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Copyright 1982 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0033-2909/82/9101-0027S00.75

Psychological Bulletin
1982, Vol. 91, No. 1, 27-54

Recipient Reactions to Aid


Arie Nadler

Jeffrey D. Fisher
University of Connecticut

Tel Aviv University

Sheryle Whitcher-Alagna
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
This article presents a comprehensive review of research and theory on reactions
to help, organized in terms of four conceptual orientations (i.e., equity, attribution, reactance, and threat to self-esteem). For each orientation, the basic
assumptions and predictions are discussed, supportive and nonsupportive data
are reviewed, and an overall appraisal is offered. Threat to self-esteem is proposed
as an organizing construct for research on reactions to help, and a model based
on this construct is presented. It is argued that a formalized threat-to-self-esteem
model is more comprehensive and parsimonious for predicting reactions to help
than are equity, attribution, or reactance models.

Over the last 15 years, there has been a


great deal of psychological research on prosocial behavior. Most of this work has investigated the conditions that elicit help-giving (e.g., Berkowitz, 1972; Krebs, 1970;
Staub, 1978). The other side of the paradigm, the recipient's reactions to help, has
received much less attention. From both a
conceptual and an applied perspective, however, the experience of receiving help is an
important area for investigation. The importance of this topic is highlighted by research indicating that help is often experienced as a mixed blessing (e.g., Fisher &

Nadler, 1974). Although recipients frequently view aid as a positive, supportive act
that reflects donor caring and concern, they
may also experience negative consequences
including feelings of failure, inferiority, and
dependency. Further, although aid may elicit
positive behavior toward the donor (e.g., liking, gratitude), in many instances recipients
"bite the hand that feeds them" (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1971).
Past research on reactions to aid consists
of experimental studies, field studies, and
practitioners' reports. These investigations
have consistently demonstrated that situational conditions and recipient characteristics affect reactions to help. Situational conditions include donor characteristics (e.g.,
behavior and attributes of the donor as perceived by the recipient), aid characteristics
(e.g., cost to the donor), and context characteristics of the aid transaction (e.g., recipient's ability to repay the donor). Recipient characteristics include stable dispositions
or skills and temporary emotional or cognitive states (Gergen, 1974).
Recipient reactions can be classified into
three categories: external perceptions (e.g.,
evaluations of the donor and the aid), internal perceptions (e.g., self-evaluations), and
behavioral responses (e.g., reciprocity). Most
studies have focused on external perceptions
and behavioral responses; very few have considered how help affects a recipient's internal perceptions. Even within the categories

This article represents an elaboration and extension


of ideas presented in August 1974 in a technical report
by J. D. Fisher and A. Nadler titled "Recipient Reactions to Aid: Literature Review and a Conceptual
Framework." That report was prepared under a grant
awarded by the Office of Naval Research and is Technical Report 23, Contract No. N00014-0226-0030, NR
177-946, August 1974. Work on the present version of
this article was greatly facilitated by a grant from the
United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation to
the first two authors. Some of the research described
herein was supported by grants from the University of
Connecticut Research Foundation to Jeffrey D, Fisher
and by a grant from the Israeli Academy of Sciences
to Arie Nadler. The first authorship of Fisher and Nadler is alphabetical.
We thank Aharon Bizman, Donn Byrne, Kay Deaux,
Bella DePaulo, Reuben M. Baron, Martin Greenberg,
and David A. Kenny for their comments on earlier drafts
of the manuscript.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jeffrey D.
Fisher, Department of Psychology, U-20, University of
Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.
27

28

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

that have received attention, many dimensions are relatively unresearched (e.g.,
whether help fosters future dependency).
Such responses may be important and should
receive greater study in the future.
Several theoretical frameworks have been
applied by researchers for conceptualizing
reactions to help: equity theories, reactance
theory, attribution theories, and threat-toself-esteem models. Although these theories
generally were not developed to predict reactions to aid, they have proved useful. Each
predicts the consequences of some situational conditions and recipient characteristics for several modes of recipient response.
Nevertheless, each views receiving help from
a different perspective. Although allowing
for a richer conceptual background, this diversity risks obscuring major conclusions
and makes an overall integration difficult.
Our goal is to provide a conceptually oriented, systematic review of existing data and
to suggest an organizing framework for past
and future research on reactions to help. In
choosing studies to include we have defined
help as the provision of resources that facilitate attainment of a goal. Nevertheless, several studies in which help falls outside this
definition (e.g., Brehm & Cole, 1966) are
included because they suggest potentially
important relationships that could hold for
types of help that are within the bounds of
the definition.
Several articles present selective coverage
of the literature on reactions to aid (e.g.,
Gergen & Gergen, 1970, 1974a; Greenberg,
1980; Gross, Wallston, & Piliavin, 1979),
but to date no attempt has been made to
provide a comprehensive review of past theory and research. To that end we will review
work done within each of the four major
conceptual frameworks. Studies will be discussed in terms of the orientation taken by
their authors. Where a study has been interpreted meaningfully from more than one
perspective, however, it will be referred to
in other sections as well. At the beginning
of each theory-based section, we will describe the conceptual assumptions and conditions basic to prediction. Then we will review supportive and nonsupportive research,
draw general conclusions, and offer an overall appraisal. Toward the end of the article

we will propose a new, integrative model for


conceptualizing reactions to aid.
Research on reactions to help has used
traditional laboratory methods (e.g., Brehm
& Cole, 1966), laboratory simulations (e.g.,
Fisher & Nadler, 1974, 1976), role play
questionnaires (e.g., Gergen, Morse. & Kristeller, 1973; Greenberg & Saxe, 1975), field
methods (e.g., Piliavin & Gross, 1977), survey techniques (e.g., Gergen & Gergen,
1971), and correlational methods (e.g.,
Gourash, 1978). 1 The strengths and weaknesses of these methods have been considered elsewhere (e.g., Selltiz, Wrightsman,
& Cook, 1981). Generally, the studies reviewed here were published in refereed journals and are characterized by a reasonable
degree of methodological and statistical
competence. We will note when caution
should be used in interpreting results as well
as when conflicting findings characterize
studies using similar experimental variables
but different methodologies. In addition, we
will indicate when results are similar, or different, in cross-cultural replications.
Four Theoretical Traditions
Equity Theories
The construct of equity in social exchange
(e.g., Adams, 1963; Blau, 1964; Gouldner,
1960; Greenberg, 1980; Homans, 1961;
Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) is central
to one family of theoretical approaches (i.e.,
equity, reciprocity, and indebtedness formulations) used in past research on reactions
to aid. Although different in their specific
conceptualizations of the equity construct,
these formulations share a set of assumptions concerning human social behavior: (a)
that people aspire to maintain equity in their
interpersonal relations, (b) that inequitable
relations produce discomfort (i.e., negative
arousal), which (c) motivates individuals to
1
Tables that list each study referred to in this article
and that indicate the methods used, type(s) of aid employed, operationalizations of any situational and/or
personality characteristics incorporated, and a succinct
statement of the results can be obtained from Jeffrey
D. Fisher, Department of Psychology, U-20, University
of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

try to reduce the unpleasant feelings either


by restoring actual equity (i.e., altering objective inputs/outcomes to yield parity) or
by achieving psychological equity (i.e., cognitive distortion of inputs/outputs of self or
other).
Greenberg (1980) in his indebtedness theory and Walster and her colleagues (Walster
et al, 1973, 1978) in their restatement of
equity theory have made specific attempts
to apply these equity considerations to the
case of the aid recipient.2 They argue that
in interactions in which the recipient has a
more favorable ratio of outcomes to inputs
than does the donor, a state of inequity occurs. Consequently, recipients experience
affective distress (e.g., feelings of indebtedness), which they attempt to eliminate via
actual or psychological means (i.e., by reciprocation or by derogating the donor and
the aid).
Equity models assume that the amount of
the recipient's distress is positively related
to the magnitude of the inequity. Nevertheless, there are several approaches to calculating the amount of inequity occasioned by
aid. Some researchers (e.g., Adams, 1963,
1965) have viewed it as due strictly to the
objective costs and rewards accruing from
the helping transaction. Others (e.g., Greenberg, 1980; Walster et al., 1973) have included more subjective aspects of the aid
context (e.g., the donor's motivation for
helping, the locus of causality for aid).
Research has (a) assessed the affective
consequences of inequity for the recipient,
(b) identified several factors as determinants
of the magnitude of inequity distress, and
(c) examined ways by which the recipient
restores equity. The following sections review the data pertinent to these research
questions.
Affective consequences of inequity. A
number of studies, both inside and outside
the prosocia! behavior literature, corroborate
the prediction that inequity produces negative affect. For example, research in organizational settings has shown that individuals who receive "more than they deserve"
feel affective distress (e.g., Adams, 1963;
Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962). More closely
related to the issue at hand, it has been
shown that people who perceive themselves

29

as indebted to others experience negative


affect (e.g., Leventhal, Allen, & Kemelgor,
1969). The burden of inequity has also been
documented in field reports on the aged
(Kalish, 1967; Lipman & Sterne, 1962) that
suggest that the aged want to avoid feelings
of indebtedness and prefer to view their retirement stipends as a form of "due pay"
rather than as a "dole" (Lipman & Sterne,
1962, p. 200).
Additional evidence for the aversive nature of inequity is provided by studies that
have examined the influence of the ability
to reciprocate on help-seeking behavior.
When individuals do not anticipate being
able to restore equity, they refrain from
seeking needed help, or are slower to ask for
it (e.g., Castro, 1974;,Clark, Gotay, & Mills,
1974; DePaulo, 1978a; Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971; Morris & Rosen, 1973), and are
more likely to break off an aid relationship
after reaching a performance criterion
(Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971). Recipients
also seek less future help when they cannot
reciprocate past help than when there is an
opportunity to repay the donor (Castro,
1974).
The particularly aversive nature of aid
that cannot be reciprocated probably results
from the fact that this type of interaction
strongly contradicts the deeply rooted norm
of equity in social relations. Aid relationships that violate this norm may lower a recipient's esteem (cf. Pritchard, 1969; Walster et al., 1973), as Gross and Latane(1974)
found. Gergen, Ellsworth, Maslach, and Seipel (1975) suggested that compared with aid
that allows for fair repayment, aid entailing
no repayment or inequitably high repayment
is self-threatening and leads to lower attraction for the donor. This study was performed
in Sweden, the United States, and Japan,
and results were similar in all three settings.
Determinants of the intensity of distress
2

Although the Greenberg (1980) notion of indebtedness and the Walster et al. (1973, 1978) concept of
inequity are not entirely congruent (see Greenberg,
1980, for a discussion of their similarities and differences), their general predictions concerning reactions
to help are similar. Therefore, we shall use the terms
inequity and indebtedness interchangeably to refer to
a recipient's felt obligation to repay a benefit and the
negative feelings associated with it.

30

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

from inequity. Greenberg (1980) suggested


that the greater the recipient's net benefits
from an aid transaction, the greater the feeling of indebtedness. Also, the higher the net
costs to the donor, the more indebted the
recipient feels (e.g., Gergen et al, 1975;
Pruitt, 1968). Given that both higher costs
for the donor and greater benefits to the recipient lead to increased indebtedness, the
question arises, ".Do the donor's costs or the
recipient's rewards figure more heavily in
determining indebtedness?" Although the
issue has not been definitively resolved, some
research (e.g., Greenberg, Block, & Silverman, 1971; Greenberg & Saxe, 1975) suggests that the recipient's rewards are more
heavily weighted.
In addition to the donor's costs and the
recipient's rewards, research supports the
assumption that more subjective aspects of
aid affect the degree of distress experienced.
When aid is voluntary (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966) and deliberate (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch, 1972), it has greater subjective value for the recipient and creates
stronger feelings of inequity than when it is
not voluntary and deliberate. In addition, aid
that is positively motivated elicits greater
feelings of inequity than does aid resulting
from ulterior motives (e.g., Lerner & Lichtman, 1968).
Restoring equity. To alleviate the discomfort associated with inequity, the recipient must equalize the input:output ratios of
the donor and the self. A direct way to accomplish this is through reciprocity, and research indicates that individuals will reciprocate to reduce feelings of indebtedness if
given the opportunity. Wilke and Lanzetta
(1970) found that subjects who had previously received help (which presumably created inequity) were more apt to assist the
donor than were subjects in a no-prior-aid
control condition. Moreover, greater inequity generates more reciprocity. This occurs
when conditions associated with aid are
more favorable (e.g., when aid is voluntary;
Gross & Latane, 1974), when greater
amounts of help are given (e.g., Greenberg
& Frisch, 1972; Kahn & Tice, 1973; Stapleton, Nacci, & Tedeschi, 1973), and when
the donor's costs rise (e.g., Gergen et al.,
1975; Pruitt, 1968). It also seems that the

magnitude of the recipients' rewards more


strongly determines reciprocity than the
amount of the donor's costs (e.g., Greenberg
et al., 1971).
Various factors appear also to affect the
recipient's desire to engage in immediate
versus delayed reciprocity. These variables
generally reflect the quality of the recipient's
relationship with the donor. For example,
the need for immediate reciprocity is diminished when the recipient expects to have
many future opportunities for repayment
(e.g., when help is given by friends or members of close-knit groups; Bar-Tal, Zohar,
Greenberg, & Hermon, 1977; Nadler, Fisher,
& Streufert, 1974). The desire to reciprocate
immediately may also be less when the recipient aspires to a "communal" relationship
with the donor rather than an "exchange"
relationship (Clark & Mills, 1979).
A question of interest is whether a recipient can reduce the negative feelings associated with inequity only via direct reciprocity to a benefactor or also by doing a
favor for some third party. Conceptually, if
reciprocating to just anyone can eliminate
the discomfort of inequitable relations, then
the case for inequity as a general state of
negative arousal related to feelings of incompetence and inferiority is strengthened. If,
however, the negative effects of inequity are
mitigated only when recipients repay the
specific individual who helped them, then the
argument that inequity involves feelings of
injustice with a particular other is corroborated.
A number of studies have compared the
effects of an opportunity to reciprocate directly to the donor with an opportunity to
reciprocate to a third party. In these experiments, subjects generally engaged in more
reciprocity (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966;
Gross & Latane, 1974; Shumaker & Jackson, 1979) and evaluated their donor more
positively (Castro, 1974; Gross & Latane,
1974; Shumaker & Jackson, 1979) when
they were allowed to reciprocate directly
than when they helped a third person or
when they could not reciprocate at all. Nevertheless, there is also some evidence tliat
aiding a third party can enhance recipients'
liking for the person who actually did help
them (Castro, 1974; Gross & Latane, 1974).

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

Thus, at this point it is unclear whether inequity is a specific state of obligation toward
the donor that can be relieved only by direct
reciprocation or whether it is a more general
state that can be alleviated through any act
of reciprocity.
Equity theories stipulate that recipients
may alleviate negative feelings not only by
behavioral means (i.e., reciprocity) but also
by altering their external perceptions. The
notion that individuals may cognitively redefine a situation rather than engage in actual reciprocity has received research support. Specifically, in an industrial setting,
overpaid workers altered their perceptions
of task difficulty and of the level of pay they
considered fair, but they did not increase
their output (Gergen, Morse, & Bode, 1974).
Similar findings have been obtained by other
investigators (e.g., Lawler, Koplin, Young,
& Faden, 1968; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson, 1972). Furthermore, Gergen and
Gergen (1971) found cross culturally that
recipients often redefine aid as the donor's
"rightful obligation" to them rather than
view it as a benefit that must be reciprocated.
A number of studies suggest that cognitive
distortion may be especially likely when direct reciprocity is not possible. According to
Castro (1974), recipients who cannot repay
a donation may blame the donor for creating
the inequity that makes them feel uncomfortable. In line with this reasoning, Gergen
et al. (1975) found that recipients in several
cultures evaluated donors who allowed opportunities for reciprocation more positively
than those who did not.
Equity and the aid recipient: A summary. A major advantage of equity formulations is that they place the issue of receiving aid in the larger context of exchange
relations, which allows an elaborate system
of predictions and explanations. Overall, the
data support the important role of these
theories in understanding reactions to
help. Their predictions have generally been
corroborated with regard to the affective
responses of the recipient (and their determinants) and the effects of inequity/indebtedness on help-seeking and other behavioral
reactions to the donor and the aid (e.g., reciprocity).
An equity model is inadequate, however,

31

for making predictions in certain contexts.


Some variables that are likely to affect reactions to aid (e.g., donor-recipient similarity) do not arouse feelings that may be easily
classified on an equity-inequity dimension.
Thus, the theory is relevant for a restricted
set of the potential variables of interest. In
addition, an equity model focuses on predicting degrees of negative reactions to aid.
According to the theory, any helping relationship that results in greater relative outcomes for the recipient than for the donor
produces inequity, and the most favorable
response envisioned by the theory is a restoration of equity. The possibility that such
a relationship could lead to positive reactions, even in the short run, seems to be precluded. Further, there is no definitive indication of what conditions lead a recipient to
choose direct reciprocity or cognitive distortion as a way of restoring equity. Walster
et al. (1973) attempted to specify when actual versus psychological reciprocity would
occur but failed to delineate criteria of sufficient power to permit prediction. There is
evidence, however, that the two modes may
be complementary and are not used simultaneously (Walster & Prestholdt, 1966).
In some instances predictions that could
be derived from equity theories are not supported. For example, it has been observed
that recipients are more likely to accept large
than small amounts of help (Freeman, 1977;
Rosen, 1971). Although this appears reasonable in an instrumental sense, it conflicts
with the prediction that one should be increasingly likely to avoid help as it leads to
greater inequity, insofar as inequity is aversive. Also, equity formulations assume that
aversive feelings mediate reciprocity. Nevertheless, there are data that suggest that
reciprocity may be mediated by positive affect as well (cf. Fisher & Nadler, 1976;
Greenberg, 1980).
Reactance Theory
In contrast to equity notions, which assume that inequity is an important variable
in determining reactions to help, reactance
theory (Brehm, 1966) predicts that freedom
restriction inherent in aid would be a major
response determinant. Specifically, Brehm's

32

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

theory stipulates that individuals desire to


maintain their freedom of choice, and that
any perceived reduction in freedom results
in a negative psychological state (i.e., reactance), which motivates them to restore the
lost freedom. The magnitude of this state is
a positive function of the importance of the
freedom to the individual and a monotonic
function of the number of freedoms lost or
threatened either directly or by implication.
Reactance results in attempts to engage in
the threatened behavior (i.e., to behave as
if freedom has not been lost), but it may also
produce modifications in perceptions and
judgments and physiological indications of
stress.3
Applied to the help recipient, reactance
notions suggest that when aid threatens the
freedom to perform present or future actions, it will arouse reactance. Such conditions are probably inherent in certain types
of aid. For example, when aid comes with
stipulations on its use, the recipient's freedom is likely to be threatened. Also, aid that
is positively motivated probably constrains
the recipient more than does aid that is negatively motivated (i.e., there is more pressure
to act kindly toward the donor). Many types
of help, however, are potentially freedom
restricting due to inextricably linked, socialized beliefs about how one should respond to help and to benefactors (e.g.,
"Don't bite the hand that feeds you," the
reciprocity norm) and to beliefs about the
true nature of helpful individuals (e.g., "You
don't get something for nothing"). Thus,
even when no explicit threat to freedom is
involved, recipients may experience reactance.
Clearly, then, a broad interpretation of
reactance theory suggests that many aspects
of aid could elicit negative responses. In line
with the theory, reactance should be greater
when aid endangers a whole range of freedoms rather than just a few. Also, reactance
should increase when freedoms that are
more important to the individual are affected. Recipients can reduce reactance by
acting as though their behavior has not been
restricted by help (e.g., by avoiding any actions based on feelings of obligation to the
donor, such as returning the aid or evaluating the giver favorably; Brehm, 1966).

In support of reactance theory, there is


evidence that aid does severely restrict freedom in certain situations (e.g., welfare recipients, the hospitalized, old age home residents). For example, Briar (1966) found
that 69% of a sample of welfare families
believed they should not object if their social
workers visited in the middle of the night,
even though 87% were aware that such visits
have a questionable legal status. Further,
many respondents felt compelled to follow
their caseworker's suggestions on matters of
a personal nature (e.g., 67% felt obliged to
follow a suggestion to obtain marriage counseling). The built-in loss of autonomy that
is frequently characteristic of helping relationships is also shown in research on factors
that affect rehabilitation (e.g., Goldin, Perry,
Margolin, & Stotsky, 1972, Note 1). These
authors report that in institutional settings,
recipients' attempts at self-help are frequently "discouraged, blocked or openly prohibited" (Goldin et al., Note 1, p. 22).
As predicted by reactance theory, when
help restricts freedom it is aversive. In many
cultures it has been observed that if donors
restrict the use of aid, recipients resent the
help and the donor (e.g., Gergen & Gergen,
1971, 1974a). Also, potential recipients avoid
placing themselves in situations that are
likely to result in reactance. For example,
Gergen et al. (1973) and Rosen (1971)
found that donors who give "with strings
attached" have less of their aid accepted
than do those who allow recipients to determine how aid will be used. This has been
documented cross culturally (cf. Gergen et
al., 1973). Other relevant data (e.g., Brehm,
1966) similarly indicate that aid that causes
reactance produces discomfort and is avoided
if possible.
A receipt of reactance-producing aid may
result in behavioral or cognitive attempts to
regain a sense of freedom. Behaviorally, recipients restore freedom by acting as if aid
has not been given (e.g., they tend not to
reciprocate to the donor; e.g., Brehm &
Cole, 1966; Schopler & Thompson, 1968).
3
Although much research reported in this section
adheres closely to Brehm's (1966) formulation of reactance theory, some of it makes predictions that could
be derived from the theory but that, strictly speaking,
are not pure "Brehmian" reactance.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

One situation in which help frequently


threatens freedom and reciprocity fails to
occur is when help is inappropriate to the
setting (Schopler & Thompson, 1968). If the
importance of the imperiled freedom is
great, reciprocity - is especially unlikely
(Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 1976). Gergen and Gergen (1971) concluded on the
basis of survey data that when recipients
have little freedom in designing international
aid programs, they work "less constructively" to implement them. This also can be
viewed as a failure to reciprocate.
Cognitive attempts to restore freedom include derogation of the donor and the aid.
For example, Ladieu, Hanfman, and Dembo
(1947) found that disabled veterans resent
help and view the helper as incompetent
when aid does not "enlarge the space of free
movement of the injured person or promote
his goals." Similarly, Gergen and Gergen
(1970) and Gergen et al. (1973) showed that
across various cultures, aid with strings attached may engender negative evaluations
of the donor and the aid. This is especially
likely when aid restricts important freedoms
(Worchel & Andreoli, 1974).
Although the research reviewed to this
point supports the predictions of reactance
theory, some data are inconsistent. For example, Gross and his associates (Broil, Gross,
& Piliavin, 1974; see also Gross et al., 1979)
investigated the effect of locus of help-initiation on reactions to aid. Reactance theory
would predict that help offered by the donor
is more freedom restricting than help that
the needy individual is free to request whenever he or she chooses. (This assumes that
performing without aid often constitutes an
important freedom; cf. DePaulo & Fisher,
1980.) Thus, there should be more help accepted and more favorable reactions when
help can be requested than when it is offered
arbitrarily. It was found, however, that more
help was obtained and donors were liked
better when help was offered than when it
was requested. These findings have been replicated in a field study with welfare recipients (Piliavin & Gross, 1977). More aid was
obtained and ancillary service utilization
was higher when the locus of help-initiation
was the helper rather than the client. Although these results do not support reac-

33

tance assumptions, they are not a particularly strong test. Even though the aid was
offered arbitrarily, the recipient still retained a degree of freedom, insofar as he or
she could refuse the help. A more stringent
test would include a third experimental condition in which subjects are given aid in a
context that does not permit them to refuse.
There are other studies that fail to support
reactance predictions including Gergen et al.
(1975), which further questions the assumption that the more restrictions on freedom,
the more negative the recipient's reactions.
Instead, Gergen et al. found an inverted Ushaped relationship. Donors who asked for
equal return of their aid (moderate freedom
restriction) were better liked than donors
who asked for no return (low freedom restriction) or for equal return plus interest
(high freedom restriction). The findings held
for both American and Japanese subjects,
though the negative implications for reactance theory are tempered by two studies
(Freeman, 1977; Gergen et al., 1973) in
which evaluations of the donor did become
more negative with increased obligation for
repayment. These studies found that aid
with no obligation to repay led to greater
attraction than did "equal return plus interest aid." Although these findings suggest
that the Gergen et al. data should be interpreted cautiously, several characteristics of
the experiments (i.e., within-subject designs,
role playing) may have made them especially
susceptible to demand characteristics.
The strongest contradiction of reactance
theory predictions comes from studies examining reciprocity in connection with voluntary versus involuntary aid, deliberate versus nondeliberate aid, and high- versus lowcost aid. In the nonintimate relationships
that are characteristic of this research (which
was done with strangers in a laboratory setting), freedom from indebtedness to others
is important (cf. Clark & Mills, 1979). The
logic of reactance theory would predict that
aid that is voluntary, deliberate, or costly to
the donor is more freedom restricting because it implies a relatively greater demand
for reciprocity and gratitude than does involuntary, nondeliberate, or low-cost aid (cf.
Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968). The results of these

34

J. FrSHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

studies were the opposite of what reactance


theory would predict. There was greater donor attraction and greater reciprocity when
aid was voluntary (e.g., Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Gross & Latane, 1974; Nemeth, 1970), deliberate (e.g., Garrett &
Libby, 1973; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972;
Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 1969), or when
the donor incurred high costs in helping the
recipient (Fisher & Nadler, 1976; Gergen
et al, 1975; Greenberg & Bar-Tal, 1976;
Pruitt, 1968). The latter finding has been
documented cross culturally (cf. Gergen et
al., 1975).
Reactance and the aid recipient: A summary. The data reveal mixed support for
reactance-based predictions. The major contribution of this approach is its emphasis on
an important motivational factor that may
affect aid relationships. Nevertheless, as a
model for predicting reactions to aid, it is
limited in several ways. First, it applies only
when conditions associated with aid differentially restrict a recipient's perceived freedom. This excludes many situational variables that may be associated with help.
Viewing reactance more broadly as a form
of loss of control (cf. Wortman & Brehm,
1975) could allow prediction for a larger
array of aid contexts, though still a restricted
set. For example, from this perspective negative responses to aid (e.g., helplessness)
might be expected in those who receive help
that is noncontingent on their responses
(Skinner, 1976). To date, no study on reactions to aid has used such an approach.
Second, reactance theory only predicts
reactions at the level of an independent variable for which threat to freedom is aroused;
it does not explicitly predict reactions at levels that do not threaten freedom. For example, the theory predicts low attraction and
low reciprocity for "restrictive" aid, but it
implies nothing about reactions to "nonrestrictive" aid. Further, the construct of reactance is not always sufficient for predicting reactions to aid because other factors
may temper its impact. For example, voluntary help may threaten freedom more
than would involuntary help because it implies greater demand for reciprocity. At the
same time, however, more positive intentions
can be attributed to a donor who helps vol-

untarily, and this may offset the negative


effects of freedom restriction, resulting in
favorable reactions. Thus, in many instances, simple reactance effects may not
occur because other processes are operating.
Aid research that is related to reactance
theory has primarily examined the effects
of reactance on reciprocity behavior and
evaluations of the donor and the help. This
focus has been partly determined by the specific predictive concerns of the formulation.
At present, whether aid that limits perceived
freedom lowers recipients' self-perceptions
is an open question. Nevertheless, on both
theoretical (e.g., Brehm, 1966) and empirical grounds (e.g., Andreas, 1969; Gergen
& Gergen, 1971, 1974a), it seems reasonable
to assume that such help would precipitate
a loss in self-esteem.
Attribution Theories
Whereas equity and reactance theories
treat the recipient as a passive individual
who is placed in inequitable relations, or
whose freedom is threatened by aid, attribution theories (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965;
Jones & McGillis, 1975; Kelley, 1967) view
the recipient as an active agent who attempts
to make sense of the helping interaction.
These formulations suggest that individuals
who receive help want to understand the
donor's behavior, their own behavior, and
the situation. Specifically, they want to know
"Why did the donor help me?" (i.e., what
were his or her intentions?) and "Why did
I need help?" (e.g., because of incompetence
or task difficulty).
Research pertaining to the first question
has generally used the theory of correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones
& McGillis, 1975) as a conceptual framework. The theory focuses on attributions of
intent and has been applied to attributions
that the recipient makes for the donor's intentions in helping. The theory of external
attribution (Kelley, 1967) has generally
been used in studies that relate to the second
question. The applications of this theory
have centered on specifying the conditions
under which recipients attribute the need for
help internally (e.g., to their own incompetence) or externally (e.g., to task difficulty).

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

In the following sections research pertaining


to each question (and theory) will be reviewed.
Theory of correspondent inferences. The
theory of correspondent inferences (Jones
& Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1975)
specifies that attributions of intent are made
when actors are perceived to have knowledge
of an action and ability to produce the effects
observed. Further, the possibility of a personality attribution decreases to the extent
that an action appears constrained by the
setting. For example, socially desirable behavior or behavior that is strictly role prescribed is generally uninformative concerning the personality of the actor and usually
does not result in attributions of intent. Such
actions, however, may be judged to reflect
personal traits when negative outcomes are
endured in performing the behavior (e.g.,
when pain is involved). Generally, enduring
costs highlights the individualistic nature of
an act, increasing the likelihood that it was
intentional and that it reflects the actor's
personality.
Applying this analysis to the aid recipient
suggests that he or she is faced with a threefold dilemma in trying to discern a donor's
intentions. The donor may have acted out
of true concern for the recipient's welfare,
for ulterior motives, or because role requirements dictated helpfulness. According to the
theory, a recipient can attribute a donor's
behavior to a personality disposition only
when the donor is seen as helping freely and
deliberately and not because of role demands
or other situational constraints. Thus, no
altruistic intentions are likely to be attributed to those who administer help as part
of their job, unless there is evidence that the
helper is acting independently of requirements, such as when he or she incurs negative outcomes (e.g., loss of free time, money)
in attempting to help.
In terms of the predictions of the theory,
there is support for the proposition that when
aid is constrained by the setting, the recipient is less likely to attribute it to a personality disposition. For example, Enzle and
Schopfiocher (1978) found that subjects who
received help that appeared to be spontaneous judged the donor to be more altruistic
than did those who received the same aid at

35

the experimenter's request. Support can also


be derived from research by Greenberg and
Frisch (1972) that indicates that when help
is deliberate, the recipient is more likely to
attribute it to personal motives than when
it is situationally caused.
Indirect evidence that situationally-dictated help is less informative concerning the
donor's personal character can also be inferred from experiments by Morse and his
associates (e.g., Morse, Gergen, Peele, &
Van Ryneveld, 1977). These researchers assessed the effects of expected (e.g., role prescribed) versus unexpected (e.g., not rob
prescribed) aid. The findings revealed that
expected help did not lead to more favorable
behavior toward the donor, whereas unexpected help did. Nevertheless, for unexpected help to have positive effects, it must
be appropriate to the context (e.g., Morse
et al, 1977; Worchel & Andreoli, 1974).
There is also support for the assertion that
an action will be judged to reflect personal
attributes, motives, or intentions to a greater
extent when negative outcomes (e.g., costs,
risks, sacrifices) are incurred. For example,
Greenberg and Frisch (1972) and Fisher and
Nadler (1976) observed that as donor costs
in providing aid rise, recipients impute more
care and concern to the donor. The results
of other studies (Andreas, 1969; Tesser et
al., 1968) also suggest that across several
cultures, correspondent inferences are more
likely when donors give help in spite of inhibitory factors.
Although the theory specifies only the conditions that precipitate attributions, there is
evidence that the aid context determines the
quality of donor intent attributions. Gergen
and Gergen (1974a) observed that when recipient nations disagree with American foreign policy, they are more likely to make
attributions of manipulative intent for the
aid. Similarly, such attributions are more
likely when the aid relationship is bilateral
than when it is multilateral (Andreas, 1969;
Gergen & Gergen, 1974b). This has been
found in a number of different cultures. Further, in an international conflict simulation,
Nadler et al. (1974) demonstrated that aid
from an ally precipitated more attributions
of altruistic intent than did equivalent aid
from an enemy. Numerous other studies

36

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

show the same pattern (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1974a).


The theory also does not relate the quality
of recipient attributions to other reactions
to aid (e.g., attraction toward the donor, reciprocity). This relationship, however, may be
derived from studies that varied factors that
affect intent attributions and that measured
other reactions. In this research, when recipients made positive attributions, they
were more attracted to the donor (e.g., Gergen & Gergen, 1974b; Greenberg & Frisch,
1972; Nadler et al, 1974), and found aid to
be more supportive (e.g., Fisher & Nadler,
1976; Gergen & Gergen, 1974a). They also
accepted more aid (Freeman, 1977; Rosen,
1971), engaged in less self-help as an alternative to dependency (Andreas, 1969; Fisher
& Nadler, 1976), and reciprocated more to
the donor (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch, 1972;
Lerner & Lichtman, 1968; Schopler &
Thompson, 1968). Thus, favorable intent
attributions are associated with positive reactions to aid, whereas unfavorable intent
attributions are associated with negative reactions. This pattern of effects has been
found to hold across several cultures (cf.
Andreas, 1969; Gergen & Gergen, 1974b).
The theory of correspondent inference
and the recipient: A summary. The question "Why did the donor help me?" is one
the recipient tries to answer to make sense
of the helping interaction. The theory of correspondent inferences provides a valuable
conceptual framework within which perceptions of donor motivation can be treated. The
theory contributes primarily to the understanding of perceptions of donor intent and
evaluations of the donor and the aid (i.e.,
external perceptions). Although it is possible
to infer links between attributions of donor
intent and other reactions (e.g., internal perceptions and behavior), these are not as easily predicted with this theory. Finally, a full
exposition of the application of concepts
within this theoretical approach (e.g., personalism, hedonic relevance) awaits further
research.
Theory of external attribution. The theory of external attribution (e.g., Kelley,
1967) specifies the conditions under which
the cause of an event is attributed to the
environment (external attribution) or to a

personal disposition of the actor (internal


attribution). According to the theory, attributions are based on information from two
sources: relevant expectations that individuals bring to a situation and information
contributed by the particular conditions of
the interaction. The theory further stipulates
that there are three kinds of information
(i.e., distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus) that, when present in varying degrees, facilitate one causal attribution over
another. An internal attribution results when
behavior is characterized by low distinctiveness, low consensus, and high consistency,
whereas an external attribution is made
when behavior reflects high distinctiveness,
high consensus, and high consistency.
Kelley's (1967) formulation is relevant to
the question "Why did I need help?" (i.e.,
internalization/externalization of the need
for aid). Specifically, the recipient may conclude that his or her need was caused by
internal-dispositional factors (e.g., one's own
inadequacy) or external-situational factors
(e.g., task difficulty). Research indicates
that the locus of causal perception has important implications for reactions to aid. If
the need for help is attributed dispositionally
(i.e., to personal inadequacy), more unfavorable self-perceptions and less help-seeking occur than if it is attributed externally.
In a pioneering study in this context, Tessler and Schwartz (1972) examined the effect of consensus information on help-seeking behavior. In line with Kelley's (1967)
theory, they reasoned that, other things
being equal, if consensus is high (i.e., many
people need help on a similar task), the need
for help should be attributed externally. If
consensus is low (i.e., few people need help
on a similar task), it should be attributed
internally. They suggested that if an internal
attribution is made, individuals may be unwilling to expose inadequacy by seeking
help, and therefore lower help-seeking may
be observed. The results supported this analysis. When subjects were informed that only
10% of others working on a similar task
needed help (low-consensus information,
which facilitated an internal attribution of
need for help), less help was sought than
when they believed that 90% of the others
had needed assistance (high-consensus in-

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

formation, which facilitated an external attribution for help.). In a study done in Israel,
Nadler and Porat (1978), however, using the
same attribution manipulation, demonstrated that it affected help-seeking only
when individuals remained anonymous.
When identifiable, all subjects refrained
from seeking help regardless of the consensus information.
Also consistent with the notion that people
are more likely to seek help when their need
can be attributed to the situation is a field
study of bereavement (Gerber, 1969). Survivors were more likely to accept professional assistance when they defined the situation as one calling for "uncustomary"
sources of support. Further, Morris and Rosen (1973) demonstrated that when a situational attribution was not possible (i.e., personal inadequacy on a task was made salient),
individuals were more reluctant to seek help
than when performance was considered competent. Work by Gross and his associates
(Broil et al, 1974; Gross et al., 1979) also
supports the relationship between external
attributions and greater help-seeking. This
research was described earlier in the section
on reactance, and although the data contradict reactance assumptions, they fit an attribution model.
Gross and his associates found that more
help was obtained (and that the donor was
better liked) when aid was offered to the
recipient than when it had to be requested.
They suggested that having to request assistance may promote an internal attribution
for failure, which inhibits help-seeking. In
contrast, being offered help is less likely to
prompt such an attribution and thus facilitates help-seeking. In corroboration of this
explanation additional data show that subjects who request help report more anxiety
and more negative self-ratings than do those
to whom help is offered (see Gross et al.,
1979). Nevertheless, although offered help
may facilitate more positive self-attributions
than does requested aid, there are conditions
under which it, too, may be aversive (e.g.,
Nadler, Fisher, & Streufert, 1976).
There is evidence that in addition to helpseeking, locus of attribution may affect reciprocity. The data suggest that felt obligation to the donor is higher when the cause

37

for dependency resides in the recipient rather


than in the environment (e.g., Greenberg
& Saxe, 1975). In addition, the assumption
that more personal responsibility accrues to
"internally" caused aid is congruent with the
finding that people are more likely to reject
others whose problems are internally rather
than externally caused (Calhoun, Pierce,
Walters, & Dawes, 1974).
Finally, Kelley's (1967) theory offers
principles that predict the strength of the
attributions being made. For example, the
augmentation principle states that when inhibitory factors (e.g., costs, risks, sacrifices)
are encountered in performing certain behavior, stronger attributions result than when
such inhibitory conditions are absent. Applied to the aid recipient, this implies that
when the penalties for seeking or accepting
help are high, more confident internal attributions for needing help will occur. Such
attributions may be more likely when aid
precludes reciprocity (e.g., Gross & Latane,
1974), when it emphasizes recipient inferiority vis-a-vis the donor (e.g., Gergen &
Gergen, 1974a; Kalish, 1967; Nadler et al.,
1976), or when it involves a central task
(e.g., Tessler & Schwartz, 1972), than when
these conditions are absent.
The theory of external attribution and the
recipient: A summary. Research indicates
that the theory of external attribution is of
value in predicting reactions to help. Relative to its range of application, however, this
formulation has only been touched on by
previous studies. A more complete delineation of the conditions that determine locus
of attribution for dependency awaits further
research. At this point the data suggest that
aid that is associated with internal attributions for failure is an unpleasant experience
that precipitates negative donor evaluation,
negative self-evaluation, and diminished helpseeking behavior. A more positive set of reactions is associated with external attributions for needing help.
Despite the potential of the locus-of-attribution variable, there are difficulties in
applying this theory to the aid recipient.
First, the theory has direct application only
for the recipient's perceptions of self and
other, although it is possible to infer databased links between locus of attribution and

38

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

such reactions as help-seeking and reciprocity. Second, the criteria specified by


Kelley (1967) for making attributions appear to be too rigid (Shaw & Constanzo,
1970). A review of relevant literature reveals
that confident external attributions are made
even when information from one or more of
Kelley's "necessary" criteria are lacking. It
appears that recipients may attribute needing help to the environment whenever possible (e.g., Worchel & Andreoli, 1974). Finally, although Kelley's criteria for making
attributions involve data gathered over multiple behavioral episodes, attributions are
frequently made in contexts in which the
recipient encounters the donor and the circumstances for the first time.
Threat to Self-Esteem
A final approach can be termed threat to
self-esteem. Unlike the equity, reactance,
and attribution formulations, this approach
assumes explicitly that self-related consequences of aid are critical in determining the
recipient's reactions. Although there have
been a number of studies in this tradition,
no well-articulated theory exists. Thus, a
complete set of propositions cannot be delineated at this point.
An underlying assumption of the threatto-self-esteem approach is that aid contains
a mixture of self-threatening and supportive
elements. On the one hand, help may be
threatening in that it implies an inferioritysuperiority relationship between recipient
and donor and conflicts with values of selfreliance and independence, which are stressed
throughout socialization (Merton, 1968).
On the other hand, help may be supportive
in that it may communicate donor caring
and concern, and it provides instrumental
benefits (e.g., money, advice). Based on this
assumption, the approach makes two major
predictions concerning reactions to help.
The first prediction is that situational conditions (i.e., donor characteristics, aid characteristics, and context characteristics) and
recipient characteristics determine whether
help is primarily threatening or supportive
in a given setting. The second prediction is
that when help is experienced as predominantly threatening, reactions are negative/

defensive (e.g., lowered self-concept, negative donor and aid evaluations, low acceptance of aid, high self-help). When help is
primarily supportive, reactions are positive/
nondefensive (e.g., enhanced self-concept,
positive donor and aid evaluations, high acceptance of aid, low self-help).
These assertions have been made frequently by aid researchers (e.g., Broil et al.,
1974; Fisher & Nadler, 1976; Gergen &
Gergen, 1974a, 1974b; Nadler et al., 1976).
Conceptual work by Blau (1964), Coopersmith (1967), and Heider (1958), among
others, has pointed to similar conclusions.
Furthermore, the self-related implications of
aid have received attention in a large number
of field studies (e.g., Lipman & Sterne,
1962; Nadler, Sheinberg, & Jaffe, in press).
Nevertheless, experimental research in social psychology has tended to ignore the recipient's internal feelings and self-cognitions. Thus, there has been little experimental
research that allows a test of the predictions
of the threat-to-self-esteem approach. The
studies we describe are unique in their use
of threat to self-esteem as a major concept.
This focus also dictates the selection of certain independent variables (e.g., chronic and
manipulated levels of self-esteem) and dependent variables (e.g., changes in affect,
situational self-esteem, self-help behavior)
that have been relatively neglected.
Situational conditions. A number of
studies support the assertion that situational
conditions determine the self-related consequences of aid. In one of the first social psychological experiments to explore the effects
of help on recipient self-perception, Fisher
and Nadler (1974) demonstrated that aid
from an attitudinally similar other person on
an intellectual task was self-threatening,
whereas the same help from a dissimilar
other person was supportive. In interpreting
these data it was suggested that because similar individuals serve as social comparison
others (cf. Castore & DeNinno, 1977; Festinger, 1954), their aid amplifies elements
of relative inferiority and dependency that
are inherent in receiving help. Later research
by Nadler et al. (1976) supported this explanation, finding that aid from a similar
other person elicited an internal attribution
for failure, whereas aid from a dissimilar

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

other person facilitated an external attribution.


The Fisher and Nadler studies on donorrecipient similarity were extended in research that may have implications for peer
tutoring in the classroom. Specifically, Fisher,
Harrison, and Nadler (1978) found that
being helped by a peer (someone with similar
task-relevant experience) is more threatening than being helped by a nonpeer (someone
with greater task-relevant experience). In
addition, Weiss (1969) showed that welfare
mothers who were interviewed by someone
similar in ethnic and socioeconomic background reported being more "bothered" by
welfare than did those who were assigned a
dissimilar interviewer.
Also in line with the threat-to-self-esteem
approach, it has been observed that other
situational conditions may moderate the
self-consequences of aid from a similar other
person. For example, a recent study performed in Israel by Nadler and Fisher (Note
2) suggests that the locus of the donor's ability to help may have such an effect. Students
in the experiment all did poorly at a problem-solving task and received aid from an
attitudinally similar other personthey were
told either that the aid reflected the donor's
superior knowledge or that the donor had
been given the answers by someone else. Aid
was threatening when it indicated the donor's superior knowledge (as in the Fisher
& Nadler, 1974, and the Nadler et al., 1976,
studies) and supportive when it did not. A
second variable (degree of friendship) affects the self-threat in aid from a similar
other person. Research by DePaulo (1978a)
and by Clark et al. (1974) suggests that assistance from similar donors who are close
friends may not be threatening. In such relationships the overall level of competence
is likely to be comparable among the individuals; ample opportunity exists for repayment in other domains where the recipient
has superiority; and it is generally clear that
help is motivated by caring and concern.
Thus, aid is less apt to constitute a threat
to self-esteem.
Another situational variable that determines the self-consequences of help is the
donor's level of resources. Fisher and Nadler
(1976) found that aid from someone who

39

had accumulated high resources in a setting


in which the recipient had failed precipitated
negative affect and lower situational self-esteem. Positive affect and higher situational
self-esteem resulted when the donor had relatively fewer resources. Their interpretation
is that aid from an "other" who began with
equivalent resources but was extremely successful (in a setting in which the' recipient
failed) carries a strong message of relative
incompetence and threat. When the donor
is barely able to help (a low-resource donor),
the messsage of relative inferiority is less
salient, and such "high-cost" aid may be
supportive because it conveys a message of
caring and concern.4 Whether parallel results would be obtained when resources are
different at the start awaits research.
Other studies also demonstrate that situational conditions determine recipient selfthreat or support. Research by Gergen and
Gergen (1974a) found that the perceived
favorability of the donor's motivation had
important self-related consequences for the
recipient. Aid from positively motivated donors was more supportive than aid from negatively motivated donors. This may be because it is threatening to be dependent on
someone who is perceived to have ulterior
motives (i.e., a donor who may take advantage of the recipient) or because positively
motivated aid is more easily viewed as reflecting true liking and concern.
Further, Gergen and Gergen (1970,
1974b) and DePaulo and her associates
(DePaulo, 1978b; Druian & DePaulo, 1977)
found that conditions that emphasize status
or ability differences, or that place the donor
in a superordinate position (e.g., when aid
is a bilateral vs. a multilateral arrangement),
lead to threat. Stokes and Bickrnan (1974)
and Nadler (1980) reported that having to
seek help from a physically attractive individual was more threatening than was de4
The data on the effects of donor-recipient similarity
and those on the effects of donor resources may seem
to be in disagreement. Specifically, they may appear to
suggest that whereas overall dissimilarity decreases selfthreat, resource disparity (or dissimilarity) increases
self-threat. This conclusion, however, would be misleading due to a number of differences in the two bodies
of research. For a complete discussion of this issue, and
an integration of these two sets of studies, see Nadler
and Fisher (Note 3).

40

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAONA

pendency on an unattractive person. This has


been corroborated with both American and
Israeli subjects and may occur because one
risks a greater loss in esteem in admitting
a need for help to someone who enjoys an
enviable social status. Alternatively, people
may feel that others who are attractive will
be less likely to comply with their request.
Finally, in studies performed in Israel it was
found that when recipients expected to meet
the donor, they experienced more self-threat
than when they were allowed to remain
anonymous (Nadler, 1980; Nadler & Porat,
1978).
Recipient characteristics. The threat-toself-esteem approach assumes further that
recipient characteristics determine the selfrelated consequences of help. Several recipient characteristics are associated with differential sensitivity to potentially threatening elements in aid. In one study done in the
United States and another in Israel, DePaulo
and Fisher (1980) and Nadler et al. (in
press) found that recipients who were highly
ego involved with tasks were more selfthreatened by aid than were those whose involvement was lower. Also, high-need
achievers, for whom autonomy and individual achievement may be central to their selfconcept, appear to be more threatened by
aid than do low-need achievers (Tessler &
Schwartz, 1972). In addition, DePaulo and
Rosenthal (1980) and DePaulo and Fisher
(1981) found that recipients who are especially sensitive to covert nonverbal cues (e.g.,
negative messages that donors may "leak"
while overtly expressing a desire to help) are
particularly susceptible to the threatening
implications of aid.
There is also evidence that high- and lowself-esteem individuals are differentially sensitive to the self-threat in aid. Two contrasting predictions can be made regarding the
effects of persistent self-esteem on reactions
to threatening aid. The first prediction is
based on a cognitive consistency formulation
(Bramel, 1968), which asserts that negative
information about the self is disturbing only
when it is inconsistent with one's self-concept. From this perspective if aid is threatening, it should be more intensely negative
for high- than for low-self-esteem individuals. In contrast, a vulnerability prediction

(cf. Tessler & Schwartz, 1972) asserts that


because people with low self-esteem have
few positive self-cognitions, they will be
more disturbed by threatening information
than will those with high self-esteem. From
this perspective threatening aid should be
more aversive for low- than for high-self-esteem people. In support of the first prediction, it was found in studies done in the
United States and Israel that high-self-esteem recipients internalized the threatening
information inherent in aid more strongly
than did low-self-esteem recipients (Nadler,
Altman, & Fisher, 1979; Nadler et al.,
1976).
Corroborative support from other studies. The predictions of the threat-to-selfesteem approach are corroborated by data
from studies done within other conceptual
frameworks. For example, situational conditions such as whether aid is offered or requested (e.g., Gross et al., 1979) and whether
or not the recipient can reciprocate (e.g.,
Gross & Latane, 1974), among others, have
been found to determine the self-consequences of aid. Aid that must be requested
may elicit threat because it involves a public
admission of inferiority, whereas an offer of
aid does not. Having to accept help that one
cannot reciprocate could be threatening because it conflicts with the salient norm that
one should be equitable in social relations.
In contrast, aid that enables reciprocity may
be more supportive because it allows one to
satisfy the equity norm and shows greater
respect for the recipient by the donor.
Research done from other perspectives has
also related recipient characteristics to the
self-threat or support in aid. For example,
less positive reactions among high-need recipients (those with relatively severe emotional problems) have been documented in
studies of psychiatric help-seeking (Calhoun, Dawes, & Lewis, 1972). Also, recipients with relatively high material need appear to be more threatened by help than do
those with low need (Morse & Gergen,
1971). In explaining their results, Morse and
Gergen (1971) suggested that people with
low need may expect aid less than do those
with high need, so aid constitutes more of
a positive disconfirmation (and hence is more
supportive for them). Also, low-need indi-

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

viduals (because of their low need) may find


useful rather than merely frustrating the
grossly inadequate levels of aid that are typical of many helping programs. Although
studies to date suggest better reactions in
low- than in high-need individuals, one can
envision situations in which this pattern
might be reversed (e.g., when help effectively meets a life-threatening need rather
than a trivial one, especially when the need
is not the fault of the recipient).
Overall, the relation specified by the
threat-to-self-esteem approach between aidrelated situational conditions, recipient characteristics, and recipient self-threat or support is corroborated by a broad array of studies. There is also evidence, reviewed below,
for the second assumption of this approach.
Specifically, aid that is threatening leads to
negative/defensive reactions (e.g., unfavorable donor and aid evaluations, low helpseeking and acceptance of aid, and high selfhelp), whereas aid that is supportive leads
to positive/nondefensive responses (e.g, favorable donor and aid evaluations, high helpseeking and acceptance of aid, and low selfhelp).
Relationship between self-consequences
of aid and recipient reactions, A number
of studies have found that when dependency
is threatening, less aid is sought than when
help is supportive. For example, Druian and
DePaulo (1977) and DePaulo (1978b) suggested that adults are more threatened by
dependence on children than on equally competent adults and thus seek less help from
them. Moreover, individuals (especially those
with high self-esteem) are more resistant to
seeking help on ego-involving than on nonego-involving tasks (e.g., DePaulo & Fisher,
1980; Tessler & Schwartz, 1972; Wallston,
1976). Finally, Nadler (1980) and Stokes
and Bickman (1974) observed that one's
public esteem is more threatened by dependence on physically attractive than on unattractive others, and that such aid is less
often sought. When helping is perceived as
out of role for a physically attractive other
person, help-seeking is depressed still further
(Stokes & Bickman, 1974).
The assertions of the threat-to-self-esteem
approach are also corroborated by data on
recipient efforts toward self-sufficiency. For

41

example, Fisher and Nadler (1976) and


Nadler and Fisher (Note 2) found that when
aid is threatening (i.e., when it comes from
a high resource donor or from a similar other
person whose success is due to superior ability), recipients make more attempts at selfhelp than when aid is supportive (i.e., when
it comes from a low resource donor or from
a similar other person whose aid does not
reflect superior ability). This pattern has
been observed in several cultures and is supported on an anecdotal level in a study of
editorials in India and Pakistan (Andreas,
1969). When American aid was perceived
as emphasizing donor superiority (i.e., when
it was threatening), editors called for their
nation to invest efforts to better itself so that
the humiliating dependency could be terminated. When help was supportive, selfhelp efforts were not stressed. Finally, it has
also been shown that after receiving threatening help, high self-esteem subjects perform especially well on a subsequent task,
presumably in an effort to avoid any further
need for help (DePaulo, Brown, Ishii, &
Fisher, 1981).
Complementing these studies is some clinical research that suggests that threatening
aid leads to higher self-help, whereas supportive aid may lead to continued dependency. Subjects who were told that mental
disorders were due to social learning (a belief
that is threatening because it places the
blame for the problem on the individual)
engaged in a high degree of self-help behavior. In contrast, individuals who were
told that mental disorders were diseases (a
belief that is less threatening because the
cause is external) engaged in less self-help
behavior (Farina, Fisher, Getter, & Fischer,
1978; Fisher & Farina, 1979). It should be
noted, however, that under conditions in
which aid is extremely threatening, a state
of debilitation rather than self-help efforts
may ensue.
In addition to help-seeking and self-help,
research in other conceptual traditions suggests that the self-related consequences of
aid can also be used to predict reciprocity
behavior. Specifically, when aid is supportive
(e.g., when it is given voluntarily, or the task
is non-ego involving), positive forms of reciprocity tend to occur (e.g., Greenberg &

42

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

Frisch, 1972; Morse, 1972). Positive reciprocity includes a variety of behavior that
is motivated by favorable feelings toward the
donor (e.g., reciprocating the aid or displaying other cooperative behavior toward the
donor, expressing gratitude, allowing the
donor to influence one's behavior to a reasonable degree). This probably occurs because the recipient has come to like the donor, feels comfortable in the dependency
relationship, and if necessary would accept
help again. Conversely, when aid is threatening (e.g., when it is involuntary or when
the task is highly ego involving), this behavior is less likely (e.g., Greenberg & Frisch,
1972; Morse, 1972).
In addition to positive reciprocity, negative forms of reciprocity may also occur. This
is behavior that is motivated by unfavorable
feelings toward the donor (e.g., sabotaging
the implementation of the program, reacting
against the donor's attempts to influence
one's behavior, returning aid immediately so
as to negate the fact that a helping transaction ever occurred). It may be viewed as
a means of restoring self-esteem, which has
been lowered by receiving aid. Negative reciprocity tends to be high when aid is selfthreatening and low when aid is supportive
(e.g., Morse, 1972; Nadler et al, 1974).5
Finally, there is corroborative evidence
that self-threatening and supportive aid lead
to differential affective states, self-evaluations, and evaluations of the donor. When
aid conveys information about relative inferiority and incompetence (e.g., similar donor, highly successful donor), recipients report more negative affect (e.g., Fisher &
Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1979) and unfavorable self-evaluation (e.g., Fisher et al.,
1978; Fisher & Nadler, 1976) than when
such information is not transmitted. Also,
aid that is threatening often elicits more negative donor evaluations than does supportive
aid (e.g., Fisher & Nadler, 1976; Gergen
& Gergen, 1974a; Gergen et al., 1973;
Greenberg & Frisch, 1972). Nevertheless,
data from some experiments (e.g., Fisher
& Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1976) are
equivocal and suggest that donors sometimes
receive positive evaluations regardless of the
self-implications of aid. Several explanations
for this, all focusing on methodological prob-

lems involved in measuring recipient evaluations of their benefactors, have been offered
(cf. Greenberg, 1980). For example, it has
been suggested that social desirability and
the reciprocity norm may cause positive
evaluations of donors even in cases where aid
is aversive. This indicates that equivocal
findings should be interpreted cautiously,
and that more unobtrusive measures (cf.
Morse, 1972) should be used in this context.
Threat to self-esteem and the aid recipient: A summary. The data support the
assertions of the threat-to-self-esteem approach. In addition, this conceptual perspective has focused attention on a neglected
domain of independent variables and reactions to help. The research highlights the
major role that the self-consequences of aid
may play in determining recipient responses.
Thus, although no formal "threat-to-self-esteem" model exists at present, there is evidence that further development may prove
beneficial.
Another important reason for a formalized threat-to-self-esteem model is its breadth
in predicting across aid contexts. Self-related consequences are inherent in a broad
5
Note that the proposed mediator of reciprocity behavior differs for the threat-to-self-esteem formulation
and for the equity theories discussed earlier. First, the
threat-to-self-esteem model argues that the implications
of aid for the recipient's self-concept (and not feelings
of inequity) are the proximal causal variables in the
relationship between aid-related conditions and reciprocity. In terms of the model, aid elicits differential
feelings of inequity because it is threatening or supportive. The level of self-threat and support inherent in
aid determines the subjective value of help, which in
turn determines perceived indebtedness and reciprocity.
For example, in the cases of high cost, voluntary and
deliberate aid recipients experience self-support due to
the message of caring and concern inherent in aid, which
causes them to report feelings of indebtedness and to
reciprocate more. In contrast, under conditions of low
cost and involuntary and nondeliberate aid, the elements
of inferiority and dependency, which may be inherent
in aid, overshadow the positive, supportive elements; aid
is more threatening, and recipients experience less indebtedness and reciprocate less. Second, according to
the threat-to-self-esteem model, forms of reciprocity
may be elicited by help which is either threatening or
supportive, whereas traditional equity theories assume
that restoration of equity is elicited only by aversive,
threatening feelings of inequity. Nevertheless, Greenberg (1980), in his statement of indebtedness, acknowledges that reciprocity can be caused by either favorable
or unfavorable affects.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

array of aid situations due to aspects of socialization and qualities of help itself. In contrast to the threat-to-self-esteem construct,
constructs used in other formulations (e.g.,
degree of inequity, limitation of freedom)
seem to omit a large segment of aid situations from their domain (see Figure 1).
Complementing its cross-situational
breadth, a formalized threat-to-self-esteem
model can relate a unified mediator to a wide
range of reactions that may occur in a particular aid context. As seen in Figure 2, previous formulations are limited in direct applicability to one or a few responses to help.
Further, a threat-to-self-esteem model is the

43

first formulation to specify how responses


relate to each other (i.e., it posits that positive/nondefensive reactions cluster together
as do negative/defensive reactions).
Toward a Formalized Threat-to-SelfEsteem Model
We shall attempt to further demonstrate
that a formalized threat-to-self-esteem model
provides an accurate and parsimonious means
of predicting reactions to aid across diverse
contexts. We begin with a careful analysis
of the data in past research. This analysis
yields a set of common patterns that are sim-

SELF ESTEEM MODEL : All variables


associated with aid that have Implications for recipient self-esteem

ATTRIBUTION THEORIES: Variables


associated with aid that affect
the quality ot donor Intent attrl'
butlons or the locus of attribution
1or needing help.

EQUITY THEORIES:
Variables
associated
with aid
that affect
perceived
equity.

REACTANCE
THEORY:
Variables associated with aid
which limit per
celved freedom,

Figure 1, Aid-related conditions: Predictive domain of various theories. (In terms of the aid situations
for which they predict, the theories overlap either partially or totally. Viewing them in this way may
be heuristically useful. Specifically, reactance and equity theories partially overlap, indicating that certain
situational conditions that limit a recipient's perceived freedomfor example, obligation to repay, ability
to reciprocatealso affect perceived equity. Moreover, the predictive domain of equity and reactance
theories can both be subsumed by attribution theories, suggesting that situational conditionsfor example, having to repay aid at excessive interestthat affect feelings of perceived equity or perceived
freedom also affect attributions of donor intent and/or self-attributions for needing help. Finally, although attribution theories subsume the range of variables addressed by equity and reactance theories,
they do not encompass the entire range of aid-related situational conditions handled by the threat-toself-esteem model.)

44

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

ilar to those proposed by a threat-to-self-esteem formulation. It suggests that such a


model constitutes a "best fit" to the extant
data, and that the assumptions of the model
are borne out by research across theoretical
contexts.
Analysis of Past Research
Two patterns exist in the literature on reactions to aid that strongly support a threatto-self-esteem model. First, a descriptive factor analysis of all past research reveals two
distinct clusters of recipient responses, which
are distinct on evaluative, affective, and behavioral levels. Cluster one is essentially negative/defensive and includes negative affect,
negative donor and aid evaluations, low pos-

itive and high negative reciprocity, high subsequent self-help, low help-seeking, and low
acceptance of aid. In contrast, cluster two
is essentially positive/nondefensive and includes positive affect, positive donor and aid
evaluations, high positive and low negative
reciprocity, low subsequent self-help, high
help-seeking, and high aid acceptance. Numerous studies show that reactions within
a particular cluster tend to occur simultaneously and tend to exclude reactions in the
other cluster (e.g., Broil et al., 1974; Fisher
& Nadler, 1976; Gergen & Gergen, 1974a;
Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg
& Frisch, 1972; Gross & Latane, 1974;
Morse, 1972; Stokes & Bickman, 1974).
Second, the data reveal that cluster one
and cluster two reactions are elicited by dif-

Posltlve/Non-defenslve
behavioral responses
Negative/Defensive behavioral
responses

Figure 2. Recipient reactions to aid: Predictive domain of various theories. (In terms of the recipient
responses that they predict, the theories differ. Specifically, reactance and equity theories both make
predictions for only a subset of recipient external perceptions and behavioral responses. Attribution
theories partially overlap with reactance and equity theories but also encompass additional variables that
are not addressed by either of the latter formulations. Nevertheless, the threat-to-self-esteem model
applies to the broadest range of reactions to help.)

45

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

ferent types of situational conditions. When


the conditions associated with each cluster
are grouped separately (see Tables 1 and 2),
it can be seen that cluster one reactions occur
when it can be reasonably assumed that aid
leads to absolute or relative threat to selfesteem, and cluster two reactions occur when
it can be reasonably assumed that aid leads
to absolute or relative self-support.
Together, these two patterns corroborate
the assumptions of a threat-to-self-esteem
model and show that the model can subsume
the valid predictions of earlier theoretical
formulations. Regardless of the specific formulation that was used originally to make
predictions, whenever the conditions associated with aid could be classified as selfthreatening, a negative set of responses occurred. In contrast, when conditions elicited
self-support, another more positive set of reactions occurred. Finally, the mediational
construct of threat to self-esteem is broad
enough to permit prediction across a diverse
range of aid situations and across many
modes of reactions to aid.
Commonalities with Other
Conceptualizations
The assertion that a threat-to-self-esteem
model can subsume the predictions of equity,
reactance, and attribution formulations can

also be derived from the models themselves.


The predictions of equity and reactance theories are based, in essence, on the same general rationale as those of a threat-to-self-esteem model. Implicit in the hypothesized
negative consequences of inequity (for equity theory) and limitations on freedom (for
reactance theory) is the assumption that
these conditions elicit self-concept distress
because they violate important socialized
norms of fairness, self-reliance, and independence. According to Walster et al. (1973),
people in an inequitable relationship who
receive more than they give experience a
threat to their self-esteem because they are
violating the strongly socialized ethical principle that "one should be fair and equitable
in dealing with others" (p. 155). Further, for
individuals socialized under the Protestant
ethic, which specifies self-reliance and independence as the greatest good and dependency as the greatest sin (Weber, 1930), aid
that limits freedom of action (i.e., help that
causes reactance) clearly threatens self-esteem.
In the case of attribution theories, they,
too, are effective for predicting reactions to
aid only insofar as they identify the implications of aid for the recipient's self-concept.
The entire predictive domain of the theory
of correspondent inferences is limited to attributions of specific motives for the donor's

Table 1
Some Conditions Associated with Aid that Elicit Cluster One (Negative/Defensive)

Responses

Aid-related conditions

Examples of specific studies

Negative donor attributes and motivation*


Donor-recipient social comparability*
Inability to reciprocate*
Threat to autonomy*
High donor resources or expertise*
Very high obligation to repay, or none
Aid that implies the loss of important freedoms
Aid that is requested rather than offered*
Aid on a central task
Involuntarily administered aid
Aid that is nondeliberate
Aid that is bilateral
Aid that is lowly normative
Aid that constitutes a negative disconflrmation of
expectancies

Gergen & Gergen (1974a)


Fisher & Nadler (1974); Nadler et al. (1976)
Gross & Latane (1974)
Gergen & Gergen (1970, 1971)
Fisher & Nadler (1976)
Gergen et al. (1975)
Brehm & Cole (1966)
Gross et al. (1979)
Morse (1972)
Goranson & Berkowitz (1966)
Greenberg & Frisch (1972)
Gergen & Gergen (1974b)
Tessler & Schwartz (1972)
Morse & Gergen (1971)

Note. Although all conditions listed can be reasonably assumed to elicit absolute or relative self-threat, this has
been measured where an asterisk appears.

46

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

behavior. The bridge to other reactions to


aid is the self-threat or support that is inherent in such attributions. When positive
donor motives are attributed (e.g., the donor
is perceived to act out of kindness or generosity), aid is more supportive and results
in more favorable reactions (cf. Gergen &
Gergen, 1970, 1974a). Positive donor motivation may also relate to self-support and
thus to other reactions to aid in another way.
More favorably motivated donors (e.g., those
who help voluntarily rather than involuntarily) may be viewed by recipients as liking
and respecting them more, which has obvious self-related consequences. The predictive domain of the theory of external attribution is limited to the recipient's locus of
attribution for the positive or negative information inherent in aid. Again, the bridge
between this and other recipient reactions
is threat to self-esteem. When the locus of
attribution leads to self-threat, reactions to
aid are negative; when such attributions are
supportive, reactions are positive (cf. Gergen
& Gergen, 1974a).
Earlier, it was established that a threatto-self-esteem model can be extracted from
and is congruent with data in past research
generated by various conceptual formulations. Above, it was shown that this formulation is also in accord with critical
conceptual elements of the formulations

themselves. Before presenting a more formalized threat-to-self-esteem model in detail, it will be suggested that the assumptions
of such a model would also be congruent
with self-esteem theories in personality research.
Relation to Self-Esteem Theories
Self-esteem formulations (e.g., Coopersmith, 1967; Wylie, 1974) suggest that individuals are motivated to maintain favorable self-attitudes and to defend the selfconcept against alteration, diminution, or
insult. Information that threatens feelings
of self-worth causes anxiety and precipitates
attempts to restore self-esteem. These may
include devaluating the source of the information, blaming others for the problem, or
engaging in behavior that has enhanced selffeelings in the past (cf. Coopersmith, 1967;
Wylie, 1974).
The assumptions of self-esteem theories
find parallels in a threat-to-self-esteem model
of reactions to aid. Specifically, the model
predicts that recipients who are threatened
by aid experience negative affect and engage
in defensive attempts to restore positive feelings about themselves. These involve derogating the donor and the aid, exhibiting high
negative and low positive reciprocity, engaging in self-help to prevent further aid from

Table 2
Some Conditions Associated with Aid that Elicit Cluster Two (Positive/Nondefensive)
Aid-related conditions
Positive donor attributes and motivation*
Donor-recipient nonsoeial comparability*
Ability to reciprocate*
Little threat to autonomy*
Low donor resources or expertise*
Moderate obligation to repay
Aid that implies few lost freedoms
Aid that is offered rather than requested*
Aid on a noncentral task
Voluntarily administered aid
Aid that is deliberate
Aid that is multilateral
Aid that is highly normative
Aid that constitutes a positive disconfirmation of
expectancies

Responses

Examples of specific studies


Gergen & Gergen (1974a)
Fisher & Nadler (1974); Nadler et al. (1976)
Gross & Latane (1974)
Gergen & Gergen (1970, 1971)
Fisher & Nadler (1976)
Gergen et al. (1975)
Brehm & Cole (1966)
Gross et al. (1979)
Morse (1972)
Goranson & Berkowitz (1966)
Greenberg & Frisch (1972)
Gergen & Gergen (1974b)
Tessler & Schwartz (1972)
Morse & Gergen (1971)

Note. Although all conditions listed can be reasonably assumed to elicit absolute or relative self-support, this has
been measured where an asterisk appears.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

47

positive or negative self-relevant messages


for the recipient (due to the way in which
it is offered, the type of help given, qualities
of the helper, etc.). For example, it may be
clear from the way aid is given or from other
characteristics of the transaction that the
donor likes, cares, and is concerned about
the recipient and views him or her as worthy
(a highly supportive message) or that the
donor disdains the recipient and views him
or her as unworthy (a highly threatening
message). Similarly, aid may stress one's
relative inferiority and dependency compared with peers (highly threatening information) or allow a recipient to see himself
or herself as equally adept as others (more
A Formalized
supportive information). To the extent that
Threat-to-Self-Esteem Model
such messages are primarily positive, aid will
Given the converging lines of evidence contain elements of self-support; to the exthat suggest the viability of a threat-to-self- tent that they are negative, aid will contain
esteem model, we propose such a model for- threatening elements.
mally. Although many of its assertions have
Socialized values. In modern Western
received experimental support, others re- culture, some values that are relevant to the
main to be tested. Thus, the model should receipt of aid are broadly socialized. These
be viewed as subject to refinement based on can be identified with great consensus. We
future research.
propose that to the extent that aid conflicts
Our model, like the informal threat-to- with such values, it will contain elements of
self-esteem approach on which it is based, self-threat; to the extent that it is congruent
assumes (a) that most aid situations contain with them, it will contain elements of selfa mixture of positive and negative self-re- support. 6
First, there is the prevalent value that peolated elements and (b) that situational conditions and recipient characteristics deter- ple should be independent and self-reliant
mine whether a particular receipt of aid is (cf. Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Merton,
predominantly threatening or supportive. 1968; Weber, 1930). From this perspective,
Our model, however, is far more explicit in aid that limits freedom of action is threatits predictions and rationale. We present ening, whereas aid that fosters freedom is
each of the hypotheses of the model in a supportive. This value orientation also imsummary statement, which we then expli- plies that an individual should be a viable
cate. Figure 3 represents a schematic dia- entitywith basic competence in certain
areas (i.e., ability to care for one's basic
gram of the entire model.
needs) as well as expertise in some domain.
I . Dependency relations have potential for When aid signifies a failure to correspond
to this ideal, it contains threatening eleself-threat and support due to (a) selfments. Aid in an area where an individual
relevant messages contained in aid itself,
6
(b) values instilled during socialization,
What we are describing here is & process that affects
and (c) inherent instrumental qualities
whether an offer of aid will be experienced as self-supportive or threatening. The specific values described
of help.
being necessary, and seeking little subsequent help. All of these responses reaffirm
the recipient's feelings of power and control.
In contrast, aid that supports the recipient's
self-concept precipitates a host of different
reactions. Recipients of such help (who are
not concerned with restoring self-esteem)
enjoy positive affect, evaluate the donor and
the aid positively, and engage in high positive and low negative reciprocity. They also
engage in low self-help and high help-seeking probably because their past dependency
was pleasant and they expect that future
dependency would be the same.

Three sources of positive and negative


self-related information that are inherent in
aid are as follows.
Self-relevant messages contained in aid
itself. Aid in and of itself often contains

should not be assumed to hold across all cultures, but


we believe the reasoning (that receipts of aid that correspond with established values that arc relevant to dependency will elicit elements of self-support in the recipient, whereas receipts of aid that conflict with such
values elicit elements of self-threat) will hold across
cultures.

48

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA


CLUSTER ONE:
negative affect
/
./

Ul

k
Conditions
associated
with a
receipt of
aid (i.e.,
characteristics
of the aid
characteristics
of the donor,

ient, context
characteristics

High relative
or absolute

^r' ^~ recipient's
UJ self-esteem

^-"""'^

Magnitude of
relative or
absolute selfs , threat or selfsupport inherent
in aid for the

s^"'

* high refusal of aid offers

^V. high degree of subsequent self-help


CLUSTER TWO:

\_
D
^>v 3 or absolute

negative evaluation
of donor and aid

** positive reciprocity

o
w
o
LL
[Jj
u.

t~

jf

'

.^ positive evaluation
of donor and aid

self support <-^_^


recipient

\X^\^

~~ t. low negative and high

N/^X/^ high help-peeking


N.

low refusal of aid offer*


\low degree of subsequent self-help

Figure 3. A threat-to-self-esteem model for conceptualizing recipient reactions to aid.

is not expected to have basic or expert competence does not represent a failure to conform to this value and thus may be supportive. When aid signifies that one has lived
up to this value (as indicated by a grant or
fellowship to a researcher recognizing his or
her expertise), it is experienced as supportive.
Second, people are socialized to believe
they should deal fairly with others (e.g.,
behave in accord with the values of equity
in social exchange and with the reciprocity
norm). Recipients thus aspire to maintain
fair relations with donors (to restore equity
after a receipt of aid and to deal fairly with
the donor in other respects). When they are
unable to comply with such values, recipients
experience self-threat, but when they are
able to comply, aid may contain supportive
elements.
Finally, people believe they should be
treated fairly by others. Aid that exploits
or otherwise takes advantage of the recipient

conflicts with this value and contains threatening elements, whereas aid that constitutes
fair treatment is congruent and contains supportive elements. We are more likely to fear
that aid constitutes an unfair arrangement,
and to experience it as threatening, when it
does not contain clear signs of the donor's
liking, caring, and concern or when the donor has negative characteristics (e.g., is perceived as dishonest; Gergen & Gergen,
1971).7
Instrumental qualities of aid. Aspects
such as the amount of aid and the efficacy
of aid also affect its self-consequences. To
7
In addition to these value orientations, dispositional
qualities (e.g., persistent self-esteem, sex typing) may
also be viewed as systems of socialized values within an
individual. Aid will be threatening to the extent that it
is inconsistent with these and supportive to the extent
that it is consistent. For example, because dependency
is more inconsistent with the values of high- than of lowself-esteem individuals, and of masculine than of feminine sex-typed people, it should be more threatening
to them.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

the extent that instrumental qualities of aid


(a) decrease the threat associated with one's
current condition and (b) increase the probability of future success, aid will contain supportive elements. Thus, aid that fully meets
the recipients' current needs and enables
them to avoid future dependency (e.g., giving the recipients a process that allows them
to care for themselves in the future) is more
supportive than a "handout" that only meets
current needs. Nevertheless, meeting current
needs, or even a portion of them, may be
supportive insofar as it tends to make one's
problem less bothersome. In contrast, aid
that is not instrumental in significantly meeting one's needs (e.g., because it is insufficient, ineffective) will be threatening because (a) one continues to bear the failure
that caused the current need as well as the
prospect of future problems, (b) as problems
persist they often become more embarrassing, (c) ineffective help may suggest a lack
of donor caring and may lead to concern that
one is being exploited, and (d) accepting ineffective help may call into question one's
judgment, status, means, or power.
2. Situational conditions and recipient
characteristics associated with receipt of
aid determine whether it is a
predominantly self-supportive or selfthreatening experience.
Many, if not most, instances of receiving
aid include both self-threatening and selfsupportive elements. For example, aid may
be supportive (e.g., provide instrumental
benefits) yet imply a threatening failure to
exhibit competence where one is supposed
to be an expert. Hypothesis 2a specifies that
situational conditions and recipient characteristics determine the configuration of selfthreatening and self-supportive elements in
a receipt of aid. Specifically, these variables
determine the extent to which aid is experienced (a) as containing a favorable or unfavorable self-relevant message, (b) as consistent or inconsistent with socialized values,
and (c) as meeting or failing to meet one's
needs.
Hypothesis 2b proposes that situational
conditions and recipient characteristics determine the relative weights of the self-re-

49

lated information deriving from the above


three sources. For example, in situations of
very high recipient need, the self-consequences accruing from the instrumental
qualities of aid outweigh those from the
other two sources. In low-need situations, the
reverse would be true. Similarly, the weight
placed on consistency or inconsistency with
socialized values (e.g., Protestant ethic orientations) depends on how strongly these
values are internalized. If they are highly
internalized, the self-support from consistency, and the threat from inconsistency, will
be more heavily weighted.
Finally, Hypothesis 2c incorporates 2a
and 2b into the following summary statement. To the extent that, overall, aid-related
situational conditions and recipient characteristics highlight aspects of aid that elicit
self-support relative to aspects that elicit
self-threat, aid is predominantly supportive.
To the extent that, overall, aid-related situational conditions and recipient characteristics highlight aspects of aid that elicit selfthreat relative to aspects that elicit self-support, aid is predominantly threatening.
3. Other things being equal, whether aid
is predominantly self-supportive or
threatening determines reactions to aid.
Other things being equal (e.g., type of
problem for which help is needed), when aid
is predominantly threatening, negative reactions, which are defensive in nature (cluster one reactions), tend to occur. In contrast,
when help is predominantly supportive, it
elicits essentially positive/nondefensive reactions (cluster two reactions). The hypothesized relationship between self-threat and
cluster one reactions and between self-support and cluster two reactions has received
direct experimental corroboration (e.g., Farina et al, 1978; Fisher & Farina, 1979;
Fisher & Nadler, 1976) and indirect support
from past research, as discussed previously.
4. Elements of self-threat and support are
the intervening construct between (a) aidrelated situational conditions and recipient
characteristics and (b) recipient reactions
to aid.
The assumption that elements of selfthreat and support are the intervening con-

50

J. FISHER, A. NADLER, AND S. WHITCHER-ALAGNA

struct between (a) aid-related situational


conditions and recipient characteristics and
(b) reactions to aid follows from Hypothesis
3. This hypothesis has also received direct
experimental support in studies by Nadler
et al. (1976) and by Nadler et al. (1979),
which used Underwood's (1975) strategy for
validating hypothesized intervening constructs. Briefly, Underwood suggested that
a hypothesized intervening construct can be
substantiated if people who differ on a relevant personality dimension respond to the
manipulation in question differentially and
in a way that is consistent with extant theory.
Using both "trait" and "state" operationalizations of self-concept, Nadler et al.
(1976, 1979) found that individuals with
high and low self-esteem responded to aid
differentially and in line with a consistency
formulation (Bramel, 1968). This is strong
evidence for elements of self-threat and support as a mediator between aid-related conditions and recipient reactions to aid.
5. The degree to which aid is
predominantly self-supportive or
threatening determines the intensity of
cluster one and cluster two responses.
To the extent that aid is predominantly
self-threatening, cluster one responses become more numerous and/or intense. 8 To
the extent that aid is predominantly self-supportive, cluster two responses become more
numerous and/or intense. This hypothesis
implies an inherent limitation on reactions
to self-supportive or self-threatening aid:
Cluster one responses are limited in intensity
and/or number by the magnitude of selfthreat, whereas cluster two responses are
similarly limited by the magnitude of selfsupport.
It is hypothesized that a second self-regulatory mechanism occurs, which is analogous to affect dissipation (Byrne, 1971).
When the recipient's negative evaluation of
the donor and the aid, failure to reciprocate,
and so forth, result in a dissipation of negative affect (and raise situational self-esteem), the impetus for subsequent cluster
one responses is reduced. A similar process
occurs for cluster two responses. When the

recipient allows the donor to exert social influence, reciprocates in kind, and so forth,
this results in a dissipation of positive affect,
and the impetus for subsequent cluster two
responses is reduced. Although these assertions have never been tested directly in an
aid context, they are based on findings for
affect dissipation demonstrated in other interpersonal interaction situations (Byrne,
1971).
These five hypotheses summarize the major assertions of a threat-to-self-esteem
model. Before concluding, we briefly discuss
the use of the model with other psychological
formulations.
Interface with other conceptual formulations. The threat-to-self-esteem model
predicts when aid will be self-threatening or
supportive and specifies the relationship between the self-implications of help and other
reactions to aid. We acknowledge that there
may be situations in which the self-consequences of receiving aid are minimal and in
which other theoretical approaches would be
more appropriate. Moreover, in many cases
where aid does affect the recipient's self-esteem, other conceptual approaches can help
determine these effects. Any psychological
theory or formulation that accurately predicts conditions under which aid will be selfsupportive or threatening (e.g., attribution
theories, social comparison theory) can be
used along with the principles specified in
the model to generate predictions. Once the
self-related implications of a particular aid
context have been established, the grouping
of potential reactions in clusters allows a
unified set of predictions for recipient responses.
Conclusions
Through a review of past research on reactions to aid and the theoretical approaches
used, we have shown that previous conceptualizations are unable to predict reactions
to aid for a large number of relevant situ8
An exception is that when aid becomes extremely
threatening, a state of debilitation will ensue under
which self-help will not occur.

RECIPIENT REACTIONS TO AID

51

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Received September 30, 1980

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