It is submitted that government employees may face dismissal if they test

positive for illegal drug use. The Civil Service Commission declared in Resolution
07-1625, dated August 31, 2007:
It is settled that the use of illegal or prohibited drugs is a serious
and grievous offense. This is because of the perils it poses not only
on the users themselves but also on the general public. It is
common knowledge that drug addicts become useless if not
dangerous members of society and, in some instances turn out to
be among the living dead. The dangers would all the more be
multiplied or compounded if the person involved is one connected
with the government, who happens to be performing some vital
frontline services such as traffic enforcement as in the present
case. It is for this reason that a government official or employee
found to be using illegal drugs is considered to be guilty of grave
misconduct, punishable with the supreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with all its attendant accessory penalties. Substance
abuse or drug addiction is directly anathema to the abiding tenet
that a public office is a public trust.
Regrettably, the appellant cannot make use of his length of service
and this case being his first offense to get off lightly. It has been
ruled, in not few cases, that rather than mitigate liability, length of
service should serve to aggravate culpability. For, one in the service
long enough should know better than to engage in nefarious
activities. Upon the other hand, the grave nature of the offense
committed by the appellant negates appreciating in his favor the
fact that this happens to be his first commission.
The Supreme Court held in Re: ADMINISTRATIVECHARGE OF MISCONDUCT
RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED USE OF PROHIBITED DRUG ("Shabu") OF
REYNARD B. CASTOR, A.M. No. 2013-08-SC that testing positive for use
of illegal drugs is considered as grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal for the first offense.
Substantial evidence obtained through a random drug test
established that Castor was indeed positive for use of shabu. This is
a flagrant violation of the law which is considered as grave
misconduct. Under Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), grave
misconduct is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the
first offense.
Further, it is provided that under Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 13, series of 2010,4 any official or employee found positive
for use of dangerous drugs shall be subjected to
disciplinary/administrative proceedings with a penalty of
dismissal from the service at first offense pursuant to

Section 46(19) of Book V of Executive Order 292 and

Section22(c) of its Omnibus Rules.
CSC Resolution No. 99-1410 dated July 1, 1999 further enunciates this point:
Government employees who are found positive for drugs and who
can offer no satisfactory explanation may be subject to dismissal
from the service. The offense is classified as Grave Misconduct and
punishable by dismissal in the service under Section 22, Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. Grave Misconduct is defined as an act which manifests a clear
intent to violate the law or there is flagrant disregard of an
established rule. It is also any act which society abhors and
condemns.
However, this does not mean that testing positive for the use of illegal drugs
means that the requisite procedure of Preliminary Investigation, Formal Charge,
Formal Investigation, and Hearing may be dispensed with.
While it is true that a formal trial-type is not essential to due process, it is
necessary that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. 1 Also, before an employer may dismiss an
employee, the latter must be afforded due process which means, among others,
the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him and to adduce evidence in
his defense.
The CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the
requisite preliminary investigation is null and void. However, upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority
shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment
under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word shall quite
obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the opportunity
to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth
above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment
required therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by
respondents. Contrary to petitioners claim, no exception is provided for in the
CSC Rules.2
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied
more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings.3 In particular, due process in administrative
1 Autobus Workers Union [AWU] vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 291 SCRA 219
2 Garcia vs. Molina, G.R. No. 157383,

August 10, 2010

3 Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil 486, 491 (1999).

proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual
or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with
the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and
to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. 4

Montoya v. Varilla, supra ar 841-842; Fabella v. CA, 346 Phil 940, 952-953 (1997)