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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST


SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PROVISIONS & LAWS
Constitution, Article III Sec. 2
CONSTITUTION Art III Sec 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search


warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:

Rule 126
Search and Seizure

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A


search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is


an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall
be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. (n)

(a) Subject of the offense;


(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense. (2a)

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The


judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
(5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search.
The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in
presence of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must
direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit
asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant
shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it
shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer
seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises
in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer
must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the
issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made,
and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant
was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain
whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with
and shall require that the property seized be delivered to
him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has
been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept
by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who
shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and
other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
(11a)
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
(12a)
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action
has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved
by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if
such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be
resolved by the latter court. (n)
CASES
Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Facts:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Stonehill Businessman alleged ganster
Diokno Justice Secretary
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or
the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
As "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which
is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
Issue: WON the search warrants are valid.
Held:
The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC
emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their
corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has
no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or
board members of the corporation. The constitution protects
the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure.
It provides;

(1) That no warrant shall issue but upon probable


cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and
(2) That the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are
met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that
Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects
to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned
corporations,
whatever
their
nature,
thus
openly
contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights
that the things to be seized be particularly described as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise
abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective
search warrant is emphasized.
Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
DOCTRINE:heJudgmstproynaxlic dhwest.Aolarnupicydebshtgozanleisudrfmthofipcffn.
FACTS:
On24Feb1970,ComsiraVfItlvRnuew dsrozJiqtgheuancfrwsiotpeavnlfSc46h)(NIRC,iretoapnsvehof,rcautilyS537208nd9,hzotigrRevuExamLnkdfilthpicofrseawn thdlr.
Thenxtday,oLswi CFIRzltabhnecsrw.AmizJRuanhgcerts;o,bymfnhuiecdtDpCrkloa snitefDLdogr.
Afterhsoniaduj,zJRwmefhtposniadlrybke.Thtgpomirsnace;thdfu,JzRrskponLgietahdwrmfisepontaudblwhgsi,ecouardfpjy.JzRgneoLscalitrfhwndgoepsi.
ThesarcwubqntlyodffiesfBachiAvl,MkztR.Soempanywrshdcoetguanfrmlpiscetoywahd nr.Buetgsilpocdhawrey6bxsfoc.
SIUE:Whertonadbvslicwt.
HELD:
No.Thusetvidncbawrmloypendg.i

3.Thesarcwntdopiuylbhegszd.
hTedocumnts,parffgbzediscnthSarWUgeidpvboksfacun(ltr,jmesipadbunotk,cmrglse);ipfayntvcdfiresokui;ntac,pmryeosdf;lxancmgesbuiot,acndsero;hkctubdsfanepoihwrl;dcsfgnemita,ovhry19670.
Thedpsctionr mquAI,Sec.1ofthCnsiadu3lR26eftvsoChr,awnuldcptiyesbhogzd.
Acseahrwntmyboidpulehngstizdwcorpenasfihtiumcwlordyahentsipxcoluaftnwbyhierofficmadgunkhietsrzowngdcibealmrthsw ioneffrfchtwasbgiued.
People vs. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)
Doctrines:
1) Existence of Probable Cause: The fact that there was
no probable cause to support the application for the seizure
of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that
the search warrant is void
2) Specificity of the offense charged: The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the
same class or species. One (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
3) Particularity of the Place: The rule is that a description
of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify
the place intended to be searched.
4) Plain View: Once the valid portion of the search warrant
has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found.
Facts:

1.JRuaizledftospnrxymhc adiwtes.
sPeonrxalmithbyudgjfcpnaiswte orybmhldneitsxcor-fapbleu.Hmyisntdohgrape fst,wdonaigrhecsmufpyjdtoainhgre cmpltdsnwiagehr.
2.Thesarcwntiudfom fispecffn.
Thesarcwntiquo dfslrnctffeuhTaxCod.AsliSnetuchrsofiglatemdnchwispuetar,CodmifitaenScu3lfR12hormsCtaecwnhloiubparecsntiohwfipffe.Nsaditquclonh,Creapgdncihtosrwaulefmntfipcoffis.

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar
applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial
Court to search the residence of accusedappellant Robert Salanguit y Ko. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseurbuyer, he was able to purchase
shabu from accused-appellant. The sale
took place in accused-appellant's room,
and Badua saw that the shabu was taken
by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside
his room. The application was granted,
and a search warrant was later issued by
Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At
about 10:30 p.m. a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of
accused-appellant to serve the warrant.
The police operatives knocked on accusedappellants door, but nobody opened it.
They heard people inside the house,
apparently
panicking.
The
police
operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house. After showing the
search warrant to the occupants of the
house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a
paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint. A receipt
of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it. The
police operatives took accused-appellant
with them along with the items they had

On the night of December


seized
26, to
1995,
Station
as 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
they were about to leave
Quezon
their house,
City. The white crystalline
they heard a commotion
substance
at theand
gate
those contained in a small
and on the roof of
were
theirfound
house. to
be
positive
for
Suddenly, about 20 methamphetamine
men in civilian
hydrochloride. On the
attire, brandishing other
long hand,
firearms,
the two bricks of dried leaves
climbed over the gatewere
and found
descended
to be marijuana.
through an opening in the roof. When
accused-appellant demanded to be
shown a search warrant, a piece of
paper inside a folder was waved in
front of him. As accused-appellant
fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn Trial
and Court
he had
no
rendered
its decision:
chance to read it. That1.heFinding
was ordered
the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty
to stay in one place ofbeyond
the house
while
reasonable
doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Republic
the policemen conducted
search,
Act No.a6425,
as amended;
forcibly opening cabinets
and taking
2. Finding
the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty
his bag containing money,
a
licensed
. doubt for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act
beyond reasonable
45 caliber firearm, No.
jewelry
,
and
6425, as amended.
canned goods. The policemen left at
around 12:30 a.m. and,
after putting
Issues:
handcuffs on accused-appellant,
took
1) Whether or
not there was no probable cause to search for
him with them to the
NARCOM
on
drug paraphernalia
EDSA, Quezon City, 2)
where
accusedWhether
or not the search warrant was issued for more
appellant was detained.
than one specific offense
3) Whether or not the place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity
4) Whether or not the seizure of Marijuana was seized under
the plain view
Ruling:
1) No. The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined
quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was
presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. However,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not
warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug
paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. None was
taken by virtue of the search warrant issued.
If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as
it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is
valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause
as to its existence.
In Aday v. Superior Court, the warrant properly described
two obscene books but improperly described other articles.
It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it
does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. The
search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid,
were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning
other articles that the seizure would in any event be
upheld as to the property specified.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was
issued on probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a
search for other items not supported by the evidence. That
the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity
of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies


the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of
the description to be made of the "place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized."
In People v. Dichoso, the search warrant was also for
"Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions
of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and
seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias." However,
it upheld the validity of the warrant: The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the
same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

2) No. In Olaes v. People, "There is probable cause to


believe that Adolfo Olaes has in their session and control
and
custody
of
marijuana
dried
stalks/leaves/
seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense."
Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the

3) No. As the Solicitor General states: The fact that the


records of Search Warrant contained several documents
which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
application for search warrant which stated that the
premises to be searched was located in between No.7 and
11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the
deposition of witness which described the premises as "a
house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose,

In Prudente v. Dayrit, the search warrant was captioned:


"For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.)." that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under section 1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under section 3
thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives
which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D.
No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the
violations under the various provisions of the said law.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the
premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who
raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been
mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same
neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact
Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan.
Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably
appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the
target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their
informant that appellant was inside his residence before
they actually started their operation.
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. The location of accused-appellant's house being
indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt
that the warrant described the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
4) No. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects
within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in evidence. To apply, there must be: (a)
prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence;
and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before
the police.
(a) Prior justification; (b) Inadvertent discovery of the
evidence
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide
any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.
That the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the

police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. The only other possible
justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for
possession of shabu. The police failed to allege in this case
the time when the marijuana was found. Its recovery,
therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
(c) Immediate apparent illegality of the evidence
before the police.
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was
no apparent illegality to justify their seizure.
Similar to People v. Musa, in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents
because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which
gave no indication of its contents. They had no clue as to its
contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they
opened it and found the marijuana. Even assuming that the
NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to
be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag
and not the marijuana.
In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession
of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped
in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time
or manner these items were discovered. For failure of the
prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana
without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the
"plain view doctrine," the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence
against
accused-appellant.
However,
the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
WHEREFORE, 1) the decision of the Regional Trial Court
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of
possession of illegal drugs under Section 16 of R.A. No.6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended
is AFFIRMED; 2) the decision finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited
drugs under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused- appellant
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation
of
marijuana,
as
well
as
the
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as
ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
AlGhoul vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126859, Sept.
4, 2001
FACTS:
On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay of RTC
Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95
and 55-95 for the search and seizure of certain items in
Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No.
8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber
pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were:
2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions
1 Bar of demolition charge
1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos.
were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3
live 45 ammunitions
1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions
in its cylinder
1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber
ammunitions
2 pieces of fragmentation grenade
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow

2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to


be explosives substance
22 detonating cords with blasting caps
and pound of high explosives TNT
1 timer alarm clock
2 bags of suspected gun powder
2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive
substance
1 small box of plastic bag of suspected
dynamites
One weighing scale
Two (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and
detonating cord.
Petitioners were charged with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to PD No.
1866. Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995
which was denied on February 19, 1996, the accused were
charged of two criminal offenses both under PD 1866, Sec. 1
and 3, penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period
to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7
thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
CA ruled: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the
penalty under which petitioners were charged has now been
reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,
respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail.
TRO is partially lifted.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PROVISIONS & CASE DIGEST
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure orders are valid and the
objects seized admissible in evidence.
HELD:
The search warrant 54-95 and search warrant 55-95,
specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment No. 2,
154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There
was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, the search
conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2
and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.
Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task
with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that
constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.
Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are
constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment
No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is
inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court
said, While it is true that the property to be seized under a
warrant must be particularly described therein and no other
property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is
required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. We could not logically conclude that
where the description of those goods to be seized has been
expressed technically, all others of a similar nature but not
bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be
lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable
purpose of the warrant issued would be defeated by mere
technicalities.

The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA


823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to
determine the particularity in the description of objects to be
seized under a search warrant is when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination
of Search Warrant Nos. 54-95[25] and 55-95[26] shows that
they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated
items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the offense
of violation of Section 1[27] and 3[28] of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the warrants
authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that
decree, and no other.
Further, the two-witness rule applies only in the
absence of the lawful occupants of the premises searched.
In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search
and seizure operation was conducted by the police at
Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel AlRiyami y Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident
of Apartment No. 2. Hence, we find here no violation of
Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted
at Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item
(.45 caliber pistol) seized therein inadmissible in evidence.
However, the search at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search
Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid and legal, and the
articles seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in
evidence.
Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board,
GR No. 157870, 3 November 2008
DOCTRINE:
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the

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guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. But while the right to
privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be
the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or
intrusion through the medium of mandatory random
drug testing among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the court upheld its
constitutionality of it because, first as to the students, right
to enroll is not absolute, the school has its prerogative to
add additional reasonal, fair and equitable requirement for
the betterment of the the school and their students. And as
to the employees, the court said that the medium is
reasonable because the Ople case laid down the
confidentiality protection as to the result of the drug test.
Thus, if the result is in the affirmative, they will not be
criminally prosecuted; they will rather be offered to undergo
rehabilitation.
As to Pimentel case, the court said that additional
requirement by the Comelec shall be in accordance to the
requirement embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
As to Laserna case, The court said that it is
unconstitutional because the randomness and suspicionless
of drug testing will never be met because the accused is
specifically picked-up, therefore, they will be forcibly
incriminating himself if the result would not be in his favor.
FACTS:
NOTE: These are three consolidated cases with Laserna vs
Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)

In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive


Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for

public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,


officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses.
Thereafter, these three petitions were consolidated for
it has the same vain as to questioning the constitutionality
of RA 9165, specifically Section 36 of sad act. In the petition
filed by Pimentel, the petitioner alleged that it is
unconstitutional for the COMELEC to issue a resolution that
will add another requirement of a Mandatory drug testing of
all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected
both in national and local government before they can be a
qualified candidate for the 2010 election wherein according
to them are not embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator. The
next petition is the Social Justice Society, the case where
brought
by petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine
the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a
student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a
third, a persons constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions. Lastly, the
Lasernas petition wherein Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna,
Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d),

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(f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Mandatory drug testing of all candidates
for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government is constitutional
2. Whether or not Mandatory drug testing of all persons
charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not
less than 6 years and 1 day is constitutional
3. Whether or not Random drug testing for secondary and
tertiary school students as well as for officials and
employees of public and private offices is constitutional.
Thus, valid and reasonable wherein it didnt infringe the
constitutional right of being secured to unreasonable search
and seizure.
HELD:
1.) NO. In declaring sec. 36(g) unconstitutional, the
Court said that the same unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon
and, if proper, be proclaimed senator-elect, adding
that the assailed provision of the law and the
COMELEC Resolution add another layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate.
2.) NO. The Court also found no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes, as required by sec. 36(f) of the law, as a
mandatory drug testing in the case of persons

charged with a crime before the prosecutors office


can never be random or suspicionless. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will, said the Court. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case
would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
3.)YES. On the other hand, the High Court held that sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug
testing of students and officials and employees of
public and private offices are constitutional. The
Court, taking note of the proliferation of prohibited
drugs in the country which threaten the well-being
of the people, particularly the youth and school
children who usually end up as victims, stated that
until a more effective method is conceptualized and
put in motion, a random drug testing of students
in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless
a
legitimate
concern
of
the
government,
are
to
be
promoted
and
protected. The Court, taking into account the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
employees, the compelling state concern likely
to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of random drug
testing, held that the challenged drug test
requirement for those employed in public and

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private offices is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and constitutional.
Nala vs. Barroso, GR No. 153087, Aug. 7, 2003
Doctrine
In determining the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, the examining
magistrate must make probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma examination of the
applicant and the witnesses. Probable cause must be
shown by the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary especially where the issue is
the existence of a negative ingredient of the offense
charged, e.g., the absence of a license required by
law.
Facts:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser
applied for the issuance of a warrant to search
the person and residence of petitioner Bernard
R. Nala, who was referred to in the application
as Rumolo[8] Nala alias Long[9] of Purok 4,
Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.[10]
The
application was filed in connection with
petitioners alleged illegal possession of one
caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in
violation of Republic Act No. 8294, which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, or the
law on Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the
same day, after examining Alcoser and his
witness Ruel Nalagon, respondent Presiding
Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, Branch 10,
issued Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01,
against Romulo Nala alias Lolong Nala who is
said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion,
Kitaotao, Bukidnon.

On July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police


officers searched petitioners house and
allegedly seized the following articles, to wit

-1- one piece caliber .38 revolver (snub-nose) with


Serial Number 1125609
-1- one pc. fragmentation grenade (cacao type)
-1- one pc. .22 long barrel
-5- pcs live ammunition for caliber .38 revolver
-4- four pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated
numbers of cellophane used for packing of shabu[

On July 5, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. 109432001-P and 10944-2001-P for illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives were
filed against the petitioner before the 5th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kitaotao,
Bukidnon

On August 8, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus


Motion[13] seeking to (1) quash Search and Seizure
Warrant No. 30-01; (2) declare inadmissible for any
purpose the items allegedly seized under the said
warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle
seized by the police officers.
Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to
Quash but ordered the return of the air rifle to
petitioner. As to the validity of the search warrant,
respondent found that probable cause was duly
established from the deposition and examination of
witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3
Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a
surveillance to confirm the information given by
Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not
exactly the items listed in the warrant does not
invalidate the same because the items seized bear a

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direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Respondent judge also found that petitioner
was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his
first name was erroneously stated therein as
Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the
warrant was couched in terms that would make it
enforceable against the person and residence of
petitioner and no other.
Issues:
1 Was petitioner sufficiently described in the
search and seizure warrant?
2 Was there probable cause for the issuance of a
search and seizure warrant against petitioner?
3 Whether or not the firearms and explosive
allegedly found in petitioners residence are
admissible in evidence against him even
though said firearms were not listed in the
search and seizure warrant.
Held:
1 Yes
2 No
3 No
Ratio:
1 On the first issue, the failure to correctly state in
the search and seizure warrant the first name of
petitioner, which is Bernard and not Romulo or
Rumolo, does not invalidate the warrant because
the additional description alias Lolong Nala who is
said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers
to locate and identify the petitioner. What is
prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party,
and not one which, as in the instant case, contains

a description personae that will enable the officer


to identify the accused without difficulty.
2

The probable cause for a valid search warrant


has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. This probable cause must be shown
to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay.[21]
In determining its existence, the examining
magistrate must make a probing and
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma
examination of the applicant and the
witnesses.[22]
Probable cause must be
shown by the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. On the
part of the applicant and witnesses, the
introduction of such evidence is necessary
especially where the issue is the existence of a
negative ingredient of the offense charged, e.g.,
the absence of a license required by law.[23] On
the other hand, the judge must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavits but must make his
own extensive inquiry on the existence of such
license, as well as on whether the applicant and
the witnesses have personal knowledge thereof.
In the case at bar, the search and seizure warrant
was issued in connection with the offense of illegal
possession of firearms, the elements of which are
(1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2)
the fact that the accused who owned or possessed

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it does not have the license or permit to possess
the same.[26] Probable cause as applied to
illegal
possession
of
firearms
would
therefore be such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that a person is in
possession of a firearm and that he does not
have the license or permit to possess the
same. Nowhere, however, in the affidavit
and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in
PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers application for the
issuance of a search warrant was it
mentioned that petitioner had no license to
possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified
before the respondent judge that the
firearms in the possession of petitioner are
not licensed, this does not qualify as
personal knowledge but only personal
belief because neither he nor Nalagon
verified, much more secured, a certification
from the appropriate government agency
that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm.
This could have been the best
evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner
had no license to possess firearms and
ammunitions, but the police officers failed to
present the same.
Witnesses only stated seeing the accused with a .
22 magnum and a 9mm pistol in the market/firing
etc.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long
as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and
2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
military officers who entered the petitioners

premises had no right to be there and therefore


had no right either to seize the pistol and
bullets.[32]
Conformably, the articles allegedly seized in the
house of petitioner cannot be used as evidence
against him because access therein was gained by
the police officer using a void search and seizure
warrant. It is as if they entered petitioners house
without a warrant, making their entry therein
illegal, and the items seized, inadmissible.
Moreover, it does not follow that because an
offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial
in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simply because they are prohibited. A
warrant is still necessary,[33]
because
possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if
the required permit or license therefor is not first
obtained.[34]
So also, admissibility of the items seized
cannot be justified under the plain view
doctrine. It is true that, as an exception, the
police officer may seize without warrant illegally
possessed firearm, or any contraband for that
matter, inadvertently found in plain view.
However, said officer must have a prior right to be
in the position to have that view of the objects to
be seized. The plain view doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the

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officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.[35]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked in
aid of the process when the officer undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In this case, the firearms and
explosive were found at the rear portion of
petitioners house[36] but the records do not
show how exactly were these items
discovered.
Clearly, therefore, the plain
view doctrine finds no application here not
only because the police officers had no
justification to search the house of petitioner
(their search warrant being void for lack of
probable cause), but also because said
officers failed to discharge the burden of
proving
that
subject
articles
were
inadvertently found in petitioners house.
The issue of the reasonableness of the
implementation of the search and seizure warrant,
i.e., whether the search was conducted in the
presence of witnesses and whether the air rifle
which the trial court ordered to be returned to
petitioner was indeed among the items seized
during the search, are matters that would be best
determined in the pending administrative case for
grave misconduct and irregularity in the

performance of duty against the police officers


who conducted the search.
3 Considering that the search and seizure warrant in
this case was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the items
seized in petitioners house, being fruits of
the poisonous tree, are inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Finally, the Court notes that among the items seized
by the officers were four pcs. of disposable lighter
and unestimated numbers of cellophane used for
packing of shabu. These items are not contraband
per se, nor objects in connection with the offense of
illegal possession of firearms for which the warrant
was issued. Moreover, it is highly preposterous to
assume that these items were used in connection with
offenses involving illegal drugs. Even granting that
they were, they would still be inadmissible against the
petitioner for being products of an illegal search.
Hence, the subject articles should be returned to
petitioner.[40]
People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
DOCTRINE:
The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend
a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object.
FACTS:
In the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team

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based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado
Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari
Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received
from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged
in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani,
another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company
with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa
to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The
same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one
newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani
returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the
newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt.
Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it
to be marijuana.

newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened


the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced
that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards
his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM
teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt.
Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00
marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where
the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given
the money to his wife who had slipped away. Sgt. Belarga
also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it
somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under
arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt.
Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped
marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa.

The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a


buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the
poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 by
Belarga. The buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus
Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation
Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt. The team
under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A
pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's
raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the
marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target
site in two civilian vehicles.

In the NARCOM office, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned


over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the
buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at
the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana
(which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of
Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for
laboratory examination. Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the
Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the
marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests.
All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results
for the presence of marijuana.
The trial court found accused Mari Musa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec.
4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425. Hence, the appeal.

Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the


house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group
positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100
meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see
what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from
where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of
his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he
wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00
marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went
back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure and admission as
evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the
NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen was valid?
HELD:
NO. In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in
his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire

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house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag
hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as
an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond
the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
"plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine may not,
however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory
search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
"plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. It has also been
suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view,"
the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated
differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his
person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM

agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag
in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within
their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to
justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from
one portion of the house to another before they sighted the
plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer
had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen
and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM
agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
intention of fishing for more evidence. Moreover, when the
NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner
of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had
to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the
marijuana. The NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag
had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that
the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic
bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be
said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
Under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view"
doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution. The exclusion of this particular evidence does
not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We
hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the

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appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the
guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
People vs. Ruben Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
DOCTRINE:
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and
seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents
would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by
Rule 126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
THE FRUIT OF POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE: is an
offspring of the Exclusionary Rule. The exclusionary rule
mandates that evidence obtained from an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation mush be
excluded from trial. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, evidence is also excluded from trial if it was gained
through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation. Like the
exclusionary rule, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
was established primarily to deter law enforcement from
violating rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
FACTS:
Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information from
one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntarily
surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating that
accused Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to join the NPA
with the use of a firearm against his life, a team was
dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos. Through the
help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was
able to locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing his field at
the time.

When asked about the firearm, the accused denied


possession of it, but after questioning the accuseds wife,
the police were able to locate and retrieve the said firearm,
a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the ground below their house.
The police, after accused pointed them to the location, were
also able to retrieve alleged subversive documents (a
notebook and a pamphlet) hidden underground a few meters
away from the house.
To prove accuseds subversive activities, Masamlok
testified that accused came to his house and told him to join
the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat
to his life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He
later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first
speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with
his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government. To
prove illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms and
explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused was
not among the list of firearm holders.
On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he
was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership
of the gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected
to physical agony. He was forced to admit possession or
ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Rubens wife
Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the
accuseds denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimed
that it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.
The RTC after considering the evidences presented by
both prosecution and defense convicted accused Ruben
Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion. The RTC
justified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the
circumstances when arrests may be validly made without a
warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It stated
that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos,

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the fact that the authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities from a
reliable
source
(report
of
Cesar
Masamlok)
the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is
lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and
applicable jurisprudence on the matter. If the arrest is valid,
the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the
alleged subversive documents would become an incident to
a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
ISSUE:
1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his
house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
documents conducted in a lawful manner.
2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy
and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects.
In this case, the arrest was made without warrant and since
it does not fall within the exceptions of arrests that can be
made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies.
Reasoning Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the
officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view.
There is no such personal knowledge in this
case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety

from the information furnished by Cesar


Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by Burgos wife. At the time of arrest,
Burgos was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was
he committing any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time.
The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be
considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that
a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a warrant under
Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have
been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to
the identity of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was
arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused
had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence
of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of
the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips
of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment
it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted. More important, the Court find no
compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. The Court fail to see

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why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There
is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there
is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were
unknown.
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer
was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not
required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was
no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under
pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to
go through the process of securing a search warrant
and a warrant of arrest becomes even clearer. The
arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is
illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and
seizure which transpired afterwards could not
likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there
was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to
object.
To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that
the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The
fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into
his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein.
2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm,
and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in
evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is
the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict
Burgos beyond reasonable doubt.

Reasoning Although it is true that the trial


court found Masamloks testimony credible and
convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by
the credibility which the trial court attaches to
a particular witness. As stated in People v
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to
question of credibility the findings of the trial
court are entitled to great respect upon appeal
for the obvious reason that it was able to
observe the demeanor, actuations and
deportment of the witnesses during the trial.
But We have also said that this rule is not
absolute for otherwise there would be no
reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the
record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated
by the trial court. In the instant case,
Masamloks
testimony
was
totally
uncorroborated.
Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the
military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be
charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as
an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be
free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated
and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his
freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other
persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could
have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused
used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or
actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.

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Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
Doctrine: An officer may perform a search for weapons
without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed
and dangerous.
Facts:
An officer observed two men, the petitioner Terry, and
Chilton, standing on a street corner. One would walk up to a
store window, look inside, and return to confer with his
companion. This process was repeated about a dozen times.
The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually
followed up the street. Given the nature of their behavior,
and thinking that the men were casing the store for
potential robbery, the officer confronted them and asked for
their names. The men mumbled a response, at which time
the officer spun the petitioner around and patted his breast.
During this process of quick frisking, he found a concealed
pistol, and removed the same. Thus, the petitioner was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, the
petitioner moved to suppress this weapon from evidence.
However, the TC, as affirmed by the CA, denied his motion.
Issue: WON the search for weapon was unreasonable?
Held & Rationale:
No. An officer is justified in conducting a carefully
limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to
be dangerous in order to discover any weapons, which might
be used to assault him or other nearby, even in the absence
of probable cause for arrest. The governments interest in
preventing harm must be balanced against the invasion into
a persons privacy. But the policeman should use an
objective test, and be able to point to specific and
articulable facts, which reasonably justify the intrusion.
Effective crime prevention and detection is a governmental
interest in appropriate circumstances for purposes of

investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is


no probable cause to make an arrest. It would be
unreasonable to require that the policeman take
unnecessary risks. He has a need to protect himself and
others in situations where he lacks probable cause for arrest.
In this case, nothing in the conduct of petitioner and his
friends dispelled the officers reasonable fear that they were
armed.
Critical summary: This case represents a delineation
between a reasonable belief and a reasonable suspicion.
Probable cause= reasonable belief. Stop and Frisk =
reasonable suspicion backed by articulable facts.
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
Facts:
Umbra and Umbra members of Integrated National
Police of Davao were conducting surveillance in Davao. They
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the
petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
Upon checking they found weapons and from then they
arrested the petitioner and brought him to the nearest
station to show the necessary license or authority to possess
the same but petitioner failed to do so.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt, weapons forfeited in


favour of Government.
CA: affirmed in toto RTCs decision

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Petitioner alleges that since there is no valid warrant


of arrest and search and seizure the evidence is inadmissible
in court.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen
approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest is valid?

Ruling:
YES. PETITION DENIED. Between a warrantless search and
seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search threat in the case at bar, the search conducted to the
petitioner is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it (the search of the petitioner) was effected on the
basis of a probable cause.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search


the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such
an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
Stop and search - Valmonte vs. de Villa, as follows:
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the
public Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal,

this Court held as follows:

. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is


indispensably
necessary,
the
mechanics
prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in
the Rules of Court must be followed and
satisfied. But We need not argue that there are
exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without warrant, what

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constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.

Despite the presumption of regularity in the


performance of the official duties of law enforcers, we
stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A.
9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.
The provisions were crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses,
especially considering that the penalty imposed may
be life imprisonment.

The assailed search and seizure may still be


justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation
whose object is either to determine the identity
of a suspicious individual or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information. This is
illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).

Facts:
1. PO1 Honorio Marmonejo received confidential information
regarding the drug pushing activities of Joker at Llorando
Compound Makati City. This alias Joker was also listed in
the said offices watchlist of suspected drug pushers.

In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer


rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and
allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information
People vs. Jose Ancheta, GR 197371, June 13, 2012
Doctrine:
Noncompliance with the required procedure will not
necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused if: (1)
the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2)
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
team.

2. A buy-bust team of four policemen and eight Makati AntiDrug Abuse Council operatives was formed. PO1 Marmonejo
was to act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team served
as his back-up. Thereafter, five pieces of 100-bills were
provided and marked for use in the operation.
3. In the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team
arrived at the compound. PO1 Marmonejo accompanied by
PO1 Mendoza and the informant, entered a slightly opened
gate through an alleyway where they met a man who asked
them where they were going. The informant replied that
they were looking for Joker as they were going to
purchase shabu from the latter. The man asked how much
they were going to buy, to which the informant answered
him that he was to purchase 500.00-worth of shabu. The
man told them to wait for a while and then called for Joker.
4. Joker came out from inside the house, and it was at this
instance that PO1 Marmonejo took out the marked money.
Joker, in turn, gave him one plastic sachet of shabu. The
man they met at the alley took the marked money from him
and handed it over to Joker. After having received the buy

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bust money, Joker faced the man washing clothes who is 3
to 4 meters away from them and gave the latter one plastic
sachet of shabu as payment for his laundry service.
5.After the transaction, the team immediately went inside
the house where the entrapment took place and assisted in
effecting the arrest of the accused. Joker was later on
identified as Joel Ancheta, the man at the alley was
identified as John Llorando, and the one doing the laundry
was Juan Carlos Gernada. After informing all of the accusedappellants of their violations and nature of their arrest as
well as their constitutional rights, they were subsequently
brought to the office of the Makati City Police.
6.Llorando denied the charge against him and claimed that
he was cooking inside his house when 3 men suddenly
entered his house and poked a gun at him and frisked him.
His brother, who was inside the house, tried to intervene,
but was not able to do anything. Meanwhile, a few meters
away from his house lived his brother-in-law, Ancheta and
the latters adopted son, Gernada.
7. Ancheta and Gernada testified while Gernada was at the
kitchen doing the dishes and Ancheta was sleeping in his
room with his wife, 5 men barged into their house without
warning and arrested them. They were brought to a white
vehicle, where they saw the Llorando, who was likewise
apparently taken by the same group.
RTC: It gave credence to the arresting officers narration of
the incident, as they were presumed to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner. It then rejected accusedappellants claims of frame-up.
Ancheta and Llorando were
found
guilty
of
violating Section
5 (Sale,
Trading,
Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals)

Ancheta and Gernada were


found
guilty
of
violating Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs)
Llorando was found guilty of violating Section 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs)
CA: Affirmed RTC, It also explained that the failure of the
arresting officers to comply with the proper procedure for
the confiscation and seizure of dangerous drugs embodied in
R.A. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecutions case. The CA
then ruled that noncompliance with the procedure in
Section 21 of R.A. 9165 would not absolve accusedappellants of the crimes of which they were found
guilty and would not render their arrest illegal or the
seizure of the items inadmissible.
Accused-appellants- question the CA affirmation of their
conviction by arguing that the arresting officers failed to
comply with the requirements for the proper custody of
seized dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165. They claim that
the officers failed to conduct the following: (1) make a
physical inventory of the seized items; (2) take
photographs of the items; and (3) establish that a
representative each from the media, the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official had
been contacted and was present during the marking
of the items.
Accused-appellants
then
contend
that
the
prosecution did not prove that noncompliance with
procedure was on justifiable grounds. They also aver
that the prosecution was unable to establish that the
apprehending team properly preserved the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
Issue: Whether or not noncompliance of the arresting
officers with the procedure drawn in Section 21 of R.A. 9165
would discharge accused-appellants from the crimes of
which they were convicted.

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Held:
Yes. Though we have recognized that minor deviations from
the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically
exonerate an accused we have also declared that when
there is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards
prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious
uncertainty is generated about the identity of the
seized items that the prosecution presented in
evidence. We then ruled that such doubt cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties, for a gross, systematic,
or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards
effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of
official duties. Accordingly, the prosecution is deemed to
have failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability
of the accused.
Here, the records are bereft of any indication that would
show that the prosecution was able to establish the arresting
officers compliance with the procedural safeguards under
R.A. 9165. Neither do the records contain any physical
inventory report or photograph of the confiscated items.
None of the arresting officers testified that they had
conducted a physical inventory or taken pictures of the
items. Nor did they state that there was even any attempt to

contact a representative from the media and the DOJ, and


an elected public official. Nowhere can it be found that the
marking of the items was done in the presence of any of the
said third-party representatives. In all these major
lapses, no one gave so much as an explanation of
why the procedure was not followed, or whether
there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so. The
arresting officers and the prosecution simply did not
bother discussing these matters.
Indeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items that is of utmost importance in
determining the admissibility of the evidence presented in
court, especially in cases of buy-bust operations. That is why
Congress saw fit to fashion a detailed procedure in order to
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated items would not be compromised. The marking
of the seized items was only a piece in a detailed set of
procedural safeguards embodied in R.A. 9165. If the
arresting officers were unable to comply with the other
requirements, they were under obligation to explain why the
procedure was not followed and prove that the reason
provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites
under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or
may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own
convenience.