
Billed

_)

In other words. I "make believe" that I

myself am one bring, in
order to be able to unite several distinct
qualities into one

The theory

invention of

object.

is intricate,
artificial,
it

and pedantic

to excess

but the

Kant

that

proves
fully appreciated the importance
which is too frequently overlooked or
forgotten, that
the unity and identity of self-consciousness must be
presupposed,
before even the simplest act of
becomes
In
of the

fact,

cognition

possible.

attempting to avoid the consequences of having admitted this fact,

he falls into the error, which, hen; and
elsewhere, is a fundamental
one in his system, of degrading Consciousness into a mere
species of
Sense, calling it the internal Sense, and
thereby referring it solely
to the
receptivity of mind, that is, to its power of
receiv

passively
ing impressions, instead of making it a part of the
spontdm-lty
whereby the mind reacts upon and modifies its impressions.
\Ve
know ourselves only by the internal Sense," he
that is, as a
says,
succession of distinct states of mind, - and therefore
only as phe
nomena."
Herein he exposes himself to a
portion of the pithy
criticism which he makes
upon two of his distinguished predeces
"

sors

intellectualizes sensible
Leibnitz," he says,
sensualizes the concepts of the
understanding."

"

Locke

"

phenomena;
Kant him-

KANT

201

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

Consciousness
does worse than Locke, for he sensualizes

Belf

it

self.

The radical difference between the two faculties is easily poi

to
The sole function of Sense, properly so called, is passively
out.
it from without, these being only
made
receive impressions
upon
effects, or at

best,

any rate

distinct

is

at

is

their source or

but

known

is

external something which

images, of something

This

from ourselves.
is

"something,"

not cognized directly and in

which
itself,

prototype,
of it in the mind ;
vicariously through representations
of it are therefore properly called phe

and these representations

nomena, or mere appearances.

But Consciousness directly and im

the existence of
the
as
thing itself to
mediately apprehends Self
certain states of
not
to
merely
It
us,
it
testifies.
which
presents
It wititself as existing in those states.
but the
the

Ego

I->o,

as the thing
nesses aud reports, not so much the manifestation,
concrete ecjo cocjito ;
manifested not the abstract coc/itatio, but the
I will and
not merely volition or hunger, but the compound facts,
For is it not evident, that either of these states of
;

I am

hungry.

mind would be nothing

to

be a state of myself?

to

me,

if it

were not known

at the

Hence, every conscious state

is

moment

a distinct

.^ // -consciousness.
to
further evident that Consciousness, unlike Sense, belongs
when
it becomes vivid and keen
because
of
mind,
the spontaneity
when monotony and
the attention is roused, but flags and dies out
or
and
When fatigued
sleepy, conversation
weariness prevail.
for the merely
music passes unheeded; yet botli must be heard,
Kant s ingenious but
must receive whatever comes.
passive Sense
self-conscious Ego in
the
of
the
that
identity
far-fetched theory,
of thought, produced by
successive mental states is a mere fiction
are grasped to
the same unifying act whereby several qualities
the simple fact,
into one object, is sufficiently disproved by
gether
and identity of Self
that we are distinctly conscious of the unity

ot!

phase
It

is

as far

back a. memory extends, when

we

pass in review

many

acts

divided
but
of mind, which are not united into one object,
are^
The
events.
and
phe
scenes
union-- a multitude of interesting

and
are multiform, but they are all witnessed
own
its
of
experience.
attested by one and the same Self, as portions
the
This fact is so evident and striking that, while still discussing
Kant to contradict him
intricate theory now in question, it forces
own existence indeed
self by making this plain admission
Then it
is it a mere illusion."
is not a phenomenon, and still less
for which
truth
the
very
must be a noumenon, or ding-an-sich,

nomena reviewed

"

am

here contending.

My

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

202

We

must now follow Kant in his detailed exposition of the

nature of the Categories; and to this end, \ve again take up the
question, whether, among the Concepts under which individual in
tuitions are subsumed, there are not some which are pure and a
in the
Understanding, and which are not
priori, lying preformed
derived Jrom experience, because without them no experience
would be possible.

We are able at once to reply, Yes; there is at least one such

a priori, Concept; namely. Can.-e, and its correlative. Kll ect. All,
both ph\
and metaphysicians, both Transcendentalists and Positivists, now admit with one voice, that we have never had experi
siei>is

ence

in

know

material universe of

the

trim Cause, so

that,

we could

distinguish it from a totally different thing,

though otten confounded with it, namely, an invariable antecedent.
Yet even Hume and the Po.sitivists would readily admit that we have
it

as

Mich, and

a Concept ot Cause.?, e.. an abstract general idea of it; since other

wise, they could not pronounce, as thev do so dogmatically, that no
true Cause ever has been, or ever will be, discovered.

know

very precisely what that

They must

which, thev sav, is thus undiscoverable.

Perhaps, if they wen/ better logicians, thev would explain how
it is that they obtained this idea, though thev have had no
experi

ence from which

it

is

could be derived, and though thev declare with

all our
knowledge comes from experi

undoubting confidence, that

till
they explain how they got the idea of
a necessary element in the idea of Causality, I must
be content either to believe with Kant, that it is a pure Concept a,
in the
Understanding, or to maintain that
priori, Iving preformed

ence

Till they do this,

Power, which

it

is

comes from internal experience.

own Power

to will.

As

to getting

rom self-consciousness

it

indirect Iv

of

my

through explana

we need only observe that Power is a simple, idea,

can no more be communicated by words than we can

tion by words,

and. as

.Mich,

teach a congenitally blind person what the sensation

is

which we

call a blue color.

15ut

Kant

is

not content, as he says, to pick up at hap-hazard,

and trial, a few Concepts a priori, like that of

after long .search

Cause; tor if thus obtained, we could never be sure that the list
them was complete, or that they were arranged in order, so as
to form a .systematic whole.
With his usual fanaticism for system
and completeness, he insists that there must be a principle and a
ready prepared rule, according to which all may be discovered, and
of

its

proper place be assigned to each, thus leaving nothing to choice

Such a principle results from what has now been ex-

or chance.

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

both in form
all the operations of the Understanding,
plained, that
under
individuals
them,
may be re
and subsuming

ing Concepts

"

duced

to

Judgments,

so that the

Understanding may be described

which

Then, all a priori Concepts,

us the faculty, of judging."
come from the pure Understanding without the aid of experience,
must be equal in number, and correspond perfectly, to the pure
be those cog
Judgments that we can form in short, they must
a Judgment,
of
Form
mere
the
about
have
can
we
nitions which
;

tliout

considering

its

Matter

in

other words, those which relate

of what we are judging

merely to the act of judging, irrespective

is all that
since the Matter, or what we are judging about,
about
These necessary Logical Forms, of
is furnished by experience.
act of judgment
course, enter into and help to constitute every
;

think any object of experience, either in itself, as a man

one whole, or in its neces
grasped together into
as
their
cause, effect, substance,
other
with
phenomena,
sary relations
When thus employed, they are the Categories,"
etc.
I

whereby

ifold of intuition

"

attribute,

must be
or the several a priori Concepts under which phenomena
of these phe
the
think
we
that
order
in
synthesis
may
subsumed,

nomena

to be objectively valid for all experience.

Now,

the science

determined
of pure logic tells
things can be thus
about the mere act of Judging considered simply as such, or irre
which may be designated for this purpose
spective of its Matter,
us

how many

letters

letters of the alphabet, as in algebra; since these

that is, for no matter at all.
stand for any Matter whatever,
hold true, whatever value
must
Then the Judgment or the equation
them equal to zero,
make
if
we
even
to
we assign
a, b, c, d, etc.,
reduce them to nothing. Logic tells us we may, in this man
i.

by mere

e.,

whether it in
first, the Quantity of the Judgment,
a Concept.
some, or one of the objects included under
we may determine the Quality of the Judgment, whether

ner, determine,

cludes

all,

Secondly,
it

or denies
affirms, denies,

we may determine

under

the

form of

the Relation between

its

affirming.

Thirdly,

two Terms, which must

be either Categorical. Hypothetical, or Disjunctive. Fourthly, and

we determine its Modality, as either Problematic, Assertoric,
lastly,
In this manner, we can answer the four questions
or Apodeictic.
about any Judgment whatsoever, irrespective
asked
be
which may

Matter; namely, Quanta? qua/is? qua? quo mo do? Thus we

into
bave a table of twelve possible forms ol Judgment, distributed
four classes, three in each. And corresponding precisely with these,
because deduced from them, we have a table of the twelve purl
a priori to objects of
Concepts of the Understanding, applying
of

its

204

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

intuition in general,

whicli we can
possibly have
These last Kant
experience, or which exist in Space and Time.
denotes, by a term borrowed from Aristotle, the
if
Categories,
\ve think an
object at all, that is, it we reduce any manifold of in
that

is.

to all of

tuition to synthetical
unity of apprehension. W e must do so under
one of each of these four classes of Categories.
The complete Table of the-e Logical Forms, with their corre
sponding Categories, may be, thus presented:

LOGICAL FOKMS.
;

CATK

KANT

205

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

and Effect at the same moment and Necessity is Existence which

of its Existence,
is determined to be such merely by the Possibility
or which must be, if it be not self-contradictory.
The Categories, since they are pure, arc judging Concepts
Thus,
while those of empirical origin are representing Concepts.
forward
in applying the Category of Cause, I do not form or bring
two previously formed empir
any new object of thought, but take
is the Cause of the other.
one
the
that
and
judge
Concepts,
their former experience a
from
framed
Thus, the vulgar, having
of what lire and heat we, judge that the former causes
;

ic;:"!

cognition
the latter.

function or otlice of the Categories, then, is not

Objects are given
to present objects, but to unite presentations.
intuition, but never the union or synthesis of these ob
to us

by

jects.

Judgment,

The

on the mere Form of the

necessary union must depend
after we have abstracted its Matter, which is of em

Kant distinguishes
and is therefore contingent.
from objective judgments by denominating the former
while he calls the latter Judgments-ofJudgments-of-perception,

pirical

origin,

subjective

Thus,

experience.

to

take his

own example, my judgment

that

not necessarily
this
merely subjective
true for another person, to whom it may appear cool, nor even to
air is still warmer out of doors.
myself at another time, when the
On the other
a
This, therefore, is
-perception.

room

is

warm

"

is

for

it is

Judgment-of
merely
will so connect phe
Judgment-of-experience
shall
them
of
union
nomena that the
appear universal and necestrue not only for me, but for all mankind, and for all time.
sar y.
An objective phenomenon, it may be remarked, is one which I rep

hand,

tin-

scientific

resent as external to myself

that

is,

as existing in space.

But

an objective judgment is one that is not peculiar to myself, but

must be shared by all persons, since it results necessarily from the
What then must be added to a merely
action of the human mind.
convert it into au
Judgment-of -perception, in order to
subjective

objective Judgment-of-experience
Kant says, the judgment that

?
"

the sun

warms

the

room

"

ac

universal validity, and thereby becomes a

quires objective or
under the Cate
Judginent-of-experience, through being subsumed
In this case, the union is a necessary one,
Effect.
and
of
Cause
gory
and therefore universal for if the sun is conceived to be the Cause,
Since the Categories are
the warmth must follow as its Effect.
those forms in which pure consciousness unites the manifold of
are
intuition, they are the conditions under which the phenomena
are the rules or laws of this union. Exand therefore
so
;

united,

they

206

MODKRX PHILOSOPHY.

perionce gives us no rase of ;i ncrcssctri/ union between (Uo events;

its Connections are
contingent, depending merely upon habitual
antecedence and consequence.
Though light lias succeeded dark
all

ness every day since the creation of the world, it inav not so suc
may not rise, to-morrow. Then. ho\v came the Un
derstanding ever to think of such a necessary connection? Be
cause, answers Kant, it has the pure or a
priori Form of Thought,
the second
Category under the head of Relation, \vhicli is the Hy
ceed, the sun

If A
pothetical Judgment,
(
is
I), follows
in rrsxnrili/

And

is

P>,

upon

is

its

I).

Here, the consequent,

ground or reason. A

the very Form of the causal

judgment.
conceive the shining of the sun as the Cause, then the
the room innsf follow as its EfT ct.
this

is

is

H.

When we
warming

of

ATI Intuition evidently gives us no knowledge,

except of its own
existence, until it is thought in relation to its object, or rather to a
that is. it would be merely a
Concept of that object
subjective
affection of my mind, if it were
without anv relation
:

experienced

object to which it belongs, or to the source whence it

comes.
An Intuition of a fragment of color,
cn, for example,
gives me no knowledge, till I refer it either to a spot of extended
to

the

r/r<

surface, say. foliage or grass, whence it came, or to a

Concept
formed from previous experience, of rolor in general, or even to
a subjective source in some morbid affection of mv nerves or
organ
of vision.
Now. all Intuitions come from experience; or if
you
say. Space and Time do not thus come, because they are a priori
Intuitions. I answer, that both Space and Time are
completely void
and indeterminate till they are constructed by the Imagination
into some deiinite
shape or quantity, sav, a triangle or a circle, a
minute or an hour.
Then we must always lind an object or a
Concept to which a given Intuition may be attached.

The next instance of the application of the Categories

may be
taken from that conception of the relation of attributes to a
stance, which is a necessary part of our
concept of any material
object whatsoever.
According to what has just been said, an intui
tion of any
quality, weight or hardness, for instance, would give me
no knowledge, except it is
thought in relation to its object, i. c.,
to the Substance in which it inheres.
But the senses tell me nothing
about Substance.
I cannot even think it,
except in relation to its
attributes; and I cannot think the attributes as attributes,
except
in relation to the Substance.
Each is thought only in and through
the other.
Evidently, then, what is here thought is a relation,
and as such, it must be the work of the
it cannot
"sub

Understanding;

KANT
be perceived by sense.

207

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

Then whence comes

the Concept of this

or universal, since every mind

certainly objective
in some sub
must think hardness, weight, color, etc., as inherent
attributes which
the
is
it
that
and
only
further, too,
stance or thing
is unchangeable and in
change and pass away, while the Substance
be an a priori Form
must
there
that
Kant answers,
destructible ?
in the pure Con
rather
or
in
the
relation
Understanding,
of this
first grasps to
which
sciousness, free from any empirical element,
the Forms of the
and
intuition
1
of
maniio-.
the
*
gether into unity
He finds such a Form of Judgment in general 111
Understanding.
the pure, Forms which he has iden
the Table of the Logical, i.
third class, Rela
the
tified as
namely, the first of the
Categories,
19
Predicate.
its
to
of a Subject
tion, the categorical relation
this
malleable.
is
iron
is
fluid;
snow is white; water
Always^
of Subject and Predicate,
is the relation, this is even the meaning,
former underlies die latter.
that the latter inheres in the former, the
that
a
of
the
proposition as TO vrroMipcvov,
Aristotle defines
Subject
so is Substance ;
which lies under the Predicate, conditions it, and
determines the Sub
while the Predicate, as a Mark or Accident,
If change takes place, if ice
inheres in the Substance.
relation,

which

is

<?.,

i.

ject,

e.,

is only the at
becomes water, or water becomes steam, still it
the subject re
but
that
or
aeriform,
change;
tributes, fluid, hard,
an atom of it
mains subject, the substance is unchangeable, not
last
no
have
experience of this
is lost or created.
Surely, we
it.
assume
we
but
mentioned fact,
necessarily
The pure
Let us take the next instance in the reverse order.

form

then

This

is

of

of

the

is

either

or

Disjunctive Judgment,
is B;
Suppose that
Category does this correspond?
vice
versa.
And
C.
it
is
then
is not B
is not C.
Suppose
the Effect
a very peculiar case; B is at once the Cause and
C is at once the Cause and the Effect of B. Evidently

logical
to which

and
the Category of reciprocal action, or mutual action
in mechanics, though ex
axiom
as
an
assumed
is
which
reaction,

this

is

cannot teach us that it must be so.

perience certainly
from the second Table, that of the difference
case
next
Take the
Affirmative, Nega
in Quality, according as Judgments are either
or Infinite, as Kant chooses to call
tive, or Negative-Affirmative,
is not-B, John is not-strong. I may
them because, by saying
make an infinity of other judgments respecting John, observing
not attributed to
this one limitation, that strength be

merely
"

him.
tions

are the founda

Evidently these three Forms of judging
or
Non-Existence
of
of
of the three
Reality,

Categories

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
Unreality, and of Limit,-.! Existence.
as they really are,

in

Tilings

^oumena,

nomena

or

mere

lying- beyond or
manifestations to sense ;
are

or

a merely
negative
Experience cannot tell us; but
unrealities,

wlu-n

we

a>k

the question.

we observe

What

you can. without mere tautology.

Here, again,

idea,
\\

what

surely
is

is

themselves or
behind tin; phe
they realities, or
not manifested ?

know

Existence

Ileg.-l says,

ll

wliat

is

we mean

Deline

it,

if

nothing.

the intermediate
position of

the"oitical

Philosophy. The Empiricists maintain, that we have no

knowledge
antecedent to experience; that we lir.M
perceive, through the
senses, the individual objects and events which are
presented to us,
and from these data, by the
way of analysis, abstraction, and gen
eralization, we obtain our simple and general
conceptions of sub
stance, unity, existence, space, etc.
Not so, says Kant; what
you
a datum of experience is a
complex, a manifold of intuition
and of a priori forma of the
call

understanding; and you could not

have any experience,
you could not know any objector event to bo
what it is, if yon had not
previously possessed the elements out
of which it is
constituted, and had not put these together h, the

symbols

of

pure consciousness, according to the

necessary laws of
You ought, h r^t to show, what, you cannot
understanding.
do,
how experience is possible without the aid of
very elements
which you vainly pretend to derive from
Yo ur process
experience.
is a i\rrf
TT/jore/K,,-, a putting the cart before the horse.
You de
rive the parent, the
conceptions of substance, cause, uiiff//, etc.,
the

the"

>r

t>

irom the

child,
experience of objects; forgetting that these
conceptions are needed to generate that experience
for, without
them, you would have
only a manifold of intuition, a multitude of
or single and consecutive
impressions on sense, without
;

unii>.

power

of grasping

them together into one thinkable whole.

any

On the other hand, he maintains, against the

Dogmatists, that
these a priori elements are mere
empty Forms of Thought, which
have no significance or utility till
they are filled up with the per
ceptions of sense, thus constituting objects and events which can be
Thus they aid to constitute
only empirically known.
experience,
but give us not the
slightest information respecting that which lies
beyond the limits of experience.
They have no meaning or ap
beyond the world of phenomena, of that which appears.
We must think according to the Categories; but that is no
proof
that things are what we
Granted
necessarily conceive them to be.
that when I luve sensations of color,
weight, hardness, shape, etc.,
I must think a Substance under
them, in which they are united,
plicability

KANT
Still, I

have no intuition of

The Substance,

qualities.

rat ion! s.

Form

209

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
this

then,

Substance

without Matter, a

I can perceive only its

unknowable

is

mode

in

which

it

is a mere ens
must think the

sensations as qualities, that is, as constituting an object.

AVe are now able to answer the second question involved in
Kant s fundamental problem, namely How is a science of pure
:

how

we

able, independently of and

Physics possible
anterior to any experience, to affirm certain universal fundamental
?

That

is,

are

principles, on which the whole of empirical physical science is

based, and without which no progress in such science would be pos
The answer is, we are able to posit them through the Cat
sible

egories, through which, as a priori, and therefore universal and

necessary, la\vs or forms of pure Thought, we must think every
Every object of external intuition, in order
object of experience.

be conceived or thought, must be subject to the universal lawn

Hence we are enabled to affirm beforehand, and an
tecedent to any experience, that every external object must be ap
to

of thought.

hat is, under

prehended both quantitatively and qualitatively;
it must, be
first two tables of the Categories
appre
hended as an extensive magnitude, as so many superficial inches,
feet, yards, acres, etc.; and it must be thought as an intensive mag
nitude, that is, as possessing one degree or another of hardness, con
sistency, weight, color, etc., which are only names for certain qualities

each of the

conceived as existing in bodies corresponding to certain sensations

in our minds.
Again, under the third table of the Categories, it
must be conceived as a Substance iu which these qualities inhere
and we must tl/ k that this substance persists or endures, any
;

change affecting only the qualities; and, therefore, that the quantity
of tins substance cannot be increased or diminished by a single atom,
whatever may be the transformation of its qualities.
Again, any
change taking place even in the qualities, must be apprehended un
der the Categories of cause and effect, and of action and reaction
that is, we know, a priori, that every change is necessarily an
effect of a preceding change, and a cause of a subsequent change,
and that, in every application of force between coexistent objects,
action and reaction must be equal. So, also, under the fourth table,
every object of experience must be conceived as a possible, an
;

actual, or a necessary object.

Summing up, we say, as Time

and Space, the a priori forms

of the Intuitive faculty, the Sense, render pure Mathematics pos

sible, so the Categories, which are the a priori forms of the Un14

210

MODKliX PHILOSOPHY.

del-standing, under which alone any object of experience can be

conceived as existing, render pun.:
physical science possible.
Our abstract of Kant s Transcendental
Logic, or analysis of the
a priori functions of the
Understanding would be very incomplete
it
we omitted to explain his system of
which is his
theory of the machinery through which the Categories, which are
the a jiriori Forms of
Judgment, become capable of application to
the empirical intuitions of sense.
bridge is necessary to form
the junction, and we nms. sho\v ho\v this
bridge is constructed.
The Deduction of the Categories proved that the
of
>Sc/,cn>(ttism,

application
the Categories to the manifold of intuition is
Iccjitinutte ; the doc
trine of Schematism shows how this
application takes place.
The union of Matter with Form, of the
receptivity of sense
with the spontaneity of
thought, does not, whenever Matter is

presented to us through sense, take place arbitrarily, by a sort of

spontaneous agglutination of the two factors.
Human conscious
ness is not like a cupboard with diverse
compartments, which
opens as often as there is anything to put into it, and in which
every thing, unguided, finds at once its appropriate place.
When
our power of imagination forms a
systematic whole by uniting
units of sensation into
objects of experience, it proceeds regularly*
according to certain primitive fundamental laws or principles. The
human mind may be regarded as a great
living organism, which
does not simply bolt its food, lint
and assimilates
digests

it;

forms part of
into muscular fibre,
part into cellular tissue, part
into nerve and brain,
The manifold of intui
part into bone, etc.
tion is only the undigested food, the nutritive elements
comiix
from without; Schematism is the process of
digestion and assimih"
it,

tion

the Categories are the distinctive

forms of nerve-fibre, cellu
which the food is ultimately worked
The Imagination, indeed, adds no new forms, but
up.
applies the
Forms or Concepts of the
Understanding to the matter of sensible
Intuition, and thereby fashions the latter into
objective knowledge.
The Imagination, according to Kant, is a sort of intermediate link
between the Faculty of Sense and the
a
;

lar tissue, skin, bone, etc., into

Understanding, forming
bridge of connection between them. It is closely allied with Sense,
because we can imagine only the Intuitions of Sense
and it is
allied with the
Understanding, because, like that faculty, it per
forms a synthesis, or unites those Intuitions.
;

The

Categories are the rules of science relating to experience,

contains the rules of
language things are the ob
But then we must know
jects of the former, words of the latter.
just as

Grammar

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

211

cases under them.

apply the rules, or rightly to subsume
rules or Concepts are homogeneous,
both being empirical, there is no difficulty.
Having the empirical

how

to

AVhen the phenomena and the

know how to put together the

general,
make up my cognition of an individual
I can judge that man is biped, is
man, say. John or AVilliam.
But when the rules are the
bimanons, is upright in gait, etc.
Concept or rule of man

in

units of intuition which

with the phenomena, these

Categories, and so are heterogeneous
the
\\hile
the
former,
Categories, are a priori, we
being empirical,
How
to unite them.
schemata or bridges
need middle terms
I
the sun, that it is the cause of warmth, when I have
jiidixican I judge that,
direct sensible perception of causality?
the substance of the water is unchanged, though its attributes are

can

How

no

those of ice or steam, when I have no immediate

middle
of
Substance,
apart from its qualities? I need a
perception
term, or bridge, something which is sensuous or empirical in one
on one side with the things of sense,
aspect, and thus homogeneous
and yet a priori, and so universal and necessary, in another aspect,
on the other hand to the nature of the Cate
thus

changed

into

approximating
of the productive Imagination, in part to
I need the aid
sublimate and purify the intuitions of sense, in part to sensualize
the Categories, under an image, or something like an image, and
tlm- to approximate the two factors of knowledge to each other.
Schema is not an image, but is a rule or law indicating the pro
cess through which an image, if it were possible, would be formed.
Thus, a small number, as 5, can be presented in an image of five
but a larger number, as 97, unpicturable in itself,
distinct dots
cannot distinctly grasp so many dots, can
because the

gories.

imagination
be thought as a continuation of the process, the successive addition

Hence,
units, through which the number 5 was presented.
though we cannot directly image cause, substance, etc., we can rep
resent figuratively the process of forming such an image, and
This diagram is the
thus irive a sort of diagram of the Concept.

of

Schema.
as

Such a Schema, for

form of the

the universal

sciousness,

conveyed

is

the vehicle

to us

they must come

other, in successive

that

we need

the Categories, is Time, which,

internal sense or empirical con
are
through which all objects of sense
all

for,

moments
as an

of

consciousness one after an

Time constitutes the bridge

a priori intuition, a universal though

is
homogeneous with the Cate

empty form of consciousness, it

on the other hand, as an
gories
;

to

Time.

contained in every
homogeneous with the

intuition, as

the manifold,
empirical presentation of

it is

MODKRN PHILOSOPHY.
of souse.
Time has Duration. Succession, and Simul
taneity as its forms and through modifications of these, it schema
tizes all the a
priori Concepts of the Understanding.
Thus, the pure Schrma of
(Quantity, tlie first Table of the Cate
gories, is Xiniihcr. which is a mere form of Succession, created
by
the continuous addition to each other in Time
of successive

phenomena

units,

thus serving to determine (lie

how much
of all ob
quantum
jects pi-e.-ented cither in Space or Time.
The manner in which
the mind adds the successive moments, so as to
constitute a definite
portion of Time, say, an hour, schematizes the way in which
it

groups together the units of intuition presented in those moments

into a conceivable whole.
The a priori fundamental
principle
of this schematization is enounced
by Kant as the "Axiom of In
tuition."
All Intuitions an extensive Magnitudes."
naindy.
Such
magnitudes are all the objects of Geometry and Arithmetic, these
having to do only with pur.
without

Quality.
ible,

-Every

and divisible

ceived.

In

Quantity,
any reference to
thing intuited is extensive;" hence it is divis

a<l

iufinitum.

indivisible can be per

never be phenomena, never

Nothing

other words, atoms can

can be objects of possible

experience.
On the other hand. Ouality. th.- second Table of the
Categories,
indicate, the
diversity of sensations, each of which has its own de
gree, reality or affirmation signifying being or existence in
Time,
while unreality or non-existence is the sensation
reduced through
successive stages of faintness to zero or
nothing.
Evidently the
difference of the two is the difference between
Time filled or occu
pied with sensation, and Time emptv.
The fundamental principle of the
Categories in this Table is the
Anticipation of Perception," that -in all phenomena, the
Real,
which is an object of sensation, has intensive
qualify, or is capable
The number of degrees is infinite, as the sensation
may be gradually diminished to any tenuity, but can never be
come absolutely null, without
ceasing to be* a sensation.
Hence
the rule, that there cannot be either an

empty Time or an empty

Space, though we arbitrarily assume any very low

degree of it to
be nothing, and then
designate it negatively as Unreality or Nonexistence.
Thus, the warmth of the room may be
gradually di
minished, till we say it is not warm at all it is cold.
The weight
of a given
of atmospheric air
may be gradually reduced,* as
jolume
in the receiver of an
air-pump, till we call it nothing.
But every
one knows an absolute vacuum to be
This is the
impossible."
meaning of Leibnitz s law of Continuity.
;

KANT

213

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

These two tables are called by Kant mathematical, since the

contained in them are the ground of mathematical
mensuration of all objects having quantity, either of space and
Their fundamental
time, and quality, or degrees of sensation.
Categories

principles are said to be constitutive, because they suffice to con

stitute objects of perception as having a given quantify and a

The other two Tables of Categories are

dynamical ; as they regulate our notions of force, action,
and the grounds of difference between possible, actual, and neces
determinate quality.
called

sary results of the combination of mechanical causes, they are

the metaphysical basis of the science of pure Physics, especially of
that department of this science which we call Mechanics.
Their
fundamental principles are not constitutive, but merely regulative,
since they only give us rules for determining the relations of one
object to other objects previously constituted.

There are three

of

of these regulative principles, called "Analogies

for the third Table of Categories, that of Relation.
of the first of these is the pel-durability, the un-

Experience,"

The Schema

changeableness, of Time itself, as contrasted with the constant flux

of phenomena, the incessant changes of things, which take place in

Time. Time changes not, and produces no change. Time does

crumble man s works to dust, wear away even the mountain s

rioc

change our hair to gray, dry up our affections, but only causes
and agencies which are at work in Time; such as meteoric forces,
side,

the attrition of falling water, chemical or mechanical solutions of

continuity and complexity, human passions or sloth.
Evidently

we have

here the Category of Substance, as the permanent and

unchangeable, underlying all the phenomenal mutations of its at
tributes or qualities.
This first Analogy, enounced as a fundamen
is thus
expressed: "In all changes of phenomena,
permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is nei
ther increased nor diminished."
Amid all changes, whether me

tal

principle,

substance

is

chanical or chemical, say our physicists, not an atom of matter is

Nih.il f/iyni, -ni/iil in
annihilated, not one new atom is created.

nihilum rcvertcre potest.

lint how do the physicists prove this dictum by their favorite
method of observation and experiment, instead of referring it, as is
here done, to an a priori principle ?
Mere inductive science
here utterly fails to establish its point.
Unless we assume this law
beforehand, no chemical or physical investigation by experiment is
and therefore the law itself is improvable, since the only
possible
;

possible proof of

it

would be by experiment.

Eor instance

we

214

MODKIJX PHILOSOPHY.

could not prove

oxides,

if

\ve did

by experiment that certain alkalies are metallic

not previously assume that the substance of the

alkali could

not possibly be annihilated in the course of the ex

tin; two
new substances, oxygen and a metal, be
created at the same time to take its place.
The accidents change,
hut :li.
substance persists.
Hence, various material substances

periment, and

differ

from each other, not

conceived

in their substance.

every atom of which

to ho

but in their ac
perfectly like every other atom,
cidents or <|iialities.
For example it is the same substance which
is

now, carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen; now. these united in

now. after being eaten and assimilated, animal
vegetable tissue
tisMic
and finally, carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen again.
Mere
experience, uninformed by the a priori laws of the Understanding,
is

could only lead us to the conclusion, that, at each of these

changes,
the previous substance was annihilated, and the new one created.

let we instinctively and instantly reject this conclusion.

The chemist says, because we jjnd by experiment that one

Why?
of the

accidents, namely, the

aggregate weight, remains unchanged. Be it
so; what then." This would only prove, that whatever number or

amount

perishes, the same amount of substance is created anew,

not necessarily that the same numerical or identical essence
per

sists of endures.
Besides, why infer identity from the one acci
dent, weight, which per.Msts in ainnnnt. rather than difference From
the many others, volume, color, texture,
consistency, chemical adm
it ie~. etc., widen
undergo great change ? As all scieniilic investi
gation proceeds by analysis and synthesis, and so depends on this

law, 1
inductive science is impossible, except through the
pre
vious assumption of an a priori
principle, which, far from being
founded on facts, appeal s directly to contradict i acts.
>ay

This

general

seems

doctrine

me

of

the

"

Critical

Philosophy,"

there

on an impregnable basis.
But I would
refer it to a different analogy from that to which Kant traces
ifInstead of attributing it to the
persistency of time itself,
which endures, while phenomena in time change, I think it de
that is, on
pends rather on the original fact of apperception,
the instinctive and
necessary recognition, in pure consciousness, of
the continuous
identity, the nnchangeableness, of myself, under all
fore,

th"

to

to

rest

phenomenal changes of thought, feeling, and outward manifes

Infancy, manhood, and old age are but different stages in
existence of one and the same
being, whose unity and continu
are attested by pure consciousness.
The child is more than

tation.

the
ity

father of the

man

he

is

the inau himself, his unfolding or devei-

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
to

one

the other being

of
only a series

stage
opment from the
witnessed from within by
phenomenal and quasi outward changes,
or dies.
which
really never changes
the same persistent Ego,
ever
before
we must have a persistent basis,
Still farther:
that is, before we can know what
idea of change becomes possible,
to a law of
For
is.
change, according
a changeable phenomenon
conceived or
be
cannot
thou-lit that has been already explained,

known except through

its

mo
just as
contrast with not-change
at
is
which
that
with
;

tion can be perceived only by comparison

reteren,
The How of the river is ascertained only by
rest
other af
and
The
thoughts
banks.
fleeting
the immobility of its
if
to
me,
they did not
be nothing
fections of my own mind would
that
endures,
the
consciousness,
Ego
flow past the fixed point of
all change, but itself changes
beholds
which
the silent witness
10

the obscure passage, first

the proper place for considering
which Kant de
of the
Critique,"
inserted in the second edition
sure that its
not
I
am
Idealism."
nominates a -confutation of
make
commentators
the
for
generally
made
clear,
can be

This

is

"

meauincr
little mention of
tains as

it,

seeming

to regard the

argument which

it

con

In order that the reader

inconclusive or unintelligible.
I translate as literally as possible

may judge for himself,

own statement of the reasoning.

The mere consciousness, empirically determined, oj

in space outside of
existence proves the existence of objects
own
my
Tin-

OHKM.

He

as determined in

PROOF. I am conscious of my own existence

But all determination in Time presupposes something per
Thie
in perception
manent Tor perdurable, etwas Beharrliches^
-

in me, for only through this

permanent cannot be something
Time be first determined.
in
existence
own
permanent can my
this permanent is only possible through
of
the
Therefore
perception
the mere mental picture
outside of me, and not through
-i thine,

this

of
such a thing. Consequently, the determination
existence
the
my own existence in Time is possible only through
But con
as external to myself.
of real things which I perceive
with the consciousness
connected
is
Time
in
necessarily
sciousness
therefore it is
of Time
of the possibility of this determination
existence of things outsi
the
with
connected
also necessarily

[ Vorstellung-] of

me

as a

condidon

sciousness of

of

my own

that is, the con

the determination of Time
an immediate
same
the
at
time,
existence is,
;

external to me.
consciousness of the existence of other things

216

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

This

is

enigmatical enough, though Kant boasts that the

U
effectually turns the tables upon the Idealists
ar"

meat here presented

for they assume, that the

only immediate experience is internal
this, that we can proceed
only by inference to external
Uut ir is here proved that external
experience is

and from

prop-

immediate, and only by its means docs internal

experience
(tliaMs, not indeed the consciousness of our o\vn
existence, but the
consciousness of its determination in
become
t:r

>

Time)

As

the

first

step

possible."

towards

understanding this obscure argument,

inquire what Kant means by our existence
let^us
being -determined
in Time."
He means, that it is so determined
only when a change
takes place in the mode of its
existence; for change cannot be
cognized except by perceiving one state of :l thing to be anterior
to its
To quote his own words, we can
subsequent state.
perceive
a determination in Time
only through a change in external rela
"

tions

to the
permanent in space for example, the
of the sun in relation to fixed
objects on the earth."
consciousness unbroken
by the occurrence of any change i,, i ts
condition, as in a swoon, is insensible to the
lapse of time, and, of
course, cannot
assign existence to any one moment durin^ the

(movement)

movement

swoon rather than to another.

But I am conscious of
my existence
only as a constant succession of distinct mental states, /.
c., as a
series of
changes; and I determine my exist, Mice in time, when I

moment when one of those

changes took place,
had a headache
Now, it has just
yesterday forenoon.
been proved that
he attributes of a
c/nin;/* is only of
thing, and
can be cognized
only through its contrast with the
unchange
able, that is. with Substance, with what is
permanent in per
I
can
be
ception.
Hence,
conscious of my existence as dcterit

assign

say.

to the

when

mm.-d

iu

time, or as a

succession of changing states of conscious

only through perceiving something which is perdurable and
does not change.
So far, the
But then the question arises.
reasoning is sound.
ness,

what

is

ception

this

"something

Kant

it

permanent," etiotts

cannot be

Jieharrliches, in

per

"

something in me" for only by

its means can the existence of
a
me be determined in time.
Then it must be
something out of me ; that is, I can
says,

"

"

cognize my
existence only
through an immediate consciousness of exter
nal substance.
On the contrary, as has been said, I maintain that
the
something permanent is in me, and that the fleeting phases of
my mind are recognized only as they drift past the fixed point of

own

KANT

217

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

remains one and the

consciousness, the perdurable Self, which
throughout.

Seemingly not more than half

satisfied

with his

own

same

reasoning,

Here, he says, the

essentially in a foot-note.
of the
consciousness
immediate
of
an
question as to the possibility
we an
Have
thus
stands
external
of
existence
things really

Kant

modifies

it

"

internal sense, but no external sense, only an external imagining?

But it is clear, that, in order only to imagine something as exter
it to the sense in intuition, we must first
nal, that is, to represent
have an external sense, and thereby be able immediately to distin
of an external impression on our mind
guish the mere receptivity
For,
from the spontaneity which characterizes every imagination.
sense would be to destroy the fac
merely to imagine an external
which [on this supposition] is to be con
ulty of perception itself,

structed by the power of

Kant s aversion to Idealism.

Here

imagination."

At

is

the secret

^of

the outset, from the very begin

he had assumed without proof, for indeed

Critique,"
ning of the
a power
the^ssertion needs no proof, that the mind has originally
"

spontaneity,
of clearly distinguishing its mere receptivity from
of separating what
its external from its internal states, and hence,
its

comes to it from without from that which is created within. Pres

external
sure and counter-pressure, my own voluntary thrust and
a
and
Not-myself reacting,
resistance to that thrust, Myself acting
of con
are both distinctly cognized by me in one and the same act
In truth, either one of them cannot be known except
sciousness.
Herein, Dr. Reid and Kant
through its contrast with the other.
an im
in the doctrine of
and Sir W. Hamilton are at one,
"

mediate consciousness of the existence of external

things,"

those

But whether
but Force.
being, not Matter,
tilings," however,
s theory, or
this doctrine is consistent with other portions of Kant
this
From
himself.
for
digression I
not. the reader may judge
now return to the exposition of Schematism.
The Schema of Causality, the second Category in the table of
"

Relation,

is

the lixed

relation to each other of the successive

mo

clock in
roughly, nine o
and
o
come
clock,
only before ten
the morning can
only after eight
And what
is inconceivable.
of
this
order
alteration
o clock.
Any
conceived by
is this but the causal relation, which is necessarily

ments

in the

How

of

Time.

To

express

it

The Cause is that

us as prius and posterius in a fixed order ?
which necessarily precedes the Effect the Effect is that which
cither
Experience tells us nothing
necessarily follows the Cause.
the apof the fixadness, or the necessity, of this order; for, to
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

218

cause and effect are not successive at all,

prehension of the senses,
And so far as experience goes, there is no ne
but simultaneous.
case at all, but only a frequent conjunction of two
cessity in the
be dissolved
events, which, though witnessed a thousand times, may
The parts of any other manifold,
the next time that one appears.
for instance, may be apprehended in any
argues Kant, of a house,
to
order, from top
bottom, or from bottom to top, from right to lett,
is
But if
or ct i-a i-crxn.
apprehended as Cause, and B a-^ KtHow do the Empiricists
fect, the order is always AB, never BA.

account for this, whose oft repeated maxim, that, Cau.-ation is

of two events, leaves us ennothing but the constant conjunction
the psychi
the
whether
loss
a
tirelv at
physical phenomenon causes
or

cal,

psychical causes the physical

the

whether the paleness

whether the volition

produces the fear, or the fear the paleness;
raises the arm. or the mi-ing of the arm excites the volition ?
lint

even

oMtivist will

conditioned by
places with any

admit,

that

every instant of Time

is

the preceding in-tants, so that it cannot change

and also, that our conception, how
one of them

all

ever

it

mav

our

be with

ob.-cr\ ation. necessarily presents

Cause

same unchangeable order. The principle of this

schemati/atiou, though hardly necessary to be enounced, is. "that
all changes take place according to the law of the connection be
And here we have another proof of
tween Cause and Effect."
and Etl eet

in the

Leibnit/ s law of Continuity; that, as the succession of Time is

one of unbroken continuity, proceeding uninterruptedly, by steps
an hour, so the
inliniteMinally small, up to any given amount, say.
conceived
it is
since
Can-e.
induced
through this
change
by any
ssioii of Time, is also neees>arily conceived as continuous or
This is usually expressed as the law, nlltil fit per
without, break.
Even the cannon ball, when
stiUinn ; Nature never acts by jVrks.
iiivd off. does not jump from a state of re.-t to one of high velocity,
but passes, though very quickly, through all the intermediate de
crees of mo; ion, even the slowest.
Certainly experience cannot
succe.-.-ivt:
the
since
this
avouch
changes are altogether too
fact,
qui<

k to be perceived by sense.

The Schema

of the third

Category

in the

Table of Kelation

is

that of Sub
just as duration was
sii,titlt<ineity
three
stance, and succession that of Cause, these being the only
The principle of this Schema of
conceivable Modes of Time.
all substances, so far as they exist in space
is, that

that of

in

Time;

simultaneity
at the same time, reciprocally act on, and mutually determine, each
and 13, if coexistent, may be perother."
For, the objects

KANT

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

BA

or in the order
;
eeivcd inclifferently, either in the order AB,
A. They re
B
determines
than
no more determines 15
that is,
Because the earth and the moon
each other.
ciprocally determine
as much as the earth
are coexistent, the moon attracts the earth just
coexistent,
as
Conceived
every substance in the
attracts the moon.
and
other
every other substance
on
substance,
acts
universe
every
This is only the law of gravity. Only pure reason can
acts on it.
since we have experience, through direct obser
establish this law
condition exists but not
the
that
equilibrium or statical
vation, only
force cannot
this
what balance of forces produces
equilibrium, since

be observed at

all.

Kant s theory of Schematization,

the three Catego
its
over
I must pass very rapidly
application to
These do not determine the object, but
ries of the fourth Table.
of the object.
For, supposing the
only the nature of my cognition
I
determined,
may still ask myself
object to be already fully
whether I know it as only a possible object, or as a real existence,
Having

said

enough

to explain

or. if

real,

whether

it

is

also

The

necessary.

called
principles for this Table,

by Kant

three fundamental

the three

Postulates of

be thus expressed
Empirical
of being in
1. Whatever can be conceived as an object capable
tuited at any time is possible.
determinate time
2. That of which we have a sensation at some
Thought,"

may

is real.

3.

That

to all time

real existence
is

which

is

conceived as belonging equally

necessary.

here I end this sketch, which probably has been too much
reader s patience, of Kant s system of Transcen
protracted for the
and justification of the a
that
dental Logic
is, of his exposition
of the
activities of mere Thought, and his determination
priori
be
can
this
alone
within which
legitimately
faculty
precise limits

And

the theory is, it

Imperfect as my analysis of
stand in the
bly enough to show, that whatever difficulties

exercised.

full raid distinct understanding of it,

and obscure style, his
his

lumbering

is

proba

way

of a

which arise from

barbarous and intricate termi
difficulties

endless repetitions, and his meagre use of illustrative

still the system can be made intel
facts,
and therefore, that
its parts
ligible both as a whole, and in all
however
understood
incapable he
himself,
Kant always perfectly

nology, his

examples from familiar

was

of

making himself understood by

others.

This Transcenden

most original and

tal Logic is the most obscure, but certainly the
I think, also, that
whole
of
the
Critique."
Characteristic, portion
"

220

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

most persons will agree with me in

regarding it as a marvel of in
genious and profound speculation, a storehouse of
striking and im
portant truths nD coting the philosophy of mind and the
logic of the

sciences, and a triumphant refutation of the doctrines of material

ism and sensualism.
But it must be added on the other hand,
that the system is
needlessly intricate, operose, and abstruse, aud, I
had almost said,
absurdly technical and systematic.

CHAPTER
KANT

"CRITIQUE"

continued.

XIII.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

be remembered that Kant s general problem, "how

a priori are possible," was divided into three
synthetical judgments
how are pure Mathematics pos
namely,
(1.)
particular problems
a priori.
is
this science
^iiice
wholly synthetical arid
sible ?
that is, how can we,
science possible ?
How is
IT

will

pure Physical
(-2.)
establish any fundamental truths in
independently of experience,
that Substance is unchangeable
affirm
we
when
physics? as we do,
or perdurable, and can never be increased or diminished
and^that
must be determinable both quantitatively
every physical phenomenon
that
?
and qualitatively. (3.) How are pure Metaphysics possible
of experience, know anything about
can
how
we,
independently
is,
;

as distinguished from phenomenal being, that is,

pure or real being,
or metaphysical objects?
about
hyperphysical, supersensuous,
again,
The first of these problems, about pure Mathematics, was solved,
of Transcendental ^Esthetic.
it will be remembered, in the doctrine
The second, about pure Physics, has now been solved in the ana

Transcendental Logic, by showing that experience

lytical part of
until we have first constructed the objects of experience
impossible-,
the Categories to the manifold of intuition ; and
is

through applying

the Categories, through the

necessary application of
schemata of Time, gives us certain fundamental truths or rules,
a
which are precisely what we wanted, namely, the fundamental
are now to attempt
We
of* all physical science.
priori principles
of
the third problem, about pure Metaphysics, in the second part
And
Dialectic.
Transcendental
the Transcendental Logic, namely,
beforehand, that the conclusion at which Kant
as well
I
that This

may

say

here arrives is, that pure Metaphysics are impossible, that there
of pure being, the
is no such science as Ontology, or a doctrine
whole which has hitherto received that name being only delusion,
unfounded assumption, and error.

This remaining portion of the Critical Philosophy I must pass

most
over hurriedly, though it contains many of Kant s peculiar and

222

MODERN PHILOSOPHY-.

Strictly speaking, wo liavo thus far con

one portion of the Logic of Thought, namely, the
Transcendental Analytic; and we have yet to treat of what Kant
calls Transcendental Dialectic, which is an
exposure; of the .soph
isms and fallacies into which the human mind inevitably falls
when it endeavors, as pure Reason is constantly urging it to do, to
its researches
up to unity and the unconditioned,
applying
its
or heyond the bourd.s
principles and Categories

characteristic doctrines.

sidered

lint

pu>h

l>v

hyperphysically,

of experience.
Kant makes a wide difference between the (ransccndcntal, or wliat. goes before experience, am! is piv.-unposed by it
as its necessary condition, and the; transcendent, or that which lies

wholly beyond the limits of experience.

The hitter, he maintains,
only a fruitful source of illusions and soplii>trv. nr^in^ us to
constantly repeated, but hopeless, endeavors to reach the absolute
and unconditioned.
The bird, ho says, feeling the roistance of
is

air

the,

better

the motion of

to

its
wings, miidit fancy that it could
Hut, in a vacuum,
impediment, were removed.

this

it

would drop

helpless,

and would thus

find

that,

the

fly
it

fancied obstacle

It is
really furnished the necessary support for its limited flight.
quite charac eristic of Kant to endow the human mind with a
distinct faculty, the Reason
so called, the highest and

properly

most

tar reaching of all

pose of seeking the

stripping one
is
son
only
"Idea,"

unattainable, of

flying

express and solo pur

without air. of out

let

us

Pure Logic
the

o\vn shadow.

".

th"

product of the

was

faculties, for the

As Hamilton remarks. Kant s Rea

Understanding which has overleaped itself his
the product of Reason, is nothing hut the
Concept, the

"

l>iit

its

Understanding, sublimated into the inconceivable.

hear the master s own explication of his
theory.
to be our guide in Transcendental Dialectic, as it

Analytic of the pure Understanding.

It,
has already
been explained, that the only proper function of
pure or formal
Logic is. to make an analysis of the work of the Understanding or
thinking faculty, in order to ascertain what are the Forms and
necessary Laws under which we always have thought, and not to

i;i

point out new processes or methods of thinking, or any improve

of old ones,
whereby we may more surely attain new truths,
and thus either increase or
When thus
fortify our

ment

limited

and
the

it

knowledge.
endeavor, Logic is properly called mere
Analytic,"
expressly disclaims any intention to become an orf/anon for
in

its

"

advancement, either of any particular science or of human

knowledge in general. But in ancient and medheval times, and
especially by the sophists, the skeptics, and the Scholastics, Logic

KANT

was erroneously held

vated

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
to

be an

with great diligence

it

and not a science. They culti

the art of Dialectics, and declarec
science and aid in the con

art,

as

was to promote
special function
The fallacies and sophistries into which they
futation of error.
as a profitless logomachy,
were thus led justly discredited their art
became a tc
or war of words ; and the very name, Dialectics,
that

its

like

Lo-ic

is

COUM-

its

Transcendental
manner, argues Kant, the only office of
in order to disthe
Understanding,
the Analytic of
pure
Forms and Laws. But these are
and a
priori

necessary

are filled up with the

mere blanks and empty Forms, till they
derived
be
can
only from experience.
which
Matter of intuition,
a Transcendent use of them, by applying
means of
lies beyond experience, as a

Every attempt to make

them in the region which

and

must be illusory
atMinino- the Absolute and the Unconditioned,
fallacies thus
an
is
exposure of the
Transcendental Dialectic
viin
of the endeavor to
the
of
hopelessness
committed, a demonstration
and thus t
the bounds of sense, to reaHze pure Ideas,

go beyond
found a science of noumena or pure being.
that we
K-uit be-ins his discussion of the subject by remarking,
the
of
Understanding,
land
pure
h-ivo now travelled through the
all its parts, and assigned to every
c-irefullv surveyed and measured
But this land," he says,
thin-- therein contained its proper place.
and
wide
a
stormy ocean, the proper
is Tin inland, surrounded
by
and rapidly melting icea
cloud-bank
where
many
seat of illusion,
"

"

of lands now first dis

deceives the mariner with a vain show
with
him
hopes, involves
thus
empty
feeding
covered, and, while
and yet can never
never
can
abandon,
he
which
adventures
in
bi-n

iic

Id

Before we embark upon this sea, in

and breadth, so as to be^ sure
order to explore
for, it will be
whether there is any discovery there to be hoped
are leaving, and
we
which
land
of
the
a
at
well first to glance
map
with
not, after all, rest satisfied
whether we

brin- to a successful end.

its

entire length

may

to a-k ourselves,

be discovered
contained in it, even if no other region should
that every
have
seen,
home.
a
build
can
we
upon which
from its own
Understanding derives a priori
thin" which the

what

is

We

pure

and for the use, of experience.

of pure Physics which
a
the
and
principles
The Categories,
priori
it
as
were, only the pure Schema
are founded upon them, contain,
Then,
why seek to go farther ? Why
of possible experience."
of things as they
not be content with the knowledge of phenomena,
have at least
formed
thus
the
since
judgments
Appear ? especially,

stores

still

exists solely in behoof,

224

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

or what Kant calls

reality,"
"objective validity," since
they are necessarily true, not only for you and me, hut for
every
human mind. As for noumena, or
things as they really are. per se,
why not let them alone?
Because, answers Kant, there is one
which the Under
"empirical

thing
standing that is occupied solely with phenomena cannot do
cannot determine the limits of iis own
so as to
use,

it

what is within its proper sphere, from that which liesoutand beyond its reach.
lie endeavors to establish these

clearly
side of
limits,

distinguish

it

through

his

doctrine, that an

abstract conception does not

s/ ttsi/oits, that is, if it
be
concrete, by the intuitions of sense; orherwise, he says, with a near approach to a
pun. the concept is wtf/iovt sense, that is. without
Jf
meaning.
noumenon, he argues, is
defined as that which is
not an object of sensuous
perception,"
the definition is
merely negative, and adds nothing to our knowl
Jf
it
is
defined
edge.
the object O f a non-sensu
positively, as
ous intuition." he declares that we have no such
intuition.
Pmt
herein be begs the
question, by making it depend on the truth of
his unfounded
assumption, that consciousness is nothing but an in

increase our knowledge,

not filled up. and made

be not mm!,-

if it

;,

"

AVe assert, that the

pure Kgo of apperception, which
one and the same throughout all our mental acts, is an
imme

ternal sense.
is

diate intuition of

consciousness,
faculty the testimony of which
cannot be doubted, since the doubt, as Descartes
proved, would
annihilate itself; and Self, thus
immediately apprehended per se,
and nol merely inferred from certain
phenomena, is a veritable

noumenon.

We

are conscious of the Thinker

whereby we are conscious

act

perceive
scilicet
4

mmion without

sum.

also

of the

in

Thought;

one and the same

just as

perceiving the thing moved.

we cannot
Cogito,

All

knowledge," says Kant,

begins with Sense, proceeds to
Understanding, and ends with Keason," the last aiming to reach
the highest unity of
thought, which is the Unconditioned.
The
Understanding, as the faculty of rules and of immediate conclu
sions, i. c.. of inferring one Judgment
directly from another, without

the intervention of a third, or of

uniting the Subject with a Pred
immediately, not employing a middle term;
the Under
standing, I say, thus employed, can give us only a relative unity,
a relative whole, a conditioned truth.
The inferred judgment is
true only on condition of the truth of that other
from
icate

which

it

judgment
and this predecessor again has but a condi
depending on the truth of that from which it was

was inferred

tional validity,

KAXI

225

TRANSCF.XDKXTAL DIALECTIC.

seek an unconditioned judg

"We
derived and so on, indefinitely.
ment, not resting on any premise, and therefore true in itself, true
In like manner, the whole which the Understanding
absolutely.
forms, by grasping together the manifold of intuition into an ob
and individuals into a class, is but a relative whole, which is
;

ject,

then placed under a genus, and this subsumed under successively

thus the limit
higher genera, an absolute summum genus being
and aim of the process, but a limit which we can never reach.
The ttnili/, also, which is formed through the Categories out of the
data furnished by experience, must be only relative, being condi
tioned by tiie union of its parts
for, as it exists in Space and
Time, each of which is divisible without end, the indivisible can
;

exist onlv in conception, never in reality.

understand a necessary conception of

\\\ Idea," says Kant,
the Reason, for which no corresponding object is presented by the
Sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of Reason, which we are
now considering, are Transcendental Ideas. They are conceptions
of pure Reason, for they regard all empirical knowledge as determin. d by an absolute totality of its conditions," or as traced back
through the whole series of its conditions, till we reach its absolute
"

"I

The conception
unit, or absolute whole.
the division ar;d subdi
back
us
to
for
instance, requires
carry
atom,
vision to infinity, in order to reach the absolute unit which cannot
of au

cause!or absolute

be divided

and the existence

of this ultimate unit

is

said to be the

condition of the whole series, since, other

neces.-ary prerequisite or
wise, there would be an aggregate or multiple not consisting of units,

which is a contradiction. These Transcendental Ideas, continues

Kan:, -are not mere fictions arbitrarily thought out, but are pre
sented by the nature of Reason itself, and therefore necessarily re
late to the whole ground for the use of the Understanding. Finally,
the limits of all experi
they are also transcendent, and go beyond
never be found which
can
an
ence, in which,
object
consequently,
Hence,"
an adequate presentation of a Transcendental Idea."
he adds, "we cannot ailirm of Wisdom in a disparaging way, that
"

is

only an Idea"
Kant proceeds to

it is

the word Idea by the au

justify this use of
times.
ancient
of
the
Plato, he says,
great philosopher
thority of
shows that he meant by it, "not only something which is never
far beyond the concep
derived from the Sense, but which

goes

tions

which Aristotle restricted himself.

accordant with it can be found in experience.

of the Understanding, to

Nothing which

is

Ideas are, for Plato, the primitive images or archetypes of things

15

226

MODKRX PHILOSOPHY.

themselves, and not mere keys to

possible experience, like the Cate
In his opinion, they proceed from the
highest Reason, by
which they arc imparted to human
thought, though now no longer
found there in their original state, but are
sadly obscured, so that
they can only be recalled v.ith effort through reminiscence, which
is
a to found his Ideas
Philosophy."
especially in all that con
cerns .Morality, as this depends
upon the Freedom of the Will, and
gories.

l>l

this, again,

upon cognitions which are a peculiar product of the

who would derive from experience the
conception of
who would make (as many have
done) what can

Reason,

lie

virtue,
really
serve,
at best, only as an
imperfect illustrative example, to be the pattern
oi our Idea of what is moral, would convert virtue into a
nonentity,

or an ambiguous thing, not

subject to rule, and changeable accord
That a man can never make his
ing to time and circumstance.
conduct conform perfectly to the pure Idea of virtue, does not
prove
this Idea to be
For as regards na
something merely chimerical.
ture, experience gives us rules, and is the source of
truth; but in
regard to the moral law, experience, alas! is the mother of
illusion,

and

extremely reprehensible to derive the laws about what I

ought to do from what is (loin-, or even to limit them by this con
sideration."
It is on the
authority, then, of the great Athenian
it

is

philosopher, that Kant establishes his distinction between the merely

regulative use of the Ideas of pure Reason, and the constitutive
employment of them in dogmatical ailirmations about what lies be

yond

the bounds of experience.

Ideas are presented to us as ends
to be striven after, but not as
objects of possible accom

which are

plishment.
All this

show how

is plain
Uut Kant is not satisfied till he can
enough.
the Transcendental Ideas of the
Reason, which arc;

only

the Infinite and the Absolute

regarded as forms of the Uncondi
tioned, are derived from just such
analysis of the forms of logic as
produced the Categories. As Reason is (lie faculty of principles,
aiming always at the highest principle, its fun .t ion is that of medi
ate conclusion, or
reasoning, the only form of which is Syllogism,
whereby, through the intervention of a third or middle term, we
reduce the two premises to a
single conclusion. This is a unifying
process, perfectly similar to that whereby Judgment unites its two
terms, the Subject and the Predicate, into a
As
single Concept.
the Forms of
Judgment produced the Categories, so we may expect
ihe Forms of
Syllogism will originate those pure conceptions of
Reason, which are called Transcendental Ideas.
There are but
three of these latter Forms, all
under the head of Rela-

comprised

KANT

227

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

and the Disjunc

they are the Categorical, the Hypothetical,
of
these
on
each
prosyllogisms,
through
Carrying
or antecedent reasoning, the validity of each stage in the process
in the
being conditioned on the validity of the one next above it
we thus
First, the unconditioned of the Cate
tion

tive Syllogism.

approximate

scale,

an unconditioned Subject, which

This is Self, the indivisible Ego of
can never
consciousness, which can be Subject to any Predicate, but
is
it
other
In
to
Predicate
words,
be
thought as
any Subject.

in a subject,
gorical synthesis
cannot become a Predicate.

i.

<?.,

absolute substance, or being per se, not per aliud.

Secondly, the
Unconditioned of the Hypothetical synthesis in a series, or a
Cause which cannot become an Effect i. e., a hypothesis than which
there is none higher and broader, and which therefore includes the
of
Thirdly, the Unconditioned
World, or universe of phenomena.
the Disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system, or a Whole which
in a
i. e., an
cannot become a Part
aggregate of all the members
division, which must embrace not only all actual, but all
;

complete

and is therefore ens realissitnum, the aggregate

possible, existence,
of all existence, God.
These, then, are the three Forms of the Un
1, the
conditioned, the three Transcendental Ideas of Pure lieason
:

absolute unity of the thn.king Subject, or the human soul, the indi
2. the absolute totality of phenome
visible Ego of Consciousness
nal existence, or the Universe; 3, the foundation and reality of
;

and possible existence, God. Hence the three sciences,

rational
which Pure lieason strives, though vainly, to establish,
Accordand
rational Theology.
rational
Cosmology,
Psychology,
Kant, onlv an empirical science can be established under
t.o
either of these heads; for in each case, that which assumes to be
based on a priori principles is mere illusion and sophistry.
We may give another, and perhaps more intelligible, account of
Since all Condi
this genesis of the three Transcendental Ideas.
name implies, depends ultimately on
tioned existence, as its

all actual

in"-

very
the Unconditioned, whenever Conditioned existence is given, infer
ence is permissible from it towards the Unconditioned as an end or
is never to be reached, but always to be striven after.
In proportion as we strive after it, our knowledge is carried up
Now, Conditioned existence, i. e., existence
higher towards unity.
in three dif
on
something else foreign to itself, is given
depending
in us; 2, as
ferent ways
1, as an internal phenomenon, something
and
us
out
o, as possible
;
an external phenomenon, something
of

aim, which

Then we must
existence in general, whether real or conceived.
reason in a threefold manner : First, up to the Unconditioned in ws,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
the Subjective Unconditioned, which lies at the
ground of all inter
nal phenomena, i.
the Soul, the Ego
secondly, up to the Uncon
ditioned out of us, the Objective
Unconditioned, or complete Object,
Nature as ;i whole, or the World-Universe. It is obvious that the
W>rld in its
largest sense, or the Universe, must be Unconditioned,
since ii comprises
In, it.self, and therefore can
<?.,

every

have no

tiling

condition out of or beyond itself.

And thirdly, to the Uncondi
tioned in respect to all possible
existence, the absolutely Uncondi
tioned, the sum of all possible realities, God himself.
I he
genesis of these three Transcendental Idea-, from the three
fundamental Forms of Syllogism is
easily given.
First, the Un
conditioned Kgo is thus derived from the
Categorical Syllogism, of
which this is the Form
:

All

are

V>\

Hut A is M;
Then A is 15.

The Major Premise,

as will be remembered, is the

origin of the
Category of Substance and Attribute.
Here, the Conclusion, A is
B, is not true unconditionally, but only on condition of the truth
of the Major Premise, that
are
and
is not an un
"all

conditioned Subject.

Ii;"

a Substance, for in the Minor

Premise,
"A is M,"
appears as a Predicate, i. c., as a mere Mark or At
tribute.
Then let us try to prove that All
are
by a prosyllogism, taking a still broader Concept, X, as the middle term.
/.

r..

"

All

P.nt .M

"

P>

tire 15;
i.

X;

Here the same difficulty recurs. The conclusion is true

only on
condition of the truth of the Major Premise, in which
N, though a
broader Concept than its predecessor, M, is still not an uncondi
tioned Subject or Substance, since it
appears in the Minor Premise
as

mere Predicate.

And wore we

to continue this process

indefinitely, always striving
the Conclusion by a
prosyllogism, that is, by employing a
higher and broader Middle Term, we could never reach the Subjec
tive Unconditioned, the
Ego or Self, the only Subject which cannot
become a Predicate. Hence, the Subjective Unconditioned
to prove

as a limit or aim,

obtain or reach.

appears
which we are always striving after, but never can
The Idea of it is merely regulative, not constitu

tive.
2.

rived

The Objective Unconditioned, or World-Universe,

is

thus de

from the Hypothetical Syllogism, the Major Premise of which,

KANT
as will

be remembered,
Tliis is the

Effect.

229

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

is

the origin of the Category of Cause

Form

and

If

C isD;

is I!,

lint

is 15;

Then C

is

L>.

Here, avowedly, the Conclusion is true only on the condition ex

is 15.
And even this is not
pressed in the Major Premise, if
the Unconditioned Cause of C being D, for we have as yet no
is B.
Let us try to prove it,
proof of the Elinor Premise, that

then, by a prosyllogism, thus referring the immediate antecedent

to a higher Cause.
If

Mis

X,

isB;

.utM isX;
Then A is B.

Here we have

the

same

The Conclusion

difficulty.

is

not

Uncon

Cause, but is conditioned on our proving

which requires a prosyllogism, and so on forever.

ditioned or Ultimate
T

to be ]S

M
We

trace one conjunction of events to another, till we have exhausted

the phenomena of the physical universe ; still we do not, and

all

cannot, rind an Unconditioned Cause, i. e., one which is not it

Then the absolute totality of
self an effect of a preceding Cause.
events, constituting the whole history of the universe, is unattain
able.

The Unconditioned in respect to all possible existence, that

the absolutely Unconditioned, is derived from the Disjunctive
Syllogism, which, in its Major Premise, expresses the Category of
u.

is,

This

Reciprocity of Action.

is

either

or C;

is

liufc

the

is

Form
not B;

Then

is

C.

Here, the conclusion is valid only on condition that the B or C of

the Major Premise is a complete Disjunction
for if there were an
unexpressed term, suppose D, then it would not follow, though
were not B, that it must be C. It might be neither it might be
And this difficulty
precisely the term which was not expressed.
would still exist, however many terms we might add for how can
we exhaust in language the terms not only of all real, but of all
To indicate the existence of an infinite and
possible existence?
;

absolute God, beyond whose perfections nothing

must express an

infinity of Worlds, each

is

conceivable,

we

one of them being in

finite.

And
physics,

here we end

which

is

this

curious parallelism of Logic and Meta

most forbidding, the most difficult to

at once the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

230

he understood, and the most characteristic feature ot the Critical

Philosophy. All that remains, to complete Kant s work, is to exam
ine the reasons \\hich have actually been alleged to prove,
(1.) the
personality of the thinking Subject
(2.) the nature of the universe
as a whole, whether it be limited or unlimited, caused or
uncaused,
substantial or phenomenal; and (.
the existence! of a God; and
;

>.)

show

that they are

as baseless as. according to thin

duction, they ought to be.
shall thus complete the
tion of the impossibility of
to

We

is

a priori de

demonstra

ontological Metaphysics.
First, we have the idea of a being, our own Kgo or Self, which
the principle of all our actions, and the subject of all our knowl

edge, and to which, therefore,

we attribute an existence out of and

beyond our present sensuous existence, and conceive it as an ab
Hut this,
solutely .Dimple, unchangeable, and immortal Substance.
Kant maintains, is an illusion, founded on a paralogism or invol
untary sophism, which converts a logical necessity of Thought into a
real and independent Substance not perceptible bv sense.
Granted,
that thought is impossible
except under the Form, coyito,
think."
Still, this is a mere conception, a blank Form of Thought,
O
not intuited or perceived, and therefore having no Predicate or
Mark whereby to distinguish it from any other existence. What
;,m I ; I cannot cognize the
Fgo as an Object of Thought, that is,
"I

as a concrete existence, but only as a

necessary Subject of

Thought,

means of cognizing anything else. The K^o, being presupposed

for any cognition whatsoever, would need another
in order to
3

or

l->o

itself

like

the

of vision, or
bodily eye, as our only means of seeing anything, it cannot see
itself.
Take the Judgment,
think myself;" Etjo me coyito.

cognize

therefore,

corporeal

organ

"I

Here, there are two things concerned:

(1.) the

"

Kgo,"

which

is

only a logical or judging Subject, the think! ti(j Kgo, without which
this judgment, or any other judgment, would not be
possible, and

which

therefore a mere

blank conception of the mind

and,
of, or the real object, about which
we endeavor to think. If this me were a real existence, which
it
purports to be, it would be presented to us through some intui
is

(2.) the

"

me

"

which

is

thought

"

tion of

the external or internal

actual existence be perceived.

tuited
and therefore it is a

sense

But

thus alone can any

not so presented and in

since

it

is

mere nonentity, a fiction of thought.

subjective condition of thought cannot be the positive cogni
tion of an object.
In short, Kant s argument against the substan
;

The
tial

existence, or absolute character, of

perfect parallel to his

the

"

"

Kgo

or Self,

argument against the objective

is

validity of

KANT

231

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

Because an a priori intuition of Space is a nec

without which I could not per
or
prerequisite,
essary condition
to be body,
ceive any external object to be external, or any body
intuition.
mental
or
a
is
subjective
therefore Space itself
only
for ne
or unreal
be
must
it
is
it
subjective
Because
necessary,
the
at
utmost,
be made known by experience, which,
cessity cannot
In like manner, because
reaches only the customary or habitual.
for thinking anything, it
is
a
the
prerequisite
necessary
Ego
Time.
Spru-e and

"

"

cannot, be presented to
for then there
thought
;

me by

which is
experience, as an object
to think it, and it would

would be nothing

We cannot erect our sub

We cannot hyposta-

also be contingent, instead of necessary.

necessities into objective affirmations.
jective
tize or incarnate blank conceptions.

his

whom
skeptical argument against
presume any one, to
a mere
would
first
was
put it down as
own existence
presented,
source
the
out
to
able
point
lo-ieal puzzle, though he might not be
this reasoning
seem
not
r
does
Kant
In
by
fact,
oft ho illacy in
as if with an uneasy feeling, he
himself
fully to have convinced
himself even to weanrecurs to the subject again and again, repeats
his argument in the
of
version
different
a
ness, and presents quite
which was given in
that
from
Critique"
later publication of the
have
I
as
here,
mistake
already pointed out,
The
the first edition.
error in his system,
fundamental
a
in
what
from
is,
truth,
arises
Consciousness into what he calls the internal
that of
this

it,"

<

degrading

it entirely on a level with the external senses,

distinction between im
and thus in great part breaking down the
external ob
Certainly, we know
mediate and mediate knowledge.
our senses;
make
which
upon
the
they
impressions
ject, only through
the
like
In
manner,
and this! at best, is only mediate knowledge.
necessa
or
is
external
thought,
only cognized
substance of things
but not directly perceived, as that in which
rily thought, indeed,
but an in
inhere
this, at best, being
or

sense, thereby placing

their attributes

qualities

the data of Consciousness are known, not through

doubt of
in themselves, or immediately; and any
anything else, but
since this
be
suicidal;
would
thU, their immediate, presentation
and as in
doubt would equally affect their presentation as necessary,
s own argu
Kant
invalidate
would
and
ternal or subjective,
thereby
The distinction between necessary and contingent, between
ment,
even between Intuition and Thought, rests
objective and subjective,
which affirms the dif
same
testimony of Consciousness,
upon the
is not, present to
ference between that which is, and that which

ference.

my

Jut

mental vision,

between the Ego and the Non-Ego,

between

232

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

active and passive states of mind.

All these distinctions must bo
accepted or rejected together, since they are not the results of ar
gument. 1ml the bases on which argument is founded, or from which

proceeds. They are immediate data of Cousciou.-ness. which even

skepticism must respect, if it be philosophical or rea.M>ning skepti

it

cism, and not

mere baseless and arbitrary atlirmatioM or denial. 1 can

not recogni/e Thought to be
Thought, and not Volition, if I do not
recognize each as ///// Thought and nuj Volition. Xow what is either
It is an action.
Thought or Volition?
that I do or

something
and its relation to the
Ego, or Myself, is, not an inferred
relation from an Attribute to an unknown
Substance, but a relation
perform

immediately perceived between an action and an a^ent.

An act
cannot be perceived without
perceiving the agent, anv more than I
can perceive motion without
the tiling moved.
(;
that

the

Ego

or Self

is

perceiving
not a conception, for

ranted,

has no

Marks

or
Attributes, and therefore no
to
complexity of parts to be
gether. This is only saying that it is a direct and simple intuition,
like that of the color
It can be
cognized, or thought,
it

<:ra>ped

though

rc<l.

not by plurality, yet

for as we perceive red to be
by difference
red. by di>tingui>liing it from blue or
yellow, so we perceive the
Ego to be the Ego by distingui>hing it from the non-Ego. In the
think myself." granted that the I
Judgment.
as
is
:

"I

>o,

thinking,
necessarily the Subject, and not the Object, of Thought; still Tt is
an Object of Consciousness ; else the allirmation itself, as a
whole,
would not be pos-ible. And the
E- o me
itself.

Judgment

an allirmation of Consciousness; what

is

Ego"

the

co^ito,"

atlirms

the
thinking, and the "Me" as thought, are not two, but one,
indivisible Ego of Consciousness.
As I have
re
it

is.

that

as

already

marked, we could not know Time itself to be in a

perpetual and
uniform lapse, forever gliding onward with an
equable motion, if

we

did

not refer

the only lixed point of Consciousness, the

could not perceive that the river was flow
if we
ourselves were not immovable.
Kant himself
am conscious of myself is a thought which contains a

unchanging Ego.
ing

pa^-t

says, that

us.
"

it

to

We

double Ego. namely, the Ego as

Subject, and the
But he admits, that thereby a double
personality

me

"

is

as

Object."

not meant, but

Ego who thinks and intuits is the person, while the

of the Object, like other
objects outside of me, is the thiny."

only that the

me
And

he makes this further admission

How it comes about that
think -hould be an
object of intuition to myself, and thereby
that I should be able to
is some
distinguish myself from
I

"

who

thing which

is

myself,
absolutely incapable of explanation, although

it

is

KANT
an incontestable

233

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

And

fact.

it

shows that the mind has a power,

so superior to all the perceptions of mere Sense, that it is

the groundwork of a human Understanding, and so effects a com
man from any species of the brutes, since we
plete separation of
have no reason to attribute to any one of them a capacity of say

which

is

Hence it has been wittily remarked, that if we

ing I to itself."
I am a pig," it would,
could only suppose a pig saying to itself
to be a pig.
ipso facto, cense
The second Form of the Unconditioned, or Transcendental Idea,
and
is the Object out of us, conceived as an absolute totality, or all,
it could be lim
which
itself
as
therefore
by
having nothing beyond
This is the World-Universe, conceived both
ited or conditioned.
"

as

all

an aggregate of coexisting parts occupying

Space, and as a

series of successive events, or stages of existence, extending through

The Idea of it as Unconditioned can be found only in
all Time.

But when we
the absolute totality of this series or aggregate.
of this totality, we find
a
in
to
form
representation
thought
attempt
ourselves involved in what Kant calls the Antinomy of Pure Rea
son, or ConlHct of Transcendental Ideas, whereby the doctrine which
we seek to establish, denominated the Thesis, and its opposite or
are both found
contradictory doctrine, denominated the Antithesis,
to rest on demonstrative or incontrovertible arguments, leaving us
choose between them. Thus, we seek to
utterly at a loss which to
in
the
Thesis,
namely, that the world had a beginning
prove, first,
Time, and is also limited in regard to Space and we succeed in
;

doing so

to

our entire satisfaction.

But then we are dismayed

to

that the world

find, that the Antithesis, or contradictory doctrine,

Time, and has no limits in Space, but is infi

Time and Space, may also be perfectly made
Such a conflict, such a
out by equally satisfactory arguments.
dilemma, is the inevitable result of seeking to push our

had no beginning
nite in

in

regard both to

hopeless

knowledge bevond the

the

human mind,

imposed by the very nature of

beyond the bounds of experience by

limitations

that

is,

actual perception.
I will give; a specimen of this fencing with contradictory argu
The Thesis, that the World had a beginning in Time, is
ments.

thus

proved

moment

If

it

had not a beginning, then, up

or date, an infinity of

its

to

any given

successive states of existence

must have already elapsed. But the very nature of an infinite

series is, that it never can have elapsed, since the Infinite has no
Then the World had a beginning. Q. E. 1). But now take
nd.
As
ihe Antithesis, that it had no beginning, and we prove it thus
:

234

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

is an existence
preceded by a time in which the tiling
did not exist, before the beginning of the world, there must have
been an empty or void Time.
But in a void Time, the origination

a beginning

is
impossible, inasmuch as there is nothing in it to de
termine whether the wo ld should begin, or not. Then the World
did not begin.
F. 1).
(,).
I he second
portion of ihis Thesis respecting Cosmologieal

of anything

quan

that the world

tity.

limits or boundaries

sume

is

not

in

infinite

space,

in

extension, but has definite

thus demonstrated:

is

-It we as

the

contradictory of the proposition to be true, then the

world is an infinite given whole, or aggregate, of
coexisting things.
But the magnitude of a quantum, which is not inven within certain
limits of an intuition, cannot be
thought in any oilier way than

through the synthesis of

and the whole of such a quan

lcil
by the repeated addition of
in
order
to think as a whole the
unity to itself.
Accordingly,
world which fills all space, we must consider the successive
syn
thesis of the parts of an infinite whole as finished; that is, an infi
nite time must have
elapsed in the enumeration of all coexisting
But this is impossible. Then an infinite aggregate of real
things.

tum

its

parts;

mu.-t be Mich a synthesis

com/ili

things cannot, be considered a- a given whole, or as existing simul

Hence, as its contradictory is false, the Thesis must
taneously.
be true, that the world is nut infinite in extension, but has definite
limits in space.
But, in a perfectly similar fa-hion. the Antithesis

demonstrated.

For

may

be also

assume the (ruth of the con

tradictory, namely, that the world is finite and limited in exten
sion
then it exists in an empty space, which is not limited. Then
there would be. not only a relation of things to each other in
space,
here, too, let us

lull

also a relation of

to a void space
relation at all.

the

things

to

y/tacc itself.

But

this relation

would be a relation to no object ; that is, it is no

Therefore, the world is not limited in space, but is

infinite in extension.

Thus far, I have given only the First Antinomy respecting the
But there
World-Universe,; that which concerns its Quantity.
are three other such Antinomies about it,
corresponding to the
three other Tables of the Categories, those of Qualitv, Relation,
and Modality. It would only be fatiguing to go through them all,
the reasoning is so similar.
But I will give one more specimen,
in the Third
The
Thesis is this
Antinomy.
Causality according
to physical law will not, alone, account for the
origin of the uni
:

verse; but there must be, united with

it,

a spontaneous or free-will

KANT
causality.

existence

and

is

235

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

or stage of
For, according to physical law, every event
the necessary consequence of some preceding event
;

this event, again, necessarily results

from

-its

predecessor

and

Then the scries of

from a third and so on forever.
is iniinito. and, of course, there was no original
causes
physical
Then, physical causa
event, since every event had a predecessor.
the
tion alone does not account for the beginning of things, but
free or
\\liole scries of physical events must be regarded as one
In other words, there must have been some
unconditioned cause.
cause not physical, not necessitated by a predecessor; that is, a
Antith
free-will cause.
Q. E. D. But now hear the proof of the
cause
is im
or
a
that
esis,
self-originating,

that, au ain,

free-will,
spontaneously
must have
Every acting cause, before it acted,
possible.
a state of inaction. And before the origin of the universe,

been in
i. e.,

be

fore anything existed, there was nothing to determine such a cause

to act. rather than to remain in inaction.
[But as by hypothesis
determined to act it
to
be
not
it
needs
and
it is
free,

spontaneous
determines itself.]

Then

a free-will cause will not account for the

Q. E. D.
origin of the universe.
The point of the argument in the Thesis here is humorously
"A
chain without a staple from which
illustrated by Coleridge.
of Causes without a
their
all the links derive
stability, or a series
as
a
not
been
has
string of blind men,
allegorized
inaptly
First,
each holding the skirt of the man before him, reaching far out of
all moving without the least deviation in one straight
would be naturally taken for granted, that there was a
but what if it were answered,
at the head of the file
seniiKj iiiiide
and infinite blindness sup
without
are
men
the
number,
No, Sir;

sight,

but
It

line.

"

of sight.
plies the place

This reasoning may be stated in still another form, in which,

will be more apparent to the ordinary reader.
perhaps, its cogency
to move an object which is not immediately within my
If I
reach, and therefore I push it with a stick, it is still true that I,
Even if another
and not the stick, am the Cause of its motion.
I
a
with
be
means
stick,
intermediate
push a board on
employed, if,
wi>h

the

further

Cause

end of which the object

of that object

implements. And
numerous
ployed be ever so

my

while

am

is

lying,

still I

am

the only

motion, the stick and the board being merely

the same may be said, though the means em
;

they are only means or implements,

the First and the sole Cause of the motion. Now, what
Causes, or Second Causes, are only such physi

are called Physical

cal

means and implements

however long a chain

of

them be em-

236

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ployed, they
lias

mere

-ire

sticks, boards, or stones.

any self-originating power;

it

Not one

acts only so far as

it

of

them

is

aeted

holly incapable even of changing its own state, it cer

When the ques
tainly cannot, change the state of anything else.
tion is asked, what is the Cause of this
phenomenon, of this

upon.

"U

of state, which

now

change

taking place before our eyes, we make iio

progress whatever toward answering it, by pointing out some other
Such an ante
physical phenomenon as its invariable antecedent.
cedent has not even the power which belongs to
every one of
Coleridge s blind men it cannot, of its own (n-cnnL either move or
pu.-h.
Consequently, we need a First Cause, /. e., one acting spon
taneously and with free-will, not merely at the head of a tile which
is

extends backward indetinitely. but whenever and wherever motion

or change is produced.
Frofes.sor Tyndall s
Matter. in which
lie discerns -the
promise and the potency of every form of life,"
is a mere stick in the hands of an
Xot the brickbat, but
agent.
he who threw the brickbat, caused the man s death.

The

the questions which are considered in the An

pointed out by Kant in still another manner.
lie
says, we should be more willing to let such questions alone, if we
could see beforehand that, the an.-wers to them, whichever
way they
lutility of

tinomies

is

turn, would only augment the ob>curity of the subject, and

rescue the mind from one perplexity by involving it in Another.
This is actually the
with all those attempts to form a
concep
tion of the Kosinos us an infinite whole, which inevitably involve

might

ca>e

the mind in Antinomies.

We may be sure beforehand that, which
ever side of the question respecting the Unconditioned is favored
by the endeavor to synthesize the whole series of the Conditioned,
the result will lie either ton small, or too
great, to be intelligently

grasped by the Understanding.

First, if the world had no beginning, it is too great for our con
for an attempt to trace the series backward can never
ception
overtake the whole eternity which has elapsed.
And it we sup
pose it did have a beginning, then it is too small for our thought;
since, as a beginning presupposes a time which antedated it, it
cannot be unconditioned, and we must look higher for a time-con
dition on which it depends.
In like manner, if the world is infinite
and unlimited in Space, it is too great for
any possible conception
which begins with experience. Is it finite and limited ? Then
you
have a right to ask what determines those limits.
Since no one
can have an experience of what is
absolutely void, empty space
cannot be a correlative of things, or a condition which forms a
;

KANT

237

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

world

too

Accordingly, a limited
part of possible experience.
small 1 or our conception.
For another instance, take the case of the fourth Antinomy. If
whether it be the
you assume an absolutely necessary existence,
then.
the Cause of the world,
world, or something in the world, or
from
remote
is
which
time
a
it
any
to
infinitely
you must assign
such an exigence is inaccessible, be
Then
of time.
moment
given
But if your opinion is,
cause it is too (jreat for our finite thought.
then
that every thing which belongs to the world is contingent,
for to be
is too small for our conception
exigence
iven
a
every
other existence lying behind it.
contingent is to depend on some
we have said that the cosmological Idea is
In all these
is

cases,
either too great, or too small, for

the
any intelligent conception by
not say just the reverse, and
we
should
But
why
Understanding.
throw the blame on the Understanding rather than the Reason, by
to be too small, or too large, for the Idea?
the

Conception
which can give reality
Because, answers Kant, it is only experience
must
to our concepts, and therefore a possible empirical conception
is a mere ens
Idea
an
whether
we
be the standard, whereby
judge
in
ration is, a fiction of thought, or whether it relates to an object
another
for
small
too
or
too
is
a
If we
the world.
large

affirming

say

thing

the sake of the latter,

regarded as existing for

and therefore needing to be adapted to it. One of the
thing, the

former

is

trivial

ques

cannot pass
tions in the old schools of dialectics was this: If a ball
shall we say that the ball is too large, or the hole
a
hole,
through
too small
ploy, for

On

the

In

this case, it

matters not which expression

we em

we do not know which exists for the sake of the

other hand, we certainly should not say, the man

other.
is

too

too short for the man.

long for his trousers, but the trousers are
Most of these Antinomies are perfectly well founded, and they
They are sim
are slated by Kant with great force and clearness.
the inextricable difficulties in which the human mind, as finite,
ply

finds itself involved

nite,

or endeavors

But Kant does only

it seeks to grasp the idea of the Infi

reason either from, or up to, the Infinite.
He constructs the labyrinth,
half his work.

whenever
to

But he
and shows the impossibility of finding our way out of it.
there
that
little
a
after
reflection,
is
obvious
what
not
does
show,
no necessity of putting ourselves into the labyrinth at all; that
we may pass it by on the other side with impunity and indifference,
When
do.
as an insoluble problem with which we have nothing to

is

#e keep within the proper range of our faculties, we know all that
with what lies
it concerns us to know, without troubling ourselves

238

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

beyond.

To

gay, that

Man

say that man cannot grasp the Infinite, is simply to

is not Cod.
To escape the whole puzzle, we need
only remember that Philosophy of the Conditioned, which has been
already reviewed, as first taught ly Pascal, and repeated after him

by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel.

true than this, for

is

it

the.

two contradictory propositions, one

a limit, or

is

it

unlimited.

Time

nutxt
is

Nothing can be more

human

highest law of

true.

/><

though:, that of
Either Space has

either finite, or

it

is

infinite.

Either the world did begin to be. or it has existed forever.

Xo
person in his senses, whether a (Jerman Transcendentalist or a
Po.-itivist of our own
these,
day. would deny that one of each
<,f

alternatives

is

incontrovertibly certain.
quence of proving, as we can very well
each alternative are alike inconceivable.

Then, what,

is

do, that huff,

that

the conse

branches of

cannot, he grasped
limits of our thought
is.

human thought;
Simply this: that the
are not the boundaries of existence; that the, inconceivable is not
therefore the impoible
and that we lo^icallv mav
nav, that we
inn xt
accept some truths that we cannot fathom.
Faith
in

comes
that

rightly

supplement knowledge, when knowledge herself confesses

resources are e\hau>ted. and that, such aid is indis

to

own

her

pensable.

The

third

realities

Form

and of

all

of the rnconditioiied

is

that of the

sum

of all

possibilities, the

absolutely perfect, the source

of all existence, and therefore Himself necessarily existent
in
one word, CJod.
This Form of the
nconditioiied is not, an Idea
in the abstract, but an Idea in concrete, or an individual
;

l>uin

therefore denominated by Kant an Ideal.

Thus, virtue, in the
abstract, is ;m Idea
but the perfectly virtuous man, such as is
presented in the conception of the Stoics for imitation, is an Ideal.
As the Idea provides a rule, so the Ideal serves as an
;

archetype
determination of the copy or
Thus, the
ectype.
conduct of this supposed perfectly virtuous man serves us as a
standard of action, with which we
may compare and judge our
selves, and so it may help us to reform ourselves, although we can
never obtain the perfection which it demands.
lie ye therefore
perfect, even as your Father which is iu heaven is perfect."
Here,
the Unconditioned, because complete or
perfect, must comprise all
for

the,

pei-fect

possible predicates or attributes, except negative ones, and is there

fore entirely determinate;
as such, he must be an individual
or Idea is formed
Being, since every abstract
ab

conception
by
by throwing out some predicates. As the condi
existence, he is the source and sum of all realities, ens

straction, that

tion of all

is,

KANT

289

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

he could not impart that which he did not him

In like manner, as the source or cause of all the at
self possess.
ex
tribute* of his creatures, he must possess all those attributes,
are mutually contradictory, and
cluding, of course, those which
their
those which are merely negative, as these are conditioned by
As Unconditioned, also, his
is Unconditioned.
he
and
positives
existence does not depend upon anything else, but he is self-exist
To speak sum
ent, or uncaused, an absolutely necessary Being.
as an Ideal, the most real of all
be
must
God
thowjht
marily,
existent.
beings, and as necessarily
us by
Since only conditioned existence is immediately known to
"ealissimum ;

since

direct perception, how can

Ideal as Unconditioned ?

The

first

is

we prove

the necessary existence of this

Three ways are open for such proof.

that this
the Cartesian or outological argument:

but existence is
Ideal, as perfect, includes all possible attributes;
an attribute; then the existence of God is contained in, and proved

God which we

by, that Idea of

answer

prompt and

is

fatal

Kant
unquestionably possess.
is not an attribute, and
s

existence

An

by add
and by
to alfirm ex
is diminished.
the
Now,
sphere
taking away which,
to add
istence is simply to put the Copula into a Judgment, not
its sphere.
and
its
to
thereby enlarge
another predicate
subject,

therefore

is

not included in the Idea.

ing which, the sphere or intension of a

When

have

the triangle
ception of a

"

is

is

is

that,

increased

u a
three-sided figure,"
triangle is a
idea^or
the triangle is"
not at all enlarged by adding

said,

conception of it
and
or exists

attribute

term

is

my

its existence, by saying

conversely, by denying
I do not at all impair or diminish my con
conception of Romulus, or George

not,"

triangle.

My

just the
ever really lived, or not.

Washington, remains

I believe that such a

same whether

Kant s

reasoning, then, is perfectly

and technical in form. It
abstruse
it
is
sound, though
needlessly
The idea of neces
thus
stated
and
be
more
forcibly
simply
may
our
of
a
forms
complex idea of God.
part
sary existence certainly
more than
Ihit the reality of it does not follow from its idea, any

man

of
the reality of a winged horse follows from my conception
is the very opposite of ideal
existence
real
as
In
fact,
Peizasus.
that the former,
existence, it is a contradiction in terms to affirm
the ideal."
is contained in the latter,
the
"

"

real,"

be abandoned, then, as having no

ontological argument must
is equally peremptory in his attempt
Kant
and
whatever
weight
According to this ar
to sweep away the cosmological proof also.
in order to explain finite and relative things, we must supgument,

The

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
pose an infinite and absolute
There mnst be a around of
being.
being out of and beyond the relative and the
finite fo?
o
ai
Uie * h
n0
of
,

-nd

rjett T^rConditioned,
T -^^^

in

I!l

word de

h<

acting

on the Unconditioned:

llda

to

the very
meaning
all the object!

Now,

-d events oi which we have

experience ire lifted,
and de l^ent; in one
.
l?.

word,

^
(

II

"

o nt

are conditioned

they

ei

They

<

!lu

<

uwav.

,a

One

be somewhere a cause or
reason of these

pendent phenomena, some

XiStiS

^^

hi

first

principle,

l,ath.

Tl,e,e

and de
and n ess

fleetin-

indepemlen

^^^^^

,, .,,.,,.,
Ct to
cause,

generation

-^.Wav,and

,.

>M

from secondary causes,

ii

mi:iI1

his ,,,,;

there are any such

up

to

First Cause, the

origin of all things.
Kant ,in,U ,a
\ h u
every step, a, inconclusive and
resting on baseless a sump on
the
-->, i>-n
continent and d,, M .nd,
I

;? ;-we
which
know

7^

thro,,,,,

experience, up to a nece^ry
existence, which we do not
know, which 1

i-ed

Kin!

mUM

"

ad

~-T -1

indepen-i
argued, because an infinite series of continent
is
beings
Who told us it was impoT ible ?
impossible.
such
impossibility be proved? In fact, we ha!, n,,
u ranee th^
h e series needs to be infinite
^: ,ak, ,!us in.inhv for
,^d
he
a ert it to be
impossible, and are thus
guilty of two untoundedf assumptions in one breath.
Snppo.se the chain of causes
* finite
that it stops at a certain
point; still we have no rH
to
-

eing,

it

is

W^

"

"

ate

at

/ the
[

^PP

entirely out of
the

b*t link a new

an

.sort

of

existence, one]yi,

unconditioned and
necessary bein<?
reasoning were faultless, still it would
give us only I
necessary First Cause, which might be blind and
purpose^ a
ae 0r necessity and therefore not a
sum of all reality and
perlection.
not a God.
series,

"

Finally,

^,,
oi.

we come

what is usually called the argument

from
denominated by Kant the
physics-theological
Instead of
arguing from the mere existence of the

hough

it

to

is

world,
cosmological proof, the reasoning here is based
the
upon
grandeur aud excellence of the
world, on the perfection which is
presented in the arrangements of the
universe, and ir the manner

n the

KANT
in

which

its

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

parts are put together,

and the succession of events in

us displays so grand a spec

regulated.
of order, variety, beauty, and conformity of means to ends,
whether we follow it into the infinity of space on the one hand, or
we find,
into the unlimited subdivisions of it on the other, that
"

it is

The world around

tacle

even in respect to the imperfect knowledge of it which our ueak

minds can reach, that, in the presence of wonders so numerous and
and number its
so inconceivably great, language has lost its force,
fails
even
adequately to conceive
thought
power to reckon nay,
an astonish
so that our judgment of the whole resolves itself into
ment which is all the more eloquent, because it is speechless.
of causes and effects, of means and
Everywhere we behold a chain
of conformity to law in beginning to be and ceasing to be;
;

ends,

in
and as nothing has entered of its own accord into the condition
other
some
to
referred
are
we
thing
it
is
which
continually
found,
as its cause, and this again suggests the same question respecting
Hence, the universe must sink into the
the origin of its being.
must assume something lying outside
we
or
of
nothingness,
abyss
and
of this infinite chain of what is contingent, something primal
at once of its origin and its con
cause
the
is
which
self-subsistent,
Reason compels us to admit that there must be an
tinuance."
all possible
author of all these wonders, and to attribute to him

Kant speaks

perfection.
is,

he says,

"

of this

argument with great respect

all, and that which

the oldest and the clearest of

it

is

It animates
to the common reason of mankind."
on
the study of nature, and the knowledge of nature again reacts
our belief in a divine author of the uni
this idea as its cause, till

most conformed

"

verse rises to an irresistible

conviction."

must abate the pride of human reason by

Still, he affirms, we
can make no claim to demonstrative
showing, that this argument
to an approbation founded only upon its own merits."
and
certainty,
As it is limited to l\e arrangements of the universe, and to the
manner in which its purts are put together, taking for granted the
raw material out of which these wonders are fashioned, it proves,
but not of one
at most, only the existence of a world-architect,
Besides, it establishes only the ex
created it from
"

who

nothing.
istence of a cause proportionate to the extent

arrangements which we behold

and excellence of the

and
astonishing as these
very great

even immeasurable by the human intellect, they do not author

is infinite, or even to
ize us to conclude that the author of them
from such unity of
Even
all
him
to
ascribe
possible perfection.

are,

plan, such

harmony

in the cooperation of separate parts, as

we

per-

242

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ceive,

wo cannot

them.

justly infer the absolute unity of

This argument, then, persuasive as

the requisites of scientific

proof.
Well, suppose it is not.
This is

sessing

all

Him who made

far from pos

not apodeictic.

it

is, is

Jt

is

only saying that we cannot

demonstrate the existence of a God, in the same manner in which
we demonstrate a theorem in
From its very nature, a
geometry.
matter of fact is not susceptible of mathematical
It can be
proof.
established only on the same
grounds on which we rest our assur
ance of any actual occurrence; in the
past or the present, or of the
reality of any person whom we have never seen.
The great doc
trine of the
being of a God is not a question about the relations
of abstract ideas, and therefore does not admit of what
Kant calls
It is rather a
apodeictic certainty.
question of experience.
sort of basis as our belief, that man is

on the same

must, all die;

It

rests

we
we were born not many years
ago, and passed
of infancy,
though we have not now the slightest
mortal; that

that

through the stage

recollection of that helpless

\Ve never visited
period of our lives.
Moscow; but we have not the slightest doubt that such a
ex
city

We

never saw Dr. Franklin, and

probably never knew a
person who had seen him: but we are fully convinced that he once
lived and wrote.
Who believes that his assurance
ists.

of these

tacts

would be enlarged or strengthened,

respecting any
if it could be

to demonstrative
I think the world owes a
certainty?
debt
of gratitude to Kant for
proving beyond all question, that the being
of a God cannot be demonstrated after the methods of
the geome
ter and the
metaphysician, and for thus removing it wholly out of
the region of
metaphysical abstractions.

changed

In

like

manner, the merely metaphysical conception of the nature

of God may be abandoned with
great advantage to
the interests of
The metaphysical idea of
religious belief.
infinity
is an inconceivable abstraction.
We cannot prove its existence in
concrete, as realixed in a personal and conscious
God, simply be
cause we know not what it is
and whenever we attempt to
grasp
from it or up to it, we are involved in inextricable
it, to reason

and attributes

The infinite is that which cannot be increased;

but every thing which we know is
capable of increase. The infinite
has no parts but
every thing which we know consists of
The
contradictions.

parts.

admits of nothing beside itself, for it embraces all

then we
ourselves are swallowed up in it, and are lost in this
pitiless abstrac
infinite

tion.

The only

faith to which it leads, if faith it can be

called, is
and pantheism is but logic run mad, and reason driven

pantheism

by despair

to suicide; for

it is

self-annihilation.

To

the finite mind,

KANT
the infinite

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

243

a negative idea, the negation of all that is conceiv

are told merely what a tiling is not, \ve are not

is

When we

able.

and what is the infinite to us

thereby enabled to know what it is
except the not-finite, that is, not anything of which we ever had,
or can have, experience ? The mathematicians, after puzzling them
selves in vain about this negative conception for more than two
;

centuries, have at last extricated themselves

from the labyrinth by

resolving the infinite into the mere indefinite; the infinitelv large
and the infinitely small, as they now confess, never meant anvthiii"
O

language except quantities which might be made as large

or as small as we please, without affecting the other conditions of
in their

is, simply the

indefinitely large and the indefi
similar reform needs to be made in all the philo
As known to its. the infinite
sophical sciences, including theology.
is not, what the etymology of the word imports, that which lias no

the question
nitely small.

that

but that to which we /enow of no limits,

limits,

that

which

is

at

we do know;
we cannot tell, but we may

least coextensive with the universe, or with

all

that

how much greater than the universe,

know hereafter. Is this an anthropomorphic

conception of the
no other sense than as it declares, that every
object of thought can be presented to us only as modified by the
laws and conditions of that faculty through which we think it;
just as the pure and white light of the sun must come to us through
the earth s atmosphere, and he thereby modified and partly shorn
of its liustre, before it can reach our eyes, though even then it is
so bright that we are dazzled and confounded by its rays.
In a

Deity

It

is

so in

with God,

mind

of

God must become man

was incarnate

to

man

can enter into communion

our conceptions, even as lie
the bodily eye nineteen centuries ago.
This is

certain sense, before the

to

God is incomprehensible to us, except in the same

which we are incomprehensible to ourselves.
"We
know not what spirit is, still less what matter is, and least of all,
how spirit can be united with matter; and yet it is this union
which constitutes our own proper being."
We cannot reconcile
not saying that

manner

in

the absolute unity of God with his omnipresence

we cannot even
conceive what absolute unity is; since every thing presentable to
sense or imagination is complex, consisting of countless parts, and
;

be divided and redivided, till the wearied mind refuses to fol

the separating process any further.
Yet each one of us is
known to himself as an absolute unit. I am one, an indivisible

may

io

Ego, one

in

my

identity,

one

in

my

universe of complexity and change.

responsibility,

And

one amidst a

yet this unit of con-

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

244

sciousness is ubiquitous to the nervous organism which it inhabits,

present wherever it feels, and present therefore throughout all its
extremities at once, tremblingly alive in every joint, nerve, and
Man is to his own body, as a presence, what God is to the
fibre.
universe.

"\Ve

understand neither; but \ve know that it is so.

a simple and obvious truth, when he de

Kant announces only

clares that the grounds of proof

the thing which is to be proved.

must be at

The

least

coextensive with

order, the law, the conform

to purpose, the unity of plan, which are everywhere visible

throughout creation, great and impressive as they are, are still
at least, so far as man s mind can comprehend them and
Unite
then they do not, as Kant says,
reason from them, they are finite
But they
prove the infinite perfections of Him who made them.
ity

do prove the presence, throughout creation, of a mind commensu

rate with these wonders, coextensive with the universe, and to
which we know of no limits.
They do not then disprove the in
finity of that mind, but leave this point for the faith which tran

They impress upon us as distinct a

Author and his attributes as we have of the mind
and character of any one whom we have not seen, but whom we
This is all the lesson that they impart, for
judge from his works.
scends the Things of sense.
vision of their

it is all

that the intellect of mail

is

capable of receiving.

CHAPTER
KANT
KANT

"

XIV.

GROUNDWORK OP

Critique of Pure Reason

"

ETHICS.

does not profess to

make

of its cog
survey of the whole mind of man, but only an analysis
nitive faculty; and even this analysis is not intended to be com

as to point out what is primi

plete, but to be carried so far only
tive and a priori in the cognitive act, and thereby to explain the

and universal
Reason," with
Metaphysics of Ethics," and the

of all necessary
origin, the nature, and the compass
In like manner, his
truth.
Critique of Practical
"

two subsidiary treatises, the

Groundwork of such Metaphysics, is not meant
Foundation or
to cover the whole territory of our moral nature, and on this broad
"

its

"

"

Even here, Kant s

up an entire system of Ethics.
aim is rather speculative than practical not so much to furnish a
moral guide to life, or to teach man what he ought to do under
every combination of circumstances, as again to separate what is
what is empirical in our rules of con
primitive and a priori from
duct, and thus, by eliminating all that is merely contingent and
prudential in these rules, to display the pure Law of absolute moral
not only
obligation, primitive, comprehensive, and eternal, binding
upon man, but upon God himself. Very austere and noble is
Kant s conception of such a Law, and, in setting it forth, he seems
to burst from the impediments of his usually thick, clumsy, and in
volved expression, and his style mounts at times without effort
It is an admirable exposi
into chaste and impressive eloquence.
tion of the theory of duty, pure, elevating, and truthful; I know

basis to build

nothing superior to it, in theory, except the divine original,

its author seems indeed to have kept closely in view,
the Sermon on the Mount.
Kant leaps at once into the very heart of his subject, by point
ing out the distinction between Absolute and merely Relative Good.
"There is nothing iti the world," he says, "and we cannot even

of

which

conceive anything out of the world, which

is

absolutely good, that

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

240
is,

good per

sc, in all

excepting a good

respects,

Will,"

and without exception or

meaning thereby

limitation,
a volition, or habit of vo

proceeding roni perfectly upright and virtuous intentions,

without any admixture of a lower motive, but dictated solelv by

lition,

Such a volition may be frustrated,

bv pulsv or other bodily weakness, even before appearing in
.Xo matter; the mere intent is good in itself,
anv ont\\ard act.
Or the outward act, though
good jn r ,xv, irrespective of success.
meant for good, may be positively harmful.
^S o matter again
the Will wis good, and conscience requires nothing more.
.Judg
reverence for the Moral Law.

a*

ment,

wit,

endowment

any high
discernment, or encrgv, firmness, courage
is certainly
of mind or character
good and desirable

manv respects, but not in all if not guided and restrained by

Great intellect
a good Will, it mav work great harm and wrong.
and an indomitable character, with an evil Will, is Milton s con
in

far from being good, it is devilish.

So with all
ception of Satan
the gifts of fortune, .such as wealth, power, honor, even health,
:

all of these
may
general prosperity, and content with one s lot,
be directed to evil ends; they may foster pride, indolence, inso
-coiiceit
lence.
they form only a relative good, relative to the
The sight of uninterrupted happi
use which is made of them.
>eli

ness itself, if it be adorned by no trait of a pure and good Will,

can give no pleasure to a rational and unbiased spectator and thus
a li ood Will appears a.-, the indi.-pensable condition of the worth
;

and dignity, the real desirableness, even of being happy. Again,

some attributes of mind and character arc; serviceable to a good
Mich are moderation in our
Will, and may facilitate its operaiion
appetites and paions, self-control, and considerate self-examina
;

these even constitute in part the internal worth, the true re

of the person in whom they are manifest.
But if
detached from a good Will, they may become utterly bad since
the cold blood of a scoundrel makes him not only more dangerous,
tion

spectability,

but in our eyes more worthy of detestation and abhorrence, than

if he were a
thoughtless, passionate, or reckless evil-doer.
not for
Hence, a good Will is good in and for itself alone;
what it produces, not for its utility, not through its fitness for the
attainment of any higher end, for there is no higher end but it is
absolutely good, and is therefore to be prized infinitely higher than
that which gratifies any desire,
higher even than the satisfaction
;

taken together.
If, by the special hardship of
and through the penurious allowance we have received
from Mature, our grudging step-mother, this good Will is wholly
of all our desires

our

lot,

KAXT

GROUNDWORK OF

247

ETHICS.

its purpose, even after the greatest

observe, this good Witt is not merely a virtuous lot sh,
the conscious strain of what faculties we have, the greatest
exertion of all means, so far as they are in our power, to

without the capacity to execute

t-d ort;

hut

(for,

it is

possible

if
this good Will, I say, be
about the willed result ;)
whollv impotent for its end in view, still, like a diamond, it will
.-.hine by its own light, as something which possesses its own full
Its utility or its uselessness can neither add to, nor
value in itself.

brin::

detract from, this

of

thu

Will,

intrinsic mid absolute worth.

cjood outside
something aimed at, or a material good, even

its

i.
<?.,

scientific or artistic culture,

though it be so respectable as health,
general well-being, etc., is only a relative good, not always or necessarilv good, not good per se.
As this absolute Good is a purpose or intention, and, as such, is
admix
wholly internal, having its sole seat within the breast, any

whatever with it of an external and merely relative Good

it of its pe
thoroughly corrupts and debases it, wholly stripping
or
a Law unto
to
be
ceases
autonomous,
It
then
character.
culiar
itself, and becomes hcteroitomoits, or that which receives the Law

ture

action from something else, outside of and superior to itself

volition or purpose is not useful for anything
for, as I

of

its

mere

wholly internal, and may not have any outward

consequences, or it may have even bad external consequences,
without thereby losing its own intrinsic and absolute goodness.
And even to say that the outward act, which generally, but not
for
always, follows the volition, is useful, leaves the matter short;

have

said,

it

is

the question immediately arises,

useful for ivliatt

For obtain

But then wealth, hap

ing wealth, power, reputation, happiness?
for which a good Will, a virtuous
the
become
end,
etc.,
piness,
and as a means is only subsidiary to its
intent, is only a means
all
its
from it, the virtuous Will thus
derives
excellence
and
end,
;

In
ceases to be an absolute, and becomes merely a relative, good.
other words, goodness ceases to be goodness, and wealth, happi
ness, or some other outward result, becomes the final end and aim,
a conclusion which shocks our whole moral
the absolute good
is
and
If, argues
nature,
directly contradicted by consciousness.
;

Kant, happiness were

man

highest good,

it

would have been more

makes no

Instinct
securely gained by instinct than by reason.
The brute is always led by the hand, like a blind child,
mistakes.

were, towards the attainment of purposes of which it is un

conscious, the chief purpose always being the preservation of the
animal s own life and the continuance of its species.
Incapable
as

it

248

JIODEFIX miLOSOPIIY.

looking into the future or of judging the past, it knows

It lives only in and for the
pres

eitlier of

neither anxiety nor repentance.

ent moment.

is autonomous, or a Law unto itself,

any referany consideration whatever either of private or
advantage, just so far vitiates the act, and makes it no longer

the will

r>ecause

enee

to

pulilic

utility,

Thus honesty is undoubtedly the best policy; but he

abstains trom cheating merely because it is politic to curl) his
fraudulent inclinations, is really a dishonest man.
Again, to pre
virtuous.

who

serve one

love

of

life

life

is

a duty
but he who does so solely from the
vi: uous, but
merely prudent.
Beneficence
;

not

is

(bene-facioi) is not bene\olence (bcnc-volji)^ except when one does

to others merely because it is a
duty, and without reference

good

even to that secret satisfaction, that joy within the breast, with
which one contemplates his own good deeds.
If conscience alone
did not prompt the act. conscience \vill dishonor the drafts which
are made upon it for self-approbation.
The action may be con
formable to iltify, even if the motive of it is only sensuous in
clination,

happiness
that

is,

c.
;

f/.,

but

the hope of gaining money, reputation, or future

only if done r.n7>/\/tv/// from n sense of duty,

from mere reverence

for the

Moral

Law, irrespective of

consequences, is it strictly virtuous, or absolutely right.

Hence it is obvious that the Mitral Law is purely a priori.

all

discards

all

reference to experience

it.

is

of absolute

and

It

intrinsic

and
is universal, for it admits
obligation, prior to all command
no exceptions, makes no compromises, and assumes authority over*
all
Kant appropriate
intelligent beings, whether human or divine.
it.

ly

denominates

Law

it

the Categorical

of the Practical

Imperative.

This fundamental

Reason bears the form of an

Command

Imperative,"

because man is not purely rational,

but also a sensuous being, and the senses are generally in active
It is not, like the maxims of prudence
opposition to the reason.
and utility, merely a hypothetical or conditioned command.
It
does not, like them, say, Do this, if you would avoid a whipping;
do it. / you would go to heaven if you would be happy, if you
would have wealth, or honor with your fellow men, etc.
But it is
that

is

to

say, a

an Absolute Command.
It says, Do
heavens should fall.
Do it, though thereby
you should lose every thing in this world, and should even forfeit
all hope in the world which is to come.
Do IT, and think not at
all of the consequences.
Be just, and fear not. This Law oper
a

"

Categorical

this,

ates

THOUGH

Imperative,"

the

upon conduct, because

it

is

instinctively regarded not

merely

KANT

GROUNDWORK OF

ETHICS.

249

we cannot disobey
with approbation, but with reverence and awe
behests except with a feeling of shame and self-humiliation.
to be that necessity of perform
Accordingly, Kant defines duty
arises solely from reverence for the Moral
which
act
a
certain
ing
For any object to be obtained as an effect of my action, I
Law.
of inclination or liking, but never of reverence,
have a
;

its

"

may

feeling
of my
the very reason that it is an effect, and not an activity,
or
inclination
for
reverence
any
Just so, I cannot have
will.
I can, at the utanother
or
s;
whether
own,
my
liking whatever,
of it, H my own. or sometimes even love it, if

for"

mosConly approve
another s because I regard

it as conducing to my own advantage.

with my Will as its ground or reason,
connected
Only
inclina
never as its effect; only that which does not subserve my
it from consid
excludes
at
least,
wholly
tion, but overpowers it,
which is a Law per se, can be an
eration
consequently, only that
and therefore a command or Imperative.
object of veneration,
the
as an action done from a sense of duty must exclude

that which

is

"or,

Hence,

of the will,
it, of every object
the
will
the
determine
objectively,
except,
there is nothing
Law. and subjectively, pure reverence for this Law, and a determi

influence of inclination, and, with

left

nation to obey

it

to

inclination whatsoever."
irrespective of any
different
insists, is a state of mind specifically
in that it is self-created, through a concep

Reverence, Kant

from

other feelings,

all

tion of the
I

What 1 immediately recognize as a Law unto

Reason.
con
with
reverence, which signifies merely the
regard

myself,
its dictates,
sciousness of the entire subordination of my will to
senses.
on
Hence,
influence
of
intervention
the
my
out
witl
any
in a merely
this eeliug is never directed towards a person, except
of an individual
figurative sense, when the character and actions
the Moral
are considered as a mere embodiment or example of
asked
rebukingly, "Why
Law. Even the Saviour of mankind
There is none good but one, that is, God."
calh-st thou me
1

good?

This doctrine is admirably illustrated by Kant in an eloquent

which many readers are familiar, as it is presented in
passage, with
Two things there are,
a translation by Sir William Hamilton.
and the more steadfastly, we consider them, fill
the
oftener,
the mind with an ever

which,
ence.

neither

t}ie

am

new and ever rising admiration and rever

STARRY HEAVEN above, the MORAL LAW wit/tin. Of

I compelled to seek out its reality, as veiled in darkness,

its possibility, as beyond the sphere of

my

or only to conjecture

clear before me,

Both I contemplate lying

knowledge.
vect both immediately with the consciousness of

my own

ami conexistence.

250

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

The one

begins from the place I occupy in the outer world of

expands beyond the bounds of imagination the connection
of my body with it into a union with worlds
rising beyond worlds,
and systems blending into systems; and
protends it also into the
sense

illimitable

times of their periodic movement, their

commencement

and duration.
The other begins with my invisible self, with
and represents me in a world
personality
infinite

my

truly
indeed,
but whose infinity can be tracked out
only by the intellect, and
my connection with which, unlike the fortuitous relation wherein I
stand to all worlds of sense. 1 am
compelled to recognize as uni
versal and necessary.
In the former, the first view oF a
countless
multitude of worlds annihilates, as it
were,
importance as an
animal creation, which, after a brief and
incomprehensible en
dowment with the powers of life, is
compelled to refund its con
stituent matter to the
itself an atom in the universe
planet
,u>/

on which
vates

my

it
The other, on the contrary, immeasurably ele
grew.
worth as an intelligence; and this
through my personality,

in which the Moral Law reveals to me a

life
independent of the
animal kingdom, nay. of the whole material world: at
least, if it
be permitted to infer as much from the
regulation of my being ex
acted by a conformity with that
Law, which is not restricted by the
conditions and limits of this life, but stretches out to
eternity."
lint a
diilicnlty seems immediately to arise; for how
we to
are"

ascertain the content of the

Law

How

know what are its

we cannot have re

can we

dictates, what it
enjoins and what it forbids, if
course to experience ?
It would seem that the Moral
Law, like
the Categories, must be a mere
blank, an empty form without
matter, if there be not presented to it an
empirical content, a

manifold of intuition.

Kant

perceives the dilliculty, and resolves

in a

very ingenious and characteristic manner,

lie sums up all
morality into one precept, which is so expressed, that its mere form
of universality seems to render it
definite, and thereby to supply
the lack of matter.
Thus speaks .Reason
absolutely a priori: Let
thy rule of conduct in every case, be such, that it might become a
unircrsal law, to govern the actions
of all mankind. *More briefly
it

and simply expressed

Always act as you would wish every in

himself included, to act, if he were in
your
And yet the problem is not here
place.
really solved, for this
precept, assumes, that my duty is made known to me
only through
my previous knowledge how all intelligent beings ought" to act,if
they were under precisely the same circumstances.
How did I
How is it easier for iue to
acquire this previous knowledge?
telligent being,

God

KANT

know what

GROUNDWORK OF

mankind ought

nil

251

ETHICS.

to do, than to recognize what is

the Utilitarian will answer, that

my

Obviously
DWII particular duty ?
consideration
a regard to consequences, that is, the
action is, or is not, expedient in the long

proposed

whether the
run, or as a

must determine what I ought to do, through pointing

to do in a similar
out what any man. any intelligent being, ought
o-enerul rule,

case.

the particular
This will appear more clearly, when we examine
mode of applying his
cases adduced by Kant as illustrations of the
Suicide is the first instance, and is a very good
universal precept.
of ethics, to demonstrate
not
it
is
since
easy, under any system
one,
An indi
Kant
argues thus.
that this act in all cases is wrong.

and believing his

vidual harassed by a series of evils, sick of life,
to himself,
wearisome
is
existence to be as useless to others as it
of
whether
first
he
but
principle
asks,
this^
proposes to kill himself;
is lit to become a universal law;
under
suicide
strong temptation
so lit, since the
and he is at once obliged to answer, that it is not
the world a
make
would
self-destruction
of
universal practice
Now I am not so sure of
desert and reduce creation to chaos.
men to
require all other
the universal law would

only
and it
placed under similar circumstances;
But
so
be
waiving
placed.
is hardly conceivable that they should
to be a
is it not obvious, that suicide is here proved
this diiliculty
own case, because it would be very inexpedient as a
crime in

that, since

do likewise, if they

ivere

my

The Utili
for then it would depopulate the earth ?
general rule,
action to be criminal,
an
hold
not
do
themselves
expedient
tarians
on the whole, or as a universal principle
except it be inexpedient
of conduct.
Kant s second instance equally fails to substantiate his theory.
^

need

borrow

knowing

that

he

money,
person in great
will be
cannot repay tin: loan, but being also aware that nothing
the sum shall be
lent to him," if he does not stoutly promise that
Is he justified, then, in making a prom
time.
repaid within a short
Certainly not, answers
he knows will not be kept?
ise which
did
that
is, if everybody
if this were a universal law,

Kant

in

to

for

so, all faith in

lend

tries

money

any one

and nobody would ever

promises would be destroyed,
But here, too, the act is proved to be criminal

again.
case,

because

it

is

assumed

to

be inexpedient in
^the

a general rule; and thus the fundamental principle

long run, or as
of utilitarianism is not destroyed, but established.
Those moralists who are not utilitarians, of course, will correct
manner.
They hold that
this portion of Kant s theory in another

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
not only the Form, but

some measure the

Content, of the Moral
a priori.
Conscience not only tells me
that such an absolute Law
exists, and therefore that
-Law

is

made known

in

to us

I"ou<rht"

irrespective of
es, but it
s

are

other considerations whatsoever, to

follow it s
nukes known to a certain extent what
those dieIt tells me what
purposes are right, and leaves me to
all

ascertain from

experience the course of conduct l,v which those

can be most
This is only savin*
effectually carried out.
that, like our other Innate
Ideas, the Law within the breast needs
and development.
Its
liability to perversion and abuse
|lture
proceeds chiefly from a
neglect of the duty of self-examination
c as it
may seem, we are often mistaken in respect to the
motives and purposes which direct our
conduct.
So blindin- is the

pm T oses

influence of self-love, so insidious are

the
promptings of passTon and
we often fancy that we are
acting from a sense of
luty, when we are really animated
by ostentation, the pride of
opinion, selfishness, or revenge.
Conscience may even
lapse into
:e of morbid
sensitiveness, or be stimulated into the fever
of
excitement which generates the cruelties of
fanaticism and partvtte
Such perversions and abuses need to be
corrected by the
ichmgs of experience, that is, usually by utilitarian considera
tions; but the hability to them does not
disprove the imiateness and
independence of our sense of right.

appetite that

Notwithstanding the strict and absolute necessity which is all

necessitarians believe,
governs every act of the will, it is still true
)th Kant and
Schopenhauer are obliged to confess, that all our
actions are attended with a distinct
consciousness, that they originate
in ourselves and are in our own
power, so that we are morally re
But responsibility
sponsible tor them.
t have
implies that we
acted otherwise, and therefore
t Hd o f
presupposes freedom. To
:s
contradiction, and thereby to reconcile the doctrine of
neces
sity with this consciousness which involves
freedom, Schopenhauer
Kant
s
distinction between man s
adopts
empirical character, which
is a
phenomenon, and as such, is all that is directly manifest to ob
servation, and his
intelligible character, which
a noumenon, or
dmg-an-srch, and, as such, is the inmost kernel of his real beino-

mH,
<^

is"

though we know

it

only indirectly.

a familiar fact, that the same cause

does not always
pro
duce the same result, but that its action is
necessarily modified by
the peculiar nature or character of that
on which it operates.
change in anything is the joint result of two factors,
namely its
proper cause and the thing s own nature or internal constitution
It

is

KANT

GROUNDWORK OF

253

ETHICS.

wax, melts it
In like
to clay, hardens
when
desire of wealth,
acting on
manner, a given motive, say, the
or
may
same
the
intensity,
with
strength
different persons, though
It induces one man to steal
actions.
dissimilar
to
lead
very
as to deny himself the ordinary
another, to be so parsimonious
a fourth,
to
be
a
indefatigably industrious
third,
comforts of life
and so on.
hate those who are richer than himself

Thus

the application of
it

fire to

powder explodes

to water, converts

it

it

to

into steam, etc.

or

to

envy
AVhv is this great disparity

umf is

equally strong

of results,

Why

when

the motive

is

the same,

are the resultant actions so dissimilar,

character, which, as a phenome

even when each agent s empirical

and which is due to the shaping influ
non, is open to observation,
and other external cir
ences of education, example, opportunity,
is
because each agents
It
same?
cumstances, is apparently the
and makes him
with
born
was
him,
which
intelligible character,
of his inmost
what he is, which is the noumenon or dincj-an-sich
it is a
because
and
real
which, precisely
is his
Self,
being, and so
inscrutable by others, and even by
and
unknowable
is
nouinenon,
character, I say, is original and
this
because

himself,

intelligible

and is precisely that which differentiates him

peculiar to himself,
it is a noumenon
from every other human being. Also, because
are
and
Causality, which
outside of Time, Space,
again, it exists
forms of Sense or of the Understanding, and
merely phenomenal
hence it cannot be necessitated or compelled, but

modes

is

of its

absolutely free.

own

being for,
in
it is also incapable of existence
of
out
Time,
^succession,
being
Hence, its previous
sinee without Time there cannot be succession.
cause its subsequent
or antecedent condition cannot produce or
It does not exist in successive states or

In

state.

it.elf,

per

se, it

is

Or still more briefly,

unchangeable.
cannot be an effect, that is, it cannot

being outside of Causality,

And yet, as it is
be caused or modified by anything out of itself.
inmost core of my existence, my primitive
only real being, the
it

my

must enter as an

a factor,
Self, it must be present as
element, into every change and every action of which
it

and inborn
nal Self,
rian

my

as.-^-rts

by previous

my phenome

What the Necessita

empirical character, is capable.
is formed
is true, that each man s empirical character
If he becomes a liar, for instance,
circumstances.
found

the causes which have made him such will probably be

and the pres
defective education, bad company, the force of habit,
falsehood.
a
Now,
uttered
iirst
he
when
ence of

among

strong temptation

a sufficient
with this acquired and empirical character, whenever
not be sutftmotive or temptation comes along, though it would

254

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

cient for another

telling another
right.

And

in

lie.

and better educated man, this one cannot

help
So far. he is not free, and the Necessitarian is

like

manner, every empirical character, when a

is
presented to it, must act as it does, must

given motive or desire

yield or resist, precisely like a stone when

operated on by lever or
The truthful man shuns the falsehood
pulley.
just as necessarily
as the habitual liar utters it.
Why, then, does he feel remorse or
self-gratulation for what he could not
?
does

help

Why

conscience

him what he ought to have done, instead of what he

did do,
though he does not censure a stone for
rolling down hill, nor water
for
tumbling over a cataract; and his own action was not one
whit less necessary than theirs? Because, answer Kant
and Scho
penhauer, this same conscience rightly tells him that he l.s
respon
1

not indeed for doing this

particular act, since t/i/ s he could
but for not being a better
man, for not having a dif
ferent empirical
character, which would have rendered it impossible
for him to yield to such a motive, or to succumb to
this
sible,

not help.

temptation.
he dues, \mtfor what he is.
Opcrari
necessarily results from the being of him
who did it. Blame not the action, then, but the man for
being
capable of such an action.
Whip him, not for telling this particu"
lar lie, but for
not for stealing this horse,
being a liar at heart
but for being a thief or rogue in
grain, in his inmost nature.
For,
this inmost nature, his real Sell, his
dintj-an-sich, is his intelligible
character, which, as a noumeuon, is in some inscrutable manner

He

is responsible,
not./w?- what,
sequitur csse : the action

emancipated from the laws of Time and Causality, from the opera
tion of motives, and is therefore
lie might have
absolutely free,
been a better man than he is, and therefore he
ought to have been

better.
For this intelligible character is the
primitive element,
the original factor, out of which his
empirical character was formed,
and
which it is based and
consequently, if it were other than
on^
it is, his whole
subsequent moral nature, and his whole series of
And thus the deep and dark problem
actions, would be different.
of fixed fate and free-will is
solved, the two contradictories bein^
reconciled with each other.
As a phenomenon, man is
j,s

just
he moves only as he is
necessity as a stone
moved. As a noumenon, he is lord of himself and his whole
con
duct nothing can mova him.

much

to

subject

Si fractus illabatur
orbis,

Impavidum

He
also

is free,

he

is

du kannsi.

ferient ruinse.

responsible, he merits praise or blame.

Du

sollst,

KANT
Freedom

255

ETHICS.

a power to act independently of any cause operating

it to act; that is, it is an unconditioned causality,
cause.
Such an unconditioned cause is never

is

60 as to

compel

or primitive

Fir>r,

GROUNDWORK OF

made known, and therefore is never cognizable. Only

phenomena can be objects of cognitive judgments, and therefore
empirically

freedom cannot be either

little

This

justified in denying
is proved in the third

or denied.

ai firmed

freedom as Idealism

is

as

affirming

it.

Empiricism
is

in

If the Critical

Philosophy
Antinomy.
denies the cognizability of freedom, it does not thereby also deny
Neither does the
That would be Dogmatism.
its
existence.
is unthinkable; for we can think
freedom
assert
that
Critique
"

An absolutely lim
anything that does not involve a contradiction.
and a completed
be
no
would
there
which
space,
beyond
for
time, beyond which there would be no time, are unthinkable
an
But
unlimited.
are
time
and
of
freedom,
intuitions
our
space

ited space,

unconditioned causality, is perfectly thinkable; for since cause and

not in eodcm (/mere, nay, are radically unlike, there is
no contradiction in supposing that effects, which are conditioned,
Freedom is think
should have a cause which is unconditioned.

effect are

even possible, though not as a phenomenon, or

In cer
and therefore it is not cognizable.
It is unthinkable as
freedom is unthinkable.
a part or member of the world of sense it is impossible as an
And this holds true both of the external
object of experience.
If
world of space, and of the interior or psychical world of time.
the causes are material, then the machine which is thereby moved

able, then,

and

is

object of experience
tain cases, however,

if
a mechanical automaton
they are psychical, if they are
Such autom
motives, then the machine is a spiritual automaton.
ata are, the Leibnitzian monads.
They are, it is true, driven by
causes which are within themselves; but they are not therefore

is

anv more

wound

is

in

And
lates,

smoke-jack, which, after

Then freedom

experience, but as

character, a

mena

necessarily kept in play

machinery.

ternal

enon

free than

up,

noumcnon.

is

it

has once been

from within, by

its

thinkable, not as a

own in
phenom

an intelligible cause, an intelligible

thus, it is not cognizable, for nou-

Even

but it is thinkable, and therefore possible.

are incognizable
our feeling of responsibility necessarily assumes, or postu
Moral obligation negatives incapacity. You
that it is real.
;

yon can.
must from its very nature have some end in
and this something is its Good, or
view, something to strive for
Us principle of xctiou. The nature of this Good depends upon

oufjlil,,

The

tlicrcfore

Will, as such,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

256

of the Will which seeks for it.

If the Will be
and
it seeks for this
heteronomous,
empirical
good in some exter
nal object or state, which experience has pointed out to it as a
source oi pleasure or happiness.
Such are. wealth, power, leisure,

the constitution

sensual

enjoyment, the gratification of any passion or desire for

So far as the Will strives for such ends,

the things of this world.

obviously empirical, having experience as its sole guide,, and

heteronomous, because it is not then an end unto itself, but finds
bomething outside of itself, which becomes a law unto it, because
suppo.-ed to be necessary for its well-being or enjoyment.
Kvery
such end is merely a contingent and temporary good, dependent
on our ever-changing doire.- and moods of mind, and on the circum.-tamvs of the, moment.
the pure Will, which is an end
unto it.-elf, and which recogni/es no principle of action but rever
ence for the .Moral Law, seeks the unconditioned or absolute
Good, not dependent upon anything, but good per ,vc, the, same
This is the highest good, the
yesterday, to-day, and forever.
sutnnnun boniun, which the ancients discussed so earnestly, and
tried to fix with precision.
What are its elements, according to
it is

l>ut

Kant

They
because

arc;
it

is

two, perfect virtue and perfect happiness the former,

the supreme (lood; the latter, because the snin/num
;

bonum

mu.-t also be the consummate or perfect Good, and there

fore include in itself all other goods, .such as the useful, the agree
able, peace of mind, content with our lot, and all other sources of

happiness.

The

difficulty

is,

and

it is

the antinomy of Practical

lieason, to reconcile these two elements with each other, that is,
to make perfect virtue compatible with perfect happiness.
The
ancients endeavored to effect this combination by the analytic

method, proving the one to be a necessary element, companion, or

consequence of the other, so that by finding one we necessarily
attain both.
Thus, the Stoics taught that perfect virtue is at the

same moment perfect happiness, the truly virtuous man needing

nothing, and desiring nothing, beyond the consciousness of his own

The Epicureans, on the other hand, maintained

uprightness.
pleasure to be the highest good, and that virtue is found to be one
of its necessary elements or concomitants.
But Kant maintains,
and with reason, that two so heterogeneous notions cannot be found
thus chemically interfused and combined, all experience going to
show their frequent entire separation from each other. Neither
are they related to each other as cause and effect, since the at
tainment of happiness is no proper motive for the exercise of

KANT

GROUNDWORK OF

257

ETHICS.

does not in
and. in this world at least, perfect integrity

virtue,

in some
sure perfect felicity. Too many also find their happiness
la\v.
moral
the
with
coincident
thing not
sumKant seeks a synthetic union of the two elements of the

cannot
bonuni in the noumenal or intelligible world, since it
rational beings,
he found in the world of phenomena or sense. As
we are noumena, or beings per se, citizens of a supersensuous
virtue and happiness does not
world, where the conflict between
is to be realized, not as a means for any
The highest
exist.

mum

good

and highest
ulterior and higher purpose, but as itself the ultimate
As such, it is unconditionally or ab
end or aim of "pure Reason.
this end should be attained
yet this is not
solutely necessary that
of the highest
realization
The
moral
a
but
a physical,
necessity.
therefore, it is also morally necessary
is
;

morally necessary
conditions should exist under which alone the highest
He who wills the attainment of the end
be realized.
can
good
must also will the conditions without which such attainment would

good*

the

that

In other words, the Practical Reason, the Moral

means
Law, postulates, or absolutely requires, the necessary
^for
united
virtue
of
that
is,
perfect
the attainment of the highest good,
with perfect happiness.
What are these necessary means ? They are two, the Immor
and the Being of a God. Without the former,
tality of the Soul
without the latter,
be beyond our reach
would
virtue
perfect
would be unattainable. In this life, in this
perfect happiness
is always a struggle and an
phenomenal world of sense, virtue
a perpetually recurring contest with temptation and sin.
effort
The victory over them is never final we can never sleep upon
in order to chas
arms, but must be constantly up and doing,

be impossible.

o>ir

our

tise

Now,

desires

selfish

the virtue which

is

and keep down our rebellious passions.

thus
assailed, and which can

perpetually
be kept up only by ceaseless effort and warfare, is at best limited,
it cannot be made perfect except in
contingent, and incomplete
an infinite lapse of time. Holiness, that is, perfect virtue, is pos
;

Consequently, the highest

being.
realized by the human will, postulates by moral
be
good,
duration of human existence, that is, the
necessity the endless
Immortality of the Soul.
Further still the highest good requires consummate happiness
sible

only in an eternity of
if it is

to

as

the

virtue

God.

of perfect
necessary consequence, the inevitable adjunct,
and this end cannot be obtained without the being of a
The constitution of the universe, the whole current of the
17

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

258

world s affairs, must be made to harmonize with the absolute re

The conditions of such harmony
quirements of the Moral Law.
do not exist in man he is not the creator and governor of the
;

universe.

is
largely dependent upon external condi
on the conformity of physical law and the outward course
of events, not only with the dictates of the moral law, but with
the needs and requirements of our whole complex
Such a
being.
conformity can be brought about only by an Author and Governor
of nature, who, as such, must be distinct from Nature, because he
who must also be omnipotent, since any limitation of his
rules it

Happiness

tions,

being would negative the perfect conformity which is requisite

intelligent, because he must act from a purpose and with a knowl
edge of man s nature and holy, because his purpose must be the
;

realization of the

supreme Good and the union of perfect

felicity

with perfect virtue.

Hence we see that the three Ideas of Pure Reason, Freedom,

Immortality, and the Being of a God, which the merely speculative
Reason, on theoretical grounds

alone, found itself incompetent

disprove, are now presented as firmly
rooted in our moral nature,
necessary postulates or assumptions
of that voice of conscience, which claims absolute
authority to
either

to establish

or to

whole conduct.
These Ideas then rest, not on knowl
but
on
faith, on moral certainty, on that veneration for the
edge,
law within the breast, without regard to which man becomes a
brute or a demon, and this world a chaos.
direct our

CHAPTER XV.
RELATIONS OP WHAT
PHILOSOPHY.

POSITIVISM.

THE

history of philosophy

is,

is

CALLED SCIEXCE TO

in great part, a record of the oscil

human mind between extreme

In succes
opinions.
periods, the pendulum swings to and fro, describing longer
or shorter arcs according as the circumstances of the age have
lations of the

sive

developed more or

We

less activity of thought.

have seen that
the philosophy of the eighteenth century was, in the main, a reac
tion from that of the age which preceded it, and. as such, that it
was a dreary aggregate of the baldest empiricism, materialism,

But thoughtful and earnest minds could not long

and unbelief.
remain content with the mockery, the sophistry, and skepticism of
Voltaire, Diderot. David Hume, and Condillac, especially after
their doctrines had largely contributed to the downfall of church
and state in France, and brought all the institutions of. society

The current of opinion turned in

Europe.
the opposite direction, and the rise of what is called the Scotch
philosophy, which is eminently conservative in doctrine, was
hailed with joy both in England and France.
Rover Collard,
into peril throughout

and Cousin revived a knowledge of Descartes and

Malebranche Sir William Hamilton, as we have seen, repeated
Pascal, and was also largely indebted to Leibnitz and Kant.
During the first third of the present century, materialism and
skepticism became generally discredited, and the doctrines of the
ism and the freedom of the will were taught in all the schools.
The influence of German philosophy, for more than half a cen
tury after the publication of the
Critique of Pure Reason," was
]\Iaine de Biran,
;

restricted, in the main, to

Germany itself, partly because compara

few persons out of the country were familiar with the
language, but still more on account of the abstruse jargon of tech
nicalities in which Kant and his immediate successors, the
philoso
phers of the Absolute, saw fit to enwrap their meaning.
They
continued to be the guardians of an occult science, which had lit-

tively

260
tie

MODKRX PHILOSOPHY.

meaning or

like

direct

own

influence outside of the universities and the

Even eminent scholars and thinkers,

Dugald Stewart and Sir James .Mackintosh in Finland, and

schools in

their

land.

Madame

de Stael and Degerando in France, either

neglected Ger
philosophy altogether, or discussed it in a manner which bctraxed only their ignorance of the
As we shall see herosubject.

man

utter, the

tide

oi

opinion in philosophy had its ehb and 1low in

than elsewhere; but this movement of the waters
was hardly perceptible from foreign shores.
.Not till about 1X.;()
were Kant. Schelling. and
Hegel so far studied and understood by

Germany no

less

foreigners, that their influence could be felt throughout

Furope.
And this curious result has followed, that
they be^an decideill\- to
altect the course of
thought in other couniries, only after their

power and reputation had considerably waned

at home.
France and Finland, within our own
day, we have wit
nessed another great
A reaction against
swing of the pendulum.
Reid. Stewart, and Hamilton,
against .Maine de Uiran and Cousin,
has brought hack in all its essential features the
of

In

philosophy

the eighteenth
century.
tended illumination, an

Once more, we

have;

a period of pre
AufU. inut j, or clearing up of old preju
dices, and also a war to the knife
against religion and the Church.
()lliv more, the methods and the
doctrines of empiricism and

materialism seem

to have the
ascendency, and aim to control the
thought of the age by the arrogance of their pretensions, and by
the .spirit of
propagandism with which their followers are ani
mated.
As the former period was denominated the
of Rea

Age

son, the

present boastfully calls

Charles

Darwin

itself

the

Age

of

Mr.

Science.

Helvetius and Lord .Monboddo,

when he tells us. that man is descended from a
hairy quadruped,
furnished with a tail and
pointed ears, probablv arboreal in its
habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World."
Herbert Spencer
teaches us, "that
and nervous action are the inner
outer faces of

only

repeats

feeling
the same change

and

"

and

having contemplated
these
changes on their outsides," as chemical disturbances prop
agated through any series of molecules in the substance of the
we have to contemplate them from their
nerves,
as
insides,"
emotions and other states of consciousness.
As one
to
;

argument

support this broad conclusion, he cites the

that
surprising fact,
as nervous action
occupies appreciable time, so feeling occupies
"

time;"
though the same analogy would prove
trundling a wheelbarrow does not differ from reading an

appreciable
poeui.

Then he develops

that

epic
at great
length the noted hypothesis of

POSITIVISM.
Condillac, respecting the

automaton fashioned like a man, and

or sensations, may be gradually de

shows how these, nerve-changes,

and feelings which occupy the
veloped into all the knowledge
human mind. Mr. Darwin seems to hold that a conscience may
be developed in a baboon, and says expressly, that a pointer dog,
his past conduct [a very significant proviso],
it able to reflect on
would say to himself, I ought (as indeed we say of him) to have
not have yielded to the passing tempta
pointed ut that hare, and

Mr. Spencer literally follows David Hume,

hunting
of the freedom of the will
the illusion
that
asserts
he
when
the
consists in supposing, that, at each moment, the Ego [or
the
than
more
is
aggregate of
something
psychical conscious Self]
And
and ideas, actual and nascent, which then exists."

tion of

it."

"

"

"

feelings

he blunders

still

desire or not

to

more wot ully when he

to desire
"

dogma

of free will

is

asserts, that

the

"

liberty
the real proposition involved in the

and Hamil
though Locke, Reid, Stewart,
one
desire
we
often
that
facts,
thing and

ton had cited the patent

will another; that opposite desires, but not opposite volitions, may
what
exist in the mind at the same moment; and that we will only
what
desire
often
we
our
within
be
to
we believe
though

power,
be beyond our reach.
Mr. Huxley pithily expresses the necessitarian doctrine, when
to make me
lie protests, "that if some great Power would agree
what is right, on condition of
always think what is true and do
and wound up every morning be
being turned into a sort of clock,
fore I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer."
The ingenious Mr. Maelzel, who, nearly a century ago, constructed
of
a wooden man, about three feet high, that played a good game
dis
chess, also fashioned a smaller puppet, which pronounced quite
of words.
Now, it matters not at all, most per
tinctly a number
whether a sentence uttered by this puppet be
sons will

we know

to

think,
in
true or false, since there would be just as much merit, or demerit,
And if all mankind were wooden
the one case as in the other.
so constructed, I think that the difference between truth and

images

would not
falsehood, or between a right action and a wrong one,
concern them in the least, and in fact would have no meaning for

Mr. Huxley s remark, if intended to be taken seriously,

the lamentable cynicism, which is the only state of
shows
merely
mind that can logically result from belief in a materialistic and fatal
A Dan ton or a Desmoulins might utter
istic theory of the universe.

them.

t,

while projecting the September massacres and the reign of the

for what sensible man would feel remorse of conscience

guillotine
oil

beheading

dolls

and puppets?

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

262

The

doctrine of Descartes, that

mere machines, simulating

ples,

we

own

da\

life,

all

the animals below

contributed largely

among

man

are

disci

his

told, to the pitiless treatment oi brutes, and to the

of
that
detestable practice of vivisection, ivnewed in our
beginning

are

and now much

in vogue, which caused an eminent French

the hellish Magenyears ago to be stigmatized as
An eminent Cartesian, being in company with Fontenelle,
die."
received a poor dug. then big with pup. that came to fawn
upon

surgeon

"

many

him. with so severe a kick that the animal yelped with pain
and
when Fontenelle showed some pity and indignation, the philoso
;

Eh. (jnut ! ne sitc z-voiis

pas bieti qne cela
/mint
Logically, the Cartesian was right
believing the
dog to be a mere automaton, there was no more brutality in the
act, than there would have been in kicking out of one s path a

pher coolly observed,

"

"

in

xr /it

>

And if human beings also, as the Positivists

rat-trap.
teach, are only curiously fa>hioiied clocks or locomotive engines, I
cannot see that there would be either wroiiii
o or harm in maimin^ or
broken

An Attila or a Genghis Khan would

any number of them.
then no more doerve reprobation, than a San Carlo Borromeo or a
Howard would merit praise.
killing

The examples here

all

it.s

cited are

essential features, the

probably enough to show that, iu

materialism and skepti-

"scientific"

of the present day, in-tead of evincing progress, would

carry
us back to the last century, being merely a revival of the philos
In this respect, as in so
ophy of the French Encyclopedists.
ci.Mii

many

others,

lights are but

we may find
new editions

re;i>oii

to

think

that the pretended

new

of old darkness.

Perhaps the parallel

here indicated may be best carried out and illustrated by examin
ing, at some length, that system of philo>ophy which, though really
of old date, has tirst acquired in our own times the name of Pos
The discussion will be more interesting in this place,
itivism.

because

some

of

will bring again into view, in their

practical application,
those great truths underlying our intellectual and moral

it

nature, which were

iirst

Jmmanuel Kant.

Both

systematically set forth and illustrated by

the heresy and the confutation of it

properly belong to the eighteenth century.

Notorious as it has become, Positivism pure and simple is not
in good repute nowadays, and finds very few, perhaps not more
than half a dozen, thorough-going adherents.
In fact, since the
death of its French founder, I hardly know any writers or think

some note and importance, except Mr. Congreve, Mr. Harri

and Di. Bridges in England, and perhaps M. Littre and one or

ers of
son,

263

POSITIVISM.

two others in France, who arc now willing to be called Positivists,

of the
and as such, are still zealous and thorough-going advocates
he
as
first
was
says,
which
by
whole body of doctrine
promulgated,
of the largest
demerit
merit
or
real
the
Auguste Comte, though
Even Mr. G. II. Lewes,
to David Hume.
it is due
portion of
volumes on the History
written
well
but
two
iiuthoi of
ponderous
to me, of
of Philosophy," though an earnest proselyte, as it seems
for
or
general substance
Hume and Comte on all important points,
of doctrine, still does not accept the name of Positivist, perhaps
because he prefers to be considered as an independent thinker.
And Mr. Huxley, after giving an amusing account of the attempts
made by two eminent specialists to shake off the odious appella
Comtism in his own be
tion, takes an opportunity of repudiating
of
have
he
added,
taking leave of it in a very
half, and,
might
He
characteristic manner, by alh xing to it a stinging epigram.
minus
Catholicism
as
than
truth
less
point,
designates it, with no
"

ki

Christianity."

But how happens

it,

then, one will naturally ask, that a system

under the name of Posi
first

of philosophic thought,
promulgated
tivism about half a century ago by a partially insane
teacher of mathematics, which cannot now boast a corporal

French
s

guard
and thorough-going adherents, and is even scornfully
all the eminent speculatists and savans, who
repudiated in name by
doctrines either in
no
predilection for conservative
certainly have

of devoted

theology or philosophy,
tem has become, in the

how happens it, I

common estimation

a sys
say, that such
at least, at once so

a portentous exhibition of modern

prevalent and so formidable;
alike our ordinary beliefs, our philosophical
menacing
skepticism,
creed, and our religious hopes buttressed, as is supposed, by some
;

of the best accredited results of

as
physical science; fortified,

is

a majority of the
by the secret or avowed adhesion of
and
naturalists,
most distinguished physicists
especially geologists,
and chemists growing in authority, spreading in
physiologists,
both the
influence, darkening in aspect, till it seems to overspread
earth and the heavens with gloom, and to shut out the future into
a system, to adopt Jean Paul Richter s language,
utter darkness
the
makes
which
universe, human beings included, to be an autom
man s future
aton, God to be the uniformity of physical law, and

feared,

"

but not too strongly, I think,

Posifor the apprehensions ot all.
livism denies the efficacy of prayer and the being of a God and as
the
t not only rejects, but scoffs at, the doctrine of the freedom of
"

a coffin

I state the case strongly,

for the convictions of

some and

264

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

human

it
annuls the precepts and the sanctions of
morality
hands of marriage and the
family, and thereby shakes
the very foundations of
It is atheism and fatalism com
society.
bined.
Here surely is a remarkable phenomenon, and one deserv

will,

loosens the

What means this strange combination of

ing of attentive; study.
seeming weakness and formidable strength ?
^\ e
begin an answer to this question by remarking, that the
name Positivism has two perfectly distinct
the first, a
meanings:
broad and comprehensive one,
including the whole body of doetrine taught by
Auguste C omte in the six ponderous octavo vol
umes, averaging about eight hundred
pages each, denominated by
him the Positive Philosophy."
In this sense. Positivism
"

hardly

merits notice, for

lytes
since

among men
includes,

it

which

all

Comte

does

it

that

does not

do/en prose

any repute as sober and earnest thinkers;

scheme of classification of the science-, in
true and valuable
belongs to Descartes, while

own

not

halt a

of

first,
is

now count over

part in
satisfy the

it is

meagre, not sufficiently worked out, and

conditions of the problem.

Secondly, it in
cludes the law of the three successive
stages, through which all the
sciences have
or are pas-ing, and which also, necessarily
]>a>-ed.

constitute

three distinct epochs in the

history both of every indi
vidual mind and of the human race. First is the
theological stage,
in which all events, all
causation, are referred to the action of
Second is the metaphysical period, in which
super-human beings.
causative power is ascribed to
metaphysical entities or abstractions,
regarded as the occult sources or principles of phenomena, such as
Substantial Forms and Quiddities,
Nature s horror of a vacuum,
and even the modern doctrines of the attraction of
gravitation,
chemical attinity, and the like, when
considered as de
delusively

noting real forces or powers, and not as a mere classification of

results produced by these fictitious causes.
The third stage is that
of Positive Science, so called, in which these names are
recognized
as mere abstractions or fictions, and both science and

philosophy

are

restricted

to

the

observation, classification,

and prevision of

phenomena.
Here, again, all that is peculiar to Comte is the assertion, that
these three stages or states of mind, or, as
they may more cor
rectly be described, these three conceptions of the phenomena of
the Universe in respect to their
origin or efficient cause, are neces
sarily successive developments of thought and science, and thus
constitute a real progress from error to truth, the first belono-in"
i

only to the infancy of speculation, and therefore being naturally

POSITIVISM.

matures and knowledge adami inevitably outgrown, as the mind

merely a
while the second is equally temporary, being
ranees
the mists oi
which
at
only
third,
the
epoch
step of transition to
illusion disappear, and physical phe
superstition and metaphysical
a clear atmos
nomena assume their true aspect, as seen through
and
is not even plausible,
not
is
true,
assertion
this
;

But

pin-re.

its falsity is

lookino-

of

modes

now almost universally admitted. These three

are not successive stages
at the phenomena of nature
to each

thought; they are not even antagonistic

as
They so far harmonize
be mutually exclusive.
in its own
each
applied
divided
being
a
empire,
to hold peacefully
of objects and events,
that is, to its own peculiar class
province
now in many, per
coexist
They
or wherever it is most fitting.
minds they have so co
and
inquiring
haps in most, thoughtful
dawn of science and religion
existed in every age since the
and students of
Nearly all speculatists
the East, and in Greece.
to personal agency, eit
nature refer one class of phenomena
are called second causes
what
to
class
hum-in or divine another
the existence of which is admitted, even

in the history of

other

as to

<o

or intermediate agencies,
when they are held to be undiscoverable

while a third class are

relations

and

their
according
inmost nature not beand
their
each
origin
other,
allinitk-s with
because confessed to be inscruta
comiiv subjects of investigation,
be lamentably deficient in breadth
would
mind
Indeed, any
ble
and
of doctrine, which did not philosophize
of view and catholicity
refer
with
or
three
these
of
each
aspects,
nature under
interrogate
7

merely observed and

to

classified

phenomena.
such possible threefold classification of
in its broad sense includes Comte s develop
Positivism
Thirdly,
and a church a theology
ment of his philosophy into a theology
nor a God, but inculcates the
revelation
a
neither
admits
which

ence

its

to"

of that gigantic idol representing

sys ematic worship
human race, which Hobbes of
whole
the
lar-re or
called

the

Sum-erne

Leviathan,"

Bern"."

but which

is

Humanity at
Malmesbury

here denominated

"

the

New

such
In the church which he instituted for

himself in the place of Pope or High Pontiff,

worship, ComteVts
wife or widow of a galley
and a rather disreputable female, the
s fervent love and adoration
Comte
of
the
was
object
slave, who
death, is installed as chief of the
for one year only before her
acts of adoration being directed,
or
prayers
Positivist saints,
cer
to her
departed spirit
durin^ the latter part of his life, not
is not one of the doctrines
soul
the
of
tainly^ for the immortality
This is the theology and
the new church, but to her memory.
"his

"

tf

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

266

the ecclesiastical organization which Mr. Huxley properly stigma

Catholicism
As a pitiable exhibi
Christianity."
tion of insane fancies and monstrous self-conceit, it deserves no
tizes as

"

i/>/n$

further notice.

Now, on each

of the three points thus far enumerated. Positiv

from being formidable, that it is simplv
contempti
ble.
In respect to each of these, doctrines, it counts very few
But after throwing overboard
adherents, and makes no converts.
all this trash, together with some minor
speculations closely aiHliated with it, for we cannot here enter into details, there .still re
mains a body of doctrine properly denominated Positivism in the
narrower sense, which is. however, really of metaphysical origin
and purport, its parentage in modern times bein^ distinctly tracea
ble to David Hume, from whom Comte borrowed it. and, as usual
in such cases, marred and distigured it in the
Hume
borrowing.
knew little or nothing about natural history or physical science
he was a metaphysician pure and simple, a teacher of skepticism
on metaphysical grounds. But his system was adopted and applied

ism

is

so far

by Comte as, in a special sense, tin- Philosophy of Physical Science;

and in this respect, Comte has been followed, not only by such
speculates as .John S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Mr. Lewes, but
by a large and increasing number of naturalists and physicists, who,
of course, only in this narrower sense are earnest and thorough
It is equally clear, that the
going Positivists.
system thus under
stood
I

is

have

not specially corroborated by their adhesion to it; for, as

does not rest upon physical, but upon metaphysical

said, it

grounds.

Even

its title is

character,

it

essentially

is

misnomer

negative

from

far
it

beinif jxixltlve in

not a

is

philosophy

of

science, but of nescience.

For a precise and succinct statement of the Positivist doctrine in
this

narrower sense,

borrow the language

of

its

most zealous and

We

authoritative adherent, Mr. John S. Mill

have no knowl
edge of anything but phenomena; and our knowledge of phenom
ena is relative, not absolute.
know not the essence, nor the
real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relations to other
"

We

facts in

the

of succession or similitude.

way

These relations are

always the same in the same circumstances.

The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the
constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and consequent,
All phenomena without exception are gov
are termed their laws.
erned by invariable laws, with which no volitions, either natural or
constant

that

is,

supernatural, interfere.

The

essential nature of

phenomena, and

267

POSITIVISM.
their ultimate
to

inscrutable

causes,

whether

efficient

or final, are

unknown and

us."

name
thus understood, Positivism is only another
from ex
comes
our
all
that
doctrine
knowledge
Empiricism, or the
and as such, it may fairly claim the
senses
the
through
perience
Darwin and
unanimous assent of men like Huxley and Tyndall,
it is the truth, in relation
correct
statement,
is
a
it
for
Il.-linhol/
it, and, in fact, as it is com
science" as they understand
to their
view the fundamental prin
of
out
leave
we
monly understood. If
of its business to
it rests, and which it is no part
which
ciples upon
first principles
its
own
take
must
science
investigate, since every
so construed as to
when
even
Science,
mere
for grafted,
Physical
Natural History, relies exclusively upon,
include all branches
observation through the senses
means
But

if

"

"of

of,
and is advanced solely by
in its own do
and experiments addressed only to the senses. Here,
undivided
holds
Physi
sway.
main, sense reigns paramount and
no facts which cannot, directly or indirectly,
cal Science

recognizes

of verifying facts, that is,

are
founded, in the last resort,
of discerning the false from the true,
senses.
Hence, when the physi
the
of
testimony

be made evident to sense.

solely

All

modes

its

uponthe

knows

now frequently do, Science

Science perceives no substance
conclusion
nothinr of this or that
Science never has
of things
the
phenomenal qualities
underlying
causation
binding events
found, and never can find, any efficient
Science
invariable
their
sequences
observes
only
togdlier, but
hence has nothing to say
neVer ascends to the origin oi things, and
or intention, no final
about creation; Science discerns no purpose
existence of that
the
of
no
finds
Science
nature
proof
cause, in
lie
thereby means my
being which each of us calls myself, except
I say,
of a God;
the
of
evidence
no
being
beholds
body*; Science

cists

and naturalists

say, as they

when

Mill,

and Huxley, and Tyndall, assuming

make

to

speak for

all

these assertions, or rather these avowals of

Physical Science,
ignorance and incompetence, they

tell nothing but the plain truth,

men
aid therefore, no wonder that they find many adherents among
These
disavowals,
themselves.
with
studies
and
of similar pursuits
the whole doctrine of
these negative assertions, which constitute
narrower
the
sense, convey only the
nescience" or Positivism in
to none of these
senses
outward
man
s
that
testify
harmless truism,
We cannot see, touch, hear, smell, or
thinos.
Quis dubitavit ?
From the tes
or
Cause, or Self, or God.
taste" either Substance,

other source of
timony of sense alone, not supplemented by any
the
infer
being of either
knowledge, we cannot even legitimately

268

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

of those four, or

the creation of the universe, or the

reality either
Thus far, Positivism ha, gained the
since no one
appears to contest the case.

of efficient or final causation.

clay,

IJut in this

doctrine, whimsically termed Positive,

though it is
exclusively negative, much more is implied than is openlv stated
and it is with these
implications that we are now concerned.
The
Science
which thus avows its
incapacity to penetrate beneath tlie
surface of things, because it cannot
the domain of tho
go bey
senses, is mere PAi/si cnl Science.
The implied but unfounded as
sumption is. that it is science in the larger sense, or human knowl

"

edge

itself,

sions.

"

which

is

is

Anglo-Saxon word,
a

S V1

make

to

compelled

"

Science

only

the

Latin

knowledge;"

bu t

these humiliating confes

equivalent for our good
common use no\v makes it

"

which is only a traction of

avails himself of this
pour ver
bal
ambiguity, in order to discredit and rule out of court all meta
UK>n -

yi

human knowledge.

Physical

Science,"

The Positive

physical and moral science; that is, to reject the whole;

testimony
of consciousness, as well as the fundamental truths
which are the
first
principle-; alike of mathematics, logic, and
philosophy.
nay,
even of the whole edifice of human
lie fai is to
knowledge.
per
ceive that, herein, he
adopts a suicidal policy; tor
Science

Physical
based upon these fundamental truths, and without them
can make no progress, and cannot even
verify what it has already
discovered and systematized.
Descartes aptly compared the whole
itself

is

man s knowledge to a tree, of which

Metaphysics are the root,
physics are the trunk, and the other sciences the branches.
Kvery
of

science, except

granted

it

Metaphysics, must begin by taking something for

cannot verify its own first
This task it
principles.

relegates to .Metaphysics, which

science of tirst principles.

is

therefore

rightly

termed the

Indirectly we find this assertion confirmed by the well-known

these dogmatical specialists, in their crude
attempts to

fact, that

confirm and explain their positive denial of

solely on the negative ground that their

all

hyperphysical truths

special

"science"

knows

nothing about them, find themselves obliged to carry over the dis
cussion into the very territory where, as
they say, there is no rest
or foothold.
into that dreamland which
they declare to be peopled

Unwittingly and in spite of themselves, they

Metaphysics
they are compelled to preach the very doctrine
and method which they disavow.
Huxley attempts to build upon
Descartes and Berkeley
Herbert Spencer and Tyndall draw their
weapons from the armory of Hamilton and Hume.
only by phantoms.
talk

269

POSITIVISM.
J prefer,
specifically,

which

is

and to show
however, to follow the direct argument,
first
of
principles,
and in each case, that the denial

is suicidal, since it
the distinctive feature of Positivism,
and reduces
of
even
inquiry,
physical
the

groundwork

takes away

to a series of baseless assumptions.

empirical science itself
The fii-t principle, the necessary a priori assumption, upon
which is at least as old
which all chemistry depends, is the axiom,
both ingenerable and
is
matter
and Democritus, that
as

Leucippus

atom of mat
Nihil gignitur, nihil inter it ; not an
This maxim certainly is not given
ter i= ever created or destroyed.
is meaningless, and
without
it, experience
to us by experience, for,
cannot be resolved
substance
us
compound
would teach
nothing.
from those elements, it we do

indestructible.

into its elements, or reconstituted

at the
not arbitrarily assume, in the first place, that,

moment

of

not a particle of one or the other substance

analysis or synthesis,
The water vanishes, hydrogen
is either created or annihilated.
What is the chemist s ground
or vice versa.

and oxygen appear

same substance persists or endures, only

to sense,
or
attributes, its manifestations
its outward properties
remains the same
it because the total weight
Is
changed?
beinBut that proves nothing, except that, for
after* the experiment?
its precise equivalent
molecule
destroyed, a new one,
each atom or
from the one
Besides, why infer identity
in weight, is created.
infer differ
than
rather
in
amount,
attribute, weight, which persists
color, texture, con
volume,
other
the
all
from
properties
ence
which undergo great change?
sistency, chemical affinities, etc.,
first principle a priori of
this
axiom,
is
this
And what
necessary
the
but the perdurability of material substance,
physical science,
affects only
however
great,
fact that any change or transformation,

of assurance here, that the

of things, while underneath

the accidents, the outward properties
and so imperceptible to sense and inscrutable by
attributes,

the<e

knows no

permanent, which
the inmost essence and actual
ch-xii^e and which really constitutes
what, I ask, is this first principle
all material things
bein" of
which the
pure Substance,
that
entity,
very metaphysical
except
the
on
ground that
Fositivists attempt to ignore and banish,

analysis, there lies

something which

is

"Science"

the worse for

Science,"

is true, so much
down.
house
own
her

far as this

of it?

So

who here

pulls

knows nothing

French chemist, as quoted by Mr. Huxley, tells

that in all
We
us
may lay it down as an incontestable axiom,
an equal
is
created;
the operations of art and nature, nothing
the
the
after
and
before
experiment;
exists
matter
of
Lavoisier, the
"

quantity

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

lake another

eru-nci!
peru-nci!

ir
inrms

ex;imi)le.

Wliut

-ill,.,!..,!

r.

notliin-

day or a week ago. The only

possible reason for Sse fi n^t a
the fact as remembered is
one that
actually happened, is the ab

that

Science

knows nothing of the

identity, or

even

271

POSITIVISM.

of the existence, of any such being as Self, considered apart from

What others
the distinct and successive states of consciousness.
call

Mind

or Self

is,

according to them, only a series of successive

sensations and ideas, existing only one at a time, Consciousness at

any one moment evidencing the existence only of the one sensation

or idea then and there present to

away and gives place to another.

it,

hut which immediately passes

the figure, they hold

To change

from which the string has been re

no longer any connection between them, the
beads constantly slipping through the thinker s fingers, since he grasps
Neither
only one of them at a time, and that but for a moment.
that Self

moved,

is

a string of beads

so that there

is

They
past nor future is in any way present to consciousness.
are the successive perceptions only," says Hume, which constitute
"

"

the

mind."

But

if

Self,

the conscious thinking being, be not

present, so to speak, all along the line, if he be not the permanent

spectator of the ever changing phenomena, the persistent, identical

substance underlying and witnessing the ever fleeting states, then

memory is a mere illusion, and the past is but a dream, which
affords no ground whatever for anticipating the future.
Experi

Then what becomes of the boasted fixity

is only a cheat.
and universality of Physical Law, which is only a projection of

ence

I say, therefore, that the continuous

the past into the future ?
existence and identity of the thinking Substance is a condition or

prerequisite of memory, without which experience is impossible.

The truth is, the Empiricists or Positivists here commit, in an

aggravated form, the very fault which they charge upon their op
the fault, namely, of dealing with pure abstractions,
ponents,
men; figments of the brain, as if they were realities, real entities.
Except as pure abstractions, entirely divorced from reality, there
is no such thing as Thought without a Thinker, Perception with
out a Percipient, Sensation without a Sentient, Action without an

Here, I am not going behind

Agent, Jumping without a Jumper.
first principles, or
to
digging up hyperphysical realities
experience
under observed facts. I am not o
o behind or under observation
at all, but am only pointing out what we observe, whether as a
What we actually
reality or a mere phenomenon, it matters not.
observe, by way of sense, is not the abstraction, motion, but the
<roin<i

what we are
fact, a particular moving thing or object
actually conscious of is not the pure abstraction, hunger, but the
concrete fact, I am now hungry.
Precisely this is the meaning of

concrete

the famous Cartesian argument. Descartes does not say, Cogitatio,

est ; that would be to start from an abstraction,

trgo res cogitans

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

272

Whereas he directly affirms, as a

to proceed by reasoning.
This is not an
particular fact of observation, Coyito, scilicet sum.
It
inference; Descartes and his followers all agree that it is not.
is onlv making the statement of a fact explicit.

and

show that all empirical or Positive science

a
metaphysical basis, that is. upon the assumption
upon
principles not evident to sense, and yet more unquestionable
sensible, fact, take the necessary postulate of all inductive

As

a third example, to

must
of

rest

lir>t

than any

Not experi
the ultimate ground of Induction?
In
something which transcends all experience.
duction is that process of thought by which we infer the unknown
from more or le.-s .similar cases which are known; that is, we arbi
ob
trarily extend the principle or law, from phenomena already
served and analvxed, to other phenomena of which, as yet, we have
What authorizes us to do so ? What
no experience whatever.
causes such a procedure even to appear legitimate?
Certainly not
cases of which
experience, for the question is expressly limited to

What

science.

ence.

we have no
fiitnri

is

sav, but

what

make known

Induction assumes to

experience.

to declare

will

the

be the result of future observation and

and it is a contradiction in terms to say that we have

experiment
had experience of the future.
Granted, say the Positivists but,
we have
they argue, we //are had experience of what was future
already tried Induction in numberless cases, and its results have
:

This subsequent verifica

been verified by subsequent experience.
tion, they say, makes up for and cancels the original illegitimacy
I maintain, on the contrary, that this
Docs it?of the process.
answer is grossly illogical, and does not even touch the point at
and I am sorry to say that the fallacy in it is not only coun
issue
:

tenanced, but expressly adopted, and made the corner-stone of his

whole philosophy, by so eminent a thinker as Mr. John S. Mill.
What merely was future has
is
It
a gross jx titto j>/-ii/fij//i.
"

"

and become the past;

therefore, in reasoning from it, we are still reasoning from the
to that of which
past to the future, from that of which we have,
we have not, experience the very process whose legitimacy is in
Mr. Mill, and all the Positivists along with him, act
question.
ulreadv. by hypothesis, ceased to be future,

the inductive
ually brings an induction to prove the validity of
Because it
will taking opium put one to sleep ?

process.

Why

always has put people to sleep.

tion

in

this case will be verified

Am

that the induc

Be-

numberless other cases has been verified by

I not reasoning from the past to the future, from

cause induction in
experience.

But what proves

by subsequent experience?

273

POSITIVISM.

known

the
to

to the

be valid, as

To make

in

unknown

just as much in thus

to be soporific ?

proving induction

proving opium

still clearer, I borrow an illustration in part

Let us suppose our whole time divided into
live equal portions, A, 1), C, D, E, the first four of which have
been experienced, and found to be similar to each other, while the
Now how must I argue with regard
is still in the future.
last,
D was
was like A, C was like
to this last?
Shall I say,

this point

from Dr. Campbell.

]<].

"B

1>,

therefore E, of which, by hypothesis, I as yet know noth

This would be strange logic; for E, the
ing, will bo likeD?"
minor term, the subject of the conclusion, does not appear at all
1

like C

in the premises.

supposing, as

the

reasoning made more legitimate, then, by

Positivists do, that the induction in this case,

Is the

iu numberless other cases, was originally made antecedently

experience; but that in each instance it was verified by subse
have only to suppose a few
Let us see.
quent experience?
more cases, F, G, M, N. Xow, our reasoning runs thus

and

to

We

"

We

believe, on inductive principles, that E would be

like D
and this induction was verified by subsequent experience.
In a similar way, the several inductions that F would resemble
would be like G, were each and all
E, and G be like F. and
verified by later experience." Shall we then argue that the induc

were

first

led to

tion

about N, which

is

still

future, will also be verified

by

later

for N, the minor

empirical logic again
experience?
And the same dif
term, does not appear at all in the premises.
four million, previous
ficulty recurs, if, instead of four, we suppose
Turn the matter as we may, the principle which is the
cases.
lint this

is

is a law of
thought, and not a law of things,
It teaches what an original
an educt from experience.
and innate law of our mental constitution obliges us to expect,
but says nothing about what must, or must not, actually happen.
When the mathematician applies the Doctrine of Chances, his
calculations are based upon this innate principle, this fundamental

ground

of induction

not

The calculated probability is subjective,

law of human belief.
The computer does not even assume to in
and not objective.
crease our quantity of information, or to reveal any new data on
which our judgment ought to be based but only how we ought
to judge and to act on the data already in our possession.
are not even assured that the calculated result will be verified
;

"We

any subsequent trial the computation oidy

shows us how we ought to expect the actual results to be dis
We see
tributed in the course of an infinite number of trials.

at the first trial, or at

18

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

274

that tliis must bo so. because the theory does not concern
future
events only, the occurrence of which is still contingent, but may
be applied also to the past, to determine whether we ought to be
lieve that, the event did, or did not. take place.
In such ease, the
of the theory cannot affect the event itself, which is
already irrevocably determined either one way or the other; but it
only assumes to guide our judgment in determining how much our

application

opinion ought to incline either to the positive or negative side as

to its occurrence.
To adopt an illustration familiar to experts in
this department, all nature!
may be compared to an immense urn
containing a countless number of balls, about the qualities of any
one of which, antecedently to experience, we know nothing.
Man
has the privilege only of drawing out one of these balls at a time,

and

after

determining its color, of returning it, to its place in the

Suppose; ten millions, or auv larger number, of such trials
to be made, and each time, as the invariable result, a white ball to
urn.

The

be drawn.

induction

prove that a white

ball

here

is

very complete; but does it

at the very next trial?

must be drawn

It is just ox
Certainly not.
possible that the next trial will pro
duce a black ball
a white one: and Nature or Providence
use which name you choose.
may have so determined, at the
outset, the relative numbers of whites and blacks, that, if we knew
those numbers, and calculated the chances, the drawing of a black
ball would be precisely what we ought to have
Let
expected.
a>

the Empiricists talk as

they may about the universality and the

Physical Law; if they mean thereby that such Law
necessarily will hold good one moment beyond the present time, or
necessarily has held good, in the past, in a single instance beyond
certainty of

those cases which have actually been observed, I scoff at their as

sertion
not at their evidence, for they have none.
;

Another dictum

of the Positives, that which concerns Final

Cause, deserves examination, as it illustrates so clearly two of the

unfounded assumptions which

first, that a fact
philosophy
being verified by the testimony
by any other sort of evidence
:

underlie and pervade their whole

incapable, from its very nature, of
of the senses, cannot be established

secondly, that our mere ignorance

does not, exist can be legitimately con
verted into a categorical denial of its existence, and, as such, may
then be made an axiomatic principle, to restrict the conclusions to
which later inquiry might otherwise lead.
;

whether

Thus,

a thing does, or

we

are often reminded nowadays of the doctrine, which ia

Science knows nothing about any

at least as old as Lucretius, that

275

POSITIVISM.

Science
which different organs were made.
supposed purposes for
can learn only how
tells us that such organs exist, and that we
their structure, and what functions they per
they exist, what is
An organ is characterized by its formation, we are told, as
form.
All
another.
this compels it to subserve one function rather than
of life
mode
the
follows
an
animal
that
us
is,
teaches
that Science
organs constrain it to follow.
our senses are our only guide, this is perfectly correct
Sci
for these facts only are evident to sense, and the
doctrine
which have not
which is here in
accepts no data

which

its

Now,

if

"

question,
needed not the authority of em
the testimony of the senses.
of scien
inent physiologists, however, to establish this limitation
that
once
at
knows
purpose, or
tific inquiry; since everybody
of mind, not of matter, and as
a
is

ence,"

We

Final Cause,

phenomenon

to sense, but is witvery nature, cannot be subject

Material
consciousness.
phenomena, outward
ncfsed solely by
or indications, from which \ve may
indeed afford

such,

from

acts,

may

its

signs

with more or less confidence, that they were purposed or in

but the thing signified, the governing purpose, is not
tentional
manifest to sense.
Observe, moreover, how soon this innocent avowal that Science
over into the
is unable to testify to the presence of design passes
affirmation, that there is no
but
illegitimate,
broader,
wholly
vastly

infer,

"

"

end or purpose discoverable by the human

intellect, in

whatever

Confessedly incompe
prosecuted.
way
how is
tent to observe the presence of a mental phenomenon,
it does not exist in
that
absence
its
affirm
to
authorized
Science
much like attempting to sound the
any case whatsoever? This is
of numerous
and
ten-foot
with
a
Atlantic
declaring the result
pole,
the

search for

may be

it

that the ocean is bottomless. Decanexperiments thus made to be,

birds fly because they have wings; but a true natural
clolle says,
order that they may
ist will never say, that birds have wings in
The functions are a result, and not an end or purpose.
fly."

Lucretius affirmed the same thing long ago.

"

Nil

....

Possemus

Who

them so ?
Decandolle, as mere

ject ?

told

Who

iiatum est in corpore, ut uti

seel,

quod natum

What

est, id

procreat

usum."

have Geoffrey St. Ililaire, or

have any opinion on the sub
creation, or informed them after

right

naturalists, to

consulted them at

wards, that the eye was not made

vided with it might see, but that

in

order that the animal pro

it

was formed by a hap-hazard

276

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

tentative process, which, after innumerable

purposeless variations,
happened at last to produce a form favorable to sight,
pretty
much as he who shoots entirely at random, and with his
eyes shut,
may at last, merely by accident, hit the bull s eye, if he has pa
tience to try long enough ?
31 r.
the fruitless search after final causes;"
Huxley speaks of
and criisure.s
those hardy ideologists, who are
ready to break
through all the laws of physics in chase of their favorite will-o He therefore agrees with Mr. Mill, who, in the passage
the-wisp.
"

"

already cited, declares that Jinal causes

table to

"are

unknown and

inscru

us."

Surely

this

tivists, that

is

a humiliating confession to be

their

Science

knows

not,

made by the Posiand never can know, a fact

which is still patent to the consciousness of

every human beinf, at
every hour of his waking and conscious existence.
Every sane
pel-son i.s perfectly aware that, with a few insignificant exceptions
due to mere caprice or weariness, he never acts, either on
great or
slight occasions, he never takes a single step, without a purpose,
distinctly recognized by him, of thereby attaining some desired end,
or reaching .some wished-for
place.
Any one would even reject
as a serious affront an insinuation that he often acted
idly, or with
out a purpose.
Jt argues no
presumption or discourtesy to allirm,
that neither

one of

Mr. Huxley nor Mr. Darwin ever wrote a sentence

his published works, or

ever

made

in

a scientific observation

or experiment, except with a full and conscious

intention, which is
always successfully carried out, of thereby instructing and enter
taining his readers, or of increasing the stores of Science.
Not only, then, are we perpetually conscious of the final causes
of our own actions, but it cannot be maintained for a
moment, that

we

are

not sure that any other persons act in the same manner,
though we actually see only what they do, and never what they
purpose.
Practically we are just as firmly convinced that other

men
it is

act with definite purposes, as that

legitimate,

it

is

even a

we

ourselves so act.

strictly scientific,

mode

Then

of reasoning,

from mere external phenomena, from books and apparatus, and

scientific collections and discourses, which we can see or
hear, to
infer the final causes of them, which we cannot see or hear.
Ac
cordingly, we have a right to believe that Mr. Mill and Mr. Hux
ley did not intend to assert that men never act from design, but
only that no other mind in the universe, except that of man, and
perhaps of the lower animals, ever acts with a purpose.
They
simply meant to say, for example, that the structure of a telescope

277

POSITIVISM.
does,

but that of the

human eye

does not, afford good scientific

evidence of design.

and this is the whole

joined. This is the question,
it does not
not be theological
need
necessarily
question.
concern the being of a God. The purpose, which we believe to be

Here

issue

is

It

not

necessarily divine,
abundantly indicated in external nature,
We
the purpose of an infinite, omniscient, and all-perfect Being.
in
is
truth,
contrivance
the
for,
that
perfect
do not need to prove
even the human eye is not a perfect organ of vision, nor the
human hand a perfect means of grasping objects and providing for
But the question is, whether there is any
wants.
our
is

physical
of the
contrivance, any indication of a purpose, any good evidence
even
of
mind
the
man,
than
other
universe
the
in
presence of mind
that other mind, so far as we can see, be put forth only to

though

It may
a finite and limited extent, or in an imperfect manner.
a
of
inferior
an
unconscious
higher power,
mind,
even be an
agent
instinct of animals, towards a pur
the
like
workiti"unwittingly,

not distinctly aware.

pose of which it is
This was the supposition of Dr. Cndworth, in his hypothesis of
This is also the doctrine, maintained on purely
a Plastic Nature.

Mr. J. J.
physical grounds, by

Murphy,

in

his

able and scientific

It is stoutly advocated, more

Habit and Intelligence."
of inductive reasoning and
over, exclusively on the principles
from the evidence of sensible facts, by Von Ilartmann, who does
This German philosopher
not believe in the existence of a God.
\vo"rk

on

"

thirteen peculiar arrangements in the

to keep up
eye, all of which are requisite
and he calculates mathematically, on
the power of distinct vision
the doctrine of chances, the probability of these thirteen being
the operation of physical laws alone, without the inter
united

enumerates no

structure of the

less

than

human

by

Assuming the prob

vention anywhere of a mental or final cause.
of these arrangements, taken separately,
one
each
that
ability
mi dit be developed from the material conditions of embryonic life,
as high on the average as .9,
probability which very
still
even of our most trustworthy knowledge possesses/
so
are
united
these
conditions
all
that
produced is
the probability
13
Hence the probability that a mental or Final
.254.
.9

tote

"a

little

only

to satisfy all these conditions taken together,

that is, the odds are three to
fourths
three
or
nearly
equals .740,
one in favor of a Final Cause. But in truth, the probability of each
and
does not exceed .25, or at most, .5
taken

Cause must be assumed,

singly
the resulting decimal for the union of the

arrangement

whole thirteen

is

then,

770

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

-a^
^^

!inscrutable
m,,v

, !|;1M

scientiiic

to

us,"

..

,
,

and

:i

so that

even
\

Unkumv

th,,n

,,.

is

illogica!

C S
"

"

1111

h3 determined

"ev.tal,l

rs:

Y^
lor

wlnVl

"~

"V^"

to be

1011

tll!lt

what

it is

"

"

"

does not acl from

design, intending
must be that his will s ,,,
even conceivable.
"

Sn U
,

if

1V --"

vtle

Li

L r

"

Are they not

"^

stI>0

S^t

restruint

ll
l

motive,
011

is

"

t::r;^^

Final Causes
.....

-<

di ^i"ction

which

:^:

the several

between

ortions,

,r

"^ance,

r ,,i Lll u \vno

purpose or end in view,
and, therefore, the
letermine a priori
.very part winch is to

c<

is

Elficient

and

whole; the movement of

ssary for its construction,

of human art.
But

work

,
"

-/- -

<>*

fruitless,

^-wisp, appears eminently uu .

"-/

i)<<;

^" ""^^^
tarian
doctrine rests almost
exclusively
every volition wliatsoevc"^
L
im
.,

4*^^
thr

f6

,, V(

generates sue-

97Q
POSITIVISM.
sake o/the
the others, and for the
to be acthe
as
and
purpose
.sand the whole, as their Effect,
a Cause and an organ lor prothen., but each one is
art exist only

.lished

though

all

by

.
material and

organizing
movTnt pow?r.

it

for clock-purposes.

A mue

machine
has also

But an organized living thing

only
and animate, the very
Dative
o
c
power; it fashions
in being.
Nay
maintained
and
it is itself built up
p Jt by which
and self -mam a,
is it self-creating

*1
.

not merely
race or species to
nrooacrates and continues the
;

wind

*^*

bo explained
an organized being cannot
e
argues Kant,
argu
re
fore
a
of
n>ovmg
as the result simply
as mere mecSnism, or
and 01
of
stretch
imagination,
Though it would be a great
we
may perhaps
be realized in fact,
which certain^ will never
that it should be a
clock to be so ingeniously fashioned,
but
of producing other c ock.
of multiplying itself, that is,
set-ton
be
to
as
contrived
e so con
not imagine one to be
we cannot
at once building up
and
self-sustaining,
-l"
tlf-p-ducing
and fas uoning
them,
digesting
built
up by
its ow
parts and
to
as
them together
own maJerials, and so putting
livm
is done by every
what
is
Yet this
precisely
one whole
from
-

Kef

:,
mis

;;;!:!

of

in its

what

is

called

^^^

self-development
to it,* u

process
te.
up
a minute and seemingly structureless germ
nt
thus
out a process
Mere mechanism, as a means of carrying
o tm
and the
is utterly inconceivable;
self-involved,
,ate and
such
Us,
to
produce
; h o dreams of it as an agency adequate
or manifests illimitabl
of
clearly,
thinking
ekh er incapable

UJ

Efficient
the Positivist doctrine, that
portion of
indefensible
as
is
to
us,
inscrutable
Causes also are unknown and
field
but it opens so broad a
it
as the portion which precedes
nay
here
that it cannot be fully considered

The remaining

"

season

Eno^h
Here,
ag.i n,
the assertion.
be briefly said, however, to refute
that what mere Fhys.a
the
implied assumption,
htentfallacvLs
excluded from he
is thereby forever
Science cannot make known
we admit, au not
causes,
Efficient
Domain of human knowledge.
1

th<

patent

to the senses.

Nobody ever has

discovered, in the exte

280

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

universe, merely by observation

through
two events together, that the
must be folUm-,.,1 by the occurrence of
tent observer
even dreams
so binds

nowadays

made,

the senses, the nexus winch

production of one of them
the other; and no
compe
that such a
discovery, so

ever be possible.
Sense takes cognizance
only of the
events themselves, mid of their
it cannot even
sequences in time
:ny that these sequences are absolutely invariable, hut
only that
found invariable so far as
they have
experience has extended.
And experience must
always come immeasurably short of the in
finite wealth of
]J,,t while the;
thing*.
Empiricist thus loudly prochums his nescience, his
n ,l an Efficient
inability
Cause, J beieve he never
really doubted, in his secret and instinctive
thought,
that such a cause
never even doubted that no event
exists,
whatever, no change in the outward
universe, ever did take place,
or ever can take
such a Cause.
place, without
Tell even a
young child, that the chair has just fallen down, or the pane of
glass
has been broken, without a
Cause, understanding thereby a true
Efficient Cause, and, if he knows the
meaning of your words, he will
either laugh in
your face, or think that you are making game of
him.
And this childish but inv>istihle conviction, not founded on
will

l>eeu

t,>f,

ju>t

experience, but antedating all experience, can never be

thoroughly
eradicated from the mind of the
grown man by any alleged science
or nescience.
And it is ju^t this primitive conviction,
though
covered up and perverted
by false theory and a wrong use of lan
which
enables the Empiricist
guage,
declare, as he does, with
absolute certitude, that
nothing can take place except in strict
accordance with Physical Law.
.Mere experience knows
nothing
of what can be ; it knows
only what /.v. and what Ims been.
Even if mere experience could determine the
sequence in time
of any two events to be
absolutely invariable, (which it cannot
do.) it is very
easy to show that such "inseparable concomitaney
not what either the man of Science!, or the
vulgar, mean by
"efficient causation."
If
is known
only as the invariable ante
cedent of IJ. then
is
only a sign or herald, which lands us to ex
pert that IJ will happen; as, for instance, just before the
spring
equinox, the clock striking six in the morning is the event which
leads us to
This is only the causa coyexpect immediate sunrise.
noscendi, or the reason why I know that
will
to"

"

But

something

happen.

certainly is not the causa Jteudi, the Efficient Cause, that

which makes the
thing happen, whether it is expected or not, and
Whether it happens on one occasion or another.
the problem exists, whether men have
yet solved it or not.
it

Now

281

POSITIVISM.

This is a case in which even the vulgar know the meaning of the
words employed, just as well as the philosopher does, and perhaps
the philosopher is a little blinded by a presomewhat better,
In common with the vulgar, I know precisely
conceived theory.
what I mean, when I ask, AVhat makes that phenomenon happen,
or what is its Efficient Cause? even though I cannot answer the
Then I know what Efficient Cause means;
question thus asked.
and this knowledge either came to me from experience, in which
of
case, I have actually had either external or internal experience
is
not
which
some
is
there
empirical.
such a Cause, or
knowledge
"if

Either horn of the dilemma confutes the Positivists.

comes from
I believe that this knowledge of Efficient Causation
of my
exertion
a
conscious
with
internal
When,
experience.
mental, and all my muscular strength, I push against
the house, I know
that such force is

am

that I

putting

or

forth force

essentially causative,

the wall of

power, and

or

necessarily efficient,
even though it be not sufficient to produce all the effect desired,
and therefore, so far as my senses testify, the wall does not in the
least

give way.

known

to

sequent.

yet I

In

this

case,

me merely

No

effect follows

know

visible

that this effort

and, therefore, that

must have tended to

it

effort

my

is

an antecedent event

as

was

certainly not made

for it has no con

the wall

still

essentially an

stands.

Efficient

And
Cause,

must have been followed by some effect,

the wall give way, even though this

make

was imperceptible to sense.

[low this first knowledge, this earliest idea, of Efficient Causa
tion subsequently passes over into an irresistible conviction of the
Law of Causality, that is, into an absolute and imperative belief,
that no change whatever can take place in the external uni
verse without an efficient cause, is a question which need not de
tain us here.
Probably it could not be fully answered without
As we have seen,
setting forth a complete system of metaphysics.
of
whole
Kant
s
first
which
the
it is
"Critique
suggested
question

effect

Pure

Reason."

The,

Positivists fail to

see,

what now appears obvious enough,

that their doctrine of nescience so narrows the domain and restricts

the processes of Physical Science itself, as to incapacitate it for the
exercise of its functions, and to discredit as illegitimate many of

conclusions hitherto supposed to be irrefragable.

According to
to phenom
limited
be
must
our
their logic,
strictly
investigations

its

ena attested by the evidence of the senses, and to what Mr. J. S

the strictly legitimate operation of inferring, from an
calls
"

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

282

observed effect, the existence, in time past, of a cause similar to

that by which \ve know it to be produced in all cases in which \ve

have had actual experience of

statt inent of the

its

But

origin."

it

this

is

a correct

uf inductive science, the

undulatory theory
of li Jit nui.-t be abandoned as a baseless and untenable hypoth
For the ether, the vibrations of which are needed or the
esis.
logic

transmission of the light to our eves, and which is supposed to be

\videlv diffused through space, extending at least, as tar beyond
tin- remotest visible star as the distance between that star and our
is not onlv absolutely imperceptible to sense, but is wholly
It is
unlike any other substance with which we are acquainted.
is vet
not inerelv invisible and intangible; hut. so lar
known, it
lias not inertia enough to retard in the slightest degree the motion

earth,

a>

of the lightest liodv passing

form of the atomic theory,

ally repel, each other; and

through it.
According to the latest
molecules do not attract, but, mutu
its vibrations are transmitted
without
its

What
stay or hindrance through tin; densest transparent bodies.
It must be something; for there cannot be vibra
is this ether?
tions
for

as

it

we

It cannot be material
i.,
nothing to vibrate.
dors not gravitate, it lias no inertia, and it does not. so far
It
know, exclude matter from the space occupied by it-ell.

where there

cannot be mind
trace of

for

it

is

extended, and

perception or consciousness.

atfords

it

Then

it

not the slightest

a tertium

must be

and as such, it is quite

something between matter and mind
and inconceivable as the Infinite and the Absolute.
Its existence is inferred solely from its effects, and from analogy
with the air and other vibrating su n-tances which are the vehicle
-an analogy fainter and more remote than that between
of sound;
Let the Positivist prove to us,
the human and the Divine Mind.
on his own principles, if lie can, that we may legitimately assume
the existence of this ether, and still deny the being of a (Jod.
Another specimen of the logic of the Positivists may be taken
;

(jultl,

as iiico^ni/able

from

upon

their attempts to

base the conclusions of a crass materialism

the assumed identity of certain chemical changes, which are

to take place in the substance of the nerves, with the

i>t/j>/H>sed

upon them as to
have already quoted Mr.
Herbert Spencer s assertion, that these two classes of phenomena
are nothing but
the inner and outer faces of the same change
and consequently, that in truth there are not two classes of them,
on their outsides,"
but only one, since these changes, if viewed
from their
appear as chemical phenomena, but if we regard them

slates of consciousness

which are

so far attendant

be manifested at the same moment.

"

;i

"

"

POSITIVISM.
"

insidcs

of consciousness.
they are phenomena

What

evidence is
does he

On what ground
assertion?
here of the truth of this
of phenomena winch are so
classes
two
of
maintain the identity
feature in common?
that they have not a single
rulically unlike
viewed
through the external senses,
The one

class

can be

only

and can
and
them

test-tubes of the chemist,

microscope or in the
u
as physical changes,
b
xpressed only
such knows
motion; consciousness as
"he

in terms of extension

o her class are absolutely imperceptible

so that it
do not move, have no relation to space,
can
or
outsides," and
insides
"

of

nothing

to sense, are
is

"

to talk of their

indivisible

and

not extended,

sheer nonsense

_be
identical

cognized only
Ego of con

successive states of the

out betwee
What trace of similarity can be pointed
the
and
tumbling down and
copious Thought on the one hand,
in the bran, on
atoms
their
from
primary
molecules
building up of
to believe that
hard
1S
it
Dissimilar in every respect,
the other ?
earnest.
sober
in
made
is
the assertion of their identity
the concomitance of
For the question here at issue,
The fact that a certain physical
phenomena proves nothing.
mental state is its invariable
certain
a
event is the antecedent, and
cause
that the former is the (physical)
consequent, may prove
of
the
not
identity
does
prove
but it certainly
of the latter
the antecedent,
one
denominating
Nay, by
the one with the other.
the supposi
it expressly negatives
and the other the consequent,
that a vibration of the air
doubts
Nobody
tion of their identity.
sensation
the invariable antecedent of the
or some other medium, is
s

sciousness.

at

be

who

laughed
would very properly
of sound; but any one
air is
that the quivering motion ot the
should seriously maintain,
nea
one
step
Then bring the two phenomena
the sensation.
other materialists do
Assume, as Mr. Spencer and
each other.
that certain molecular changes in
without a scintilla of evidence,
or accompany any
the substance of the nerves always precede
such molecular
that
assertion
the
Still,
chan-e in consciousness.
which it accompanies, is quite
conscious
the
is
thought
disturbance
the quivering motion is the se
absurd as the former one, that
as

you might
things are entirely incongruous
is an epic poem.
atoms
of
dance
a
that
well say
much farther. The great
But the nrcmmont may be carried
action in any substance, and
molecular
of
and
uniformity
simplicity
are wholly ncompatible with
of all other merely physical change,
All phys
human
of
thought.
and
diversity
the infinite range
motion.
of
modes
elnne is resolvable exclusively into

siition.

The two

284

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

The verv

ion.

ois

""

<>

;U1(1

"
<

"<>tl"n-

mt

n
.

one which has

by no me
v or

"

no n

! 1

s,,,,,/

-rsJ.,. m(

>-

I)

.,,.

.,,,

and

Wes";

"^ -i "-

he TCPV

.-.-,

"Paradise

<

:;

;:/v

""

ame
,

counts for that va- ..... ,|,

call rt OK

/,

whatever of

^mely,
i

,,,

r
\ / ;T

tlfe

the

whi ch

materialist
i"

"

^-ai
>

brain,

as to
i

,,

fail

"

ffh

th

;
"^

S<

a r

vh

IM

hoM

^e 1
V

"

?-

his

;1

re

;l

thought"

^^

lls

the

mmor ta]

hich u-e

ex

?*

\athe cof

^
"

",""

*>

:"

;;;
,

Ils

ce

<>

"

^""

"^

sSdc
to

the

!4l

niV1II1W!

"!

."".

-,

;^^^

WI

ousne ss o f

;ltollls in

"

*I IO

th

be so

one and

^till identical

^7 sufficiently ao-

"

""

(vr

ir

Il

>

"^"S

..Ml!, ,ins.

articular

at

"

tlll

com V"S

? ami 7 ^ 7

when

,
1|)|1(

";

actually

one thinker.

ll

iminit

Sl)t

meditating

"

"

Vn
* lltfm

,/";

upaIl(l(l(w
These are

^^

"w^
ini

^S^lt^^

!(

Partners"

and I
Should ve

>

alF;

"

Lost,"

"Principia."

"

>

,-;;

of atoms
or anv n^i, ,,,
l!)I(

<!

^m,

;i1

,,-

,
""

Ki

fire (Iailcc

"

U1

"

CHAPTER

XVI.

CIIOIT.NHAUER S FOURFOLD ROOT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

SUFFICIENT REASON. THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.
IN the preceding chapter, and elsewhere,

\ve

have

briefly

looked

the great question respecting the Freedom of the Will in a few

of its aspects, reserving a complete discussion of the subject for a
As a means of facili
later opportunity, which has now arrived.
at

examination of this problem, I will

tating a separate and thorough
of Schopenhauer s doctrine re
view
a
compendious
present here
The
his earliest publication, entitled
it, as contained in
"

specting

Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient

book, one of the ablest and most original, as

This

Reason."

seems

little

me, of all
his works, was the Thesis which he presented when he took his
Many
Doctor s degree, in 1813, at the age of twenty-six years.
of the conclusions which it seeks to establish appear unfounded,
and the reasoning in support of them is sophistical; but they are
worked out with great acuteness and ingenuity, and were after
it

to

wards made the basis of that system of philosophy, the exposition

The
and defence of which occupied the remainder of his life.
character of this philosophy, and of its author, will be considered
Here, we have
at length in a subsequent portion of this book.
to examine his masterly analysis of the great Principle first
enunciated by Leibnitz as the foundation of all science and all

onlv

philosophy.
The broadest and most universal expression of the Principle of
Suiiicient Reason is, that no phenomenon can exist or take place,

and no assertion can be

is

so rather

more

valid,

than otherwise.

without a Sufficient Reason why it

enunciation of it may be made
In the phenomenal world, that is,

The

clear and precise thus

universe as it appears to
:

us, every object and every event,

the mind,
including even every judgment, volition, and affection of
it
is determined, or made what it is, through the relations in which
stands to other phenomena ; so that, if we knew those relations
existence and the
thoroughly, we could determine a priori the

in the

28G

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

character of

tin 1

as

prehended

phenomenal object or event, the Litter being ap

Consequent, and the determinative nature of

the

these relations as

its

ground or Reason.

This supreme or ultimate

principle of all phenomenal existence is expanded bv Logic into

these two fundamental laws: It you allirm the Reason, y,ui must
also allirm the Consequent, as inevitably going alon^ with it
it
you deny the Consequent, you must also deny the Reason.

from denying
o the Reason, or from

The

principle of Sullieieiit

and
Uut

no
o the Consequent,
i
follow
from
some
may
1

allirmin"

conclusion follows; because the Consequent

other Reason than the one in question.

expression of the truth, that,

Rea-on may further be regarded as an

in the universe as it
appears to us, no

phenomenon whatever

is isolated or
independent; not only, through
universality of the laws
Space and Time, doe-, it stand in
iieces-ary relations of coexistence and Mi vession with other phe

the,

nomena, but

it is also
necessarily apprehended as determining, and
determined by, some of these relations.
All objects and events,
regarded either as coexisting at one time, or as succeeding each
other throughout all time, and so conceived as occupying immensity
and eternity, are thus, to our apprehension at least, lirmlv bound
together as one whole, every part being necessarily what, where,
and when it is, through its relations of mutual dependence, or reci

This is an a priori prin

procity of action, with every other part.
ciple, as it is universally and necessarily true; it is not derived
from experience, but must be presupposed before experience is pos
sible.

titled to

Why

is

Thus, with regard to every phenomenon, we are both en

ask the question, and we are necessarily urged to ask it,
it
so? The whole business of science is to answer this

que-tion. in which
have a Ground or

is. of course, assumed that every

thing must
Reason for its existence, and that it is itself a
Ground or Reason, on which other things must depend as its Con
it

that is. of
sequent. Then the universal meaning of the Principle,
the question Why,
is, that every thing is by means of some other
Our only idea of necessity, says Schopenhauer, the only
thing.
meaning of the word, is derived from this relation of a Ground or

Reason to its Consequent.

Hence, all phenomena are necessary ;
each must have its Ground, and this being given, the Consequent
must follow. All other relations of phenomena with each other are
contingent
they are merely accidental juxtapositions or coexist
ences of some with others, which, however frequently repeated, still
;

appear ca-ual, and do not even suggest the idea of a necessary

union one with the other, until we begin to suspect that one is
the

Ground

or Reason of the other.

SCHOPENHAUER

FOURFOLD ROOT.

287

I must
Herein, and therefore at the outset of the discussion,
doctrine
the
from
Only
dissent entirely
taught by Schopenhauer.
and in
in the external and material universe, as it seems to me,
demonstrative reasoning, as in pure mathematics, is the connection
In the realm of
of Ground with Consequent a necessary union.
and in all cases of merely probable reason
mind, on the

contrary,

which man regulates his

embracing most of the conclusions by
are not strong enough to necessitate
Reasons
conduct,
ordinary
then- Consequents, but the connection between them is, avowedly,
This connection is not equally
only contingent or hypothetical.
even in the same mind at different
strong in different minds, or
The facts and arguments, which convince me now, may
times.
have no effect upon my neighbor s opinion, and may perhaps seem
inconclusive to me also at another time, and under different cir

ing,

at the outset,
Schopenhauer really begs the question
of Uiu Freedom of the Will, by arbitrarily lim
doctrine
the
against
the Leibnit/ian axiom, so as to exclude all
iting the meaning of
of human life
cases of
reasoning, though the greater part

cumstances.

probable
I have
by reasoning of that character. Certainly
Ground for my conduct, when I decline a hazardous investment
for
my property but it is not a conclusive or absolute Ground,
return
we
But
mind.
before
making up my
may hesitate long

is

directed

a
of

the

German philosopher s exposition of the

The Fourfold Root of the Principle

In

subject.
of Suflicient

to

Reason,"

of thought and phe

Schopenhauer analyzes this highest Principle
nomenal existence into four distinct species, to which he gives the
or the Ground of
respective names of (1) the causa fiendi.
of Knowledge,
Ground
the
or
the
causa
cognoscendi,
Chr.ngo; (2)
causa esscndi, or
that, is, the Reason for every affirmation
(3) the
the Ground of Being, such as the Reason for the determinate posi
and
tion of every point in Space and of every moment in Time;
in
its
Action
and
Volition
of
or
the
Ground
(4) the causa agendi,
or determination through
that
Motivation,
is,
subjective aspect;
;

Motives,

Several of these, as

we

hereafter see, he subdi

shall

vide s into

inferior species.
The first of these four Roots, the causa Jiendi, or Ground of
Change, is the Principle of Causality as ordinarily understood,
we assume that no event in the material universe, that is,

thereby
no change

in the attributes of matter, is possible, except through

the action of some other phenomenon, conceived as cause or force,
which furnishes a Reason for such change. The existence of Mat
accordter does not
upon this Principle for its existence,

depend

OQO

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
r

merely a manifestation of

lteration

of

its

state
"

^""

"

""

a priori

that

it

is

necess-irilv

,-

Otll

P -ecedi,,, clmng^^rc"
T s
e.
immediately preceding
fo r a l tl..-^!
gPowcler, tokea phi
1

^
--

must

Huv,

Mat,,

(i

,,,,

l,.,v,

tak , u

,, s not

alteration of
n somet

its

but

>

^^t
J

ifc

,Iq,,,i,l

"

""

,]

"^

and

appear as
voluminous; it

,,
U
he same g

<.],,i, (

,,,

.-it

,1,,

^^

,xis|(

its

change
of

11(:ij

thai

change

IK states or condiis

the

remain unaltered
It
Mrogen, uncombined, aeriform, and
s
water, the two
gases being comweigh!

"

M
l^

r!

;U1

IJut

tf

"

!t

k is s!i11
essentially
was ^fore, and the

that tornier state.

""

can be either

ds

exempt from

They

^r

nce neither of

ure co "ceived

chanirp
""

of

while any

--

-H

"

Changeable,
on some
{

"

f^r

th

other

bpi,,gi,,ga spark

".

-(-J

attrib^es must

^
fange

me

!;f

:.,

never affecu the

to 8

"

r-

"

"y

"7

"I

;,:

,,,;,:,;:

it-

tlu

SCHOPENHAUER
that

it is

forces

is

Void

their nature

FOURFOLD ROOT.

thus to act.

The

289

action of these primitive

just as inexplicable as the pel-durability of Substance.

time and space, as mere forms of the internal and external

no efficient causation, make no impression upon our

It is
bodily organs, and so are not perceptible by sense.
only as
occupied or filled by the attributes of Matter, such as impenetra
sense, exert

bility, color, etc., that they become perceptible

hence, Matter may
be defined to be the perceptibility of time and space, and the link
of connection which binds these two
Time is perceived
together.
only through the changes of state and attribute which take place
in time
space is perceived only through the persistence or un;

changeableuess of the material Substance which occupies space.

Thus. Matter is conceived only as a force
occupying space, capable
of affecting our external senses, and
susceptible, in successive

moments of time, of change in its attributes, which are its mani

festations to sense, but not in its Substance.
This is the simplest
definition which can be given of Matter as such, or in an inorganic
not modified by the phenomena of life.
is, as
And in
regard to inorganic matter only, are we able to apply the two
axioms of physical causation, namely, that action and reaction are
equal, and that cause and effect are manifested in exact proportion
to each other.
state, that

But Matter

an organic state, in two other forms,

manifesting either Vegetable or Animal life.
Living vegetable organisms, and those portions of the animal or
ganism which have merely an unconscious and vegetative life and
office, such as the functions of nutrition, assimilation, and growth,
are partially withdrawn from the influence of the
purely Physical
Causation \vhich reigns alone in inorganic substance, and are
subject
to such Stimuli as food, moisture,
In regard to the
light, and heat.
influence of these Stimuli, the law of the
equality of action and
reactio.i is not applicable, and that of the
proportionality of the
effect to the cause docs not hold true.
Thus, a certain quantity
both of food, moisture, and warmth is an essential condition of
but the growth is not increased in
vegetable life and growth
exact proportion to the quantity thus supplied and if the amount
exists

also in

as constituting or

furnished
result, but

exceed a given
the plant dies.

not only more growth does not

In like manner, animal life, which is

limit,

its
capacity for sensation from merely vegetable
subject to still another form of causation, that of
Motives.
The action of every animal, man himself included, may
be controlled more or less by
offering to it certain external in-

distinguished by
existence,

is

19

290

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ducements.

Every animal has certain primitive impulses and de

such as the sexual passion, emulation, the love of
society, the
instinct of self-preservation, and the like; and most of its actions
result from the felt presence or absence of the means of
gratifying
these desires.
For reasons which will appear further on, I speak
here only of what may be called the objective
aspect of motives,
sires,

or the presence of external inducements.

Stimulation, or the capacity of being affected by such external
agencies as fond and light, which is the active principle of vegeta
ble life, occupies middle ground between the two others
that is,
;

between Physical Causes strictly so

called, or the principle of change in inorganic matter, and Motiva
tion, which is the active
As a
principle peculiar to animal life.
stone may be made to move by pushing or striking it, which is

it

constitutes

Causation

in

the

transition

the narrowest sense, so plants

by supplying them with food and

may

be

made

to

grow

and the action of animals,

man included, may be governed by holding out to them external
inducements, as food to the hungry, and water to the thirsty
animal, and the prospect of gaining wealth or fame to man him
heat,

self.
In this last case, Motivation is, so to
speak, accompanied
and interpenetrated by knowledge that is, it acts through intelli
A motive, in the ob
gence, and is witnessed by consciousness.
jective sense, is something which the animal knows will gratify its
desire
otherwise, it would not be a motive, and so would not
;

It avails nothing to hold out external induce

govern its action.
ments either to a stone or a plant, since neither of them is capable
of knowing what would gratify its desires or tendencies, even if it
had any such. But since Stimulation holds intermediate ground
between the other two, its action is
united with theirs

frequently

in plants, its action is united with that of

in animals, it is united with Motivation.

Cause

strictly so called;

Thus, the upward mo

determined
partly
by such Stimuli as
heat and light, and partly by such
inorganic forces, or causes in
the narrowest sense, as the laws of
hydraulics and the capillary
action of narrow tubes.
Again, certain actions in an animal s
body are wholly voluntary, and so wholly produced by Motivation,
while certain others, as involuntary, are produced
by Stimuli, or even
tion of the sap in

plants

is

exclusively by inorganic force, or again, by a union of two or

more of those modes of causation. Thus, the winking of the eye
lids is most
commonly involuntary, being stimulated by tears or
bright light

So likewise

but

is

sometirr.es voluntary, or

governed by motives.

respiration, and the act of swallowing, partly volun-

SCHOPENHAUER

FOURFOLD ROOT.

291

tary and partly involuntary, are the conjoint results of pure Stimuli
and Motives. The circulation of the blood is due to the joint

Stimuli and purely inorganic forces.

Because the actions of an animal, so far as they are voluntary,
depend on Motivation, which is conditioned and limited by knowl
edge, the proper characteristic of animal life, says Schopenhauer,
An animal may be defined as a living organism
is intelligence.
which knows. Both Physical Causes and Stimuli, before they can
become grounds of action or change, must be in actual contact
action of

But as knowledge is
with the substances to be affected by them.
can act from a
relations
of
Motivation
the
of
space,
independent
distance.

The conduct

of the

lower animals can be influenced, at

any moment, by objects placed anywhere within the range of their

senses.
Indeed, leaving out the obscure phenomena of instinct,
and the exceptional cases of conduct induced by habit and training,
the Motivation of brutes is properly limited to what is within the
What is merely animal
range of their senses for the moment.
the
lives only in and for what is present to it in time and space
absent, whether past or future, is equivalent to the non-existent.
But man s intellect has a twofold operation, and is capable not
;

only of intuitive, but of abstract knowledge, which is not limited

to what is present, and is not necessarily directed by what is near

Man
most conspicuous, as an object of aversion or desire.
motives
each
other
he
can
of
repress
weighing
against
capable
the impulse of the moment, till the voice of prudence has had time
to be heard, and till he has estimated the comparative desirable
But this distinction between
ness of what is distant and future.
man and brute will be further considered, when we come to treat
of the causa agendi, or subjective Motivation.
Observe that Schopenhauer s analysis here points directly to
one conclusion, which he did not anticipate, and would not have
welcomed. The doctrine that all living organisms are mere autom
ata, so that all the movements and changes taking place in them
can be explained merely on mechanical principles, is unfounded,
because it leaves wholly out of view the radical distinctions now
Stimuli
pointed out between the three forms of the causa fiendi.
cannot be put in the same class with Physical Causes strictly so
for the law of proportionality between cause and effect
called
And still less can Motiva
does not hold good in respect to them.
tion be explained as Mechanism, since it operates from any dis
tance, and only through the intervention of knowledge.
Agreeably to what has now been said, the first of the four Roots

est or
is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

292

of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely, the causa fien di, the
Ground of Change in the condition and attributes of Matter, may

be subdivided into three perfectly distinct species, as follows:

1. Physical Causation in the narrowest sense, controlling
O
2.

all

inorganic matter.
Stimulation, controlling the growth of plants and the exer
in

change

cise of all vegetative functions.

3.

Objective Motivation, controlling from a distance the outward

by external inducements.

acts of animals

The
cient

consideration of the second Root of the Principle of Suffi

carries us over from the realm of Matter to that of

Reason

Every judgment or mental

Mind.

or Reason

why

affirmation

must have a Ground

This Reason, the

be true.

to

plainly distinguishable from the causa fiendi,

a certain respect, is the opposite of it, as the relation of

causa cognosccndi,
and, in

made, or held

it is

cause and effect

the former case.

is

here frequently reversed from what it was in

in the case of physical causation, was effect

is

"NVhat,

now becomes cause that is,

the reason why I know that a

becomes the causa cognoscendi, or

physical cause has been in operation.
Thus, the rise of the mercury is the causa cognoscendi, the reason
but in respect
or cause of my knowing that the heat is increased
;

it

to the causa Jicndi, this rise of

increase of heat is the cause.

the

As

mercury

a material

the effect, and the

is

phenomenon, heat

is

the cause, the rise of the mercury is the effect

as a mental phe
nomenon, the rise of the meivtiry is the cause, and my knowledge
All this is obvious enough ;
of the increased heat is the effect.
;

and we have only

to

consider Schopenhauer

causas cognoscendi into four species.

subdivision of the

He

designates the first of

these species as logical, since a proposition may be affirmed to be
true because it is a valid inference from another proposition pre
the second as empirical, because I may know
is, through perception by sense, that iron is
the third as transcendental, be
blue, and the like

viously established

from experience, that

hard, the sky is

cause the very nature of the

human mind,

its a priori laws or in

nate principles, preceding and transcending all experience, assure
me that space is indestructible and infinite, and that time flows on

and the fourth as metalogical,

in a perfectly uniform lapse forever
consisting solely of the three fundamental axioms of pure Thought,
those of Identity, Non-Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, on
;

which

all

legitimate thinking depends.

Schopenhauer is entitled to the credit of being the first to point

out the third Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and to

SCHOPENHAUER

293

FOURFOLD ROOT.

enumerate the characteristics, hitherto unnoticed, by which it is

The cases thus
distinguished from both the lirst and the second.
far mentioned are not all those in which we tire entitled to ask, Why
is it so? that is. to demand a Reason.
If asked, why the three
sides of this triangle are equal, the answer is, because the three
Is this the assignment of an ordinary
angles are equal.
Physical
no means; for in this case, there is
Cause, or causa fiendi?
no change, no beginning to be. and therefore we do not seek for
any force, the application of which has had eilicacy to produce a
change. Neither is it a causa cognoscendi ; for the equality of the
angles is not merely a Reason why we know the equality of the
sides, but whether we know it or not, the equality of the former
necessitates the equality of the latter.
These two things, these two
determinations of existence, must have gone together forever,
though there were no mind in the universe to cognize their union.
The being of one involves and necessitates the being oi the other.
This third Root of the Principle is appropriately denominated by
Schopenhauer the causa esscndi, the Ground or Reason of Being.
It determines the relations to each other of all Numbers, that is,
of till succession in time, and of all Positions in space and there
fore is the foundation of arithmetic and geometry, that is, of all
Three is one half of six, and the square root
pure mathematics.
of nine, on account of the respective relations of three, six, and
nine, to unity, which is the foundation of number, as it is the start
P>y

ing point for determining succession

in time.

In like manner, every

position in space is inevitably determined to be where it is, through

its coexistent relations with at least three other
points in space, not

same plane.

There is a Ground or Reason, therefore, for

pure mathematics and it is neither the causa jftendi,
why it became so, for it never did become, but always was so; nor
the causa coynoscendi, for it determines not merely our knowledge

in

the

every truth

in

of the fact, but the very being of the fact,

the causa esscndi.

and

is

consequently

named

Schopenhauer maintains that the fourth Root of the Principle is

found in Motivation as viewed in its subjective aspect, that is, in
the relations of volition to the desire, passion, or motive, by which
it is
Of course, he is a
inevitably determined to be what it is.
strict Necessitarian.
As under the third subdivision of the lirst
Root, Motivation in its objective aspect, he held the outward con
duct of all animals, man himself included, to be irresistibly de
termined by external inducements, so in this fourth Root, he con
siders the

phenomenal manifestations

of will, that

is,

particular

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

294

the prevailing
to be just as necessarily determined by
Given the
cause.
motive as any physical event is by its ellieient
must
volition
the
and
he
moment,
of the
says,
predominant desire
there would he
otherwise,
follow;
must
and
is.
it
instantly
be what
or Reason.
a phenomenon without any sutlicient Ground
is
analvds
summarily presented in the following
This whole

volitions,

echeine.

Reason.
Prtt^/jile of Sufficient

M.
Causa Jiendi.

1.

4.

Causa cujwH.

essendi.

whether

as

...... Infm

Logical

2.

F.mpiri.-al

;{

x raiiscendental

4.

Metalo. ical (analytic)

1.

In

(synthetic)
.

(Irowth.

Outward

act.

.ire.

Kxperit-nee through
A priori truths.

the senses.

Three axioms of thought.

Nuniher.
pcisition.

ln ^,, u e

Motivation (subjective)
all

Time
,

<

._,

But while

1.

Cus

Principle of Motivation (objective)

3.

.Chance.

/ 3.

Causa cognoscenti.

Principle of Cimsulitv
Principle of Stimulation

2.

) 2!

Volition.

all

manifestations of Will,

phenomena, including
deor as outward acts, are thus inevitably

volitions

its own particular Ground

termined or necessitated, each by
the Will in
and
Kant
both
Schopenhauer maintain that
Reason,
a
not
is
it
as
Character,
phenomenon, but
itself, or the Intelligible
is not so determined; it has no
absolute
or
being,
is being per se,
free.
Space and
Ground or Reason, and is therefore absolutely
forms of
or
laws
are
from
Kant,
only
time as we have learned
never ot the ding
that is, of what appears

phenomenal being,

or

This, as existent out of space

is.
being as it really
there is
is absolutely one, so that
but
no
has
and time,
plurality,
As
it.
determine
having no
act upon or
nothin" else- wliii-.li can
has no
therefore
and
to
is
not
it
change,
subject
durati.m in time,
know
can
intellect
the
only
causa fiendi. As incognizable, because
the causa cognoscenti does not enter
phenomena or what appears,
even
As absolute, it is out of relation to any thing,
into the case.
and
therefore,
time
of
is,
moment
to any point of space or to any
And as to Motivation, or the causa
essendi.

an

sich, or

free from the causa

the particular volition,
aaendi. that, as we have seen, affects only
or inmost nature
inborn
character,
the
never
act.
or the concrete
the
universe
the
of
This is the essence
;_
of man and of all things.
one
the
that
primal
all
of
appears
ultimate Ground or Reason
;

and free, because it only acts,

force which is wholly indeterminate
attributes
as
change affects only the
and is never acted upon. Just
unleaves its incognizable substance
but
of
or
anything,
properties

SCHOPENHAUER

FOURFOLD ROOT.

same yesterday, to-day, and forever.ro

which
the volitions and outward acts
Motivation determines only
character which is born
essential
that
of
are the manifestations
makes tl
are
nay, winch
with us, and makes us what we

the
altered and unalterable,

successfully traced
already remarked, having
one of the primto
matter
up
action or change in
any phenomenal
law, say,
ultimate
an
to
that is, up
it ve forces in nature,
A\ hy doe
ask
orP^ica!
farther,
never
we
inquire
to
heat,
gravity or
Such a question, ,t is seen, would
thus?"
Iruvity or heat act
it could only be answered by asserting
for
have no proper meaning,
he very es
is the nature,
"It
the fact over again, or by saying,
it is the nature of
that
is,
act
to
thus;"
sence of gravity or heat
to tend
so far as they are affected by g,-avity,
particles,
heat t
affected
are
by
as
far
they
towards each other, and, so

^ThulJ aUinras

Sal

We

may, indeed reother, or to expand.

considered as
hitherto
of these physical forces,

move away from each

solve two or more

resolve heat
we may, as has been recently done
primal, into one;
then
But
into motion
lUt, electricity, magnetism, etc.,
debecome
and
be
to
cease
primal,
forces so resolved, of course,
their resultant motion is now
and
only
-ivative or phenomenal;
at winch all
thus constituting the ultimate goal,
iruly primal,
or Reason
Ground
sufficient
a
for
demand
all
physical inquiry,
can be
act
should
thus,
The question, why motion
properly ends.
to mani
It is the nature of motion thus
answered only by saying,
outward act or
In like manner, having traced any
fest itself.
or original
desire,
volition of man to some primitive

particular

the
to the desire of happiness
manifestation of Will as such, say,
have
we
or the sexual appetite
instinct of self-preservation,
and can no longer ask
reached the ultimate Ground or Reason,
is the Will so consti
be
asked,
Why
the
if
question
Why? Or
we can
their
than
rather
opposite*?
tuted as to desire these things
of Will to wisJ
essence
or
nature
the
is
it
only answer, because
* urther answer
death.
life rather than misery and
happiness and
than this can no man give.
and explicitly
The same doctrine can perhaps be more clearly
a Ground or
needs
world
the
in
Nothing
stated in this form.
for its existence now and
but
mere
its
existence,
only
Reason for
in Space an.
that is, for its phenomenal manifestation
here
does it happen
it?
is
but,
Why
ask
do not
simply, Why
Time.
rather than elseat some other time? Why here,
than
rather
now,
now fall? and tot, wny
ask, Why does this body
where?

We

We

296
fODERN PHILOSOPHY.
do

bofll es

TnviMfo?

generally
nature or essence of

**;
"

;;,: ,

Nothing

now

d ifficult

Problem

J;r

pass to a

con,,.

",

^S

exclLs

r n

( l(

ti

respon

(lone

m,

he

freedom,

e Se

ble for

"

conduct?

\vj u a

he

I(I

ond a,ion
VJI

r iu

11;l

"

re account

Rem

earthquake.

Pood,

its

I.at h u sl.aU

T,;~"

govern

IM1 -

all.

"

ii<1

"

a>

^lan

u-l,,f

^^l^
^^ ^
"

leaves

"<l

nau
,

^"

in his
];-

,1 ,; ;

tlle

rol u io

Ilks

hts

"

F
lUiuerbach
whole doctrine in
this

nn

fruit

"

,.
th

and shape our

nature and
l
mnitj.

th

i,

is

subject to the si,

U P the
man,,
h Ie ma
P th
n
,
! Y
has anv
If th ^e

T1.C Jaws of
matter., ml

SeSrs ;
""

^7

for

e are

"

,|,>

climate

soil,

ls

fl(

^ntljce*

k)

\JJ

eS
^ ment

basis

vice or cri me

feVCr

i"

will or effort

choice.

animal frame, but

his life
are "eh and
generous, so will
act.ons.
His moral na ture
.]
"

1"

a blunder, re

is

on

is

lias
,

[(,.-,

no t

^^

eJf-improvement or
r
isa Plant that
rows
K
th, and tl,o

of his

there

^f^"

lair.

"

arno

then

either for

otherwise

Jl(J
JI(J

* suitable

!
>y

"<

(J

>

1)0

this

^oS

Uvcd
1

";

"

Necessitarian do

tlfo

committed
up to the

"

tj

4
1

"

^ ^nowled^

10

is

trTte

allu

Fl

;t

"^
"

fault

ij^

Se

"

U L

"

and

Old and

^U
"

have not at

*-

to

of the abstrus

ri;eivill

T"

of the

ifc

aI]j

spontaneously.

>

^iT?
M
VM

"I

Ithelf

->-!-Uion

"

lni ,ti,,,/

human
t

;ts

that

uni

,^,^orl.

temptation,
vuinh- att,

"

1CeiVe

he discu str even

who, seeking an ex
P f

"

child,
S

,;;;

];

iM,,, it is slill
e Can ot
avoid

/ J *?

bod eV

all

x-

^x

)uu

[m
these

"

?ittiu

-ivitation

rdiuary Brutal

rman

tcu

and
is

manner,

^^ MtascA

T
and

Slllns
1st

^^

rv
tesnmony of
7,7
a fact
lousiies sattested alike
yfo,,,^
by corisc
sn two courses
consci ousness, that
of action are
present
Tt
etween
iU e f ee to
and therefore
choose
hl,, f them,
.,
have Ollly
-.nlv OUrseliraa f^,
or

contlT^
-

""

We

con-

297

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

we all feel selfsequences of our conduct have become manifest,

that we might have
reproach or self-gratulatiou, because we know
willed differently.

The

the Principle of
is an inference from
Necessitarian alleges that we could not
because no particular volition would be

opposite doctrine

The

Sufficient Reason.

have willed

differently,

determined by some antecedent motive or

If all the antecedent circumstances, the
this
motive
character
and
s
included, should remain unchanged,
agent
the volition must be repeated
otherwise, a given cause would not
would be a
produce any effect, which is a contradiction, or there
free volition, it is
change without a cause, which is impossible.
and ex
asserted, would be a cause of action residing in the mind,
it would be a first
that
of
motives
itself
is,
independently
erting

possible, if it were not

cause to be what it is.

which case, it would be wholly indeterminate, as there

would be no reason why this particular volition should be exerted

cause

in

rather than any other.

Sir William Hamilton, borrowing his theory from Kant s An

and confesses that the doctrine of

tinomies, admits this argument,

is inconceivable, because it asserts that an event, a voli

but he maintains that the op
takes
tion,
place without a cause
is equally inconceivable,
of
the
doctrine,
Necessity,
theory
posite

Freewill

involves the assertion of an infinite series of causes, through

If no event can happen,
denying the possibility of a First cause.

for

it

except

it

be determined to happen by some preceding event, then

The chain
on seeking such preceding events forever.

we must go
is

endless

the series

is

infinite

and

this

is

as impossible

just

thought as the opposite doctrine, that there is a First cause.

Thus. Hamilton s view of the conflicting theories of Necessity and
Freewill is but one application of his Philosophy of the Condi
In his opinion, both doctrines are inconceivable but as
tioned.
one of them must be true and therefore,
are
contradictories,
they
as an inconceivability which is common to both does not disprove
either, we must believe in Freewill, which has, what the other has
to

not. the

Hamilton

Then
testimony of consciousness in its favor.
conclusion is, I know that I am free, but I cannot con

distinct
s

how am free.
Then the only reason why

ceive

be inconceivable

is,

that

it

is alleged to
to
volitions
originate without
supposes
to be left indeterminate, since there is

the Freewill doctrine

a Cause, so that they seem

to determine why we should have one volition rather than

nothing

another.

demur

to this statement, in

which

it is

implied that no

98

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

of Sufficient

anZfsof the

that which
enables
he had bettor do
h
tho

"^

""

httlr

he

is

ulviZft o

thoughts

the

this

^ly

prelhnfnary
separated from it

-/

i-portant

millds

to

by

call

of
for

consciousness a

come,

and also that

may

or

e at

may

ha

""V*
i

calle(1

th

value of
the

Re

U^tan

V litioU

inte

^al

sons for

ng

dis-

and

"

I>Ursued

moS H ^
m ;r
;

Se

t0

awl

make

P our

th

"

he

tl

Again

ls

"

"hf

Power, u-hateve

that

InarM
P a icular

the

?
rained

proper cou
which we are then
,- /

it,

*C

^Sn^^?

fo

bvi U8

"?

the! fof 7"^

s h ort ll

o-

B^ cause

anv one cone u on

to

motives, or estimatin
ere t "odei of
condu

"

rovvn

not follow

"

, aT^-"

"

<>

which

mere
f tW

"

Effect, exactly
y nro,

of

"

ch

ound is wet tin.,,.

ground
tin.,,
.elation between a
C
le, while that between
Ke,
degree changeable and contin
en
J"st

T"
ni

CauT wh

the

t0

"

""

know

^
^P
that

f"

to

"

*****

Tt

sti,

the fatter

*****>

thing happen

the

K-SOU and

of

onsequent
a.l its

Wha(

0t

ReasonUn
d tIOM
?
is
often emu ,
Eke
fo^er

hich

is Sti]1

to

299

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

moved by Physical Causes, strictly so called. If this

that the doctrine of the
theory were true, I admit
for I cannot even
demonstrated
be
Necessitarian would thereby
in Matter, except through the
place
imagine any change taking
it is necessarily deter
operation of some efficient Cause, whereby
mined to be what it is and I cannot see how a Necessitarian can
only as he

is

Materialist

The two doctrines re

being also a Materialist.
But then
them
inevitably go together.
spectively maintained by
the distinction already pointed out, and which is as obvious to the
between the
vulgar as it is to the skilled logician and psychologist,
causa
the
and
altogether.
disappears
causa fcndi
cognoscendi,
There is then no difference between the Cause, which makes an
event happen, and the Reason which merely enables me to know,
But it seems to
or inclines me to believe, that it has happened.
me an unquestionable and even self-evident truth, that the rela
tion between one state of consciousness and another is radically
unlike that between one condition of any material object and a
logically avoid

In the latter case, the change

subsequent state of the same thing.
from one to the other is inconceivable, except through the action
in the former, it is
of some determinate force or physical agency
such force or agency should have any
that
inconceivable
equally
in hand.
Ideas, states of mind, are not
thing to do with the case
extended
not
sticks or stones.
they are not impen
They are
or strike, or block the way, except met
do not
etrable
;

push,

they

As Dr. Reid bluntly expresses it, that a motive exerts

aphorically.
assertion as meaning
or
compulsion upon my will, is an
any force
less as that the motive drinks my health, or boxes my ears.
mo
adverted to the fact, that what are called
I have
"

already

not Efficient Causes, do not

they are Final Causes, and
volitions, but, at best, supply only
direction and guidance to an impulse or effort which must origi

tives,"

in

as

any manner move or constrain

which emanates in fact from the

from the self-determining power of his will.

nate elsewhere,
that

is,

man

himself,

motive

is

the consciousness of a purpose, and therefore acts only through

The Empiri
the understanding, and only on the understanding.
be the last
to
Final
Causes
who
cist,
altogether, ought
rejects
to attribute constraining force to motives.

person
Ur.

J. II.

illustrated

in his

"

truth, that

practical Assent to

determined by inferences, or deductions of the understanding.

Sometimes Assent fails, while the reasons for it, and the infer-

rily
*

Grammar of Assent," has admirably

Assent and conduct, which is merely
the Reasons for such conduct, are not necessa

Newman,

the

300

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Asse

aS

ut

tangible reusors

iffici

ss

""T

.,,.

,/;

^times

^ ^ -n,vs,,

to
i,,i

Jt

.;"

(M)v

ls

"

^ whentlle Process

intricate

U<1

ground, the nnrl,

.....

,,,. r

-n

corroboration of

ve

other

..

i,,,,

"

?-

"""

is

preliminarjr whi,h

"

k,

beside

of O the,
ril

ll

a ., nt to

IIOt

<lf(

;;;

the

Even

1>oint -"

is

his

.^

^r

Ilis

he haa

till

y el

own.

I,,-

>

new

""

.ail,,,

in

iven without

to H

reasons are for

-|
witl

!er
"

e,

.^

,;.,,,.,,

Illi(fl

""...

v ,.

this

that

Vo |nn

Two
thit

y exerting

effort,

"

after

it

remaiu when

to

has
th

establish."

phenomenon

ener

of
takes place in
view
C0nscious ^ss

:u,,I

attests,

fo

end rather than

io

the force

^v,,

""

compulsion by then,.

to

j,

UI ^ !l

,,

sav

some particular end.

*
Whence comes
ed

/
"^

capitulating,
s.

^ -1 reasons

proposition
reasons
,,,,;,
:<

iven, the

ori^at

ol^lt

merely transmitted passive]

second
nd uesti

the f rce

her?
** *

**
<**

^-originated, and
from Another.
The

^-of

ng,m which
in

foment,

case

which

it is

e dfrec
the
of the
understand!

^]*** *?*

^ ^ Ci

301

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

of
will adopt, irrespective of the comparative weight or cogency
but that it actually does so, and thus maintains its
these reasons
voluntarily look away
freedom, is attested by consciousness.
of argument and evidence.
or shut our
to, the
;

We

weight

eyes

from,

"

He who
Is of the

convinced against, his will

same opinion

still."

Whatever the philosophers and the pedants may say about

man

is

animal.
reasoning, than a wilful,
of undertaking to turn an obstinate man

much

less

it,

The very

is to argue
worst way
or his
his
in
mistaken
is
he
that
to
premises
and
with him,
prove
has
a reason for his decision, so that it is not alto
lie
logic.
and capricious but this is not necessarily the
gether arbitrary
;

own estimation. The error of the

strongest reason, even in his
Necessitarians consists in allirming, that there can be no guidance
at all of the choice, unless it is absolutely controlling guidance.
The fact probably is, that Reasons cannot be measured by pints,
Their influence is not
or
ounces, or even

by grains.
weighed by
cannot tell why a volition is
quantitative, but qualitative.
determined to one end rather than any other, simply because we
or
are unable to see how reasons can be thus equally balanced,

We

how they cannot be compared with each other in respect

know from consciousness that they
weight or influence. But we
The word
are thus equally balanced, or are incommensurable.
and implies a quantum of
motive, as it signifies that wliicli moves,

rather,
to

either an unfair assumption of the whole dogma

generating force, is
to be proved, or a misleading metaphor.
But whatever the relation may be between the Reasons and the
there is the clearest evidence
consequent choice or determination,
and its
that it is not the same with the relation between a Cause
them.
between
similitude
no
is
there
that
Effect, and even
proper

Cause in energy must be instantaneously followed by its Effect,

indeed the two are not more properly said to be simultaneous
for the former is in operation only so far as the latter is produced.
the will cannot re
According to the Necessitarian theory, then,
are
action
Reasons
for
the
while
main dormant
present to the mind,
more than a balance can remain in equilibrium after a weight
;

il

any

If the volition must follow

has been put into one of the scales.
since an in
the strongest desire, then it must follow instantly
herent or uncaused power to delay is equivalent to a power to
;

But as John Locke remarked long ago, the mind has, as is

evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satis-

resist.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

302
faction of

on

any

sides

all

;"

of

and

its

desires,

ho.

till

it

rightly adds.

can consider and examine them

in this lies the liberty a man
"

compelled to assert, that an ante

or,
cedent volition is necessary to determine the will to inaction
remain
in other words, that we need to will that the will should

Then

has."

the Necessitarian

is

in regard to selecting one out of two or more contem

deny any such need. Will is power;
plated courses of action.
Like imagi
but it is not necessarily, or always, power in action.
nation, it is a power or faculty which is called into action only
While the under
intervals.
divisionally, sometimes after long
as in
is wholly absorbed with some object of cogitation,
standing
tor
Reasons
or
mathematical
considering
problem,
working out a
courses of conduct, we are not conscious of ici/lii/t/ ; and

dormant,

We

divergent

is
the existence of a volition to suspend volition, at such a moment,
But the Reasons
a blank hypothesis invented to save a theory.
are then present to the mind, which is deeply engaged in consid
Necessitarian calls the Causes are
ering them; that is, what the
not follow.
does
Effect
the
and
yet
present,
in different directions, are
Again, when several desires, leading
will were
all present to the mind at once, if their action upon the
that of causes producing their effects, the action ought not to be
in the direction of the strongest desire, but in that of the resultant
For
which is contrary to the fact.
of all the desires combined
to go to Boston, and another,
wi-h
one
have
I
strong
may
example
almost equally urgent, to visit Mcdford. ^Then, on the Necessi
tarian theory of the inability of the will tof-ftct except as it is acted
;

but to Charlestown,
ought to go to neither of these places,
about half way between them, and whither I have no
where, in fact, it might be very inconvenient
at all to go
Therefc ve, either the doctrine of the me
for me to find myself.
causative
or
chanical
power of Reasons and desires is unfounded,
or the whole science of mechanics, which is founded upon the com

upon,

which
motive

lies

of forces, is false.
position and resolution
Fatalist
the
to
doctrine, every
According

cause of its invariable consequent, and an

antecedent; and this antecedent, again, is an

phenomenon

is

both a

effect of its invariable

effect of its antecedent,

This series of antecedents must be inh uite

one
if
at
we
antecedent, whether near or remote, that
for
stop
any
one is an absolute commencement, or First Cause. Lither the

and so on forever.

chain

is

infinite

in

or
length, therefore,

it

has a

first

link, place

But an infinite series is just as impossible to

where we may.
as an uncaused volition, or First Cause; and thus the
thought
O
this

303

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Necessitarian escapes from one inconceivability only by throwing

In following the series of causes, he who
himself into another.
of infinity necessarily admits a First Cause
short
at
any point
stops
done so at the
and therefore
at this
just as well have

might

point,

outset.

When it is urged, that what I am able to do is not a subject of

consciousness, but only what I actually do or feel, the answer is,
that the exercise of ability, the exertion of power, is a subject of
the
consciousness.
Ability and force are attributes o powers of
mind and we are directly conscious of them when they are ex
as we are conscious of fixing the attention,
erted v
forth,
i%

put

just

Whether the ata strenuous effort.

or controlling emotion, by
j
of
no
a
is
or
succeeds
not,
importance for our present
point
tempt
what I know is, that a vigorous effort was made to in
purpose

sure success.

Even

of the endeavor

endeavor.

aware

On

is

in

far

the case of a muscular strain, the failure

f-om negativing the consciousness of that

the contrary, perhaps a strong

of the extent of his powers, as

accomplish some remarkable

feat,

man

is

never so fully

when he has attempted

and failed;

for success

to

comes

before, but failure only after, lie lias put forth his whole strength.
Observe, however, that what we thus strongly assert is the ability
do, or accomplish, the meditated feat ;
an actual contraction of the muscles, can
But in one sense, and that a
be known only through its results.
the action,
very important one, as already observed, the volition is
in its subjective and moral aspect, since it is for this alone that
to will,

not the ability

the latter, so far as

to

it is

mere volition to commit mur

conscience holds us responsible.
der is murder, before God, though not at man s tribunal ; since we
can know the volitions of our fellow man only by their results, his
outward acts.
It is admitted, on all hands, that the internal force of volition is
whatso
absolutely free from compulsion or restraint by any power
No external force can constrain
ever applied to it from without.
Bind me hand and foot with chains, and I am still con
the will.
scious that

my

will is just as free as ever.

But

if

consciousness

is

thus competent to declare, and thereby to prove, the freedom of

the will as against external compulsion, against bolts and chains, it
is equally competent to affirm the like freedom as against internal
desires.
No
compulsion, against pressing inducements and urgent
one can candidly deny, that its testimony is just as clearly and
Whatever in
in the former.
positively given in the latter case as
be present to my mind, I am still conscious that I
ducements

may

304
PHILOSOPHY.

fear,

anxiet
v el
against winch our
most

Consciousness testifies to
ovv, then can we

consist

il

us with
vai
i

the case of
volitions to the comer
1 the
existence of

i"

power?

r.

cannot

cou]d

know

this

T WO on

cs
nece^itv
U,

and
pleasure,

except"

abse -e of

hs testimon
Pre8ence

7
to

necessity)

Pposite
the

any

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Fatalism

305

namely, that the strongest motive is a Cause, and, as

But the
compels the volition, as an Effect, to follow it.
modern Necessitarians, since they ignore, or deny altogether, the
notion ot EHicicnt Causation, reject also the idea of compulsion.
;

such,

They argue from experience

Certain inducements and de

only.
being present to a mind of a given character and disposition,
we find from experience, they say, that a volition corresponding to
the relative strength of these inducements, and to the prevailing
bent of the disposition, invariably follows.
volition is a moral
sires

"

effect,

which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly

and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes."

Mr. Mill acknowledges himself to be entirely ignorant whether it
must so follow
all I know is, that it always does."
By virtue
of this distinction, which rejects coercion, but denies ability, he
hopes to wipe off the most repulsive aspect, and to escape the most
"

appalling consequences, of pure Fatalism.

must avow a strong belief that this is a distinction without any

It makes no possible difference to the pris
oner, though bolts and fetters do not compel him to stay in his cell,
if he is so disabled that he cannot
Our quarrel with
get out of it.
Mr. Mill is not for what he asserts, but for what he denies. He does
not aliirm Compulsion, but he denies Freedom.
If my Volition
I

essential difference.

does" follow the

strongest motive, it is not at liberty to
and there is small comfort in being
go in any othei direction
reminded, that the lack of liberty does not arise from the applica
tion of any force whatever.

"always

On

the old theory, the will is like an unfortunate man tied hand
and dragged after the heels of a mad bull by a rope
attached to the animal s horns.
This is the doctrine of Fatalism

and

foot,

wherever the bull gallops, the man must follow, by compulsion.

But tli is is not Mr. Mill s theory. lie asks us to believe that the
rope lias disappeared, and that there is no compulsion in the case,
whether visible or real and yet that we learn from actual obser
;

vation, that the

man

"always does"

follow his grim antecedent at

the same distance as before, each bound of the one being copied
This, he says, is not Fatal
by a corresponding leap of the other.
But
ism, is not even Necessity, since there is no must in the case.
it is

and

what he

calls, at

at another,

"

one time, the

Moral

Causation,"

Determinism" of the Will,

or the doctrine of invariable

"

sequence.

Evidently this latter statement of the theory is more unwar

We can understand the necessity which

rantable than the former.

20

>

Ap

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

t
can,,, without restraint
""

......

......
"

volition,

<l

"

......

vitl,

1,

",

"

"

"""

"

">-.l

pScatel

tr,c;:,:

of experience

"

;""-"

the saJ

roe

-/ ir^ir^r;,/:^"
events foUow their

al

M,

by

B
"""

liiili

>iii

"""

"

"""^

.....

-^
.-

Vsi -

"

--

;r;

llo

of our

what

certainty,
it

fl

hi.,

obviously

actions

,v I!

"

C so

"

"

infer ...... ,!

,,,,-.

i,,

and"

is

that

a most

JM

they are one

other.

"

Toanv

,;:*
"

T-.......

abstract

ever act alike

-a,, ,,,,
,.1^ (I
ij

occasions.

never reeat

S "

""

"

.I"",
""

":

gerson

ee s fo r r
P

ncwV
;

very

s;u
;;

wo Jd aim

""""

"

"

le

ii;

"

all

"

a<

Hd

y k

^^

:lssertio

Pe

!t
"

<>"

..... ""ver

that ,,o

he
of

two

<****+
no ono
8a ie OOIlr8e of
conduct
two sim?
f
fi
ma tO be un animal tha
;

"

"

*<,,
""""

"P

,,1

*o u8 and,

of a

,S

""

men

""

........ f

""

"

"

307

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

out, then, by inference, analogy, and

that
the
I
uniformity and certainty of voli
stoutly deny
theory,
a truth of experience," meaning thereby a fact patent to
tions is

Whatever may be made

"

Mr. Mill could not have chosen a weaker position

observation.
for his doctrine, as nearly all the facts point directly the other way.
lie would say, of course, that when the volitions vary, the ante
Be it so, for the nonce but if the antece
cedents are different.
;

dents are hardly ever the same, the uniformity of the volitions is
And since these moral an
certainly not a truth of experience.
tecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions" in another
man s mind, how can any one not gifted with omniscience declare,
that they are always different when the volition is not the same,
and always alike when a volition is exactly repeated ? In truth,
what is here claimed as experience must be resolved into an
"

"

"

inveterate preconceived opinion, that even the actions of the human

an honest opinion,
the universality of law
it
may be, but one which takes for granted the whole matter in

will cannot escape

dispute.

am

in

far

human

from denying a certain measure and kind of uniformity

The doctrine of Free Will recognizes this

conduct.

it by the essential unity of human nature.

we often act uniformly, because we are rational be
and we often act inconsistently and not according to rule,
ings
because we are free beings. Men are similarly, though not equally,
with
endowed with the great springs and impulses of activity.

fact,

and accounts for

It

certain

is

corresponding
the principal

appetites, affections, and desires, which determine

of action, and with intellectual powers that are

Ends

homogeneous, though not equiponderant, so that often similar Means

Whole sciences, such as
are adopted for effecting our purposes.
ethics, politics, political economy, and the philosophy of history,
are built upon this general accordance of human beings with each
other
though the surface of life is constantly broken and fretted
A prevailing
the
idiosyncrasies of intellect and character.
by
unity of aim and purpose is created by the wants and necessities
even of our physical being and some uniformity of conduct is the
obvious result of the similar circumstances by which we are sur
But above and around this accordance of general feat
rounded.
is room for infinite variety of details, and a boundless
there
ures,
Geld for the freedom of particular volitions.
The Necessitarians utterly mistake the lesson which is taught
;

the statistical results of the observation of human beings, act

ing in numbers sufficient to eliminate the influences which operate
"

by

808

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

nce of general ends

and ,im
all men with
the
an

though

"

IX

^<

<-o

to

^
"

>.

--

encc

;,

all

"-

,,
1

,1,,!,,:

,.!,,,,

uhi

t]

|)0

:
1

lth>

"

by which

nd uct these

T"

stijill|i

"

means
rS

much

les

obvious,
of these less .,,
K r
,

Uuit7 of action

,V^

tr aced

^^M^"^

-.IH,^,,,

,,

-Inch was found

before
proved by statist"
sciences,

-itUe

Analyxe
a"cl

sucli statistical

"

^^

(lo

""

variety and
the
5
868

"

of

caprice.
""^

^
IM^"^
he ol ct of
discussion in the

is

f*

a, e

Prtferei ..... and

ve
of *e
Will, but are
usually
val of time.

,lud^

;^;"""^
,

nity of our intellectual an

terizes those acts of
the ,
-

GSCUpe the

n a

is

at ail.

t ,

altogether, and

the

efforts,

and often cln

nnot
.

the

^^

vvith

va>t

no iJn

"

P^P

Jif

**

endoivments.
~ Wl h

It

tO the

charac-

**<**

"f

PreC6de
aCti n
b a conscious
iuter*"

"

^^"n
I()lu

I
1L

>

evidence ,!,,

other

Q
observers, and he cor e
0t these
^rvation a
apparent.
The events u""
h 8
aft
P roved to ^ecur
f
jear in nearly

Z l!l; ^

be

almost an
equal
be found

pmpo

ion

1",

Ut

Thus, the number of

l>y

itS^^Jn^Sn^

Petty thefts, cases of

a given
population^ art c hed
where it would be
st

a% m

springing from different motives an

s-

^"tain-

^^.^^ ^^
?
to

">

coLplel

mea

^^
"

lar

Th

Present

-v

speed or eagerness
To
on ends a
u tt mber of
undertaking of

"

the

to Means

are

"

what v
ay most probably be attained

? llich

"

"->

"

:r"r
men with each other
in

gle acts and special vol

Aiding nurno

"

JV

^r

Tor r" : ?ta

llot in

decree
,vid,,, o?

P ur P**> and corre-

^ TU
d

rnentof

expected

to

Ve

"^
"

1-ple,
asP ect
di

^-

"^^

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

309

produced them, the circumstances which excited these passions, the

quickness with which the determination was carried out, and the

means by which

the crowning act was perpetrated

The

lawyers,

a very imperfect analysis, distinguish at least halt a dozen

kinds of killing.
One man jumps overboard because crossed in
after

love

a clerk or trustee hangs himself because detected in embez

a gambler throws away life after fortune
a sentenced

zlement

criminal escapes the shame of a public execution

the prosperous
man destroys himself in a fit of insanity. Statistics which lump
;

together so dissimilar acts as these prove nothing as to the uniform

To hunt
sequence between volitions and their moral antecedents.

through the history of the world for one human act perfectly re
sembling another, not only in itself, but in the motives which pro
duced it, would be as bootless an undertaking as to take up the
challenge of Leibnitz, and seek on an oak tree for two leaves
which should be exact counterparts of each other. And yet the
Necessitarian claims uniformity of sequence between motives and
volitions as

"

a truth of experience

"

CHAPTER

XVII.

FrcnxE.

THE

Kant

general result of

Critical

Philosophy

is

that all

knowledge is limited and conditioned by experience.

We know
only phenomena, only that which appears.
15,,t bein- in itself
the real ground of that which
appears, the thin- as
is
apart troin
b ave
f;
"

its
"

manifestation to us

ult v
-

_
<e

given

we

factually

is

capable of grasping

Ve

absolutely incognizable
w hat transcends the sphere

be content with what is

given to us, and as it
There are inborn and
necessary principles of the

mu>t

to us.

human

understanding, synthetic co-nitions a priori, valid for all

experience, but valid on/,/ for experience.
And yet Kant is a
maintains that there are
I"

as they
really are; for

nonmcna, fy n(JC an

sick,

there must be a -round or basis

of
what is manifested to us under the forms of
space an,] time, and
in accordance with the
He is driven to this admisCategories.
by what he had conceded in the outset; that there is a re
ceptivity, as well as a spontaneity, of the human mind,
and, conse
quently, that there is something given to and received
by the mind
apart from its power of reacting upon and
modifying what is thus
f
nothing is, nothing would appear ; if there were no
reality, there would be no phenomenon, and
nothing to determine
why the object should appear thus, rather than otherwise. What
this noumeual
reality is, we do not know, and never can know.
Kant only asserts that it is we never can know
what it is, or how
if
i

i
it is.
.-

Then came Fichte, whose endeavor is to

sweep away even this
poor ghost of actual being, and to refashion Kant s broad but dis
cursive survey of the limitations of human
knowledge into a scienc and
rigorously demonstrated system of Idealism, or rather of
absolute Egoism
a system which is, in
fact, a combination of Spinozism and Berkeleyanism.
Fichte reduces the universe of exist
ence to one absolute and universal
Ego, which spins out in thought
an imaginary world and a finite and
particular Ego, only as a
;

311

FICHTE.

His system differs

two important respects first, as
it teaches idealism instead of realism
and, secondly, as it is an
the absolute and the uncon
of
a
establish
to
philosophy
attempt

means

of arriving at a consciousness of itself.

from that of Kant, therefore,

in

ditioned,

and thus

10

build

up dogmatism

again, in spite of the

Critique of Pure Reason," that

pretended demonstration in the
such an undertaking transcends the limits of the human intellect.
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (born 1762, died 1814) began his phil
"

a
osophical career by publishing, at the age of twenty-nine years,
book composed by him in four weeks, entitled a
Critique of all
It was an attempt to determine a priori, on the
Revelation."
"

whether
principles of the Critical Philosophy,

any special revela

from God to man is possible, and, if so, what must be its na
In other words, supposing the existence of a
ture and evidence.
God, and of a race of beings constituted and situated as we are,
the purpose is to determine whether it is conceivable that He
should make a special communication to His creatures; and, if so,
what must be its purport, and how the message could be authen
As the doctrines expressed were very similar to those of
ticated.
Kant, and as the work was first published anonymously, in 1791,
But he dis
it
was at first universally attributed to Kant himself.
avowed it by the complimentary remark, that he should have
deemed it an honor to be the author of so able a book and two
the same problem himself,
years afterwards, he attempted to solve
tion

Religion within the limits of

by publishing his treatise entitled
mere Reason." Both writers endeavor to expound that system of
Rationalism in religion, which is the only one consistent with the
"

Fichte s conclusion
principles of the Transcendental philosophy.
that if the doctrine which claims to be revealed from heaven

is,

more than the Moral Law, originally written in

our own hearts, it cannot be of divine origin if it be perfectly
coincident with that Law, it is useless, and can in no proper sense
be called a revelation.
Still, he says, we can conceive of a people
reduced by circumstances to so low a state, that even the wish to
comply with the dictates of conscience has either died out among
To such, a revelation authen
them, or has never been developed.

contains anything

by miracles may temporarily be of use, in order to awaken

a due sense of moral obligation,
to stun their senses into obedience, and to guide their first at
When they have advanced far enough in moral
tempts in virtue.
and religious culture to recognize the independent and imperative
Character of the law of conscience, there will no longer be any

ticated

among them, by awe and wonder,

312

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

need of

message from God, and their DOW enlightened intellects

percehe that the assumed evidence of its authenticity is
and baseless.
The general doctrine of Rationalism
that
:i

will soon
illusive

is,

religion is only a sort of moral go-cart; the natural development

of the child s own powers soon enables it to walk alone.

Compared with other works

of the same class, Fiehte s

Cri
has high merits in point of execution.
It attracted notice
by a Titanlike audacity of speculation, which seemed to aim at
scaling the heavens and prescribing limits to
Of
"

"

tique

Omnipotence.

course, the

work

over with the formidable

terminology
oi its school; but in
point of clearness, precision, and brevity, it is
far superior to the
The conduct of the argu
writings of Kant.
ment throughout is marked by severe logic and admirable
arrange
ment.
The style is dry. as the nature of the subject demands;
in
but
treating of the theory of morals, and especially in develop
ing his pure and lofty conception of absolute right, the writer
kindles with his theme, and the
argumentation, though still severe,
swells

into

bristles all

and impressive, eloquence.

chaste

reputation, which

it

established for

its

The

well-merited

author, was the

means of

procuring for him, in 17 ,). !, a professorship of philosophy at the

university of Jena, a situation which rescued him from the ex
treme poverty which seems to have been the common doom of the
1

great thinkers of Germany during the earlier portions of their

career.
Here, the first year after his appointment, he published
his
Wissenschaft slehre, or
Theory of Science," the first sketch of
a system of philosophy which
controverted the
of
"

really

Kant, though

principles

professed only to carry them out to their farthest

consequences, to reduce them to rigorous precision and method,
and thereby to erect in stately architecture a
system of human
knowledge upon a foundation as broad and sure as that which
it

Euclid constructed for geometry.

lie who studies the Wissenschaftslehre will not find his progress impeded, as in the case of

Kant s Critique," by any marked defects of style. Fichte is a

good writer, distinct, concise, and forcible but he abuses his power
of strict argumentation and abstract
His work is as arid
thought.
and forbidding as the desert of Sahara. It is a tour de
force
of abstruse and repulsive
If first published in
metaphysics.
any
other country than Germany, it would never have found a reader.
"

shall not attempt any

exposition of
to penetrate so far into the

enough

discern us

it

at full length.

prominent characteristics, and make

bearing and tendency.

It will

system that the reader

out

its

be

may

general

313

FICHTE.

Every

must have one fundamental

particular science, says Fichte,
which all its conclusions are based, or to which they

principle, on

can be traced back.

undertake

to

prove

This one principle the science itself cannot

must be taken for granted, as certain, be

it

there must be some universal science, whose office

demonstrate the fundamental principles of all the par
human
ticular sciences, and thereby to build up the edifice of all
in all its parts, firmly
coherent
one
into
structure,
knowledge
bolted together, uniform in its development, and self-consistent
This universal science, therefore, will be the Theory
throughout
or the Science of Sciences, because it will
of Science in

Then

forehand.
it

will be to

be the

common

general,
foundation, of which they are the superstructure.

its own fundamental principle,

it must have
cannot be
nothing lying behind or above it,
of
means
ultimate
the
be
must
proving every
for as it
without rea
it cannot be deduced from any other truth

Moreover,

like them,

which, as

there

proved

is

thing else,
soning in a circle.

And yet it must in some manner be established ;

we
arch would be without its keystone
the
scientific
otherwise,
should have the particular sciences resting each on its own funda
mental principle, these principles collectively on the Wissenschaftsscience based on its own first axiom, but this
lehre, this universal
a mere
this corner-stone of all science, resting on nothing,
;

axiom,

To say that we must begin by taking at least

baseless assumption.
one such principle for granted, is to give up all pretension of being

and to proceed arbitrarily, according to our own good

and pleasure. To affirm that this ultimate principle shines
as not to need any proof, is only to say
by its own light, so
and this would
be thus self-guarantied
us
to
to
that it appears
it would be
it only phenomenal or apparent validity;
be
were
it
if
Even
innate, or a
not
true
true for its, but
absolutely.

scientific,

will

<>iving

structure of our minds, it does not follow that

part of the original
for we have not yet proved the existence
it must be, authoritative
the validity of all innate principles.
less
much
Sell
or
.Mind
of
as the rival
It is evident, therefore, that Fichte came forward
;

of

the

in
Descartes, having the same end in view which was proposed
Discourse on Method," adopting similar means for the ac
of this end, and, as we shall soon see, in the initial

complishment

at precisely the same results as those

steps of his system, arriving
It is merely a difference of
established by his French predecessor.
not founded on any divergence of thought, to say that

language,
Fichte by taking
Descartes began by doubting every thing, and
two
the
of
The
systems was the
purpose
uothing for granted.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
same, namely, to find a corner-stone which
should be steadfasl md
not based on
anything else, because needino7o support
Immovable,

w
h
whole

^^

aDd

"

S"
^

f 8ervi
as a f UDd "^ on wj
knowledge might securely rest.
Can
n ted
Cl1
s elf-evident and
W!

fr
human

fabric of
,

"*

"

^^

"

unque7tionlt lhichl k
also a

rcc

fruj^

cl"

y elicited from

it,

or be traced back to

it

as the

tneir confirmation?

t^l!!

uhimate mean

If such there be then tl

1
Relativity of Knowledge, which is much in
vogue at* t
Lsent
ay-n-nst be abandoned.
It would be diHicuh to
iind two
p Ho
hers more unlike each other in
their
s and
characters, their
pursuits, and the general tendencies of
their intellect
ha
Des
cartes and Fichte.
were trained in
>

tas<

They
wholly dissimilar choo
and approach,! the
problem in opposite direcnon, B
arrived at the same result.
Both teach tha. the central
truth
hereforeof all human
Is the I*.
^
knowledge,
elf, the indivisible and
consequently immaterial Ego of

of thought,

t^y
isten

TsT

15-it
I
go back to Fichte s own
exposition of the manner in
which he arrived at this conclusion.
We have to scare h
tl e
"

"

10116
f huma
k
Prlndple
^dge
ct^t I,,,
cannot
oe proved,
^"r
for there is
behind or above it -it
nothing
nn , K, determined for
there is
nothing to limit it or render
;a
finite
It cannot be an
fact of
17

Itt
.

mus

empirical

be

consciousness, for

it

bought as the basis of all the truths of

consciousness
1
there be any such
principle, it must be that the very act of
it constitutes its
affirming
existence and its proof.
It must be a
the act of
affirming and the truth affirmed, the action and the
result ol the
activity, the truth cognized and the act of
nix , t
both ,n one
It must be what Fichte
calls a
a let
Thathandlung,
action.
Every other truth may be divided
by abstraction
to
two parts, its matter or
content, and its form -that is, somethin
whereof we know, and that which we
know
that
""7

co<

thing.

so,!

respecting

For

instance, to adopt Fichte s own illustration

proportion "gold is a metal," the matter or
content is
and "metal;
for about these we
OIie

tTtedTTi
u!

of the
a tese
judgment,, is,
these two in a
s, that
tha
Id
a meta1 so that

come before

all

>\

other

"

tt
s
Wissenschaftslehre
J

the

""old

know; and what we know of

ceran

Form

them, or the

in

Tf
BUt
is

can

the abS lute f ^amental

to be the

ground of

all

SS

principle of

certainty,

and

to

knowledge, no Matter o , Content can be

pre

315

FICHTE.

viously given to it about which to know ; but what we know, or

the Form, must constitute that respecting which we know, or the
Matter and the reverse. Its Form must determine its Content,
;

Content must determine its Form. And this is only repeat

what
was said before, that it must be a Thathandlung, the act
ing
In other words,
of knowing and the truth known, both in one.
the fundamental principle of all our knowledge must necessarily
that is, it must
be a formal and a material principle, both at once
be not merely an abstract Form or Rule, which fashions into unity
the Matter of our thought, this Matter being given to us from
without, but it must be a productive power, which, from itself, first
and at the same
gives us the Matter or elements of the knowledge,
time, and in the same act, moulds and fashions this Matter, bring
Let us then try to find such a
ing it into a determinate Form.
since it can only be found
fundamental principle, or fact-action
anil its

"

"

by experiment.
Let us first take the

A=

A, or the equiv
admit to be abso
in itself, without any ground or
is, certain
and by admitting thus much, every one
reason for its certainty
ascribes to himself the power of absolutely affirming something.
But by so doing in this case, he acquires only the Form of knowl
For the proposition,
edge, without any Matter or Content.
exists, either as its
is, or even that
A, does not tell us ivhat

alent expression,
lutely certain, that

is

identical proposition,

A, which everybody

will

"

subject or

its

predicate.

only affirms

It

"

posits

is

the tech

is, then it is
only posits that, if
In technical phrase, then, the proposition is uncondi
equal to A.
Thus we
tioned or absolute in Form, but conditioned in Matter.

nical

term for affirming

it

not as yet anything

only affirm absolutely an act of knowing, but
But even to affirm only an act
about which this act is conversant.
for an act is impossible
is to affirm that / know
of

knowing,
without an actor

To adopt Fichte s lan

a deed requires a doer.
is affirmed between
connection
at
as
in
so
far,
least,
any
guage,
as predicate, that connection is posited in and
as subject and
;

through the

In short, every thought, because

Ego."

and as
requires a thinker
thought, there must be an
;

A=

the proposition,
Ego who thinks it;

it is

A,

is

an

act,

certainly

not necessarily

but
your Ego, nor my Ego, for as yet it is perfectly indeterminate
Egoity and individuality, the
only a thinker, a universal Ego.
ideas.
pure Ego and the empirical Ego, are entirely different
The same reasoning may be more clearly stated as follows
;

In the proposition,

= A,

the

first

A, which

is

the

Subject,

is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

..gig

it
// A *, then
only affirmed conditionally.
is afl.rmed
Predicate,
the
is
second \, which

hTcndi

ion

fulfilled, then,

is

Now

the second

beyond
what is

all
it

is

=A

But

absolute!)

-which

acts,

judges,

must
first
question, the
which brings these two
.

here

the

foi

it is

nU-

hi,

a.Urms and constitutes

I myself.

is the Ego
it
between them? Evidently
the
you remove
take away the relation
and
Eo,
you
awavthe
the
Then, above
propotwo terms -you cancel the proposition.
a higher
as it appears to be, there is
founded
well
V
n
A,
known namely, the act, and
a truth more immediately
;

tion

Then
proposition Ego
Ego.
eeforethe
and in Form.
in
Matter
both
- -Voorl -VM.is unconditional
the

existence, of the

Li

,,

as

vv

t.

Htionally,
as_
l.-o. i im,
This ,),-?
i
iudgment, then, Ego
1T
Her,
condition -hatsoever
no
on
truth. dependent
>/J
wl noli
o
the absolute fundamental principle
then, we have
al ,,ther
which
on
that
all
of
certainty,
leTe in search, the ground

Ego, or subject,
Prrn Ol
nr 1)1
im-dicate
CUIL.IH
cppniKi IVO.

The

affirmed

is

on nothing else it
itself, depends
depends, but which,
this
and
depends upon
Every other cogniuon implies

one, which

The
fore I

the highest of

is

question

self-conscious

became

I was not
affirm

The Ego

I.

n"

all.

has been asked,

that

says

I.

w, only so far as

the

\\

Fichte,

The answer

is,

it

Ego posits itself

from southing which

am

cLS2gubhed

is

lut

was not

be

at a

conscious

1,

for

itself.

without needing to be
is

not-itself

for

One is
is identical with the subject
ment, the predicate
th s iu
And
further,
as the other.
same
the
Ego
affil-med to be absolutely
what I *., you assume the existfalrely ob^rved, by asking
of
the reality of Time, the existence
llcl oil pall and therefor,
ou
what
assume
}
If you did not
vhTch has not yet been proved.
of Time, you
for granted, namely, the reality
take
to
have

Vo

rigt

iy

tru

M * c^

h.

aso

knowledge would
of
knowledge;
fundamenta principle
I
-less
I know it tha t is,
not be know/edge, unless
ex^as
from
myself
and, by contradsinguishing
tl^e
subject knowing,
own existence. Here we liave, i
since

all

L-nnwn

ilfirm

f 0^;,^
..nnirv

t
"

-he

Itolute

for

it

my

which "*.
"t.^hole edifice of science
all knowlThe E^o is a necessary element of

more

absolutely Unconaiuoneu, or,

to anything else,
is out of relation

is

briefly,

thus indepen-

611

FICHTE.

it exists merely by
dent of every thing, and self-existent, because
As I have said, it is not my Ego, nor your Ego,
itself.
for as yet, there is no distinction be
in

affirming
iior

anyEgo

particular

tween me and you, but whoever

Any

alone in the universe.

posits the

Ego,

is

that Ego, and

is

other existence can be known only

else. This alone exists merely

by distinguishing it from something

and is perfectly indeterminate, be
by affirming its own existence,
It posits only its own
from
nothing.
cause it i:T distinguished
It is created from
that
of
virtue
it
is
and
positing.
bein",
by
science must be
of
fabric
nothing but every thing in the whole
is a mere self-devel
All
it.
from
knowledge
created or
developed

opment
in

my

of the

thought.

am

Ego.
""This

exists only
every thing, and every thing

absolute Idealism, or rather

is

Egoism and

Pantheism both in one.

What can be said of such a monstrous system as this,^except
a marvel of rigorous
that it is very curious and ingenious, and is
argumentation and
very closely resembles,

Like Spinozi.m, which it

an exaggerated and one-sided devel

abstract thought?

opment

of

it

Cartesianism.

is

It

is

really all

contained in the

Descartes says, Skepticism itself cannot

think, therefore I am."
and when I
doubt the existence of thought, for doubt is thought ;^
the existence of a thinker,
secured
thus
am.
I
Having
think,
this thinker s mind,
Descartes proceeds from one of the ideas in
the existence of
to
nite
iirst,
inh
and
prove,
being,
that of a perfect
the trustworthiness
a God, and then, through the veracity of God,
the existence of other
of our faculties, whereby we are assured of
real
a
of
universe, such as
and
beside
ourselves,
human beings
Thus, out of the abyss of
these faculties make known to us.
the
thoroughgoing skepticism, out of doubting every thing except
up
to consciousness, Descartes works his
of
presence

thought

by

proved by

^way

that is witnessed
to a full conviction of the reality of every thing
it is
his
In
truth,
or
system, because
sense
logic.

than

self-consistent throughout, is more complete and satisfactory

who came after
that of any of the philosophers of the Absolute
back from the veracity of God, he estab
him for
;

by reasoning

which all
the validity of those original laws of thought on
successors are compelled to
His
German
reasoning depends.
of the Iirst prin
assume, without proof, this trustworthy character
a step towards
take
not
could
otherwise
since
they
ciples of logic,
half way along
Fichte
a
only
proceeds
theory.
^with
building up
lishes

According to him, every judg

an act of thought establishing the relation be

Descartes, and then stops short.

ment, because

it is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
without positing the ex
tween a subject and a predicate, though
ami
actor or thinker
an
of
the
;

reality
istence of either, assures
existence by an act of self-consciousness;
this Ivro posits its own
needs no confirmation be
I am
since the identical judgment,
Hut Fichte refuses
itself.
in
certain
yond itself, but is absolutely
lie will not -admit the Cartesian
farther,
to carry the system any
to
of a God, after the merciless criticism
argument for the being
he therefore leaves Ins
and
Kant;
which it had been subjected by
absolute, impersonal, and inconceiv
Ecro alone in the universe, an
to show how the
able Bein"; or rather, he proceeds by attempting
its own consciousness an imag
of
the
of
out
depths
evolves
I,"

Ivro
an ideal universe, peopled with
inary non-Ego, and thereby
j,
it
is the only means whereby
existence
beings, whose imagined
relative
or
suppose,!
can become conscious of its own individuality,

and limited existence.

brought be
llr.v then, we have the grave question distinctly
(,er
or
Solipsismus, as the
fore us whether Absolute Idealism,
ot philosophy.
sufficient
and
system
a
is
tenable
mans now call it.

As

and the certainty

this

the origin the nature,

inquiry into
we
are
compelled to adopt
knowledge,

the result of the prolonged

of

human

universe, both ot mind and

lamentable conclusion, that the
fabric of a vision,

mere dream

only the baseless

thinker?
the thought of a solitary and impersonal
floating before
Monistic
scheme,
which
in
every
the abyss of nothingness
This
inev
"

matter,

is

i"

every

"Philosophy

itably terminates/

of the

out

if logically earned
of Absolute Idealism must he sharply

Absolute,"

system
Idealism which is
from the modified and partial
The essence of the forhis followers.
and
taught by Berkeley
Alkinheit ; that Plurality even
meris Monism, or the doctrine of
since all real
is only phenomenal,
Dualism,
as
in its earliest stage,

distinguished

mode ot its presenta

revival of the Lleatic
a
only
tion, there is no
Parmenides taught the same system
and
school; Xenophanes
But the modified Idealism of
ago.
nearly three thousand years
the existence of other mite minds
Berkeley, distinctly recognizing
and of the Infinite
outside of the thinker s individuality,
teaches the plurality or
them
in
all,
mirrored

being

is

absolutely one.

novelty in

Except
it

it

in

the

is

Mmd

which

is partially
matter from
individual being and eliminates
multiplicity of
to be the
,
then
and
holding
universe onlv by spiritualizing it,
then, Berkeleyanspeaking,
Strictly
of
reality.
tvpe and essence"
but Spiritualism, since it teaches
ism should not be called Idealism,
in countless forms to our
as
presented
the reality of a Non-Ego

319

FICHTE.

thought, though these forms or manifestations are not corporeal

It was a gross blunder of the
spiritual objects.

objects, but

Scotch school, of good Dr. Reid and his followers, to regard Berke
in itself, or as tending indirectly to
ley s system as skeptical
skeptical conclusions.
It

is

objection enough to any system of Absolute (subjective)

like that of Fichte, that it does not reach the end in
it stops far short of
it leaves the problem only half solved
which philosophy was instituted in order to

IdeOism,
viev

the very purpose

Even

accomplish.
into

if

we adopt

mere dream,

the

resolve all
its conclusion, and
mystery of the universe, as pre

things
For
sented to our thought, remains just as inscrutable as ever.
tJiis particular dream, rather
the question immediately arises,
other ?
th:iii
Granted, if you will, that the universe is only

Why

ft

any
phantom, and that there

eyes that

it

no speculation, no reality, in those

it must be admitted, that it is a
phantom, intricate and far-reaching, with count

does glare with.

perfectly definite

is

Still

and attributes, all artistically arranged, fitted to each

It may be a mere dream ; but
other and jointed into one whole.
consistent dream, not a mere
it is an extensive, orderly, and
in a sick
jumble of incoherent fancies, like those crowded together
man s brain. Still less is it of excessive simplicity and indefiniteness, a mere Non-Ego, as it is presented by Fichte, with no char
less parts

a mere Anstoss, or point of resistance external

by impinging on which the Ego is first waked up to a
The
consciousness of its own distinct and individual existence.
bloodless and featureless Non-Ego, which alone this system is able
to conjure up, advances us hardly a step in our attempt to under
stand the mystery even of a dream-creation, such as is actually

acteristics at all

to thought,

Even Fichte s elaborate evolution of

presented to our thought.
the Kantian Categories from the depths of the Ego s thought does
not help him, and brings him hardly an inch nearer a solution of
for these Categories of quantity, quality, relation,
the problem
etc., are still lofty and vague abstractions, without one particular
;

element, and so incapable of giving definite dimensions,

Fichte s
shape, or color to a single phenomenon in the universe.
conception of the Non-Ego is that of a completely empty and in
izing

definite Object, the only office of which is to put a limit upon the
Ego there is nothing to be perceived in this Object, except that
;

Such a Non-Ego affords no expla

opposed to the Subject.
nation whatever of the universe either as it really is, per se, or as
it
either as a noumenon, or as a
appears to the human mind ;

it

is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

320

The system

phenomenon.

of Absolute Idealism, therefore logia

profitless
it be, is as idle and

though
cally dovetailed together

(.1

speculation

as the perverted ingenuity

to it was strongly

man

ever put to-

liei.

urged by Schelling
Another objection
the Ego and fo the
doctrine, that every thing exists only through
and for our boasthuman
for
one
pride,
is Indeed a flattering
,ut it is
ourselves
on
ful feeling that we are dependent solely
and when do
its assumption
in
Thrasonic and overweening
1->

examined,

its

extravagant

are revealed in their true

pretensions
hat the
it is true
For

though
so
only
through me, and
oi
conscious
myself in
and as I am

and baseless.
character, as arbitrary
outer world exists

only/- me and

as I also exist along with

it,

exist and am
is also true, that I
doing; the counter proposition
world also
outer
the
condition of
conscious that / am, solely on
as
not
by
creation,
produced
not as my
already existing beside me,
for that consciousnes
me, but as the indispensable prerequisite
wine h on y ac
and that affirmation of my own existence, through
that he O bjec
Granted,
cording to Fichte, 1 first become myself.
the Subject
that
is it not equally evident,
depend, on the Subject
wit)
conceived
be
cannot
one
the
and that
depends on the Object,
cannot be separate,
terms
correlative
two
The
out the other?
the relation between the n
even for a moment, without destroying
this
1 need not dwell upon
Hut
both.
annihilating
and
;

thereby
of Spellings own system
here; since the divergence
this point, and theref
at
from that of Fichte begins precisely
hereafter.
consideration
for
come
will
up
the

criticism

subject

the abso.
of the process whereby
of a poi
consciousness
a
at
arrives
according to Fichte,

Let us now trace a few steps

lute

Eo,

to itself an imagEgo. through opposing

mdicate some o
to
shall
only attempt,
Lry Non-Ego. Here, 1
his
and the general character o
the peculiarities of his method,
Is of an abstiuse
deta
the
with
the reader
results, without wearying
without prolonged
-stem which could not be made intelligible
t
this necessary law of thoug
have
I
explained
already
discussion.
it to be what it is, only
know
or
that we can determine an object,
Thus we can know the
it from what it is not.
by distinguishing
a
it from blue gieen
color red to be red, only by distinguishing
b
to
is
This law of thought
red.
some other color different from
Observe also the
with reference to all that follows.
mind
in
kept
method,, and
and
the
synthetic
of
analytic
method, a combination
whereby,
mentioned,
of thought just
the complement of the law

sonul and determinate

beginning

datum oi consciousn
with a single and indeterminate

321

FICHTE.

resolves it into two opposite or contradictory notions or

judgments, and then, by a higher act of synthesis, reconciles this
contradiction, and unites the two opposites into a richer and more
determinate notion.
Then, repeating the analysis of this last
result into two other opposites, another synthesis of these produces
Ficlite

and so on indefinitely, thus constructing

a brill higher cognition
a priori the whole fabric of science out of a single fundamental
all the data
principle, instead of collecting empirically, like Kant,
aid categories, and setting them down in mere juxtaposition. This
;

method of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, which Hegel

borrowed from Ficlite, improved and developed it as the
immanent logic of the Idea, and made it the keynote, indeed, of his
whole metaphysical system. It may be not inaptly symbolized by
a magnetic iron bar, with its north and south poles, and point of
Break this in two at its
indifference half way between them.
central point, and forthwith you have two magnets, each complete,
Hence this method
with its opposite poles and indifferent centre.
It
has been called by some
really depends upon
polar logic."
this curious law of thought, that two contradictories, like any two
correlative terms, are really grasped and apprehended by one act
of thought; and this for a good reason; because what is really
thought in such a case, is, not the two terms, but the one relation
between them. Thus, we may draw two straight lines, not paral
lel to each other, on the blackboard, and we cannot tell whether
the

soon

"

Really they are both

they are convergent or divergent.

yet the

two terms are contradictories. In like manner, a curved line is

both convex and concave, though these two terms contradict each
I dwell on this curious law of thought, because he who
other.
understands

it

Schelling, and

has taken a long step towards understanding Ficlite,

Hegel and, I may add, if he fully understands it,
;

towards refuting

But

to

all

three.

return to Ficlite

indeterminate,

that

is,

not

as yet

we have only

defined

or

limited

the absolute Ego,

by any attribute

whatsoever, but which exists merely by affirming its existence

this gives us the category of being, or reality, though not yet
being in
distinguished from any other being, so that it is only
This Ego, existing only by an act
or in the abstract.
general,"
;

and

"

is
nothing but pure and infinite activity;
because
not as yet limited or restrained by any
say,
As the first exertion of this activity, and
other being whatsoever.
likewise as the first step towards self-determination, the Ego posits,
or affirms the existence of, another being or activity over against

of self-affirmation,
finite,"

"in

21

322

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

itself, which is not itself, and therefore is a

Non-Ego. At first, I
only know that I am but I begin to know u-hat I am, as soon as I
can distinguish myself from something which I am not
that is,
from a Non-Ego, a Not-Self.
This can be logically done for the
;

"

judgment

am

"

gives,

by the well-known

procedure,
contraposition through infinitation, this other judgment,
am not
not-I."
Stated more simply,
am not not-I," the second funda
mental principle of the Wissenschaftskfire, is an immediate and
per
I am
This second allirmation,
fectly logical inference from
therefore, is just as absolute or unconditioned as the former one.
logical

"I

"I

"

I."

lint observe
ter, for

the

that

it

is

unconditioned in

Form

only; not in

Mat

posited by the Ego, and can be known

only under condition of knowing the Ego:
just as "not-red"
can be known only through what
red
invertebrate
is,

Non-Ego

is

"

"

"

"

only through
Already, then, we have Idealism, or
rather Egoism, firmly established; for the
Non-Ego is, so to
speak, only the creature of the Ego, can be known only by know
ing the Ego, is thus dependent upon the
and, in fact, cannot
"

vertebrate."

Ego,

be cognized at

all

except as the opposite or contradictory of the

According to the logic of contraposition, whatever belongs

Ego, the contradictory of it must belong to the Non-Ego.
The universe and God, for instance, are only forms of the Non-

Ego.

to the

Ego, and, as such, are but developments or creations of the ab

solute Ego, which is the principle or
beginning of all things, ex
plaining

all,

affirming

informing his class

the

P>go

We
thesis,

all,

The story is told of Fichte

creating all.
the next lecture, he should show how

that, in

creates God.

now have two fundamental principles, a thesis and an anti

the Ego absolutely posited, and the
Non-Ego absolutely

^posited, the latter being obtained by a process of analysis, or

But they contradict each other,
self-diremption, from the former.
and we need a third fundamental principle, to make a synthesis of
the two, in such a manner as to cancel their
opposition, and re

two into a higher notion. As yet, the two are opposites,

so that they cannot exist together.
If we posit the one, we sublate the other.
If an absolute Ego exists, there cannot be a Nonsolve the

Ego

and

if

we assume an

How

absolute

Non-Ego, we destroy the idea

can being and non-being, reality and negation,

be thought together without mutual destruction ?
They must mu
But in limitation, the category of quan
tually limit each other.
for to limit
tity is already implied
anything is to deny the
of
a
of
not of the whole ; we deny a part of
only
it,
reality
part
of the Ego.

323

FICHTE.
it,

we

affirm

Therefore, the notion of limit in

the other part.

so reconciles, the notions of reality and nega

tion, (thus completing Kant s second table of Categories, Reality,
and Limitation,) and also includes the idea of divisibil

cludes in

itself,

and

Negation,
In this manner arises our third fundamental principle, ex
ity.
In the Ego, I oppose to the divisible Ego
pressed in this formula
Now the two opposites are identical in a
a divisible Non-Ego."
portion of their marks or attributes, so that they no longer wholly
"

contradict each other

on the other hand, there

is

ground for

dis

has some marks or attri

tinguishing the two, inasmuch as each
Of course, as each
butes which are not possessed by the other.
becomes limited, it ceases to be absolute but so far as it is lim
;

Omnis debecomes determinate, and thereby knowable.

I begin to know what I am, as soon as I
terminatio est negatio.
know what I am not but as soon as there is anything which I
am not, I cease to be absolute. Thus, I know at least one attri

ited,

it

when

bute of myself, namely, spirituality,

know

that I

am

not

and thereby determines, the

On the other hand, by this same act, I begin to know mat
Ego.
so far as
ter, as it now appears that it is not mind, or spirit ; and
it is thus known, the Non-Ego is limited and determined by the
So far as you and he are represented in my consciousness,
Ego.
an imaginary or ideal Nonyou are a part of my Non-Ego
For all the Non-Ego merely exists and is de
Ego, observe
But so far as I distinguish myself, though
veloped by the Ego.
a de
only in thought, from you and him, I know myself better as
I enter the
terminate personality, as one man among other men.

matter.

Here

the

Non-Ego

limits,

in thought, the realm of

only a phenomenal and unreal, an ideal,
world for you, and he, and all other outward things, are only
phantoms in my imagination and when philosophy brushes away
this universe of shadows, my personal being falls back into the

world of phenomena as soon as I leave,

the Absolute.

But

it is

all, the universal Mind.

unnecessary to pursue the development of the theory far
The third fundamental principle again resolves itself, on

Absolute, the one and

It is

ther.

analysis, into these

Ego

1. The NonThe Ego determines or

former, the Ego appears

two contradictory propositions

determines or limits the

Ego

2.

According to the
and so far as its thoughts are shaped
as passive, as acted upon
and modified by impressions made upon its senses from the phe
nomenal world without, it is cognitive and, therefore, this is the

limits the

Non-Ego.

principle of theoretic knowledge.

According to

the

latter,

the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

304

the Ego is active, and the Moral

which does not co mo
consciousness,
an element of its
inmost being, be
without, but from our own
to us from the world
creates
former
The
principle
comes the law of the universe.
one can build up a sysEthics.
Any
the latter generates
The development
of the polar logic.
1)0t ,i by the method
t,m o

Ego determining

the

Non-Ego,

own

2w
"

need not here be caned

he theoretic and cognitive principle
brief consideration
satisfied with a very
father; and we maybe
doctrine
ethical
Fichte s
of the peculiarity of
of the
the grandeur and independence
s conception of
ln
of
his
of
application
Law. and in the rigor and severity
Mo
and perhaps
Fichte
equals,
the
and
life,
this law to the heart
as we have
In order to create knowledge,
surpasses, Kant.
an object, the
and
up
conjures
the E-o imposes limits upon itself,
and
determining its
of restricting
Non-Ecro, for the very purpose
On the
and
finite
is
dependent.
So far, then, it

own
oU

acUvitv.

just

so far

the

as

Ego

he very act of affirming its

Inddtrefore infinite and eternal.
th o u- h

is

is

the Absolute, creating itsef

own

existence,

it is

at

causa

sui,

the same

Consequently,
both finite
both dependent and independent,
itself determining
and
the
!
Object,
|,y

\\Y cannot reconcile this contradicas intellect, the

e Object altogether; for,
outside of itIt needs something
awakened to
be
it
r
on which
may
is. to
recognize the
Tit-, only resource
but also to
r nnl Object as limiting,
it is not alsothat
oriainal freedom and spontaneity;
ct<

[.

t,

i-ul

therefore

its

own pure

activity

is

always

825

FTCHTE.

can never be perfectly carried out over all obstacles, the

striving is directed not towards the actual world, or the universe
as it is, which is dependent on the activity of the Non-Ego, but
pose

towards the world as

it,

would

be,

lutely created through and by the

ideal

world and

"When

the

Ego

to

all

if

Ego

reality in

that

is, it

were abso
turned to an

it
is

acting in conformity to an ideal end and aim.

and hampered

finds itself limited

in

this its effort,

a longing and an aspiration.

If its action is
conformed to this aspiration, there is created within it a feeling
of contentment and self-approbation
if otherwise, it has a sense
of uneasiness and discontent
the Ego becomes aware that it is at

there arises in

it

variance with itself.

But since that feeling of self-content does
not spring from the accomplishment of any definite external ob
ject, but depends upon the agreement and harmony of the Ego
with itself, the ideal impulse has its end and aim within itself.
It
is an absolute
a
or
and
its
for
own
sake
impulse,
impulse
longing
;

or

if

we regard

which aims only

it

to

as a law,

assert

its

it

is

an absolute law, a

own sovereignty

it is

command

a Categorical

Imperative.

Here, then,

we

reach the point of union between Fichte s ethi

it is not
necessary to carry the
The philosophy of the Wissenschaftslehre, both
exposition farther.
in its purely speculative
principles, and in the theory of morals
cal

system and that of Kant, and

which

is founded
upon them, owes most of its interest and impor
tance to the effect which it produced upon the subsequent course

of speculation in Germany,
the character and life of

and

to

the light which

Eichte himself.

it casts
upon
Both Schelling and

Hegel, with their numerous disciples and coadjutors, built in the

his foundations, worked by his method, and carried out
to their remotest
consequences the principles which he established.
The logical filiation of doctrine which binds together the systems
of these three great thinkers,
together with their common obliga
tions to Kant, forms an instructive
chapter in the history of the

main upon

natural development of thought.

seems

to

me

still

more

attractive

But

when

the philosophy of Eichte

is regarded as a
key to

it

the story of his life.

Harsh, abstruse, and forbidding in its outer
form, it is warmed and lighted up within by the glow of intense
As
feeling and conviction which was characteristic of the man.
perfectly as in Spinoza s case, his conduct illustrated his principles,
He seems like
theory was the outgrowth of his character.

his

one of the old Stoics in the loftiness of his aims, in the

rigor of
his thought, and in the
severity of the demands which he made

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

steeled

the school of

i,,

service of Ins inTel lee

bis

><""

or

Pose,

nuule hin
of

"n,n.-.,rs

When

No tf

",

-iHat^n

>

Ps

of

the feet of
of heart or
hope hut ^
I
*piru of ,h,.
u V

NapZn.
,

!,

the

for th ..... re,

German

Berlin
ul;u ,, mlm

^o

iVv

and

he"

iD S

I-

spirit of

"^

Pl

t!

1!ul

P""

1<ldlt(!

^^
^

hu-

her at
uot a jot

1):lt(><1

his efforts

to

rouse the

of

oppressor

r^T-

^f

countrJS?.
IIU
n ble "Cresses
to
the ACaderaic theatl
e at
"

n,

ki

"

Ili1

ri

"

27th of

ll

hou h

philoso

an

ra]

"

Ot

sick

in

Hve

the

Same CaUS6
FiC Ue

Uie

January, 1814.

"

at,

:
"

to wit

pop"

ess

>^

k the fever

tO

It

"

t7husLsT

^ -

military hosra c2ed an

^ dedaed
T^^

<

Sr 7?^

ih

ded on

!7;

attending

No more

yoke.

6 h :UlS

a Tn his
that

Hmated

"

War

Nation"

in th

Jt

the

C IlduCt

hand Or the left

which his "atare was in-

miremi

:;:!;:;:^^
wa

his

^^

"?.

h; 808 alfhad
^
ln tui ;^; ^"t::;
^A
Whil,
triumph
V
the

tlu- final

from

^Iment

US

*^

^ Pr-

i,:

eloquent voice than his

men

^
LTttl

<lu

at the

in-....-..,,,,.

ff

f r

"

liis fix

hi8 plh he
heT^,
f llo ed
T
^

Hi,

6ff0rtS

"I

hosen

a fanatic or a
martyr to
seemed to ],i,n a i, reli
capable.

**?

]S

wi]]

aslll

"

he h ;u , once

Il is 8tr
being.
Unreser

et/dtwZ^-f .^"r
from

men

fen

le

>

should be
doctrille8

the

same

CHAPTER

XVIII.

THB PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE

WH

SCHELLING.

of the
followed the promulgation
strange consequences

"

know

this he
and the absolute.
the supersensual, the infinite,
^11
strict
method,
that
rigorous
i
h.,,1
nrromnlished by
i

?;:r;:

i.

T,>

r,t

p, S al,le

i,n

>t

olt

rrulw.ui .^

^ ^y *

Wms

the title of one of

the lanua"e which forms
0.
haTlaid
he
be thought

i*-

"Prolegomena

for every system of

mctaphy,^e

"

atc^denta! metaphysie,

And

this far-reach.og

cs

luch

en erpnse

a time, even to others, to be

met -th almost
soon as it became known,
Philosophy, as
Not only were his results acknowledged,
were adopted
nd metL even his terminology,
s
successful.

,,ne-irca for
fc

ZTrrS
aud

eopU;

schools of
extent, ia all the
and, to a considerable

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

328

Germany, as well as wherever speculative

home, they reign paramount to this hour.

science

has found a

man! Kant had, as it

IJiit ho\v vain are the expectations of
were, thrown out a challenge to the whole thinking world, to com
conditions, and still to establish, on an inexpugnable
ply with his
and should
baVis. a philosophy which should transcend experience,
realm of
the
lies
which
world
the
of
secrets
beyond
reveal the
Ile>h

And

and sense.

within

of

forty years after the publication

three great thinkers, Fichte. Schclthe

Critique of Pure Keason."
least within Kant s own lifetime,
at
of
them
two
and
He^el.
liiiL;-.
had taken up his gauntlet, and worked out, each in his own way
:ind in full

compliance, as

seemed, with the severest conditions of

it

science, a complete Philosophy of the Absolute.

to add a fourth name to the list, that of Arthur

ought
Perhaps
Schopenhauer, a
I

of greater literary anility than either of the illustrious three

and offensive in his tone
mentioned,
certainly more arrogant
just
in
19,
whose
and
than they,
metaphysical system, tirst published
forced its
though overlooked or neglected for many year-, at last
wav into general notice and reputation shortly before the authors

man

1<S

death, and

now admitted

is

literature of

Germany,

countries in the world.

of

"Teat

note

the

a front rank in

to

richest,

in

this

Four Philosophies

the

philosophical
all the

department of

the Absolute, each

of

and importance, and numbering a vast crowd

of

within forty years of the time when Kant sol

disciples in its day,
he had demonstrated any such science to be
that
announced
emnly
since the time of Aristotle, the man has not
And
impossible.
lived who had a better right to put forth so lofty a pretension

than Immanuel Kant.

sketch
In the last chapter, I endeavored to present an outline
within
of the earliest of these systems, that of Fichte, published
Critique, of Pure
thirteen years after the appearance of the
"

Keason."

lie fore passing

to

the next, that of Sehelling,

it

may

be well, by the aid of what we have accomplished, to attempt to

form as clear an idea as possible of what is meant by a Philoso
As we can thoroughly determine what a
of the Absolute."
"

phy

let us begin by contrasting

thing is only by showing what it is not,
doctrine of Empiricism.
the
its
with
a
such
opposite,
philosophy
He who makes experience his only law and guide begins and
that is, with what is most particular and concrete.
ends with facts
;

These he proceeds to analyze, classify, and reduce to system and

for generalized facts.
law, these words being only expressions
and
is always upward from what is rnost particular
course
his
Thus,

329

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

and here, up to
determinate, from individual phenomena seen now
the loftiest generalizations, even, if you will, to ultimate principles ;
as ultimate,
thouh, properly speaking, his science admits nothing
but always leaves room for corrections to be obtained from further
Thus, he accepts nothing as absolutely certain, or
experience.
because
determined
definitely
nothing as absolutely simple or one,
resolve what now appears as the most re
;

subsequent analysis may

nothing as a totality,
fractory element into its constituent parts
or absolute whole, because nicer or more extended observation may
add new links to the series
nothing as an absolute beginning or
;

an absolute end, because later inquiry may always disclose some

Thus empirical science is always in
thing which lies beyond.
choate and imperfect, even glorifying itself on these shortcomings,
because

or at any
thereby leaves the road open for progress,
But corrections and extensions of the
for its original construction, can be

it

rate, for subsequent effort.

theory, like the materials

drawn only from

vation of facts.

the storehouse of nature, that is, from the obser

or
Empirical science often reasons downward,

but never from first principles always

it is true
from maxims which express former generalizations of experience.
It never aims to go behind the facts, and therefore never seeks
for a First Cause of them, nor for a Final Cause, or the purpose
deductively,

only with secondary causes, or physical

with phenomena,
not
laws with relative,
absolute, antecedents
with the
or what appears, not with noumena, or what really is
actual consequents of phenomena, and not with any purposes which
It does not seek to penetrate the
they were intended to subserve.
or
to explain how things began to be, or
of
existence,
mysteries
why they manifest themselves thus, rather than otherwise.
Now the briefest explanation which can be given of the Philos

why they

exist,

It deals

of
ophy of the Absolute is to say, that it is the direct opposite
and
mentioned
one
of
the
in
particulars just
every
Empiricism
found of the truth
perhaps this is as good an illustration as can be
Instead
of the old scholastic adage, omnis determinatio est negatio.
of beginning with the particular, the concrete, and the determinate,
it aims to start from what is most universal, most abstract, and least
Instead of rising from facts to laws, and from these to
determinate.
;

it endeavors to posit, first of all, a priucipium principiorum, an absolute first Cause, absolute unity, absolute totality, the
Infinite and the .A 1 solute, universal substance, absolutely indeter
minate existence, all in one and from this absolute commencement
to unfold and develop, step by step, all degrees and varieties of

principles,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

330

actual and determinate existence in the universe of thought and of

need not be surprised, then, to hear Hegel declare
real being.
that the .Philosophy of the Absolute, as taught in his Logic, is

We

"a

representation of God as he was in his eternal essence, before the

creation of the world or of a finite spirit;" as
all things were
"

made by Him.
things

consist."

and

"lie

brt ore

is

all

things, and by Him all

this absolutely first

Having obtained or assumed

principle, thus wholly indeterminate, the

problem is, to trace the

and continuous development from it of all modes of de
terminate existence and determinate thought, thus explaining how
all things began to be. and
why they appear under the respective
in
forms
which
phenomenal
they now manifest themselves to con/ti

i-i

ust/ry

sciousuess.

and imperfect attempt

beginning with the single da
tum, which skepticism itself cannot doubt, namely, pure thought,
or thought in the abstract, it endeavors to deduce from this, suc
Thus, even Cartesianism

is

a sort of crude

to construct such a philosophy

for,

the thinker s own existence, the being of a (lod, the

trustworthiness of our faculties, and hence the universe ol things
as actually known, and in which we live.
But the attempt was a

cessively,

lame one; for after taking successfully the first two steps, thought
and the thinker, Descartes unwittingly introduces an empirical
element, a mere fact learned by internal observation, namely, that
other ideas in the thinker s mind, there is one of an infinite
and perfect Being and from this idea as an effect, he reasons up
ward, after the manner of the Empiricists again, to the actual ex

among

Spinoza, ivsolved to be more rigorous

the forms and precautions of pure mathe
matics, and therefore set out with a definition, an arbitrary one, of
MI abstract idea, xmiversal Substance, as that which exists and is
istence of such a Being.

in his logic,

conceived

all

adopted

in

and of

itself,

and therefore does not need a prior

As this definition is so framed as to

conception of anything else.
exclude in the outset all individual and real objects, and as in the
tlu;
system from this one principle every empirical
carefully excluded, Spinoza s conclusions, of course, turn
His theory
out to be just as arbitrary and unreal as his premises.

evolution of

datum

is

of pantheism is the rigorous logical development of a mere phan

tasm of his own thought, having no connection or similarity with

the phenomenal world actually present to sense and consciousness,

the genesis of which it was his duty to explain.
Fichte was more consistent than Descartes, and had a clearer

apprehension

than.

Spinoza of the nature of the task which lay

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

331

he enjoyed the great advantage of beginning his

laid down the con
work after Kant had carefully distinguished and
I think the Wissenschaftslehre is, on the
ditions of the problem.
more severely reasoned out
whole, more complete and systematic,
than any Phi
remotest
its
to
consequences,
tracked
and faithfully
has
ever devised.
man
of
which the wit
losophy of the Absolute
set forth with all
so
not
a
gorgeously
It is not so poetical
system,
could
the eloquence and illustrations which a glowing imagination
of
miracle
a
such
not
is
It
ingenuity
as that of Schelling.
before

him

for

supply,

com

and

comprehensiveness
of thought, of minuteness
But it is more frank and simple, so to
bined, as that of Hegel.
to its legitimate
it is more faithfully traced out
speak, than either
Instead of attempting to deduce every
and inevitable conclusions.
because wholly indeterminate, is inde
thing from an idea, which,
Fichte began with the
therefore
equivalent to zero,
finable, and
and thus secured
or affirming its own existence
itself,
Ego positing
absolute and
an
unlimited
activity,
and

and depth

an indefinite

consequently
secret of creation.
Still,
infinite Ego, wherewith to explain the
from
the actual evolution of a real universe of determinate beings

mere phantom
such a blank conception of pure activity, the
There is nothing
God, remained just as incomprehensible as ever.
be
this
pure activity, should
to determine why this absolute Ego,
of determinate existence rather than any
form
one
into
developed
should create this world instead of any conceivable universe,
of

other,

It is merely the x of an insoluble equation,

or no universe at all.
so out of relation
a pure activity out of relation to anything, and
existence more
of
form
one
to
any
to any conceivable product, or
still driven to the usual sub
is
Fichte
other.
Hence,
than to

any

Unable to explain
of the Absolute.
terfuge of these philosophers
we
finite
actual
of
beings, such as
the creation of a real universe,
itself into a mere dream, and all finite
existence
resolves
he
are,
The
and determined being into a mere shadow of the Absolute.
of its own
out
an
to
Non-Ego
is then

Ego

spin

supposed

imaginary

own shadowy existence, and

itself the poor spectre of
becomes
against this unreal background,
These system-mongers succeed
determinate and individual being.
the fact, of crea
in explaining the process, only through denying

thought, a

still

dimmer

reflection of its

tion.

The philosophy

of

Kant and Fichte represented the

destructive

the moral enthusiasm,

tendencies, the deification of pure reason,
Revolu
nd the lofty hopes which characterized the first French
The enthusiasts of that period hoped to build a new world
tion.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

332

out of the ruins of the past

to

i,nd

new forms

create

justice .-huuM prevail.

ditional in society and

to

demolish all existing institutions;,

which truth, freedom, and

of society, in

was positive and tra

and morality, while
The subjective and rationalistic

rejected all that

State, in religion

They
the

thev deilied individual freedom.

the Critical Philosophy, the theory of the Wissenschaftswhich the universal Kgo, as pure activity, asserts its own
freedom in limiting and determining the Non-Ego, the world with
vassal, har
out, which is its own creation and thus its subject and
monized with
revolutionary movements, and aided in completmethod.>

Ichri

<>f

in

the>e

W them.

15ut a reaction

iii"-

soon be^au

in

Germanv, where those

sought refuge in the traditions and institutions

of the past, inculcated reverence for a higher authority than that
of man, ami a mystic recognition of the unseen agencies which direct
The religious sentiment, offended
the course oi nature and history.

who dreaded change

by the negative

results of Rationalism, clung all the

more lirmly

to

a victorious reaction
positive belief, and Catholicism raised
against the Protestant, principle, so that some ol the most distin
its

(ierman literature, such as Gb rres, Haller, Friedand

lardrnlu-rg (Novalis), became prose
Romish church.
Poetry also found inspiration and

guished names
rich

vSchh

lytes to

M-,.].

the.

materials

in

in

Miiller.

the consecrated traditions of the past, in the mysteries

human mind and thus was formed the Ro

of nature and of the

mantic school

literature, to

in

which

the

poets,

Tieck, Xovalis,

b. longed.
The arts also, and to
Schlegel, Stolberg, and others
some extent the sciences, followed the same direction.
Painting,
the remains of
sculpture, and architecture looked for guidance to
media val art, and for inspiration to the fervent Catholicism of

earlier times.
tlu;

Historians turned their inquiries from the recent to

with their stories of
past, to the Middle Ages,

more remote

miracles and legends of the saints, and even back to hoary an

The rapid
of the Kast.
tiquity, and the primitive religions systems
also tended
then
sciences
were
which
the
making
physical
progress
U Idle
to develop this taste for the recondite and the marvellous.
marvellous
and
new
were
and
observation
heaping up

experiment

to these facts
philosophy attempted to give unity and system
and thus to bind
by interpenetrating them with speculative ideas,
nature into a living organism.
together the disjecta membra of
Most interesting among the recent discoveries were those which
facts,

concerned the mysterious phenomena of electricity and magnetism.

seemed to throw
Chemistry, which was then making rapid progress,
the mutual
new
upon the internal operations of nature and
light

play of

its

secret formative agencies.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

333

All this tended to correct the morbid tendency to introspection

and Idealism which characterized the school of Kant and Fichte.
Instead of regarding the Ego alone as real and active, and even
as the Absolute itself, the Non-Ego, or the whole outer world, ex
and imagined for no other purpose than to
isting merely in idea,
render the Ego more determinate, by setting up over against it
in
a phantom from which it could be discriminated in thought,
stead of this subjective and egoistic theory, I say, there was a reac

Instead of mak
tion towards the objective pantheism of Spinoza.
ing outward nature to be the mere creature of human thought, the
tendencv now was to absorb man into nature, and to regard his
individual existence as lost among the countless phenomena, the

myriad developments, of the mighty mother, the universal Sub

This new turn of speculation, how
stance, the One and the All.
Nature
far from it.
ever, was not in the direction of Materialism
was still ideal, still a mere creation of universal thought or mani
festation of the Absolute. But Nature was now viewed objectively,
as one organic whole, independent and self-sustained, a system of
forces and agencies necessarily acting upon and limiting each other,
Indi
one law.
yet all derived from one source and working by
vidual mind was but one bubble floating on the surface of this
Realism
resistless current, and driven round in its eternal vortices.
;

of the day, and a sort of pantheistic worship

and sensible nature was substituted for the fa
natical Egoism which inspired the system of the Wissenschaftslehre.
Amonu the poets, Goethe perhaps best set forth this realistic and
was still absorbed in
objective aspect of nature, whilst Schiller

became the passion

of the outer world

dreamy and

enthusiastic idealism.

Schelling was a precocious genius, the boy-Plato of Germany,

who achieved eminence as a great metaphysical thinker while he

was
and

still

a youth at the university.

He

had the fervid imagination

critical understanding
lively fancy of a poet, rather than the
He was a great master also of varied and or
of a philosopher.

nate disquisition in lofty and eloquent prose, richly illustrated by a

wide range of reading and considerable acquisitions in science
and he thus fascinated and warmed his hearers, even when his turn
for mysticism considerably obscured the connection of his thoughts.
;

He

in 1794-1795,
published two remarkable philosophical treatises
before he had left college, and when he was as yet only twenty
In these he appeared as still a disciple of Fichte,
years old.
to ex
though aspiring rather to amplify and correct, than merely
But he soon worked himself
the doctrines of his master.

pound,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

334
from

this dependence, and, both in his lectures and other pub

began to teacli a philosophy which no other person than
himself was capable of originating.
His system passed through
no less than five successive stages, varying widely in the course of

free

lications,

development, so that
view of it as one whole.
its

it

is

impossible to give any self-consistent

His

life, also, presents two distinct pe

riods of great literary activity, separated from each other by a
long
interval.
Before he was thirty years old, that is, before 1S05, be

had published

all the works on which his fame really

depends, and
achieved through them a world-wide reputation, his (henries largely
coloring not only the metaphysic thought, but also, to a consider

physical science, of all his German countrymen.

Then, though continuing to hold high academic position at Munich
and Erlangen, his literary activity seemed to come to an end, and
he maintained an almost unbroken silence for over thirty-five
years, the very period during which his great rival, though former
associate and intimate college friend, Hegel, was developing his
system of metaphysics, and through that, and subsidiary publica
tions, was making himself a power in the state, and exercising an
influence, not only in philosophy, but in history, politics, and theol
ogy, such as hardly any men specnlatist has equalled for more than
a century.
Coldly and silently Schelling stood aloof, and made
no sign, while Hegelianism was running its brilliant but short
lived career, agitating all North Germany, and thereby affecting

able extent, the

the course of thought throughout civilized Europe.

At length,
1841, nine years after the death of Hegel, Schelling emerged

in

from

his retirement, accepted Hegel s vacant post as professor of

philosophy at Berlin, and, amid the generally excited attention
and expectation of the whole public, began to lecture again with
all the enthusiasm, eloquence, and fertility of his youth.
Thus, to

adopt Ilartmann s striking figure, Schelling was tin; morning star

which heralded the uprising sun of Hegel and also the evening
Still, the
star, which continued to shine on after that sun had set.
high expectations of those who had called him from his retirement
terminated generally in disappointment.
Those who heard him,
;

but they brought away

indeed, were fascinated by his eloquence
very obscure notions of a mystic theogony and cosmogony, which
were substituted for the more definite metaphysical speculations in
;

which his youth delighted, and on which his fame chiefiy depends.
These lectures of his old age were published after his death in two
or three bulky volumes
but I fancy few persons have had cour
to
read
The philosophy of his earlier
them
age enough
through.
;

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

335

in a
I shall undertake to consider, and this only
days is all that
cursory manner.
and his interest in the creations
Spelling s poetical imagination,
felt the full force of
of art and The phenomena of outward nature,
at the be
as
described
I
have
constituting,
which
those influences
and
Idealism
a reaction against excessive
ginning of this century,
external
of
of
sort
a
to
worship
dreamy
Egoism, and as leading

Through Coleridge, who

nature and mystic absorption into it.
of his thoughts, though
some
knew enough of Schelling to pilfer
these influences were
a
as
him
whole,
understand
to
not enough
and they constitute
to speak, into English literature
so
imported,
the
of
that
of
poetry of Words
the very spirit and essence
portion
worth which belongs to this period, and which is pantheistic
From him I might quote almost at random in con
throughout.
;

firmation of this remark

the meanest flower that blows could give

for tears."
thoughts that do often lie too deep

To him,

And

again

The sounding cataract

Haunted me like a passion the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
"

Their colors and their forms, were then to

a feeling and a love
An appetite;
That had no need of a remoter charm
supplied, or

By thought

Unborrowed from the

And

still

Schelling,

any

"

interest

eye."

more directly expressive

we hear him say or sing
.

me

of the objective pantheism of

:

have

felt

a sense sublime

Of something

far

more deeply

interfused,

Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,

And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;

motion and a

spirit that

All thinking things,

And

rolls

through

all

all

impela

objects of all thought,

things.

Therefore

am

I still

A lover of the

meadows and the woods,

And mountains and of all that we behold
From this green earth of all the mighty world
Of eye and ear, both what they half create,
;

And what perceive well pleased to recognize,

In nature and the language of the sense,
;

The anchor of my purest thoughts,

Of all my moral being."
this
True, Wordsworth has carried

....

"worship"

and soul

of nature to an

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

336

unreasonable and ridiculous excess, and fallen into

dizzy rap
what is beautiful and grand in the outward
tures," not only over
world, but over many low and paltry objects, which no poetry can
elevate above their intrinsic meanness and vulgarity.
Thus, in
one of his walks, he sees
"

"A
crowd, a host, of golden daffodils;
Beside the lake, beneath the trees,

He

tells

and daucinjr

in the

breeze."

us that
1

And

luUerin<r

I i, a/ed, and Lfa/ed, but little thought

AYhat wealth the show to me had brought.

he concludes,
"

in the

And
And

very jingle of Mother Goose,

then my heart witli pleasure

dances with the daflbdils."

fills,

Still more curious is the influence of Schelling

Philosophy of
the Absolute on the physical science of his own day, and even of
In respect to the poets, it may well be, that of
these later times.
the realistic and pantheistic tendencies which they began to mani
.s

fest

some seventy years ago. Schelling

metaphysics were not so

much a cause as an expression and exponent. There was a com

mon influence at work, both upon him and upon them. Not so
which he was to a great extent an inspirer,
not a teacher, even an originator of novel doctrines which
lie
opened lines of research and inquiry heretofore untried.
in physical science, in
if

taught the physiologists and naturali>ts of Germany, instead of

mi-rely accumulating facts of observation, to arrange them into
sv.Meins at least provisionally true, under the guidance of what

Oken and Agassiz

might seem to be purely funeii ul speculation.
were only the most conspicuous among a crowd of men engaged in
similar pursuits, who, in their earlier years, were pupils of Schelhim not only inspiration, but pregnant hints
ling, and derived from
J suppose the
of what they afterwards worked out in detail.
modern doctrines

Metamorphosis of Plants, or Vegetable

llomologies of the Skeleton, of the plan of
God in the animal kingdom, and even of the Darwinian hypotheses
of the Origin of Species and Pangeuesis, may be traced very
Morphology,

of

of the

the

Ail these
directly to Schelling s Philosophy of the Absolute.
theories or hypotheses, call them what you please, are not facts,
but ideas about the relations, the arrangement, and the genesis of
facts.

Strictly speaking, they do not belong to Zoology,

which

is

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSOLUTE.

337

the science of living things as they now are, actually manifested to

sense, hut to Cosmogony, or the doctrine of the origin of things.
In proof that the germs, at
any rate, of all these theories are
to he found in
Schelling, I will quote, not Schilling s own words,
which conM only he done at too great length, hut the words of
Schwegler, one of the hest of his German expounders and critics,

Mho,

the passage cited, has no reference to the point which I

in

now seeking
master

his

to establish, but

is

am

merely abbreviating and explaining

doctrine.

then, Schelling teaches,

just as original as
It is
Inorganic nature, as such, does not exist.
actually
organized, and is, as it were, the universal germ, out of which or
"is

"Organization,"

natter.

The

ganization proceeds.

internal evolution of the

ing,

not

becomes animal and

formed

itself out

of

organization of each body

itself; the earth, by its

body

is

but the

own

evolv

And

yet the organic world has

the inorganic, but was, at least poten

plant.

What now lies before us

apparently as inorganic matter, is the residuum of the organic
is what was unable at the first trial to become
metamorphosis,
The brain of man is the highest result of the whole
organic.
tially,

present in

it

from the beginning.

organic metamorphosis of the earth.

we maintain the internal identity of

It

will be

seen, then, that

and the potential

wherefore we regard the so-called dead
all

things,

presence of all in all

matter as only a plant-world, and an animal-world,
asleep a world
which, at some future time, the absolute identity of its essence with
what has gone before may possibly animate and awake to a new
;

phase of

life."

Again, he says,
of opposed forces,

"matter and mind,

exhibiting the same conflict
must themselves be capable of union in a
higher
There is the same Absolute in nature as in mind, and
identity.
their harmony is no mere reflection of
If you maintain
thought.

that

we who only

transfer this idea to nature, then never

upon your soul has any dream dawned of what, for us, nature is
and should be. Mature shall be the visible soul, and soul the in
visible nature.
Nature appears thus as the counterpart of mind,
and produced by the mind only that the mind
may, through its
it

is

to self-consciousness
agency, attain to a pure perception of itself
Hence the series of grades or steps in nature, in which all the
stations of intellect, on its
way to self-consciousness, are stereo

typed.

For

The

this

reason there

is

something symbolical

in

every

a corporealized throb of the soul.

main peculiarities of organic growth,
intussusception, or self-

thing organic

every plant
22

is

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
formation from within
outwards, adantat
of
variety of interpenetration of fo
mutef
are
leading features of the mind
\
u.
~
1
AS
in

to\v. irn

a11

""""I?

t0

^^

so

ma J

tlie

enort

onlf_^,.

both

.......
,

Ktcrnitv. Absolute

;,

Mind

each term

But

,;

fatter,
is

the

--tan,i
must be

)m

tnei.l^an^onn

one; and this i/,.,,,

once their
e
p o U
cin"

-, and

the

h(

^e\t
>]

of

J!
""

Ab8

terms o

them both in

Iute

>>

Jt

is :lt

root
br !ule8t

and

clearest dig-

:;;,;;;:;

tl ,o

B
Bein S

product of Thought or
0"lv in and
throS the
certain, that

to think

that other.

fil

Reason, that is. to the

,
other phenomeno

^ from
f ^S
Conto M

ne

|-

7;ppof^^

between

"

Whe "-the S
tinction

istin

;;,;;";

ah,
i

Unconditioned,
OUr

there

1
I

Thought

either of the

,,,

fa

of

1S

the

qon
SCHELLING.

own existence. Hence,

can I become aware of my
before consciousness becomes.
Sfo eThe daTn of consciousness,
constructed unconsciously
been
have
must already
possible Nature
winch
self-evolved
by the Ateolute,
Lsl ha ve been spontaneously
the
and
Non-fcgo.
both of the Ego
is the common -round
from

.elf

it

ltion

Th

in

which ScheUing stands

to other

these two forms of idenUBcation

the
therefore properly calls ^B system
me led
His Absolute is the

sdentHies

n
each

with

other,

and

of Absolute Identity.
os ;P
of
unity of Subiect and Object,

of Fichte Is

Thought and Being.

in the main upon

have shown, was based

of Descartes; and

in

the iunda-

manner, Schelling,

like

pHnciple
a reprois in great part
he works by a different method,
of n-ter and
both
world
The

hot

of

S^

phenomenal

into a vague
resolved, in the one case,
.ab.tiaction,
tha^o
in the other, into an inconceivabl
and
Substance,
universal

mind

is

for a seminal first principle,

absolute unity in all things,
from which, or from
in his eternal essence,

?o

or ab-

whom

to think or

When
attempt
thought
the Object oi my ihoag ,U
absolute umt, 5 becomes
b bj c
and set over agamst, the
;
thereby is distinguished from,
and all
one
be
to
absolutely
and therefore it ceases
contemit and strive, to

teefore

fi

ife,

Sins

coS with
lae S

the

essence.

Mind that conceives

The difficulty is inevitable

Subject know:
between the***"?%**
depends upon this antithesis
no.
of
my thought
known. Then the Absolute
"nd the Object
"
exists
former
fte true Absolute; since the
ftfrom it, b ?
be developed
. Duality; all other things may
tself

MODKKN PHILOSOPHY.
is one
thing winch it cannot generate, and which i.s at
least co
equal with it: and that is, the
thinking Mind by which it is itself

later, a

-"".

always takes the torm

ot

";

The

doctrine of the

dte.

At

"

U Oi

Philosophy of the Absolute

Idealism.

Wisscnschaftskhre is. that the E- o is the

this Absolute
Ego cannot be conceived

first,

.or as Absolute;
on

;/"

for since

it

is

(at

the outset, or before

imaginary world) both One and All, and

A ;,
e
here
nothing from which it can be contradisgu shed, andJ thereby thought.
Hut though
inconceivable, it can
it does
act; first, by
positing itself, or affirming its own
ece, and secondly, by
positing a fictitious Non-Ego, tn unreal
;l

"

"

<

<

."

>;

""-

OUtsidc

ilst lt

"

It

is,
therefore, first anprelas pure and unlimited
activity, exerted with perfect free
then as the
product of that activity, since there cannot
action without an
Then it creates an unreal
agent.
Non-Ego,
universe, peoples it with
imaginary human
and

beings,
a determinate individual exence, so far as it is discriminated from these
spec,,,,, which are
It!
C
;U
I ^t,
therefore, I am not myself as a deter
;:
minate in, ividua, but I am
only one manifestation of the Absolute
Urns, Fichte s
is Idealism
"Hies

<nV

conscious of

itself as

""-

".

philosophy

first
exaggerated into
or rather Nihilism, wink
Pantheism,
;
usual conclusion of a
Philosophy of the Absolute.
Jo
Schelling argues at length, and with much acuteness and
sub-

;ln

ai

"

"

*"l""""

J<>o-

into

"I

"""

I"
"

IU

"

"

"

Ego,

ary NOM-I

.-O.

til

11

j^

in

"

^htcan

setting

He

system.

up over against

cannot be regarded as the result

objects,

itself

that

an imagin

says cannot avoid considering the

Drained

_""

to

iorm

at

least

Eg,, as dependent, that is as

a mental
picture of the outer world;

only too much in this world which the

Ego, had it
have constituted otherwise.
The necessity to
;0uld
which t is thus
subjected is an internal and blind
necessity, not
oceeding from any conscious exercise of the
will, but grounded
inmost nature ot the
Nothing hinders me from goin*
Je in thought therefore, Ego.
ck
with this
Ego, which has now become
conscious oi itself in
me, to a preceding moment, when as
yet it
was not
s

conscums; and from

assuming the reality of something
beyond the now existing consciousness, and of an
activity*
previously exerted, of which I become aware
its rl
only
ihzs

through

activity cannot be anything else than the labor of

com-

341

SCIIELLIXG.

ing to one s self, the very act of first becoming conscious, which is
therefore not known in itself, but only in its consequence.
This

mere

result or

consequence, which alone

is

present to conscious

that very mental picture of an outer world, which the Ego

cannot regard us produced by itself, for it existed simultaneously
with the Kgo, and afforded the only means through which the
is

ness,

Kgo could lirst become self-conscious. This inseparable union of

myself with the necessary presentation of a universe external to
myself, says Schelling, was the fact which I sought to explain
through a transcendental past existence, preceding the origin of
For

empirical consciousness.

lirst

know

that 1

am

through the

coming to myself; and this coming to myself implies a pre

came.
ceding and unconscious .state, out of myself, from which
act of

The
of

condition of the Ego. therefore, is a state of being outside

Because it comes from a region
proper or individual self.

first

its

lying behind or above consciousness, it is not yet the individual

Kgo; but it first becomes individual, and thereby self-conscious,
Therefore, the state lying
through the act of coming to itself.
outside of consciousness, and preceding the affirmation that I am,
one and the same for all human beings it is the one universal

is

Substance of Spino/a.
Only when it emerges from this primal
and unconscious state of being, does it lirst become in every one
his Kgo, his individual Kgo, because it then lirst comes to itself,
and distinctly says, I am.
Certainly, when it lirst becomes capa
ble of this utterance wherewith its individual and separate life
begins, it no longer remembers the road which it has traversed in
order to reach

this

Since self-consciousness

goal.

lirst

appears at

the end of the journey, it must have passed over the whole route
The individual Kgo holds
unconsciously, and without knowing it.

mind only the monuments, us it were, the faint mementos, of the

read which it has passed over, but remembers not the road itself.

in

And

it is the
duty of philosophy to recon
and enable the mind to recall its previous
The Kgo must be enabled consciously to retrace its
history.
whole unconscious progress, from the beginning, when it was not
as yet separated from universal and indeterminate being, up to the
In so far, Philosophy
close, when it first became self-conscious.

for

this

very reason,

struct the forgotten past,

is

nothing else than

dra/Av^crts

a reminiscence of

what

it

has

done and suffered in its universal and pre-iiidividuul state a re

sult which harmonizes well enough with the well-known doctrine
;

Of Plato.

We

can

now

see,

tl~

t-,

as the doctrine of Fichte

is

closely allied

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

342

with that of Descartes, being,

German

viated

Schelling

is

in

in

fact, little

more than an abbre

version of Cogito* scilicet sum, so the Philosophy of

the main a mere reproduction of Spinoza. Alike in

premises and in his results. Schelling repeats the work of his

\\\ mere definition, that is. by an arbitrary
.Jewi-h predecessor.
the Absolute." in which all
assumption. Spino/a holds that
his

things are fused into one.

terminate, and eternal, all

>imilar

manner.

Substance, illimitable, inde

phenomena, whether of extransitory modes or affections.

individual

or thought, being only

ten.Mon
]n a

universal

is

Schelliiii_r

its

teaches

that,

"the

Absolute"

is

an

inconceivable centre and source of being, lying behind conscious

and manifesting itself solelv through its opposite poles, Sub

and Object: and according as the one or the other of these
predominates, Matter or .Mind in various degrees becomes appre

ness,
ject

hensible.
v

left
is

In

order that

inconceivable,

obliged

to

may

"the

not

contrive a

thus conceived, or thus

be an arbitrary invention. In
mental faculty, that of intellectual
Absolute"

seem

new

to

which onlv artists and men of genius are endowed with,

and which is competent spiritually to discern what lies far beyond
intuition,

of consciousness, namely, the identity of Subject with

Object. :md thereby of One with All.
Obviously, then, Schelling s ambition was to reverse, the Ficlitean

the reach

and to reestablish the .Nou-K^o in its dignity and rights,

by developing the Subject from the Object, or Spiiit from Nature,
But here a difficulty immediately arises.
instead of the converse.
/The Non-Ki.ro does not allirm its own exigence by positing itself.
Nature without Spirit, as Object independent of a Subject, it is
Chaos is voiceless and inactive, a mere waste
both dumb and inert.
process,

A->

of waters, before

the

spirit

of

Jod

Hence Schelling was forced

to

moves over the face

of the

adopt the theory, that both

deep.
the K^o and the Xon-Kijo are merely phenomenal manifestations
of the true Absolute, which lies behind or beneath them, and which
develop?, itself by a constantly repeated process of self-diremption,
forever -plating itself into two oppo.-ito poles, and thereby succes
sively

ri>ing

into

more

distinct degrees of difference

and Self-Con

Polar logic, the

sciousness, and into higher stages of being.
of
class of metaphysi
universal
this
the
invention,
method,
grand
The Absolute is the mid
cians, is aii ain pressed into the service.

and therefore,
dle point, the centre of indifference of the magnet
in itself, is no magnet at all, but first becomes such by setting its
two extremities over against each other, as North and South poles,
;

or Thesis

and Antithesis, the centre, or the true Absolute, existing

SCIIELLING.

Break the magnet in two

of these opposites.
only as the synthesis
becomes a perfect mag
once
at
half
each
and
at this medial point,
Repeat tins pro
net in itself, with its own set of opposite poles.
of
thought can be
since
object
any
cess indefinitely in thought,
its discrimination
conceived, or become determinate, only through
and you have the suefrom and opposition to, some other object,
the
determinate
and
being, which are
individual
of
cessive stages
winch
in
All
or
One,
of being per ,e,
phenomenal manifestations
The Ego and the Non-Ego, Subject and
lies at the centre.
the product of the
are only the first of these manifestations,
ject,
Absolute.
first self-diremption of the
But here Hamilton

objection comes

in,

and

is

In order to reach
as such, before
apprehend the Absolute

the whole theory.

thereby to

self-diremption,

really fatal

this point of indifference,

we must by

its first

and

act ot

abstraction annihilate both the Object

what remains ?
and Subject of consciousness. But then,
contrast between Subject
the
of
abstraction
The
a mere blank.
and the ne^ aon of
and Object is a negation of consciousness
"

The alternative
itself.
consciousness is the annihilation of thought
the Absolute, we lose our
either,
unavoidable
finding
therefore
is
and individual consciousness, we do not
selves
or, retaining self
;

resell the

He

-el

Absolute."

whan he

This objection was also wittily expressed by

in Schilling s philosophy, the Absolute
It is made sud
out of a
shot
been

said that

had

"

appears as if it
reason
denly to appear, without any

pistol."

why it is
And as we

there, or

why

it

is

can attempt to con

differences whereby one thing

inconceivable.
anything since it is
ceive ifonly by abstracting from all
all
it is but the night in which
is distinguished from another,
are
expressed
all
successively
since
things
cows are black;" and
the two poles into which it is constantly
sis one or the other of
of a painter, who has but
uividino- itself, it is
only the method
former to be used on
and
red
his
green, the
two colors on
palette,
the latter on landscapes."
historical
<

"

pieces,

lie admits that

frankly acknowledged by Sehelling.
and therefore that a
of
condition
a
is
knowledge,
consciousness
As a
is impossible.
conscious knowledge of the Absolute, to us,
the
can
man
only
apprehend
conscious and understanding being,
rel
as
conceived
be
for every object of his thought must
Relative
as
other object of thought, at least to himself,
ative, if not to any
be apprehended only by
can
Absolute
The
the thinking subject.
Only if man be himself
back out of consciousness.
sinkin"
u Nee sentire
known
be
Infinite
the
can
by him.
the Infinite,

All this

is

344

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Deum, nisi qui pars ipse Deo rum

does not himself share the Godhead.

None can

est."

But Schelling

asserts

that

there

is

feel

capacity of

God, who

knowledge

above or behind consciousness, and

higher than the Understanding,
and that this knowledge is
competent to human reason, because
this Reason itself is identical with the
Absolute.
In this act of
knowledge, which he calls the Intellectual Intuition, as distinguished
from the intuitions of sense, there exists no distinction
of Subject
and
no contrast of knowledge with
existence; all difference
Object,
is lost in
mere indifference, all
in
Absolute
Because

itself

is

plurality
identified with the Reason

simple,

unity.

The

which apprehends it.

man is himself :l manifestation of
_tho Absolute, he can
know the source and essence of his
being onTy~T)y" falling back
behind the limits and conditions of his
phenomenal existence, and
knowing himself as he really is,
God.
All tilings are God;
Hun we live, and move, and have our
Of
the
"in

being."

act

course,

-the vision and the

lie
faculty divine."
who is incapable of it is
This is
incompetent for philosophy.
what Cousin means by his doctrine of the,
impersonality of Reason.
That by which 1 apprehend the truth, he
says, is not
reason,
nor your reason, but Reason itself, as such or in
the abstract
is

ineffable;

is

it

,n>/

the

also,

truth

itself,

thus known,

is

not

truth as such, or the

Absolute, identical

apprehends
In

or your truth, but

with the faculty which

my

it.

teaching this doctrine, that

human

reason has a power of

intellectual

mtuhion,aa distinguished from the intuitions of sense.

we may remark, which is
doctrine,
a^
earnestly controverted by
Kant,
Schelling s tone is somewhat lofty and supercilious,
being
strongly marked with the arrogance which characterixes most of
his earlier

writings.
Philosophy, he says, just as much as Art, de
pends upon a capacity lor creation, that is. upon a
power first of
producing its object, and then of reflecting or reproducing that
object through an image or representation of it.
The only differ
ence is, that the
productive power in Art is directed towards the

external world, in order to

reproduce there in sensible images
it has created
while in
Philosophy, its gaze is turned In
wards, in order to reflect its products in an intellectual intuition.

what

Hence, the esthetic sense

losophy exercises
of art

is

the

true

its

is

the proper organ

functions,
organon of

and just for

through which phi

this reason, the science

in general.
There are

philosophy
only two outlets from the world of commonplace realities; the
first is
poetry, which transfers us to an ideal world; the second is
^

345

SCIIELLING.

universe to disappear from our

philosophy, which causes the outer
It does not appear, says Schelling, why a capac
vision altogether.
for Philosophy should be any more common than a capacity

ity

for Art, especially in that class of men who, either from their ex
ercise of memory, than which nothing more quickly kills out all
creative power, or from their habits of formal speculation, which

benumb

their imaginative faculty,

thetic sense.

the intellect,
it kills

down

Mere reflection, he
and when it extends
to its roots his

whole

have completely

lost their

aes

further argues, is a malady of

its power over the whole man,
spiritual life.

It

is

constantly

leading us astray even in the conduct of affairs, and it blinds our

Its dividing power
perception of the ordinary objects around us.
is

but when it separates

not confined to the phenomenal world
this the spiritual principle, it fills the intellectual world also
;

from

with chimeras, against which, because they lie beyond the province
It makes permanent
of reason, we cannot wage successful war.
the separation between Subject and Object, between man and the
world, when it considers the latter as a noumenon, or dln j an sick,
which neither intuition nor imagination, neither understanding nor
reason, is able to reach or comprehend.
Opposed to it stands true
as
a means, and which aims
which
uses
reflection
only
philosophy,
to bridge

over that yawning chasm, and bring together again the

sundered parts

since otherwise,

it

would have no need

to philoso

Evidently, then, the proper office of intellectual intuition is

phize.
to discern the primitive identity of Subject and Object, to unite

man

with the universe, and thereby to resolve all into one.

Thus, as Hamilton declares, Schelling founds philosophy on the
annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the un

The essence of the

philosopher with God himself.
but
not subjective, like that of Fichte,
pantheism,
is swallowed up
all
conscious
which
being
objective pantheism, by
in the Infinite, the unknowing and unconscious God, One and All.

conscious

system

is

much argument and ingenuity on

the attempt to
thus
intellect
which
the
emancipates
through
from the conditions of time and sense, and even from all the

Schelling spends

illustrate the process

itseli

of
oi! its own
being, so far, at least, as to catch glimpses
knowl
that unfathomable abyss in which it is itself engult ed.
edge ot the Absolute, he says, is a recognition of the essential

limitations

.dentity

and indifference of

all

things.

In

it,

all

contrast

and

opposition is taken away.

Thought is identified with existence,
the ideal with the real, the subjective with the objective, the uni
versal with the particular, the infinite with the finite, the one with

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

346

The essence of all things is one, and what creates appar

the all.
ent diversity is only the distinction of Form, whereby individuals
are seemingly distinguished and set off over against each other.
Abstract these differences of Form, and what remains is the indistin^ui.-hable
real in his

essence.

Thus, the

own work, which

is

artist

a true

identifies the ideal

work

with the

of art only so far as

it

The forms
perfectly embodies the Idea on canvas or in marble.
which the geometer contemplates in abstract space represent the
eternal and immutable relations to each other of what really exists
in idea, and to which the vi.-ible diagram is but an imperfect
Kverv judgment is an identical equation, and its
approximation.
formula, A
A, does not determine the nature, or allirm the ex
istence, of either member of the equation, but only allirms their

only

essential identity,

whatever they may

be.

Objective pantheism, as it is conceived by Schelling, may per

haps be best illustrated by that common but vague abstraction and
generalization, whereby we designate the whole external universe,
all the forces operating in it. and all the physical laws which are
the expression of these

forces,

from any theory upon the

Apart
by one word, as future.
order to avoid

Mibjeei, ami. indeed, in

the nece.vsity of framing or adopting any theory respecting the

and constitution of things, we ordinarily speak of Nature as

origin

all the forces which produce its various

powers of Nature; and then, carrying the gen-

one connected whole, of

phenomena

as the

still further, we consider all these individual

causes, or
niudes of operation, and the phenomena dependent upon them, as
the manifestations of a single force, the one great, power which
.Nature to
operates in Nature, and controls all its forms of being.

crali/ation

an ai^regate of objects and events, the former coexisting ill

We consider the
space, the latter succeeding each other in time.
forms and various attributes of different substances, and all the
us

is

which they are subject, as determined by some cause,

acting from within outwards, which constrains
all things to be what they are
and this is what we call Nature.
Thus, we say that it is the .Nature of matter to gravitate, or for
all its particles to attract each other; of the particles of given sub
of light, to radiate in straight lines from a
stances, to cohere

changes

to

we know not what,

of
of plants, to grow
equally
All that we are, and
animals, to be sentient; of man, to think.
all that we behold, are but the various forms of Nature, and mani
centre

of heat, to diffuse itself

festations of her occult power.

Now, what is with us merely a loose

form

of expression, in-

347

SCHELLING.

to confess our ignorance, is,

vented not to simulate knowledge, but
and the secret oi the
of
philosophy,
to Schellin", the keynote
It is the mysterious,
is the Absolute.
Nature
To
universe.
him,
is the source
or
force
agency, which
inconceivable and unconscious
_

of all that manifests

of nil things, the origin of all phenomena,
not
is
It
only their source,
itself either to sense or consciousness.
the substance ot
and
the
once
at
is
It
spirit
but their very being.
what they are, and
them
makes
which
that
is
it
Hie universe;
ill

that they are.

We

We

cannot know

it,

of

to a

think

we cannot even
it

it.

into
only by falling back
men
or
trance
a
such
In

knowledge
can approximate
Nature and becoming identified with it.
and
tal vision. 1 must become unconscious,

first know myself only

one of the infinite
am
but
not
only
myself,
bv knowing
exists only
then
universe
The
manifestations of the Absolute.
an infini
consciousness
to
through
idea, and this idea struggles up
itself in them, and culmifirst
realizing
forms,
tude of phenomenal

that I

am

this
mind of man. The successive stages of
as potenzes, or grades
are
Schelling
designated by
upward progress
or lowest form of
of phenomenal existence, from the brute clod,
And
life and thought.
of
manifestations
Nature, up to the highest
a.
unconscious
one
energy,
of
manifestation
the
but
is
since -ill
of
law
force,
one
polar
takes place by one law of development,
becomes
through which the One uniformly and necessarily
anc
it is the business of science
Many! This law of development
science
of
The
demonstrate.
progress
philosophy to trace and
indications of the uniformity (
consists in detecting ever fresh
Nature s work, and the oneness of her being.
natino- at last in the

The reader would be only puzzled and confounded,

if

he were

the copious details of Spelling s

penetrate
from this mere sketch of its ground
system since it is evident,
traverse the broad fields of science,
to
is
he
work, that
obliged
a long series of sweeping generalizations,
with
and
art,
history
of the future
ingenious speculative views, and bold anticipations

to attempt to

far into

The main branches of his philosophic tree,

progress of discovery.
of foliage and fruit,
moreover, are covered with such a profusion
from the mam
of
ourselves,
in
is
diverted,
spite
that our attention
of particulars.
multitude
a
features of the system, and lost among
that
to
although he
in
Schelling,
justice
It must be observed, also,
of physical
various
the
of
departments
a
had
competent knowledge
the
of
present century,
science as they existed at the beginning
a new aspec
has
time
that
since
given
the progress of discovery
which were considered and mco
to many of the facts and laws

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

348

porated into his system, has thereby taken away much of the evi
relied, and has made his speculations seem

dence on which he

much more

fanciful and unfounded than they appeared to be when

He was thus placed at a disadvan
they were first promulgated.
tage even during his lifetime, since he published his "Philosophy
of Nature" when he was yet a young man; and for this reason,

no other. Ilegelianism for a while triumphed over him.

first movement of the Absolute towards its manifestation
to sense and consciousness, according to Schelling, is bv its own
self-diremption, through the law of polar forces, into the two op
But as both these
posite*, outward Nature and Mind or Spirit.
are mere expressions of the unity which lies beneath them, whence
they spring, the two must perfectly correspond witli each other in
all their manifestations.
Nature must be the visible soul, soul the
invisible nature.
Kach exists only as the conflict, of two opposing
forces.
Mind is the unity of a limiting and an unlimited force.
It would fain extend itself to
infinity; but it can become conscious
only by abutting upon some obstacle, by which it is shut in and
rendered determinate. Jn like manner. Matter must be conceived,
not as an inert mass, but as the, antagonism of the two opposite
forces, attraction and repulsion, the, former appearing in cohesion
and gravitation, the latter in impenetrability, or the power by
which it excludes every thing el-e from the space occupied by it
self.
But Force is, as it were, what is immaterial in matter; it is
that which may be compared to mind.
Then the two are essen
of a conflict of forces, which
tially identical, each being the
are at bottom the same.
Nature appears, then, as the counterpart
of mind, and produced by mind, only that the mind may, through
if

for

The,

re>ult

its

to a

agencv, attain

consciousness.

Hence

aspect of Sehelling

pure perception of

itself,

that

is,

to

self-

appears, notwithstanding the objective

pantheism, that his system at bottom is essen
it

The

universe exists only in thought; and yet

tially
thought is itself only a development of universal nature, that is, of
the Absolute.
Mind, he says, continually seeks to externalize
itself in outward visible forms, and thereby to become finite
but
then the infinite power within reasserts itself, and it returns vic
idealistic.

torious from every such effort at objectivation into identity with

itself as pure
It is by a succession of Potenzes, or dis
Subject.

process of evolution and involution is contin

In order to trace these parallel developments of
matter and mind, Schelling divided philosophy into two parts, and
wrote a separate treatise upon each, as the
Philosophy of Na
tinct steps, that this

ually carried on.

"

ture,"

and

"

Transcendental

Idealism,"

or the Philosophy of Spirit.

349

SCHILLING.

The Absolute is the identity of thought and being, of the ideal

the
and the real, of the subjective and the objective. We take
main
he
What
we adopt his theory.
stoutly
Realist at his word
;

tains

is,

iron, for in

lump of

that the actual material thing,

we perceive and think it to

precisely what
the
Just so, we answer;
be.
perception and thought perfectly
There is not the difference of a
real object,
to
the
correspond
Esse
Thought and
percipi.
hair s breadth between them.
and
therefore,
one
am
I
thinking being;
BeiiiLi are One.
stance, or a book,

is

myself

the outer universe of men and things, external

that this Nature per
is one; for you have just asserted
]S ;,tmv,
still more exact, at any
be
To
to
ray thought.
fectly corresponds
but I
one moment, I myself am not precisely one thinking being,
ex
one
one
that
moment,
for
since,
thought
am one thought
and if that
is my entire being
and
whole
existence,
presses my
that
one thought represents the universe, then the universe is
differ from it by the diameter of a hair.
not
does
and
thought,
The Absolute is the middle point of the magnet, the centre where
all

that

think,

there ceases to be any difference between the two opposite poles,

or Objective at
the Ideal or Subjective at one end, and the Real
is
A, north
then,
The formula for the Absolute,
the other.
Ideal
the
south
from
and
pole,
indistinguishable
pole indifferent
The difference between these opposites
identical with the Heal.
of phenomena, of that which only ap
emerges only in the world
And this difference is only one of
which
that
not
really is.
pears?
not
of quality; taken at anyone point on the bar of iron,
quantity,
is a pre
other than the centre, magnetism is still one, only there
of
dominance either of north or south polarity. Just so, equilibrium

A=

the Real and the Ideal exists only at the centre

quantity between
and at every stage of removal from the Absolute,
of indifference
;

difference between individual things appeal s as a mere prepond

absence of
erance ot either force, but by no means as the entire

one of them.

Illustrations

may

easily be

found of

this

tendency

mere quantity to pass over into an apparent difference of qual

Thus, merely by diminishing the quantity of heat, water
ity.
and becomes ice.
changes its quality from a liquid to a solid state,
the Real
or
Ideal
the
If we designate
Subjective pole by A, and

of

that is,
or Objective pole by B, then the formula for the finite,
from
different
an
with
Object
for the union of a conscious Subject
is preponderant, it ap
B
or
as
is
According
itself,
and its contrary as the negative, pole nat
pears as the positive,
is
Thus, for examdifference
the
only quantitative.
urally so, as

A=B.

850

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

a particular stone, the Objective preponderates, and the

h
On the other hand, in the concept, or
abstract general idea of stone as a whole class of
objects, the Sub
=; B~.
jective or Ideal pole predominates, and the formula is,
pie, in

A~~=B

formula becomes

Of

are hen- usi-d not in

course, -f- and
sense, but only as symbols for more or less.

their strict algebraic

Schelling distinguishes three Poten/es. as he calls them, or de

of preponderance, on both the Real and the
Ideal side.
()l..-erve that each
is
Ideal;
only relatively Real and

grees

and

this

is

precisely what

is

meant by saying

relatively
that the phenomenal

difference between them

is
only quantitative: there is no real dif
The. absolutely Real is identical with the ab
solutely Ideal in the centre of indifference, the Absolute, where all is

ference of quality.

is all.
The relatively Heal, or Objective phenomenal
being, appears as (iravity. Inertia. Matter, designated as
next,
as Light, Movement. Force, which are B
as Life.

one and one

B"

+L>

ism,

Animal.

B +!

lastly,

Organ
lie! ween

It is
easy to point out the differences
forms and forces of external nature, which
Schelling
had in view, when he arranged them as successive
steps or Poten/es
whereby the Real return- towards the Ideal. Thus, the action of
.

the various

(Iravity

centripetal, tending to

draw

all

into

one; but that of

centrifugal, tending to infinite dispersion.

Again, Inertia
be conceived as the
impediment, and Movement as its

-Light

may

is

is

oppo

or the impediment overcome.

Matter is passive, and Forcethat through which this
is
What follows
passivity
vanquished.
much more fanciful, was elaborated by Sclielling at a later day,

site-,

is
is

and appears

to

lack evidence and to

be deficient in precision of

thought.

The relatively Ideal, or Subjective P>eing, he says, appears as

Truth, Science, abstract general Idea, these being the first Potenz,
A+
Next, (ioodness. Religion, Feeling, A+ 2 and lastly. Beauty,
l

3
Product of free Activity,
The entire develop
of
ment
the Real Potenzes gives us the external universe,
standing
under its laws of physical necessity.
The crown and complement
of this world of realities is Man,
regarded as the microcosm or rep

Art,

the

"

A"

of the universe.
The complete development of the
Ideal Potcn/es gives us the
history of the free activity of the hu
man race. The crown and complement of history is the ideal
State.
Reason is the knowledge of the identity of the two sides
in the Absolute, or God
and the crown and complement of the
reason which has risen to a full
cognition of itself, is Philosophy.
In every form, one of the two factors or constituents of the

resentative

351

SCHELLING.

but the other is never

Absolute, as I have said, is predominant
of
Nature, there is an excess of
In the forms
entirely wanting.
ideal
the
factor, this Matter receives
from
but
Matter
Reality or
of the
and Soul. On the other hand, the creations
;

Form,

Life,

l.mmin mind in Science, Art, and Religion, although especially rep

back to, the
the Ideal, always proceed from, and go
resenting
The
Real.

Idea incorporates

itself

in

outward

visible

forms.

and experi
Science appeals to the senses in diagrams, apparatus,
to its
ments ; in the objects of natural history, classified according
of ab
even
visible
in
museums
symbols
;
ideas in herbaria and

Art creates imaginative ideal forms, but emstract general ideas.

Even relig
bodies (hem in paintings, statuary, and architecture.
ion must have

and

its

its

cuUus,

priesthood.

As

its music,
symbols, its temples,
bias arid
constant
a
Nature manifests
on the other hand, Spirit seeks for

its rites, its

the Ideal, so,

pressure towards
a definite shape and a solid
its universal and formless conceptions

foundation.

The magnet
shows

itself in

is

not the only form in which the law of polarity

rather this law is revealed throughout all
so that Nature is, so to speak, one great

Nature

parts of the universe,

Another phenomenal form of
muo-net.

the polarizing power in

and
its positive
negative sides, which,
electricity, having
The same law is found
neutralize each other.

Nature is
on cominir together,

we are told, in the phenomena of light ;

physicist again,
with nitrogen.
and by the chemist, in the compounds of oxygen
of contrary
mutual
this
play
of
world
forms,
in
the
Even
organic

by the

forces

is

recognized.

The

animal are the represen

plant and the

force or ten
tatives of two opposite directions of the organizing
The plant consumes carbonic acid and gives out
in Nature.

dency
and gives out carbonic acid.
oxygen the animal inspires oxygen
this law of
animal
and
the
kingdoms, also,
vegetable
Throughout
world of
the
In
sex.
itself in the distinction of
polarity shows
again in
the
same
appears
polar opposition
spiritual life, also,
of religion
and
of
contrast
doing,
in
the
as
knowing
forms,
;

higher

But the most striking illustration of it is in that

and the state.
fre
have
law
of perception and thought, to which we
^so
great
discrimi
us
to
comes
only by
quently referred, that each cognition
We know what any
nation or difference, that is, by contrast.
Omnis deit is not.
is,
by distinguishing it from what
only
thing
terminatio est negatio.

law of polarization unde

Philosophy contemplates this universal
or
the form of triplicity, as Unity which is the Thesis, Duplicity

352
MODEfiN PHILOSOPHY.
Plurality which is the
Antithesis and the
these two, , e
. Many
regarded aVon!
ne
What iirst

ia

si

lils

Ie

V,

- -^

01

exists

"

Int

"

t!

>

itself or is
TI is
di]r
it ";:;!
opposite of itself; au d
othera
then these"?
oPPosites are mered
higher Unity, n ,, re
complete nud ,)!
tho A1 M)!llt( IH,-j.
.;,] AH ;,
inAiTtw
~"T
U1;
LS ?
;ui(i ( ^ ne
Lrod, is a full
exi)ressioi
v or Tot ^levery particular
t

re

?""*

>

,-

""

"

>

1>Iuilt

siib.staii(X

as

j"t

we"I

^itv. of
yr
1<lofll
::r
rlbiit

"

; s io,ete
,y

onsebelot"
U

lw<llll

"-"

cogui
refore, says Sch

rather

;^

ItTM

-.,

"

Gravity

,7 ;;

/.^

is

it

a union

vl1

f^u.

."

ested in

at tributes

^
^uvely

IPeueI
Matte

"

to its surface

11

with

^ctr

as

raliih v

element,

gravity, or

tf

P^.by

t(

itself.

if

"

is

this
"ent,

and

^.
stage,
a ;th

f;na\ ure

ne.

f^inthe

,,

Fol

"

C0me

ul

!^ f o
ui
e

,!

;,;,

Uutast

inte-

^"thesis

the former
ap-

"

I;i "-

\;

- -M-nl

^.^^^m P^omi-

the space

],

A~ -

con-

"

its

; d ,h

as

18

at(;

designated as

"

co

1)JU

,"

IVU

factor

comparativ
"

The

Ule

"

0faor
overpowers

SGC ud

or

p-ci P ie

"

the principle

Here we cannot
help ren

distinction of sex

ight, material

erely

form>

.ft
BO nw more

ih

is

^
/l^r^ ^

n Wt

surface

viud, ,.;,

cu

its

l-^Wes,

"

nn S:

"

""

the Ideal

hv

anything but

fancifu]
particles

ccLanicul l aws
rms under
dynamic laws.
"

ex,

nertia
J

J6 ?

2Sf

leave the

th

r"
r

male ele
which

^"V
0f

^"t

the
doct nne

that
P?ation
hlfluence
f

tO

the
>J

int

ormation, the formative

SCIIKLUXG.

353

Nature, begins to show itself, and lo advance from the

impulse,
lower to higher forms, Time
being the .schema of his progressive
The earliest shape or form which Matter
development.
assumes,
in

when

it leaves the
state of mere inert and
shapeless aggregation
which it is brought by
gravity, is that of the straight line.
The Force which thus arranges them in lines is the force of
Co
hesion,
the universal schema or
expression of this force is
^and
All outward Xature is one
magnetism.
and every
great magnet
particular substance, also, is a magnet.
Again, from the effort of different bodies to increase their own
ion, and to diminish the Qphcsioii of
other bodies in
5

into

contact
The body which suffers a
developed.
its cohesive force is said to
be positively,
ich the cohesion is
relatively increased is negatively
Still further; even the union of
Magnetism and Elec

\vifh

them, electricity
elative diminution of

tlui1

does

not,

is

represent the

totality of the dynamic process,

by Chemical action, which takes place through
the two former agents, and
appeal s in its most complete form Is
Galvanism.
Therefore, Magnetism, Electricity, and Galvanism
tricity

lirst

effected

are the three stages tf the

Dynamic process. The first of these is
relative identity or the Thesis, the second is
relative
duplicity or
plurality, the Antithesis, and Galvanism is relative
totality, or the
Synthesis.

The
with

two powers of Nature,

Gravity and Light, together
dynamic process which is conditioned by them, elevate

first

the

themselves into

a, third
Poteuz,
ernal material form is a
compact

Here the exOrganic Life.

body of determinate shape, contaming in itself a persistent principle of movement, a nisus formativui or continuous
tendency to development, so that its existence
belongs to Time as well as to Space.
The lower forms of nature s
prodacts have a permanent existence, or endure
unchanged; but
the organic life of the individual
has a beginning and an
end,
birth and death;
though the species to which this individual be
longs

is

perpetually reproduced, so that the idea or plan

is

per

petuated.

The living
as Vegetable,

organism develops itself under three distinct forms,

Animal, and Human Life, each having its distinctive
and independent
In plants, this is the
principle of development.
law ot reproduction; in animals that of
ihty belongs to man alone.
other
that is, as
;

tive

faculty

irritability

is

diminished;

irritability; while

sensi-

These exist in inverse ratio to each

becomes stronger, the mere
reproduc
and irritability again is
as
lessened,

354

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

sensibility

te*

trains

within

the

O^J^, T^*

d*

8pher e!
and deoxidation.
Ve- ot-ible 1 f
compounds of carbon.
en etc
animal consists in -ilis, rl
nitro<r

di/ing them again!

Iw.th of

de

p^sica]

oi

;!T,
vidualize
;

itself

built on Mio

remption, one

"

F?,

"

i,,

successive

io ni

lsteiltI

f/lf*

"

i<1(

by a process of

as,

-i

te

strives to

.v

the S!lme

verv"j

Tt

same

tlie

an<1

ut this

of the
species

one

11}<<

i;

"iuc

.,.,,

^ ^oxidizing the
We-process of the
n, and thus oxi-

res P irati

^tLZtSJ^

same plan.
l l(

rpetusi]]

GrowVnnf ^continuance

them phen

""*"

tendencies to
oxidation

self-di

1*

v a

"

^^ ^.^^^^^ ^^
co

"

,""

emimraneous and
1

I" .

l^. l! 11 /,

1] ir

.]., j,

"

it

.1

lli

\v.ith,wi

itJUb

"

s>

OX

the corals, and

**
I- case of
ev,n O f the I,, -V
^"^
Im
form a sort of
individuals, but
republic h-wino a leo
f i
e ative I!
The drone, the
worker, and the
queen-bee
j
IlMll)s
Thus the law of
f one
organism.
trinlicitv n
P ol ^ity reigns
Kature.
throughout external

^ r%
^

, |,

"

"^

Subjective phasis of the 1h

complement of th,
,
endowed with a ceaseW

^:-^ -A,,
"J

thegratification of the
v

i.uit

the Absolute.
d Action.

R<*1

lead

the

harm

fi

"

;t e

bein-

?^

Go

of his

reason

infinite

"?

"""f*

re;kS

,TcSciCnCe

WorM^beCT

The

actions,

prompt

essence of

"l

progressive

^^ ^^^ ^

"^.^^

objective
-.and the same end in vi
lm
mtion of reason s id
eas
Whi
e v
the
organic laws of that ffrea
^11 Nature or
the
of God
for the
World is nothtj
himself under

Sci

Acti

^
;

Jt

Action have

"P^ntation or real-

PP/hend through Science

develo P men t which we

**
F*
G
if f

^vine essence
by Action, when

Wlth

is t

1? T

? the Id
man festtion

forms

is

Science

finite

naturc

"

thc

;lt

Mttn the

""^

"

mi,

Two ways

or

"^

man con

glance

""^

:.

and the morali

y of
development of his ideas
,|

happiness

towards organic c,-eat

he cognition and

or
ail(1

than

? the
(1

"ing

revel

spirit

"ion

of

SCIIELLING.
reality the universal law of development and
with all our powers, strive to raise

355
harmony

humanity

to

when we,

perfectness

and

completion.
Science and Action, Truth and Goodness, eease to be
opposites
and are fused tog-ether in Art, which, as the creator of the beauti
ful, is the synthesis of the two.
Art is the complete and perfect
form under which the Infinite is represented to our reason.
The
images which it creates are something external and corporeal; but
it

makes these images

live, through infusing into them the breath

In these artistic creations, the Absolute
speaks
to us
immediately and unveiled, and shines around us with its God
like splendor.
What Science seeks in vain to accomplish through
the embodied operations of
thought, what morality holds out as a,
lofty but remote Ideal, wherewith to quicken and rouse our Will,

of the divine Idea.

that the Artist,

through a single creative act of his genius, places
directly before us in a living form.
Hence, Science leading to

Truth,

Morality guiding to Religion and right

creative of Beauty, are the three
potenzcs which
tality of the Ideal side of Nature.

action,

and Art

make up

the to

And yet Art is not, in every respect, an

adequate expression of
the Absolute.
This cannot be
revealed in
indi

completely
any
vidual thing, or any
It can
single representation of one Idea.
pour forth the inexhaustible fulness of its essence only in a mul
titude of individuals, who.
through harmonious organic laws, are
fused

together into that living unity which we call a State.

the external or
objective organism, which first brings
Freedom into haiaiony with compulsory Law, as well in the
ag
gregate life of the community, as in the single acts of the individ
ual citizen, arid which, after the divine
prototype, is the artistic

This

is

forging together into one body, Incinsbildiing, of morality and re

The State is the realization of the idea
ligion, art arid science.
of Right,

Again, as a merely external and objective manifestation of the

Absolute, the State must have as its complement an Ideal factor
;

and

God

this is Religion, or the Church.

in his infinite revelation and

revelation of

Religion

is

the intuition of

development of himself.

God

finds

This

its

highest expression in History, that grand

manifestation, on the theatre of the universe, of the process of de
velopment of human freedom and civilization.
The succession of
events which the historian
is not a blind mechanism

contemplates

of physical causes and effects, under the

despotic rule of necessity ;
neither is it a picture of
humanity driven forward by the fierce

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

356

impetuosity of blind passions and appetites, without any determi

nate aim or law of action.
Philosophy perceives that human life
is

neither impelled by thoughtless caprice nor shaped by the stem

but in the steady development of the

necessities of physical law;

human race, it perceives the
of

Tlm>,

tion of
tin.:

agency of divine Providence, the work

iod himself.

History comes back to Religion, to the immediate revela

As Nature,
to man and the return of man to God.

God

All of corporeal things, finds its highest expression in Man, so

rises bv a continuous development in Science and Art, Mo-

3Ian

to unity with God, the absolute identity of all

intuition of this unity with the Absolute
intellectual
things.
is
Philosophy, which, as tin: universal essence of reason, unites iu
ralitv

and Religion,

The

itself all the

them

other expressions of spiritual

iu their absolute identity.

life,

and comprehends

CHAPTER
HEGEL.

XIX.

ALL RESOLVED

I.

IXTO ONE.

GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERIC HEGEL,

the founder of the third

Absolute based upon the principles of Kantian
metaphysics, was born at Stuttgard in 1770, and died of the
cholera at Berlin in 1831.
His life was an uneventful one, de
voted with indefatigable industry to the
of his theo

philosophy of

tlu;

development

ries,

the usual

Germany

round

affording

of

him

occupations for

a livelihood, at first

an

academic

man

in

narrow and poverty-

stricken, and only becoming reputable and independent when he

was well advanced in years. In 1818, he succeeded Fichte as

professor of philosophy in the University of Berlin, the highest

post of honor and emolument then open to a metaphysician in all
Europe.
Previously, as schoolmaster, editor, author, privat-docent,
and ordinary professor in one of the lesser German
universities,

he had earned his bread and acquired some

but noth
reputation
After his removal to Berlin, his fame blazed forth like
ing more.
a meteor, and his philosophy became the
leading topic of the day,
not merely in academic circles and schools of
theology, but in.
literature, politics, and art.
in
Hegelianism was debated iiot
;

only
the Universities, its proper home, but in the council
chamber, in
the halls of legislation, in the popular
journals, and even in the
marts of commerce.
are told, that the first question which
was asked respecting any person who appeared
likely to obtain
distinction and power in
any career whatsoever was, Is lie, or is he
Parties were formed, and vehement discussions
not, a Hegelian?

We

ensued between them, in respect to the

proper interpretation of
Hegel s doctrines, and the right application of them in theology,

These parties long survived the

politics, legislation, avid history.
death of u the Master," as he was called
by his admiring disciples
of whichever faction
and it is only within a few years that we
have ceased to hear much about
Young Hegelians and Old Hegel
ians, Hegelians of the Centre, the right Centre, the Left, and the
extreme Left; though many of the eminent men are still living and
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

358

who wore long

active

familiarly

known

as

constituting these dis

tinct schools.

The

popularity and influence of Hegel s speculations appear the

as they are more refined and subtle, and arc

more remarkable,

phraseology more repulsive and dillicult to be under

any philosophical doctrine that has been broached since
tin- days ot
lleraclitus the Obscure.
Kven one who has fully
mastered the
Critique of Pure Reason," and the Wissenschaftsli lu
may still shrink from grappling with the
Phenomenology of

clothed

in

stand, than

the

and the

Spirit,"

The
on

"

Knevclopa-dia of the Philosophical

Sciences."

told of Ilegid, that he remarked despondently, when

I
shall leave behind me in all Kurope but one
death-bed,

story

liis

"

is

man who understands my philosophv and lie don

Dr. Stir
ling, an enthusiastic Scotch disciple, who has spent years in Ger
t."

many

intense study of the system, has published, in two bulky

Secret of Hegel." But it is a
Secret"

in

octavos, what he calls the

"

"

all, only ou a
very imperfectly divulged
corner of the subject, and the writer himself sees lit to discourse ill
that anta<tic. jerkv, and discursive style, full of queer conceits and
;

since

it,

touches, after

labored intensities of expression, which Thomas Carlyle once made

popular, though it is sure to prove a Xosiis-shirl to any one who
has not

After

arlyle
all.

geniu>.

Hegel

guage,

is

not a poMtively bad writer, like Kant.

resources of the German

command of the vast

and often cxprees him-elf

has a large

with

much

force, terseness,

lie
lan

and

and occasionally with tingling wit am sarcasm.

lint he is
crabbed, and obscure, through the constant and excessive
use, or rather abuse, of the most repul.-ivc terminology, the most
uncouth jargon of technical terms, that the perverse ingenuity of
point,

har.>h.

man

ever invented.

In the pedantic employment of this barbarous

he out-herods Herod; in comparison with his, even Kant s
In re
technical phraseology appears almost pure and classical.

dialect,

spect to this profusion of ab-tru-e technicalities, a mastery of

is the shibboleth of the sect, Menzel, himself a German,
says,

which
Let

a person read a philosophical work of Hegel, and ask himself if

there ever was a nation in the world, who would acknowledge such
a language as its own."
And there is this further evil attendant
of such a pedantic dialect, that after one has, by dint
become conversant with it, his own thought involun
tarily assumus this garb, and he fancies that he has discerned new
truths, or new confutations of old errors, when in fact he has been

upon the use

of hard work,

occupied only in translating what was familiarly

kuowu

iuto

new

HEGEL.

359

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

I.

He mistakes the acquisition of another lan

forms of expression.
In the writings of
the
for
diseovery of another science.
guage
Dr. Stirling and Mr. Wallace, who are far the ablest English dis
of llegelianism, I think one may sometimes
and
expositors
detect this unintentional substitution of words for thoughts.
ciples

On

its

native ground, the use of this metaphysical jargon seems to be

Since the deatli of Ilegel, a new generation
rapidly dying out.
have arisen, who refuse to undertake the drudgery of mastering its
details,

and who contemptuously reject the system because

unintelligible.

Another obstacle

in the

way

of understanding Ilegel arises

it

is

from

in the resolute and thorough

the encyclopedic vastness of his aims
all the sciences, all
he
turns
in
which
topsy-turvy
manner,
;

going
departments of

them

human

in the Titanic

life,

to enfold
thought, and action, in order

arms

of his system,
true or absolute

The
at his bidding.
contain in itself, not only the

and compel them to dance

philosophy, he says, must

antecedent philo
principles of all
the doctrines of morality, religion, and
the ideas which have ever contributed to unfold
politics, and all
the destiny, and promote the progress and culture, of the human
Jt must explicate at once the philosophy of history and the
race.
eacli to its source in the development
history of philosophy, tracing
which
fundamental
one
one
of
principle of thought,
grand Idea,
unites and reconciles all oppositions and contrasts, and leaves
whether as an
nothing unexplained in the nature and life of man,

sophical systems, but

all

Philosophy, he says still more audaciously,

the representation of God as he was in his eternal essence,
and be
before the creation of the world or of any finite being
office of philosophy is to repeat in
the
at
this
point,
ginning
how the universe of all that
thought the act of creation, showing
is
evolved
has
ever
and
all
that
been,
by successive steps out of
is,
Immanent
Dialectic," or the neces
calls
he
what
nothing, through
in
inherent
is
which
pure thought.
sary process of logic
Of course, the system which is to accomplish this grand result
must be based, in the first place, upon absolute Idealism for if

individual or a race.
u

is

"

the universe exists only in thought,

it

be comparatively easy
constructed out of pure

will

the process through which it is

in character; for
thought; and secondly, it must be pantheistic
is identified with All, can All be developed out
as
One
far
so
only
and only so far as man s thought is identical with God s
of One
creation be repeated or followed by the
thought, can the act of
human mind. The system starts with the assumption, that Thought

to trace

360

2IJDERX PHILOSOPHY.

and Being are idcnhVii

one.

onlv^o

n
W e colp
r

as

oti.u

ore,,,,.,,
or in some other
min d.
^"
of each of its ,,
lrN

A /d

bd
t!

"

t^T

(^

f; r

vvhu

^-^ oVt Cgene^^

Inin<1

of the

tl-a!,s ,,,
;"H

tos of the

,,,.,

Vtl

,.

n,,,,,
!

a,;;;;,:!::/r ;;^ ---o--nvU

ti^ ami acculeutal For !,
,^T
an(

7^^~M^^

b hl
=

ri

1)n

aui ^"ce,a,d a

- -.,,

,,,<

^
^

,j

,.;:;

,,,,

illH

(1

o, lt

o,-vi,,

h, m

successive

_u-h
t..

Phantasnw,

,,,>

-n

from Aristotle
hi,

of

r.

Ullimi)or

-it

lef

^^ M

out some

pheuome-

necessary process

-"lin !,
(

\r

f;:

:IK

"

of

iu

:;

,;:

illston

.;;

r;

Pr ......

ie

ith<)i

prLent

Mi.-unt^M.s

wL

,1

c
;,,"

"

;
"

-- i--

|1,,.

Tw

"

ms

"

i, e ct

that

|, ic .|,

"-

"

ot at

"1

h :IVC learn
ed, if not
ure u
.-

"""

.1
,"

iiic

nay

n^i

-"

,!,-,,.,

co,,,:;,l ;; L ;
i, s Matter
or

, m i-

the individual
tljings
Co 8ciou! e88.

fhj

to

1(

we

<*.

Itis

"""

lvo

of

tllc

"

--

o|)j

e X-

litios

be explained

to

^
T
^^
^^^
^l^

are

th.

"

sS
IV.,,,,

,"

stens

,,;:/

u-],ich

widely

"

,
I>

V vhch

Selianism, briefly expresed

the -rid is a
crysLliii

is

,,

ndivW

all

Tir^
i abstract
r
the S^ral

"r.
aildI
""

H-^or.xi,,,,;

itw Mh

Logic

"

the

-vnTlf^

trace the

h>

tears.

ij

;: t

-^f:;^^^

and

or self-develon

include

living body,

"e

-iis

-.-

wil]

-^ -, y

iii

-"^-""umi^,^^^^^
only in thought, i is evide
t

v, H

^-

acquaintance

J--"i-ht

conception of the class to which

"on of
consciousnes
ho
e
To explain the oH i
the
o

-ce

^-

,; ;:;r

Phonal

^"

sona] knou-led-eof the

""essential,

non.no, them

;mr !i|it ;
biped and tu,,-l 1;111

lwt

es seatia

with them, but

simply a*

>

true

fle

:i

;U1 ,1

;UT

objects tha

is

>

ii;

th(

whole,

ff

mbd

"

"*

ll

atti

"

""7

da?

-7

<"

<"

tf
tr le of

mc

HEGEL.

I.

361

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

whether ideal or real, to which our thoughts may be directed.

Hence, the science is not an organon, or a means of increasing our
test of the validity or
knowledge and it furnishes only a negative
;

If the
the knowledge already in our possession.
but
reasoning be incorrect in Form, the conclusion is invalid
even if correct in form, the conclusion may be wrong, because de
and Logic as such has no concern
rived from wrong premises
That consideration be
of the
with the truth or

correctness of

premises.
But as understood by Hegel,
longs to the Mutter of Thought.
its great function being
or
science,
material
is
a
metaphysical
Lo^ic
the evolution of truth, and in fact the creation of the universe,
falsity

of thinking.
through the generative power of the mere process
his theory, there is no receptivity of mind, but every
to
According
of pure thought.
Beginning
thing is evolved by the spontaneity
with the loftiest of all abstractions, with pure and universal Being,
which, because absolutely indeterminate or without attributes, is
3

not distinguishable from Xon-being. the mere process of thinking

into the world of concrete realities
develops this shadow of a shade

which appear

to be manifested to sense.

lean hardly suppose

to

be hoped that

nal principle of

whatever

is

it

Hegel

Real

is

that this

will
s

as yet;
intelligible
as we go on.

is

become clearer
system

is

but

it is

cardi

that
thus enunciated by him
is Rational is Real.
:

Rational, and whatever

and it will be found to mean,

Explicate this comprehensive maxim,
that whatever
that the law of thought is also the law of things
I necessarily think, must present itself objectively to my conscious
that the mind, or rather the
ness, as at least an empirical reality
;

we must

use pantheistic phrases now,

minds being reduced to one, the typical one corre
notion of its class, and this one
sponding to the Concept or general
that this universal con
be in L; identified with the mind of God,
sciousness. I say. has a natural and necessary order of development
for

universal consciousness,
all

individual

thinks according to imperative laws, only the

and that
uch thinking being what we call "rational
nal reality, all that is or ever lias been, must be capa
tion, or

;"

these categories of thought, or of explanation

of the one all-comprehensive Process,
through which the particular is educed from the universal, the All
from the One.
here a difficulty presents itself, in the shape of a very in

ble of
as

reduction

inevitable

to

Moments

P>ut

convenient

test of

only well founded

If it be not
system.
as
a
or
whole, but
general conception,

the validity of the whole

in

its

362

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
the

also, as

Master

"

and

his

disciples

successfully worked out in all

adequate and rational explanation of

so

far

maintain,

its

all

if

past

has been

it

an
and present phe

parts, as

to

afford

if all
that is now, or ever has been, present to con
sciousness conforms to this exposition of its nature and
origin,
thru Hegelianism should he capable of
answering all demands that

nomena,

may he made upon it, and of revealing the secrets of the future,
as well as unriddling all the enigmas of our
present and past ex
I call this an inconvenient
istence.
test, since it is an awkward
trial
In-in

any one

f<r

ii

to

be compelled to prophesy, under

penalty of
it
the events do not conform to the

discredited altogether,

Accordingly, we detect some shuilling among the

So fur, indeed, as the History of Phi
Hegelians upon this point.
losophy is concerned, all is plain we have only to regard Hegelprediction.

ianiMii as a

culmination of the speculative spirit, and

therefore as ilia Absolute Philosophy,
beyond which there is no
progress, and. conseqently. no future systems whose rise is to be
But in respect to the
of
the case
predicted.
linality, the,

Philosophy

History,

here indefinite progress, or at any rate, un

ceasing change, whether for the better or the worse, must be an
and to determine the laws, or write out a
ticipated
p rlori the
history, of what is to be man s future experience upon earth, is
is

very different

for

more than the most daring spceulatist will venture to attempt.

Yet consistency requires him who dogmatically asserts that all
which has been is but the necessary evolution of the principles set
forth in his theory, to be
equally positive and unerring in the ap
plication of the same principles to the record of the future.
3Iy present purpose, however,

is

not to criticise, but to expound

1 have commented
Ilegeliani.-m.
upon this single point, merely in
order to call attention for a moment to that endless
diversity of
human affairs, that ever changing lot of man upon earth, which
bears so .strong testimony to the perfect freedom of the human will,

of the elforts made by speculative fatalists to

regard all
events as necessarily determined by the universal laws which
they
have evolved either from a past experience, or from the depths of
in

>pite

own consciousness.
One source of the great

their

popularity of

llegelianism, especially

with politicians and theologians, may he found in its conciliatory

character.
It has a
strong tendency to bridge over the separation
of parties and differences of creeds, and to effect compromises be

tween jarring opinions.

It bears a catholic
aspect, and seems to
opeu its arms in order to gather into one fold the inmates of many

HEGEL.

I.

863

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

The
fierce war upon each other.
camps, who had hitherto waged
enables
law of trichotomy, which is the basis of the Hegelian logic,
melt them into one
us to take up any two contradictory ideas, and
a consistent
both.
them
Hence,
includes
which
synthetic notion,
and expert Hegelian may repeat any theological creed, join any
or defend any philosophical system, without prejudice
political party,
At one time, Hegel
to the opinions which he formerly avowed.
as a
himself was vehemently accused of abandoning his principles
with the Con
hand
and
heart
and
Reformer,
a
and
Liberal
joining
servatives in Church and State, who, in return, freely dispensed

Even Schwegler, who

his disciples.
patronage to him and
extent his admirer and disciple, asserts that Hegel,
and the bureaucracy
through his connection with the government
for himself, but the
influence
not
of Prussia,
only acquired political
his tenets having
credit for his system of being a state-philosophy,
determinate
a
to
theologi
such official sanction as is usually given
and he adds, that this
cal creed by a union of Church and State
did not always promote the
artificial superiority over other systems
its moral worth.
increase
or
his
of
freedom

official

was

to a great

internal

philosophy,
a dis
accusation was unjust, so far as it imputed to Hegel
his
of
for the essence
philosophy consists^not only
honest motive
and identity under
contradiction
under
in finding everywhere unity
and heresy merely as partial ap
difference, but in regarding error
^

The

As

all

all

and

all

sys

events,
opinions,
prehensions of the truth.
of develop
tems are but Moments of the great Process, or stages
own
their
bear
justification
ment of the one Absolute Idea, they
Each is the necessary result of that which pre
along with them.
each is at
ceded it, and of its own environment of circumstances
realization
the
towards
a
the
to
truth,
step
least an approximation
link of the chain which binds
what is rational, an
;

indispensable

of

for ef
Hence, the system is one admirably adapted
out
differences
old
and
of
a
burying
parties,
^of
fecting
junction
the other hand, the same peculiarity gives it an ambig
sight. On
of inter
uous or Protean aspect, and makes its doctrines uncertain
flame
so that the former oppositions and contrasts may
all into

one.

pretation,

of hostile principles
any moment. The conciliation
a
theory, and
is
based
which
metaphysical
and interests,
only upon
is not likely to
that one oL indistinct speech and doubtful import,
Hence the dissensions, to which I have
continuance.
be of

out mruiii at

long
out in the school immediately after
already alluded, as breaking
into parties that
the death of its founder, and which separated it
The
attrition.
mutual
philosophy of
other
each
soon destroyed
by

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
Hegel had
present,

brilliant success for a

time, but its career
as effete as Scholasticism.
After

it is

was short

at

enjoying an unprece

dented triumph, after

coloring every form of German speculation
in
philosophy and theology for nearly half a century, a reaction has
sprung up against it on its own ground, and
appears to be now
rapidly hurrying it into oblivion.

The two most important works

others are

founded, are the

published in 1807, and the

or seven
years afterwards.
ot each other, the former

"

of Ifegel,

upon which

all

the

Spirit."

fir<t

"

Phenomenology
Science of

Logic,"

These two.

of

the.

which appeared six

in fact,

are complements

aiming to demonstrate the principles of

his
system by the analytic method, resolving the complex
phenom
ena of consciousness into their elements and thin
reaching at last
the Absolute Idesi, whence
they are all successively developed
and
the Logic
beginning, where the Phenomenology leaves off, with
pure or absolute thought, and thus through synthesis,
tracing up
wards iis self-evolution,
by a continuous application of its Imma
nent Dialectic, and by what
as successive acts of
;

into the concrete universe as

appears
creation,
now manifested to the senses and the

The Phenomenology

understanding.

resolves

the

All

into

One,

Login develops One into the All.

Tin: Absolute Idea, which
is reached
only as the termination ot the analytic process, is that
which forms the beginning, the
of
in
the,

point

evolution of the system.

As

have

the synthetic
departure,
essence of ideal pan

said, the

theism consists in regarding all determinate

being, all individual
forms of concrete existence, a* mere
phenomenal manifestations of
the universal and the absolute.
The Phenomenology attempts, by
an effort of pure reason, to demonstrate the
unreality or purely
sul.jeetive and spectral character, of all that now
appears, bv fol
lowing back the history of an individual consciousness through the
unconscious or unremembered
steps, by which it seemed to awake
from nothingness into lite, and then
proceeded to construct in
thought the apparent universe with which it is now surrounded.
then, with this, the
analytic, portion of the system.
perceptions of sense have to do exclusively with the Single
and the Immediate; that is, at
anyone moment, with some oiie

We^begin,

The

lorm

of

tiling

which

individual

and

perfectly

determinate existence.

Any

is

immediately cognized by sense, for instance, a piece

a pen, or a book, is
presented to us immediately as t/tis
ofj>aper.
thing, existing now and here.
this
Every
"

whether
place

it

(hoc,

was,

is,

or will

/ucccei(as),

must have its own one time and

be now and here.
This
is the es-

past, present, or future,

"

"

HEGEL.

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

I.

sence of an individual phenomenon of immediate consciousness ;

But in truth,
now" and "here" are its only possible forms.

which

neither of these is immediately known, and the individuality

the Universal in
they seem to manifest is a mere illusion, is only
is "Now?" the answer, we will
What
To
the
question,
disguise.

and we will write down this answer,

now, it is day
suppose, is,
as an intuition of sense, and therefore a truth immediately known,
But we have only to wait till sundown, and the truth
or certain.
"

"

thus written

down becomes

a lie; for,

now

it is niyltt.

to the intuitions of sense, each and every moment of

or will be Now.
Thus, far from being individual,

universal designation of time.

To the question,
the others.

is

But

tree."

becomes a

have only

for lo

Hi- re

And it
What is

Here

"

turn round, and

to

"

"

just so in regard to both

is
"

Evidently,
time was, is,
Now is a

Here
answer too

answer,

this

"

"

Here,"
then, though
apprehended by sense as singular or individual, is really a univer
In like manner, this
sal designation for any object whatsoever.

lie,

"

is

house."

being the designation of only one object,

and
immediately known as such, is really a universal name for each
them
each
of
since
in
the
universe
bit
of
become,
may
every
paper
to any person now taking cognizance of it through his senses,
bit of paper, instead of

"

bit of paper.
I borrow, from Mr. Wallace s translation, Hegel s own state
ment of another instance.
Similarly, when I say I, I mean my
but what I say, namely,
single Self to the exclusion of all others
"

this

"

is

I,

from

it is

But

which

in

like

manner excludes

others

all

is

is

I
it in common with me to be
just
mine.
to
be
and
sensations
conceptions
my
in the abstract, as such, is the mere act of concentration

All other

sality.

I,

the absolute universal; and community or as

one of the forms, though an external form, of univer
I

itself.

sociation

as

every

just

common

men have

to

all

or reference to Self, in which

we make

from every

abstraction from

all

con

mind and

peculiarity of
feeling,
To this extent, I means the
nature, talent, and experience.
existence of a wholly abstract universality, a principle of abstract
freedom.
Thought, viewed as a Subject, is expressed by the word

ception and

state of

and since I am at the same time in all my sensations, con

ceptions, and states of consciousness, thought is everywhere pres
ent, and is a category that runs through all these modifications."
Moreover, the single or determinate is necessarily finite, and
therefore limited, or bounded, being. But where its limit or bound
I

ary comes,

its

being ceases, and something else,

"

the other

"

ot

it-

366

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

self.
open space, for instance,
begins; and tin s is the negation,
or non-being, of what we started
with, namely, the individual and
concrete.
Hence, every single being, because determinate, leads

directly to that which

what

it

is.

iifin

is

is

it

cst
ncgatio ; \\
substance, because

other" or
negation of itself; it is
not something else.
Oinnis dcfcnnihard, for instance, because it is not soft; it
is not attribute;
or attribute, because not

is

only because

"the

it

is

substance.

Therefore, single or individual being, because

always
and mingled with, its "other" or
contradictory, that
is.
non-being or nothing, cannot lie true and pure Being, which must
Hut this true and pun; .eing
always be itself and nothing else.
must be the imf-nnif/Ie, uot-indirniuid ; that
is, it must be the UnC
lea. ling

nn

to.

versal.
We approach this true Being just so far as we leave be
hind us the single, the Unite, and the determinate, and therefor*!
rise
higher in the scale of generality, and approximate to the All, the

I niversid. the Indeterminate.

The Universal is the Concept, the
general Idea, of the class or whole to which the individuals
belong.
Thus, individual men and animals
quickly pass away, die. and are
resolved into their elements.
lint the
species or genus, the typical
man or animal,
;,]] O f
them, persists, and endmx s for
representing
ever as the universal Idea.
In this Idea, as I have already
said,
are present all the
necessary and essential attributes of the species;
all the rest,
belonging exclusively to one individual or another, i.s
accidental and
The most general of all is flic Idea, or
transitory.

pure Thought
definite

in

quality,

its,.

If;

from

free

from

any

individuality:

mingled with any Non-being, but

and for

all

is

determinateness, from every

Being that, is not

pure and Absolute

Being

in

it>elf.

Perhaps enough has been said to make plain what is the start
ing point of Ilegelianism, and the kind of reasoning
whereby we
are conducted to it.
But I will add one other consideration, taken
irom the subjective aspect of the
question.

The ground of our

erroneous conviction that the individual as
cogni/ed by sense is
true or real being is, that the
Ego imtiwUnti-hj apprehends it as

As Sir W. Hamilton would say, I am

directly or immedi
conscious
of this individual
ately
perception, for instance, of the
written paper now before me.
But Hegel answers, consider first,
that such
involves two individual
perception
such.

necessarily

factors,

Ego, or the individual I who perceive, and this paper as the

Since both these factors must be
object of the perception.
present
in order to constitute the
it is evident that each is con
tins

perception,

ditioned by the other

in

other words,

it

could not exist

except

HEGEL.

367

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

I.

medium

or intervention of the other. Then, neither is

can have the certainty of perception only through
and the paper
the other, that is, through the paper perceived
The
cannot he perceived except through me as perceiving it.
enables me to be conscious of myself as perceiving; but
//rough the

immediate.

paper

is no
certainty of the existence of the paper, except through
But it is reasoning in a circle, first
existence
as perceiving it.
my
to prove
first, to give me conscious
by B, and then B by
ness of mvself through the paper, and then assurance of the paper

there

through

my

consciousness of

self.

Then,

Ego and

this

this

sheet

of paper are equally unreal, mere phenomenal manifestations of

the Universal, the Absolute, the. Idea.
If perception of individual things by the senses is thus a source
only of illusion and error, can we acquire any clearer and better

founded knowledge of them through reflection, which is the opera

As we do not perceive a t-ree, for in
tion of the Understanding?
stance, in its true being, through the faculty of sense, let us ex
amine the process through which we attempt to conceive it, by the
action of thoitf/hf, i. e., by reflecting upon the essential attributes of
to which it belongs.
the whole class of objects
-namely, trees
How do we conceive li tree in general, and not merely this or that
"

particular tree

We

first

conceive

it

as the universal substance,

here incorporated and fixed

in this particular instance by a definite form,
say, by the special
other
of
and
the
leaves, fruit,
trunk,
branches,
size,
shape,
qualities
Just so, we may regard
etc.. of this one specimen now before us.
"

treedom

"

it

might be

called,

which

is

whatso
triangularity as the universal substance of all
triangles
as embodied in the particular dimen
ever, and this u universal
"

"

"

sions of the sides and angles of the one triangle now drawn upon
the blackboard.
Or we may take, with equal propriety, just the
reverse, method
we may regard the substance, or particular Mat
:

the special and determinate

universal attributes or properties of
ter, as

unity, in which the

trees
namely, having

form or
all

and blossoms
are here united or
These attributes then appear as the more Universal,
and the definite form of their union in this one case as the Indi

root, trunk, branches, leaves,

embodied.

Thirdly, we may help ourselves out of the

perplexity arising from the opposition of these two methods by
tree
as the product of a single tree-producing
considering the
Force in Nature, expressing or developing itself according to def

vidual or Particular.

"

"

This Power, which we generally call

organic or physical Force, this general principle of creation, for-

inite internal physical laws.

368

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

mation, and self-development, expresses itself here, in an individ

ual and determinate manner, in this
particular tree
just as, else
where, it shou-s itself in all other trees.
But this same physical
Force reveals itself, not only in trees, but in countless other
phys
ical object,-,
in the formation of the chemical
elements, in dif
:

ferent plants, minerals, animals, etc.

In short, by the idea of
or Force, we understand a universal relation or law of
Nature and of our own consciousness the law,
namely,

Power

whereby

anything docs not stand in need of any other tiling, outside of itdeli, iu order to complete and furnish forth its own deJinite exist
ence
but it develops all that it is out of itself alone.
Now. through this conception or intuition, call it which we
may,
of an immanent or
indwelling Power or Force to develop one s
self, we are raised to a higher stage of our consciousness, and into
;

a wholly new circle of

thought.
According to the common view,
both in sensation and reflection, a
fvreiyn object, a Non-Ego,
stands over against the
and these two
subjective

consciousness,
together, namely, the Object and the Subject, first create a whole,
which is the representation or mental
picture of the Object. Here,
a difference of opinion exists
upon the question which of these two
factors is the
necessary and the universal, and which furnishes only
the limiting and individual element.
According to one theory, the
universal of our subjective Sensation is limited and individualized
by the determinateness of the Object to which we refer this Sen
sation
according to the other, the universal objective essence, the
being of things in general, is restricted and made finite through the
definite forms in which
But the
they are apprehended by us.
ground of opposition between the two opinions falls away, when
we have learned to know things as the
identity of the immanent
Power or Force and its Manifestation.
Every thing then appears
to us as a unit
complete in itself, and shut off from every thing
;

an essence unfolding itself from itself, and

referring it
in one word, as an
itself;
Then
Ego, I myself.
falls away also the
opposition between ourselves and the objects of
our perception and thought; for we are ourselves
just such a
Power or Force, which unfolds or develops itself from and
As a tree develops itself from the seed, first into
through itself.
the tender shoot, then into a
sapling, and so into the fully formed
trunk with its wealth of branches, foliage, and fruit, all
by an
inherent vegetative force which was
perfect, though latent, in its
feast developed form, the seed
so the human mind, the
Ego of
consciousness, even in its infantine state, has the latent aiid iutriiielse;

self

as

back

to

HEGEL.

369

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

I.

it from without,
the universe of perceptions,
thoughts, cognitions, and feelings, which form the theatre on which
"Wo
need not external objects to enable our
it acts its ideal life.

sic

power, without any agencies operating upon

of subsequently developing itself into

consciousness

to

run

this,

destined, career

its

but

it

contains

the forms and determinations, through which it is

Our consciousness is Self-consciousness.
successively expressed.
Each is but the expression of
are one.
the
the
tree
and
Ego
Xay.

within itsrh

all

the oilier
each is but the manifestation of one intrinsic imma
nent Force.
Every thing is Ego, and so also is Man.
lint
need not carry any further this analysis and explanation
;

Phenomenology, which

the foreporch or introduction to

a portion
Ilegelianism.
Strictly speaking, it does not constitute
of the svstem itself, but is only a preparation for it, an attempted
demonstration of the principle from which it is to start, and of the
of the

method which

it is

to follow.

is

Hegel himself

calls

it

his

voyage of

a rigorously logi
discovery, the result of his endeavors to find, by
cal examination of the sources and nature of human knowledge,

some one absolute principle, some firmly set basis of science, whence
could be deduced and demonstrated, in proper order and connec
tion, not only all that now appears perceptible to sense or cogniza
ble by the understanding, but an explanation of the history of
things, and of the rise and progress of the universe as it is now
present to our thought.

have already

cited

his

criticism of the

the Absolute, the starting point

of all inquiry and the origin and foundation of all existence, ap
an arbitrary assumption,
pears, as it were, shot out of a pistol,
because something must be taken for granted, or phi
made

philosophy of Schelling,

that, in

it,

only
losophy will have no rest for the sole of her foot, and the secret why
this universe is manifested to us rather than any other, or why any
universe, indeed, should exist, either in appearance or in reality,
In opposition to this loose and
will remain forever undivulged.
uncritical procedure, Hegel claims to have demonstrated in the

Phenomenology,

that individual

and concrete existences, appearing

before consciousness as perceived by sense or cognized in thought,

are unreal and illusive, mere phenomenal manifestations of the one

Absolute a-ul Universal Being, perfectly indeterminate, which, by

an inherent power, an
Immanent Dialectic," develops itself into
To follow and explain, step by
^11 that has been, is, or will be.
from the One, is what
step, this process of development of the All
"

Hegel claims to have accomplished in his philosophy.

Let us admire first the boldness of the undertaking,
24

to ex-

370

MODI-KX PHILOSOPHY.

plain every thing which is in heaven or on earth

by the mere evo
lution of logical
thought, whose spontaneous movement produces,
out of itself, on the one hand, the material
universe, and on the
other, the intelligible or ideal world as it is
to conscious

present

These two worlds, indeed, are at bottom identical with each

other, being two similar though opposite manifestations of a
ness

single
The absolute Idea of Hegel, unlike the universal substance
of Spinoza, is
it is
essentially subjective
Spirit or K^o.
Hence,
the proper name of the
Absolute Idealism!"
system is
Now, all
Spirit or Thought is one. individual differences, as \ve ],. IV(

force.

SOCI1?

being merged

in

the

universality of

the Absolute.

Hence, the

mind

of man, because it is identical with the divine

or universal
thought, can think over again, or re-create in thought, the move
ment which first constituted, and still constitutes, the real and ideal
universe.
rniversal history, the
history of the human mind, of
the sciences and the arts, of morals,
laws, customs, religion, and
all will be
philosophy.
reproduced and explained by the selfevolution of thought from
or
Absolute Ideal
pun-

ism aspires
or rather

lieing,
Nothing.
nothing less than omniscience, to the science
does not merely aspire to, but declares thai, it

to

it

this science, which is

inherent, though
and needs only to be unfolded
by a process which
and requires only to be observed, not to be

possesses,

<,f

latent, in
is

(Jod

actually
itself,

spontaneous,

guided.

According even to the common notion, (iod, being the principle

and cause of every
must, for that
reason
in
thing,
very
possess
himself alone the supreme
knowledge O f causes and principle-;, the
science of the essence of things
and it is
of man to

worthy

after

this

divine science.

Nothing

is

aspire

possible

except

through

thought; and every reality presuppose.-, ;l thought equal, to itself.

No iinite being can exhaust in thought the
reality of all that ex
ists, and still less can it
and
comprehend the
possibility

of

all

things.

Then

perfectly conceives
real

and

there
all

must be an

possibility

as

inlinite

possible,

reality

intelligence,

and

all

which

reality as

this

Uut according to what we

intelligence is God.
learned, all difference and plurality
being done away
with, the divine and the human are one, and man s
spirit itself is
identical with this infinite
must
of
;

now

have

We

intelligence.
say
every
thing which exists, that it exists and is maintained by an eter
nal act of
knowledge on the part of the Absolute and the spirit
of man, being itself the
Absolute, has the faculty of reproducing
;

freely,

edge

through speculative

and true philosophy

is

thought, this eternal act of knowl

nothing else than such reproduction.

HEGEL.

371

ALL RESOLVED INTO ONE.

I.

world, says Hegel, is a flower which proceeds eternally from

This flower is the divine Idea, absolute and uni
its
and
versal
unfolding into full blossom is the

The

a single germ.

spontaneous

self-development of pure thought.

As Dr. Stirling acutely observes, the

systems of Locke and

Heijel, though they are seemingly opposites, are really comple

Locke
ments of eacli other, and thus, in one sense, are identical.
sen
from
are
abstractions
abstract
or
general ideas,
says. Concepts,

and Ilegel only begins at the other end when he says,

that sensations are concretions from Concepts or abstract ideas.
Here, au ain, we perceive the conciliatory character of the Hegelian
sations

resolves apparent contradiction into unity, and

us to say with impunity, and even with a sem
enables
thereby
blance of great profundity of thought, that black is white. But the
an improvement on
philosophy of Ilegel, Dr. Stirling claims, is

method, which

that of

Locke,

which
begins with pure abstract thought,

in that it

by its own
and finite
while the objects of sense, because passive and inert,
distinctions
are incapable of evolution through their own power into higher
It seems to me, however, that this advantage is counter
forms.
alive in itself," and is therefore able
so to speak,
forms
activity to clothe itself with successive concrete
"

is,

balanced by a great defect; for pure thought, through excessive

abstraction, has been divorced even from the thinker; and without
the cooperation of the Ego, it does not appear, in any proper
sense, to be

"

alive,"

or to be capable of exercising any function of

life.

En order to

make more

clear

what

is

to follow,

something should

explanation of Hegel s peculiar use of words,

not
1 shall
attempt, in what follows, always to employ the
though
words in the perverted meaning which he attaches to them. Ab
stract and concrete have, in his philosophy, almost the opposite of

here

be said

in

The Idea in its concrete state represents,

their ordinary meaning.
in his system, infinite virtuality, or the yet undeveloped capacity
becoming something else. It is the state of involution or poten
all is as yet involved in one.
Things are abstract
tiality, in which
when they have been evolved, or, as it were, drawn out into actuThus,
from this their hitherto ideal or potential condition.
3.1ity
abstraction is riot a quality, considered apart from its subject, but a
regarded separately from the idea which is its essence.
In order to explain the three technical phrases, an sich, fur sicn,
an und fur sich, the frequent use of which makes Hegel s exposi
tion of his system so obscure, I borrow with some abridgment the

of

thin"-

"

...

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

372

language and illustrations of Mr. Wallace.

in

That

is

an

sicJi

which

or implicit
it is
given in the germ, but is, as yet, un
It is the potential as
developed.
opposed to the actual, the latent
as distinguished from the realized.
The oak is contained an sick
is

itself,

the acorn.

in

That \*fitr

sic/t,

the result

It is

<>f

for itself, which

an. sic/t when

has become explicit and actual.

developed, and is applied to what

our own, as opposed to what was

has been acquired and made

in a crude condition.
Thus, a human being, even in a stale
o!
infancy, has a capacity for reason; he is an sick rational; but
given
is

it,

lor

him

to realize

this

endowment and become

rational fur

sic/t.

Hence the phrase an and

denote both

fiir sic/t, in

and for

itself, is

applied

purr and entire, and what is spontaneous

and independent.
The thing is taken in the entirety of its devel
opment, and that development is due to the evolution of its own
to

native

\\liat

is

forces.

It is the Absolute, in so far as it has passed

through the Moments of the Process, and become every thing
which it was destined to be.
The double meaning of the Latin word explicatio indicates the

nature of the movement by which

every thing is produced; to un
is, in the
language of Hegel, to show what place
To
anything occupies in the general development of thought.

twine or c.rp/ain

comprehend is to know the origin or previous form of a thing;

thus, we comprehend the universe when we understand how it is
developed from the Absolute Idea.
ical

To prove

data to their general expression, or

in

is

to

reduce empir

other words, to formu

them

as the re.-ults of a
general law. It was thus, says Hegel,
Kepler demonstrated the facts of the solar svstem. reducing
them to their most general expression in his three celebrated laws.
The various elements and distinct existences are only so many
late-

that

"

Moments,"

or successive steps, in the universal

movement

of the

one Idea; they are transitory forms, which have

nothing real or
is the
permanent.
Self-diremption
spontaneous separation of a
notion into its opposite parts, each
being set off against the other
"

"

as its contradictory.

CHAPTER XX.
HEGEL.

II.

INTO ALL.

ONE DEVELOPED

lias been proved in the Phenomenology to

Pure Being, which is uni
absolute
reality, namely,
be the only
indeterminate, having no parts or
and" therefore
wholly
versal,

WE

Leoin with what

whereby it can be distinguished

so potentially comprehending every thing.

attributes

from anything else, and

This Idea, for it evi

ulti
in thought, of abstract or pure Being, is the
dently exists only
it is that which remains after all
for
abstract
absolute
mate and
;

has
whatsoever have been thrust aside, and abstraction
qualities
the
is
It
world.
vague
whole
comprehensive,
been made from the
and its
infinitude of Being, having its circumference everywhere,
the abstract,

It is every thing in general, or

no
Let there
it is nothing in particular.
because
be_
precisely
let there be no mind,
in all the firmament
star
no
no
sun,
earth,
Still
Let the universe disappear."
no time, no God.
no
in

centre nowhere.

"

space,

not got rid of this conception of Being in the abstract,

we declare
if
which is absolutely essential to thought; for even
understood
be
can
word
only as
the
nothing
that "nothing
of Being, and therefore could not be
or
opposite
No-bciiK),
a previous thought of Being, of which it
predicated except through
lines that
Just as the definition of parallel lines,
is the negation.

we have

is,""

"the

do not meet, however far

us

we

it

did not already

extended."

would have no

know what meeting

to

significance
that is, what the

is,

is
which parallelism denies so, to aflirm that Nothing is,
is the positive,
this
for
as
think
we
such,
that
Being
also to aflirm
To adopt the technicalities of
of which Nothing is the negative.
since it denotes or in
Extension,
infinite
has
Loo-ic, Pure Being
and no Intension,
real
or
whether
imaginary
cludes every thing,
for it connotes no mark or attribute whatever.
Now the problem which Hegelianism seeks to solve is, to ex

idea

is

plain

how

the

phenomenal universe

all

whether in reality or in pure thought

Absolute Idea of Pure Being evolved
;

that
is

now

is

or has been,

self-evolved

from

it,

from

this

because, as al-

374

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

said, the Absolute Idea potentially, or as Hegel would

say,
the concrete, includes every
thing, though in an iiu olced or
latent state
and self-evolved, because, as nothing exists outside of
or beyond the Idea, there is
nothing without to produce or assist

ready

in

the evolution, but

it must
take place by an internal and intrinsic
Force, a necessary process of development from within
just as, to
recur to a former illustration, the
vegetative force inherent in the
;

seed develops out of it, step

by step, first the tender shoot, then
the sapling, and at last the
stately oak.
Hegel undertakes not

only to follow severally the various

".Moments

that

self-evolution,

is,

the successive

steps of

this

of the

Process,"

from what is
particular and

most universal and indeterminate up to what is

to show how the whole Process takes
place by suc
cessive exertions of one and the same Force inherent in the
Idea,
mo>t

definite, but

the

or in other words, by constant

repetition in act of what he calls
Immanent Dialectic of pure thought. To this end he in
"

"

vents a new Logic, which is

only an improvement on that with
which we have already become familiar in the
philosophy of
Fichte and Schelling.
lie lays it down as a universal law of
pure
thought, that every concept (Bi grijf) becomes more and more
definite, that is, assumes one additional attribute after another,
by
successive acts of hettrization or
self-diremption in each case, first
passing over into the opposite or contradictory Concept, and then,
;

by an act of synthesi.-, resolving this contradiction, destroving the

opposition between them, and uniting the two contradictories into
a higher and more definite
On this, again, the same
Concept.
Process
series

of

is

repeated, and so on indefinitely.

as

Thus we

rise,

by a

them, just as by successive

steps of a ladder, from the vague, and indeterminate Idea of Pure
trichotomies."

lie

calls

lieing up to the universe of delinite conceptions and distinct real

as these are grasped
by the understanding or presented to
the sense.
He displays marvellous
and
ities,

ingenuity

comprehensive

ness of thought in the use of this

logical invention, finding trichot
omies everywhere, and by their aid bestriding the universe as with

seven-leagued boots, thus aiming to repeat in thought God s act of

creation, whereby the world was evolved out of
nothing, or rather
out of the thought of its Creator.
Empiricism begins with the
particular, with single phenomena and individual concrete exist
ences, rising from these, by abstraction of differences, to what is

and comparatively indeterminate. Philosophy, Ilegel

it
maintains, does precisely the reverse
begins with the exclusion
of all finite differences, that is, with the universal and infinite, and
universal

HEGEL.

375

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

II.

to the point
from this comes down by successive determinations
to bring differ
where Empiricism began. It is not we who are
which must produce
ences into the Absolute, but the Absolute
and definite out
relative
the
evolve
and
from

them
of

thereby

itself,

own essence.
The logic of trichotomy
its

success

is

so great iu using

is

so original and peculiar, and Hegel

as a process of passing from one

it

it here may be use

another, that some illustrations of
All Judgment
whole
the
throw
system.
light upon
ful, as they
the subject is rendered more
is an act of determination, whereby

thought

to

will

deiinite

of it one or more attributes.

by allirming or predicating
of
first entirely vague, acquires one stage
at
A,
"Concept
so
in
But
A
is
that
judging,
when we

Thus, the

determinateness,
we contradict

judge

no longer A, but that

immediately resolved or
And yet this contradiction
it is 1).
is the complex and
which
the
of
result
denied by the
judgment,
We can make this clearer by
B.
determinate affirmation of
When I say that Iron is hard,"
instance.
taking a concrete
make
to
my conception of iron more de
thereby endeavoring

for

we

declare that

is

is

"

"

the attribute of

I really

"

make

hardness,"
terminate by adding to it
inasmuch as the judgment
the two terms contradict each other
that hard is no
is no longer iron, but is hard; and
is, that iron
is the Logic
which
old
the
Now
is iron.
Logic,
longer hard, but
exclude each
contradictories
that
alarms
in
the
schools,
stilf taught
that, of two contradictories, one must
other, or are incompatible, so
the two cannot be true to
false
be
must
other
the
be true, and
affirms that this is not true, but
the
;

But

Hegelian Logic
gether.
unites the
that the synthesis, which is the result of the judgment,
affirma
determinate
more
but
the
into
contradictories
two
single
What once was two contradictory thoughts,
hard iron."
tion of
each being indeterminate, because not
and
namely,
affirmed of either, is now one determinate
was
attribute
any
con
hard iron."
Accordingly, as all Thought
thought, namely,
sists of Judgments, this is the universal law of Thought, whereby
we proceed from the abstract, the universal, and the indetermi
This, then,
nate, to the concrete, the particular, and the definite.
"iron"

"hard,"

"

Dialectic" of pure Thought:

every thought
is the "Immanent
of itself,
or concept first denies itself by affirming some attribute
and then denies this denial by uniting the thought and attribute
And since this is
into one higher and more determinate thought.
it is also a universal law of Things,
a universal law of

Thought,

for,

according to Hegel, Things exist only

in

Thought.

376

MODKRX PHILOSOPHY.

I take,

almost at random, some instances of the

application of
Things," that is, to concrete existences.

the law to what we: call

"

drawing or engraving is
with which the artist puts in

made by

the pen, pencil, or graver,

the outlines and shadows wherewith

to bring out the, rcMilt.

Hut the lines and .surfaces shadowed would
not alone constitute the picture, without the
opposite or contradic
tory of shadow, namely, the lights, or the
portions of the paper over
winch no lines are drawn audit is
precisely the union of these
two contradictories, light and shade, which forms the
As
picture.
;

yet.

however,

it

is

a colorless picture,

put in the contradictory of

mere

light

and shade.

Xow

namely, some definite color,

and then we have, not a mere drawing in li^ht and
say. green
shade, but a painting, though a
poor one, for it, has only one color,
"colorless,"

Then

green.
color,

which

is

put

in

the contradictory of

"not-green."

-ay.

this,

And

brown.

that

is.

some other

thus continuously

add other colors, each being the contradictory of tho.se already

used, because not the same, with
any one of them, and, as the lin;,l
result, we have- a rich and varied
painting, made up, step by step,
And this Process is creation, as
by the union of contradictories.
of a work of art. so of what we call a
work of nature." since both
exist only in
thought, and therefore an; products or creations of
"

thought.

According to Mr. Herbert Spencer s theory, founded, as he claims,

on observation, the universal law for the course of
development or
in

the organic,
into

kingdom is a process whereby homogeneity

heterogeneity, the like into the unlike, the
simple always developing itself by throwing oil the opposite or
and these two contradictories then uniting
contradictory of
into a higher, because more complex,
stage of the organism. What
is this but
Ilegeliaiiism in physiology, though wrought out by in
duction from observed facts, while He-el
developed it a priori
troni the depths of his own consciousness:
The beginning of all
growth
is

self-evolved

it>elf.

organi-nis, according to Professor Huxley,

substance as homogeneous and formless

is
protoplasm, a pasty
throughout as hasty pud

ding; and in this there is self-developed, or spontaneously gener

ated, a nucleated cell, which is the opposite of that from which it,

was generated, inasmuch as it has Form.

that is, a difference of
and these parts having a relation to each other, while the
Each cell then develops and pushes
protoplasm was formless.
vlf from itself, by a sort
of fissiparous generation, other cells,
each differentiated from, and therefore, the
opposite of, every
other, and of the parent cell, and thus becoming the distinctive
parts,

HEGEL.

877

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

II.

and seminal principles of the several heterogeneous

which finally constitute one animal
and
organic compounds
parts
economy.
TakJ another example from the science of mechanics. Every
revolution round its primary, is held and propelled
planet, in its
of two opposite forces,
in its orbit by the union and counteraction
By the former, the action of
the centripetal and centrifugal.
the centre; and by the lat
it is constantly drawn towards
elements

gravity,
is always striving to fly off into distant
ter, the tangential force, it
And the union of these opposite tendencies is the single
space.
iu its appointed
force which keeps the body perpetually whirling
elimination of either would instantly destroy the
the
while
path,
of the
This law of the solar system is but one example
system.
is usually called the parwhich
in
Mechanics,
universal principle
whatever may be decomallelo Tam of forces, whereby any force
which counteract each
forces
other
two
into its equivalent,
pose<f
since these
other as to the lines of direction on which they act,
two
form
thus
and
adjacent sides of a
two lines meet at an angle,
of which the original force is the diagonal.
parallelogram,
that
I have already mentioned two geometrical examples: first,
of divergence, the same
is the
5

contradictory
inclined to each other both converge

although convergence
lines

two straight
verge

converge from

B, and diverge from

to

secondly, though convexity

is

to

and

di

and

the contradictory of concavity, the

Then two contra

both convex and concave.
each
with
other, are but
of
dictories, instead
being incompatible
two aspects of one and the same truth.
same curved

line

is

Incarnation.
a theological example in the doctrine of the
finite
as
therefore,
of
the
Man,
is
contradictory
God, as infinite,
the
God can be reconciled to Man only by God becoming^ Man,

Take

two natures,
of

finite

our

and

infinite,

Lord,

who

human and divine, becoming one iu

Of course,
both God and Man.

is

the person
of the same truth.
the doctrine of the Trinity is but another aspect
but they
at
random;
taken
miscellaneous
Tlu-si! are
examples
calls it, the Im
are enough to show that Hegel s logic, or, as he

Dialectic of pure thought, is an instrument of wide range

and striking combina
of application, and fertile in effecting new
But we have now to make a systematic use of it
tions of id-as.
the universe of realities
in the series of evolutions through which
distinct consciousness.
is developed from nothing into
with the Absolute Idea of Pure
begin, as already stated,
is entirely vague and mand
absolute
as
universal,
which,

manent

We

Being,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

378

determinate, having no quality or attribute whatsoever wherewith

to be distinguished from any other being, and therefore
potentially
including all other being within itself.
the definition of universal Substance
llegel probably burrowed

conceived for

and

it,

It corresponds exactly to

by Spinoza, from

that which exists in itself

as

whom
and

is

be conceived without pre

As Being, it is the op
supposing a conception of anything else.
posite or contradictory of No-being, or Nothing; and yet, as per
fectly vague and indeterminate, having no attribute whatever, it is
identical with Nothing, from which it cannot be discriminated in

any

iv-]>ect.

a .-ynlhe.-is

of

By

plained?

into the other.

itself,

therefore, can

Snin iitix nttlla sii.ut attributa.

Here, then, we have
two contradictories
How can their union b(3 ex
the

A-

notion of becoming, through which one passes

l!ein^ is the same with Nothing, the truth of

Being, as well as the truth of Nothing,

found

is

in

the,

union of

the two. or in fusing one into the other; and this union is found
in the one
Thus, we may ask respecting
becoming the other.
"the sunset,"
whether it consists in the presence or the absence of

the sun.

In fact,

it

consists

above the horizon, sunset

zon, the .-unset is
to the other.
it

water.
not-ice.

neither;
;

and

for
if

it

if

the

sun

is

still

be below the hori

consists in the passage (the

It

Becoming)
manner, water becomes ice; but so
is water, it is not ice
and so far as it is ice, it is not
Water, therefore, becomes not-water, and ice becomes
Thus the process of b^cnnnng is the union of is with is
pa>t.

from one
far as

in

not yet

is

In like

not. or of a particular

mode

of existence with the negation of that

mode.

To

conceive

Nothing as becoming Being, is to conceive crea

conceive Being as becoming Nothing, is to conceive
annihilation.
As the result of a .-vmhesis of two factors or ele
tion

and

to

ment- must be more determinate (since it can now be defined as

the union of the two) than either of the.-e factors taken singly, the
creation of Being out of Nothing is properly the creation of exis
tence (Udscyti), which is
It-mii/nil/
being, or, as Dr. Stirling
chooses to render it, So-being,
Being in some determinate form
<!

or manifestation, rather than in any other.

Thus, as the begin
ning of thought attempting to become definite and fixed for itself,
we have the genesis of one of Kant s first Categories, Quality,
through which alone any one existence can be discriminated from

But this assumption of Quality gives me forthwith a

conception of one thing as distinguished from others, and is there
that is, Quality immedifore properly the conception of Unity
another.

IIKGKL.

into
ately passes over
of Kant s Categories.

its

379

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

II.

opposite or

"

other,"

Quantity, the second

be conceived us Unity
Again, Unity can
its contradictory, Many or
from
discriminated
only through being
"

But the contradiction between them is immediately

Plurality.
one passes over into the other, or becomes the other,
and
resolved,
of
when we consider that Many or Plurality is only an aggregate
The
other.
each
from
Many,
not
differing
Units or Ones, these
is equally Many; and the synthe
therefore, are One, and the One
sis of

these two

Number.

definite quantity, or

is

As mere Quan

Then,
has no Quality, but relates only to Magnitude.
tity, this
;
of two contradictory
a ain. Magnitude presents itself as the union
in which the units are distinguishable,
Quantities? namely, Discrete,
which they are homogeneous and now into
and Continuous,
and the
each other yet this contradiction is immediately resolved,
it is considered that Conti
when
become
identical,
two opposite*
without Discreteness, (for example, the
nuity cannot be thought
nor Discreteness without
in
feet
distinct
is so
"in

many

table

length,)

units being added together as one Magni

Continuity, the distinct
Tims we obtain definite or limited Magnitude, which is the
tude.
How much." This is extensive Magnitude, as
or

Num

"

quantum,

In
intensive Magnitude, as Degree.
amount
relative
the
as
conceived
this notion of Degree, which is
and
returns to Quality
of some one attribute or power, Quantity

ber, the opposite of which

is

Then Measure, or
the union of Quantity and Quality is Measure.
on the
the
Quality depending
Proportion, is a qualitative quantum,
How much" of the power or attribute is present.
or
"

Quantum,
For instance, add a

certain

amount of

heat,

and

ice

becomes water

Then the
steam.
add a farther amount, and the water becomes
steam depend on the relative
different Qualities of ice, water, and
But again, the Quantity and
of heat.
Quantity, or Measure,

as
definite thing can be distinctly conceived only
Quality of any
it
on
of
constitution
or that internal
resulting from its Essence,
For instance as
which we suppose all its attributes to depend.
;

conceive the

we

Essence, or internal

constitution, of

oxygen

to

manifests less weight and

differ from that of hydrogen, the latter
differences ;
these
the
than
former,
being quantitative
more volume
of support
and while hydrogen appears inflammable and incapable
and supplies the vital
combustion
maintains
ing respiration, oxygen
Change the
breath* these being differences of quality.
part to the
its
both
quantita
Essence of either, and you will thereby change
tive

and qualitative

And

characteristics.

here let us pause for a

moment

to

take breath, and review

380

MODKI;N PHILOSOPHY.

thought the bewildering phantasmagoria of abstractions that wo

traver.-ed.
The discussion is abstruse, for it is concerned ex-

in

have

!ii.-ivc]y with the highest abstractions and generalizations \vhich

the 1m man mind can form: and it is
repulsive, owing to (lie ceasel p ss
rej)etition ot one uniform process, contradictories and s\ntheses

perpetually succeeding each other, one set of them being included

another, like a nest of chip-boxes.
One tires of eternal trichot
omies, the perpetual recurrence of which reminds him
only of tbe
ohl-fashioued game, the frequent burden of which w:is a
in

triumphant
But the procos is by no means unintelligible, and
it has an
imposing air. owing to the novelty and seeming univer
Let me endeavor to illustrate the
sality of the method employed.
method, then, by adopting more familiar
phraseology.
he word
is the most
"thing"
comprehensive sub.-tantive which
language furnishes, since it includes c
tiling and //o-thiu^.
Bui on account of tin-; very universality, we cannot think it, we
cannot form any definite idea of it
since there is nothing from
which it can be discriminated, for it includes
every tiling, and it
cannot have any quality or attribute whatsoever, the
of
too

tit. tat.

/>>>/

possession

which distinguishes one thing from another.

Now let us endeavor
to flunk
it
thing," by investing
successively with the most, compivhen-ive of all attributes, proceeding from these, step by step, to
those which are less
comprehensive, thus approximating b\- regular
degrees to the conception of some OHP
which, as havin"
thing,"
numberless attributes, is thereby distinguished from every other
"

"

We

"thing."

will

first

suppose

general, an;/ quality, since

an cj-intiiuj thing (I
or non-existent,
Pure
)<!*<

>/

tl

"thing"

the possession of
from that which

Being

(X<->/n).

to

possess

any one

maybe

f//">/if//

in

di.-tininii -lies

either existent

Next, we may suppose it

in either one of its

to possess quantity in general, or

three forms, a- (1) more or less
(Magnitude in general), (2) as
one or many (Number), and (. !) as more or less intense
iii"</ititn<l<>.

As
we

(Degree).

now differ from each other in qiutlitii and ijnuiififi/,

things
must conceive this difference to result from some difference in
"

"

their internal constitution, nature, or Essence; as when we

say, it
the nature or essence of iron to be hard and
malleable, and of

is

be aeriform and combustible.

This conception of
marks the precise Moment of the Process, or
stage
of development of the Absolute Idea of
from absolute indetermiuateness and universality to definiteness and
particularity,
at which we have now arrived.

hydrogen

Ksseuce

to

"

"

"

"thing,"

Furthermore,

this

Process

"

necessarily takes place by

way

of

ITF.GEL.

tricriofonu/,

that,

is.

IT.

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

by the successive evolution

call
(wind. llcgcl chooses to

"

contradictories,"

of

"differences,"

though more

fre

and then by the reconciliation

quently they are only "contraries,")
or synthesis of the
of these "differences;" that is. by the union
with
differentiating attribute
whole end and aim of the

"

the

Of

"thing."

Process"

is

course,

when

the

and

dis-

to differentiate

some one "thing in particular,"

general into
or
successive
assumption of differences,
we" must
proceed by the
or synthesis of the attributes,
union
the
and
"contradictions,"
by
the "thing."
which are the bases of these "contradictions," with
we
is only a name for the mental process whereby
Trichotomy"
of thought; but it is
assign in thought any predicate to any object
a contemplation of
a forced and awkward analysis of that process,
in order to justify the use
familiar
least
its
of
one
under
aspects,
it
tin-Miish

in

"thing"

of such ;m appellation.

thus far
one who has followed intelligently the exposition
it in all its prin
understands
understands
Hegelianism,
really
for what I have now stated is
characteristics
ciples and essential
remains is to carry out the
that
All
nutshell.
in
a
Hegelianism
multitude of details, every thing in nature
system into a countless
science and art,
and every object of thought, every department of
and
being obviously
of
theology,
history, philosophy,
every chapter

Any

what I may call analysis by the trichotpmic method;

susceptible of
definite in thought
or in other words, of becoming more and more
that is, of differ
of attributes,
successive
the
assumption
by
a mastery
a
With
contradictions."
plodding industry,
ences or
abstractions
the
with
in
a
highest
and
details,
dealing
of
facility
for they are thorough
of human thought, which are truly German,
has
his
applied the system
of
countrymen, Hegel
ly characteristic
in eighteen solid
throughout the length and breadth of the land;
into
to
so
every nook and crevice
octavos, he has carried it,
speak,
an
has
It
air, owing to its vast
and
imposing
of reality
thought.
to the minutest
reach and comprehensiveness, its applicability even
in which it
technicalities
abstruse
of
details, the formidable
"

array
the perfect precision and
enveloped, and the systematic manner,
successive
the
to
grades of abstrac
order, with which it is applied
it deals.
with
which
and
tion
generalization
should devel
Then, too, it is not so very marvellous that Hegel
he had pre
that
the
Absolute
out
Idea, seeing
of
op every thing
thing into
every
with
away
packed
care,
laboriously
great
viously,
in the
"Pure
of
definition
Being"
so framed his

is

it,

lie

had

outset, that

it

obviously included

all

being

and he had

also, in

O QO

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

the
Phenomenology." as we have seen,
elaborately attempted to
prove that the particular, the concrete, and the individual are
only

the Universal in disguise.

It seems almost like
pricking a Titanic soap-bubble, to point out
the one unauthorized
assumption, and the single, thou-h simple
and plausible, analysis of a
logical process of thought, which form
the narrow premises, the sole l,,,t
insufficient foundation, on which
the whole
All beyond and above this is ;l
theory is based.
:m ,on

and jugglery of repulsive technicalities

and minute details
The
one assumption is
absolute Idealism, that
Thought and Beino- u e
identical, or that Things exist
only in Thought. Certainly it is easy
to explain the
process, and repeat the act, of
when
j

there

creation,

is

nothing

to

except an evolution of thought from itself;

and the single and
simple analysis of this evolution is contained in
the dictum, that all
predication is trichotomy; in other words that
create,

whenever we predicate an attribute of

subject, because we atlirm

tradict, that

we deny, or con
a difference or contra

a subject,
of

it

dictory ot itself; and of course, the more determinate

subject,
Which is the result of the
predication, is a reconciliation or
synthesis
the two contradictories.
I call this a mere
juiHe of words for
is
pure verbal fallacy to assert that the
judgment A is U contradicts A. by
maintaining that A is no lon-er A. but is 15.
To apply the
system, as Goschel, Bauer, Daub, Murheineke
trauss and a host of others have
done, to the gravest realities
:

"

"

fundamental

facts and
highest truths, of ethics, politics, :i nd
mere paltering with
words, and seems too much like
nockery and blasphemy combined.
to the time when -the
Master
died, in 1831, he and his disciples
carefully avoided any
open breach with the positive dogmas of
religion; and thus arose

ogy,

is

l>

the well-founded belief, that there

were

in the
Hegelian school two
one exoteric, for the
public at large and the
for the initiated; and that
the latter contained the

sorts ot doctrines, the

>ther

esoteric,

thorough-going skepticism, or the denial of

truths of religion.

And

all

the positive

was supported by the evident

ambiguity ol Hegel s philosophy, which contains in itself both a
principle of conservatism and a
principle of progress or reform
According to the former, all the fixed dogmas of the Church
which constitute the orthodox
creed, are and must be ri-ht and
true

tor

this belief

they are a necessary

Moment of the Process," a riecssary stage in the self-development of abstract or
pure Thought.
In a certain sense, in
this, as in every other,
system of fatalilm,
ope s version of the Leibnitzian doctrine of
optimism holds true;
;

"

HEGEL.
wbatevei

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

II.

"

is,

is

right."

To

the same

says Menzel,

purport,"

the notorious proposition of Hegel, All that is Real is Rational,

is
is made use of to show that the present condition of things
"

absolutely the most rational, and that it is not merely revolution

and unphilosophical, to take ex
ary, hut eminently stupid, foolish,
the system declares that any
hand,
On the other
ceptions to
the Process," and therefore
of
Moment
is
a
creed
dogmatic
only
to pass away, and he followed hy farther developments of
is
What these
thought, higher truths, which will take their place.
are the
Hegelians taught us with a
it."

young
higher developments
the Master," when Feuerbach,
vengeance, after the death of
Bruu Bauer, Arnold Ruge, and others, preached the baldest infi
under the name and garb of philos
delity and red-republicanism
"

ophy.

The baseless assumptions which are involved in the initial steps

Pure
of Hegelianism are ably pointed out by Trendelenburg.
this is equivalent to Nothing,
and
the
first step
constitutes
Being
because it has no attribute or quality whatsoever whereby it can
:

be distinguished from anything. Then it must be inert, motion

To endow it with any principle of motion
and unchangeable.
or change, and thus to render it capable of becoming any deter
minate existence, would be to take it out of the category of Pure
Then it cannot become; it is incapable of heterization ;
Being.
the
from itself, or bring
the other
it cannot either evolve
the
with
into
other
reconciling
itself,
through
again
harmony
It must forever continue to be that
contradiction between them.

less,

"

"

"

"

And
which it was equivalent at the outset, namely, Nothing.
the same difficulty emerges, if Pure Thought is regarded as the be
because it is
Pure," is
ginning of the Process, for this also,
to

and so
wholly vague and indefinite, possesses no attribute whatever,
In order to
cannot change, cannot become any particular thought.
render it capable of self-development, Hegel endows it with an in
but he fails
Immanent Dialectic
ternal principle of activity, an
therefore is no
to see that it thereby ceases to be
Pure," and
In this dilemma, inthe absolute
longer
beginning
o
o of things.
o
"

"

"

"

"

O
deed,

What they sup

systems are involved.
all being, either has no dis
of
be
the
origin
pose
become anything more
tinguishing element, and therefore cannot
or it must contain within itself a defi
than it was at the outset
nite seminal principle, by virtue of which it is necessarily devel
into the particular modes of definite being which now con
all

these ambitious

to be primal, to

oped

stitute the universe.

To endow

it

with such a principle

is

already

384

MODl-.RN PHILOSOPHY.

to create the universe in germ, through the agency of some uri

seen Power; ami \vr might just as well suppose that Power to
\Ve are
preside over and effectuate each step of the evolution.
thus brought back to the truth already enunciated, that nothing

was not previously

When the
atoms oi the primitive lie-rv mist are the
life,
they must believe, either that these
atoms are homogeneous and indeterminate, and so have no ten
dency to evolve any one mode of existence rather than any other,
or else that they were
constituted at the outset that all living
things ure necessarily developed from them; and this is only St.
Augus Jne s theory of potential and derivative creation.
Hut it is time to go back to the point where we left Hegelianism, and to trace a few more steps of development of the Absolute
Idea into concrete and phenomenal being.
We had advanced as
far as K-.-ence, which is conceived as that internal con>titut.ion of
.things, of which their outward qualities and quantity are only the
manifestation.
Hence, it is a sort of inward or reflected being, so
called from the analogy of light, which in its straight course im
We
pinging on a mirror, is tin-own back or reflected from it.
sec only the reflected ray, not the incident one, which comes from
a different direction.
Thus, \ye, conceive Matter as a single and
homogeneous substance, which appears under a variety of forms,
can be

erolrcd which

inr<>lr<:<f.

materialists say. that the

source ot all orms of
t

>o

but always preserves the identity of its E-sence.

Hence, when
we, propose to study the Essence of anything, we regard its out
ward visible form, of which the senses directly take cognizance,

only the rind or yeil behind which the Essence is concealed.

Hence, again, all things have a sort of double being in thought,
of which the outer one. that is merely apparent or Inessential, is
manifest to sense, while the inner one, the real beinix, is dis
And yet, though theses two, the Inessen
cerned only by reason.
tial and the Essential, are the opposite* or contradictories of each
other, each can be conceived or known only through the other,
and each is therefore Essential to the other for the Essential
This mutual relation be
only is in relation to the Inessential.
tween them is what we have termed reflection, or reflected being.
Therefore, all characters which are such that each is incogitabla
without the other (such as positive and negative, inner and outer,
antecedent and consequent, identical and different, thing and qual
ity, matter and form, force and energy or the operation of force,}

as

are determinations of this reflection

or duality of being.

Essence, as Leibnitz acutely remarks, belongs only to species and

HEGEL.

OXE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

II.

885

Accident
genera, that is, to classes of things, not to individuals.
or sickness may change my complexion or my weight; fever or a

may deprive me of reason and memory apoplexy may

me even without feeling. Hence, if asked whether it is es
sential for me to have reason, I answer, No.
But to
Man in
contusion

leave

"

"

general, reason

humanity.
their species

is essential,

Hence
;

also,

it is a
distinguishing attribute of
Leibnitz, individuals may change

since

says

man may become

a brute.

contrariety of any two of these opposite characters men

tioned above is reconciled in tbe notion of Ground, from which
I lie

There is a common Ground, substratum, or

they both proceed.
Cause, on which the Essential and the Inessential, the real and
theapparent, the inner and outer being, the Matter and the Form,
alike equally depend.

The Force can be explained only by

Energy or being put

into

the

operation, the Energy only by the

Force.
The identity of the two, of inner and outer, force and
energy, essence and manifestation, is actuality, that which is, as
distinguished from the merely possible or contingent, and from the

necessary.
gin,

What

Substance

is

is

necessary, regarded as its own ground or ori

is merely accidental or
contingent is the

what

Qualities, which are only transitory affections of the Substance,

mutable phenomenal forms, the waves in relation to the water of
the sea.
Thus, to recur to a former illustration, water, ice, steam,
mist, cloud, are only various phenomenal manifestations of one and
the same Substance, which may exist successively in each of these
forms, and, throughout all of them, is always at bottom the same, a
compound of oxygen arid hydrogen. This relation of Substance to
its
phenomena may be otherwise conceived as Cause and Effect, the
Substance causing or producing its sensible Qualities, and the acci

dents being the effects of the Substance.

But in this relation, the
same matter is twice posited, once as Cause and once as Effect.
I

push against the table, but at the same moment, and in the same
Action and reaction are
degree, the table pushes against me.
equal each is equal to the other, and each is conceived successively
;

Cause and as Effect. There is no effect without

no action without reaction.
This is the category
of Reciprocity, in which the duplicity of Cause and Effect, Essence
and Manifestation, has collapsed to unity. And this unity of the
inner and outer being, the Essence and its visible form, is the
as the other,

counter

as

effect,

Notion, or Concept, that we form of a thing.

Tims, my Notion of
wan includes both the internal essence of humanity, that which
25

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

386

makes him
his outward visible characteristics, a twoman," ami
legged and two-handed animal without feathers.
Observe how far we have now advanced, through the idea of
Being, and that of Essence, which is its correlative and reflection,
"

to the entire

both.

Jt

is

Notion or Concept of a thing, which includes them

but following a similar evolution to trace the devel

of the Notion through its

subjective and objective forms,
the thought, and the realization of that thought in external
to the Absolute Idea
things.
again, which appears as the unity
of Cognition and Life, of tin; Idea or
plan of the species, and of

opment

the species as embodying in outward form and

actuality the Idea.
God s idea of creation is expressed in the universe and it is only
;

putting the same truth into other words, to say that the universe
is the realization of the divine Idea.
Tims we have two branches
of the system, the first being a
"Philosophy of Nature," according
as the Idea has pas-ed out into external
reality as -the other," or

and the second, when, returning into it

fully conscious of itself through its oppo
sition to Nature, it establishes a u
Both
Philosophy of Spirit."
these "philosophies" are very
ingeniously worked out by Ilcgel
himself; they manifest great fertility of imagination and richness
of thought, and abound with broad and
striking generalizations,
which may well be termed splendid sophisms, as
they amaxe and
stun the student, without
Without entering into
convincing him.
details, a few sketches will be
enough to show the outlines of the
contradictory, of
self,

itself,

and becoming more

two systems.
As outward Nature

is

a departure of the Idea from

itself into

the

contradictory of itself, it manifests, especially in its lower

forms, tokens of the absence of Spirit or Mind, such as a sort
of hap-hazard character, great
variety, irregularity, and lawless
ness appearing in many shapes, which can with
be re
difficulty

duced

system and principle.

appears as a mere chaos

of shapeless rocks, earths, minerals, and water,
confusedly hurled to
gether, and even in its lower essays towards vegetable and animal
life, branching out into a countless multitude of fantastic forms, as
to

It

first

were trying its

at every thing and anything.
prentice hand
confounds the lines of demarcation between species by
meaningless variations, monstrous births, lusns natures, and the

if it

"

"

It often

Nature, says Hegel, is a Bacchantic God, uncontrolled by,

because unconscious of, himself, and therefore
revelling in wild

like.

sports, regardless of law.

with it, as it were, and to

Science
accept

is

its

often obliged to compound

products as imperfect reali-

HEGEL.

II.

387

ONE DEVELOPED INTO ALL.

the speculative ideas which it is the office of Science

The progress of Nature, its advance from lower to

zations of

to establish.

higher forms,

is

a record of

from
struggles upwards,

shapeless,

of being, to more complex and uniform

wild, and disjointed
and a final symme
results, to a nicer balance of opposing forces,
Inor
which mark the reign of mind.
try, order, and precision
and this has but one trace
inert Matter is its lowest form

modes

ganic
of

mind and

law or msus of gravitation, through which

one centre, the centre of gravity, and
towards
tend

unity, the

all its particles

In
as in the solar system.
doing are organized into unity,
the periods of revolution are reducible to mathematical laws,
and thereby the real becomes rational. Time and Space, which
to
lie at the bottom of these mathematical laws, are not, according

in so
this,

to the result.
Hegel, merely ideal factors, but contribute reality
a man s
if only placed upon
or
tile
slate,
a
for
Thus,
example,
but if
head, will not. from the mere action of gravity, kill him
;

such a

tile

upon him from a considerable height, as

Next come
a house, the blow will be mortal.

or slate falls

from the roof

of

relations are considered,

Physics, in which not merely quantitative
as in Astronomy, but qualitative conditions necessarily come into
view we have here to regard, for instance, the differences be
;

tween the

and aeriform

solid, fluid,

states

of matter.

In Chemis

the characteristic properties of different substances

try, again,
and thus exhibit
change on the application of various reagents,
and
so demonstrate
as
nature
and
inessential
such,
their
fleeting
all

the possibility of matter passing into higher forms.

In living organisms, the chemical and vital forces hold a divided
the animate body resisting
empire, and struggle against each other,
the chemical process during life, though minute portions of it are
the action of this antagonistic force,
perpetually relapsing under
abandoned to it at death. As life, the
and the whole is
finally

three distinct stages.

First, in geological
of a former life
the
remains,
the
result,
petrified
forms,
only
and process of formation. "The earth of geology is a gigantic
life, the vital processes of growth,
Next, in

Idea passes

through

it is

vegetable

corpse."

assimilation,

and reproduction are complete, but the whole

is,

as

an aggregate of parts imperfectly articulated into each

other.
Any one of the parts may be metamorphosed into any
Every
other, so that the leaf is potentially the whole organism.
branch
Lastly, in the animal
represents the entire tree.

yet, only

perfectly

the parts are mutually

kingdom, there is perfect intussusception, all
ends and means, each living only through the cooperation of the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

388
Here,

others.

too,

we

first

have spontaneous movement, sensation,

And in its
and, in the higher forms, voice and internal warmth.
highest type, in Man, the spirit that works in Nature attains its
and individuality of each
culminating point, in the conscious unity
living soul.

which has

"We
tliu- c.une hack to Spirit, the Philosophy of
a series of stages to describe before the merely animal soul, subject
to all the sk\ey influences, affected even by climatic differences

still

and peculiarities of geographical type, can fully liberate itself from

the operation of these purely physical causes, and rise to that universtl or rational self-consciousness, which has been all along its
Throuuh Sensation and Feeling, which are but the blind
goal.

the Subjective Spirit emerges

growings of unconscious individuality,
at last to a cognition of itself as the Ego. which is the first step to
Then, by distinguishing itself from Nature as the
Consciousness.

Non-Eim, and thus opposing

to all

itself

objective existence,

you

and him, and other forms of humanity included, it recognizes itself

as the free or universal Ego, and thus becomes, first, Theoretical
and secondly, Practical Spirit or Will.
Spirit or Intelligence,

Then,

in

its

attempt*

to

carry out

its

own

ideas into action, or to

itself as Objective Spirit, and thus lays

objectify them, it manifests
the foundations of Legal Right, of Morality, of the Family, and
of the two, and there
the State.
Finally, recogni/ing the identity

by reconciling the contradiction between

it
advances to
Objective manifestations,
Spirit,

which

linds

its

three

its

own

Subjective and

the stage of

forms of expression

in

Absolute

Art, Religion,

and Philosophy.
Here, then, is the bond of union, through which ITcgel is enabled
to speculate at large in the broad fields of History, Ethics, and
Politics, of Art, Religion, and Philosophy, manifesting everywhere
for acute distinctions, novel theories, and
his unrivalled
capacity

always directing his theoretical

peculiar method, and forging
them together into the unity of his system. This sketch of his
carried farther without entering into a multi
philosophy cannot be
tude of details, which, for the very reason that they are details, can
to
be
only by those who have patience enough

broad generalisations, and

views by the principles of

fairly appreciated
them in Hegel s

follow

still

his

own

own words.

CHAPTER
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

I.

XXI.

THE WOULD

AS PRESENTATION

AND WILL.
has at last,
the metaphysical system of Schopenhauer
obtained
and
in
obscurity,
neglect
after remaining for forty years
his publi
and
in
though
and
Germany,
influence
much
reputation

Tiiornn

cations

and brilliancy
literary and speculative ability
I hesi
his
German
of
contemporaries,
of
any
writings
account of them into this work.
before

show more

than the

introducing any
even for purposes of censure and refutation,
them,
analyze
For
of evil.
like
much
seemed too
promoting the dissemination

tated long

To

and

ten

pernicious
not only is much of his philosophy unsound
I speak
himself was eminently a bad man.
dency, but the writer
and in a biograph
written
his
in
works,
he
as
him
of
appears
only
of his admiring disciples, Dr.
ical sketch" of him published by one
He may
in his last illness.
him
attended
who
William Gwinner,
in private life,
have shown some respectable or amiable qualities
it is hard to believe
is no evidence of the fact, and

though there
there was any element of good

in

In his books, he appears

him.

a hater of this
and an atheist
in nothing
believed
who
one
and
in
it,
world and of everybody
and the injustice with which he was treated
own
his
merits,
except
In my opinion, the world treated him just
by his contemporaries.
and neglect. This
it passed him by with silent reprobation
right;
He would have welcomed open
not at all what lie wanted.

as

misanthrope,

pessimist,

was

abuse and any measure of noisy hostility

for he craved notoriety,

confident of his power to shower mud faster than

justly
But that people should take no notice
any of his adversaries.
In
irritated him almost to frenzy.
books
his
or
him
either of

and was

irascible,

and suspicious,

his

ordinately self-conceited, arrogant,

his hand was against
whole career was that of a literary Ishmael
s
and, in a sense most galling to his pride, everybody
;

everybody,

him.
nand was against him for everybody slighted
since he died
him
of
notice
here,
take
Then wliy
any
;

in

1860,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

390

is well rid of him?

Because, like Balaam, he often
spoke the truth unwittingly, and, as it were, in spite of himself.
The man had a positive genius for literature and metaphysics,
Luckily, also, the
though unquestionably it was an evil genius.
the worst part of his doctrine, though it was his favorite part, is

and the world

weakest, and cannot do

many

also

then;

l>v

^r ood

much harm

things in
These
mistake.

his

we

to

anybody.

l>ut

there are

philosophy, though he put them

can pick out, and leave the bad

has often taught what is good and right, though most

In paving the way for his ulti
with
an evil purpose.
frequently
mate conclusions, which are often untrue and even diabolical, he

alone.

He

stumbled upon many intermediate truths of great moment,

and lias defended them with more wit, vigor, and originality than
Alter the character now
were ever expended upon them before.
to add, that I have read his
ashamed
I
am
almost
him.
to
given
works no/ onlv with more interest and amusement, but in many
and delight, than those of
parts posit. velv with more instruction
His very impudence
of
this
other
century.
metaphy.-ieian
uny
and recklessness are sometimes an advantage, as they enable him
to tell his mind with a vigor, raciness, and na ivelS, which a consci
Like the man "who spoko
entious thinker could never rival.
has

right out in meeting," he often blurts out the truth with a direct
ness and simplicity which render it ten times more effective than
He detests the whole tribe ol
if warilv uttered, and in lit season.
German Professors of the Absolute, especially their leaders,

and as he is a hard hitter in con

Fichte. Schelling. and llegvl
to truth by demolishing some
troversy, he often does good service
Far from dissecting their theories at length,
of their
;

paradoxes.
he pours upon them a volley of invective and abuse for their
affected obscurity, their inordinate use of technicalities and ab

struse phraseology, and their general disregard of common sense.

a master of style, of literal are. wit, and sarcasm, he is not only

As
I

rival in Germany, but I hardly know his equal any

where among writers of the present time. Macaulay is not more
successful in ridiculing a theory, or Voltaire in demolishing an
He writes more like a Frenchman than a German,
opponent.
witli inimitable force, clearness, and precision, and with a wide
It
of illustration from every field of literature and science.

without a

range
is

a fact

Germany,
ty,

illustrative of the state of literary taste in

that writers, like Kant, of singular clumsiness, obscur-

.strangely

and want of

struse

formulas

force, or, like

and repulsive

Hegel, darkening counsel by ab

technicalities, should soon have

391

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

found there hosts of admiring disciples, while one of the most bril
liant writers of the age hardly obtained a follower, or eveii a
reader, for more than thirty years.
Arthur Schopenhauer was born in 1788, at Dantzic, where his
and wealthy merchant, and his mother a
father was a
respectable

of third-rate novels, which

prolific writer
able popularity in Germany, though they had

most

obtained consider

no reputation

else

he resided for several years both in

During
France and in England, and there obtained the intimate knowl
which he was
edge of the literature of both these countries by
Part of his university course was spent
afterwards distinguished.
JEueat Gottingen, where the lectures of Schulze, author of the
awakened his taste for metaphysics. By Schulze s
sidemus,"
advice, he first applied himself exclusively to Plato and Kant,
whom he ever afterwards acknowledged as his masters, while he

where.

his youth,

"

slighted Aristotle

and

Spinoza, then

much

studied in

Germany.

In 1811 he removed to Berlin, attracted by the lectures of Fichte,

whose course he followed, hough he soon learned to regard the
The war inter
Wissenschaftslehre with dension and contempt.
at Berlin, he finally took his degree at Jena,
his
studies
rupting
where he offered as his academic thesis the very able dissertation,
which he afterwards published, on the Fourfold Root of the Prin
5

sketch of the doctrine of this essay

Reason.
lie then
has already been given in the chapter on Freewill,
different
at
two
in
four
Dresden, and,
periods, five
years
spent
in the
from
relaxation
in
pursuits
metaphysical
seeking
Italy,
years
ciple of Sufficient

As his circumstances were

study of art and Italian literature.
and
his
his
memory good, he was enabled
perceptions quick,
easy,
to gratify his tastes to their full extent; and he certainly quali
fied himself for literary and philosophical pursuits by a broad and
Perhaps the consciousness of his superior
accomplished culture.
to most of his countrymen in this respect fostered his natural
ity

As he was never married, and a

the
permanent quarrel separated him from his mother and sister,
of
domestic
want
the
father
s
members
of
his
only surviving
family,
arrogance and superciliousness.

dried up his affections, and, when united with his lack of suc
cess in establishing his fame as a metaphysician, made him the re
sentful and misanthropic being which he remained till his death in.
ties

reason for his abstaining from matrimony may be found

remark, worthy of Rochefoucauld, for it shows as much wit
in our monogamistic part of the world, for
as selfishness, that
*
one to marry is to halve his rights, and to double his duties.

I860.

in his

"

any

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

392

No
He

one ever suspected Schopenhauer of any wish to do either

does not seem ever to have hud a friend, and till within five
Frauenyears of his death, he had found but one ardent disciple.
the editor of his literary remains, was this one
and as lie
was a thorough sycophant, one cannot pity him much, though he
appears to have been bullied without stint by the object of his fer
vent admiration, the merciless Schopenhauer.
As he led a solitary and unhappy life, it is not strange that he
became extremely suspicious and irritable; but we; are surprised
to learn that he was also of a
cowardly temperament, and was per
lie
petually anxious and fear-stricken before imaginary dangers.
was wont, to keep his money in the strangest places of conceal
ment, and if roused by any sudden noise at night, he immediately
grasped dagger and pistols, which he always had near at hand.
While yet a student at the University, he was haunted
by the fear
that he was consumptive, and by the dread of
being forced into
He was driven from Naples bv apprehension of
military service.
smul -pox. and from Berlin by
appearance of Asiatic cholera.
"While* at, Verona, he was made
miserable by a fixed idea that he
had taken poisoned snuff; and lie was afterwa: s harassed
by con
stant fears of the loss of his
property, and by the attack upon his
inheritance made by his own mother.
In one instance, produced
stiidt,

th<;

by

his

own

money by

irritability

of

a lawsuit proved

temper, his apprehensions of losing

be well founded.
While he occu

to

pied furnished lodgings in Berlin, an acquaintance of his landlady

caused him some annoyance, and he pushed her not very
gently
out of doors.
In the sciifllc she fell, broke her
right arm, and was

She sued him for damages, was suc

and the court sentenced him to pay her an annuity for
life.
Unfortunately for him. she had a good constitution and
lived long, so that he was compelled to bear this burden over
At last, he joyfully wrote in his diary, obit amis,
twenty years.
partially disabled for labor.
cessful,

ablt onus.

I should not enter into these details

respecting his life
if
they were not in some measure a key to his phi
they did not furnish a sufficient reason for his earnest

and character,
losophy,

if

and persistent advocacy of pessimism.

In 181!), at the age of thirty,
Schopenhauer published

his prin

metaphysical work, that of which all his other books, which

are somewhat numerous, are mere amplifications, illustrations, and
defences,
Die Welt als Wille nnd Vorstellung." As soon us he
had put the manuscript into the hands of the
he hurried
cipal

publisher,

off to

Italy,

chuckling over the sensation which he expected

it

to

393

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

of its
by its novel and startling doctrines, tlie brilliancy
it heaped upon those who
which
abuse
ridicule
and
the
and
stvle,
had boon for over twenty years the demigods of German idolatry in
And in any other country than Germany, in France
philosophy.
or England, for instance, I doubt not that it would have created an
unexampled sensation that men would have looked with mingled

create

admiration and dismay upon the avatar of

this

portentous

spirit,

and that a controversy would have sprung up which would have

made its author one of the most noted men of his time. But in
though the especial home of metaphysics, it was far oth

Germany,

After remaining three years in Italy, Schopenhauer re

and
to learn what the world said of his book
he found that the world paid no attention to it whatever.
Only

erwise.

turned home eager

one notice of

it

had not found a

read

it

any of the critical journals, it

and
probably not one person had
single adversary,
had appeared

And

through.

century was
of a second edition
still

in

to

Just a quarter of a
the neglect continued.
it attained even the poor honor
before
elapse

and not till 1859, when its author was in his

from the press. And
seventy-second year, did it issue a third time
tin s too, in a country where editions were multiplying every year
of the principal writings, not only of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,
;

and fourth rate commentators, disciples, and op

Schopenhauer s rage and mortification were unbounded
ponents.
and I must admit that he had good cause to be angry. But like
the old woman who was ducked by the mob for Jacobitism, but

but, of

their third

when she could get

persisted, at every momentary interval
her mouth out of water, in crying out "Charlie yet!" so Schopen
hauer obstinately continued to write and publish, as if only to
manifest his hatred and contempt for the noted trio of German

who

metaphysicians, and the stupid

philosophy, teachers,

tribe of

university professors

of

critical journals, who made a

their respective systems in a technical jar

and editors of

continuous pother about

gon, of which no one, who was not
&

"to

the

manor

born"

could

understand one syllable.

The fact w;is, that hardly anybody in Germany, at that time,
read metaphysics, or wrote about them in literary journals, except
students, theologians, and professors, who were mostly congregated
in the numerous universities, and who had become so accustomed

barbarous patois of philosophical technicalities, which Kant,

Fichte, and Hegel had invented and rendered fashionable, that
nor be
they could not express their thoughts in any other dialect,

to the

lieve that

anybody was a philosopher who could not pronounce

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

394

These formed a poor clique of pedants, who al

They had mis
Schopenhauer s contempt for them.
taken the mastery of an abstruse and barbarous terminology for
When,
proof of metaphysical power, acumen, and erudition.
among the world outoide, there appeared a book which expressed
disdain for this jargon, heaped abuse upon the authors of it and
their systems, and also preached new and startling doctrines, these
professorlings and their disciples affected cool contempt and ig
nored it altogether;
just as a competent mathematician would
Medo, if an outsider should make a vehement assault upon the.
cf Laplace, though his language showed total
canique Celeste
ignorance of the technicalities of the infinitesimal Calculus, and
even of the names of the common trigonometric functions.
They
forgot the just and striking remark of D Alembert, that a good
cannot teach the world anything which is
book on
really new, but can only bring out into clearer consciousness, and
lie only
in due order and svstem, what everybody knew before.
is a competent teacher of philosophy, who can not only make him
their shibboleth.

most

justified

"

"

nietaphy>ic>

understood by all the world, but is willing to accept all the

world as well-qualified judges of the truth or falsity of his opin
self

ions.

Let us now attempt to understand and appreciate the system of

philosophy put forth in this long neglected work, which has at last
become notorious, and even popular. The two leading doctrines
of

philosophy are sufficiently indicated in the brief

Schopenhauer

title

of his book.

"The

world

is

First,

my

represent or believe
it

is

my

be-lief

thought.
existent in

is

it

a system of thorough-going idealism.

is what I
or mental picture,

Presentation"
it

to

be;

The World

thought and present

my
to

it

agrees exactly with

e.\ists_/o/-

me only

mind, only so far as

my

consciousness.

it is

my

thought;

as a picture

and

portrayed by

my

Schopenhauer prefers

as Kant did, a Presentation, a Vorstelluny, or placing

is im
Ir,
mind, of certain phenomena or appearances.
that
it should be known, to be
and
even
inconceivable,
possible,
anything else than it appears to be and of course, an appearance
be
is, from its very nature, an appearance only to the mind of the
to

call

before

it,

my

Make

holder.
ple5.se

this

it is still

mental picture as vivid or

only a mental picture.

lifelike

Whatever

as

you

the ignorant

be
fancy, or the superstitious may dream, nothing is known to
He only
behind it.
It is only an appearance or Presentation.
to whom this is distinct
is a
philosopher," says Schopenhauer,
but is, only
that he knows no sun, and no earth
arid certaiu,

may

"

"

SCHOPENHAUER

395

PRESENTATION THEORY.

and always, an eye that sees the sun, and a hand that feels the
is only a Presen
earth; and that the world which surrounds him
that is, exists only in reference to the person
tation in his mind,
who thinks or represents it and this person is himself." It is
be knoiun, except as it is con
impossible that anything should
other
in
or
words, as it is present to conscious
sciously known,
to the
ness; and nothing but an affection of or a Presentation
;

mind can be present

to consciousness.

This world as Presentation has two essential, necessary, and inthe one is the Subject knowing, and
divisible halves or factors
These are not two separate enti
known.
the
is
the other
Object
have foolishly imagined, one or the
as former
:

ties,
philosophers
Subject
other existing as Cause, and the Presentation as Effect.
and Object are not related to each other as Cause and Effect.
The Subject does not produce or create the Object, as the Idealist
neither does the Object create the Subject, as the Ma
supposes
But as I have said, the two are inseparable,
terialist supposes.
and the same phenomenon,
only the different aspects of one
;

being
The Object is an Object only to the
namely, the Presentation.
In other
is a Subject only to the Object.
the
Subject
Subject
there
and
knower
a
known
without
be
cannot
words, a thing
Then they are
cannot be a knower without something known.
indivisible and indistinguishable from the Presentation, being only
that Presentation itself viewed on its two opposite sides
just as
the two necessary aspects of one and
are
and
concavity
convexity
the same curved line, being only that line viewed from one side
;

Just so there is no Object known apart from the

Presentation of it neither is there any Subject knowing apart
In one
from the mental picture presenting the Object known.
word, Subject and Object are both merged in the Presentation,

or the other.

is both what appears, and that to which it appears.

can easily be shown that the existence of an Object without
a Subject, that is, of any material thing or any physical event out
side of consciousness, and without any mind to behold it, is an

which
It

for such an existence is not even ^phenome

arbitrary hypothesis;
and therefore real be
nal fact it does not even
appear to be
In
or actual existence, cannot reasonably be predicated of it.
"

"

ing,

manner, argues Schopenhauer, the existence of a Subject with

out an Object, that is, of a mind without anything presented to it,
As I cannot be conscious,
is an equally indefensible hypothesis.

like

am conscious of something, i. e., of some Object, a Subject

without an Object would be a mind without consciousness, the exunless I

396

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

istence of which

is not
merely an arbitrary supposition, but one
any proper meaning. A Subject cannot be presented
to consciousness, for what is so presented ceases to be
Subject, the
Hence, because
very fact of presentation making it an Object.
not presented, it does not even -appear to
so that it is absurd

destitute of

be,"

The conclusion is, therefore, that

suppose that it really exists.
we have no experience whatever of the existence either of mind
or matter
experience teaches us nothing whatever but the exist
ence of Presentations.
Hence, the world is my Presentation.
to

And as this is true of the Present, it is, so to speak, still more ob

for they, confessedly,
viously true both of the Past ami Future
exist only in my thought, as my Presentations
at the present
;

moment, as all admit, both are non-existent.

A more sweeping system of Idealism than
liut for the other and better half
imagined.
doctrine, the

]Vor!<l

us

l(7//,

which

can hardly be

this

of

Schopenhauer

be considered hereafter, it
But the theory as thus far

will

would be thoroughgoing Nihilism.

expounded certainly seems to invite

this criticism or

parody.

Any

pair of correlative terms may thus be made to annihilate each

other.
For instance: a husband is a husband only in relation to
his wife, for, without her, he \vould not be a husband, or would
not exist as such.
In like manner, the wife is a wife only in re
lation to her husband; for, without, him. she

that

is.

she would not exist.

Then

would not be a wife,

neither exists as a person or

exists is the ground of the re

but all which re-illv

between the two. or the abstract idea of Matrimony. This
is not
merely ;i parody of the system but it is a corollary, a le
gitimate, though ludicrous, application of it to a particular case,
as Schopenhauer himself would acknowledge.
For since his the
ory annihilates not only the Object known, but the Subject know
ing, he actually maintains the unreality, the non-existence, not
He
only of the outward universe, but of all individual minds.
leaves nothing really existing but the one Presentation, or menbd
picture, which is present at any one moment, and only for
moment, to consciousness for, he declares, this is the single fact
attested by experience
and he stoutly affirms that his system is a
Like Hume, he annihilates both mat
philosophy of experience.
ter and mind, asserting that one distinct perception, or mental im
age, is the only actually existing thing, and that no real connec
tion can be perceived between any two of these images existing
at successive moments, or at wider intervals.
This doctrine ought
tiling in-itsclf ;

lation

th>it

to

be called the Pi jseutation philosophy.

SCHOPENHAUER
It

397

PRESENTATION THEORY.

should be mentioned, that

it

is

only the post-Kantian meta

Scho

so-called Philosophies of the Absolute, that

physics, or the
treats with unmitigated censure

He

and contempt.

pro
be a faithful, though discriminating, disciple of Kant
himself, declaring that his own system is built exclusively upon
Kantian foundations, and only carries out to their legitimate con

penhauer

fesses

to

Critique of Pure Rea

most searching, and, on the whole, most
sensible criticism of Kantian metaphysics which has yet appeared in
Germany, is contained in the first volume of Die Welt als "Wille
und Vor.-tcllung." He adopts unreservedly from Kant the doctrines
of the unreality or subjective character of Space and Time, and
in the
sequences the principles developed
son."

Far the

"

ablest,

"

that the Categories are mere forms of our Understanding or think

outside of their application
ing faculty, so that they have no validity
But he reduces the number of the Cate
to the p/teiiomcnal world.
and very
that of Cause and Effect
gories from twelve to one,
for his pedantic and almost childish love
Kant
ridicules
properly
of symmetry, in tracing the analogy between Logic and Meta
a dozen of them, divided into
physics so far as to set up just
four equal tables, for no earthly reason but that of causing the
number to coincide with that of the Forms of Pure Judgment.
will not admit, as Kant does, that there is any
;

Schopenhauer

whose only office is to con

special faculty of the Unconditioned,
duct us to illusion and error.
Schopenhauer s psychology, or di
vision of the faculties of the mind, I

that of Kant.

abstract general ideas

think,

more judicious than

is

be the faculty of Concepts, or

and Understanding to be the faculty of

He makes Reason

to

Effect, just as Siimlichkeit (external or internal Sense)

In other words, Reason appre
the faculty of Time and Space.

Cause and
is

hends the relations of an individual thing to its class, its Concept,

or abstract general notion
Understanding discerns the relations
while
of individual tilings to each other as Causes and Effects
;

the Sense perceives these things in their relations to Time and

All abstract general knowledge conies from the Reason,
Space.

common

him and

which is peculiar to man Understanding

Effect is the
the brutes.
Cognition of the relation of Cause to
a
and
of
the
one and only function
dog appre
Understanding
For the Under
hends this relation as perfectly as man does.
but its functions are con
standing has no power of generalization,
and the man who
fined to single objects immediately known
knows that a mutton chop will satisfy his hunger, has no advantage
over a horse, who practically affirms the same thing of a bundle
;

is

to

398

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

of hay.

Practical cleverness, ingenuity, ami most of the

helps foi
getting on in the world," depend on acuteness of Understanding
and the want of these qualities is what we usually term
stupid
ity."
Inability to generalize quickly and correctly is what we
call want of Reason,
narrow-mindedness, lack of philosophical
"

"

breadth and power.

But I go hack to the general theory of
Schopenhauer, which is
evidently confirmed and illustrated by this Kantian doctrine of the
purely subjective character, and consequent unreality, of Time,
As on the rising of the sun
Space, and the law of Causation.
the visible world begins to be. so the
Understanding at one
stride,

single function, converts the dumb meaningless Sensa

tions into perceptions of outward
objects and events, giving to the

through

its

former an imaginary locality

in unreal
Spaces and to the latter a
What the eye;, the
supposititious position or date in unreal Time.
ear, the hand fuel-;, these are not perceptions;
they are only data
for perception.
First when the Understanding, in the exercise of
its single function,
passes over from the Sen-ation, as an Effect, to
its

supposed Cau~e

as

its

Matter

in an external
thing, does the world begin to be,
spread out in Space, changing in regard to its
form and attributes, but persistent through all time in
to

perception
for

Matter, that

Matter

is.

it

unites

Space and Time

in

respect
the Presentation of

of actuality, actual existence, or that which acts.

portion of Space invested with

only a determinate

is

Causality, or the power to act in Time, as in its supposed attributes

of impenetrability, attraction, and
Hence we cannot
repulsion.
conceive; of Matter
being either created or annihilated, that is, of

quantity being either increased or diminished

uent elements of Matter, namely. Time,
Space,
its

for the constit

and Causation,

being necessary Forms of the mind, exist indestructibly in the

mind, and can neither begin to be nor pass away.
This world is a
Presentation only through the necessary forms of the Understand
ing and the faculty of Sense, and only for the Understanding and
the Sense,
that is, through the laws of Cause and Effect, ar.tl
those of Space and Time.
Time, Space, and Causality are forms, each of only one class of
;

Presentations;

Time

nal, Causality, or

two

of

what

is

Internal, Space of what is Exter

But the falling apart into the

Force, of Matter.

and Object, is a Form common to all Presen

and belongs to their very nature.
Indeed, pure Time and
Space, not occupied by objects or events, are mere blanks
they
cannot as such be perceived by Sense nor constructed by the Irafactors. Subject

tations,

SCHOPENHAUER
agination.

Only

so

399

PRESENTATION THEORY.

far as they are occupied

become perceptible and imaginable

by Matter, do they

hence, Matter

may be

defined

and of
be the manifestation or objectivity of Space and Time
are.
course, it is as unreal as they
Time and Space are not only conditions of all
Still further
without them, no real existence is possible, but
reality, so lhat,
individual exis
they are principia individuationis, principles of
is possible.
tence, without which no separate or concrete being
all that
of
forms
universal
Sense,
these
Except as viewed under
now appears as particular, concrete, and individual being, would be
merovd in the universal, and would be indistinguishable from that
This thing can be
is both one and all, the Presentation.
;

to

which

that thing, only as this occupies a different place

distinguished from
The
from that, or occupies the same place at a different time.
as
\\\Q future can be distinguished from the present, only
and
past
moment
indivisible
the
the two former exist at different times from
a cir
which constitutes the present. Time may be compared to
of which the
cular disk perpetually revolving in a vertical plane,
and the always sinking half is the
always rising halt is \\\G future,
these two halves meet, which
where
The
tangential point
past.
the rest, is the pres
is stationary and does not revolve with
point
ever
to
an
be
flowing stream, which
Or Time may
ent.
compared
a rock in the midst of it, but does not move
forever breaks

upon
forward this rock, this being the nunc stans.

We

may

imagine,

but so
indeed, that this tangential point is continually shifting
^
it is that which
far as we know, it persists as one and the same
Take away these grounds of distinction, as in
is always Present.
the percip
the doctrine that Time and Space are mere Forms of
or
no
and
that,
future, no
past
ient mind, and there are no this
;

and universal Object, an indivis

you and /; but only an indivisible
ible and universal present, and an indivisible and universal knowing
The history of the world, as well as its complexity and
Subject..
Of the two necessary
into
fades

away
multiplicity,
and indivisible halves, which
one

is

Object,

Multiplicity

nothingness.

make up the world as Presentation, the

whose forms are Time and Space, and through them,
and the other is Subject, which has neither Form,

which does not occupy Space, nor exist in Time, and is absolutely
one and indivisible.
That which knows all, and is known by none, not even by it
It is, then, the bearer or supporter of the World
Subject.
As this Subject
for whatever exists, exists only for the Subject.
the
is
he
kuower, never
as
far
so
finds himself; yet only
self, is

everyone

400

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

as being the object known.

His body, indeed, is Object,
one
Object among other Objects, a part of the world
although it is
his immediate Object, and not, like other parts of the world, or
Like all other objects
foreign matter, remote or mediate Object.
;

man

of intuition, a

own body appears

which are the Forms

to

him

in

Space and Time,

cognition, and through which alone

But the Subject is not
anything appears as manifold or complex.
manifested under these; Forms, but rather is presupposed by them;
of all

therefore, strictly speaking, neither

unity, belongs

to

it.

We

multiplicity, nor

know
known

never

knows

but

it,

it

its

opposite,
that which

is

like the eye, which sees

all, whenever anything is
There is one thing which
every thing else, but never sees itself.
never appears to me as a cognizable or complex, phenomenon, or,
indeed, under any Form whatsoever
and that is Myself.
Every
;

thing which belongs, or can belong, to the World, is inevitably

burdened with this condition, that as it can be known only by the
Subject,

As there would be no light

for the Subject.
there were no eye to see it, as there would be no
there were no ear to hear it, for light and sound are
only
c.n sfx

it

<>it!i/

in the world,

sound, if
sensations

if

mind, so there would be no World,

in the

if there were
Time, Space, and Causation, which
alone constitute the World, and render it possible, exist onlv in the
Subject, and an: Forms of its cognition.
Esse=))ercipi ; existence

no Subject

to

know

it

for

and

This is not denying the

perceptibility are convertible terms.
existence of Matter, which would be lunacy, but only correcting
o
the popular notion of it.
/

hough perception takes place by means

that

of the

law of Causal

can

perceive nothing external except through

the re
affirming that there must be some Cause of my sensations,
lation between Subject and Object is by no means a relation be
tween Cause and Effect, but is rather, as I have said, only like the
ity,

relation

is,

between the convexity and concavity

of

any curved

line,

the twofold aspect of one indivisible thing, the Presentation or

The relation of Cause and Effect exists only
mental picture.

between

Objects

my own

primarily, between the immediate Object,

body, and other Objects foreign

between those foreign Objects themselves.

i.

e.,

and secondarily,
Analyze the action of
any of the senses, and you will always find it is the action of some
other body on some part of my body, as on the retina or the
tympanum never the action of body on mind. Hence, the old
contest of the Realists and Idealists, whether body is the cause of
mental action, or mental action the cause of body, is foolish and
;

to

it

SCHOPENHAUER

PRESENTATION THEORY.

401

Neither is Cause neither is Effect.

The law of
meaningless.
Causation, like the, forms of Space and Time, belongs only to the
convex side of the curve, to the objective aspect of the Presenta
tion, and to the relations of these
Objects to each other as known;
never to the concave side, or to the Subject which knows, but
;

never is known, not even to itself, and so cannot be

regarded under
any laws or forms, simply because it cannot be -regarded" or
known at all. That is not its office or function.

As Schopenhauer

philosophy thus largely depends on the sub

exclusively empirical applicability, and consequent

unreality, or transcendental idealism, of Time, Space, and Causality,
he fortifies Kant s arguments in support of this doctrine by some
jective origin,

The law of causation,

very original and striking ones of his own.
he says, cannot be derived from any external experience, for
without it, as we should not know that there was any external

We

world, no external experience would be possible.

cannot
pro^e the existence of an outward universe except by applying the
law of Causality, and saying that there must be a Cause of our
sensations.
But then we cannot make use of that universe in
order to prove that our sensations must have a Cause
for this
would be reasoning in a circle, first proving
by B, and then
;

li by A.
The law of Causality, then, is a mere necessity
mind or thought, to enable us to think that there is an external

proving
of

world.

And when

it has enabled us so to
think, it has performed
can do nothing more.
Again, this very application of
the law presupposes an a priori intuition of
Space and Time.
For Causation here means the necessary antecedence of one
phys

its office

ical

it

event, as

Cause, before another physical event, as

its

Effect.

Such antecedence and consequence are possible only in Time, and

such events can happen only in Space.
The subjectivity of Time and Space is thus further illustrated.

They cannot

br.
anything, because they cannot do anything. Time
never a Cause, but only a Condition, of any phenomenon
only
an atmosphere, so to speak, in which any physical Cause must be
conceived to act.
Action is motion, and motion can take place
only in Time and Space but Time and Space alone, taken either

is

separately or in combination with each other, cannot produce mo

tion or rest, cannot
This is what
change either into the other.
the physicist calls the law of Inertia.
if

body once

no physical cause intervenes, continue

line forever

lions of years,

the lapse of Time

during its
and ihe quantity of Space which
26

in

motion

motion

will,

a straight
motion, though it be bil
in

it

in

traverses, though

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

402

be billions of leagues, will not affect or alter its motion in the

And so, also, if once at rest, it will forever be
slightest degree.
at rest.
Hut tin- rjinuition, the relative amount, of Time and Space
it

they were anything real or actually existent, would necessarily

have some effect, would exert some influence.
Time, Schopenhaner says very prettily. Hies over things, but leaves no trace
upon
It is not Time which corrodes
them.
every thing that is perish
able, covers the rock with moss, draws wrinkles in the cheek, and
eats away the river bank or the mountain side
but only Causes
Shut of? anything from the action of these
operative in Time.
chemical and other physical influence s, as the Siberian mammoth
was when enclosed in ice or geological ages, or as a flv is in am
ber, and it will remain absolutely unaltered forever. And as Time
and Space produce no change in other things, so they suffer no
if

themselves.

are equally indifferent to the pres

of real objects or events, in
them.
The clock may stop, tin earth may stand still in its orbit,
all motion of
things may cease, things themselves may be annihi
lated, leaving only a void Space
but Time still rolls on in its

change

ence;

in

or the absence of

They

phenomena,
1

perfectly uniform lapse, and the void Space endures immovable for
ever.
cannot even conceive or think, that the one should ever

We

rest

from

its

move from its rest. In our

two things limit, or set bounds to,
for we cannot think that even Almighty power can

motion, or the other ever

apprehension, at

Omnipotence

least,

these;

change them.
These two things, also, art: everywhere present and coexistent.
Space exists throughout all Time, and Time is present at every
Wherever we go. even in imagination, these two
point of Space.
inevitably go along with us.
thus persistently accompanies

Now,
us.

in every other case, whatever

mov
say, a particular odor,

ing wherever we go and resting wherever we stop, we immediately

suspect that it comes from our own body, that it emanates from

The

which

always and everywhere hear,

my mind, where alone a sen
sation can be felt.
If a blood-red image of the sun should conO
lloat before my eyes at the same distance, whichever
"tantly
way
I turn
my head, and wherever I go, then I immediately know that
it is of
subjective origin, that there is no real outward object corourst.-lves.

must be

in

respondu g
fected.

ringing

my own

to

Why

it,

ears, or rather in

but that

my own

sense of sight

not reason in the same

is

seriously af

manner respecting Time and

Space, which beset me so persistently

them even in imagination or thought

that
?

cannot rid myself of

They haunt me.

Then

SCHOPENHAUER
they are products of

THE WORLD AS WILL.

thought, laws of

my

my

403

perceptive faculty,

spectral sights and spectral sounds,

which originate, and have their

That my head appears constantly to be in
only being, in myself.
Time and Space, ought to prove to me that Time and Space are
That you resist this conclusion only shows that
only in my //cad.

you are unwilling or reluctant to accept it; for I defy you to pro
duce a single valid argument against it.
But that infinite or end
less Space, says Schopenhauer, Space at once immovable and inde
structible, should exist in itself, independently of us, absolutely
and objectively, and a mere image or representation of it should
come into our minds through our eyes and other senses, is the
most absurd of all fantasies and yet, in a certain sense, it is the
most fruitful of all imaginings for he who distinctly sees its ab
;

surdity thereby recognizes the purely phenomenal existence of this

world, and sees it in its true character, as a mere phantasm of the
brain, which perishes with the thinking Subject who entertains it.

the World as Presentation,"

Having sufficiently considered
which is the first half of Schopenhauer s philosophy, we now pass
to

the second half,

"

World

the

as

Will."

The repugnance and

unwillingness, he says, with which every one regards this truth, the
World is my Presentation, that is, is merely a phenomenon or base
less

image appearing

in

my

mind, prove that

this

is

a one-sided

doctrine, or only half of the truth

and that we must search for the
other moiety.
For the question immediately occurs,
should
;

Why

there be any such phenomenon?

Presentation of the World as it

Why

do we have

this particular

now

appears, rather than any

constituted
from the present
differently
one? Philosophy as well as common sense affirms the dictum of
Leibnitz, that nothing exists without a Sufficient Reason for its ex
other, say, of a

istence.

We

World very

must be able

to tell

why

this rather than that, or

we

leave the matter short.

Pressed by this difficulty, Kant, whose

system, since he denies the reality both of Space and Time, is
quite as idealistic as that of Fichte or Hume, found himself com
pelled to assert the existence of a
\ying behind the phenomenon as

ding an
its

sick,

Ground

or

a real entity

Reason,

and

But as Schopen
thereby imparting to it its distinctive character.
hauer remarks, this is the Achilles heel, the vulnerable point of
Kantian metaphysics; for it is a mere assumption, an acknowl
Kant is
edgment of the difficulty, but not a removal of it.
obliged to confess, in conformity with his own principles, that we
do not know, and never can know, what this ding an sick is, or
wherein it differs from the phenomenon.
Its existence is af-

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

4:04

any independent reasons or grounds of its own,

meet the exigency of the case: and as nothing else is

firmed, not for

but only
said about

to

affirm

it is utterly incognizable, to
that such an exigency exists.

except that

it.

to admit
reality is only
trine that the Unknown

and Unknowable

is

the

its

Tho doc

Reason

for

any

we do not know
simplv a confession of ignorance, that
Let us
what the Reason is, though there must be such a Reason.
see, then, whether the direct testimony of consciousness will not
thing,

is

some indication

us

<_nve

of

what

this real entity

is.

himself were only a pure

says Schopenhauer, the inquirer
for instance, a winged head without a body,
knowing Subject.
then he could not find a way over,
like one of the Cherubim.
from a mere Presentation of the world in his mind, to a world of
(iround or Reason.
Iving behind or underneath it. as its
It

reality

Man is not merely a knowing, but a willing,

not so.
is
it
but volitions, aversions,
Subject; for he has not merely cognitions,
and, what is more, he
desires, and other manifestations of Will
has a sentient body, his own nervous organism, which is the only
intmi ilinh Object of his consciousness, all other phenomenal things
P>ut

being

through

their

they are known to him merely

own body, and therefore through its
The inquirer finds that he is himself

Objects since

iiK ilinti

action on

his

intervention as a medium.

an individual corporeal bein^. and. as such, that he is a part of this

that
phenomenal world, and rooted in it, his own body being
he can have any per
through whose affections and sensations alone
To the
that He around him.
ception of all the other phenomena
it
is
true, its own body is itself a
pure L-iimi iiiii Subject as such,
Presentation like every other, one Object among other Objects
;

and in

so fur, its

movements,

its

known to him just as

are known to him, and

actions, are

the changes of all other perceptible Objects

would be just as strange and incomprehensible to him as they are,
differ
if their significance were not unriddled to him in a wholly
ent way.

I>ut

this his

own body

is

manifested

to

him

in

two en

other Objects in
laws of percep
to
the
and
thus
an intelligible perception,
subject
and secondly, as that conscious force or power, immediately
tion
known to every one, which is designated by the word Will. His
volitions, or the acts of Will, arc not, in themselves, mere phenom
ena or presentations, for the very reason that they are inward
manifestation of
acts, which point forwards to some embodiment or
themselves in outward phenomena, and not merely backwards to
or Reason, of which they are only a
some hidden
tirely different

modes

first,

Cause, Ground,

as one Object

among

SCHOVNHAUER

405

THE WORLD AS WILL.

their own
phenomenal expression. They certify their own verity,
As to have a sensation, is
substantial and independent character.
to know that, this sensation exists, so to have a volition, is to know

for it is our own act, and not merely an

that this volition exists
It is known
image or presentation of something beyond itself.
our own
immediately, and as such, since it is the expression of
True, it immediately passes into an outward mani
inmost being.
festation of itself, which then becomes the Object of a presentation.
Every true act of my Will, says Schopenhauer, is so far, and in
;

I cannot really lolll the

body.
perceiving that the volition appears
If I will to raise my arm, or clinch
as a movement of my body.
my fingers, at once the arm appears raised, and the fingers

fallibly, also a movement of

act, without at the same time

my

stand, to walk, or to sit, immediately my

In like manner,
standing, walking, or sitting.
also, every effect produced upon my body from without, as when I
am struck, or warmed, or chilled, or vibrations reach the tym
If

clinched.

body appears

panum

of

my

will to

me

to

ear, or odors excite

olfactory nerves,

my

all

these,

my
being
body, immediately
called pleasurable, when they harmonize with the Will, and pain
ful or unpleasant, when they are opposed to the Will, or are repu
It is a great mistake to regard pain and pleasure,
diated by it.
and fear, and the like, as mere Presentations or images in
in so far as they affect

hope

the mind.
ject
tion

affect

my

for they have no Ob

are not so by any means
from themselves, of which they could be a Presenta

They

distinct

"Will,

not possible that they should be unreal or imagi

be what they arc felt to be, for their very essence
nary.
consists in being felt.
They exist in the very act through which
;

and

it

is

They must

they are

felt to

exist.

They

are a

momentary and enforced

will

the impression made

ing or unwilling, acceptance or repudiation, of
upon the Will. As the movements and actions of my body ex
so my limbs,
press and render visible my conscious volitions,
muscles, and other organs, even my whole body, express and make
manifest to Sense my unconscious volitions; they are the embodi
ment of the incessant activity of my Will.
I

am

conscious of the foreign outer world only once, as my Pre

but I am doubly conscious of my own body, first as

sentation
states of

it

express

my

volitions

feelings, and secondly, as

In general, then, my whole
that is, my Will
objectified Will

and

my

a mental Presentation of these states.

body is nothing else than my

become a Presentation or perception.
the same thing, though given to us

Body and Will

in

two

are one and

different ways.

The

MODERN

40G

PHILOSOPHY".

Will is, in a certain sense, the a priori cognition of the Body

and the liodv is the a posteriori cognition of the Will.
Here, and
here only, \ve penetrate immediately and consciously to the Ground
or Iu
of the Presentation, to the diny an sic/i, the AVill, which
lies behind or beneath the phenomenon, and imparts to it its dis
;

UM>M

tinctive

character,
so willed.

as

appearance rather

this

than that, because

Now, because our corporeal being is thus given to ourselves in a

double manner, immediately and mediately, internallv and exter
nally, lirst, in our immediate consciousness of Will objectifying itself
in outward phenomena, and
secondly, as these phenomena repre
sented in our cognitive sense as one Object among other Objects,
the former bein^

possible

the ttnlnrn nntnnu/s,

because of

nii!i<r<ittt,

for

knowledge

u>

oi

to

tin-;

make our

and the

twofold cognition,
internal

the universal dun/

mi

latter the
I

say,

natnra

becomes

it

self-cognition a key to the

the true Ground or Ks-

sic/i,

senee of all external things.

Will, says Schopenhauer, is not one
form or species of the genus Power or Force, but each and every
Power or Force is one species of the genus Will. Will is not
necessarily

or

self-conscious,

known

to

itself

as

such

in

the

greater number of cases, we infer, what in several cases we dinvtlv know, that it is unconscious.
Self-consciousness, knowledge
as Mich, is only an accident of tiie manifestation of Will in (tiiii)i(ih,

man but it is not an invariable accompaniment of

even in him.
In all frequently repeated series of actions, which
have Income easy and familiar by long practice, as in walking,
iding. writing, winking, and many others, wean: not coii.-cious of
particularly in

it

the hundredth part of our volitions.

Then there is an unconscious
and incognitive Will in Nature.
a AVill not. accompanied by in
tellect, a universal, all-pervading Will, which is the true Ground or
Reason of all phenomena, of all that appears.
In the last analysis,
Matter is nothing but Force, and Force is nothing but Will.

only the visibility or Objectivation of Will; it is Will

apparent as a phenomenon or Presentation; and the
And this
powers of Matter are identical with the Will in us.
AVill is everywhere one and the same, a blind and unconscious
God. coinciding in this respect with the one universal Substance of
It manifests itself, indeed, to our perception, in a count
Spino/a.
.Matter

is

become

less

multitude of forms, and in particular concrete cases, as the im

gravitation, cohesion, attraction, and repulsion of

penetrability,

as the life and principle of growth, the

rirute or inorganic matter
nisus formativus (bildungstriefy, of plants and animals; and eveu
;

407

SCHOPENHAUER: THE WORLD AS WILL.

But as we
and cognitive Will, in man and brute.
are
individual
the
only phenomenal
have seen, the particular and
mere accidents of the subjective
manifestations of the universal,
Forms of Space and Time. What is thus manifested is only the
as
universal all-pervading Will objectified, or become perceptible
It is the nature of this one Will thus to manifest
Precondition.
of development or objectivation, as Matter
itself, in various stages
itself necessarily, one form sucAnd it so
and Life.
as conscious

objectifies

seneeeding another, impulse preceding motion, thought following

after
death
and
life
motives,
coining
sation, volitions succeeding
all being governed or neces
each other in ceaseless interchange,
and Consequence, which
Reason
of
sitated by the immutable law
universal Form under which all phenomena must present
is the
Thus, the world or Universe,
themselves to the Understanding.
on its other side,
mere
is
Presentation,
its
which, in one of
aspects,
The man
Will.
as a noumenon or thing-in-itself, is pure universal
a
as
in
itself
us,
stretching out
ner in which a volition announces
sort
to take hold of some object, is only a particular
a motive towards a cer
namely, that which is directed by
in distinc
tain act; and this act is therefore called a voluntary one,
But there
tion from those which are involuntary or unintentional.
under
the
as
which
motives,
perceived by
is another sort of Will, on
have no influence, but which manifests itself as a Force

of the

hand

of Will,

standing,

call mechanical, chemical, and physiological

acting under what we
a stone, in chemical actions and reactions,
fall
of
the
in
s
U
laws,
and animals.
in the assimilation of food, and in the growth of plants
are usu
them
of
most
as
or
of
Force,
But these various kinds
Will,

only different stages of

to say, various degrees
prefers
penhauer
the same Will, which, in its innermost
The leading feature of the
with itself.
ally called, are

manifestation, or, as Scho

one and

of objectivation, of
essence, is always identical
theory is, the entire separa

from any mode of cognition or conscious

in man, and even, to some extent, in
which,
intellect, by
to prove,
brur.es, the Will is guided, is, as Schopenhauer attempts
state of
the
in
the
of
creation
or
Will,
a
highest
itself only
product
of its objectiva
its manifestation. That which, in the lowest degree
as a blind Force, when it has
tion, shows itself in Nature only
worked its way up to the animal kingdom, appears in a body
of sense and a brain, and now for the first
provided with organs
contime becomes self-illumined, so that it is able to will with
Then Will alone is primary and essential, while Knowl
piousness.

tion of the Will, as such,

The

ness.

edge

is

secondary,

artificial,

and accidental.

What

is

eternal

and

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

408

indesti uctible in man, says Schopenhauer, is, not the soul, but that
which, to use a chemical expression, is the basis of the soul
and
The so-called soul is a compound, a union of Will
that is Will.
with rots or Intellect, the latter being a mere adjunct and im
;

plement of the former.

Spino/a says, that a stone flying through the air from an im
pulse which it has received, if it had consciousness, would suppose
that it was thus living from its own will.
I have
only to add,"
says

Sclmpenhauer,

itiijni/sc

for

is

"that

the stone would

the stone, the

rnatirc

is

for

What

be right.

me.

the

AVhat appears

in

stone as cohesion, weight, and

impenetrability, is, in its inter
nal essence, the same which I know in
and which
myself as Will
the stone
if it had intellect
and consciousness, would recognize
t.he

Spino/a. in this remark, had his attention tixed on the

which
he rightfully held to belong to the two cases.
necessity,
as

Will."

As

the. flight of the stone is the lu

cessnr;/ result of its physical
properties and of the impulse which it has received, so any volun
tary act of man is the inevitable consequence of his character, and
of the motive which is present to his mind.
The only dif

ference between the two cases

lowest, and in

man

is,

that in

the stone. Will

has

its

and objectiveness.
Even St. Augustine recogni/ed with keen insight ibis sameness
with our Will in the tendencies and strivings of all things.
He
or appetite, whether
speaks of the iri it/lit of b idies as their
for as
they tend downwards by gravity, or upwards by levity;
the body by its weight, so the mind
its love or desire, is car
ried whithersoever it listeth.
If we were stones, or waves, or
wind, or thune. or anything of the kind, and so were without
any
sense or life, still we should not be without some appetite or
long
And Euler also
ing each for our own proper place and order."
saw that the essence of (/riiritdtlnii must finally bo referred to a
sort of inclination or desire
of each particle of matter toward
So two ships in a dead calm at sea. though
every other particle.
they may have been several furlongs apart when first the wind
fell, inevitably tend, strive, and gravitate toward each other, and
its

highest, .stage of visibility

lnc<

"

l>v

k-

"

soon, if no hindrance arises, come to float side by side with their

yards interlocked.
Here is the nucleus of a great truth, which Schopenhauer clearly
discerned and fully incorporated into his system
and which, when
;

stripped of the unnecessary, and even meaningless, adjuncts that he

has heaped up around it, seems to me the noblest and most truth
ful solution

which can be given of the great problem that

philos-

SCHOPENHAUER

THE WORLD AS WILL.

409

nothing but Force, Force is nothing

Every phenomenon, every object that appears to our
senses, and every change that takes place in the universe, is but
the manifestation of the one Infinite Will, that first brought the

ophy has

to solve.

Matter

is

but Will.

universe into being,

ness of

man

when

as a living

lie

first

soul.

made

Man

is

it present to the conscious

the earliest work of crea

tion, for whose moral improvement alone the outer world was fash
ioned and spread out in the eternal thought of God, where alone
:: can be
Give up the
spiritually discerned in its true essence.
hallucination, that our volitions are necessarily determined by mo

human Will

as finally emancipated, and

Freedom, when the chain of
physical causation is broken at every link, and the material uni
verse becomes only a Presentation in human minds of the infinite
Give up also the senseless
goodness and wisdom of their Creator.
pantheistic doctrine, which resolves the particular and concrete
into the universal, and thereby absorbs man into God, and recog
tives,

and recognize the

rejoicing in the

consciousness of

nize, as the first

dictum of consciousness, that

its

I exist, as a separate

and responsible, though not independent, being, and,

lesson of philosophy, that

God

also exists as

my

as

the

first

creator, benefactor,

and judge.

Malebranche is right. Any

"Certainly," says Schopenhauer,
physical antecedent is merely the Occasional Cause of the event
which follows it only marks the occasion for the appearance now
"

and here of that one and indivisible Will, which is the essence, the
This whole visible world consists only
inmost being, of all things.
of tiie successive manifestations, the objectivation in one phenome
non after another, of that one Will. The physical cause merely
determines, (or enables us to know beforehand, through the uniform
time at
ity of physical law.) the particular place and the particular
which the event may be expected to occur but it is not that which
This producing Force is
generates the event, or makes it happen.
the essence and internal nature of all things; it is the one univer
sal Will, which creates and sustains all, and of which the visible
world is onlv a mirror, only a manifestation to sense.
Therefore,
what we call cause is only the Occasional Cause." Fas est ab
Itoste ducc.ri ; either Malebranche or Berkeley might have accepted
this, as a full and explicit statement of the doctrine which they in
culcated with so much earnestness,
that of the immediate presence
and agency of the Ueity throughout the physical universe, every
;

motion or change in it, with the single exception of human voliVions, being produced directly by His omnipresent and omniscient
Will.

CHAPTER

XXTI.

II.
PESSIMISM, ./ESTHETICS, AND
ETHICS.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

THE
in

remainder of Schopenhauer s philosophy is loss sail-factory

itself, and less creditable to its author, than the doctrines thus

Very curious

far noticed.

ordei

to

exalt

the Will

is

his

as the

depreciation of the

primary and essential

Intellect, in
tiling,

not

As there can
but in individual minds.
be no Object without a Subject, he argues, so there can be no
that is, no act of knowing, without
Subject without an Object
onlv

in

nature as a

\vliole,

something
ness which

dill

impo.-sible.

space

As

if

Hence, a Conscious
which is known.
be pure intellect, and nothing more, would be
intellect is like the sun, which does not illuminate

erent from

it,

>hould

The

there be not

that which

knows,

some object there

it

throw back

to

cannot, as Mich, be

known

its

beams.

bur the only

the Will. For,
;

thing in self-consciousness which is really kiioiai is

not only willing and determining in the narrowest sense, but also
all

striving, wishing. Hying, hoping, fearing, loving, hating,

that immediately constitutes our proper weal and

short, all

pleasure and pain.

all

this

is

in

woe,

an excitement or modification of

is that which, if it works outwardly,

Willing or Repudiating;
And all this we know thoroughly;
appears as an act of the Will.
in truth, it is the only part of ourselves which is known.

Now, in all knowledge, the first and essential thing is the

known, not the knowing; since the former is the real thing, the
prototype; while the latter is only the image in the mirror, the
proentation, the

ectype.

Therefore, in

self-consciousness

also,

known, that is, the Will, is the lirst and essential but the
knowing of it is the secondary, what is added, the mirror. The
two are related to each other as self-luminous bodies are to reflect
what

is

the tone
ing ones, or as the vibrating string is to the sounding board,
In order to know con
or sound from which is the consciousness.
sciousness thoroughly, we must first ask what that is which is

equally and

constantly present in every consciousness, since this

SCHOPENHAUER: AESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

411

That which
must be the common and essential element of it.
another is the acci
from
consciousness
one
merely distinguishes
it, the merely additional or secondary.
Consciousness belongs exclusively to animal life, so that the
be tautological.
Now, what
pin-use "animal consciousness" would
even in the weakest and
is
present in every animal consciousness,

dental element of

most incomplete, and which lies at the bottom of it, is the imme
diate being aware of a desire, and the gratification or disappoint
ment of this desire in different degrees. This we somehow know
a priori.
It is the common feeling, that which makes us sympa

and even with brutes.

thize witli each other,

"Wonderfully differ

ent as the numerous sorts of animals are, however strange one of

a new species among them, never before seen, may be, we still as
once, and with confidence, that its innermost essence is
that is, we know that the animal
perfectly well known to us;
we even know idtat it wills, namely, existence, gratification
wills
or well-being, freedom from pain, life, and the propagation of its

sume

at

Herein we assume its entire identity with ourselves, and

species.
do not hesitate to attribute to it all those modifications of the Will
We speak of its desires,
which we are conscious of in ourselves.

But
aversions, fear, anger, hate, love, joy, sorrow, longing, etc.
as soon as the phenomena of mere Intellect come into question,

we

doubt.

We

judges, knows.

common

to

dare not say that the animal comprehends, thinks,

But willing and not-willing, or repudiating, are

man and

All actions and gestures of ani

the polyp.

mals which express affections of the Will, we understand, and in

some measure sympathize with, because our Will is like theirs, and
The great gulf between us
at bottom is even identical with it.
and them is the Intellect. This is a mere implement for the ser
vice of the Will, to discover the means of satisfying its desires and
providing for its wants; and the Intellect, together with its organ,

the brain,

mands
mal

is

more complicated

wants, that

is,

in

proportion to the greater de

also corresponds to the ani

The organism

of this service.
to

its

Will

and according as

it

has horns,

teeth, wings, hoof, claw, or hand, it has a more or less developed

brain, whose function is the intelligence required for the use of
these organs.
Thus, both the structure of the animal, and its In

peculiar instincts, are at once the manifestation and the

ministers of its Will.
The more complicated the organization, the
more numerous are its wants and desires, and the more developed

tellect or

ihe

Intellect

which

Complicated of

all

needed to supply them. Man is the most

he needs most, he wills most, and therefore

is
;

412

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

And

has most Intellect

still

the real

man

himself

is

not the In

what he wills, and how lie wills it,

as with more or less energy and persistence.
As we havo scon, all individualization is a mere outcome of
Space and Time, which are subjective Forms of the perceptive
All
faculty, and therefore have no real being in themselves.
which depends upon them, then, is mere Presentation the
par
ticular and individual are
only manifestations of the one universal
but the Character

tellect,

Will, spectral
Time.
Just

images on the shadowy background of Space and

one human face, that of an orator, for instance,

so,

who is addressing a large assemblage of persons, all of whom are

looking at him. is reflected and multiplied in thousands of images
of itself painted on the retinas of each beholder.
These
images,

though numerically distinct from each other, and all seemingly

alive and glowing with the expression of
thought, are in fact only
ideal multiplications to the

Sense of the one

reality at the centre.

Will

primarily objectifies itself in general ideas, in genera and

these are the only permanent forms of the world as Will.
species
Individuals rise and pass away; they are mere
Heeling phenom
ena; Nature heeds them not. but reserves all her care for the con
tinuance of the species.
To this end. the seeds of life are multi
;

plied with measureless

life and
death succeed each
profusion
other in cea-ele.-s interchange: bin the aliernalion is onlv phenom

enal, for all life at

The Will

bottom is one, and is the objecti\ ation of Will.

which Li. e. or the World, is the phenomenal

to live, of

is

expression,

mere pleonasm

for

the

Even

Will.

individual

organisms, as material, are rapidly fleeting forms, subsisting only

Life and death,
by a constant process of decay and restoration.
also, are but

higher forms of assimilation and excretion, of taking

off life; they are only reproductions, or successive

on and putting

manifestations, of the one universal

more

life

or Will.

We

ourht no

grieve at death, than at the loss of the matter which is

The matter is ever
constantly passing away from our bodies.
to

changing

endures.

the form
It

is

is

persistent.

just as

absurd

to

Individuals perish, the species

embalm

bodies, as carefully to

That individual man should fear to die,

preserve our excrements.
is as foolish as if the sun should fear to set,
forgetting that what
appears as dipping beneath the horizon,
diminished

to illuminate

is
merely passing on unanother hemisphere.
Death is a sleep in

which one s individuality, it is true, is forgotten every thing else

awakes again, or rather, has always remained awake.
Schopenhauer makes a striking application of this doctrine in
;

SCHOPENHAUER

413

ESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

his theory of ethics, where lie bases upon it the only sort of retri
Whatever injury I
bution which his system admits as possible.
do to you, I suffer it ; for you and I are one and the same being,

or rather

we

are only different expressions of one and the same

beast who fastens
injures another is only a wild

He who

Will.
his fan

<rs

in his

own

flesh

for the slayer

tim and his avenger, are one; and

the;

and

his victim, the vic

World

is

itself

its

own

Every misfortune, pain, or

great tribunal of retributive justice.
which can befall a man, comes upon him with strict

disappointment
because it is his own act; the one universal Will, which
constitutes and governs the world and life, is also his own Will,
In every act
and lie has no individual being independent of it.
and every occurrence, the agent and the patient are one and the
Could all the misery of
same and thus eternal justice reigns.
the
all
and
one
into
world
be
the
scale,
guilt of the world into
put
the other, the balance would remain exactly even, inclining neither
we would know what men are worth, on an average, in
way.
we have
that is, what they deserve,
amoral point of view,
have to undergo, in
only to observe what their lot is, or what they
If the
This is want, sorrow, misery, pain, and death.
this world.
human race, taken as a whole, were not so unworthy, so bad, their
fate, taken as a whole, would not be so mournful.
We are thus brought to what is the crowning and most charac

justice,

teristic feature of
all

among

Schopenhauer

ancient or

system.

Alone, so far as I know,

is an avowed, con
To him, this is the worst

modern philosophers, he

and thorough-going Pessimist.

by the worst of all possible beings,
AVe have already had a sketch of the Optimism of
mankind.
Leibnitz, with which, indeed, most readers are familiar, as it was
Voltaire.
The
paraphrased by Pope, and ridiculed by Bayle and

sistent,

of all possible worlds, tenanted

caricature of

many
But
the

it

by the

to be the wittiest

latter, in

the story of Candide,

and ablest of

is

held by

all his

philosophical writings.
not in the half-jesting, half-earnest manner of Bayle, not in
and sarcastic spirit of Voltaire, not even with the dog

mocking

matic and overweening insolence of Ilobbes, does the German

Pessimist undertake to prove that this world is a hell, and that the
men who tenant it are demons. Schopenhauer s tone is fierce,
He is a misanthrope, one who has
acrimonious, and denunciatory.
quarrelled with the world, and hates

all

his fellow beings, not, as

Athens did, because they had at first fawned upon, and

then injured and forsook him, but because he was by natural dispo
For we cannot
hater."
a
sition what Dr. Johnson called

Timon

of

"

<jood

414

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

attribute his disgust with the world to the ill

reception, 01- rather
neglect, which his writings had experienced
since his
avowal of Pessimism was bold and
uncompromising in the first and
ablest of his works, that for which he
unquestionably anticipated
a great success.
His tone, moreover, is not that of mortiiied van
ity, but is acrid, bitter, and vituperative.
His doctrine is an effu
sion of spleen, which has no better source than a bad
and

the utter

temper

an ill-regulated intellect.
He is witty and eloquent, indeed, in his
denunciation of the woes that atllict humanity, and the misdeeds
which have merited them.
Hut these are natural qualities of the

man and

his

have sulliciently shown, never fails

style, which, as
and vigorous on any theme.
Hut on this subject, the
hatefulness of this world, his wit is turned to
gall, and his eloquence
only makes the picture more gloomy and untruthful.
The link ot connection which binds his Pessimism to the other
to be

lively

leading doctrines of his philosophy is ingeniously contrived.

Ac
cording to his theory, us we have seen, the Will is the
tin
the sole real existence, of which all
phenomena are only the mani
festation.
Xow what is Will? Jt is a constant striving, a never
<Hnq

,v/r/<,

satisfied desire, a
reaching forward to something which it has not
and never can have, because the attainment of its
object would bo
its own annihilation as Will; it would then in //
no longer, for it
would possess what it had willed.
Hecause Will is life and all
things, and cannot cease to will without
to be, therefore

the essence of

:m

-and

life is

unsatisfied

ceasing
purpose, a striving to be what
have not and the fruit of life

we

gain what we
is
disappointment and sorrow, the end whereof is death.
The only
possible virtues, then, are pity
pity for all other beings who arc
as wretched as we are;
resignation or submission to the inevitable
Is oi
life; and self-abnegation, or a renunciation of the Will to
live, which is a virtual return to
the only heaven
nothingness.
""

to

which Schopenhauer admits as

possible; and even

this

is

possible

only in thought, or as a Presentation, since the universal and un

conscious Will, of which
individual existence is but a transi

my

tory phenomenon, must persist or endure, because its essence is

indestructible.
As one desire is chastised or perishes, another in
evitably rises; for we must will even to cease to
will, or, as its

The hindrance which, in any case, pre

equivalent, to cease to be.
vents the accomplishment of our
desire, we call Sorrow, the frustra
tion of
hope, failure, or at best the postponement of happiness.
.Man never is, but
always to be blest."
"

Victuros agimus semper, nee vivirnus

unquam."

SCHOPENHAUER
But these sorrows,
without these,

for

to be.

an

we

415

AESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

failures, or

could not

our life
postponements constitute
and therefore we should cease
;

will,

to avert or postpone death,

spend our life in striving
Death is, not happi
which is sure to be at last a failure.
And death (for
but the end, for us, of pain, toil, and sorrow.

We

effort

ness,

us, again, for

is

our individual existence.)

annihilation

since the

the
If we knocked at the graves, and asked
deacfdo not will.
to
back
earth,
come
to
they
wished
dead in them whether they
would all shake their heads. Even the much desired immortality
a better world," is a sure
oi the soul, as it is always the hope of
In truth, what we
much.
worth
not
is
world
siirn that the present
is not so much death, considered merely
to
seek
and
dread,
postpone,
of non-existence,
in itself, or in its consequence, as a mere stage
No one regrets his own non-exist
but simply the act of dying.
and non-exist
ence during the eternity which preceded his birth
"

will not concern him, since

during a subsequent eternity
forward
he will not be conscious of it. The only use of looking
the
sadden
is
to
is
it
present
to it, even for him to whom
gloomy,
In general,
to live.
Will
unsatisfied
and
irrational
an
with
moment
since the one is
both the Past and the Future are nothing to us,
Both are confessedly
is not yet.
other
the
and
gone,

ence

irretrievably
mere Presentations, or images of

what

is

not, since this

All that really

is

is

the

na

the present
a desire, an

memory and anticipation.

moment and all that actually occupies this moment, is
Now, as all the happiness, or rather
unsatisfied longing, a Will.
we ever have enjoyed, or hope to
which
from
sorrow,
the freedom
ture of

is,

Pre
either to the past or future, this also is a mere
enjoy, belongnow
which
corresponds.
to
nothing
sentation, an unreal image,
an imOur view of existence, therefore, says Schopenhauer, is but
be
there
which
spots
may
a-re or mental picture of a vast plain, on
but there is one spot on
behind or before us
sunlight, either
and this is all that is real, the)
it which
always lies in shadow;
What mockery is it to say this is the best of
present moment,
no more blessed moment
the
which
in
worlds,
happiest man knows
most unhappy no more
than that of
asleep, and the
_

o"

dropping

miserable one than that of waking up again

itself wak
Out of the night of unconsciousness, the Will finds
unlimited
and
world,
eternal
an
into
ened as an individual into life,
all striving, suffering, erring
other
numberless
individuals,
vnong
it hastens back again into
and, as if frightened by a horrid dream,
and
at the
wondered
the old unconsciousness.
Lessing
foresight^
he thoroughly disliked
because
his
shown
sense
who,
son,
by
good
!

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
the appearance of this life, had to be drawn into it
by force on the
day of his birth; and was no sooner in the world than he made

haste out of it again.

Old age and death, to which we all are
rapidly hastening, is a sentence of condemnation, passed
by nature
herself, upon the desire for life, as a blunder and a crime.
"What
"

you

willed," it

"

says,

"Then

ends thus

then will
something

better."

old a^e and experience,

Lead him

to

hand in hand,
death, and make him understand

After a search so painful and so

Ions;,
That all his life lie has been in the

wrong."

These truths

appear more evident, says Schopenhauer, as

soon as we perceive that
only suffering and sorrow are positive
what we call happiness is merely negative, the absence of
pain.
Thus, we feel pain, but not the absence of
we are conscious
pain
of trouble and anxiety, but not of freedom from
of dan
them;
We are not even conscious of the three
ger, but not of security.
greatest goods of life.
so long as
youth, health, and freedom,
they are in our grasp, but only when we have lost them
for these
will

also are negations.

We

first

observe that the days of our

happy, when they have given place

"

Che

rieordarsi del

to

life

were

unhappy days.

Nessun maggior dolore,

tempo

felice

Nella miseria.

In proportion as enjoyments
multiply,

we lose our sensibility for

customary no longer gives pleasure.
Ceaseless longing, unsatisfied desire, is but one form of the
misery
of life; the quick and
easy fulfilment of all our wants introduces
another
and
worse form of suffering, the
only
aching void of weariness and ennui, which renders life
and thus
them;

for

what

is

absolutely unbearable,

often leads to suicide.

So our existence, like a pendulum,

swings
between pain and ennui and this truth is

to and fro
enounced in the
in

pains

hell, all

fact, that after

man had

strangely

placed

that remained for his heaven

all

sorrows

"and

was the weariness

ot

nothing to do. Life is always threatened by a thousand various

and the utmost watchfulness is needed to
escape them. With
careful steps, and anxious
circumspection, man follows his path,
around which countless dangers and enemies lie in wait.
So he
travelled when he was a
savage in the wilderness, and so he must
walk even in civilized life, since there is for him no
perils,

security.

"

The

life

Qualibus in tenebris vitre, quantisque

Degitur hocce asvi, quodcunque est."

of most

men

is

periclis,

only a perpetual struggle for existence,

SCHOPENHAUER

/ESTHETICS

with the certainty of losing it at last.

vi re in the miserable contest is, not so

AND ETHICS.

417

What makes them

much

a love of

life,

perseas the

fear of Death, which yet stands as unavoidable in the background,

and may enter at any moment.
Life itself is a sea full of rocks
and t-hoals, which man avoids only by the utmost care and watch
fulness, although he knows that, even if successful, with all his
exertion and skill, in winding his way through them, he thereby
only comes the nearer, with every foot of progress
yes, steers
Death.
directly towards, the greatest and worst shipwreck of all
This is the final object and termination of his sad voyage.
If we
reckon up, as far as possible, the sum of want, pain, and misery of
every kind, which the sun illuminates in his course, w e shall admit
that it would have been much better, had it been as little able to
evoke the phenomenon of life on the earth, as on the moon, and
r

did the surface of the former, as of the latter,

still

find itself in a

We

purely crystalline condition.

may conceive our life, indeed, as
a short and uselessly interrupting episode in the boundless and
blissful repose of

Nothingness, as only a gross mystification, not to

say, cheat.

The World and Life, as they are here portrayed, thus burdened
with crimes, sufferings, and death, are the manifestation of Will,
exist only in and through the Will, and express its true character.
All the pains and sorrows of this life, as we have seen, are strictly
and therefore just; men are miserable, because they
so.
He who, through his intellect, has arrived at a
knowledge of this nature and essence of the world, has but one
course remaining to him.
It is to renounce the Will altogether,
retributive,

deserve to be

cease striving after anything, to repudiate all desires, to sink

into inaction and mere thought, and
thereby, so far as in him lies,

to

reduce this

life to the
nothingness whence it was drawn, and
heaven as compared with the miseries of this world.
Hence, in the ethics of Schopenhauer, asceticism, celibacy, quietism,
monacliism, and the like, are the only virtuous modes of living;

to

which

is

for they alone are consistent with

resignation for one s self and
If all would
pity for others.
adopt this course, this world would
to be
for it exists only as Presentation, as a
picture before the mind, and this is made continuous only through
successive acts of the Will.
This, he maintains, is the teaching
even of Christianity, a system which, on other
grounds, he utterly
rejects, as indeed he does all religion, except that of the Buddhists,

immediately cease

which, according to him, denies the existence of a God. Throughout the New Testament, this world and the
things of the world are
27

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

418
the

synonym

he that

"

tion of

of evil, and

shall

it

keep

-he

unto

the Saviour, that

that hateth his life in this

life

"I

am come

world"

is

He

forgets the declara

a light into the world, that

eternal."

whosoever believeth on me should not abide

in darkness;"

"for

came

not to judge the world, but to save the world."

And this suggests the only comment, which we really need to
make, upon this monstrous system of Pessimism.
It is, that these

gloomy and misanthropic views of human life are held oidv bv

avowed skeptics, like Bayle, Hume, and Voltaire, or by open athe
like Schopenhauer.
ists,
Believers, such as Leibnit/, Uarrow,
Tucker, Paley, and others, either preach Optimism, or so great a
preponderance ot good over evil, even in this world, as amply to vin
dicate the goodness of its Creator.
Be their opinion well-founded
or not, it certainly ca-ts sunshine on their
pathway through life,
while unbelief shrouds it in sorrow and darkness.
The latter is a
religion, if it can be so called, of gloom, misanthropy, and despair;
and no more striking illustration of this fact can be found than in

the philosophy,
hauer.

The

it

fallacy in

it

the

deserves that name, of the

initial

argument

atheist,

of the Pessimist,

Schopen
is

easily

lie; holds that life consists in a series of Volitions,

pointed out.
sach one of which expresses a want, a privation, an unsatisfied
desire, and therefore, is a constant sense of suffering and sorrow.
On the contrary, Will, because it is the origin and spring of acfor energetic action, the
tivity, is a perennial source of happiness
strain of all the faculties, both of mind and
body, in the pursuit of
;

some

object,

happiness.

which

is

keen enjoyment.

Klfort

is

While

pleasurable

in

it lasts,

itself,

it

is

uninterrupted

irrespective of the end

Vigorous work quickly becomes play, and

not imposed upon us by any of the necessities of
life, we voluntarily create occasions for it,
by setting up trivial or
invent or imagine a goal,
imaginary objects to be pursued.
merely to have the pleasure of running a race.
Schopenhauer
would have us believe, that a fox-chase is misery, since it
springs
from a sense of privation and want, because the hunters have not
to

is

it

therefore,

it

it

directed.
is

We

yet caught the fox.

false;

it

is

The theory

the morbid

dream

is even
ludicrously
has become soured with

of the Pessimist

of one

who

the world, because he has not cultivated his affections for others,
nor his sense of duty to his country or his God, and so has allowed
all his desires to terminate in Self.
An energetic and persistent
Will, constituting what is usually called force of character, because
t keeps all the faculties in
vigorous action, is a source of happiness

SCIIOPEXIIAUETC

AESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

419

The intellect," says Aristotle, is

than of greatness.
of the
perfected not by knowledge, but by activity." The teaching
Hamilton:
Stagirite on this subject is thus tersely summed up by
HO

"

"

less

We exist only as we energize; pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded

energy; energy is the means, by which our faculties are developed;
and a higher energy the end, which their development proposes.
In action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement,
and peri ection of our being and knowledge is only precious, as it
may afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers."
"

Pessimism

is

a natural outgrowth of Pantheism, or rather of the

doctrine improperly so called, (since Pessimists, like Schopenhauer

and llartmann. are not theists.) which consists in maintaining that
the whole human race must be regarded as one individual man,
all ages and over all parts of the
experience comprises all the woes and

whose existence extends through

that

earth, so

his

single

crimes, which, in fact, are widely distributed, and so, thinly scat
this is a
tered, among countless multitudes of human beings.
baseless theory, which is confuted by the distinct testimony of con
l>ut

sciousness, that
beinff,
o

is

other truth.
to

existence, as a separate and individual

certainties and the foundation of all

my own

the highest
of
O

Hence,

it is

all

an

make out a catalogue

idle task, a fantastic

of all the calamities

and gloomy dream,

and sufferings of

is
any mention in history, and thereby to imply that
s life is darkened by the thought of them, or haunted
one
man
any
by a dread of their recurrence. As I have elsewhere argued, it is

which there

mere truism

to say, that happiness or

misery is experienced only

as suffering of the race
no
such
thing
by
in general
that no one person was ever distressed by a thousandth
and that the occurrence even
part of the woes thus enumerated
of any one of them would occupy only a small fraction of his whole
experience of life, all the rest of which may have been spent in
individuals

that there

is

and even joyous endeavor.

Any one man s share of the
The
which are possible to humanity is always a small one.
human mind is too happily constituted to be plagued by shadows,
It is
by forebodings of infrequent and improbable calamities.
it is much less prone to dream of future ills, than of
sanguine
coming pleasures. It does not, like the Pessimist, brood over the
unhappiness of mankind.
active

evils

"

Verse sweetens

toil,

however rude the sound

All at her work the village maiden sings :

Nor while she turns the giddy wheel around,

Revolves the sad vicissitude of

things."

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

420

We

come now

to

what

is

most striking and original, and

least

to his theory of
philosophy,
aesthetics, explaining the nature of the sublime and beautiful, and
The Will, which is the primal
the principles of art and taste.
of the phenomenal world, does not at once
force and inmost

objectionable,

in

Schopenhauer

being

These
the Heeling forms of individual things.
of
the
the
surface
on
deep,
ripples
break or fall as soon as formed, constantly becoming, but

manifest

itself

in

perishable, mere waves or

are

which
The Will is
never (ndurin-, or really subsisting in themselves.
first objectified in the species or genera of things, which persist or
perpetuallv renewed by the ceaseless activity of the
though their separate members quickly pass away.
.Men die. but humanity lives one generation passeth away, but
What is constantly preserved is the
another generation cometh.

endure,

beini;-

principle of

life,

Type

of the class, the specific or generic form, that in the likeness

of which every individual

ideal

its

is

created, though imperfectly expressing

is u
plant or animal, not even man,

No one

perfection.

but none attain,

perfect representative of its class; all approximate,
This type is the Platonic Idea, the
the excellence of their type.

and highest manifestation of the universal Will, because it does

not exist either in Space or Time, and is therefore incapable of
Of man, in gen
nor end.
plurality, and knows neither beginning

iirst

Type of his species, neiiher multiplicity, beginning to be,

nor ceasing to be. can be predicated; lie belongs to no one place or
time; he is wherever and whenever individual men are possible;

eral, the

indeed, individual

men

are but

his faint

and shadowy ectypes, his

Obviously, the Platonic

Heeling and imperfect representatives.
Idea is the nearest approximation to the noumenon, the being per
for when he denies that either Time. Space, Causalse, of Kant
itv, or Substance, which are mere phenomenal Forms, can be pred
an sich, lie in fact ailirms of it just what Plato
icated of the
;

diurj
aflirms of his Idea.

Without Time or Space, it cannot be plural

without Causality, it cannot
without Substance, it cannot be real
it is eternal, increate, immortal.
have begun to be, or cease, to be
To Schopenhauer, universal Will i.s the diit j an sich, and the Pla
tonic Idea or typical form is only its first and highest manifesta
first and highest, be
tion
only a manifestation, I say, though the

cause,

though free from

of the intellect,

it is

all

still

other phenomenal and subjective Forms

most persistent
subject to this one, the

So long as it
the distinction between Subject and Object.
of contemplation,
an
mind
as
the
Object
consciously regarded by
distinct from the contemplating Subject, so long it exists only

of
is

all,

SCHOPENHAUER

ESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

421

and therefore is not pure being per se.

and the true artist is capable, in his hap
above even this last Form of time and
pier
own individuality in ecstatic contempla
his
of
and
sense,
losing
of art. or in the
tion of the Idea, as embodied in a genuine work
far as he has
So
nature.
of
beautiful
more
aspects
grander and
him
true esthetic perception and taste, he no longer distinguishes
and
into
absorbed
becomes
it,
but
from the admired
in relation to that Subject,

But

man

of genius
moments, of rising

the

Object,
He forgets himself he ceases to will
essence.
he is free from the miseries and sufferings of
or desire anything
conscious of his separate existence.
because no
self

identified with

its

longer

humanity,

difference to him, whether it is from the window of a

that he beholds and admires a beautiful sunset.
prison or a palace,
wills to live, his individual life for
because he no
It

makes no

In

fact,

this

moment

lation

at

is

Schopenhauer

is

man
common men

what

longer
he
an end
s

of genius

the

is

self-annihilated

and self-annihi

And
blessedness, his only idea of heaven.
artist habitually does, even
or the
genuine

are capable of doing at times, when stimulated by

They
or sounds of unusual grandeur and beauty.
thoughts, sights,
or poetry rouses
too forget themselves, when music entrances them,
into a new world.
their nobler feelings, or art introduces them
that is, pure intellect without Will,
or
mere
become
ear,
eye
They
themselves with
or any disturbing passion; and then they identify^
it and them, and
both
animates
one
that
conscious
as
spirit
nature,
to exclaim with the poet,
are

ready

"

Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part

Of me and of my soul, as I of them?
"

This theory
it is

is

due

but the credit of orig

well founded and striking
Kant, who first drew attention to the fact, that
;

to

inating
of self, is nec
absolute disinterestedness, or an entire forgetfulness
aesthetic perception and emotion become possible.
true
before
essary
As soon as we begin to think of the relations of the object either
to
its
its

and things, as of its ownership,

ourselves, or to other persons
certain ends, or even of
desirableness, its utility, its fitness for
of art, immediately our
rules
and
conformity to certain theories

The mind then becomes

of it vanishes.
purely esthetic enjoyment
with an
selfish or utilitarian computations, or even
with
occupied
the
about
abstract
admiration
its
reasoning
by
attempt to justify
and we thus really become insensible to the
taste
of
principles
which we profess to admire.
Schopenhauer
beauty and sublimity
in any of
far as to maintain, that if the object is thought
so
goes
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

122
relations

its

to

tilings

outside of

means, end, seed, blossom, or

itself,

that

fruit, so far it

as cause, effect
is,
ceases at once to afford

Hence, as the sole

any pleasure of a proper aesthetic character.
function of the I nderstanding or logical faculty is to compare
things with cadi other, and thereby to discern the relations be

tween them,

follows that this faculty is excluded altogether from

Science, heeaiisc it works through the un
derstanding and is occupied solely with relations, with comparison
and induction, has nothing to do with aesthetics, but moves in a
it

the province of

ta>te.

The beautiful or the sublime is discerned

atmosphere.
of immediate intuition, that is, by the mere contem
plation of things; no one can reason himself into a perception of
them.
Yet the faculty for their enjoyment is not, a mere percep
different

by a process

tion of the sense, for it is not limited to what is external, but

trates to the typical Form, the manifestation of the pure Idea,
lies

pene
which

behind.

In the a sthetic

two

mode

essential elements:

of viewing things, therefore, we find these

1. The
knowledge of the object not as an

individual or single thing, but as the Platonic Idea, that is, as the
2. The
persistent Form, or Type, of this whole species of things.
self-consciousness of the spectator as no longer an individual, no

longer a person, but as without

"Will, a
pure knowing or intuiting
The Object is contemplated out of its uses, and out of
Subject.
the forms of Space and Time.
It is no longer dependent on either
ot the roots of the
we no longer
Principle of Snllicient Reason
;

a>k

alter

its

or whither
ot

it>

it

tends;

existence.

tion of

it

nature,

is

is

its

the

or Wherefore,

\\l\y

It

its

owner>hip,

we no longer demand
is

all-suflicient

in

whence

it

comes

the cause or the motive

itself,

and bare contempla

own exceeding rich reward. Such, to the lover of

dim forest, the sounding cataract, the ocean beach,

or the snow-covered peak of the Alps

such, to the student of
art, is the Last Supper of Da Vinci, the Parthenon, the Apollo
;

Kven the last phenomenal Form, the distinction be

Belvedere.
tween Subject and Object, gradually fades away, and the two are
incited into one.
The spectator is no longer an anxious and care
worn personality, seeking what he has not, craving rest and hap
lie no longer wills or wishes;
piness, and constantly disappointed,
he is absorbed in the Object, identified with it, and gives up his
individual being.
He is at one with Nature.
The cundttio sine qua non of the union of these two elements
s the abandonment of that mode of knowledge
which is directed
~
jy the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and which is serviceable only

SCHOPENHAUER: .ESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

423

The pleasure
and as a means for science.
beautiful proceeds
the
of
the
contemplation
which is excited by
now with more of
from the union of these two elements, though
as the ob
other
according
constituent,
one, now with more of the
All volition springs from
of aesthetic admiration requires.
as a sla/e of the Will,

ject

some need or want, and therefore, according to Schopenhauer,

an end to this
from suffering. The fulfilment of the desire puts

but for one wish that

is

gratified,

at least

ten

remain

to

us,

plague

its
Moreover, desire continues long, and
as nnsatisiied cravings.
is short, and K
fulfilment
while
infinite
the
to
reach
demands
Even the finite gratification is but a vain
tmid-ingly imparted.
;

show

to a new one ;
the satisfied wish immediately gives place
to de
error, the latter continues
is an

the former

acknowledged

neverobtained object of desire can give permanent,

it
thrown to a beggar
alms
the
like
is
but
only
fading joy.
mor
the
on
it
darken
to
order
life to-day, merely in
brightens his
and is saddened by the con
row, which brings no further boon,
is occupied by the
trast.
Therefore, so long as our consciousness
with Us con
desire,
Will, so long as we are constantly urged by
slaves to the Will, and
are
we
so
and
stant hoping
long
fearing,
Whether we hunt or
there is for us no abiding happiness or rest.

No

ceive.

all the
fear evil or strive after good, it is essentially
same^;
form it shows itself,
care for the always craving Will, in whatever
and agitates our consciousness; and without
persistently occupies
Thus the Subject that wills is
no
true
rest,
well-being is possible.
he is ever pouring into the
stretched forever upon Ixion s wheel
like Tantalus.
mocked
forever
is
sieve of the Danaides,
But when some external occasion or internal impulse suddenly

fly,

and tears
us up out of the never-ending flow of the Will,
the
its enslavement to desire, then
from
the
cognitive faculty
away
the
but
volition,
for
motives
attention is no longer directed to the
to the Will, and
relation
their
of
out
mind comprehends things
views
therefore considers them disinterestedly, without subjectivity,

lifts

to
their purely objective aspect, and is wholly given up
and not motives
Presentations,
mere
are
as
far
so
they
them,
but always sought in
then, that peace of mind, first sought for,
now comes upon
of
an
desire,
as
or
object
vain, through the Will,
us.
well
us at once, of its own accord, and all is completely
witli^
as the high
which
Epicurus praised
This is the painless condition,
Then we are,
an 1 believed to be the state of the gods.

them

in

est good,
tor that moment only, released

from the ignoble pressure of the

the penitentiary labor of the
from
the
Sabbath
we keep
Will
stands still.
Ixion
of
wheel
the
and
Will,
;

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

424
Science, because

constantly seeking for the Reason of things,

On the
occupied only with phenomena.
other hand, Art. the offspring of Genius, beholds only the eternal

always asking

it is

Why,

is

Ideas, the essential and the permanent, lying above and behind the
phenomena, which are only shadows. Art aims to impart these
Idea-; to others by
expre.-sing them in sensible forms, and according
to the material on which it works, it is either
plastic Art, Poetry, or

Music.

Some

objects are so constituted, through their union of

multiplicity with order and distinctness, through the
absence ot harsh transitions, and the harmonious
together

variety and

blending

numerous parts

uniform whole, that the Ideas which

they symboli/e are seen as if reflected in a pure and bright mir
ror
they appear prominent and vivid, and need no effort to com
Such objects are said to possess Beaut v. becuu.-e
prehend them.
the mind of the beholder ea-ily passes into the state of a-stlietic
contemplation of them, and is thereby filled with unselfish and
of

into one

It is
spontaneous delight.
pleased without a reason, it knows not
wherefore.
While the Beautiful thus prompts, invites, and facili
tates aesthetic emotion and insight, the Sublime forcibly arrests
attention, reduces the passions and the Will to silence, and com
Hence a
of
pels the observer to stand still and admire.

feeling
or terror often heightens the impression of Sublimity, increas
ing the energy and violence with which it masters all other per
ceptions and appetites, and assumes exclusive dominion over the
soul.
But if the emotion of terror is so much excited that the be

awe

holder becomes alarmed for his personal

.safety, his

individual Will

brought again into activity, and the feeling of Sublimity disap

pears, because it is merged in a selfish desire for self-preservation.
is

Thus, as
shore,

it is

us, when we are in safety on the

pleasant to observe a storm impending over the ocean

Lucretius reminds

and bringing the hapless mariner into peril.

But the approach
ing conflict with the winds and waves raises no emotion of Sublim
ity, and therefore imparts no pleasure, if we are in a frail bark,
and thus exposed to all the violence of the storm.
Beauty softens and tranquillizes the mind, grandeur conquers and
overwhelms it. But in either case, the intellect no longer
searches
O
or inquires
it loses
sight of the relations of things to each other
mid to itself, and is absorbed in wonder and admiration.
A
person of lofty character produces the impression of Moral Sublim
ity, because we are forced to admire his entire forgett ulness of self
and disregard of the ordinary selfish motives which prompt com
mon men to action. He never thinks of what will injure or pro
;

SCHOPENHAUER

.ESTHETICS

425

AND ETHICS.

his own passions or interests, but contemplates men and

of view, with as little re
things from an entirely objective point
to what may affect himself as if he were beholding the in
gard
It follows from this analysis, that
habitants of a distant

mote

planet.

what

simply alluring or attractive in the sense of exciting passion

is

What often passes,

is the very opposite of the Beautiful.
is
though \vith persons of degraded taste, under the name of Art,
it feeds appetite
because
or
the
luscious
which,
licentious,
merely
or stimulates passion, is never typical or representative of an Idea,

or desire,

and

so contributes to develop, instead of restraining, the disturbing

So, also, mere imitation, as in the lower forms of

consciousness.

it is related solely to an individual form,

without reference to any general idea or character impressed upon
cannot awaken genuine
it, is petty, and however skilfully done,
aesthetic admiration.
The Ethics of Schopenhauer are based upon a frank avowal of

portrait-painting, because

the logical consequences of his doctrines of Fatalism, Pessim

An action, he says, can no more take place
ism, and Monism.
without a suilicient motive, than a stone can move without a suf
all

and when a motive is present which is

thrust or pull
to
act
the agent s character, the action cannot
upon
strong enough
fail to take place, if it is not prevented by a more powerful antag

ficient

onistic motive.

Hence,

it

is

idle to talk

Im

about a Categorical

since this implies a

perative, about what we ought to have done,
acted otherwise.
have
that
we
could
an
assertion
falsehood, namely,
"let no one
expect
Ethics," says Schopenhauer,
any moral precepts, or any doctrine of duties still less
should he look for any universal precept for creating all virtuous
We shall speak neither of any unconditional obligation,
actions.
nor of anv law imposed on human freedom; since both of these
We shall say nothing of what
phrases are self-contradictory.
lor so one talks to children, and to nations in their
ought to be
childhood, but not to a people who have appropriated to them
selves all the culture of a civilized age.
Indeed, there is an ob
vious contradiction in calling the Will free, and still prescribing

"

In this theory of

to lind

laws

to

wooden

it,

how

it

ought to

will.

Ought

to

will!

that

is.

iron."

And yet an action may properly be deemed either praiseworthy

or blameable, according as it does, or does not, promote some val
uable end, or conduce to some beneficent result; and also, accord
ing as
of thin

it is
s,

based upon a true or false theory respecting the nature

the constitution of the

un

verse,

and the relations

of

man

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

426

Aii(?
beings and to the other orders of animals.
the true theory in these respects, according to Schopen
that all distinc
It is, as we have seen, that All are One

his fellow

to

what

is

haner

individuals

of

tion

is

only phenomenal or apparent, being only

my thought that as Space and Time are unreal

and have only subjective validity, so also all plurality or inulti
and Time as their priiicijiia indiplicity. depending upon Space
riilitutionis, are equally unreal, are mere shadows of the only ac
tual entity, which lies behind them, the one universal Will, with
which my own Will is in truth coincident, being only one of its
presentations to

countless manifestations.

As an immediate consequence
have

men

of

this doctrine of

lie
a theory of Right or Justice,
as coordinate manifestations of the

and who

in fact

who

Monism, we

recognizes

all

other

same Will with himself,

regards them as identical with himself, will treat

if they were his own, and will consider that in

their interests as

or injures himself.
benefiting or injuring them, he thereby benefits
he will do to others
In short, he will follow the golden rule
:

lie will be in
they would do to him.
lie will perceive that there is no divid
with
the
world
harmony
On the other hand, the bad
ing wall between others and himself.
man, blinded by the veil of Maja, and falsely regarding phenom
enal distinctions as real ones, will consider other persons to be

whatsoever

lie

wi.-hes that
;

forms of his Non-Ego, and therefore mere phantoms, while his

own personality is the only real one in the universe. This is
The true Egoist believes
the essence of Egoism or selfishness.
liimselt to be the sole reality, and therefore unhesitatingly appro
consideration for
priates all goods to his own use, without any

who are as nothing in his esteem. lie is not necessarily

malicious, or positively bad, since he does not harm others gratubut only when he may thereby procure some advantage
itou>lv,

others,

for himself.

The

essence of Injustice, or Wrong, consists in carrying out in

s own will can rightly

conduct the unfounded assumption that one

make the wills of all other individuals subservient to it, since they
own will af
are merely spectral presentations to his fancy.
firms and realizes itself in my own body, and all the powers inher
ent in that body may be fairly used by me for my own purposes.
which belongs to human nature constantly tempts
15ut the

My

Egoism

me

own will as practically to deny or

so far in affirming
my neighbor s will as expressed in his body, and thus
compel his powers also to serve my selfish ends. This infringeto

go

transgress
1,0

my

SCHOPENHAUER
ment

of

427

/ESTHETICS AND ETHICS.

the limits of another

s will,

made

appearing in an attack

or his property, is
by violence or fraud upon his person
and the harm
as
what the world properly stigmatizes
Injustice
sufferer is enhanced by the peculiar mental
to
the
done
thereby
Justice, says
a sense of Wrong endured.
pain which arises from
consists merely in refrainSchopenhauer, is only negative, since it
The latter is the positive term, because it
from Injustice.
in

either

<r

in active infringement, which is negation, of another s

while
Justice simply abstains from so doing, or at most, acts
riii ht;
only in order to ward off Injustice, and thereby denies or nega
The vehemence of the individual s will is that
tives a negation.

consists

which constantly tempts him

to

wrong-doing, since

it

blinds

him

to

the truth, that by injuring another he is in fact

assailant and the victim are really
injuring himself, because the
This truth, as we have already seen, is the basis of eternal
one.
a perception of

which is necessarily retributive; and it is a vague forebod

a
sort of dim consciousness of it, which creates what is usu
ing,
remorse of conscience.
called
ally
of all
*Still further; the wise man, recognizing the essential unity

Justice,

inanimate things, and therefore making no dis

and himself, will be not only just, but piti
harm him
harming any living thing he would really

living beings and

tinction between others

As by

ful.

so his compassion for every sufferer, his pitying regard for

an expression of grief for
any unfortunate man or animal, is only
All
is
he
to
which
woes
the countless
subject in his own person.
the miseries of human life are his own, and therefore by doing his
self,

best to alleviate them, he

is

himself.
really benefiting

We

weep,

not on account of the pains which we are

says Schopenhauer,
the moment, but because we are thinking
at
enduring
actually
the woes which we have
over, we are repeating in imagination,
It is because our
uidured. or to which we are looking forward.
intolerable than
more
seem
own woes, when pictured in fancy,
moved to
oftener
are
we
that
first
we
them,
when
experienced
And yet it is only
tears by others sufferings than by our own.
M) far as imagination makes them our own, that we grieve for
for ourselves only when we iind our own state
them.

We

weep

if we saw another person suffering the same ills,

that we should be full of compassion and of an.
convinced
we are
Thus Petrarch admirably describes the
active desire to aid him.

so

pitiable, that

reason

why he wept:

428

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
"

vo pensando; e nel pensar

assale
si forte di me
stesso,

Una pieta

Che mi conduce

Ad

spesso

alto lagrimar,

ch

non

soleva."

The

greatest excellence, however, of which human virtue is

capable, is reached when pity for the countless miseries and wrongs
of which tliis world is the theatre
goes so far that one renounces
alto-ether the exercise of Will, sinks back into
and

pure inaction,
tranquilly beholds all existence fading out into nothingness.
Life
and the world, woful and
pitiable as they are, are only the mani
festation of the "Will to live,
only the mirror in which the Will
beholds itself in its true character and since all
plurality and dif
ference are merely phenomenal and unreal, that Will is
;

my

own,

is

Throttle the monster, then

chastise every passion
re
nounce every desire cease to will and
thereby cause the lights
to be
extinguished, and the curtain to fall.
myself.

CHAPTER
HARTMANN

XXIII.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

EDWARD Vox HARTMANN,

the founder of the latest, and at

the Absolute, is one of

present the most popular, Philosophy of
oui contemporaries, as he was born iu Berlin, February 23, 1842.
His father was an officer of artillery in the army, but stationed

permanently at Berlin, as the head of a commission for testing by

Thus
experiment all pretended improvements in heavy firearms.
of
spared the necessity to which other arm/ officers are subject,
his
to
station
from
one
shifted
another,
military
being frequently
sou s education was carried on without any intermission or change
of locality in

the excellent public schools of the

German

capital,

He
and Edward therefore boasts of being a genuine Berliner."
was an only child, and as he thus had no young playmates within,
the family, and was quick-witted and precocious in mental develop
ment, he became rather prematurely old in his manners, habits of
thought, and modes of expression, because his only associates at
home were his parents or other persons of greater age than him
Even at school, as his precocity caused him to be jumped
self.
over the younger classes, he had but few boyish associates, and
lie completed with distinc
those considerably older than he was.
tion, and at an unusually early age, the whole course preparatory
But he had no liking for the ordin
to entering the University.
"

ary academic studies, except mathematics, his favorite pursuits being

music and drawing.
Hence, and because he disliked excessively
the coarse and almost brutal manners and amusements of the
students, he decided not to enter the University, but to adopt his
It is a curious fact, that neither of the two
father s profession.

systems of German philosophy, which have become widely known

and have found numerous disciples in our own day, is of Univer
Ilartmann was not
sity origin; Schopenhauer was not a professor,
Before receiving a commission in the army, it
even a graduate.

was necessary to pass through one of the military schools, and

Ilartmann selected the school of artillery and engineering.
Here,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
however, his studies were soon
interrupted by chronic rheumatism
his lower limbs; and this
malady was soon complicated by the
crippling and tedious affection of wafer on

the knee.

The

disease

appeared when he was only nineteen years

old, and after
prolonged but fruitless trial of all that the
physicians and various
mineral springs could do for him. he
was compelled, at the a-e of
twenty-three, to abandon his profession, in which he had
already
amed the rank of first lieutenant, and
j

resign himself to the

prospect of bring a cripple within doors for a Ionperiod
lor life.
In 1807, however, the
worst
malady reached
and since that
time, it is pleasant to learn that there are
of
"".y

l"

"ai>s

si<n,s

tea,

y though very gradual

improvement,

In

short autobio

graphical

sketch, published in 1870, he writes

cheerfully about
constant literary
occupation, an accomplished and affectione wi e and a son two
years old contributing much to the happi!f

of

h,s

home.

Alluding

to

one of

Ilartmann s fixed opinions

philosophy, an intimate friend of the
once lau<dim<dy renai ked
L y u isl f see bright and family
contented faces! you must
*;

"

"

go among the

Pessimists."

Among

the occupations
open even to an invalid confined to the
of music,
painting, and poetry, for each of which
e
frankly confesses that he had much
liking, though but little
each he made earnest trial of his
genius, and
productive power
though not to much purpose.
He even published a poetical drama
he story of Tristan and
Isolde, which did not meet a fluttering

were those

renouncing effort where only failure was prob

phrase, he bravely threw the fine arts overin
spite of earnest dissuasion
by his father, he settled
the strenuous
amusement, which he had Ion- had a l,. u ,kand somewhat practised,
namely, a thorough course of
metaphysical .study and speculation.
Without any instruction or
sympathizing friends with whom to converse upon the
subject he
rly read the published works of
Hegel, Schelling. Schopen
hauer, Kuno Fischer, and
many other renowned German thinkers
-Near the end of the
year 1864, at the age of twenty-two, he be-an
rit
"The
Philosophy of the Unconscious;" and in
lb/, tins able work, a large octavo volume of over 800 April,
closely
pages, lull of original speculation and subtle
reasoning
- a
large acquaintance with the physical sciences hi
riien,

<

.">

use

Ins

own

-"id

<;

>;:

ieir
principles and their
and ready for the
press.

latest theories

But

and

the finished

lying in his desk, and

it

was completed
manuscript remained

results,

was only the accident

of

mak-

HARTMANN

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

431

the acquaintance, in 18G8, of a competent and willing publisher,

1115
of
which prevented its author from complying with the advice
work
the
When
annum.
in
published,
Horace, no/mm prematur
had immediate and great success.
Though its author was almost
or
a boy in years, with no aid from previously earned reputation
from
or
from
without
cliques
University
help
high social position,
association with the mana-crs of literary and scientific journals,
who nowadays generally forestall public opinion, the book in eight
seven successive editions, and raised a hail
years passed through
This remarkable success
storm of review articles and pamphlets.

though not so brilliant as

and forcible, his learning
often appear novel and ingenious,
ample, and his speculations
at which he
though the reader may dissent from the conclusions
and a shrewd ob
is a
He
arrives.
psychologist
good
ultimately
human nature and he shows more practical judgment
server
fund of common sense than are usually found in the
and a

was

Ilartmann

fully deserved.

that of Schopenhauer,

of"

style,

clear, concise,

is

larger

German
The Philosophy

writings of

metaphysicians.
the Unconscious

of

is

a great improvement

the doctrine of Schopenhauer, though it is built in the main

re
the same foundations, and often seems to arrive at similar

uoon
011

But the qualifications of his predecessor s opinions are

numerous and important, and are generally such as to take away
much of their offensive character, and to prepare them, perhaps
Thus, he
after some farther modification, for general acceptance.
but he also fully accepts and defends
a Pessimist
is
sults.

nominally

the doctrine of Leibnitz, that this

is

the best of all possible worlds,

it is the best pos

qualification, however, that though
better for all of us if it did
sible, it is still so bad that it would be
But Leibnitz also teaches the inevitable charac
not exist at all.

making

ter of

this

what he

calls

"

metaphysical

evil,"

which even omnipotence

could no more obviate than it could create two mountains without

At the worst, then, Hartmann only ex
a valley between them.
and therefore.
aggerates the amount of this "metaphysical evil
;"

has not as good a right to be called an Opti

In fact, his Pessimism appears
mist as either Leibnitz or Pope.
rather speculative and theoretical in character, than earnest and
I

why he

cannot see

profound.
culty,

It

which

origin of evil.

is

all

of the old diffi

only his rhetorical presentation
the
theologians feel the weight of, respecting
He is not a misanthrope, he has not a suspicious
and his experience of life has not been

and gloomy temperament,

so unhappy as was that of Schopenhauer.

Hence,

if

he should be

132

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

entirely cured of the

malady which has so long crippled him, and

happy family should increase in number and contentment,
his admirers may well
hope to learn that he has abjured Pessimism
as bravely as he has
already renounced his inclination to dabble in
if

his

poetry and the

fine arts.

Nominally, also, Ilartmann holds atheistic opinions; and yet his

philosophy so nearly coincides with the theism of Christianity, that
in the sixth edition of his work, he found it
expedient to insert an
additional chapter, and a
the Unconsci
long and elaborate one, on
ous and the God of Theism," in which he concedes and
explains

much, that his doctrine remains

hardly distinguishable
from the theology which is now often inculcated without olfenee in
a Christian pulpit.
This acceptance of most of the conclusions
so

away

of natural theology will appear

sulliciently manifest in all that fol
lows.
It is noticed here
only in order to call attention to the
weight of the testimony which is thus involuntarily rendered to
the truth.
Ueginning, as he frankly avows, with a strong preju
dice against theism,
to build
a
of

attempting
human
up
philosophy
nature and of the phenomena of the universe which should
nowhere
require the existence of a (Jod, the course of his
and
investigations

his reasonings still

brings him irresistibly near to the very conclu
sions which he sought to avoid.
little more; earnestness of feel

and some greater definiteness and warmth of moral

purpose,
would probably have opened his intellect to a full conviction of
ing,

the

truth.

For the only disagreeable personal

which one finds in

his writings is the entire lack of
enthusiasm, and a certain hard and
dry manner which is so cold-blooded as to appear repulsive.
The purpose of The Philosophy of the
Unconscious," as taught
by Ilartmann, is to prove that there is omnipresent in nature One
Will and Intellect, acting
in
union with
^

trait

"

unconsciously
inseparable
each other, through whose
agency all the phenomena of the uni
verse may be
He will not consent to
satisfactorily accounted for.
worship this principle as Deity, though he declares that his name
lor it, -the Unconscious," is not
merely a negative expression, signitymg the absence of consciousness, but that it has the very
essential positive attributes of Will and
Intellect, which neces
sarily act together, and are never divided from each other except

mind of man, where first the phenomenon of Consciousness

begins to appear, and where, consequently, Intellect may be eman
cipated from control by the Will, though even here "Will must
Even this partial divorce
always be accompanied by intelligence.
of the two
the Unpsychical principles never takes place in
in the

"

IIARTMAXX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

"

conscious

"

but

all

433

unconscious functions are exercised by One

identical Subject, which has merely its phenomenal manifestation

in a multitude of individuals; so that
the Unconscious signifies

One

this

absolute

Subject."

a thorough -going Monist, therefore, after the man

Eleatics, maintaining the doctrine of (All-JSinheit) the

ILirtinann

ner of the

is

Oneness of

essential

all

things, so that

"

conscious

Fichte

takes the place of Spinoza

absolute Ego," of Schelling

"

of Ilegid

-absolute

Idea,"

s
s

the Un
principle of
universal
Substance," of

his

"

absolute

and of Schopenhauer

"

Subject-object,"
s

But

Will.

from all these philosophers in his metltod, which

not
the usual one with metaphysicians,
of deductive reasonin<OT from abL
v

lie

difiers

struct principles, nor yet of the spontaneous evolution of thought

He adopts the method of the physical
by a dialectic process.
sciences, resting nearly his whole theory upon induction from ob
facts.
lie builds in the main upon the common facts that
are universally known, and upon the latest results obtained in the
sciences of physics, biology, physiology, psychology, and

served

history.

Hence

work

by no means so abstruse and forbidding in

character as are most metaphysical treatises.
It is a vast reper
tory of curious and interesting facts, collected from all the fields
of science, stated with remarkable brevity and precision, and dove
tailed into the unity of theory and system by much
ingenious argu
ment and speculation. In its way, the book is almost as attractive
as the celebrated
Origin of Species," and owes its early popularity,
probably, to the same causes which contributed so largely to Mr.
his

is

"

Darwin s great success. It is spiced with heretical doctrine, it be

trays the imagination and the insight of a poet quite as much as
the profundity of a philosopher, and it
brings together on one
canvas the latest speculations of science and a multitude of de
each one of which would interest even a
It is
school-boy.
only ai cer he has laid the broad foundations of his theory on in
ductive principles, and in the later portions of his work, that
tails,

Hartmann

rises

into

the pure but thin atmosphere, inca pable of

where metaphysics find their proper

respiration by ordinary lungs,

home, and where he certainly shows a power of fine analysis and

subtle and abstruse reasoning, and a
thorough knowledge of the
history and the results of philosophy, which would do honor even
to

Hegel.

As

the first step towards proving the presence

throughout nature
one Will, and Intellect (Wille und Vorstellung), distinct from
what appears in the mind of man, he is obliged to analyze the idea

of

28

134

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

of Purpose or Final

Cause (Zwcck), and to show that

physioloand psychological processes, and indeed the
phenomena of the
universe generally, cannot be
satisfactorily explained and accounted
for except, on the hypothesis that
they were at first arranged, and
are ever afterwards directed and
kept in activity, by one govern
in other words, that
ing Purpose
they everywhere indicate intel
ical

Design.

ligent

He

argues rightly, that the conception of Final

Cause by no means excludes that of Efficient Cause, but rather

presupposes it. and could not be carried out except through its
coop
eration.
If I im not able to
bring about directly the End which I
have in view, he says, I seek for some Means of
accomplishing it
indirectly; then, being myself an Efficient Cause, I will those
Means, and thereby produce them and these .Means thus
realized,
;

through their

Efficient

Causality, produce the

End which

I at

first

designed. The phy>icist is right, therefore, in maintaining that all

events are produced by Ellicient Causes
hut then these Efficient
Causes may be selected, arranged, and directed
an
:

intelligent

Will, which seeks through

Purposes.

Surely,

an

intelligent

them

Will

is

to

I;/ mind, by
carry out its own

one

Efficient

Cause

among others volition counts for something in this world s affairs.

Even Mr. Darwin or Professor
Huxley will admit as much as this
;

since

otherwise, he could not grasp a pen and write the words

through which he would express his denial of it. "We do not deny
the Efficient Causation of the
pen. the ink, and the lingers in writ
ing those words; and he cannot deny the Final Cause, The

Purpose,

which chose, combined, and governed those Ellicient

agencies.
Thus, in maintaining that the structure of the human
eye proves
Design, Ilartmann does not deny, but affirms, that

many

physical

"

must
you choose to call them so
have cooperated in building up that
complex and nicely arranged
organ he only asserts that these would not have so cooperated
harmoniously, if they had not been combined and directed by
some intelligent Will for that very
agencies

physical

laws,"

if

purpose.

If a

highly useful end

that of distinct vision, or

hearing, for
is
example
brought about by a complex and intricate structure,
like that of the human
eye or ear, which we know to have been

produced through the combined action of many distinct physio

on the only fit material,
protoplasm, which
is
always made to be conveniently near at hand, then, Ilartmann
argues mathematically, from the Doctrine of Chances, that the
logical laws operating

overwhelming in favor of the hypothesis that the

necessary arrangements were intentional, were effected by a

probability

many

is

HARTMANN

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

435

which these laws were made to cooperate

"Will, through
I have al
harmoniously so as to bring about the useful result.
ready given an outline (see page 277) of this curious argument,
which depends wholly on the mathematical principle, that when the
concurrence of many distinct conditions is needed before a certain
result becomes possible, the probability of such concurrence is as
certained by multiplying into each other successively the fractions
denoting the probability of each of the conditions taken singly.
designing

Hence,

as

before the

at least thirteen

separate

arrangements are required

human eye can

of a combination of all

successfully do its work, the probability

of them being effected in any other way

than through the direction and agency of an intelligent, designing

Cause, is expressed by so minute a fraction that it cannot be enter
tained for a moment by any sound mind.
It is the probability,

with thirteen dice in the box, of obtaining sixes from all of them
at a single throw, through any number of trials.
We are morally
certain that it could not be done.

Hut

this

not

is

all.

further cumulative.
the

As Hartmann insists, the argument is still

The eye is by no means the only organ in

human body depending on

the combination of

many

nice ar

but one out of hundreds of similar instances,

such as the ear, the hand, the respiratory apparatus, the heart, etc.,
the union of all of them being necessary for the continuous life
It is

rangements.

and activity of the organism as a whole.

Hence, the extremely
minute fraction representing the probability of the eye alone being
produced solely by a fortuitous combination of merely physical
causes, must be raised at least to the one hundredth power, and
thereby become almost too minute to admit of numerical expres
sion, before we obtain the probability of the Darwinian hypothesis
being the true one, namely, that the whole human body might be
BO constructed, without

seen,

directed,

supposing the process to be anywhere fore

and brought about by a designing Intellect and

Will.

Hart ma nn

work

is

divided into three Books, the

first

of

which

brings together the evidence of unconscious mental action in the

the second contains proofs of the activity of
corporeal organism
the Unconscious in the phenomena of the human mind
while the
;

third presents what the author calls the Metaphysics of the Uncon
lie first directs attention to the independent or self-reg
scious,
ulating functions of the ganglia, or lower nervous centres, connected

with the spinal cord and the sympathetic system.

These, without
any communication with the brain, and therefore unconsciously.

MODKUX PHILOSOPHY.

136

and maintain complicated movements nicely adjusted to each

other, such as the beating of the heart and the movements of the
intestines and other organs, all of which are
means of
direct

necessary

keening up the
form its work.

vitality of the
/

and enabling
system
v
o the body
*/

to 1per-

In a decapitated frog. Professor Huxley tells us,

if tlic limbs are stimulated
by touching them with a drop of acid,
even the feeblest
rapid and active movements will take place,
and .-implest of which require a certain combination of muscles,
and some ot them, such as the act of rubbing off the acids, are in
the highest degree complex.
<ir

l>nsi

end

is evident;"

a purpose.

suc/i

Is

strikingly

in part a transmitter of

In all of them, too, a certain pur-in the more complex movements,

and

apparent"

The

impulses to and

spinal cord
roin the brain

is
;

only
but iu

it is an
part, also.
independent nervou> centre, capable of origin
ating combined movements
upon the reception of a nervous im
The conscious mind knows nothing of these movements ;
pulse.
"

they are produced and regulated, so to speak, by a power outside

of ourselves,

and so regulated as

to

suit

the varying exigencies

moment, and to serve important purposes in the animal

economy.
Thus far we have considered only a class of facts, with the ob
vious deductions from them, which have been for some time famil
Hut Ilartmann proceeds to argue in
iarly known to physiologists.
a very original and striking manner, that even the
voluntary move
ments of the muscles and
cannot be effected without the coop
eration of the Unconscious.
I
simply will the movements of my
of

the

limb>

lingers by which these

thing of the intricate

words are written, without knowing any

machinery of nerves, muscles, and tendons
by which the volition is executed, or even of the particular point
in the brain which must be touched, in order to
bring the compli
cated apparatus into play in such manner that precisely this move
ment, and not an entirely irrelevant one, may be brought about.

The

may be compared, he says, to the key-board of a piano

though so curiously fashioned as to present within narrow
limits almost a countless multitude of
keys; and the right note can.
be sounded, or the intended motion be effected, only on condition
of instantly hitting the right one out of the whole number. Speak
ing of the human body in his earnest and yet simple manner, good
Dr. Watts exclaims
brain

forte,

"

Strange that a harp of thousand strings should keep in tune so long

Stranger

still

is

it,

"

that an unseen musician should be always at

IIARTMANX

437

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

make the instrument discourse eloquent music in the most

of these its
harmony and melody, whatever combination
and
what
various,
skilfully
Consider
rapid,
owner may call for.
combined movements of his arms and fingers the human organist
must call for, in order to express his musical ideas and how the
structure of his brain, his nervous and mus
hand

to

intricate

curiously complicated
cular system, which he

knows nothing about,

is

so directed

by

unseen assistant as

his

He

his volitions.
precisely to

to correspond
done for him, though not by
merely wills the work, and it is

him.
Further proof of the action of

"

the Unconscious

"

afforded

is

is defined by Ilartmann to
by the phenomena of Instinct, which
consciousness
a
be "acting in conformity to
purpose, without any
There are only three possible modes of account
of that purpose."
of the
1. That it is a mechanical consequence
ing for such actions
s mind is so con
brute
the
2.
That
animal s corporeal organization
o. The
stituted by nature as to be a sort of spiritual automaton
inter
constant
the
from
it
results
that
doctrine here maintained,
:

The first of these hypotheses accords

with the Cartesian dogma, that animals are only curiously fashioned
machines and it is here controverted, on the ground that the in
is the same.
stincts are often dissimilar, when the bodily structure
one
same
spinning apparatus, though
Thus, all spiders have the
an
webs
radiated
and
constructs
regular polygonal
species always
other weaves them in any irregular form; while a third does not
of the
build
web, but lines with its silk the sides and door

vention of the Unconscious.

any

hole in which

claws and

it

bill,

All birds have essentially the same means,

but the forms adopted by
chosen, and the modes of attaching the structure

lives.

for constructing a nest

them, the places

They have the

supports, present a measureless variety.
two
of
no
the
but
of
same organs
species are alike.
voice,
songs
On the other hand, the instincts often are the same, though the

to

its

The migrating impulse shows itself

organizations are dissimilar.
with equal strength in animals very differently constituted, and
the journey, whether
provided with various means for performing
Numerous
the
air.
or
or
water,
species are ar
land,
by

through

boreal in their habits, though very few of them have similar means
or reasons for making their homes in trees.
and
Moreover, the attempt to explain instinct as the blind
in the animal s corporeal
necessary operation of machinery, either
or its mental organization, only pushes the designing action of the
It is the same Power which
Unconscious one step farther back.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

4:38

does the work, and with the same purpose in view, whether it
operates duvet ly and at the moment, like a special Providence, or
long beforehand by a far-seeing contrivance, which
provides for
it.

impels the animal mechanically to do just the right thing at just

the right time.
Instinctive action is not incessant, often is not

uniformly periodic but it comes into play only when exigencies

arise, which \\onld afford sufficient motives, if the conscious human
;

were concerned, to call out

and provident energies.

intellect

all

coiiM ious, thus manifested

its

And

defeii.Mve

inventive

the

wisdom

It.

never hesitates or wavers;

ation;

it

effects

it

its

Unwisdom of

of the

surpasses the
takes no time for deliber

in.-tinet, far

in

man.

skill, all

instantly the necessary combination of numerous

it makes no
mistakes.
llartmann

and far-reaching means; and

to it that mysterious power, which we have no

one Kngli.-h name for
in ( .Jcrmaii, Jfcltsi /teti, in French, clair
which
is
voyance
properly divine, for it is unquestionably super
human. Thus, carrv away blindfold some animals, like the carrier
pigeon, the honey bee, and even some quadrupeds, to a distance of
many league-, by a route which they have never before traversed,
and instantly, on being set free, they return
a bee-line" to
their old homes.
A species of wasp stores up food of a kind
which it never u.-es for itself, and carefully deposits it in a lit re
ceptacle which is not its own abode, for the use of its young
who-c birth it will not live to witness.
It is in view of prodigies
like
that even cold and skeptical Kant exclaims,
Instinct

rightly attributes

"in

"

the>e,

the

i.~

voice of

the action of the

are

they

Ilartmann

(lod.

them, that
interpretation
Unconscious, sounds like bathos, but
of

These facts obviously

precisely the same meaning as Kant s.
negative the fanciful hypothesis, that human reason is developed
lia>

out.

of animal instinct through a blind process, which necessarily

all accidental variations from the typical form if they

perpetuates
;ire

improvements on

changes

for the worse.

it,

while

Man

it
just as necessarily kills out all
has lost a wonderful faculty which

We

possessed in great perfection by birds and insects.

to consider that nothing is gained by referring the in
stinct to the structure of the organism, whether mental or corpo
is

Mill

ought al-o
real

for

it is

already obvious, and

organic structure
purposeful action of the

will

be more fully proved here

after, that the

itself

the

Unconscious.

making

the instinct to

ought rather
the instinct

is

built up, step

by step, by
Hence, instead of

depend on the organization of the brain, we

whole nervous system as fashioned by

to regard the

which was innate

in the

germ.

IURTM ANN

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

439

their motive
Bodily movements having a useful purpose, though
not a thought originating in the brain, but
is

or exciting cause

or some
merely an impression on the sense

irritation of the skin,

are usually attributed to the reflex action of the nerves, and are
But as the effect of a single
considered as entirely mechanical.
stimulus, though not reaching the brain, and so unconscious, may
be to induce a scries of nicely coordinated motions, the whole re
for the welfare of the organism, the ac
sult of which is

important
be classed with the phenomena of instinct rather
The involuntary move
than with the operation of machinery.
ments thus induced are often surer, quicker, and even more grace
and through the perfecting power of
ful, than the voluntary ones

tion

ought

to

even the action, which was deliberate in its origin, may

of consciousness, and thus come to appear mechanical.
out
drop
In such cases, we often will the combined result, but know nothing
of the successive steps of the process by which it is effected.
that the brain consciously sets the lower ner
Hartmann
habit,

supposes,

vous centres at work, and these unconsciously guide the muscles so

as to perform the intended act.
If the nest of the bird or the

web

of the spider

is

damaged, the

animal quickly repairs the rent, and makes the structure as service
In like manner, if some of the bird s wing-feath
able as before.
ers are pulled out, or the spider has one of its legs accidentally
torn

"

off,

the
quickly makes good the loss, and
Shall we say that
whole locomotive power.
the two former cases is purposeful, but in the two
?
If the artisan tears his coat, he can

the Unconscious

sufferer recovers

"

its

the operation in
latter that it is purposeless

will mend it for him in

nature
he cuts his finger,
Mr. Charles Dar
to
hours.
Decandolle,
Yet,
according
forty-eight
win, and Professor Huxley, we have no right to say that nature"
intended to do any such thing. Very marvellous is the vis medicoAfter poisoning their patients with
trix reparatrixque Naturce.
have at last come to
drugs through many centuries, the doctors
know their business better, and now generally stand aside, or at
accident may
tempt only to remove obstacles which ignorance or
have put in the way, so as to leave free course to the curative
of the Unconscious, which alone can restore the patient

mend

"

"

it

if

agencies

to perfect health.

The reconstructive power (vis reparatrix) of the Unconscious,

as in replacing an entire limb or segment of the body after its
shown in the
amputation, is far more frequently and perfectly
lower species of animals than in those of a higher grade, and least

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

440

of all at tlie summit of the scale, in man, where

usually nature
only reunites and heals (ins medicatrix ) but does not restore.
The animal has here a great advantage over man, and thus again,
,

as in the ease of instinct.

Darwinism

fails

since evolution from the lower to the highest

to

explain the facts,

is not
improve

form

ment, development is not progress, except it be progress down

and therefor the theory of -natural selection" out of
a

hill,

"

strug
Ilartmann ingeniously accounts
gle for life" is not applicable.
for nature s reconstructive
power being less active in the higher

forms of animal

life, by saying that the Unconscious here turns

energies inward, so to speak, in order to improve the intel
lect through developing the brain, and
consequently has less effort

all its

spare in reproducing crushed or amputated joints and limbs.

is cut
in two by a cross section, nature
builds up each of the severed parts into a
perfect animal ajjain,
to

If one of the Annelida

reconstructing a head with its proper appendages for the lower

half, and a tail with its adjuncts for the upper one.
It would
seem, says Ilartmann. as if there must be present in each
of the
severed parts an Idea of what was
wanting in order to build

up

again the whole typical form of the species; and this Idea is the
pattern or model according to which the Unconscious works.
From each of the cut ends a minute drop of protoplasm exudes,

and

this is quickly and

deftly moulded in each case into such pro
longations of the alimentary canal, the blood-vessels, and nerves
as are needed
respectively for the upper and the lower half of the
animal as a whole, several organs in one of the reconstructed

mo^ties having nothing analogous to them in the other. Merely

physical causatio n, blind mechanism, cannot explain such a pro
cess
Will and Intellect must cooperate in the work.
;

The

plastic power of nature (nisns fonnativiis] consists in so

building up every organism that, at each stage of its existence, it
shall perfectly realize or
represent the typical form, the Idea, of
its
while its curative and restorative power aims
peculiar species
only at the preservation of this form against accidents after it has
;

once been constructed.

In a large sense, both these powers
may
be regarded as instincts innate in the germ, and
working continu
ously, but unconsciously, towards keeping up the countless definite
forms of life, each in its own kind.
Indeed, Instinct may be con
sidered as the most general expression, the
typical form, of the
action of the Unconscious.
In each case, a peculiar useful or
necessary result is the goal of the process, requiring foresight and
choice by unconscious Intellect, and the
application of unconscious

HARTMAXX

PHILOSOPTIY OF THE UNCOXSCIOUS.

441

The ulti
force or Will supplying the means for its attainment.
animal
the
kingdom as
mate purpose, the final end and aim of
In
consciousness.
of
the
is
insists,
development
such, llartraann
the Un
the vegetable realm, on the contrary, all the energies of
matter
conscious are devoted to the mere conversion of inorganic
organic, and

into

of the lower

combination, into higher ones

of
organic structures, or stages
it has, so to speak,

and therefore

no spare force left for efforts at internalization, and for building

have their food provided
up forms of subjectivity. But animals
and hence,
for them ready made by the processes of vegetation
a
to
itself
can
in
them
constructing
the Unconscious
chiefly
apply
What
nervous system and a brain as organs of a conscious mind.
animal life consumes and from the lowest
vegetative life produces,
animal form up to man, we witness a constantly rising and height
ened development of nervous structure and consciousness. Thus,
freedom of locomotion is needed in order to gain the wider and
which is a necessary means of mental
more diversified
;

experience
of conscious life.
development, and so of rising to a higher stage
some
of
case
in
the
as
lowest
the
aquatic species,
animals,
Hence,
because fettered for life to one spot, are hardly distinguishable

from

plants.

not necessary to pursue farther the train of argument and

the
by which Hartmann attempts to prove inductively
and Intellect in nature s cor
Will
an
unconscious
of
omnipresence
But the few specimens here given of his mode of
poreal forms.
to indicate the abun
conducting the inquiry may suffice, I think,
dance of rich material which he has at hand for the purposes of
and the clearness and ingenuity with which he reasons
his
It

is

illustrations

theory,
the facts adduced as the

upon

groundwork

of his conclusions.

But

before passing to his second book, which considers the action of

the Unconscious in the human mind, I must briefly notice his ar
who holds that the
gument against the doctrine of Schopenhauer,
essence or inmost being of nature is a merely blind Will, not ac-

companicd or directed
Intellect.

in

any

of

lower stages by any form of

the contrary, that Will as such,

its

Hartmann maintains on

order to express itself in determinate volitions, must be insepa

in
rably united with cognition; that it could not act at all except
of volition is a felt dis
nature
mind.
The
with
very
cooperation
in

with an existing state of things, and an attempt to

that is, to produce a change.
a different state of them
about
bring
It necessarily implies one condition which is present and which
sdone is real, as the starting point, and another condition, which,
satisfaction

442

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

because it is willed, must exist iu the future, and therefore can

be now present only in idea.
In other words, we cannot will
without knowing what we will.
Then there must be an end or

aim for every volition and this end can be present only in
thought,
if it
were also present in reality, we should already pos
sess all that we desire, and there would be no occasion to will.
Hence, without thought, without an idea of what is still future,
in other words, without a
purpose or Final Cause, Will would not
;

for

be

\\

ill,

as

volition, or

it

could not be definitely expressed in any determinate

at any one thing more than another.
volition

aim

without any definite aim or content is inconceivable

for there is
110 such
thing as Will in general, that wills nothing in particular.
The mere striving or effort is only the Form which is common to
all volitions
any one of them, in order to be realized, must have the
merely blank Form filled out with a content, that is, with a deter
minate purpose, which is necessarily mental or ideal, to accomplish
;

some

particular end.
Consequently, Schopenhauer s whole theory
respecting the secondary and derivative nature of Intellect, created
at a comparatively late period in the
history of the Will, and so
created only in order to be the minister and servant of the auto

the ground as a baseless assumption.

Mind
by Ilartmann, as coeval with Will, and in
separably united with it in the Unconscious, though capable of
being divorced from it, and thus of existing independently, in
cratic Will, falls
is

restored to

its

to

rights

human

manifestation.
But Will, as already remarked, can
under any circumstances, be separated from Intellect, being
forever dependent upon it for guidance and determination.
Of
course, the guiding idea, the dominant motive, may be unconscious.
Often we are not aware what we will, or even that we will.
But
the determinate nature of the volition, the fact that we will this
its

not,

rather

than that, proves that the guiding idea is always there,

though it may not rise into consciousness.
Ilartmann begins his proof of the action of the Unconscious in
the realm of mind by attempting to show that man, as well as the
brute, has instincts properly so called.
This seems to me ques
tionable doctrine, and the evidence here adduced in its support is
I believe
certainly insufficient, and even, in great part, irrelevant.
that instinct differs from reason, not merely in
degree, surely, for
in some of its manifestations, as has just been shown, it is evi
that it is given to the brutes aa
dently the superior, but in kind
a substitute for reason
that in truth, the two faculties exist in
inverse ratio to each other ; and as at the bottom of the scale, in.
;

HART MANX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

443

so at the
the lowest animal, there is certainly no trace of reason,
In his consciously
is no vestige of instinct.
there
in
man,
top,
to the teachings of experience,
acts, man is left entirely

voluntary
and never consciously employs means for a useful end without
Under the influ
having first perceived their fitness for that end.
relation of the
the
of
this
is
it
habit,
of
ence
true,
perception
means to the end may gradually fall out of consciousness, and he
seem to continue the action mechanically but always rea

may

We

have so
of the habit.
necessary for the first formation
and to write, for example, that we cease
perfectly learned to walk
each
to be aware of the scries of volitions necessary for taking

son

is

but the young child slowly acquires

step and forming each letter
Of all the
these useful habits through distinct conscious efforts.
the hu
that
to
his
in
prove
instances cited
attempt
Ilartmann,
;

by

man mind possesses instincts properly so called, not one conforms

acting in conformity
to his own definition of instinct, that it is
They
to a purpose without any consciousness of that purpose."
"

are cases only of natural and primitive emotions and appetites,

which dictate, indeed, the end to be pursued, but do not guide us
on the contrary,
in selecting the right means for its attainment
more mistaken
the
or
the
desire,
too frequently the stronger
feeling
we are in our eager attempts to gratify it, which often defeat the
we have in view. Instinct makes no such blunders.
;

very purpose
of ma
Thus, Ilartmann appeals to the strong primitive emotions
etc.
ternal love, pity for distress, gratitude, shame, fear of death,
in
the
under
most
when
for
instincts
But these are no guiding
fluence of them, people blunder wofully, and generally adopt any
Hartmann
course rather than the best one for satisfying them.
it
because
an
is
sexual
instinct,
the
that
even
appetite
;

argues,
that of continuing and multiplying the
really has a useful purpose,
Malthusian
as a blind impulse.
it is
gratified only
species, though
it directly contro
and
this
of
the
force
admit
not
will
argument,

verts

its

The

s own theory of Pessimism.

and best portions of Hartmann

author

ablest

second book are

the
those in which he points out the necessity of the action of
in what is strictly
Unconscious" in the origin of language, and
"

In respect to Language, it is only putting his

to say, that he maintains what the old
words
other
theory
the origin
so
fable of Prometheus
beautifully teaches concerning
Even the low
of heaven.
of Fire, that it is the immediate

called

Thought."

into

gift

est savages are

never found without this divine endowment, this

this conditio sine qua non for

necessary prerequisite for progress,

444

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

any advance in civilization. Not one of the anima .s below man

seems to have any capacity for it, or any rudiments out of which
it

could possibly be constructed.

to articulate 1

amount

Several of them

may

be taught

words with perfect distinctness; but not one,

by any

of painstaking instruction, can

be enabled

to

t<ilk<

that

is,

words together with appropriateness, and evident

percep
tion of their relative
meaning, into an intelligible proposition and
this for good cause, because
they are entirely devoid of that power,
the faculty of Thought
strictly so called, by which alone the re
lations of words with each other, and of words with things, can be
at all apprehended.
When words are taken separately, and so
out of relation to each other, they are
merely the elements of
to join

speech not yet developed or fully constructed

Language properly
so called begins to exist with the
Proposition, and therefore con
sists in a synthesis of words.
To recur to a former illustration,
if a
I
pig could only be enabled to say to himself, or to others,
;

am

a pig," he would,
On the other
fur/,,, cease to be a pig.
hand, Laura Bridgeman, blind, deaf, and dumb from
infancy, and
having only a very imperfect sense of smell, can now write a good
i/>so

and keep up a sensible conversation, through her fingers, on

Let Mr. Darwin do as much for dog, elephant, or
chimpanzee, as Dr. S. G. Howe did for Laura Bridgeman. and he
will convert the world to Darwinism.
Any one at all acquainted with the history of Philosophy, says
Ilartmaun, must have learned how much it owes to the analysis of
the structure of language, and to the
study of grammatical forms.
Most of the fundamental principles of logic, psychology, and met
aphysics are, so to speak, imbedded and innate in the wonderful
letter

any

topic.

mechanism

of speech.

They belong to language as such, because

very essence; and hence they are found alike
in the rudest, and in the most
Schelhighly developed, tongues.
ling rightly argues, that consciousness does not become possible ex
cept through language, and therefore the origin of language must
have antedated the birth of consciousness. In every form of hu
they constitute

man

speech

its

we

find

the

necessary

elements for constructing a

that is to say, we find Subject

proposition
clearly distinguished
from Predicate, Subject from Object, Substantive from Verb and
;

If the language is not far

Adjective.
enough developed to ex
press these distinctions through inflectional forms, they are at
least intelligibly indicated through the relative
position of the
words in a sentence.
Ileuce they are, and always have been,

as familiar to the native Australian

and the Hottentot, as

just
to a

IIAimiANN

Bepp
man s

or a

Grimm.

soul,

Dr.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

4-45

had not been innate in Laura Bridgenever could have found them there, or en

If they

Howe

abled her to express them in a finger-alphabet, when the sense of

touch was the only medium of. communication between teacher
When the human mind fur the first time wondered at
and
pupil.

to philosophi/e, it found itself already provided

ideas and nice
containing
O a rich store of abstract
and as Kant remarks,
distinctions and classifications of thought
a u reat part, perhaps the greatest part, of the subsequent busi
itself,

w nh

and began
O

laii" u;i"-e

i*

"

oi! reason has been to

analyze and take account of what it
thus found preexistent and familiar to use in its own modes of ex

ness

pression."

The conception

of

judgment, as a

distinct

mental process,

is

verbal proposition, merely discarding

directly abstracted from the
the form of words; the Category of Substance and Attribute is
the enderived in the same manner from Subject and Predicate
;

the concise form of the syllogism, is still more

in
the word
therefore," ergo, and its equiva
tightly packed up
to discover and nicely discriminate the
Ilartmann
lents.

thymeme, which

is

"

"

says,

mental process which is the counterpart of the grammatical dis

tinction between Substantive and Verb, is still an unsolved, and
in this particular,
fruitful, philosophical problem
conscious speculation is still far behind the unconscious creation
No new relations of ideas are forged
of the genius of humanity."
or invented, when metaphysical analysis first brings into clear con

perhaps very

sciousness the distinctions and processes which are wrapped up in

verbal forms as their garments.
Philosophy has only to develop

and distinctly enunciate what language offers to it in a crude state,

Nascent philosophy finds lying before it abundant
or in the u erm.
material, already thought out and prepared for its use, in the cases
of declension, in the voices, tenses, and moods of the verb, and in
a rich treasure of word-concepts, expressive, through their etymo
of thought.
logical forms, of the fundamental divisions and relations

have to
primitive ideas with which psychology and ontology
deal are found expressed in all languages by words which signify

The

Being, Phenomenon, Becoming, Understanding, Thinking, Feeling,

and the like and
Desiring. Ought, Motion, Force, Power, Cause,
there is work enough for many centuries yet to come, before this
treasure-house of the Unconscious speculation of the race will be
;

Who

taught the rude Germans, as yet wandering in.

the depths of their Hercynian forest, to designate Cause as Ursache,
the primitive business or thing," answering to the Latin causa and

exhausted.
"

446

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

Italian

cosa

or

Judgment as Urtheil, "the primitive sentence

between plaintiff and
defendant, or between subjectand attribute; or Notion (Concept) as
a irraspimr
JJeqrijf,
together "of several attributes and thiug.s into one
general idea?
The student of Greek will
easily add to these few many other
curious examples from the
of Plato and Aristotle.
of parti.

ion,"

as

terminology

Hurtmanu

maintains, that as the groundwork or general struc

Language is far too intricate and
to have

ture of

comprehensive
up by one man, it must have been a work of the masses
the people at
large; and that it is also too nicely
arranged, and
"form in
plan, to have been produced by the conscious labor of
several persons
working h, concert. Only an instinct of the masses
can have created it, such as we see
in the
been

built

exemplified

try ol

hive

of bees or a

commnnitv

joint indus

The

of ants.

process of
levelopment. also, in the whole family of
languages, is essentially
one and the same, both
up to the period of culmination of each,
and then through its successive
stages of decline and degradation.
He further insists, that what we
may call the metaphysics or

sophy ,,t the Unconscious, as embodied in Language, far from

being perfected by the advancing culture and civilization of the
people, attains its ripest development and most distinct
expression
at a very
early period, in prehistoric times, as in the case of San
skrit, and thenceforward becomes
gradually deteriorated, through

the resolution of inflectional

forms, the grinding down of cons onantal sounds, the invasion of
foreign elements. and a general de
cay in point of simplicity, force, and
pregnancy of "expression.
Speech no longer so faithfully mirrors the primitive and uncoulous thought of the race
it becomes
perverted, as manners often
are, by an excess of conscious effort,
by straining after refine
ment, and by the corrupting tendencies of fashion and
precept.
The Categories of Aristotle are an exhaustive
enumeration of the
;

germs of
to

all
metaphysical and logical speculation
Trend, -lei, burg, who is followed
Dean

are

"

only

by
the different modes

and according
Mansel, these Catego

of

naming

things,

classified

primarily according to the grammatical distinctions of

speech, and
gained, not from the observation of objects, but from the
analysis
or assertions."
Kant attempted a similar
generalization from an
point of view; and his Categories, as we
have seen, merely
express the twelve Forms of Judgment, which
result from a
of the
logical
as the
exclusively subjective

analysis
Proposition,
of the synthesis of words into a
Language.
In
passing to a consideration of the action of the

Form

necessary

Unconscious

HAETMAXN
in

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

447

transi
Thought strictly so called, we make a hardly perceptible
and em
Language is in great part only the expression 1

tion, since

As I have elsewhere remarked, Words

bodiment of Thought.
are not only signs and preservatives, they are also substitutes, for
is an excellence or
Thought and this peculiarity of Language
;

Hence
used.
it, according as it is, or is not, judiciously
of Language gives us the power of
use
the
that
said
be
may
This
words are stenographic thoughts.
thinking in short-hand

defect? in
it

abbreviated expression of thought is a great help to the memory;

and thus Language is the great repository of Thought, not only in
So the algebraist easily recalls to
books, but in our own minds.
mind a few brief formulas, which enable him to perform almost
which the arithmeti
mechanically long numerical computations,
This
cian must slowly and painfully think out step by step.
termed by Leibnitz, bears about the
symbolic knowledge, as it was
same relation to the full thought, of which it is the abbreviated
does to an ideo
expression, that our ordinary cursive handwriting
to the picture-writing of the Mexicans.
or
graphic system,
In respect to the processes of reminiscence, reasoning, induc
tion,

mann

and several others, Ilartdiscovery, composition, invention,

that
observes,
every thing depends on the right
justly
And this happy
occurring to one at the right moment.

thought

the work of the Unconscious.

Vainly do
suggestion is invariably
we rack our brains with persistent conscious effort and research
to find the word for the riddle or the solution of the problem; it

come at our bidding. And then suddenly, perhaps after

a considerable interval of time, during which we had discharged
will not

the subject from our thought, and perhaps when we were idly mus
as
ing on some other theme, just what we wanted flashes upon us
The man of science is quite as dependent as the
by inspiration.
of light coming from the Uncon
or the wit, on these

gleams
Archimedes stepping out of a bath, or Newton idly gaz
calls out, Eu
ing when an apple falls from the tree, suddenly
and the problem, which may have perplexed him half a
reka
What remains is easy enough,
lifetime, is spontaneously solved.
and may be slowly elaborated in conscious thought it is only,
the new truths into har
through the reasoning process, to bring
and
those
with
thereby to determine their
previously known,

poet,
scious.

mony

classification

and place

in a system.

The premises being given

in

Treatise on Logic, or The Laws of Pure Thought, comprising both the Arisand Hamiltonian Analyses of Logical Forms, and some Chapters of Applied
24.
By F. Bowen. Cambridge. C. W. Sever. 1864. p.
Logic.
i

iotelic

448

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

immediate

through inspiration from the Unconscious, the

them follows, as it were, mechanically, being
drawn as easily and correctly by a simpleton as by a man of
genius in fact, says Ilartmann, it follows necessarily, just as a
ball propelled by two forces must move on the
diagonal which is
intuition,

right inference iVom

the resultant of their combined directions.

A\ e can
easily sec that the aid of the Unconscious is indispen
sable in order to furnish the right thought at the right moment,

when we consider
tions, tin;

the nature of Memory, and the vast accumula

almost countless wealth, which it constantly has at hand.

In most of

the psychological theories which have been framed to

explain remembrance, especially in those which are of a physio
logical and materialistic character, it seems to have been taken
for granted that the principal, if not the
only, fact which needs to
be accounted tor, is the rctt ittlr/
of mind, or its
of

power

power

a linn grasp for many years the countless individual

facts and general truths which have
gradually been amassed by

holding

in

the cumulative labors and experiences of a lifetime.

Hut it is not
the real marvel in the
is the
reproductive faculty when
occasion requires, the wonderful power of
unembar

so

ca>e

Memory,

rassed by its
what it wants.

immense

instantly to put its hand on just

the acquired knowledge of a man of

riches,

Herein does

genius, a Scaliger or a Macanlay, differ from the lumber accumu

lated by ;i learned fool, in that it all lies at instant command.

The laws

of association offer

merely a statement and

be explained

no explanation of the

fact,

but are

classification of the

phenomena needing to
but not wln^ we remember.
Just

they tell us Itmr.

laws do not rjocerii material events, or exert on
them any agency whatever, but merely classify and describe
them.
Xow, observe that all the vast stores of Memory are only
so,

physical

figuratively said

to

be actually

present in the mind; they are

only potential wealth.
They are all the property
of
the Unconscious," whose treasure-house is nobody knows
where.
Out of the skies, out of the depths, suddenly comes back

latent, they are

"

upon us the long-lost remembrance of the scenes of our youth

and though events now passing around us quickly fade for the
present from our mental vision,

"

The

Forsan et hoec olim meminisse

juvabit."

hypothesis of the materialist avails nothing, or rather serves

only to render the phenomenon more mysterious and inscrutable.
Granted, if you will, that each event of observation is at once

HARTM ANN

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

449

stamped ineffaceably upon the brain then, the imprint being al

ways there, why does it quickly cease to be visible? Why does
it
entirely pass out of consciousness for many years, and then
wluiu mysterious power suddenly
brings it back in its pristine dis
tinctness, still sharply defined, unblurred by the
myriads of ob
served facts meanwhile impressed upon the same limited surface ?
Familiar as it is, this alternate lighting up and
fading out of con
scious remembrance is the most marvellous fact in our mental
constitution
in view of it, every
reflecting person must stand
;

ama/ed

at himself.

Monist as he is, ultimately resolving matter itself into the com

bined Will and Intellect of the Unconscious, Hartmann is still
just
Herbert Spencer, and maintains that the
all be traced to the action of the nerv
wonderful that he fails to see, that herein his

as crass a materialist as

phenomena

of

memory may

ous system.
Jt is
theory is not only inconsistent

when regarded
the brain

as

with

itself,

but

is

an attempted explanation of the

unintelligible

Since

facts.

a material structure, impressions made upon it can be

distinguished from each other only in shape or outline, and pro
cesses generated in it can be
modes of molecular motion.
is

only
External visible objects and events can be outlined
by an artist,
But
impressed in wax, cut in marble, or stamped on the brain.
how can we outline or paint, or what "dance of atoms" will
faithfully

represent, articulate sounds, odors, abstract ideas,

emo

tions, or

These can become impres

processes of pure thought ?
sions on the brain, that is, can be
visibly or tangibly presented,
only through arbitrary signs, or such merely conventional symbols
as letters and words.
Adopt such means, then, and the inquiry
immediately arises, what language, what alphabet, what sort of char
acters, does the stamping power of "the Unconscious"
employ.

Does

it

write

style, or

German
does

text or an Italian

hand? Is it master of a
For we must remem
correctly ?

it even
spell
emotions and abstract thoughts of the unlettered
peasant, just as much as those of the philosopher, need to be im
Even if we jump these difficulties, and sup
printed on the brain.
pose all to be fairly written out on the pulpy surface of the cere
brum, we must farther imagine the record to be blurred or faded
out for many years, and then
marvellously brightened into visibil

good
ber,

that the

ity again, when some reminding word or incident comes like a

And when all this is ac
vapor bath of iodine to a sun picture.
complished, we still need an eye inside of the skull to see the writ
ing, a mind to comprehend it, and a conviction in that mind that

450
the

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
feelings

nnd thoughts thus inscribed are old acquaintances,

mere copies from former experience. Let the physiologist or

chemist contrive what mechanism he may; if an indivisible
Ego of
consciousness is not allowed to come in, the machine will not work.

The automaton won

t
play chess, if an Ego be not smuggled into
the cupboard.
Hut it is farther argued, that the cud of thought is never en
tirely lost, the succession of ideas being incessant, swift, and

We

involuntary; and this looks mechanical.

answer, that the psy

admit, that the association
by the will, but is in great part
and grotesque.
Poets and wits

chologists do not dispute the fact

of ideas is not directly controlled

all

arbitrary, sometimes whimsical

are well aware of this spontaneity of

thought, and often there

which they make of such inspira
But attention is voluntary, and selection is possible and
tions.
thereby, indirectly, we change the whole current of thought at
We arrest the flow when we please, and thus force the river
will.
into a different channel.
No one allows his thoughts always to
drift at random, as they often do in aimless reverie or a dream.
But the action of the Unconscious, which is the fountain that
keeps the river always full, and generally determines whether its
waters shall be bitter or sweet, and which way
they shall run, is
often checked and controlled by the conscious
Ego, that asserts
its sovereignty, and
easily dominates the whole course of thought.
is

something uncanny

in the use

consciousness is to be believed when it asserts the train of

thought to be spontaneous, capricious, and necessary, is it not
equally to be trusted when it affirms attention and selection to be
If

deliberate, voluntary, and free, thus manifesting the

individual mind to control its own action ?

power

of the

We need to have an adequate conception of the magnitude and

importance of the work which memory has to do, before we can
that power
rightly understand how far its operation depends upon
not ourselves," which Hartmann calls
the Unconscious."
An
obvious illustration will make this point clear.
Many educated
"

"

persons, in this country as well as in England,

know enough

least four languages, Latin, French, German or Italian,

lish, to be able to read any common book in either of

and

of at

Eng

them with

The whole number of English words, not

facility.
including purely technical terms or mere derivatives, is at least
40,000 and that portion of the vocabulary of either of the other
three languages, which is at the command of a well-educated for
about equal
;

eigner,

is

probably half as large.

Among

the treasures of

mem-

HARTMAXX
in

ory

451

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

such a mind, therefore, must be reckoned at least 100,000

all of which, with some trifling exceptions for onoma
What a
as arbitrary as the signs in algebra.
are

mere words,

symbols

topoeia,

countless multitude of individual facts and familiar truths in sci

ence and ordinary life are either wrapped up in these words, or
Cer
exist side by side with them, in any well-informed mind
!

tainly such a mind is far more

ideas than the British Museum

richly stocked with words and

That admirably
is with books.

institution, suffering from the embarrassment of riches,

full staff of well-trained librarians ; and one of them,

managed

maintains a

rummaging the catalogue and the shelves for perhaps ten

minutes, will triumphantly produce any volume that may be called
But the single invisible librarian, who awaits our orders in
for.
the crowded chambers of the Memory, is far more speedy and
A student reads a page of French or Ger
skilful in his service.
after

man

minute, and for each of the two or three hundred groups

in a

"

the Unconscious
of hieroglyphics printed on it,
instantly fur
nishes us whatever we call for, either its meaning, or its etymology,
"

or

English equivalent, or

its

its

grammatical relations

to other

same sentence, or any of the associated ideas in a

groups
little world of knowledge of which this one word forms the centre.
We have no conscious clew with which to direct ourselves in the
it is enough that we have an interest in the point to be
search
remembered, that we need it for the work which is in hand, and
the

in

I think this
produced out of the vast repository.
of
sufficiently proves the presence and agency
the Unconscious," and sufficiently disproves the shallow and
has need
stupid theory of the materialists with which Hartmann
For what merely mechanical or
lessly burdened his system.

instantly

it

is

single illustration
"

chemical action

phenomena
Thus far

is

conceivable as

a.

possible

in question ?
I have endeavored to follow step

explanation of the

by

step,

and

in

some

facts
long array of evidence, the great accumulation of
and arguments distributed under many heads, through which Hartman seeks by the inductive method, and on strictly scientific prin

detail, the

ciples, to

But
establish the leading doctrine of his Philosophy.
is so abundant, and the subject itself so far-reaching

the material

and comprehensive, that

in the

very limited space yet remaining at

command,
attempt at an exhaustive consideration of it
In fact, as Hartmann himself remarks,
cannot be carried farther.

my

this

each of the thirty-six chapters constituting his work may be re

treatise on some
garded as an independent and tolerably complete

452

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

physical or moral science, some special branch of philosophy, which

admits of study and criticism by itself, apart from its connection
with the other portions of his system.
And his own treatment of

each of these themes includes so much, and

row

is

kept within so nar

limits

by great condensation of matter and conciseness of

expression, that any farther abridgment of it is hardly practicable
without sacrificing much that is essential for a fair
development
his thought.
Having tracked his progress pretty closely in
twelve of the earlier and shorter
chapters, I must

of

the rest of his work,

merely indicating by

hurry through
of the sub

name many

remain, and endeavoring to select a few of the more

ject.- which
interesting and characteristic points which ought to be noticed with

some

detail.

The mental

faculties are usually distributed into three

large
groups, designated respectively as the Intellect, the Sensibility,
and the "Will. The Philosophy of the Unconscious is concerned
and Hartexclusively with the ill-stand the third of these

powers;

maun argues with

great ingenuity and acuteness, that the feelings

and emotions placed under the second head
ought not to form a,

(hey an; only modes of AVill and Intellect

of the Unconscious.
Briefly ex
all our
is, that
passions may be resolved into
mere Pleasure or Pain, since they express
only conformity or dis
one of
agreement with the Will all that appears peculiar in
separate

class,

since

together in
pressed, the theory

acting

processes

any

them
of

is

due

to the Intellect

the content of

which

is

the

conscious or unconscious perception

Will, or the real motive of the volition,
s

often a secret even to ourselves, and also to a

of the circumstances attendant

knowledge

upon the

gratification or non-grat
or volition of the moment.
Tooth

ification of

the ruling desire

distinguished from ear-ache simply by our perception of
the different locality and the relative
intensity of the Pain en
dured.
There are no qualitative, but only quantitative, distinc

ache

is

between different Pleasures and different Pains the inten

either depends upon the vehemence or
strength of the
volition, often an unconscious one, which is favored or crossed.
tions

sity

of

Many sen.sitions are indifferent to us at their ordinary pitch, being

neither grateful nor irksome
but if, while remaining
qualitatively
the same, they are
greatly changed in degree, intense pain or
pleasure may result.
Thus, the ordinary effect of light upon the
eye is indifferent to us; but if intense, as from the sun at noon,
;

it

becomes very painful.

We wrongly consider the perception,
is an act of the
Intellect, as the cause of the pain, which is

which

HARTMAXX

453

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

or
a manifestation of Will, because the two usually go together,
or inter
continuous
either
be
The
simultaneous.
may
are
pain
to be
mittent and most of its distinctions, which are supposed
various
the
of
our
from
result
in
knowledge
differences
kind,
;

of remission, or of the causes of our unpleasant feeling.

and then as
Thus, we describe a bodily pain, first by its locality,
Moreover, we
etc.
biting,
throbbing, darting, cutting, gnawing,
and
each other
weia h different enjoyments and pains against
be
not
would
this
possible,
measured
be
like,
like can

modes

since

by

only

or similar, and only quanti

they were not qualitatively equal
We decide either to bear the toothache some
tatively different.
and
the cause of anguish to be pulled out
days longer, or permit
a ride, or
to spencfa small sum either in buying a book, procuring

if

visiting the theatre.

Mental pleasures

also consist in

gratified volitions,

and mental

pain we

feel at the
of the Will.
pains in the frustration
is precisely similar
Ilartmann
friend,
dear
coolly argues,
death of a
and it depends upon the strength ot ^our
in kind to the toothache
we willed
attachment to him, that is, on the vehemence with which
One
acute.
more
the
is
may be
which
continued
his
presence,
difference
a
is
also
that
than the other, it is true but
more

The

lasting

argument is, that we weigh

mental pleasures against sensual ones, which would not be possible
we do not weigh hay with
for
if they were unlike in quality
intrinsic
The
commensurability of
with
straw, or pecks
pounds."
the sameness of
from
the two classes, which appears in language
there
and
of
sorts
all
to
pleasure, must
which we
pain

in quantity only.

Here,

too, the chief

"

name

give
it holds not only
fore be accepted unconditionally as a fact; and
for the gratifica
but
for the various sorts of sensual enjoyment,
In both
intellect.
the
of
those
with
as
tions of sense
compared
is the Will, the intensity of the pleas
is
what
gratified
cases,
really
of the volition.
Thus,
ure
upon the strength or energy

depending
man hesitates between two equally wealthy sisters
he says,
but quick
which to choose for his wife, the one plain in feature,
as
and
fool
a
other
the
according
and
witted and sensible,
pretty
"a

is
desire or intellectual taste predominates, his choice
in
ineffable
and
is
Whatever
obscure, inexplicable,
determined."
from the
the nature of feeling and emotion, he argues, proceeds
of which
out
or
intellect,
unconscious mental states, whether of will
do not
often
are
which
or
arise
accompanied.

mere sensual

they

by

We

they

and only the pain or pleasure, which

really desire
character of our
ooines after the event, instructs us as to the true

know what we

45

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

will.
Our .elf-respect prevents us from consciously wishing the
death of a near relative, whose property we are to inherit
but
after he is taken away, we find to our shame that the loss does
not grieve us as it ought.
Or we fancy that we have ceased to
mourn for a friend supposed long ago to have been lost at sea
;

transport of joy into which we are thrown by his sudden

re-appearance proves that we have been all the while unconsciously

but

rlie

longing for him to come back again.

In his theory of the action of the Unconscious

in

our aesthetic

judgments and the productions of art, Ilartmann takes middle

ground between the doctrine of the idealists and that of the ompiriAccording to the former, which is in the main that of Plato,
there is innate in the human soul an Idea of the Beautiful, from
which in each department of art is constructed an Ideal and in
n.-t>.

proportion to

its

conformity with

this

tvpe,

any object or creation

But the empiricists maintain, that

adjudged to poess beauty.
works of art which come the nearest to this pretended Ideal,
no elements are to be found which did not preexist in nature,
though in combination with other ingredients which partially mar
their effect
and that the vocation of the artist is to distinguish and
eliminate these deformed and injurious adjuncts, and bring together
llartmanu
only what can excite unmixed admiration and pleasure,
that each of these theories is partly ri^lit and partly
wrong.
is

in the

say>.

Tin; idealists are right in holding that the process of creating an

Ideal lies behind or above consciousness, so that, in this sense, the
a stiietical

is a
priori; but they are wrong in regarding
a pure abstraction, an indeterminate unit, originating
not how,
a direct gift from heaven.
On the contrary,

judgment

this Ideal as

we know

the Beautiful, since

intuitively perceived by Sense, must exist

and determinate forms and concrete mani

it is

in countless individual

festations.

instance,

The

nm>t

Ideal

is

not one, but

many;

that of humanity, for

include both a masculine and a feminine

Type

and

former, must be found the Ideal of infancy, childhood, youth,

manhood, and old age also, the Ideal of a Hercules, an Odysseus,
a Zeus, etc.
To maintain the eternal existence of all these dis
in the

and concrete ideal forms, infinitely numerous as they are,

would be to assert the reality, not of the single miracle of one ab
stract Ideal, but of numberless individual miracles.
Rather the
creative process of each takes place in the Unconscious, and the
special Ideal first appears fully formed, concrete and determinate,
as an inspiration to the mind of the individual artist.
Its source
is
not from without, as the empiricist vainly supposes, but from
tinct

HARTMAXX

455

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

and preconscious selection and arrange

to impart aesthetic pleasure.
elements
ment of the fittest
and Morality, a similar theory is
Ill the chapter on Character
formation of rules ot con
unconscious
the
propounded respecting
of what is beneficial
observation
duct really generated by repeated
to the conscious
manifested
first
but

within, in

the

instinctive

for the individual

and

society,

ap
together, and
the
revelation of the Moral Law within
a
an
as
priori
peal-in*
voice of conscience,
the
as
authority

intellect

thus

when completely formed and put

breast,and claiming supreme

mam.
Volitions as such, Hartmann
because its origin is unknown.
other
the
all
ap
other only in intensity
tains, differ from each
to their content, that
relate
them
only
between
parent distinctions
end and purpose which the Will has
is to their Motive, or the
But the apprehension of Motives
view and strives to accomplish.
holds up
and
Intellect
according as this faculty
is the work of the
sensual
as
such
enjoy
of desire,
the Will various
;

objects

before

in art, or in love,
directed to one

success
ment wealth, honor, reputation, learning,
and
strenuously
more
are
frequently
etc volitions

individual is said to be covetous,

or "the other of them, and the
and the like.
ambitious,
eager to learn,
licentious, vain, proud,
will
which
or
Which motive will be habitually preferred,
c
can
we
circumstances,
one case under given
iu

chosen

any

know only through observation of the result, by experience.

in
We can learn what our own character is, only in the same way
back
reasoning
our
fellow-man,
of
by
which we study the character

tainlv

from what
the action,

the probable motive which induced

actually done to
the desire which
and hence to the habitual strength of

is

We can never tell

caused that special motive to predominate.
will operate
motive
foi-ehand with certainty how a particular
what influ
the
to
trial,
know
not, previous
dilferent men
nay, we
firmest resolutions,
our
Often
ourselves.
over
have
ence it will
scattered like chaff before
our most deliberately formed plans, are
out of the night of the
forth
comes
Will
true
the wind, when the
Hartmann seems
decision.
Unconscious, and announces its
s Intelligible bnarman
each
adopt the doctrine of Kant respecting
the inmost kernel
is born with him and forms
<

acter,

which
which

his empirical or acquii

groundwork on which
determines whs
therefore
and
built
up,
Character is subsequently
motive shall have over him in any particular
power a
or conscience, must
Rules of conduct, whether dictated by prudence
the Umlerstai
held
motives
by
other
up
the
with
bo classed

bi-iiK

is

the

<nven

often a vain one, of thereby

before the Will, with the expectation,

456

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

influencing its decision. The consideration of this

subject
edly left imperfect, as Hartmann does not
profess in this
nave elaborated a theory of Ethics.
I

is avow
work to

pass over a curious chapter on

to me on
very insufficient

Mysticism, in which, as it
grounds, Hartmann attempts to
prove, that the germs both of all
philosophy and all revealed rel.Vare to be found in the
heated fancies of the
Mystics, these
lane,
.gam being due to inspirations from the
Unconscious.
he
^ce adduced goes tar
enough only to confirm a text of
a-ipture, winch he
unconsciously labors to establish, that "the
prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but
holy meu
God spake as they were moved
by the Holy Ghost." Also a
chapter on the action of the Unconscious in
History need not dehere since it contains
only the speculations of the writer
on a topic which h ;l s been worn
threadbare of lateyears, because
is a tavonte theme
with the evolutionists and the

seems

><>

fatalists-

which

they have pretentiously designated as

Sociology, or the Science of
claims to be regarded as an exact
science; but as no
two of the numerous theories which
have been constructed about
)ear eve
emote resemblance to each other,
people irenerally
have no wish to discuss the
validity of its pretensions.
They are
to leave that task to
those who have succeeded to "their
satisfaction m harm,
.nixing wit!, each other the doctrines
scientific"
subject maintained respectively by Comte,
Buckle, Hartmann, Herbert
Spencer, and a do/en other English
and German speculatists.
Tim conclusion at which Hartmann
rives may be
presented here, as it is a summary of his whole
doctrine upon this
[

<

subject.

Greeks, Romans, and Mohammedans are

quite ri-ht in
conception of an dftap^ or Fate, in so far as this
signifies
ecessity of every event regarded as the effect of its imme-

"The
"

cause, so

that every link in the chain is

dependent on that
precedes it, and therefore,- the whole succession is foreor
dained and determined
through its first member.
i

right in

its

belief in a Providence, since

Christianity

is

every event takes place

perfect conformity with the foresight and intention of
an abolutely wise directing Cause; that is, as a means for
carrying out

of the

never-erring Unconscious, which is Reason

event can be
logically ri-ht and

At any moment,
only one

2lt.

this one is
just what must happen, for it is as
necessary
wisely conformed to the end in view.
Finally, the modern
nne of the rationalistic
empiricists is right, that History is

strand
is

IIARTM ANN

457

PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

result of the spontaneous action of individuals

with psychological laws, without any miracle
accordance
acting
But the up
of higher powers.
resulting from the interference
in
are
two
theories
first
the
of
holders
denying Spontaneity,
wrong
while those of the third system are wrong in denying Fate and
Providence for the union of all three first constitutes the truth."
The doctrine thus stated harmonizes so perfectly with the con

exclusively the
in

upon the same subject, that I doubt not every

would have been accepted by that great thinker.
After all that has been said about the importance and even the
of the action of the Unconscious, when Hart-

clusions of Leibnitz

word

of

it

indispensableness

its functions relatively, he still decides

the higher and more valuable of the two
individual and of the race,
progress, both of the
and cultivating the sphere of its iniluence.

raann comes to consider

that Consciousness

agencies, since

all

is

depends on enlarging

Each

acts within its

own

well-defined province, and at any one

the other, except to a limited

time, neither can encroach upon

And yet the welfare of
degree.

man and the ultimate redemp

humanity from the misery of existence can be promoted
the limits
only by conscious effort, by gradually encroaching upon
of the Unconscious, and converting instinctive action into thought
But how is this possible, on
ful and well-considered endeavor.

tion of

the theory here adopted, that a volition in any given case is the
Character
mysterious and necessary reaction of the Intelligible
takes
which
to
out
held
the
motives
it,
place wholly in the
upon
realm of the Unconscious?
By conscious and thoughtful con
sideration of the motives to be presented, Hartmann answers
by
stress on those which we have found from
and
;

laying
action of the
experience to be most efficient in determining the
Will.
We cannot directly shape our desires and volitions but
we can do so indirectly, by cultivating conscious reflection upon
the reasons, principles, and inducements which are most apt to
selecting

Hereby, the conscious Intellect, through

guide our actions aright.
and prof
thoughtful deliberation, can widen its sphere of influence,
of
Hereby, through forming habits
itably determine conduct.
a
about
we
can
well
considered
motives,
bring
acting only upon
can prevent passion from
beneficial change of character.
can prevent the indulgence of heedblinding the judgment.
lessness and inattention on the one hand, and of indecision and
indeterminateness on the other; and can educate ourselves to act
of blindly
only upon a well-considered plan of conduct, instead

We

We

following the impulses of the moment.

The proper

choice of a

MODERN PHILOSOPHY;

458
profession, of the

modes of employing our

leisure, of

our friend

ships and social intercourse, also depends upon our conscious and
Much of the profitable exercise of intellect
deliberate thought.
the search after truth, and in aesthetic culture, also falls within the

sphere of Consciousness.
This harm, at least, results from abandoning ourselves entirely
to the Unconscious
that one never distinctly knows how much he
has. or what he is aiming at
that he gropes round in the dark,
;

while carrying the lantern of Consciousness

in his

pocket,

that

it

chance whether an inspiration from the Unconscious will

come when it is most wanted
that he has no criterion but the
result, from which to judge what is a happy suggestion from the
Unconscious, and what is the mere dictate of a freakish fancy, or
which feeling or impulse he can trust, and which not; and finally,
is

left

to

exercise his faculty of conscious judgment and

which he can never safely do without, and then, when
an emergency arises, he must put up with poor analogies, instead
of rational inferences and comprehensive- views.
Only what is
conscious is known to be properly our own while the Unconscious
appears as something incomprehensible, and as a foreign agency,
\Yhile we have our con
upon whose favor one is dependent.
scious faculty as a ready servant, always at hand, and whose
obedience can lie enforced, the Unconscious slips out of our grasp
like a fairy, and always has something of an impish and unearthly
is done witli Consciousness I can be
"\Vhat
proud of, as my
aspect.
own act, brought about by the sweat of my brow, while the per
formance of the Unconscious is, as it were, a gift from the gods,
and as any man is merely its favored messenger, it can only teach
him humility.
What is inspired by the Unconscious is complete
as soon as it comes, is subject to no estimate of its value, but must
that

he does not

reflection,

it is; while the Conscious is its own standard,

judges and improves itself, and it may be changed at any
moment, as soon as newly acquired knowledge or a change of cir

be accepted just as
it

of good, and what is

and therefore it gives
me a feeling of security, because I know precisely what I have,
and also a feeling of modesty, because I know that this is still
There can be no improvement in the work done by
incomplete.

cumstances requires.

m\

defective, in

know what

there

consciously acquired result

is
;

the Unconscious, for its earliest as well as its latest inspirations are
But Consciousness contains in itself the infinite per
involuntary.
both
of the individual and of the race, and therefore
fectibility
sonstautly

prompts

provement."

to

gladsome and endless

efforts

at

self-im

CHAPTER XXIV.
HARTMANN

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

Kant respecting Time and Space, that they are

Forms of the faculty
because
they are subjective
priori,
we have seen, into
as
him,
of Sense, was illogically converted by

THE

doctrine of

known a

and there
the skeptical assumption that they are only subjective,
He arbi
are unreal and illusory.
fore, in their objective aspect,
is no correspondence between the world
there
that
trarily assumes,
to
of things as they really are, and that of things as they appear
ex
this
for
whatever
no
his "premises afford
us
ground
;

though

tension of the doctrine, for the same incompetency of our faculties,

which prevents us from asserting that things really are as they ap
forbids us to maintain that they are not as they
pear to us, equally
this theory that Space and
As
necessary inferences from
appear.
which thinks them, we
mind
Time have no reality outside of the
or Solipsismus,
Idealism,
of
a
thorough-going
have, first,
system
or the absolute Unity of all things.
of
one
Monism,
and, secondly,
Without Space, there is no coexistence, but the universe is con
and has no re
tracted to a mathematical point, which is nowhere
is no suc
there
without
itself
Time,
to

lation

cessive

anything beyond

existence,

indivisible present
to be.

but"

the

past and

and even

the

future

this disappears as

shrink

soon as

hi to
it

the

begins

Ilartmann here parts company both with Kant and Schopen

In a certain sense, he maintains the objective reality both
as per
of Space and Time, and of the universe of external things,
But we soon
ceived in them through the senses and the brain.

hauer.

iiud

that

this

so-called

"objective

reality"

is

only apparent,

outward expression and manifestation,

only the phenomenality, or
On the sur
of the Unconscious, which is absolutely One and All.
but as
decided
a
realist,
not
is
Ilartmann
his
of
only
face
doctrine,
and yet, when we come to sound
crass a materialist as Biichner
the metaphysics of his system to its foundation and inmost essence,
and as earnest and thoran Idealist and
;

we

find

him both

Monist,

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
in

ough-going

this hereafter

)0 th

respects as

as yet,

we have

Hegel or Sclioponhauor.
to

do with

his

But

of

philosophy only in

aspect, and under the Forms of sense.

In opposition to Kant, he maintains
that Space and Time are
^
Forms of real P.eing, as well as of conscious
Thought; that Time
lirectly intuited by experience, and is therefore a
posteriori in

its realistic

ts

origin, being

igh

made immediately

successive

perceptible by the inward sense

in the brain; and

and continuous vibrations

thai

Space, though a priori so far as consciousness is concerned is

previously constructed by a synthetic act, for a definite
purpose, by
spiritual function of the Unconscious.
Inverting the
usual course of the
argument. Hartmami first reasons
inductively
from the probabilities of the case, in favor of
the actual existence
ot material
things outside of the mind, and then infers the
reality
of Space and Time, because
they are necessary conditions of such
existence.
Against the supposition of the [dealist, that the
fashions for itself a dream-world out of
its own
imaginings, he
argues very plausibly, that our perceptions are often
entirely novel,
taking us by surprise, while the known creations of mere
fancy are
made up entirely from familiar elements that the
eyes must be
opened and the ears unstopped, before ,]
xlernal scene enters
!<>,)

whereas mere imagination

plays
silent places

its

freaks equally well in dark and

that fancy acts

only in accordance with the laws of
the association of ideas, while
impressions on the senses often
startle us by their suddenness and
seeming want of conformity to
law
that the different senses,
through their simultaneous tes
timony to the same object, as when we at once see,
touch,
;

taste,

smell

an apple, confirm each other; that

external things
operate not only upon our organs of sense, but
upon each other
according to perfectly definite laws, though there is no reason
why
should attribute to them
mere^fancy
any such uniformity of action*;
that imagined
perceptions can by the conscious Will be called

up!
continued, and repeated at
pleasure, while those which present
themselves as actual are
entirely independent of the Will; and
finally, that every Ego perceives a multitude of other bodies re

sembling his own, each seemingly animated by a mind like his

own, each having a similar experience with himself of the vicissi
tudes of life, and
the same
making
as to the
essentially

report

evidence of their senses and their consciousness

respecting the
outer and the inner world.
Induction from such facts as these
leaves an
overwhelming weight of probability in favor of the be
lief that I
live, not in a dream-world built
out of
own

up

my

HARTMANNS METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

own existence.
fancies, but in one as real as
of sense are not created by me, but are forced

my

The

461

perceptions

upon me from the

outer world, and are plainly distinguishable from the creatures of
Then
my imagination, which can be summoned up at pleasure.
uni
external
the
them
without
for
also
are
Time and Space
real,
The vulgar are right, and the would-be phil
verse could not be.
themselves with the fancy of a fan
osophical Idealists, who cheat
cied world, are wrong.
And yet, Kant is right in maintaining that Space (not Time) is
not directly perceived either by sight or touch, but that it is, to
consciousness at least, a subjective and a priori Form of sense.
It is
It is, however, a creation of mind anterior to consciousness.
the local
the Unconscious out of what Lotze calls
constructed
"

by

indications by
{. c., the various external circumstances and
signs,"
skin at one
the
with
contact
to
enabled
we
are
which
distinguish
do not directly see even
We
it at another.
with
from
contact
spot,
on the retina of the eye, as that would require
the image

painted
another eye, back of the external one, in
not directly cognizant even of one spot on
But because the
as distinct from another.
ant on being touched here rather than

order to see

it

we

are

the surface of the brain,

other sensations attend
there

are dissimilar, the

in
mind, in its preconscious stage, infers a difference of locality
Therefore the aid
order to account for the difference of feeling.
of the Unconscious is necessary before we can, out of our sensa
Just so,
external things.
tions, construct images or perceptions of
the formation of a single image from binocular vision is nothing
else than an unconscious inference.
that is, an
have, then, what Ilartmann calls a "real"
universe spread out belore us in Space,
actually phenomenal
the events or changes
peopled with innumerable beings and things,
in
it taking place according to physical laws, in Time
occurring
and the question almost forces itself upon us, What is it, and to
is it here? and why thus, rather than other
what end?

We

Why

is its real inmost being and essence under all these

?
And what is its significance, or for what Pur
forms
phenomenal
As we have already seen, there is not one
it exist?
does
pose
however minute and
in
it, animal or vegetable,
living organism
is not, in all its parts, formed, controlled, and di
which
lowly,
and all these organisms, all
rected by an intelligent Final Cause

wise?

What

and universality of
beings and events, through the uniformity
Law, are closely bound together into one whole, each operating
and affected
Then, what are the essence and
every other.
apon

by

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
the ultimate
leading Purpose of the universe as a whole ?
This
is the
question which Philosophy has to
answer, and which she
cannot blink without
abdicating her office, and fallino- back into a
state of shameless indolence and
iucuriousness.
Hartmann s answer is at least frank and
The uni
explicit.
verse, he says, is a mere- Form or manifestation
of
the Uncon"

us,

wind,

has assumed in order to rid

it

itself of the burden of

enible existence, by
cheating itself into nothingness.
This is
best answer,
perhaps the only one, which an atheist and -i
1 essim st can arrive
at, for it is a reductio ad absurdnm of
the
principles that he started with.

have

tt e

to consider in what
sense, and by what means
plurality of phenomenal being is reduced
by Hartmann to the
t
the Unconscious.
can he be a decide,! Monist in
spite of the elaborate argument which he has
just constructed in
favor of the "real" existence in
Space, outside of our minds, of
the countless material
things which constitute the outer world?
answer is, that the universe is
of
first

How

our thought

independent

independent even

human thought. It is not a

subjective
the percipient
Ego of consciousness, not a dream-world
arbitrarily fashioned
our
own
vain
by
but it is an
imaginings
of all

objective manifestation of the

Unconscious, which would continue

even if there were no
eye to behold it, and no
thought in winch it could be reflected.
The unity of the Unconis is not
destroyed by the countless
multiplication of its phe
nomenal aspects, any more than the sun in
the heavens ceases to
ue, because its image is mirrored in
"real,"

innumerable pools and

right in maintaining that the multiplicity of
ndividual being is as broad and true as the
reality of existence itbut his mistake consists in
to
the
Herbart

is

failing

nomenal character of

recogni/e

strictly

reality and all existence.

Subjective
lealism had a
just presentiment that reality is
only phenomenal
t
distorted and defaced this
thought, because it
all

recognized
a subjective
phenomenality, whereby plurality was degraded
a
In its essence and inmost
merely personal illusion.
nature,
universe is only an
objective manifestation of one omnipresent
t and Will
but it is a
real
presentation to
thought

>nly

:>

"

my

:s

brook

is

myriad forms, just as the image of the sun reflected in a

a
real
image and it will continue to be thus mani
"

"

fested after

my mind

shall cease to be.

Then, what are Matter and Space per se, in their inmost
being,
from the phenomenal
aspects under which they are man!-

HARTMANN

463

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

consists only
Schopenhauer says, Matter
and
Causality pre
of the purely subjective forms of Time, Space,
and
sented to Sense by the universal Will as visible and tangible

tested to consciousness?

therefore

is

it

Presentation to thought, a
Hartmann says, Matter is the Will and Intellect

mere

Vorstellung, a

mental picture.
call
of the Unconscious, made objective in what the physicists
a
of
mind,
spiritualistic
which is only a manifestation
Force,"
Matter in
Hence, like* Berkeley, he does not idealize
principle.
Force is
it unreal, but only spiritualizes it.
the sense of
"

making

is
the highest or absolute meaning of that term ; for it
Intellect in action, and therefore it would continue
Will
and
only
human
both to be and to appear, though there were no brain, no

real in

It was thus displayed and

consciousness, to witness its activity.
in material forms, as we learn from geology, before any

objectified

animal life appeared upon the earth.

Matter as Will and Intellect," Hartmann
In the chapter on
concise statement of the Atomic Theory,
and
an
elegant
present
is now accepted by most physicists and
it
in
which
form
in the
"

the "atom" thus conceived

chemists, Mid argues conclusively, that
is the seat of force, the as
which
is merely a mathematical point,
material substratum of this force being
and
inert
an
of
sumption
The conclusion at
an arbitrary and really unmeaning hypothesis.
doctrine
the
with
propounded, as
arrives
which ha
agrees perfectly
Hartmann presents his
far back as 1758, by Father Boscovich.
of
conrlusiMx in these words: "Matter is therefore a system
From these atomic
atomic fct^:.- in a certain state of equilibrium.
and reactions, arise all the soforces, in thcu- various combinations
called forces ot matter, such as gravitation, expansibility, crystal
The lines of action of all the
etc.
lization, chemical
affinity,

the
forces cut each other in a mathematical point, which we call
The doctrine of Bosco
seat, of force, and this seat is movable."
that "the ultimate
vich, as summed up by Dugald Stewart, is,
unextended
are
atoms, or,
is
Matter
which
elements of
composed,
endued with certain powers
mathematical
in other

words,

of attraction

points,

and repulsion

and

it

is

from these powers that

all

The effects, for

the physical appearances of the universe arise.
to actual contact, are all
example, which are vulgarly ascribed
of space where
repulsive forces, occupying those parts
produced by

bodies are perceived by our senses."

The attractive force of each atom,
nite

another atom nearer;

it

Hartmann

defi
argues, has a

produced by it of bringing
must, therefore, be conceived as a striving

end and aim, before the result

is

464

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

or effort, and the actual

approximation of the two atoms to each
other, an approximation not yet effected, as the
purpo.se of this
effort.
Jn so tar as the effect is
already produced, the striving has
come to an end, and no longer exists;
only so far as the movement

remains as yet unrealized, is

any effort to reali/e it possible.
Hence, the movement, which is a deiinite one of
approach with in

still

creasing velocity,
before it exists

mu>t

exist in idea, us the

purpose of an

as a result
accomplished

raz%,

intellect,

otherwise, it
aimless effort, without
any deiinite object, which is
Then the movement cannot be
contrary to experience.
produced,

Unu1

1)r

""

as

Schopenhauer supposes, by a mere blind Will or force

acting
vaguely, without reference to any particular result; but this Wifl
niiiM
be accompanied and directed
by Intellect, by which it is
pointed, so to speak, to a preconceived and determinate end.
Con
sequently, the atomic force, like every other action of the Unconscious,musl be viewed as the joint expression of Will and Intellect
acting together in inseparable union.
Jla\ ing found what .Matter
i*,j>rr

manifestation,

per

sc.

we have next

in^which

that

tin-

what

is

!<!,((

all

of

Matter

Space

in

sc,

to consider

exists.

the

apart from its phenomenal

what the Space is, as beino-

Ilartmann has already

human mind

proved"

constructed by the
Unconscious out of "local signs," in Mich wise as to
appear a priori
to consciousness.
But what is the external and
objective manifes
tation, to which this idea
This also, wo tire told, is
corresponds ?
a creation of the L ncons.-ious, which builds
both the
is

up

called the

"reality"

of pure Space.

If

it

is

idea, and
mere Pres
which first

entation to thought
(Vorstelhmg), or mental picture,
brings ideal Space before the mind, then the Space exists
ideally
in the
Presentation, and this proves that the Presentation itself
does not exist in the ideal Spare.
Jn other words, mental or

cog
wholly independent of Space; and it is ab
particular locality, the presence chamber, of
the intellect in the brain.
Mind is wherever it acts ; that is, it is
ubiquitous to the whole nervous organism.
The unconscious Will
is that which realizes ideal
Space, by adding to it "reality," or ob
jective manifestation, which mere thought cannot
give. Then, what
nitive action, as such,
surd to ask after the

we

call

quent

to

"

real

is

"

Space, as a creation of the Will, must be subse

it, and therefore the Will, as
such,

that which creates

exists out of Space, whether the

Space be considered as a mere
Presentation to thought, or as a
reality.
Hence, both Intellect
and AVill are unspacial in their
very nature, since the former cre
ates Space in idea, and the latter creates it in
"

reality."

It

fol-

HAKTMANN S METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

465

lows, therefore, that even the atomic Will, or

force, exists outside of
it is

ing says,

what we call atomic

Space and independent of it; for as Schell-

prior to extension.
outside of Time; for as

It also exists

teristic of

doubts,

it

memory,

since

therefore

we have

the action of the Unconscious, that

needs no time for consideration, and

it is charac
never wavers or

seen,

it

independent of

it is

acts unerringly as well before as after

experience;
does not, like conscious reason, proceed by

it

it

comparison

and inference, but

grasps the result instantaneously, through its

infinite power of Hettsehcn or
clairvoyance, the conclusion being
instinctively apprehended at once, not after the premises, nor
through them, but in them, the whole logical process being com
The thought of the
pleted by one act and in a single moment.
and though it is
Unconscious, therefore, has no duration in Time
manifested only at a particular epoch, when an
it

emergency

and therefore

at a definite date,

date, so far as

we know,

phenomena, but not of

we must remember

is the
manifestation in the world of
action per se ; nay, the very act of its

only of
its

arises,

that this

its

manifestation through some phenomenal

change is that which first
establishes a difference between one moment and another, that
is,

which

first

being.

change on

Time as a phenomenon, though not as absolute

imagine a universe at perfect rest, manifesting no
surface, no movement either of sun or star, even con

creates

Try

to

its

sciousness lapsing into quiescence, and therefore

ceasing to be, be
cause not cognizant of any variation of its state.
In such a uni
verse, as in dreamless sleep,

years

sion at least, if not occupied

is a mere blank, is

The realm of
World of Kant,
trine of

one hour would be as a thousand

Time would not even appear

our apprehen

to be, since, to

by events or conscious thoughts, Time

nothingness.
the Unconscious, therefore, like the
Intelligible
exists outside of Space and Time
and the doc
;

Monism, the

essential

Oneness of

all

things, follows as a

necessary inference.
Space collapses into a mathematical point;
Time shrinks into the indivisible present moment and One becomes
;

identical with

All.

The Unconscious

creates both of these

phe
nomenal Forms, and thereby individualizes the objects and events
which are manifested in them. Moreover, as we have
just seen,
the objects themselves, as
they all consist of Matter in its various
forms, whether organic or inorganic, from a clod of earth up to
man, are also creations of the one omnipresent Will and Intellect
so that the universe is the mere
expression of its action and its
nature.
Before we can fully understand the motive which led to
;

30

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

466

the formation of the universe and

determined

its

character,

we

must consider Hartmarm s theory of the origin of Consciousness,

and its dependence upon molecular action in the brain.
That the cerebral hemispheres are to a certain extent the organ
of some of our mental faculties, or that through which they act, is
what no spiritualist thinks of denying; since he might as well deny
that the eye and ear, together with the portions of the brain spe
cially connected therewith, are the organs of visual and audible sen
The language of Hartmann, that the brain, and the gan
sation.
which perform in part certain functions of the brain, are the
conditions of animal consciousness, even seems, if taken literally, to

glia

go hardly as far as this since it amounts only to saying, that con

scious mental action is so far dejiendi iif upon the state of certain
that it cannot be manifested ex
portions of the nervous organism,
;

Of course not we all know perfectly

cept through their agency.
and that
well, that when the brains are out, the man will die
the
of
the
disturbance
or
other
lesion
is
serious
brain,
there
when
;

But Materialism pure and

often becomes unconscious.
that molecular
simple identifies the two kinds of action it declares
is sensation and
in
the
cerebral
or
hemispheres
change
agitation

patient

phenomena being merely two aspects

thought, the two

the same thing.

object

to

blank hypothesis without any evidence in

meaningless
syllogism.

it

is

of one

merely that it
favor, but that

this doctrine, not

its

and
is

it is

equivalent to saying that a dance of atoms is a

is prevented from accepting this absurd doc

Hartmann

because the very essence of his theory is, that Will and In
Unconscious first create the brain at a comparatively
Without the previous indepen
late stage of their manifestation.
dent action of Mind, not even space, time, or matter would have
trine,

tellect in the

been manifested

there would not have been any brain.

Hence,

forced to adopt the conclusion, which had been pre

viously enounced by Schelling, that the brain is the condition, or
not of mind as such, but of
for the

Hartmann

is

origin,
necessary prerequisite,
Mind acts independently in the Unconscious but
Consciousness.
it
cannot become cognizant of itself, and therefore cannot be
till it has deluded the
emancipated from its servitude to the Will,
;

Will into building up a brain.

fixed
Consciousness, says Hartmann, is not a continuous and
but a process; it is an action frequently repeated, a con

atate,

have seen,
becoming conscious. Will and Intellect, as we
are inseparably united in the Unconscious, which cannot have a
determinate volition without knowing what it wills, nor a definite
stant

HARTMANN

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

467

conception or presentation to thought without instantly realizing it

by an exertion of Will. Now the essence of Consciousness
consists in breaking up this companionship, in sundering the union
in act

faculties, by forcing upon the mind a novel perception

not a purpose of its own volition, and therefore exists in
Consciousness is the stupefaction of the
opposition to the Will.

of the

two

which

is

upon its domain, this presence of an

visitant.
Because a brain has been
and
unwelcome
unexpected
constructed, an impression upon it from the world without, in spite
The Un
of the opposition of the Will, has become possible.
conscious has objectively manifested itself by conjuring up an ex
ternal universe for the very purpose of thus severing the union
between the Intellect and the Will, and thus releasing the former
from the misery entailed upon it through its hitherto indivisible
connection with blind and unreasoning volition, that is, from an
It looks
incessant striving and effort which is constant suffering.
forward to a state of unbroken calm, to quiet contemplation and
To this end
rest unbroken by the feverous agitations of desire.
it lias created space, and peopled it with countless living organisms,
rising by imperceptible gradations from the lowest forms of vege
table life up to animal existence, and so on still upwards to man,
in whose perfected brain pure conscious thought first becomes pos
Will at

this violent intrusion

without any intermingling of volition or desire.

The devel
of Consciousness, and, through that, the severance of Intel
lect from AVill, is the guiding purpose of creation.
Through
Space and Time as principia individuationis, separate individual
before
existences, as objective phenomena, first become possible
sible

opment

thc^e

Forms were

Through

evolved, All was One, as it is still in essence.

the independent action and reaction of these separate ex

istences on each other, the human brain is affected with the mo

lecular vibrations which force conscious sensation and perception

The action thus rendered necessary is invol

upon the intellect.
untary and distasteful, since it takes place without the concur
rence of the individual Will.

Hence Consciousness

is

born in pain,

It
being attended with aversion and suffering.
a bitter medicine, but without it no recovery
says Ilartmann,

every act of

it

"

is,

is

possible; and as it is swallowed at every moment in infinitesimal

doses, its bitterness soon escapes perception."
Some indications of a theory similar to this respecting the origin
of Consciousness may be gleaned from earlier writers, especially
from some of the mystics.
Thus Jacob Bohme says,
nothing
"

5an

become revealed

to

itself

without opposition or contrariety.

MODKHN PHILOSOPHY.

4(38

For it there is nothing which

ment ijoes on unchecked, and
Hut,

reflection.

which
tive

the

it

if

it, the; process of its

develop
not thrown back upon itself in

resists
it is

does not come hack upon

And

condition."
Ab-i>lute

i-

to

in

like

itself,

as to that

from

knows nothing of its primi

manner Schelling argues, that

originally went forth, then

il

it

"if

become manifest

to itself, then, in

respect to

its

must appear as dependent upon .something else, upon

This dependence, however, is not of
something foreign to it.-elf.
hr ssence of the Ab-oltite, but belongs merely to its manifesta
Hence he concludes, that "not the mental states them
tion."
selves, but the Consciousness of them, is conditioned by an affec
and if the empiricists had restricted their
tion of the org.ini.-m
as-eitiou 10 the latter point, there would be nothing to object to
objective,

it

<

their doctrine.

We

come now

to

the great question

Have we

rality or Individualism.

between Monism and Plu

sulTicient evidence that the

Un-

which works in any one living organism, say. in my own

body and mind, is one and the saint; with that which similarly
and governs every manifestation of life around me, and
which is, in fact, omnipresent in nature, creating and controlling
coiiM ious

alfect>

all

objects and

llartmann

events

in

order to carry out a single purpose?

If
Mill leaves a doubt whether he has

argument here

because the question lies within the

proved his point, it
of pure metaphysics, and his method, which is that of in
duction as applied in the physical sciences, appears not only insuf
lie
ficient, but inapplicable to the conditions of the problem.
sanctions and adopts, it is true, the usual metaphysical reasoning
of the Philosophers of the Ab>olute. especially that founded upon
the merely phenomenal character of Space and Time, and the con
sequent unreality of all distinctions of individual being. But he en
deavors to supplement and fortify this argument by considerations
drawn from the various brandies of physiology and natural history.
lie relies, in the first place, upon the axiom denominated Oc
fully

i>

domain

s razor, e.ntia non muUiplicanda sunt prceter nccessitatcm, ulti

mate principles are not to be multiplied more than is absolutely

cam

one principle of the Unconscious, for instance, is

account for all those operations and pro
cesses in my own organism which do not come within the purview
)( Consciousness, the burden of proof falls upon him who maintains
that there are many such principles, coordinate with each other,
ind all working harmoniously towards one and the same end.

necessary.

enough

If

satisfactorily to

The unity of the Unconscious

in this case

is

also farther indicated

IIARTMANN

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

409

by the unity of the organism within which it acts, by the conti

nuity of its action, by the singleness of purpose or final cause
which seems to be the object of its endeavor, and by the manner
in which all the parts tire made to
cooperate with each other and
with the whole.
Moreover, as we have seen, matter and con
sciousness themselves are only phenomenal forms of the Uncon
and therefore the unity of this principle in any individual
scious
;

organism

anywhere
I

is

in

the strongest expression of unity which can be found

nature.

the consciousness of Peter

Jut

that of Paul

and

is

phenomenally

distinct

from

certainly conceivable that the Unconscious

also, which directs the life of one, is not identical with the corre
;

it is

sponding principle manifested

Ilartmann

in the other.

argument

favor of the essential unity of this principle is perfectly con

clusive
it coincides in
every respect with the ordinarv argument
in

of the theist to prove the unity of

sons as a Pantheist or Monist, only

One
fest.

God.

It is

when he

only when he rea

strives to identify the

with the All. that the weakness of his theory becomes mani
It is only in reference to this latter portion of the doctrine,

that he finds himself reduced to the necessity of maintaining, that

our idea of the distinction between unity and plurality, after all, is

What we usually call an Individual, whether it

merely relative.
be a stone, a living organism, a community, or a universe, is not

No
absolutely one, for it confessedly has a multiplicity of parts.
one denies a sort of unity in creation in a certain sense, a creator
or artist is one with his work, for this is the expression at once of
;

It is
thought, his character, his endowments, and his skill.
said of a great artist, that he puts himself into his work.
IJut this is not absolute oneness, of which, as it seems to me, we
have a perfect tvne in the absolute indivisibility of the thinking
O

his

commonly

Self, which is a pure Monad, so that in respect to it the distinction

between whole and part is meaningless. I know, for I have the
direct testimony of consciousness, that the being which I call My
self is an absolute unit
that I am one in all my acts, in my re
sponsibility, in the remembered past and the perceived present
that it is not one portion of me which feels, another which imag
ines, and a third which wills, but that these are only various modes
of action of one agency.
I also know, that my remembered self is
one and the same with my present self; otherwise, no assertion of
memory could be trusted, no imputation of wrong-doing could be
chain of reasoning depending upon the remembrance
justified, no
of its several steps could be relied upon.
Hence, no process of in;

470

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ference, however ingenious, can shake this

knowledge for as it
does not rest upon argument, but upon direct
intuition, the reason
;

ing which would refute

it

stultifies

itself.

One who

is

conscious

of having committed a great crime

many years ago cannot reason
himself into a conviction that he is now a different
being from ihe

one who incurred the guilt; the stings of remorse

prove that he is
one and the same with the perpetrator.
When it is urged that we
cannot describe Self, or give
any deiinition of personality, except
by enumerating its attributes and successive states, the answer is,
that in this respect it is in the
of consciousness, which, as

id<Ms

same category with all the simple

John Locke told us long ago, can

not be defined

because; they do not admit either of analysis or de

Hence, they cannot be communicated to another person
except by giving him an opportunity of obtaining them for himself.
I cannot teach a
congenially blind person what the color blue is;
and even i; the learner has eyes,
can instruct him only by show
scription.

ing him a blue object, and taking for granted, what is by no means
sure, and never can be rendered sure, that it makes the same imIf the
pression upon his organs of vision that it does upon mine.
spontaneous action of his intellect had not previously evoked in the
child s mind the idea or
perception which is called
myself," no
possjMr instruction, no principle of imitation, no conceivable com

bination of a sign with the thing signified, could teach him how to
correctly, any more than one blind from birth
could learn what
blue
means.

use the word

"1"

Monism is .shivered upon this rock, that it is compelled to deny

the separate individual being of the Ego, and
thereby to contradict
the immediate testimony of consciousness.
have here an in

We

dubitable case of absolute unity, like that of a mathematical

point;
and a doctrine of Alleinheit, which seeks to establish
merely a
relative unity, like that of a hive of bees, or even of the several
parts, or physiological units, of a
organism, does not amount
living

much.

llartmann fails to perceive that the position of Des

cartes, afterwards adopted by Eichte, is
All
really impregnable.
Iiis
reasoning upon the subject, ingenious as it is, is actually con
futed in three words: Coytto, scilicet sum.
Though the word
Individual"
properly signifies indivisible, and is therefore strictly
applicable only to an absolute unit, the Philosophy of the Uncon
scious assumes that there is a
hierarchy of "Individuals," every
one of which, except the lowest, is a unit
to all which
to

"

relatively

above it, though it is an organized community of those which

ire next below it in the scale.

art

HART MANN

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

471

Hartmann teaches
theory of Virchow,
constituted
community of al
that a livin^ organism is a skilfully
has an independent
which
of
one
most countless living cells, every
of all the different
life and definite functions, the cooperation
of the
to
keep up the economy
classes of them being necessary
of a higher order, which they
Individual
an
a
whole,
as
organism
Billions of such cells circulate in the blood
Adontin"-

the

cellular

collectively constitute.
various and independent
of every grown-up man, and all have their
bees which keep up the collec
offices to perform, like the working
Still farther
any one of these cell:
tive life of the hive.
the
as
cell-wall, the matter con
such
and
distinct parts
organs,
and each of these
nucleolus
the
tained therein, the nucleus, and
is necessary
which
of
the
performance
has its special functions,
Here again,
its work.
order that the collective whole may do
constituted
by an asso
Individual
organism
therefore, we have an
hinders us
And
order.
lower
nothing
a
of
Individuals
of
ciation
;

when

the

from going still lower, guided by the light of analogy

from considering each of these cellpower of the microscope fails,
atoms
little state, made up of primitive
or
a
as
community,
organs
its special
of
one
which, through
or Leibnitzian Monads, every
or particular place in the system,
nature, stage of development,
for its office.
contributes its part to qualify the cell-organ
the Individual of con
of
relation
the
consider
to
have next
to the external and material Indi
the
or
unit,
spiritual
sciousness,
Here again, according to Hartmann, we
vidual in which it acts.
of the cerebral
relative
of
units, the consciousness
a
have
hierarchy
therefore
the
in
one
system, and
hemispheres being the dominant
in each of the
consciousness
the
separate
controlling and regulating

We

in

some

nervous centres, although itself dependent

ganglia or lower
a similar relation
measure on the cooperation of its ministers. And
of each ganglion and
consciousness
the
between
exist
to
is asserted
the formation of that
that of every separate cell which enters into
than this HartLower
its
work.
for
it
ganglion and capacitates
maim does not go in search of the phenomenal unit of mind ; for,
a certain degree of
as we have seen, molecular disturbance of
of con
is a necessary condition of the origin
or
vivacity
strength
brain
and
nerves
the
passing
sciousness, faint impressions upon
no
In any organism lower than the cell, he finds
without notice.
rise to consciousness.
trace of action energetic enough to give
action of
Each Individual consciousness is constituted by the joint
is itself controlled
those next below it in the scale; and, in turn,
enters as an unHid inspired by that which is above it, and which

472

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

conscious factor into

every individual

man

its

work.

Then

in the universe

the brain-consciousness of

he regarded either as a
clement, or as an objective
manifestation, of the uni
versal and all-pervading Unconscious; if it be the
former, we have
only a relative unity; it it be the latter, then the doctrine is an
Either form of the
unproved hypothesis.
theory contradicts our
immediate intuition of the
independent unity of human conscious

may

constitutive

ness,

and

rests

upon a supposition, which

is entirely devoid of evi

a separate consciousness in
every ganglion, and
even in every cell, of the human
organism.

dence, that then-

is

llartmami would have us believe, that consciousness docs not

to the essence, but
only to the phenomenal form or mani
festation, of individual
I maintain, on
the contrary, that
being.

belong

self-consciousness
directly

is

the

only strictly indivisible being

know, the

supposition

primitive atom (Uratome)

invented to explain the

being

that

we

merely

phenomena, and either the

Cod of the theist, or -the Unconscious" of our

author, being re
vealed to us not
immediately, but by inspiration or inference.
He
says, that the undivided ant or polyp has one consciousness, but

when cut apart, that it has two; and that this is

true, also, of
parent and offering before and after their physical connection
with each other is severed
and also that the halves of two differ
ent polyps, each of which has a consciousness of its
when
:

own,
brought together and united, form but one animal and one con
sciousness.
I answer, it is an
unproved and improbable hypothe
sis that the ant,
polyp, or offspring still in (/rcmio matris, lias any

consciousness at

all.

He

scious being one and the

argues, that the doctrine of the

same

Uncon

in all

things explains all that is

marvellous and otherwise inscrutable in the
phenomenon of JMlsehcn or clnin-uyance ; since on this
theory, the seer is identical
with the seen.
The obvious reply s that the phenomena are also
perfectly explicable on the doctrine of the theist, that there is an
i

Intellect and Will which is

omnipresent, but not identified with
Vhe universe; for the
inspiration of the Almighty, which first en
dowed man with understanding, can also
the vision and
give him
the faculty divine."
I need not dwell on the remainder of the
discussion, since it tends to show, at the utmost, as in this last in
"

stance, that the essential unity of all

things is a possible, but not
that it is a probable,
hypothesis.
In the popular
sayings, which are also maxims of science, that
^
Nature does nothing in vain, but
always acts for the best, invari
ably adopting the simplest means of effecting its purpose, Hart-

HARTMANN

473

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

finds proof of the Leibnitzian doctrine, which he implicitly

universe, being a manifesta
adopts, that this is the best possible
tion of the infinite wisdom and power of its author, governor, and

maim

In truth, little more is needed than a recapitula

constant guide.
tion of what has been already proved in order fully to establish
As every action of what we call force is the
this conclusion.
made
of
Will, which would not be Will if it were not
expression
determinate by a definite content, or aim, every act of the Uncon
And this must be the best
scious must have a special purpose.
for the
it is dictated by an allwise intelligence ;
since
purpose,
or doubts, but hav
omnipresent Intellect never blunders, wavers,
without requiring the aid of mem
ing all the data at its command
and
the right conclusion from them
ory, instantaneously grasps
the
select
must
it
infinite
its
prevision (Hellsehen)
by virtue of
means of attaining them.
ends and the best
best
;

possible

possible

and whenever or wherever need exists, it

All this is seen in the
the fittest moment.

Its action is incessant,

always intervenes at
nature in its first building up
healing and recuperative agency of
and excellences, and
contrivances
countless
the organism with its
then preserving it through perpetually repairing the waste of old
and
material
by its keeping up the species through propagation,
;

survival of the fittest."

"the
constantly ennobling it through
These incessant interventions of an allwise Providence are even
"

natural; that is, they are not arbitrary, but conformable to law;
for they are determined by a logical necessity, and therefore must
be always adapted to the infinitely varied relations and needs of
the
moment, and to the ultimate purpose for which all
present

In truth, our contemplations of organic life only

confirm the lofty affirmation of Christian theology, that the gov
ernment of God is not merely a general direction of earthly affairs
as a whole, but its immeasurable perfection and minuteness are
"

things

exist."

marvellously

revealed in

Providence

omnipresent and equally

is

the greatest,

just

this

respect,

that

efficient in

his controlling
the least, as in

events."

The wisdom of the Unconscious is all

when it economizes force, and avoids a

the

more

to

be praised

constantly recurring ne
in
some
of
labor, through
ingenious contrivance, whereby
cessity
each case the end is sure to be obtained in the fittest possible

manner.

The most comprehensive and important

of all such

con

But
the entire system of physical and chemical laws.
as the very nature of mechanism confines it to a class of homoge
neous cases, while in fact many cases are peculiar in some respects,
trivances

is

474

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

these contrivances, however admirable, can never do

away with
the necessity of frequent immediate intervention
by the Uncon
scious.
As soon as the expenditure of force in the creation of a

mechanism would be greater than the economy of force effected

by it. which is the case generally with complex combinations of
circumstances, recourse must be had to what is called a special
Providence.
Of this nature are all inspirations to individual
human minds whereby the course of history is
permanently
aliened, and the tide of culture and
progress is turned towards

the end which the Unconscious

always had in view.
thought
suddenly occurring at the right moment to a Cromwell or a
Napoleon, a Luther or a Loyola, may alter the whole aspect of
human affairs in the civilized world.

In view of such considerations as these, we cannot avoid attrib

uting to the Unconscious the divine qualities of omniscience, omni
presence throughout all time, and absolute wisdom.
Then we
must adopt the doctrine of Leibnitx. and believe that, at the
begin
ning of all things, all possible universes were present in idea to
the divine Intellect, and that this universe was made actual
merely
because it is the best possible out of the whole number.

Being

incapable of error, the Unconscious cannot have been deceived in

its estimate of the
comparative value of this world and being
omnipresent and incessantly active throughout all time, there could
uot have been any pause or omission in its
government, whereby
the world could have deteriorated from its
state.
These
;

pristine

are the conclusions, be it observed, of an avowed materialist and

atheist, who linds himself driven to them
by inductive reasoning

from observed

facts.

He

refuses to admit, however, the remainder of the doctrine of

Leibnitx, that evil is merely of a privative character, since it is not
the entire absence, but
only a diminution, of conceivable good.

Designating an unmixed good as A, and an evil as a, Ilartmann

argues, that any reasonable person would desire to possess
alone,
rather than
But he is wrong, for by supposition, a is not
-f-

unmixed
f

he

evil,

evil

and

if

while the evil

of this good, then

the

amount

of

in

good

it

predominates over

also a necessary condition of the existence

alone. It is an evil to
-f a is preferable to
is

have a broken finger; but this is no sufficient reason for

ampu
tating it, since even in its present state, with the chance that the
bone may be reunited, it is better than no finger at all.
The doc
trine of Leibnitz

Compensation

merely affirms that there

and

this is true, if

we

is

no

evil

without some

take a sufficiently broad view

HARTMAXN

is

METAPHYSICS OF THE

^CONSCIOUS.

475

a hand with three

if the finger be amputated,
Our view is
be condemned as an incumbrance.

Even

of eich ca=e.
fillers

not

to

a whole

broad only when we consider human

conclusion against Leibnitz,
before the Pessimist can establish his
of existence, and show that
results
the
take
to
he ou"-lit
abrogate
evil over good,
of
there ^is an absolute preponderance
for
take
we
if
granted the illogical assumption,
cannot do, even
and not holiness, is man
which he always makes, that happiness,
life as

sufficiently

highest interest.

that the principal doctrine

right in maintaining
for
although the universe
of Leibnitz leaves the matter short ;
it is
it may very well be that
best
the
is
which we live
possible,
be
would
at all, that is, nothingness,
still so bad that no universe
the best
;
a
even
is
saying
best
popular
Bad is the
preferable.
district may still be a detest
road between two towns in a rugged
"But

Ilartmaim

is

"

"

however, when thus enan immense improvement

Crafted upon
Schopenhauer,
union of the two doctrines
on the doctrine of the latter since the
inherent in the nature ot
is
exists
evil which

able one.

The philosophy

of Leibnitz,
is

that of

proves, that the only

or irremediable.
as "metaphysical
properly regarded
and an ab
contradiction
a
The supposition of its removal being
either upon the
no
it
of
imputation
brings
surdity, the existence
of the sowisdom or the goodness of the Creator. The presence

things,

and

"

is

the utmost
be even a necessary means of producing
would
its absence or removal
that
so
of
good,
possible amount
If the compensatory
in the plan of the universe.
positive defect
trom the only
harm
the
over
resulting
excess
rood is in considerable
it is obvious that the aggre
that
of
means
good,
creating
possible
have been it
will be greater than it would
gate beneficial result
himself points out lor
Ilartmann
been
all harm had
prohibited.
as manifested by i
admiration the wisdom of the Unconscious,
those
heart
impulses of pity, beneficence,
nlautiu" in the human
which count
and retributive

called evil

may

justice,
gratitude, distributive fairness,
that is necessary t
eract the feeling of egoism or selfishness
result
Here, surely, the net
preservation of individual well-being.
had
been
have
possible,
obtained is greater than would
of
!

good

islmess been altogether eliminated.

After what has been said, we

may

dismiss

unnoticed

the miseries of human

mann s long and gloomy disquisition upon
the existence of the
that
to
he
prove
attempts
life, whereby
burdensome interlude
verse is only an impertinent and
that a wel
of
realm
blissful
nothingness, and
"omparativel y

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
formed intellect would prefer not
whole inquiry, though important in

to

be.

Tie admits that the

bearings on the ultimate

principles of philosophy, is not of immediate influence on the sub
the Unconscious."
ject promised in the title of his work,
Most
of his argument is intended to
dissipate the illusions of the vulgar
mind in respect to the attainableness of
happiness either here or
hen-after, and thereby to induce the, educated and
thinking mind
to strive
only after such improvement of the intellect as will
correct

its

these

illusions, ;ind dispose mankind generally to

bring the world to an end by common consent.
But the whole
subject of Pessimism has been considered at sufficient length in
connection with the
philosophy of Schopenhauer, and I gladly
waive any further treatment of the dismal
topic.
healthy
mind, not constitutionally disposed to ^loom, and neither harassed

finally

by exceptional experience of the ills of life, nor corrupted by met

aphysical refinements, could not seriously entertain the theory for
a moment.

We

come now to the last question. What is the ultimate Pur

pose, the final end and aim, to which all minor and immediate aims
are subservient, for the creation of the world and for the
develop
ment of its affairs through its continuance in bein--? What motive
had the measureless wisdom of
ticular

manifestation of

itself,

"

the Unconscious" for this

par
it
was free to assume any

when

other mode of being, or to

Process" of dj.
carry out any other
This ultimate motive,
according to Ilartmann, cannot
be the promotion of justice and
morality, or the increase of virtue;
for he is a utilitarian, and holds that virtue is not an
end, but only
a means for the attainment of some worthier
Neither can
object.
it be
happine-s, for he thinks he has proved that this is not ob

velopment?

tained

at

any stage of the Process, hut only its opposite, misery,

being aggravated, too. as the development of history goes oil,
through the clearing up of illusions and the augmentation of con
sciousness.
.Neither can freedom be the aim of the Process,
for
I hold that freedom is
nothing positive, but only the absence of
compulsion and since the Unconscious is one and all, there is
nothing which could place it under constraint,"
Freedom, more
this

over, is a consciousness of the absence of necessity

and therefore
the increase of freedom is identical with the enhancement of con
sciousness.
And this is a sufficient indication of what is already
evident on other grounds, that we can
to ascertain the ulti
;

hope
mate purpose of creation only by
searching for it in that direc
tion where we behold a decided and constant
And
progress.

HARTMANN

477

METAPHYSICS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

for
be found in the development of consciousness
we witness continual advancement from the primitive
thence to the culmination
cell up to the dawn of animal life, and
Thus
man.
of
brain
the
Hegel says, "every
in
life
of such
in heaven and on earth, the life of God
takes
which
place
thing
that the
and all that is done in time, strives only to this end,
know itself, may become an object to itself, may rise

this

is

to

here alone

Spirit

may

from self-Involved
tion
to

and separate being; it is self-diremporder to be able to find itself and to come

to distinct

in

or duplication,

itself."

The ever-rising development of consciousness, therefore, marks

in which we are
the drift of the current, and shows the direction
ultimate
or
end
the
in itself,
purpose
hastening yet it cannot be,
For consciousness, as we have seen, is born in
of the journey.
and purchases by pain every step in its own
pain, lives in pain,
what has it in itself as a compensation for all
;

advancement.

And

Only a vain duplication

this suffering?

of self in a mirror

Was

it in
there not, then, already real misery enough, without doubling
infinite wisdom of
the
Since
?
consciousness
of
the mao-ic-lanteni
such increase of suf
the ruling Intellect must be opposed to any
unto itself, but its
end
an
is
be that consciousness
fering, it cannot
Every
as a means to some higher end.
serve
must
development
this is the most universal
lives strives after happiness
which
thing
it is the essence of the Will
of action that we know of
;

principle
itself

seeking

its

own

is

the only spring of activity,

because
illogical or irrational,

is

Mere

Will, however, though it

it is not merely
essentially blind

gratification.

it

does

not

reason at

all,

even

cravings in automatic

and acts out

devoid of
properly alogical, being entirely
nature distinct from
reason, just as the Intellect, being in its very
Consequently, this ill-matched
Will, cannot act, but simply knows.
cooperate ;
in the Unconscious, cannot
united
pair, indissolubly
Intellect
neither can help the other.
Vainly does the all-wise
since
the
in
is
Will
wrong,
entirely
perceive that the unreasoning
the
increases misery
its ceaseless craving for happiness merely
its own
cannot
and
impart
Will cannot heed its warnings,

wrongly.

It simply craves,

volitions.

Hence

it

its

is

alogical

As long as
but helpless companion.
capacity of action to its wise
each
neutralize
like a balky team, they
they are tied together,
miser
the
that
universe,
determines
Will
Blind
other s powers.
the result of the
able as it is, shall continue in being; for this is
and what the
how
determines
Intellect
Will.
persistent action of
but
up a
holding
not
through
indeed,
shall
universe
be,
directly

478

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

picture of the best possible state of the world as

something to be
striven for
and this ideal is
instantly realized by the Will."
Bad is the best, however and this the Intellect
;

knows

well.

If,

has recourse to an

artifice, therefore, in

order

full

to obtain

the utmost feasible

good.
Happiness is unattainable but freedom
pain, which is the nearest possible approximation to it,
may
be secured by a return to
Hence the Intellect forms
nothingness.
the conception of a universe in which the Will
shall be divided
against itself, through the indefinite
multiplication of individuals,
each striving
and the necessary
independently for ends of its own
result of such
independent action, as we have seen, is the emanci
pation of Intellect from the Will through the
development of
Consciousness.
This conception of a universe, of
course, is in
stantly reali/ed by the blind Will, which knows not that it is
;

from

thereby cheated into a contest with itself, that ideas will thus be
forced upon it which it has not willed, that
thought will thus be
severed from action, and that the finite
Intellect, thus made inde
pendent, will be gradually led, through the enhancement of con
sciousness and the increase of
knowledge, to will the annihilation
all
things, and thus to rid itself of the misery of existence.

of

As

can never be
separated from the Will in the Uncon
purpose of the universe is to effect this divorce
through the action of finite conscious minds and the advancement
of knowledge, which must
correct the illusions which
Intellect

scious, the ultimate

finally

up

the

vain

pursuit of happiness, and bring about by

consent the end of all
things.

keep

common

Schopenhauer

s
philosophy aims at the same result, but proaccomplish it by a different method, namely, by advising
the individual man to cease to will, and
thereby, through ascet

po.es

to

and the privation of nourishment, to cease to be.

Ilartmann justly objects, that this would be
only protracted and
painful suicide by starvation, and be no more efficient as a means
of bringing the world to an end than the death
of an individual in
cisrn. self-denial,

the ordinary course of nature.

Final deliverance from the
misery
of this world cannot be obtained
by an act of individual Will, as
this is
merely phenomenal, but only by universal consent, which
would be an expression of the universal Will that is both one
and
all.

And

this deliverance is not near at

hand, but must be
for as an
It can take place
object in the distant future.
only at the close of "the Process," at the termination of the

worked

struggle between Consciousness and the Will, when the

develop
ment of the former shall have reached its
climax, at the last day,

UNCONSCIOUS.
HARTMANN S METAPHYSICS OF THE

when the cravings

BhaTcease, and

of the Will
shall

"Time

shall

be no

479

be silenced, when activity

can do something,
for the advar

more."

We

laboring
indeed, to hasten this consummation, by

convince the whole human

knowledge, which will finally
Not by personal
of
spirit.
race that all is vanity and vexation
the conflict, therefore
from
withdrawal
nciln and cowardly
our burden, by affirming
as Schopenhauer teaches; but by bearing
and
sorrows,
by devoting our
the Will to live with all its pains
to the education of the
and
intellect
the
of
selves to the cultivation
haven o
the universe nearer to the

ment

of

ru

to bring
race, shall we help
"Bravely
rest to the blissful repose of nothingness.
as laborers
of
Process
development,
in the

great

vineyard

^ncl^his

For
is

it is

only this

onward, then,
the Masters

Process which can lead

It
the Gospel of Monistic Atheism!
must have utterance

to final

is

one long

when man

wail of despair, which always

and the universe without a
finds that he is without a Father,
effort to dwell upon the
and
It would be a waste of time
God.
in its confuta
offer
to
or
arguments
extravagance of the theory,
as an
entertained
believe that it is seriously
tion

for I cannot

sane student, or even by its

opinion influencing conduct, by any
corner-stone of
Descartes laid one permanent
author himself.
Kant estab
and
sum
;
modern metaphysics in his Cogito, scilicet
he pointed
when
of
Ethics,
Groundwork
lished another in his
Law
Moral
the
of
character
out the absolute and imperative
of these two
denial
an
arbitrary
Am- system which is based upon
be summarily put aside;
fundamental truths of consciousness may
as an ilk
of
curiosity, and
as a matter
it can merit notice only
fe capable.
mind
human
the
which
of
tration of the wild vagaries
Hartmann s work is found in
is really valuable in
that
all
Nearly
of the
contain the whole Philosophy
its first two Books, which
o
In these we have a storehouse
called.
so
Unconscious properly
and dovetaile
illustrated
curious and interesting facts, admirably
and profound in speculation
into system, and much that is original
of
is called "the Metaphysics
what
The third Book, containing
of
exercise
an
pervert*
the Unconscious," is for the most part
and contradictions.
it is a jumble of incongruities
ingenuity, for
realism
with
materialism
spiritualism,
It"is an
attempt to reconcile
the beb
with
atheism
with idealism, optimism with pessimism,
common sense.
a divine Providence, and monism with
student, as it evinces
attentive
will be of service to the
this
<

medley

a large acquaintance with

German

philosophy,

and great power

480

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

different systems to their briefest

possible expression,
pointing out their leading characteristics, and makiuo- nice dis
tinctions between them.
Even at his worst, HartmanAas three
considerable merits; he is learned, he is

reducing

its

ingenious, and he

dull.

is

never

INDEX.

ABSOLUTE, philosophy
of

planation

thought,

the,

of the, 328

329

cannot

ex
be

3-39.

ANTINOMIES of Kant, 233.

ARISTOTLE on the origin of knowledge,
10

on Universal, 132.

his proof of the being of God, 27:

on Innate Ideas, 28; neglects the idea
of Cause, 30; on continuous creation,

20

31; on the essence of matter and mind,

on
32; on the idea of the Infinite, 33
thought and the Ego, 35; different
;

works

of, 36.

EMPIRICISM refuted by Kant, 1G4.

ESSENCE of matter and mind, 32; nom
from

inal distinguished

real,

33

He

gel on the doctrine of, 384.

ETHICS, Kant

CATEGORIES, Kant on

the, 195, 202; ta

ble

life,

289.

si-cundurntsse. 32; Final. 274; Efficient,

;

232

Causa coynoscendi, four

Caits

sorts of,

csttndi, 293.

245; cf

FICIITE, philosophy
character of, 311,

of,

310

325;

and

life

Critique

of

Revelation by, 311; Wissenschaftslehre

of, 312; fundamental principle of, 313;
on the Ego, 310; builds on Descartes,
absolute Idealism of, 318; the
317
;

COMTE, philosophy of, 204.

CONCETTUALISM, meaning of, 129;

method
truth

of,

322; Ethics

320;
of,

other principles of,

324; on the Absolute,

330.

of, 135.

CONDILLAC, philosophy of, 155.

CONTINUITY, law of, 110, 112 Locke and
Grove on, 122.
CKITIQUE of Pure Reason analyzed, 170;
of Revelation, by Fichte, 311.
;

FINAL Cause, Positivism

mann on, 277, 434.

FREEDOM of the will

by

anticipated

Leibnitz,

123.

DESCARTES, biography and character of,

method and
22; not a skeptic, 23
;

starting-point of, 24; his Coffito, ergo

sum, 25, 34 ; on the veracity of God,

31

on, 274; Hart-

proved, 290.

of. 20
proof of the being
the idea of, in the soul of man,
the idea of, 49;
42, 48; three forms of
threefold root of the innate idea of, 52;

GOD, veracity
of,

DARWINISM

of,

Schopenhauer, 417

of

principle of, 287; in vegeta

CAUSE, distinguished from Substance,

30; secundum fieri distinguished from
278

Groundwork

425.

ble of the, 204.

CAUSALITY,

324;

Fichte,

27

revealed by the religious sentiment,

and by conscience, 53 defects of
;
s idea of, 54, 242
the

id.

metaphysician

Spinoza

definition

of.

Male-

INDEX.
branche on perception through ideas
79
Kant on the idea of, 238.

in,

and on the origin ot, 78; classification

of, by Leibnitz, 102; Kant on tran
scendental, 225

HAMILTON,

Sir

~\Y.,

borrowed

osophy from Pascal,

his

ill

87,

on the

limitations of human knowledge, 07

on Freewill, 297.
HAKTMANN on Final Cause, 277, 404;

and character

life

of

proofs

tin;

in-tinct,

437

nature,

440;

429; pessimism
433, 408; his

of,

Monism

475:

of, 4:il,

of,

Unconscious, 4 15; on
on the plastic power of
on Will and Intellect,
;

441; on language, 44- !; on niemorv,

448; materialism of, 441), 400; on the
emotions, 452;

454; on

aesthetics of,

mysticism, 450; on consciousness, 457,

400; on metaphysics, 459; on Space

and Time, 400; on the purpose of the
universe, 401, 470; on Matter, 402;
on the genesis of Space, 404 on in
;

dividualism, 471;
on the origin of

optimism

472:

of.

/./.

evil,

,-

refutes

Schopenhauer, 478; faults and merits

of, 479.

dantic

and character

dialect

359;

Ideali-m,

358;

of,

polar

357;

of,

pe
his absolute

logic

300;

of,

Phenom

conciliatory system of, 302;

(hi Spirit by, 304

resolves
into one, 305: on Absolute Being,

enology of
all

God with man,

identities

SCO;

compared with Locke, 371

ities

373

of.
;

logic

ill.;

of,

into

Dialectic of, 374

idea

summary

illustrated, 380;

ambiguities
of, 383

assumptions

of Essence, 384; on

INNATE IDEAS, Descartes

28,

38;

proved by the
instincts of brutes, 45; how they ex
ist in

the mind,

4(j

KANT, philosophy
acter of, 100

of God, 51.

life

of, 15G;

and char

opposes dogmatism, 163

and empiriei.-in, 104; on a priori ele
;

ments of knowledge, 167 on Sense and

Understanding, 108, 175 on analytical
;

and synthetical judgments, 170; tran

scendental aesthetics

of, 171; percep

analyzed by, 173; on Space, 176;
and Time, 177; on empirical reality,

tion

181

on transcendental ideality, 182; on

arithmetic, 180; on geometry, 187; on

the imagination, 193
on self-con

of,

382;

confutation

on the

Categories,
195, 202; revised theory of perception

197;

by,

rejects

215;

idealism, 198,

on the Ego of consciousness, 200,231;

on pure Physics, 209; on Schematism,
210; on the Schema of Causality, 217;
Transcendental Dialectic, 221; on

liis

233

result

baseless

on the doctrine

194

sciousness,

outward Nature,

of a

on the Infinite, 237; on the proof

God, 238, criticism

Groundwork

of

Ethics,

of,

245;

241; his

ou ab

solute good, 240, 255; on the Categori

cal

Imperative, 248; on necessity and

free will,

252; on immortality and a

God, 257; Schopenhauer

criticism of,

397; on aesthetic perception, 421.

KNOWLEDGE,
IDEALISM, Berkeley

Kant

on,

criteria or tests of, 43;

his

386; on Spirit, 388.

system

of, 237.

the Unconditioned, 224; on Transcen

dental Ideas, 225; on the Antinomies,

on the Idea of

illustrated, 370;

381;

INFINITY, Descartes on the idea of, 33;

of space, 94 of time, 95 Kant on the

all,

technical

develops one

Immanent

370;

Pure, Being, 377; his first trichotomy,

378;

office of, 193,

211.

life

Ili:i.i;i,,

of, 22i}.

genesis

IMAGINATION, Kant on the

phil

theory
of,

215;

148;
Fichte s

of,

318; insufficiency of, 319;

absolute, 359, 370; Schopen

origin

"Wordsworth,

totle on, 40

of,

38;

Plato,

and Keble on, 39; Aris

Manning

on, 41.

of,

Hegel s
hauer on, 394.

IDEAS, Malebranche on perception by, 77;

LANGUAGE, symbolic
conscious
LEIISNITZ,

in,

443.

on

the

use

of,

criteria

20; the

of

Un

innate

483

INDEX.

Primimi

statis
296; presupposes freedom, 304;
tical evidence on, 308.
NOMINALISM, meaning of, 128, 132; truth

on the Monad, 45; on the

ideas, 43;

47

Cognitum,

comprehen

sive genius of, 99; life of, 100; logic

and method of, 10 2 ; his optimism,

of,

134; extravagance

of,

139.

103, 474; origin of evil explained by,

475

105,
ble

OPTIMISM

on necessary and immuta

truths, 107;

scheme

of

writing by, 109; moiuidology of, 110,

114; three fundamental axioms of, 110;
on
harmony of, 115

PASCAL,

id.

conflicting

doctrines

reconciled by, 125.

study

of,

and character

of,

74; his doctrine of

73;

me

POLAK

on ideas, 131, 420.

on the ubiquity of

on the

intelligible

POSITIVISM explained and criticized,

259; two meanings of, 204; theology

the origin of knowledge,

of,

41.

MAXSEL

on conceiving creation, 98.

MATHEMATICS, Kant

s theory
185; an intuitive science, id.

MATTER deteriorates by

use, 14;

of,

logic of Ficlite, 321; of Schelling,

342; of Hegel, 3GO.

POPE, optimism of, derived from Leib
nitz, 104.

world,

85.

MANNING on

conscious. 429, 432.

the origin of knowledge, 39

on Cau
79; on Occasional Causes, 80
doctrine of, confirmed by
sation, 82
science, 83

the 17th century, 1

PLATO on

God, 84;

of

inevitable, 9; definition of,

of,

diate perception, 77; on the origin of

in God,
ideas, 78 ; on seeing all things

modern

reactions in the history of, 154,

259; of the Absolute, 328; of the Un

10

philosophy

refutes

on, 431.

PHILOSOPHY

life

the Conditioned, 93

122.
by, 11: on the law of Continuity,
of Hegel, 374.
of, 1C

MALEBKANCIIE,

of

man n

LOCKE, Essay on Human Understanding

LOGIC, definition

on the

human knowledge, 97.

PESSIMISM, Schopenhauer on, 413; argu
ments for, 414 fallacy of, 418 Hart-

theory compared with.

his

87

s,

of,

en
empiricism, 94 lesson of humility
forced by, 90; on the limitations of

123

and character

ophy

Law

development theory of,

ences, 120
121
anticipations of modern science

Darwin

life

ideas
Substance, 110; doctrine of latent
with
by, id.; reconciles mechanism
Teleology, 118; on the scale of exist

by,

by Pope,

89 the
grandeur and misery of man,
s philos
philosophy of, 90; Hamilton
borrowed from, 87, 91; on the

preestablislied

of Leibnitz versified

104; Ilartinann on, 431, 472.

universal

183,

205

essential

doctrine

of,

266

assumes that matter is indestructible,

209; assumes that memory is trust
of
worthy, 270 assumes the existence
;

reduced

has no ground for induction,

on Effi
272; denies Final Cause, 274

self,

271

to force, 149.

METAPHYSICAL

conception of

God de

fective. 54.
.1. S.,on conceiving infinite space,
94; OB determinism of the will, 305.

MILL,

MONADOLOGY of

Leibnitz explained, 110,

cient Causes, 278; incapacitates Phys

ical Science, 281; bad logic of, 283.
FREEST ABLISH ED HARMONY of Leib
nitz, 115.

PSYCHOLOGY,

definition of, 12.

114.

MOTIVATION,

action

of,

REALISM and Nominalism,

290, 293, 298.

127,

129

truth of, 133.

NECESSITY, Spinoza

Kant

on, 252

doctrine of, 70

Huxley and Spencer

on,

261; Schopenhauer on, 286; disproved,

SCHELLING, philosophy of, 327; on the

Absolute, 328; life and character of,

4S4

INDEX.

333; influence of, on physical science,

33G; intellectual intuition of, 338, 34-4;

TELEOLOGY

argues against Fichte, 340; the method

342; objective pantheism of, 345;

THOUGHT,

of,

limitation

of,

3."i

4.

of Kant, 210.

noi-KMiArKK on
on

171);

the

lation or ratio,

and

Space
of

principle

Time,

lu-asmi, 285; life and character of,

389; on the World as Presentation and

Will, 392; idealism

of, 31)4;

mu>ie,

possibility
of re

137

always general,

TIMK, Kant on the idea

Sufficient

three pro

proceeds by

and negation, 21;

of abstract, 130; in

SCHEMATISM
S<

science of, 17; perception of

difference necessary for, 18

cesses of, 19
laws of, 2!)

on Nature, 340; Potenzes of, 348; on

Absolute Identity, 351 subjective the
ory

reconciled with mechanism,

118.

of,

id.

177; a priori

truths concerning, 179.

.KsTii .TICS of Kant,

Logic of Kant, 1V2. 219; Dialec
of Kant, 221
222.
meaning

TI:AXS<-|.;XI>I.;NTAL

170;

on Time

tic

:>{,

and Space,

401; on the World as

Will. 403; on Force as Will, 400; on
Occasional Causes, 409; on animal
39,8,

life,

UNCONDITIONED, Kant on
I

Ncoxscn.rs,

the.

the, 224.

Philosophy

411; on death, 412; pessimism of, 413;

ethics of. 417, 425; aesthetics of, 420;

432; proofs

on the Platonic Idea,

426; on pity, 427.

ing power of nature, 439;

id.

on

injustice,

15;

Physical,

2G7

depends solely on the

on
of, 208;

ambiguity

Final Cause, 275.

STACK, Kant on
truths

the idea of, 170; a priori

concerning,

179; relations

of,

debted

and character

life

to

CO; in

of,

01; Substance
wrongly delined by, C2; on the causa
ftii, 03; his definition of God, CO; on
Descartes,

435

1291

of,

voluntary move
instinct, 437; in the heal

442;

in

in

mental

iu

443; in
thought, 445; in invention, 447: iu
memory, 448; in esthetic judgments,

language,

454; in character, 455; value

defects

188.

SPINOZA,

-130; in

action,

SCIENCE distinguished from

knowledge,
senses,

ment,

of,

of,

458; Metaphysics

of,

of,

457;
459;

and Time, 405;

472; ultimate pur

exists outside of Space

infinite

wisdom

pose

470.

of,

of,

Kant on

r.Ni>i:i:sr.\Ni>iNG,

the, 223.

UMVKKSAI.S

or general ideas, 130; Plato

on, 131; Aristotle on, 132; not limited

by space

or time, 138.

the

his doc
unity of Substance, 08
trine of Necessity, 70; on Absolute Be
;

VISION, Berkeley

theory

of,

141.

ing, 72.

SUHSTAXCK
30

distinguished from Cause,

s definition
an ab
of, G2

Spinoza

the unity
idea of, 110;
of

of,

08

Kant on

on, 24G;

the Category of,

300; uniformity

IJeason,

principle of,

110;

Schopenhauer on, 285; four-fold root

298.

Kant

the,

of,

307; as guided by

intellect, 441.

SUFFICIENT
287

as absolute good,

freedom of

Spinoza s proof
Leibnitz on the

213.

of,

WILL,

285,294; not subject

to compulsion, 303;
determinism of
the, 305; whimsical and
capricious,

stract general idea, 05;

analysis of, 294

of volition,

WORDSWORTH
edge, 39

on (he origin of knowl

pantheistic poetry

of,

335.

BINDING SECT.

JAN151975

o
-p
CD

-P
f-i

co

O
co
CD

O
g
ru

B
791
B7
1877

Bowen, Francis

Modern philosophy from

Descartes to Schopenhauer and
Hartmann. 3d. ed.