People vs.

Lolo
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
FACTS:
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one
of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat
eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The second
boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat,
took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and
repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of
the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands, they were arrested and were charged in
the CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed a demurrer
on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the
CFI, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing
each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended
parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of
the
costs.
ISSUE:
WON the elements of piracy exists?
HELD:
The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and
not disputed and all of the elements of the crime of piracy were present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
1

authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind which can be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all. Therefore it does not matter that the
crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state,
"for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

People vs Tulin
G.R. No. 111709

August 30, 2001

FACTS:
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned
by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with barrels of
kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed
pirates. The pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and
Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely took over the vessel.
The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded transferred and sold under the direct supervision of accused
Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the
Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter affected and all the accused
were charged with qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime
charged. Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial
court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine
waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him
for trial, to convict, and sentence.
ISSUE:
WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed
outside the Philippine waters and territory?
HELD:
YES. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas byany person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened
2

to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,

under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law
on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between
the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well
as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in
one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended,
and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate
laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack
on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and
its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo wa soff-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires
that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is
still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters

People vs Catantan
G.R. No. 118075

September 5, 1997

FACTS:
Emilano Catantan and Jose Ursal alias "Bimbo" were charged with
violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway
Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm
and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of
violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and
inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then
3

fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to
their damage and prejudice.
ISSUE:
WON the activities of the accused constitutes Piracy.
HELD:
YES. Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack
upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof
or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed
it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that
he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil
brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it
was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel
the Pilapils to take them to some other place.
Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the
Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

Astorga vs People
G.R. No. 154130

August 20, 2004

FACTS:
On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection
operations in line with the governments campaign against illegal logging.
Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Astorga was found to be the
owner of two boats. A heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called
for reinforcements. Ten armed men arrived in the scene. The offended
parties were then brought to Mayor Astorgas house where they had dinner
and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down
from the house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3
Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was
finally allowed to leave.
4

ISSUE:
WON Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.
HELD:
YES. Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Arbitrary Detention
is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of
their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by
petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and
arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue
rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses. Given such circumstances, we give
credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not safe to refuse
Mayor Astorgas orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but
also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which
proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to
the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent
to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will
is thus clear.

Cayao vs Del mundo

A.M. No. MTJ93813 September 15, 1993
FACTS:
A bus driven by the complainant almost collided head-on with an
owner-type jeepney owned by Judge del Mundo. Complainant was picked up
by policemen and immediately brought before the sala of the respondent
judge where he was confronted by the latter. Without giving complainant any
opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be
punished for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by
respondent judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of
which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a charge of multiple attempted
homicide; (b) revocation of his drivers license; or (c) to be put in jail for
three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e.,
5

confinement for three (3) days, as a consequence of which he was forced to

sign a waiver of detention by respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant
was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail. Though not
actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the municipal
jail for three (3) days.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and
arbitrary detention.
HELD:
YES. The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of,
constitute abuse of authority. While it is true that complainant was not put
behind bare as respondent had intended, however, complainant was not
allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is
not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to
qualify as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically,
of his personal liberty. Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in
fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he, as a public officer, ordered the
arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds. In overtaking
another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually
committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the
case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were
illegal.
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct
of respondent is not alone centered on his order for the detention of
complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that complainant was so
detained without affording him his constitutional rights.

Milo vs Salanga
G.R. No. L37007

July 20, 1987

FACTS:
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private
respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some other private
persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their
guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with
deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused
respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and
6

helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail
of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said
crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo
filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent
was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention,
respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD:
YES. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested
with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It
is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with
abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers
and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a
barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction
is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must
be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is
the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the
aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.

People vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 126252

August 30, 1999

FACTS:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, Jesus Garcia had in his possession, custody and control
five (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried leaves, without the authority of
law to do so.
November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE PANGANIBAN boarded a
passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet,
7

en route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while
SPO3 Panganiban sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When the
jeepney reached Km. 4 or 5, accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney
carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and
placed the plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the policemen
smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To confirm
their suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney.
The accused alighted at the Baguio city hall and the police officers
trailed him. He was found to be in possession of five (5) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. The policeofficers then arrested the
accused and seized his bag.
ISSUE:
WON the manner of arrest proper.
HELD:
YES. The prosecution was able to prove appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. There is nothing irregular in the manner appellant was
apprehended by the police authorities.
On the contrary, we find that, without compromising their sworn duty to
enforce the law, the police officers exercised reasonable prudence and
caution in desisting to apprehend appellant inside the jeepney when they
initially suspected he was in possession of marijuana. They sought to verify
further their suspicion and decided to trail appellant when the latter alighted
from the jeepney. It was only after they saw that one of the packages with
the torn wrapper contained what looked like marijuana fruiting tops did they
accost appellant and make the arrest.
At that precise time, they had obtained personal knowledge of
circumstances indicating that appellant had illicit drugs in his possession.
They had reasonable ground upon which to base a lawful arrest without a
warrant.

Agbay vs Deputy Ombudsman

G.R. No. 134503
July 2, 1999
FACTS:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin
Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu
for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, or on September 8,
8

1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and
Jugalbot.
Counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the
immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had failed to
deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within
thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997. Private respondents did not
act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained
persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr.,
SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at
the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes to a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
YES. Art. 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without
permitting him to go on bail . More specifically, it punishes public officials or
employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal
upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such
detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.
The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the
courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order
the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such
inferior
courts
as
may
be
established
by
law.
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is
determinative of the issue. In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that
a municipal court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct
preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or
commitment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that
by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against
him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
9

Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release
when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the
very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of
the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman
that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.

Ladlad vs velasco
G.R. Nos. 17207072 June 1, 2007
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and
certiorari to enjoin petitioners' prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the
rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners'
cases.
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a "State of
National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25 February
2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with
rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial determination of
probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE:
WON there is probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion.
HELD:
NO. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
10

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes
involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end. The evidence
before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for
Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to
indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in
Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier,
he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated
that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a
rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the
affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged
presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a
leader of a rebellion.
In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to
Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February 2006, as basis for the finding of
probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement
regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005
and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were
allegedly discussed, among others. However, what the allegations in
Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion,
punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under
Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring
down a government is a mere preparatory step to commit the acts
constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged
this, since the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the
criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not Rebellion. The
Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired to
form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred
when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based
on the evidence before it.

11

People vs. Silongan

G.R. No. 137182
April 24, 2003
FACTS:
On January 18, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City convicted
the appellants of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal
Detention and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. Upon
arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The appellants argued that the fact that they are rebel surrenderees
precludes conviction for the common crime of kidnapping. They contend that
common crimes are absorbed in rebellion. Therefore, the trial court erred
when it convicted them of kidnapping for ransom.
ISSUE:
WON there is merit on the contention of the appellants that the crim
committed was rebellion.
HELD:
NO. The argument that the crime was politically motivated and that
consequently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping,
Holds no merit. As held in Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga
Del Norte vs. CA, the political motivation for the crime must be shown in
order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it
is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the
crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the
evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was
politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are
rebel surrenderees.

People vs Oliva
G.R. No. 106826

January 18, 2001

FACTS:
On or about May 26, 1986, in the morning thereof, at barangay
Mapea, Municipality of
12

Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this

court, the Oliva was confederating together and helping one another with the
used of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain and keep one Jacinto Magbojos
alias "Dagoy" against the latter's will.
On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court
found Oliva and Salcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, not
kidnapping with murder. However, Joel Cinco was acquitted. Hence, insisting
on their innocence, Oliva and Salcedo instantly appealed.
In his brief, Oliva raises that the honorable lower court committed a
reversible error in the conviction. He claims that since he is a member of the
Communist party of the Philippines, the conviction should that be of
rebellion, in which kidnap and murder is absorbed.
ISSUE:
WON Oliva should be charged of rebellion.
HELD:
NO. Oliva asserts that he should have been charged with rebellion
instead of kidnapping with murder considering that he is member of the
Communist party of the Philippines and Commander of the New People's
Army. He claims that the killing was committed in furtherance of rebellion,
hence, it should be absorbed in rebellion.
Oliva's contention that he should have been charged with and tried for
rebellion lacks factual and legal basis, hence, bereft of merit. True, one can
be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and kidnapping
were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollary,
offenses, which were not committed in furtherance of rebellion, but for
personal reasons or other motives, are to be punished separately even if
committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts.
In the instant case, there was no evidence at all to show that the killing
of Jacinto Magbojos Jr. was in connection with or in furtherance of their
rebellious act. Besides Jr. was
not indubitably proved that Oliva was indeed a member of the New People's
Army.

People vs Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235
November 29, 1995

13

FACTS:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St.,
away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked
beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as
he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that
he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the
victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. On
autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as
hypovolemic shock.
ISSUE:
WON accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135
or Murder under Article 248 of the RPC?
HELD:
YES. The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who
are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to
pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral
damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five
Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part
of the said accused.
In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's
principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should
14

have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of
the New People's Army.
However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending
the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends
on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally, treachery was adequately
proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden,
and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by
treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with all the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED.
People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
FACTS:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa,
presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et
al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal
Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple
Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan
J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian
Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among
those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn
their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are Bayani
Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres
Balsa,
Jr.
withdrew
his
appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the
decision subject of the present appeals.
ISSUE:
WON the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?

15

HELD:
YES. The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO), had close connections with the Secretariat of the
Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and
its members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime charged against him
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the
costs.
In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and
other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn
issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts
in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to
have limited his actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez,
Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the
charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the
costs de oficio. But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and
Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the
crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article
136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one
days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the
costs.

People vs Dasig
G.R. No. 100231

April 28, 1993

FACTS:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuez and 6 others were charged
together of shooting Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while
performing duties. Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a
plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first
witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence,
the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against
said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence.
16

While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby
extinguishing his criminal liability.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He
noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc.
Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow
unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group
saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team of Capt.
Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued
Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper
arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live
ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to
the hospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom
for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues
killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were members
of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively.
The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every
page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by
him. However, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial
confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional
rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc.
Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder
with direct assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was
done while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully
appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the
deceased and participated in the act of rebellion?
HELD:
YES. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of
rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the
heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary
17

to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant
Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not
specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to
the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed
the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the resulting
death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

People vs Cabrera
G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922
FACTS:
The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila
and they want to inflict revenge for the following reasons: (1) On December
13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the
household of a constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said
policeman. (2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a Manila
police and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spread
among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his
original duties while Macasinag was declared dead. There were also rumors
that the said shooting was ordered. On the night of December 15 some
members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window (the
saw out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were
organized in groups under the command of their sergeants and corporals.
They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances: (1) On
Calle Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot and killed an
American Policeman and his friend. (2) The Constabulary indiscriminately
shot at a passer- by, causing a death and wounding most of the passengers.
(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E.
Wichman (asst. chief of police in Manila) was shot and killed together with
Saplala
ISSUES:
(1) WON there was connivance/conspiracy between the accused.
18

(2) WON the accused are properly convicted of a violation of the

Treason and Sedition Law.
HELD:
(1)
YES. Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the
same object, one performing one part and another another part of the same,
so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one
will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to
the effect that object. It is incontestable that all of the defendants were
imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the
police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all.
(2)
YES. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions
or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all
persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to
obtain by force of outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal
government. The counsel contested that it is necessary that the offender
should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functioinary, and
what really happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the
Philippine Government. The court held that this contention is without
foundation.
The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to
which it applies. What is important is that there is a public rising to incite or
inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official
or agent of the Insular government or of a provincial or municipal
government.

People vs Umali
G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954
FACTS:

19

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found
guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of
Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14,
1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and
complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its
content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000,
and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and
civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of
Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders
engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the
raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine
Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
ISSUE:
WON the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson
and robbery?
HELD:
YES. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson,
frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the
appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of
P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to
life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of
P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty
provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house
of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons,
because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at
the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each
of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be
understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In
view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the
court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences
corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by

20

the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
People vs Nabong
G.R. No. L-36426
November 3, 1932
FACTS:
In the latter part of January, 1931, the head of the communists in the
Philippine Islands, died in the municipality of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and a
necrological service in his memory was appointed by his followers to be held
at Santa Rosa on the evening of January 30. The fact that said meeting was
to be held came to the attention of Major Silvino Gallardo, in charge of the
Philippine Constabulary in Cabanatuan, and he was informed that the red
flag would be displayed in this meeting as an emblem of the communists. He
then met the appellant Nabong, and knowing the relation between the latter
and Feleo, the leader of the communists in that province, Major Gallardo
requested Nabong to interfere and prevent the display of the red flag at the
meeting referred to.
After perusing the opinion Nabong said that he did not agree with the
conclusion of the fiscal; and he, therefore, refused to accompany the
Constabulary officers and the deputy provincial fiscal to Santa Rosa, stating
that, if he were to go there, he would tell the communists that no law
prohibited the display of the red flag and that he would induce them to
display the same. He added that, if the communist were forbidden to use the
flag, a disturbance would probably result.
Although Nabong, as above stated, had refused to accompany Major
Gallardo and his companions on their trip to Santa Rosa, he waited a while at
Cabanatuan and afterwards left for Santa Rosa, arriving in time to participate
in the meeting. At this meeting the red flag was displayed, contrary to the
promise that Feleo had made to Major Gallardo. A couple of things happened
and Feleo was arrested for sedition. The arrest and removal of Feleo resulted
in disorder among the people present at the meeting, and Major Gallardo
found it advisable to make a short speech explaining why Feleo had been
arrested.
Ignacio Nabong who delivered a speech stating that the constabulary
committed a real abuse in seizing the flag, and that they ought to be united
to suppress abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own
government, the government of the poor.
ISSUE:
WON Nabong should be guilty of inciting to sedition.
21

HELD:
YES. The language used by the appellant clearly imported an
overthrow of the Government by violence, and it should be interpreted in the
plain and obvious sense in which it was evidently intended to be understood.
The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinary change by the exercise of the elective franchise. The use of the
whip, an instrument designed to leave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistent with the mild interpretation which the appellant would have us
impute to the language. It was the purpose of the speaker, beyond a doubt,
to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful
means. The words used by the appellant manifestly tended to induce the
people to resist and use violence against the agents of the Constabulary and
to instigate the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes. They
also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the order of the Government.
It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that the words used should
in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. The
law is not aimed merely at actual disturbance, and its purpose is also to
punish utterances which may endanger public order.

Gelig vs People
G.R. No. 173150

July 28, 2010

FACTS:
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia
confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a
"sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her,
thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a
medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However,
Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two
days after the incident.
On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital
and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.

22

She was then convicted for committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the
crime of slight physical injuries.
The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be
held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing
the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise,
Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on
the alleged name-calling of her son. However, it declared that Lydia can be
held guilty of slight physical injuries but later on appealed for corrections.
ISSUE:
WON Lydia Gelig should be convicted on direct assault.
HELD:
YES. The case of Lydia falls under the second mode of direct assault. Its
elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a
serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the
past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in
the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork
while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their
recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Gemma then proceeded
towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of
force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act
resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor. Gemma being a public school teacher,
belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article
152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades,
Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to
23

pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia
refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives.

Rivera vs People
G.R. No. 138553

June 30, 2005

FACTS:
Victim, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Accused Rivera was
in the same vicinity. When he saw Ruben, Rivera mocked Ruben for being
jobless and dependent on his wife. This caused an exchange of heated words
between the two.
The next day when Ruben and his daughter were once again buying
food, Rivera and two other men attacked Ruben. The two men punched and
mauled Ruben while Rivera, on the other hand, got a hollowblock and hit
Rubenss head with it three times. Rivera and his companions left only when
the policemen arrived.
Ruben was brought to the hospital and it was said that he suffered only
slight and superficial wounds but were it not for the arrival of the policemen,
Ruben would have died.
The Trial Court held that the three are guilty of frustrated murder while
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with
modifications.
ISSUE:
WON there was intention to kill.
HELD:
YES. There is intent to kill in the case at bar.
The pieces of evidence required to prove intent to kill are as follows:
1. Means used by the malefactors;
2. Nature,location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
3. Conduct of the malefactor before, during and after the commission of the
crime;
4. Circumstances under which the crime was committed; and,
5. Motive of the accused.
Applying the elements to the case at bar, the means or weapons used
by RIVERA is a piece of hollow block. As to nature, location and number of
wounds, Rivera inflicted injuries on the head of Ruben three times. Conduct
before during and after the commission of the crime, Rivera was angry at
24

Ruben because of the circumstances that transpired between Ruben and

him.

People vs Abalos
G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996
FACTS:
In the evening of March 20, 1983, while accused Tiburcio Abalos and
his father, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, were having a heated argument, a
woman shouted Police officer, help us! Somebodys making trouble here.
The victim, P/Pfc. Labine, then appeared at the scene and asked Major
Abalos, What is it, sir? The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned
around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, accused
hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three
inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle. He then
swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at
Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his
head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the
severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. The trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct
assault with murder.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder.
HELD:
YES. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad
o sus agentes under Article 148 of the RPC. The first is not a true atentado as
it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of
committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in
the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon
a person in authority. Appellant committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault
was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a
person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
25

intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in

authority or an agent of a person in authority. Here, Labine was a duly
appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an
agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the RPC. There is
also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when
assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during
the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he
personally knew Labine to be a policeman and, in fact, Labine was then
wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant
from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he
really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct assault
with murder or homicide. The killing in the instant case constituted the
felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means
deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being
confronted at the same time by appellants father. The evidence shows that
appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece
of wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

People vs Dural
G.R. No. L84921

June 8, 1993

FACTS:
A couple of witnesses testified that at about 12 o'clock in the
afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them were at supposed do go
somewhere but were not able to arrive there because while on their way or
from a distance of twelve armslength they heard successive gunfires so they
run and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a store from the place they
were hiding or from a distance of ten armslength they saw three men each of
them armed with .45 pistol, firing upon at the two Capcom soldiers on board
a Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop although its engine was
still running two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the
side of the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as
accused Rolando Dural.
26

Both Itucal and Dural denied authorship of the crime charged and
interposed the defense of alibi. The trial court rejected the defense of alibi on
the ground that eyewitnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos,whose
testimonies "were logical, straightforward and probable" and whose
"credibility was not shaken in any manner by the rigorous examination to
which they have been exposed," positively identified the accused. The
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on 1 September 1988.
ISSUE:
(1)WON Durals alibi has merit.
(2) WON he should be guilty of direct assault.
HELD:
(1) NO. In the instant case, Dural was positively identified by the
principal witnesses for the prosecution. It is equally settled that for alibi to
prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused was at some other place
at the time of the incident but that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. This was
not proven by Dural.
(2) YES. There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the
two other gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the
CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The
victims, who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of
official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For having assaulted and
killed the said victims, in conspiracy with the other two gunmen, appellant
Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. The crimes he committed, therefore, are two complex crimes of
murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Pursuant
then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious crime which is murder, should be imposed.

Tecson vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113218
November 22, 2001
FACTS:
On or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and control, with intent to use
27

and pass, as in fact he did use and pass ten (10) pieces of 100US dollar
notes of the Federal Reserve Note, or a sum of $1,000.00 (US Dollar) to Pedro
C. Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central Bank of the Philippines,
which bills were in the resemblance and similitude of the dollar bills issued
by the United States Government, the said accused knowing, as he did, that
the said US dollar bills were forged and falsified. Andy Tecson appealed then
defended himself and said that the said buy-bust operation was created to
frame him.
ISSUE:
WON the CoA erred in its judgement given Tecsons defense.
HELD:
NO. We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the case
at bar. The prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita
and Johnny Marqueta, that a buybust operation was conducted by the
combined agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the US Secret
Service, and that
the petitioner was therein caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and
in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes.
During the buybust operation, prosecution witnesses Labita and
Marqueta were introduced by the civilian informer to the petitioner as
interested buyers of fake US dollar notes. When the petitioner was in the act
of drawing the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes from his wallet,
he was immediately placed under arrest by Labita and his team.

Clemente vs People
G.R. No. 194367
June 15, 2011
FACTS:
On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person of
inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael
Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill
from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City
28

Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and
refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along
with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection.
Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and
found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the
latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a
surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black
wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twentythree pieces of
P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the
same. Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into
the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch of the Manila City jail
for interrogation. Appellant simply raised the defense of frameup.
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the
RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is
intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant
Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.
ISSUE:
WON there is a missing element for Clemente to be convicted.
HELD:
YES. The Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain
substantial facts of value to warrant a reversal of its factual assessments.
While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credence, said
defense must be given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to
meet its burden of proof.
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything
more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article
168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury
or bank notes.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the
counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis
dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy
soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they
were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to
buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In
short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked

29

Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay
and not based on the personal knowledge.

Hernandez vs. Hernandez

G.R. No. 171165
February 14, 2011
FACTS:
Sometime in 1995, PMRDC entered through its president,respondent
Mario Villamor into various agreements with corespondents HIGC and Land
Bank of the Philippines , in connection with the construction of the Isabel
Homes housing project in Batangas and of the Monumento Plaza commercial
and recreation complex in Caloocan City.
On November 13, 1997, PMRDC entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) whereby it was given the option to buy pieces of land
owned by petitioners. On March 23, 1998, it entered with LBP and Demetrio
the latter purportedly acting under authority of the same special power of
attorney as in the MOA into a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC).
In its January 21, 1999 letter to Demetrio, however, PMRDC, through
Villamor, stated that the TCTs could no longer be delivered back to
petitioners as the covered properties had already been conveyed and
assigned to the Asset Pool pursuant to the March 23, 1998 DAC. In the
correspondence that ensued, petitioners disowned Demetrios signature in
the DAC and labeled it a mere forgery. Boldly, they asserted that the
fraudulent execution of the DAC was made possible through the connivance
of all the respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the contention that Demetrios signature has been forged holds
merit.
HELD:
NO. Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be
presumed from a mere allegation but rather must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same. The
burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been
conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records
supports the allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit selfserving
disavowal of his signature in
open court.
30

Tamani vs Salvador
G.R. No. 171497

April 4, 2011

FACTS:
On July 29, 1986, a Complaint for quieting of title was filed by
(respondents) spouses Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo against
(petitioners)Tamani et al. over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya.
Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided
parcel of land with an area of 776 sq. m. under TCT No. 8582. Under said
title, respondents own 345 sq. m. of the property whereas the Spouses
Tamani own the remaining 431 sq. m. (disputed property).
On August 17, 1959, the Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed
property to Milagros Cruz and Cruz thereafter sold the disputed property to
respondents.
At the RTC, petitioners filed an Answer wherein they argued that they
were the lawful owners and were in actual possession of the disputed
property having inherited the same from their parents. Petitioners contend
that the signature of their parents were forged and thus assail the validity of
the August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute sale between Cruz and their parents.
During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of Demetrio Tamani
appearing on the deed of sale and his standard signatures were submitted
for examination and comparison to the Questioned Documents Division of
the NBI. Bienvenido C. Albacea (Albacea), a document examiner of the NBI,
filed a NBI report finding that the questioned and standard signatures
DEMETRIO TAMANI are WRITTEN by one and the same person. Dissatisfied
with the NBI report, petitioners asked for another examination of the
signatures, this time submitting the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service. Mely Sorra (Sorra), a document examiner of the PNP, filed a PNP
report finding that the questioned signature of DEMETRIO TAMANI marked
Q appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 17, 1959 and the
standard signatures of Demetrio Tamani marked S-1 to S-11 and S-19
WERE WRITTEN BY TWO DIFFERENT PERSONS.
The RTC rendered a Decision ruling in petitioners favor Confronted
with conflicting testimonies from handwriting experts, the RTC gave more

31

weight to the PNP report and testimony of Sorra because of her educational,
professional and work background.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the RTC, respondents filed a Notice of
Appeal. The CA issued a Decision ruling in respondents favor. The CA ruled
that the RTC erred when it relied solely on Sorras educational, professional
and work background when it decided to give more credence to the PNP
report. The CA, after examining the questioned and standard signatures of
Tamani opined that the similarities of strokes are more prominent and
pronounced than the dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are
overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned and the standard
signatures.
ISSUE:
WON the CA is correct in overturning the factual findings of the RTC.
HELD:
NO. Well settled is the rule that in the exercise of Our power of review
the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on this Court.
However, there are recognized exceptions, among which is when the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. The
disagreement between the RTC and the CA in their respective factual
conclusions with regard to the alleged forgery of the signature of Tamani
authorizes this Court to re-examine the testimonies and evidence submitted
by the parties. It is noteworthy to point out that two expert witnesses
testified, each with a different opinion on the issue at hand.
Before anything else, this Court observes that the present spectacle of
having two expert witnesses with conflicting findings could have been
avoided had respondents timely objected to petitioners motion to have a
second re-examination of Tamanis signature. After all, respondents are
correct in their claim that the first examination was at the instance of
petitioners. Respondents should have, therefore, objected to the second reexamination, as the RTC would have likely sustained the motion. However, a
perusal of the records would show that counsel for respondents never
objected to petitioners motion for a re-examination of Tamanis signature.
The manner by which the RTC disposed of the issue leaves much to be
desired. While credentials of an expert witness play a factor in the
evidentiary and persuasive weight of his testimony, the same cannot be the
sole factor in determining its value. The CA was thus correct when it declared
that the judge must conduct his own independent examination of the
signatures under scrutiny.
32

However, after painstakingly reviewing the testimonies of the expert

witnesses and the documentary evidence at hand, this Court is more inclined
to believe that the signature of Tamani appearing on the August 17, 1959
Deed of Sale was forged as can be gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the
document examiner from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere
statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance
he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.
While admittedly this Court was unable to fully comprehend all the
differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical in
nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that this
Court has observed a good number of the differences noted by her.
Lastly, while it was improper for the RTC to rely solely on Sorras
credentials, her superior credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give
added value to her testimony.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

Guillergan vs People
G.R. No. 185493
February 2, 2011
FACTS:
Sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the AFP,
directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon, Chief Clerk of the Comptrollers
Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence
agents with supporting time record and book. The agents names were
copied and, based on their appointment papers, certified as correct by
Guillergan
and then approved by Brigadier General Domingo T. Rio. Each time the
processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees,
Guillergan would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the
Budget and Fiscal NonCommissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the
"Remarks/Sig" column of the payrolls to complete the requirements and
facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls.

33

ISSUES:
WON petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public
documents.
HELD:
YES. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1,
Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his official position 2) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 and 3)
the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.
All of the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan as a public officer when he committed the offense charged.
He was the comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the
Information said that he took advantage of his position in committing the
crime, the Sandiganbayan found that his work as comptroller did not include
the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have
official custody of the pertinent documents. His official function was limited
to keeping the records of the resources that the command received from
Camp Crame.
Galeos vs People
G.R. Nos. 17473037

February 9, 2011

FACTS:
Ong was elected Mayor of the Naga in 1988 and served as such until
1998.
On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and
Federico T. Rivera for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and
Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal Engineer.
Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual
employees of the municipal government. In their individual Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered
"No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the
government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the
names of relatives referred to in the said query.
On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga,
Cebu filed a lettercomplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)34

Visayas against Ong ,Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
and AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of
public documents on the basis that said petitioners are related.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners are guilty of falsification of Public Document.
HELD:
YES. Falsification of Public Document by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the government service. All the elements of
falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the
prosecution. Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section
79 of the Local Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of
the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as
both require the application of the rules on relationship under the law of
succession. Court disagrees.
A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority
regarding the law that applies in a particular case. It is opposed to a finding
of fact, which interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be
applied. A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the
particulars of an event or occurrence.

Gonzaludo vs People
G.R. No. 150910
February 6, 2006
FACTS:
On January 20, 1993, Rosemarie Gelogo and Gregg Canlas executed a
Deed of Sale,
witnessed by petitioner. In that deed, Rosemarie Gelogo signed as
Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be the lawful owner of the
2storey house. By virtue of the same deed, vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all
of Rosemaries rights and interest on the subject house.Later, upon
complaint of Ulyssess widow Anita Manlangit, an Information dated May 31,
1994 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City charging
Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and

35

Melba Canlas and petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Public Document.
Atty. Ramon B. Clapiz, to the effect that she is the lawful owner of the
said house and affixing or causing to be affixed thereon her name and
signature, Rosemarie G. Villaflor, purportedly as wife of the deceased Ulysses
Villaflor, thus making untruthful statement in the narration of facts as
accused well know that such was not the case for the deceased Ulysses
Villaflor has a legal wife in the person of the herein offended party, by reason
of which accused was able to effect the sale and eventual occupancy of the
said house to the herein accused Sps. Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas who
despite of their knowledge that such house was not owned by Rosemarie
Gelogo bought the same from her in the amount of P80,000.00 and, herein
accused Bienvenido Gonzaludo despite of his knowledge that such house
was not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo, participated in the commission of the
herein offense by causing his name and signature to be affixed in the said
Deed of Sale as witness to the fraudulent sale entered into by the parties.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is guilty of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public
Document.
HELD:
NO. The petitioner may only be found guilty of the crime of Falsification
of Public Document. Based on the provisions of Art. 171, the same penalty
shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of
the offenses
enumerated in the paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of
persons.
As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with
Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration
of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the
house subject of such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her
real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas
spouses. It is established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
Rosemarie committed the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise,
proof beyond reasonable doubt has been duly adduced to establish
conspiracy between Rosemarie and petitioner who is the brotherinlaw of
Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the house in this case.

36

Garcia vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128213
December 13, 2005
FACTS:
Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal agreement was entered into
between Alberto Quijada, Jr. (Alberto) and Avella for the sale of the formers
house and lot located at 46 P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for the
purchase price of P1.2 million pesos.
On October 23, 1990, an "earnest money" in the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) was given to Alberto by Avella. On October 31,
1990, the amount of one hundred and fifty-five thousand pesos (P155,000)
was delivered by Avella representing this time the downpayment for the
house and lot. A subsequent payment of five thousand pesos (P5,000) was
made on January 21, 1991. With respect to this last transaction, Avella
prepared in her own handwriting two identical receipts.
The relationship between buyer and seller turned sour. Avella filed a
complaint for estafa against Alberto for his failure to execute a deed of sale
and deliver the subject property. Among the evidence she submitted was the
copy of the receipt she prepared on January 21, 1991. However, the receipt
appeared to have been. Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted a
criminal action against Avella.
ISSUE:
WON Avella should be guilty of falsification of a public document.
HELD:
YES. Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and
without convincing evidence that the alteration was with the consent of
private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements have been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is
readily apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000
when in fact he did not. Hence, Avellas conviction.

37