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Fig. 1. Culturally widespread supernatural concepts (only the most frequent are
represented here) correspond to a small number of templates that combine [a]
activation of a domain concept with its default assumptions and [b] culturally
transmitted, limited violations of expectations for that domain.
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Review
But say
Religious thoughts are typically activated when people deal with concrete
situations (this crop, that disease, this new birth, this dead body, etc.)
It is about a variety of agents: ghouls, ghosts, spirits, ancestors, gods, etc., in
direct interaction with people
It generates as much anxiety as it allays: vengeful ghosts, nasty spirits and
aggressive gods are as common as protective deities
There is no reason to think that the various kinds of thoughts we call religious all
appeared in human cultures at the same time
Most religious explanations of natural phenomena actually explain little but
produce salient mysteries
In places where religion is not invoked to explain them, such phenomena are not
seen as intrinsically mystical or supernatural
The notion of salvation is particular to a few doctrines (Christianity and doctrinal
religions of Asia and the Middle-East) and unheard of in most other traditions
Religious commitment can (under some conditions) be used as signal of
coalitional affiliation; but coalitions create social fission (secession) as often as
group integration
There are many irrefutable statements that no-one believes; what makes some of
them plausible to some people is what we need to explain
Commitment to imagined agents does not really relax or suspend ordinary
mechanisms of belief-formation; indeed it can provide important evidence for
their functioning (and therefore should be studied attentively)
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Box 1. Trance vs. doctrine: does salient experience shape ordinary practice?
In many different places around the world, rituals induce what are called
altered states of consciousness: trance, possession, meditation, and so
on (Fig. I). The techniques include self-stimulation, visual fixation,
verbal satiation, hyper-ventilation, mood-enhancing or hallucinogenic
drugs, sensory deprivation, and music [67]. How do such techniques
contribute to the creation, spread and intuitive plausibility of religious
notions?
Psychologists of religion have often suggested that the specific
phenomenology of such states inform religious notions [68], and
propose the following causal links:
(1) specific brain events in a particular person lead to specific
experience of supernatural entities or agents;
(2) a mystics specific experience leads to that persons specific
concepts;
(3) the mystics concepts lead to the groups religious tradition.
This is the path taken in the modern study of altered states of
consciousness, including the very few experimental studies of their
neural underpinnings [66].
Such studies might one day be able to document causal links 1 and 2
above. But what about link 3? As anthropologists point out, most
religious concepts in most minds at most times in most cultures are built
on the basis of other peoples statements (e.g. the gods are awesome),
sometimes completed by some personal experience (e.g. feeling awed
at the thought of the gods), and very seldom accompanied by any
mystical experience (e.g. of feeling the presence of the god). So it is
difficult to say whether extraordinary experience really has much impact
on religious concepts. Many anthropologists argue that the phenomenology of altered states is intrinsically indeterminate. Culturally
transmitted concepts are required to give the experience any content
at all [69].
The production of exceptional experience could be part of what R.N.
McCauley and E.T. Lawson call the high sensory pageantry of rituals
that create exceptional emotional states, from elation to terror and from
intense pleasure to excruciating pain [70]. By contrast, many rituals are
based on repetitive lessons. Why this difference? For McCauley and
E.T. Lawson, high sensory rituals have supernatural agents acting; low
sensory rituals are those in which they are being acted upon. The two
ritual modes perhaps also use two distinct resources of human
memory: salient perceptually encoded autobiographical events versus
conceptually integrated scripts [71].
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Specific system [46], selective impairment [47,48]. NC: joint activation of medial
FC [49,50] and regions dedicated to social cues [44], imitation [51] and emotional
empathy (see below). Questions: How do these systems generate inferences
about non-physically present agents (imaginary companions, spirits)?
3
Face-recognition [52] and agency cues (above). NC: those of social agency and
person files [53]. Questions: Do dead bodies produce disjunction between social
agency and animacy detection? How does this connect with emotional effects of
mortality?
7
Inferential systems detached from general mental logic [63] and cultural factors
[64], possible selective im-pairment [65]. Questions: Are the emotions triggered
specific to these systems? How are the emotions transferred to non-physical
resources?
8
The argument presented in this article is that religion does not involve a specific mental faculty or neural system. A cognitive neuroscience of religion would require a twostep reduction. First, different aspects of religion (left column, bold) require diverse inference systems (left column, below headings) also found in non-religious contexts.
Second, each inference system corresponds not to a single neural system but to the joint activation of a family of systems (right column). Abbreviations: NC: neural correlates;
FC: frontal cortex; PtdCho: parietal cortex; STS: superior-temporal cortex; Ac: anterior cingulate; OFC: orbito-frontal cortex; Caud.: caudate nucleus; TC: temporal cortex. All
numbers refer to main text bibliography.
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