1NC Deterrence

U.S. commitment to Asia increasing

Gates, 6-5-2010 Secretary of Defense (6/5/10, Robert M., International Institute For Strategic Studies (Shangri-La--Asia
Security) http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1483, JMP)
When I last stood before you, I did so only a few months after a new administration had taken office. President Obamas policies
toward this region were still evolving, but I noted that he had a very personal connection to this part of the world, and that,
regardless of new initiatives, or different areas of emphasis under his administration, the underlying themes of continuity and

The United States has responsibilities to friends and allies, and will not
waver in its longstanding commitments here. Indeed, we will continue to deepen and expand our
alliances and partnerships. In the next few minutes, I would like to provide an overview of how the United States sees its
engagement in Asia would hold true.

responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region within the context of broader U.S. defense priorities and events over the past year. As a
starting point, it is important to remember that the success this region has enjoyed over the past several decades its
unprecedented economic growth and political development was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, it was enabled by clear choices
about the enduring principles that we all believe are essential to peace, prosperity, and stability. These include our commitment to:
* Free and open commerce; * A just international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule
of law; * Open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and now, cyberspace; and * The principle of resolving conflict
without the use of force. Simply put, pursuing our common interests has increased our common security. Today, the Asia-Pacific
region is contending with new and evolving challenges from rising powers and failing states, to the proliferation of nuclear and
ballistic missiles, extremist violence, and new technologies that have the ability to disrupt the foundations of trade and commerce
on which Asias economic stability depends. Confronting these threats is not the task of any one nation acting alone. Rather, our
collective response will test our commitment to the principles I just mentioned principles that are key to the regions continued
prosperity. In this, all of us have responsibilities we must fulfill, since all will bear the costs of instability as well as the rewards of

My governments overriding obligation to allies, partners, and the region is

to reaffirm Americas security commitments in this region. Over the last year, the Obama administration has
international cooperation.

begun to lay out the architecture of Americas future defense posture through a series of strategy reviews. These reviews were
shaped by a bracing dose of realism, and in a very sober and clear-eyed way assessed risks, set priorities, made tradeoffs, and

It has become clear to

us that an effective, affordable, and sustainable U.S. defense posture requires a broad portfolio
of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict.
Fielding these capabilities, and demonstrating the resolve to use them if necessary, assures
friends and potential adversaries alike of the credibility of U.S. security commitments through
our ability to defend against the full range of potential threats.
identified requirements based on plausible, real-world threats, scenarios, and potential adversaries.

Withdrawal will wreck U.S. influence.

Kang & Cha, 3 *associate professor of Business at Dartmouth, AND **associate professor of government Georgetowns
school of Foreign Service (May/June 2003, David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha, Foreign Policy, Think Again: The Korea Crisis,
http://www.ituassu.com.br/asia_fp1.pdf, JMP)
The United States Should Pull Its Troops Out of an Ungrateful South Korea Not yet. Massive demonstrations, Molotov cocktails
hurled into U.S. bases, and American soldiers stabbed on the streets of Seoul have stoked anger in Congress and on the op-ed pages
of major newspapers about South Korea. As North Korea appears on the nuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by the groundswell of
anti-Americanism. They cringe at a younger generation of Koreans who tell cbs televisions investigative program 60 Minutes that
Bush is more threatening than Kim, and they worry about reports that South Koreas new president, Roh Moo-hyun, was avowedly
anti-American in his younger days. Most Koreans have complicated feelings about the United States. Some of them are antiAmerican, to be sure, but many are grateful. South Korea has historically been one of the strongest allies of the United States. Yet it
would be naive to dismiss the concerns of South Koreans about U.S. policy and the continued presence of U.S. forces as merely
emotional. Imagine, for example, how Washingtonians might feel about the concrete economic impact of thousands of foreign
soldiers monopolizing prime real estate downtown in the nations capital, as U.S. forces do in Seoul. But

hasty withdrawal

of U.S. forces is hardly the answer to such trans-Pacific anxiety , particularly as the U.S.South Korean
alliance enters uncharted territory. The North Koreans would claim victory, and the United States would lose
influence in one of the most dynamic economic regions in the world an outcome it neither wants nor can
afford. In the long term, such a withdrawal would also pave the way for Chinese regional dominance .
Some South Koreans might welcome a larger role for Chinaa romantic and uninformed notion at best. Betting on China, after all,

The
alternatives to the alliance are not appealing to either South Koreans or Americans. Seoul would
did not make South Korea the 12th largest economy and one of the most vibrant liberal democracies in the world.

have to boost its relatively low level of defense spending (which, at roughly 3 percent of gross domestic product, is less than that of

Washington would run the risk of jeopardizing its military

presence across East Asia, as a U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula raised questions about
the raison dtre for keeping its troops in Japan . A revision in the U.S. military presence in Korea is likely within
Israel and Saudi Arabia, for example).

the next five years, but withdrawal of that presence and abrogation of its alliance are not.

Regional states confidence in the U.S. commitment is key to East Asian stability and
U.S. global leadership the impact is rapid Japan remilitarization, Taiwan conflict and
instability in India-Pakistan and Korea.

Goh, 8 Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford

(Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,
2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database, JMP)

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the
hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits and
ideational convictions the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows

regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective
certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been
determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary
position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US
commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the
regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of
that

second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of
their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North
Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the
dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained

Three of the key potential global challengers to US

unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to,
US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian
regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position
from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by
encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance.
Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing
in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining
challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War.

characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that

successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance

and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a normal country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and
expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the
United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to
perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community
between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater
independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it
appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the
regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for
regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather
than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there
comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically,

remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist hawks in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained normalization process cannot take place outside of

Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a

conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the
United States dominance directly. The United StatesROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic
the restraining framework of the United StatesJapan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007).

priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification in
South Korea, the image of the US as the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North, and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an evil state
suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States as
indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.7980). These
observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the
United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's
regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the
US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United StatesROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on
South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting
business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis--vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its
contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved
significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough
was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and
independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the
latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there
has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against
potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States,
not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional
norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition.
Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the
small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to choose sides between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum,
ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also
constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical
deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on
this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of
how and why the United StatesChina relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China
is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional
power witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to
engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of
China's power culminates in US fears about the region being lost to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy
post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast
Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the
East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable regional stakeholder that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security
aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its
global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent
question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a
closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does

the East Asian

regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely
disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese
remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear
not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet,

brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are

all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have
suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order . The major patterns of
equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest
insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to
managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era.
However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because
of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails
social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional
and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared

The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability
of the United States' global leadership and regional domination . At the regional level, the main
scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of
key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US
leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in
doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of
in ways yet to be determined?

change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is
notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the
United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that
could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

This causes great power nuclear conflict.

Gray, 5 Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies, and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, at the

University of Reading (Spring 2005, Colin S., Parameters, How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?
http://www.carlisle.army. mil/usawc/parameters/05spring/gray.htm)
6. Interstate War, Down but Far from Out Logically, the reverse side of the coin which proclaims a trend favoring political violence

Metz and
Millen assure us that most armed conflicts in coming decades are likely to be internal

internal to states is the claim that interstate warfare is becoming, or has become, a historical curiosity. Steven
Raymond

ones.21 That is probably a safe prediction, though one might choose to be troubled by their prudent hedging with the qualifier
most. Their plausible claim would look a little different in hindsight were it to prove true except
for a mere one or two interstate nuclear conflicts, say between India and Pakistan, or North
Korea and the United States and its allies. The same authors also offer the comforting judgment that decisive war
between major states is rapidly moving toward historys dustbin.22 It is an attractive claim; it is a shame that it is wrong. War, let
alone decisive war, between major states currently is enjoying an off-season for one main reason: So
extreme is the imbalance of military power in favor of the United States that potential rivals rule
out policies that might lead to hostilities with the superpower . It is fashionable to argue that major interstate
war is yesterdays problemrecall that the yesterday in question is barely 15 years in the pastbecause now there is nothing to

The
menace of major, if not necessarily decisive, interstate war will return to frighten us when
great-power rivals feel able to challenge American hegemony . If you read Thucydides, or Donald
fight about and nothing to be gained by armed conflict. Would that those points were true; unfortunately they are not.

Kagan, you will be reminded of the deadly and eternal influence of the triad of motives for war: fear, honor, and interest.23

Gender is not the root cause of warwar causes gender oppression and other
structural violence
Goldstein 2 (Joshua S., Professor Emeritus of International Relations, American University (Washington, DC) Research

Scholar, University of Massachusetts and Nonresident Sadat Senior Fellow, CIDCM, University of Maryland, War and Gender , P.
412 2k2)

peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace.
Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, if you want peace, work for justice.
Then if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically
(perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace
movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in
this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism,
imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influences wars outbreaks and
outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices. So, if you want
peace, work for peace. Indeed, if you want justice (gener and others), work for peace.
Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis from types of individuals,
societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in
attitudes toward war and the military may be the most important way to reverse womens
oppression/ The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies and moral
grounding, yet, in light of this books evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to
be empirically inadequate.
First,

1NC NK War CP
Text: The United States federal government should
-establish and publicly portray a willingness to engage North Korea diplomatically in a
reciprocal process
-convince other regional actors to participate in a multilateral security solution with
negotiations being open and scheduled on a continuous basis.
-offer Russia the mediator role
-propose the creation of a body that organizes economic assistance to North Korea with the
goal of system transformation
This solves Korean War better than the aff and avoids the deterrence DA
Kinne 4 US Army Colonel (5/3/2004, Gary, U.S. Strategy Towards North Korea, US Army War College
Strategy Research Project, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423691) MGM
The United States, through its diplomatic arm, has effectively garnered the support of the international
community and isolated North Korea. While containing the North, the U.S. has continued to foster diplomatic
relations with key regional actors such as South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China. These actions further solidify the
legitimacy of U.S. efforts and promote regional stability. However, recent developments indicate that North Korea intends to up
the ante by resuming its WMD development program and proliferation efforts. These activities are seen by the
North as the best way to exact aid and concessions from the rest of the world 17 the equivalent of blackmail. This new
dynamic exposes one of the most significant weaknesses of the containment strategy time. The more time it takes for North Korea to comply with U.S.
and international law, the more time available for it to develop and proliferate WMD. Diplomatic isolation of North Korea prevents

reconciliatory dialogue between the two sides. A stalemate or delay favors the underlying efforts of the North. Adoption of the
three-pronged strategy would help resolve many of the issues mentioned above. This strategy represents an adaptation
of the current containment policy coupled with elements of selective engagement and support of regional
actors. An obvious advantage of this strategy would be engagement of the North by U.S. diplomats . In order to be
successful, the U.S. administration must be willing to openly engage North Korean officials. Without a conduit for
open and frank dialogue, each side will continue to harbor their respective feelings of mistrust and grievances.
Scholars and foreign affairs experts suggest that the primary stumbling block between the two
countries is extremely limited and ineffective communications . Although severely hampered by the Bush administrations policy
of diplomatic isolation, both sides talk but neither listens. Succinctly stated, North Koreas mistrust of the U.S. and her
allies combined with the Bush administrations immediate dismissal of all North Korean points of views and
issues prevents any and all hopes of a compromise.18 This talking past one another must be resolved if a viable solution is to
be obtained. Embracing a policy of engagement is the solution. Formally establishing and publicly portraying a
willingness to engage diplomatically with North Korean government officials could serve as a catalyst for peace .
Not only should the U.S. develop a direct diplomatic link with the North, they should also convince other key regional actors to
participate in the development of a regional solution to the ongoing security issue. These negotiations and
discussions should be frank, open, and scheduled on a continuous basis in an attempt to reduce mistrust
between parties; promote mutual understanding of both sides issues and reservations ; attain a proposed
solution to ease and eliminate tension; and develop a mutually agreed upon plan of action to implement such
solutions. Although some might regard such a policy of engagement as being overly optimistic, a continued narrow-minded strategy of containment
leading to simply more of the status quo favors the North. Again, time is the ally of evil and the enemy of good. A policy of engagement does
not signify weakness or a willingness on behalf of the Bush administration to buy U.S. interests .19 Rather, it
must be formulated and executed with the goal of opening honest dialogue from that compromise follows.
Assistance of all regional actors in the peaceful resolution of issues on the Korean peninsula benefits all
involved. Although the Korean crisis represents a unique Asian-Pacific regional issue with vital U.S. national
interests at stake, the U.S. should not attempt to pursue or negotiate a resolution unilaterally. As stated in the latest
version of the National Security Strategy (2002): [w]e are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer , better world alone.
Alliance and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is
committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other
long-standing alliances.20 Leveraging the power gained by involving all the regional actors is the optimal solution.

This in turn enhances open and frank dialogue; sensitivity and better understanding of cultural diversity;
alliances and bonds between nation states; development of mutually agreed upon courses of actions; execution,
oversight, and enforcement of agreed solutions; sharing of resources; and legitimacy. As positive as this may sound, the
most difficult aspect of this strategy to achieve will be obtaining consensus. The time necessary to conduct these negotiations could also be lengthy. The

indicators
reveal that our current policies are propelling North Korea to the brink of a humanitarian crisis. Economic
devastation, famine, and malnutrition may further threaten the relatively fragile balance of power on the
peninsula.21 As noted earlier, some experts blame the current U.S. administration and its strategy of containment for the
resurgence of the Norths WMD program. Continued implementation of both economic and trade sanctions remain
easily executable; however, a resulting humanitarian crisis would devastate the region, undermine our current
strategy, and erode our credibility both regionally and worldwide. Utilizing the three-pronged strategy of
containment, engagement, and regional actors would offer many economic advantages over our current policy. First,
through a process of engagement the administration could adopt a more flexible posture utilizing a carrot and
stick approach as a means of resolving issues.22 Providing incentives for desired North Korean behaviors, such
as humanitarian aid or fuel oil shipments in exchange for WMD development and proliferation cessation,
might resurrect successful negotiation talks. Second, regional actors stringent support of U.S. economic and trade
policies towards North Korea would help force the Norths compliance to acceptable international norms and
values. Third, a regional solution to the security issue promotes economic burden sharing while simultaneously
allowing continued U.S. access to Asian-Pacific markets . Fourth, involvement of the U.S. and regional
actors in a mutually agreed upon strategy strengthens the credibility, prestige, and ability of the U.S. to shape
the region in terms favorable to its vital national interests .23 Again, the primary drawback of this strategy is the inability to obtain
consensus and the time required to develop and implement the agreed upon solution. Forward deployed U.S. military forces on the
Korean peninsula, backed up by additional forces in Japan, have long been the bastions of our current containment
policy. Their presence signifies resolve, commitment to our allies, and deterrence . Although not the only element of power used to
coerce North Korea, this remains the most persuasive and visible tool used to moderate potential aggression.
Forward presence enables the U.S. to rapidly respond to crises while promoting regional stability . The primary
U.S. containment policy towards North Korea remains economically viable, but at a cost. Although a successful strategy in the past,

disadvantage of this strategy is the requirement to maintain a dedicated military presence in the region. These forces are thus unavailable to respond to
other worldwide contingencies. Adoption of the three-pronged strategy could alleviate some of the burden placed on

current U.S. military forces. Regional actors involvement in the formulation of a military alliance designed to
deter and defeat North Korean aggression would be the optimal solution. Regional actors could also equally
share the requirements for resources in terms of manpower , dollars, equipment, and training. Other advantages of this
strategy include: a multilateral versus a unilateral approach to conflict resolution; a potential de-escalation of
tensions resulting from reduced U.S. military presence; greater U.S. military strategic flexibility; and increased
pressure exerted by unified regional actors designed to compel North Korea to comply with international law
and order. This regional alliance would help secure vital interests of the U.S. and its allies, a critical component of our current National Security Strategy.
24 Furthermore, operations devoid of multilateral or regional alliance support have predominately failed or become

too resource intensive to execute. For example, critics contend that the Bush administrations decision to conduct offensive operations
against Iraq was done unilaterally, in their eyes. Failure to obtain United Nations backing prior to the commencement of hostilities left the credibility
and image of the U.S. somewhat tarnished. Although viewed as a great militarily success, the resulting quagmire brought on by requirements, such as
peace keeping and nation building operations, might well have been avoided through enhanced support from other countries. Lessons learned

from Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as in Bosnia and Kosovo, suggest that future U.S./North Korea policies
should optimize the benefits of strong regional actor and alliance support . The difficulty with this course of action lies, once
again, in the ability of the United States to garner the required support, gain consensus, and equably distribute the burden amongst actors. All this must
be achieved while remaining responsive to our treaty obligations and continuing to secure our own vital interests worldwide. Table 2 depicts a
comparison between the strategy of containment (COA 1) and the three-pronged strategy (COA 3). Using the previously identified

criteria, the comparison clearly indicates COA 3 is a better option. It promotes a regional solution to the Korean security
dilemma. This option enables the U.S. to assert its role as a world hegemon while subsequently continuing to
shape the region in terms favorable to the U.S. Not only does this course of action afford the greatest
opportunity for regional stability, it also enables the United States to shape the emergence of China as an
upcoming regional and potential world super power.

1NC Fem Adv

1. Zero aff solvency cx proves that the aff is insufficient to break down gender hierarchies
their Enloe evidence concludes neg. If win framework, they solve zilch.
2. Prostitutes are still prostitutes post-plan they cant prevent masculinity
3. The structure of their argument undermines feminismthe claim that a single link
results in a big root cause impact marginalizes struggles against other forms of
violence and discrimination
Crenshaw 2 [Carrie Crenshaw PhD, Former President of CEDA, Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary
Argumentation and Debate 2002 p. 119-126]
Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate.

Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I
such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound

applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that

causal

reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being

debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to

marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He
argued thatcausal arguments are desirable for four reasons First causal analysis increases the control
of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning
increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third causal arguments promote understanding of
the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil . Finally causal
reasoning supplies good reasons for "commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief
which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive "claims of immediacy (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role
debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that

"

in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal
reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical
proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation
resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions "to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists" (108). The second
and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of "good reasons" to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I
contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal
questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative,
debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, "[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives
argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic,
"(rjesolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a

most affirmatives on both topics desiring "big

impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear
annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal
patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women,

harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal
nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the

Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common.

is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic,
theoreticaland pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical m otivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that
patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression . Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent
oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and
capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the
complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical
quantification. The transformation of feminists to feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is
related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined
welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole.
First

, there

as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic
criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far
as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects,
conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form
appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement

Debaters practice the convention of

poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form
Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage.
126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality.

Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link

Debaters practice the convention of

establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to
audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the
certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us
from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate
will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional.

rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However,

The sacrifice has consequences for our

students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized
movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is
when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning.

ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to
the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions
of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated . Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many
and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that
feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of
women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of
feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two
distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational
feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women
of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull;
Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the
situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to
either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17).

The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to
define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism . As a
result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed

Debate arguments that assume a singular

conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women
while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status . This
position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate patriarchy is the sole cause
oppression Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy
as the sole cause
allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like
racism and classism to the struggle against sexism ch subjugation has the effect of denigrating
the
legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance . "Within feminist movement in the
West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist
action than resisting racism and other forms of domination " (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class
exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression
obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination , bell hooks argues that we should not
obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated If focus on patriarchal
domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women
cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume
responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as
the sole cause allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class
and race privilege It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes
ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form , the expectation of judges that they will isolate a
women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18).

of

of oppression

. Su

of oppression

single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our

The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of

certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about
feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into
commodity, spectacle hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students
to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students
would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization
of many feminist voices in the debate itself The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so,
responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships.

"(

we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for
exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a

arguments about
feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common
practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal
link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a
single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression . In making this critique, I
hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point,

am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns
affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of
power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation.
"lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our
collective experience" (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal
consciousness raising

4. Feminist theory is inherently exclusive, it essentializes men creating more binaries,

and gender isnt the only category through which people understand difference
Jarvis 2k (Darryl, government and international relations, U. of Sydney, International Relations and the
Challenge of Postmodernism, Feminist revisions of international relations, p. 162-3)

Critics of feminist perspectives run

the risk of denouncement as either a misogynist malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the
gate. At work in much of this discourse is an unstated political correctness, where the historical
Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations.

marginalization of women bestows intellectual autonomy, excluding those outside the identity
group from legitimate participation in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real,
legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional
(personal) ontology. Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of particular groups
are, of course, welcome to lend support and encouragement, but only on terms delineated by the
groups themselves. In this way, they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony oyer their own self-identification, insuring the group
discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, ,uu\ standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self
defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls for a "home steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that we be included on our terms"
(my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from
critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and
trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many
debaters are chimerical," but, as a consequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93
Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically

Demands for entry to the

discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern
feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about
the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and
aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity.

"emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary

Intolerance or
misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom
of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory.'"' Most
means of reinventing the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identitiesthe most important of which is gender.94

strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the discipline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality.

After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectualand
well establishedspaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed
by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that
derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged . And privilege is variously interpreted
historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to

White males, for example, become generic signifiers for historical

oppression, indicating an ontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of
the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, AND
exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and
the extent to which the history of that particular group has been silenced. In this same way,
self-identification or self-situation establishes ones credentials, allowing admittance to the
group and legitimating the authoritative vantage point from which one speaks and writes . Thus,
assess the injustices of past histories.

for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worlding Women, a section titled A (personal) politics
of location, in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes apparent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96
Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, It is important to provide a context for ones work in the often-denied politics of
the personal. Accordingly, self-declaration revelas to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to
develop your brains and confess something called sins to always male forever priests, and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic

Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intellectual spaces

whose sovereign authority is policed as much by marginal subjectivies as they allege
of the oppressors who police the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline
objectivity.97

insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and malestream theory. If Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernism is projected as
tolerant, perspectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches ,

in reality it is as selective, exclusionary, and

dismissive of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being .
Skillful theoretical moves of this nature underscore the adroitness of postmodern feminist theory at emasculating many of its logical inconsistencies.
In arguing for a feminist postmodernism, for example, Sylvester employs a double theoretical move that, on the one hand, invokes a kind of
epistemological deconstructive anarchy cum relativism in an attempt to decenter or make insecure fixed research gazes, identities, and concepts (men,
women, security, and nation-state), while on the other hand turning to the lived experiences of women as if ontologically given and assuming their
experiences to be authentic, real, substantive, and authoritative interpretations of the realities of international relations. Women at the peace camps of
Greenham Common or in the cooperatives of Harare, represent, for Sylvester, the real coal face of international politics, their experiences and
strategies the real politics of relations international. But why should we take the experiences of these women to be ontologically superior or more
insightful than the experiences of other women or other men? As Sylvester admits elsewhere, Experience is at once always already an
interpretation and in need of interpretation. Why, then are experience-based modes of knowledge more insightful than knowledges derived through
other modes of inquiry?98

Such espistemologies are surely crudely positivistic in their singular reliance

on osmotic perception of the facts as they impact upon the person al. If, as Sylvester writes, sceptical inlining
draws on substantive everydayness as a time and site of knowledge, much as does everyday feminist theorizing, and if, as she further notes, it

why should this knowledge be valued as

anything other than fleeting subjective perceptions of multiple environmental stimuli whose
meaning is beyond explanation other than as a personal narrative ?99 Is this what Sylvester means when she calls
understands experienceas mobile, indeterminate, hyphenated, [and] homeless,

for a re-visioning and a repainting of the canvases of IR, that we dissipate knowledge into an infinitesimal number of disparate sites, all equally valid,
and let loose with a mlange of visceral perceptions; stories of how each of us perceive we experience international politics? If this is the case, then
Sylvesters version of feminist postmodernity does not advance our understanding of international politics, leaving untheorized and unexplained the

Personal narratives do not constitute theoretical discourse, nor indeed an

explanation of the systemic factors that procure international events, process, or the actions of
certain actors. We might also extend a contextualist lens to analyze Sylvesters formulations,
causes of international relations.

much as she insists her epistemogical approach does. Sylvester, for example, is adamant that
we can not really know who women are, since to do so would be to invoke an essentialist
concept, concealing the diversity inherent in this category. Women dont really exist in
Sylvesters estimation since there are black women, white women, Hispanic, disabled, lesbin,
poor, rich, middle class, and illiterate women, to name but a few. The point, for Sylvester, is that
to speak of women is to do violence to the diversity encapsulated in this category and, in its
own way, to silence those women who remain unnamed. Well and good. Yet this same analytical
respect for diversity seems lost with men. Politics and international relations become the
places of men. But which men? All men? Or just white men, or rich, educated, elite, upper
class, hetero-sexual men? To speak of political places as the places of men ignores the fact that
most men, in fact the overwhelming majority of men, are not in these political places at all, are
not decision makers, elite, affluent, or powerful . Much as with Sylvesters categories, there are poor, lower
class, illiterate, gay, black, and white men, many of whom suffer the vestiges of hunger, poverty,
despair, and disenfranchisement just as much as women . So why invoke the category men in
such essentialist and ubiquitous ways while cognizant only of the diversity of in the category
women. These are double standards, not erudite theoretical formulations, betraying, dare one
say, sexism toward men by invoking male gender generalizations and crude caricatures.
Problems of this nature, however, are really manifestations of a deeper, underlying ailment
endemic to discourses derived from identity politics . At base, the most elemental question for identity discourse, as
Zalewski and Enloe note, is Who am I?100 The personal becomes the political, evolving a discourse where self-identification, but also ones
identification by others, presupposes multiple identities that are fleeting, overlapping, and changing at any particular moment in time or place. We

these identities are

variously depicted as transient, polymorphic, interactive, discursive, and never fixed. As Richard
have multiple identities, argues V. Spike Peterson, e.g., Canadian, homemaker, Jewish, Hispanic, socialist.101 And

Brown notes, Identity is given neither institutionally nor biologically. It evolves as one orders continuities on ones conception of oneself.102 Yet, if

Which identity, for example, do we choose

from the many that any one subject might display affinity for? Are we to assume that all
identities are of equal importance or that some are more important than others? How do we
know which of these identities might be transient and less consequential to ones sense of self
and, in turn, politically significant to understanding international politics? Why, for example,
should we place gender identity ontologically prior to class, sexual orientation, ethnic
origin, ideological perspective, or national identity?103 As Zalewski and Enloe ask, Why do we consider states
to be a major referent? Why not men? Or women?104 But by the same token, why not dogs, shipping magnates, movie stars, or trade regimes? W hy
is gender more constitutive of global politics than, say, class, or an identity as a cancer survivor,
laborer, or social worker? Most of all, why is gender essentialized in feminist discourse , reified
into the most preeminent of all identities as the primary lens through which international
relations must be viewed? Perhaps, for example, people understand difference in the context of
identities outside of gender. As Jane Martin notes, How do we know that differencedoes not turn on being fat or religious or in
an abusive relationship?105 The point, perhaps flippantly made, is that identity is such a nebulous concept, its
meaning so obtuse and so inherently subjective, that it is near meaningless as a
conduit for understanding global politics if only because it can mean anything to
anybody.
we accept this, the analytical utility of identity politics seems problematic at best.

5. Focusing on prostitutes on bases in foreign countries obscures the real challenge by not
putting pressure on the people who are complicient in the gendered constructions outside of
the specific instance of the aff, it marginalizes womens movements.
Enloe 93 Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science
from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases p. 198-199, MT)

women are not just the

objects of that power, not merely passive puppets or victims . As we have seen, women of different classes and different ethnic
Women need to be made visible in order to understand how and why international power takes the forms it does. But

groups have made their own calculations in order to cope with or benefit from the current struggles between states. These calculations result in whole
countries becoming related to one another, often in hierarchical terms. In search of adventure, that physical and intellectual excitement typically
reserved for men, some affluent women have helped turn other women into exotic landscapes. In pursuit of meaningful paid careers, some women have
settled in colonies or hired women from former colonies. Out of a desire to appear fashionable and bolster their sometimes shaky self-confidence, many
women have become the prime consumers of products made by women working for low wages in other countries. And in an effort to measure the
progress they have made towards emancipation in their own societies, women have often helped legitimize international global pyramids of 'civilization'.

All too often, the only women who are made visible on the international stage are 'Third World
women', especially those who are underpaid factory workers or entertainment workers around foreign

military bases. There are two dangers here. First, the multiple relationships that women in
industrialized countries have to international politics are camouflaged . For instance, we do not see the
British Asian woman who is organizing anti-deportation campaigns, which can reshape governments' use of
marriage to control international flows of people. The American woman on holiday who is helping to 'open up'
Grenada to tourism is made invisible, as is the Canadian woman who is insisting on pursuing her career rather than following her diplomat
husband overseas. The Italian woman sewing for Benetton at home is hidden. In the process, the international system is made to look
less complicated, less infused with power, less gendered than it really is. The second danger in this tendency to
see only 'Third World women' when thinking about women on the international stage is that the important
differences between women in less industrialized countries will be ignored . By portraying all
women in Third World societies as sewing jeans, not buying jeans, as prostitutes, not as social workers and activists,
we again under-estimate the complex relationships it takes to sustain the current international
political system. Middle-class women in countries such as Mexico and Sri Lanka have different kinds of stakes in the present system than do
working-class and peasant women. This is compounded by societies' ethnic and racial barriers between Hispanicized and Indian Mexican women, and
between Tamil and Singhalese Sri Lankan women, for instance. International debt may affect all women in Mexico, but not to the same degree or in the
same ways. National dignity may be appealing to all Sri Lankan women, but which nation one feels part of may be problematic. Sexuality may also divide
women in a Third World country. Heterosexual women, for instance, may feel ashamed or contemptuous of lesbian women and thus not be able to
confront nationalist men who use homophobic innuendos to delegitimize arguments for women's rights. The international establishment has needed
many women in Third World countries to feel more at ease with women from Europe or North America than with women living in a shanty town a mile
from their front door. Therefore, efforts to transcend internationally and locally devised barriers between women of Third World countries have had the
most significant impact on foreign military bases, multinational corporations and investment bankers. While women have not been mere pawns in global
politics, governments and companies with government backing have made explicit attempts to try to control and channel women's actions in order to
achieve their own ends. Male officials who make foreign policy might prefer to think of themselves as dealing with high finance or military strategy, but
in reality they have self-consciously designed immigration, labor, civil service, propaganda and military bases policies so as to control women. They have
acted as though their government's place in world affairs has hinged on how women behaved. Uncovering these efforts has exposed men as men.

6. Enloe concludes neg aff does nothing to solve gender

Enloe 93 Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science
from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War p. 150, MT)

There is no evidence thus far that being compelled by the forces of nature and nationalism to shut down
two of their most prized overseas bases has caused U.S. military planners to rethink their
prostitution policies. Shifting some of the Philippines operations to Guam or Singapore or back home to the United States does
not in itself guarantee new official presumptions about the kinds of sexual relations required to
sustain U.S. military power in the post Cold War world. The governments of Singapore and the United States signed a basing agreement in

Tokyo in mid-I992. But, despite popular misgivings about the implications of allowing U.S. Navy personnel to use the small island nation for repairs and
training, the basing agreement itself was kept secret. Thus, Singapore citizens, as well as U.S. citizens, are left with little information about what policing
formulas, public health formulas, and commercial zoning formulas have been devised by the two governments to shape the sexual relations between
American and Singapore men and the women of Singapore.11 The women who have been generous enough to tell their stories of prostitution have
revealed that sexuality is as central to the complex web of relationships between civil and military cultures as are more talked-about security doctrines
and economic quid pro quo. Korean and Filipino women interviewed by Sandra Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus for their oral history collection Let the
Good Times Roll also remind us of how hard it is sometimes to map the boundaries between sexual relations and economics.12 They found that the local
and foreign men who own the brothels, bars, and discos catering to soldiers are motivated by profit.

7. Other instances of prostitution and gender problems the aff doesnt solve, like US bases in
Japan, Europe, and Guam.

1NC Korean War

1. THEY DONT ACCESS THEIR SCENARIOS. THEIR ARMSTRONG EVIDENCE TALKS ABOUT A WAR ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA, AND THEIR THREAT CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS SAY CONFLICT WOULD ESCALATE
BETWEEN THE US AND NORTH KOREA. BECAUSE THEY DONT ACCESS KOREAN WAR, THEY DONT SOLVE.

2. Kim Jong-il is rational and wont risk suicidal war risk of war is extremely low
Marshall 9 Asia Political Risk Correspondent (10/27/2009, Andrew, Why it's sane for Kim Jong-il to be
crazy http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59Q0BE20091027)
For those who see North Korean leader Kim Jong-il as a dangerous lunatic prepared to risk the annihilation of
his regime by launching a devastating attack on his neighbors, there is no shortage of supporting evidence. He
uses platform shoes and bouffant hair to appear taller. His official media churns out hagiographic tales of his almost superhuman talents -- including the
world's greatest round of golf, 38 under par with 5 holes in one. And his stance in nuclear negotiations frequently appears contradictory and
confounding. But for analysts and policymakers trying to gauge the chance of a catastrophic war, game theory offers a crucial insight. In Kim's

position, it is perfectly sane to seem mad. And it would be a disaster for him if the world believed he was
rational. This has fundamental implications for risk analysis. Above all, it means investors should avoid overreacting to signs of rising tension. The
doomsday scenario of full-scale war on the Korean peninsula is an extremely remote possibility. "He is
frequently described as irrational, eccentric and dangerous. Most assuredly he is the last of those, but irrational and lightweight -- I think not," said
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who specializes in political forecasting based on game theory, and who advised the U.S. Defense Department on Korea in
2004. "No fool stays in power for years ... when there are so many generals, sons and wives waiting in the wings to launch a coup." For years, Kim

has veered unpredictably between belligerence and conciliation. In May he stunned the world with a nuclear
test after earlier walking out of disarmament talks, vowing never to return. This month he made a conditional offer to restart
talks, before wrong footing observers again with short-range missile tests. Viewed in terms of game theory, this behavior is entirely
rational. In fact, it is Kim's only viable strategy. For game theorists like Bueno de Mesquita, the overriding objective of
political leaders is the same -- survival. Viewed in this context, Kim's actions should be interpreted as designed to
maintain his internal grip on power and protect his regime against any foreign efforts to overthrow it. This is
why he has put military strength above even feeding his people. A second insight from game theory is that the decisions of
players are shaped by their beliefs about how other players will respond. Each side tries to anticipate the actions of the other. Despite the world's highest
military spending as a percentage of GDP, North Korea is at a fundamental disadvantage -- South Korea is backed by the might of the United States.

Kim could inflict devastating damage on South Korea in any war, but the result would be massive retaliation
that finished his regime. So it would be irrational for Kim ever to launch a major attack -- the inevitable result
would be the end of his regime. The United States and its allies know this. The only way Kim can leverage his weaker
military power is by making his opponents believe he may be crazy enough to launch a war anyway . This strategy

not only allows Kim to deter foreign attacks, but also gets him the maximum concessions in talks to give up the nuclear bomb. Because the other
negotiating nations believe the threat Kim would use nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out, they are prepared to offer much more to remove this risk. By
signaling that he is irrational and unpredictable, Kim can turn a weak set of cards into a winning hand. Washington and its allies face the opposite
problem -- they are unable to make Kim believe their threats are credible. Despite the frequent U.S. insistence that a nuclear North

Korea is unacceptable, Pyongyang has never faced significant consequences for breaking promises and making
threats, beyond economic sanctions which have only limited effectiveness. Kim would not be the first world leader to adopt a
strategy of calculated irrationality. It has been used repeatedly in history, not least by former U.S. President Richard Nixon. Nixon tried to convince the
Soviet Union, North Vietnam and other enemy states that he was unbalanced enough to launch a nuclear attack at the slightest provocation. "I call it the
Madman Theory, Bob," he told his Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman. Nobel economics laureate Thomas Schelling explained "the rationality of irrationality"
in his seminal 1960 work on game theory, The Strategy of Conflict. And as far back as the 16th Century, Italian political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli
wrote that it can be "a very wise thing to simulate madness." It is possible Kim would risk a suicidal war he cannot win. But a

far more likely scenario is that he is bluffing -- or, in game theory terms, strategically leveraging a weak
bargaining position by faking irrationality to make his threats credible. Such a strategy would entail sudden
policy changes, frequent brinkmanship and grandiose threats, and a willingness to initiate isolated military
skirmishes, while preventing conflict escalating. This is exactly how Pyongyang has behaved for years. In this
interpretation of North Korean behavior, investors and markets should not take North Korean threats and provocations seriously. Periodic
escalations of tension should be regarded as distractions which don't change the underlying risk calculus. Any
panicky market sell-off should be seen as buying opportunities. A second implication is that while Kim remains leader of North Korea, the country will
remain a constant source of regional scares. Kim's strategy has repeatedly won him concessions , and also helps him

maintain his internal grip on power. There is no reason for him to throw away his best cards .

3. War wont escalate

A. Empirics and experts
Strobel and Landay 5/25 *Foreign affairs correspondent AND **Reporter (5/25/2010, Warren and
Jonathan, Will North Korea's saber rattling lead to war?,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/25/94820/will-north-koreas-saber-rattling.html#ixzz0ycjuaAZf)
MGM

Still, Brown

and other former top U.S. officials said that serious clashes between the Koreas during the past 57
years haven't led to warfare and sometimes have provided opportunities for rapprochement. "It's not
inevitable that it will escalate," said Mitchell Reiss, who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton
administration. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the
sinking of the Cheonan was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean
cabinet members who were visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence , the
Blue House.

B. China would intervene

BMO, 10 (Business Monitor Online, 3/26/10, Souths Ship Sunk: Whats Next?, Lexis)
'Were North and South Korea to engage in even a limited clash, there would be a risk that both sides would send reinforcements to strike each other even
harder. Provided that hostilities are kept to within a limited geographic area - primarily at sea - then the situation could be contained, even if it leads to
dozens of casualties. This was the case in 1999 and 2002. The real danger would come if either Pyongyang or Seoul started attacking

each other's land, especially territory or facilities not immediately associated with the putative naval clash. This would be interpreted by
either side as escalation, raising fears of a wider battle. At that point, the conflict would become far more
unpredictable, and China - North Korea's only true ally on the international stage - would probably feel the
need to intervene behind the scenes to force Pyongyang not to take the confrontation too far. This would be
highly likely if the US moves to support the South militarily in any West Sea clash.'

Framework
They dont provide a framework which means that we get to weigh our DAs against the
case.
1. Reps dont come first
Changing representational practices hinders understanding of policy by overlooking
questions of agency and material structures
Tuathail, 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political
Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)
While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse
and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they
constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that
academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of
foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious
importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I

Dalbys fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-Precisely because
reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war
fought-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is
representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself . Political, military and
economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in
explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices . Both
do not disagree with

here and earlier, Dalbys reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalbys fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting,
first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of
the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalbys book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the
Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is
a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalbys interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as
heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises
facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachevs reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile
attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are
important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely

there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so

that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the
political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become
significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies
important ones for political geographers to engage,

poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is
human history.

2. Policy implications are necessary to test theorya legitimate alternative must

describe the consequences of implementing specific change because rhetorical
criticism can make the world worsethe impact is education and it turns the case
FEAVER 1 (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)
all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension
of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the real world, what can be
good about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of
intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world
and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily
from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it
comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are
considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered.
Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing . The gap
between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a realityor at
least create an undesirable kind of realitywhere policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good
theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It
is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferationa topic that raises interesting and
At the same time, virtually

important questions for both policy and theoryto bring the communities together .

Happily, the best

work in the proliferation field already does so.

Right to life outweighs all other considerations

Kateb, 1992 (George, Professor at Princeton, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture, p. 12-13)
For the state to override THAT IS, SACRIFICE a right of some so that others may keep it, the situation must be desperate. I HAVE IN MIND, SAY,
circumstances in which the choice is between sacrificing a right of some and letting a right of all be lost . The state (OR SOME OTHER AGENT) may
kill some (OR ALLOW THEM TO BE KILLED) if the only alternative is letting everyone die. It is the right of life which most prominently figures in
thinking about deserate situations. I CANNOT SEE ANY RESOLUTION BUT TO HEED THE PRECEP THAT NUMBERS COUNT. JUST AS ONE MAY PREFER SAVING ONES OVEN LIFE TO SAVING THAT OF
ANOTHER WHEN BOTH CANNOT BE SAVED, SO A THIRD PARTY LET US SAY, the state CAN (PERHAPS must) choose to save the greater number of lives AND at the cost of the
lesser number, when there is otherwise no hope for either group. THAT CHOICE DOES NOT MEAN THAT THOSE TO BE SACRIFICED ARE IMMORAL IF THEY RESIST BEING SACRIFICED.
IT FOLLOWS, OF COURSE, THAT IF A THIRD PARTY IS RIGHT TO RRISK OR SACRIFICE THE LIVES OF THE LESSER FOR THE LIVES OF THE GREATER NUMBER WHEN THE LESSER WOULD OTHERWISE LIVE, THE LESSER ARE
ALSO NOT WRONG IF THEY RESIST BEING SACRIFICED.