PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No.

705 May 19, 1975

REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FORESTRY REFORM
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 3. Definitions.
(c) Alienable and disposable lands refer to those lands of the public domain which have been the subject
of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes.
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated
water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands.
(cc) License is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources as in any forest land,
without any right of occupation and possession over the same, to the exclusion of others, or establish and
operate a wood-processing plant, or conduct any activity involving the utilization of any forest resources.
(dd) License agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within
any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the
government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.
(ee) Permit is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any limited
forest resources or undertake a limited activity with any forest land without any right of occupation and
possession therein.
(ff) Annual allowable cut is the volume of materials, whether of wood or other forest products, that is
authorized to be cut regularly from the forest.
Section 15. Topography. No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over shall be
classified as alienable and disposable, nor any forest land fifty per cent (50%) in slope or over, as grazing
land.
Lands eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over which have already been declared as alienable and
disposable shall be reverted to the classification of forest lands by the Department Head, to form part of
the forest reserves, unless they are already covered by existing titles or approved public land application,
or actually occupied openly, continuously, adversely and publicly for a period of not less than thirty (30)
years as of the effectivity of this Code, where the occupant is qualified for a free patent under the Public
Land Act: Provided, That said lands, which are not yet part of a well-established communities, shall be
kept in a vegetative condition sufficient to prevent erosion and adverse effects on the lowlands and
streams: Provided, further, That when public interest so requires, steps shall be taken to expropriate,
cancel defective titles, reject public land application, or eject occupants thereof.
Section 16. Areas needed for forest purposes. The following lands, even if they are below eighteen per
cent (18%) in slope, are needed for forest purposes, and may not, therefore, be classified as alienable
and disposable land, to wit:
1. Areas less than 250 hectares which are far from, or are not contiguous with, any certified
alienable and disposable land;

2. Isolated patches of forest of at least five (5) hectares with rocky terrain, or which protect a
spring for communal use;
3. Areas which have already been reforested;
4. Areas within forest concessions which are timbered or have good residual stocking to support
an existing, or approved to be established, wood processing plant;
5. Ridge tops and plateaus regardless of size found within, or surrounded wholly or partly by,
forest lands where headwaters emanate;
6. Appropriately located road-rights-or-way;
7. Twenty-meter strips of land along the edge of the normal high waterline of rivers and streams
with channels of at least five (5) meters wide;
8. Strips of mangrove or swamplands at least twenty (20) meters wide, along shorelines facing
oceans, lakes, and other bodies of water, and strips of land at least twenty (20) meters wide
facing lakes;
9. Areas needed for other purposes, such as national parks, national historical sites, game
refuges and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station sites, and others of public interest; and
10. Areas previously proclaimed by the President as forest reserves, national parks, game refuge,
bird sanctuaries, national shrines, national historic sites:
Provided, That in case an area falling under any of the foregoing categories shall have been titled in favor
of any person, steps shall be taken, if public interest so requires, to have said title cancelled or amended,
or the titled area expropriated.
Section 20. License agreement, license, lease or permit. No person may utilize, exploit, occupy, possess
or conduct any activity within any forest land, or establish and operate any wood-processing plant, unless
he has been authorized to do so under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit.
Section 27. Duration of license agreement or license to harvest timber in forest lands. The duration of the
privilege to harvest timber in any particular forest land under a license agreement or license shall be fixed
and determined in accordance with the annual allowable cut therein, the established cutting cycle thereof,
the yield capacity of harvestable timber, and the capacity of healthy residuals for a second growth.
The privilege shall automatically terminate, even before the expiration of the license agreement of license,
the moment the harvestable timber have been utilized without leaving any logged-over area capable of
commercial utilization.
The maximum period of any privilege to harvest timber is twenty-five (25) years, renewable for a period,
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years, necessary to utilize all the remaining commercial quantity or
harvestable timber either from the unlogged or logged-over area.

It shall be a condition for the continued privilege to harvest timber under any license or license agreement
that the licensee shall reforest all the areas which shall be determined by the Bureau.
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license
agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or
corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products to
cut, gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements and tools used therein,
and the forfeiture of his improvements in the area.
The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual
disqualification from acquiring any such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or
permittee who cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of another, without prejudice to whatever civil
action the latter may bring against the offender.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3571 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE CUTTING, DESTROYING OR INJURING OF
PLANTED OR GROWING TREES, FLOWERING PLANTS AND SHRUBS OR PLANTS OF SCENIC
VALUE ALONG PUBLIC ROADS, IN PLAZAS, PARKS, SCHOOL PREMISES OR IN ANY OTHER
PUBLIC GROUND
SEC. 3. No cutting, destroying, or injuring of planted or growing trees, flowering plants and shrubs or
plants of scenic value along public roads, in plazas parks, school premises or in any other public ground
shall be permitted save when the cutting, destroying, or injuring of same is necessary for public safety, or
such pruning of same is necessary to enhance its beauty and only upon the recommendation of the
committee mentioned in the preceding section, and upon the approval of the Director of Parks and
Wildlife. The cutting, destroying, or pruning shall be under the supervision of the committee.
SEC. 4. Any person who shall cut, destroy or injure trees, flowering plants and shrubs or plants of scenic
value mentioned in the preceding sections of this Act, shall be punished by prison correctional in its
minimum period to prison mayor in its minimum period.
ACT NO. 3572 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE CUTTING OF TINDALO, AKLE OR MOLAVE

TREES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND TO PENALIZE VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The cutting in the public forests of tindalo, akle, or molave trees less than
sixty centimeters in diameters measured at a height of four feet from the ground (breast high) is
hereby prohibited.
SEC. 2. Any person, company or corporation violating the provisions of this Act shall be
punished by a fine of not more than fifty pesos or imprisonment for not more than fifteen days,

or both, and to pay, besides, two times the amount of the tax on the timber cut:Provided, That in
the case of a company or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for
the acts of his employees or laborers if it proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; other
wise the responsibility will extend only as far as fine is concerned: Provided, Further, That all
tindalo, akle, or molave timber cut in violation of this Act shall be forfeited to the Government.
SEC. 3. All acts and provisions of law inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved: 26 November 1929.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL
INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM, DEFINING ITS SCOPE AND COVERAGE,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 4.
follows:

Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as

1. National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) is the classification and administration
of all designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support
systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein,
and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible;
2. Protected Area refers to identified portions of land and water set aside by reason of their
unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and
protected against destructive human exploitation;
3. Buffer zones are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immediately adjacent to
designated protected areas pursuant to Section 8 that need special development control in
order to avoid or minimize harm to the protected area;
4. Indigenous cultural community refers to a group of people sharing common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits and who have since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory;
5. National park refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness character which
has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of exploitation except in conformity
with approved management plan and set aside as such exclusively to conserve the area or
preserve the scenery, the natural and historic objects, wild animals and plants therein and to
provide enjoyment of these features in such areas;

6. Natural monuments is a relatively small area focused on protection of small features to

protect or preserve nationally significant natural features on account of their special interest or
unique characteristics;
7. Natural biotic area is an area set aside to allow the way of life of societies living in harmony
with the environment to adapt to modern technology at their pace;
8. Natural park is a relatively large area not materially altered by human activity where
extractive resource uses are not allowed and maintained to protect outstanding natural and
scenic areas of national or international significance for scientific, educational and recreational
use;
9. Protected landscapes/seascapes are areas of national significance which are characterized
by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public
enjoyment through the recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity
of these areas;
10. Resource reserve is an extensive and relatively isolated and uninhabited area normally
with difficult access designated as such to protect natural resources of the area for future use
and prevent or contain development activities that could affect the resource pending the
establishment of objectives which are based upon appropriate knowledge and planning;
11. Strict nature reserve is an area possessing some outstanding ecosystem, features and/or
species of flora and fauna of national scientific importance maintained to protect nature and
maintain processes in an undisturbed state in order to have ecologically representative
examples of the natural environment available for scientific study, environmental monitoring,
education, and for the maintenance of genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state;
12. Tenured migrant communities are communities within protected areas which have actually
and continuously occupied such areas for five (5) years before the designation of the same as
protected areas in accordance with this Act and are solely dependent therein for subsistence;
and
13. Wildlife sanctuary comprises an area which assures the natural conditions necessary to
protect nationally significant species, groups of species, biotic communities or physical features
of the environment where these may require specific human manipulations for their
perpetuation.
SECTION 20.
Prohibited Acts. Except as may be allowed by the nature of their categories
and pursuant to rules and regulations governing the same, the following acts are prohibited
within protected areas:
a.
Hunting, destroying, disturbing, or mere possession of any plants or animals or products
derived therefrom without a permit from the Management Board;

b.
Dumping of any waste products detrimental to the protected area, or to the plants and
animals or inhabitants therein;
c.

Use of any motorized equipment without a permit from the Management Board;

d.
Mutilating, defacing or destroying objects of natural beauty, or objects of interest to
cultural communities (of scenic value);
e.

Damaging and leaving roads and trails in a damaged condition;

f.

Squatting, mineral locating, or otherwise occupying any land;

g.
Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence or enclosures, conducting any
business enterprise without a permit;
h.
Leaving in exposed or unsanitary conditions refuse or debris, or depositing in ground or
in bodies of water; and
i.

Altering, removing destroying or defacing boundary marks or signs.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8371
AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING
MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SECTION 3.
mean:

Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall

a)
Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the
present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth
or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b)
Ancestral Lands Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed
and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government
projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;
c)
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title refers to a title formally recognizing the rights
of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated
in accordance with this law;
d)
Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9147

July 30, 2001

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES

AND THEIR HABITATS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 5. Definition of Terms. As used in the Act, the term:
(a) "Bioprospecting" means the research, collection and utilization of biological and genetic resources for
purposes of applying the knowledge derived there from solely for commercial purposes;
Section 7. Collection of Wildlife. Collection of wildlife may be allowed in accordance with Section 6 of this
Act:Provided, That in the collection of wildlife, appropriate and acceptable wildlife collection techniques
with least or no detrimental effects to the existing wildlife populations and their habitats shall, likewise, be
required: Provided, further, That collection of wildlife by indigenous people may be allowed for traditional
use and not primarily for trade: Provided, furthermore, That collection and utilization for said purpose shall
not cover threatened species:Provided, finally, That Section 23 of this Act shall govern the collection of
threatened species.
Section 8. Possession of Wildlife. - No person or entity shall be allowed possession of wildlife unless
such person or entity can prove financial and technical capability and facility to maintain said
wildlife: Provided,
That the source was not obtained in violation of this Act.
Section 9. Collection and/or Possession of By-Products and Derivatives. By-products and derivatives
may be collected and/or possessed: Provided, That the source was not obtained in violation of this Act.
Section 10. Local Transport of Wildlife, By-Products and Derivatives. - Local transport of wildlife, byproducts and derivatives collected or possessed through any other means shall be authorized unless the
same is prejudicial to the wildlife and public health.

Section 14. Bioprospecting. - Bioprospecting shall be allowed upon execution of an undertaking by any
proponent, stipulating therein its compliance with and commitment(s) to reasonable terms and conditions
that may be imposed by the Secretary which are necessary to protect biological diversity.
The Secretary or the authorized representative, in consultation with the concerned agencies, before
granting the necessary permit, shall require that prior informed consent be obtained by the applicant from
the concerned indigenous cultural communities, local communities, management board under Republic
Act No. 7586 or private individual or entity. The applicant shall disclose fully the intent and scope of the
bioprospecting activity in a language and process understandable to the community. The prior informed
consent from the indigenous peoples shall be obtained in accordance with existing laws. The action on
the bioprospecting proposal by concerned bodies shall be made within a reasonable period.
Upon submission of the complete requirements, the Secretary shall act on the research proposal within a
reasonable period.
If the applicant is a foreign entity or individual, a local institution should be actively involved in the
research, collection and, whenever applicable and appropriate in the technological development of the
products derived from the biological and genetic resources.
Section 15. Scientific Researches on Wildlife. Collection and utilization of biological resources for
scientific research and not for commercial purposes shall be allowed upon execution of an
undertaking/agreement with and issuance of a gratuitous permit by the Secretary or the authorized
representative: Provided, That prior clearance from concerned bodies shall be secured before the
issuance of the gratuitous permit: Provided, further, That the last paragraph of Section 14 shall likewise
apply.
Section 27. Illegal Acts. - Unless otherwise allowed in accordance with this Act, it shall be unlawful for
any person to willfully and knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, or undertake the
following acts;
(a) killing and destroying wildlife species, except in the following instances;
(i) when it is done as part of the religious rituals of established tribal groups or indigenous cultural
communities;
(ii) when the wildlife is afflicted with an incurable communicable disease;
(iii) when it is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered by the wildlife;
(iv) when it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a human being; and
(v) when the wildlife is killed or destroyed after it has been used in authorized research or
experiments.
(b) inflicting injury which cripples and/or impairs the reproductive system of wildlife species;
(c) effecting any of the following acts in critical habitat(s)

(i) dumping of waste products detrimental to wildlife;

(ii) squatting or otherwise occupying any portion of the critical habitat;
(iii) mineral exploration and/or extraction;
(iv) burning;
(v) logging; and
(vi) quarrying
(d) introduction, reintroduction or restocking of wildlife resources;
(e) trading of wildlife;
(f) collecting, hunting or possessing wildlife, their by-products and derivatives;
(g) gathering or destroying of active nests, nest trees, host plants and the like;
(h) maltreating and/or inflicting other injuries not covered by the preceding paragraph; and
(i) transporting of wildlife.

CASES:

G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997

EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from
the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The
Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging
the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio
Lalican, 1 Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:

That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City
of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted
species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other
forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed
into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added
that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents
required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be
quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. 2
The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the
wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber"
should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the
prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could

stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The
prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law. 3
On September 24, 1991, the lower court, 4 guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the
information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the
law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa)
thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of
"timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the
government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:

Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest
lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold.
Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber.
The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding
that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues. 5
The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on
Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece
of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to
facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of
timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private
Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of
origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps
bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact
that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber
origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one
point to another. 6
Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber"
is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of
"lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the
acts penalized under that section. 7
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself
from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.
On June 10, 1992, the lower court 8 issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the
previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the
possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that
even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally
prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition
arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside

the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No.
705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."
The petition is devoid of merit.
Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by
then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the recent case of Mustang, Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 9 this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used
for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood,
wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market ." Simply put , lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases
used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And
insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed
timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from
the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the
country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the
vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due
to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to
make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .
To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law
itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so
interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or
contravene the plain words of the law. 10 After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass
lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in
tautology. As the lower court said:

Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the
prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof
without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3(q) of PD
705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest
products, viz., . . .
Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product
(supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is
not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily
cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is
rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If
lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. . . . .
If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized
in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the
legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of
timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is
prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other
forest products without lawful authority.
The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal
of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly

shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 11 Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. 12

On the other hand, certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked
or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. 13 Where the court has jurisdiction over the
case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. 14 As this Court said:

. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action
of certiorari. 15
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions. 16
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact
that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash
the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper
procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the
merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 17
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the
appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as
the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. 18 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 19 An
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 20However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial
measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of
review by certiorari would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts. 21

Petitioner may not seek refuge under Flordelis v. Himalaloan 22 for his contention that a denial of a motion to
quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at
bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed, 23 this case
may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.

With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court
consider, 24this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for
judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
unless it is the lis motaof the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application
of the statute or general law.26

The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country,
considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more
specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused
must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general
welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a
solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing
interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a
difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal
protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is
enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is
immediately executory. Costs against, petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165711 June 30, 2006
HERMOSO ARRIOLA and MELCHOR RADAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly having lost the confiscated lumber entrusted to their custody, petitioners Barangay Captain
Hermoso Arriola and Barangay Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon were
convicted as principal and accessory respectively by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 81 of the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information 1 docketed as Criminal Case No.
2064, which alleges
That on, about and during the first week of May, 1996, in barangay Dulangan, municipality of Magdiwang,
province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then a duly appointed/elected Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod of Dulangan, Magdiwang,
Romblon and as such, they have under their custody and control approximately forty four (44) pieces of
illegally sawn lumbers of assorted sizes and species, with an estimated value of P17,611.20, Philippine
currency, which were confiscated or recovered by the elements of the Philippine National Police and
DENR personnel and thereafter turned over the same to accused Brgy. Capt. Hermoso Arriola which he
acknowledged to have received the same and stockpiled at the backyard of accused Chief Tanod Melchor
Radans house, and through abandonment or negligence, they permitted any other person to take the
public property wholly or partially, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the sum of
P17,611.20.
Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. On May 3, 1998, the trial
court rendered its Decision,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds co-accused barangay captain HERMOSO ARRIOLA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or
Abandonment and he is hereby sentenced to not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18
years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P17,611.20, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of
P13,209.20 as indemnification of consequential damages to the government.
Likewise, co-accused barangay chief tanod MELCHOR RADAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as accessory of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and
he is sentenced to not less than 6 years, as minimum, to 8 years and 8 months, as maximum, with the
accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of
P4,402.80, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of P4,402.80 as indemnification of consequential
damages to the government.
No subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine is imposed to both accused under Article 39,
paragraph 3, RPC but either accused is subsidiarily liable for the quota of either in the indemnity for
consequential damages to the government (Art. 110, RPC). Both accused shall pay the costs equally.
The accused are entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment under Article 29, RPC.
The accused are allowed to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bonds during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsmen (Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended.)
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which referred the same to the public respondent
Sandiganbayan on a finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case. 4 On June 29, 2004, the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan resolved5 thus
Notwithstanding the referral of this case to this Court by the Court of Appeals, it appearing that no
correction was made of the correct appellate court by the appellant, this Court is constrained to DISMISS
the instant case pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating
insofar as pertinent, that "(a)n appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright," and the ruling in the case of Moll vs. Buban, et al.,
G.R. No. 136974 promulgated on August 27, 2002, that the designation of the correct appellate court
should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied6 by the Sandiganbayan; hence, this petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their appeal. They
maintain that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC
OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO CONFISCATED ILLEGALLY LOGGED LUMBER, BY REASON OF THE
DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.

II. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MISAPPROPRIATED OR

CONSENTED OR, THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR ABANDONMENT, PERMITTED ANOTHER PERSON
TO TAKE THE CONFISCATED LUMBER.
III. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MALICIOUSLY OR
FRAUDULENTLY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE MISSING LUMBER WERE FOUND
AND RECOVED (sic).
IV. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MELCHOR RADAN IS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE
CRIME WHO SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-PETITIONER.
V. IN RULING THAT THE GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY
EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
At noon on April 22, 1996 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Forest Rangers
Efren Mandia (Mandia) and Joepre Ferriol, Senior Inspector Noel Alonzo, the team leader of Task Force
Kalikasan together with the Chief of Police of Magdiwang, Romblon SPO3 Agustin Ramal and some other
police officers, confiscated 44 pieces of illegally sawn lumber totaling 1,174 board feet with an estimated
value of P17,611.20.8
Mandia scaled the lumber and made notches on most of the pieces before issuing the seizure
receipt9 and turning over its custody to petitioner Arriola in the presence of petitioner Radan. Arriola
acknowledged receipt thereof and signed10 accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered the lumber
missing on May 5, 1996.11
He went back to Barangay Dulangan on May 14, 1996 accompanied by several police officers and
Foresters Gerardo Sabigan and Glenn Tansiongco. They requested petitioners to turn over custody of the
confiscated lumber but the latter claimed that the same were taken away without their knowledge.
Subsequently, petitioners produced lumber and claimed that these were the ones they recovered. Upon
closer inspection however, Mandia noted that the lumber produced by petitioners were different from
those previously confiscated.
The subsequent investigation conducted by Mandia together with Forester and Officer-in-Charge Gerardo
Sabigan, SPO1 Jose Fabrique, Jr., and some members of the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee
showed that the missing lumber was actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where
petitioner Arriola is a stockholder.12
On June 10, 1996, a complaint was filed against petitioners before the Romblon Provincial Prosecution
Office.
In his defense, Arriola asserts that contrary to the finding of the trial court, he is not an accountable officer
insofar as the confiscated lumber is concerned. He maintains that none of the powers, duties and
functions of a Barangay Captain as enumerated in the Local Government Code 13 (R.A. 7160) directly or
by inference suggests that as such Barangay Captain, he is an accountable officer with respect to the
custody of illegally sawn lumber confiscated within his territorial jurisdiction.

He insists that the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody "not by reason of the duties of his office"
as Barangay Captain, thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to make him liable for
Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners claim that they did not
misappropriate, abandon or neglect the confiscated lumber and insist that the same were stolen. Arriola
claims he visited the stockpiled lumber regularly so the theft probably occurred at night.
With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently produced, petitioners believed in good faith
that the various lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing confiscated lumber left by the
thieves who failed to transport them across.
Before going into the merits of the case, we must first resolve the procedural issue of whether the
Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the appeal. The Sandiganbayan anchored its dismissal on this
Courts pronouncement in Moll v. Buban14 that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily
affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be made
within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct
appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant portion of which states:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
xxxx
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright.
In this case, the records had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals which endorsed petitioners appeal
to the Sandiganbayan. However, petitioners failed to designate the proper appellate court within the
allowable time.
We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for dismissing the appeal outright for it was merely applying the law
and existing jurisprudence on the matter. Appeal is not a vested right but a mere statutory privilege; thus,
appeal must be made strictly in accordance with provisions set by law.15 Section 2, Rule 50 clearly
requires that the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day
period to appeal.
However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have
been adopted to help secure not override substantial justice. 16 This Court has repeatedly stressed that
the ends of justice would be served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some
procedural nicety, but on the merits after all the parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their
causes and defenses. Lest it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon.17
Having resolved the procedural issue, we shall now proceed to the merits of the case. The issue boils
down to whether or not petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the purview of Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the confiscated items.
To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

a.] The offender is a public officer;

b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.
An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is accountable for
public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No. 1455)
defines accountable officer to be every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require
the possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be accountable therefor and for
the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.18
In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which he performs
and not the nomenclature or the relative importance the position held which is the controlling factor. 19
Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the confiscated lumber an
accountable officer with respect to its loss?
Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states that:
In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR officer, the forest products and the
conveyance used shall be deposited to the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case may be, for
safekeeping, wherever it is most convenient. If the transfer of the seized forest products to the above
places is not immediately feasible, the same shall be placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill
operator or the nearest local public official such as the Barangay Captain, Municipal/City Mayor,
Provincial Governor or the PC/INP; at the discretion of the confiscating officer taking into account the
safety of the confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the forest products shall be
duly acknowledged and receipted by the official taking custody thereof.
In the case of United States v. Lafuente,20 the accused was a Municipal Secretary and a member of the
auction committee. A public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held pursuant to the provisions of
the Municipal Law and a municipal ordinance. When the auction was concluded, the bidders deposited
the amount of their respective bids with the accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal
use. It was held that the accused is guilty of misappropriation of public funds. Although a Municipal
Secretarys duties do not normally include the receipt of public funds, the accused in this case was
nonetheless held accountable for the same because the money was deposited with him under authority of
law. The obligation of the secretary was to safeguard the money for the Government. 21
In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles.
By affixing his signature in said document, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the
Government. The receipt contains a provision which states that as custodian, Arriola "obliges himself to
faithfully keep and protect to the best of his ability the said seized articles from defacement in any
manner, destruction or loss and that he will never alter or remove said seized articles until ordered by the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources or his duly authorized representative or any court of
Justice in the Philippines."

Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles
on behalf of the Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,22 he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need
arises. Furthermore, by affixing his signature in the seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his
obligations as a custodian therein, he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefor.
The records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR officers on April 22, 1996, the lumber was
previously apprehended by Arriola on April 19, 1996.23 Thus, even without the seizure receipt where he
signed as custodian for the said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefor because he was the one who
originally took possession of it on behalf of the government.
His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for malversation through negligence or
abandonment lacks merit. The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit structure where he
happens to be a stockholder. Also, Arriola admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long
before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not inform them about its loss because
"somebody advised me not to report because the one who got the lumber might panic and tuluyan na ang
lumber."24
He even produced 44 pieces of lumber and passed it off as those missing. The evidence showed
however that the species was of a cheaper quality and did not bear the markings made by the
apprehending officers of the DENR. All told, his alibi and denials cannot prevail over the credible
testimonies of government witnesses which corroborated each other. His defenses did not withstand the
onslaught of clear and obvious physical, documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging him liable as an accessory.
Article 19, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take
part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radans liability as an accessory
were neither clear nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers turned over the
custody of the seized items to Arriola is not enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated
lumber was placed behind his fathers house. The assertion that he was responsible for the alleged
transport of the confiscated articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a mere conjecture.
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the
accused.25When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the
presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right. 26
We now come to the penalty which should be imposed on petitioner Arriola. According to Article 217,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation is reclusion temporal in its medium
and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P22,000. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum
imposable penalty shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 5 months and
20 days, while the minimum shall be within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.

The trial court therefore properly imposed the penalty of imprisonment to petitioner Arriola ranging from 14
years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum.
Under the second paragraph of Art. 217, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the total
value of the property embezzled, which in this case is P17,611.20. There will be no subsidiary
imprisonment because the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional. 27
WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 in
Criminal Case No. 2064 finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of Public Property thru
Negligence or Abandonment and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to not less than 14
years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories
of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P17,611.20 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the imposition of consequential damages on petitioner
Hermoso Arriola is ordered DELETED for lack of legal basis. Petitioner Melchor Radan is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant

PUNO, J.:p
Accused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 705 1 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277. 2
The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial
Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number
PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City. 3
On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on
patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General
Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number
PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge. 4
There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and
an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo. 5
SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accusedappellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. 6

SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate
of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR,
and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant
failed to present any of these documents . All he could show was a certification 7 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut
slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 7

SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial
capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were
sawn lumber under the coconut slabs. 9
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO
personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and
sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile
lumber. 10 When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred
fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total
assessed value of P93,232.50. 11

On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:
That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner
of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258
pieces of various sizes of Forest Products chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a
total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total
amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so
from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 12
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued
by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa 13 and Elpidio Sabal. 14 The PLTP authorizes
its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile
lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by
Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. 15

Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him.
He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial
admission.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered
the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The
dispositive portion of the Decision 16 states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail
bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.
The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 17
Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment of
errors: 18
1. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by
EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in
EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are
no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for
possession of timber and other forest products.
2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of
accused against unlawful searches and seizures.
3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of
accused under custodial investigation.
On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other
forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to
make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its
enactment.
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without
License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if

such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or
any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber
or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied).
Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give
life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies
the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the
Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required.
Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer,
non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities
shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR
officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be
accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or
his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant
producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In
order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery
receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the
258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a
single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. . . .
Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily
showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a
certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title
covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.(Exhibit "F").

It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be
transported by Mr. Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No. PAD
548 were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the
private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614(8)
located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for
the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is
valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final
destination, whichever comes first.
It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 1994. The
accused was apprehended onMarch 8, 1994 aboard his truck bearing plate number PAD548 which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well.
Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the
middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and
rear of the truck were removed.
Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much
aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not
secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner
that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.
In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994
addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the
CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the
reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibits "8", "8-A").
While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994,
the Court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the
accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the
same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify
that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for
personal used (sic) and ". . . came from PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to
him.
The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the
accused. Documents or other papers, i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a
government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any
document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets
a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his
avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned
the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination,

the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned
the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person ". . . but they were
already reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said
that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)
Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request,
to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Please consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of
the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own
needs.
Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport
agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when
he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?
All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.

19

xxx xxx xxx

Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly

constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.
We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and
that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of
such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68
of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under existing forest laws and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or
removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the
second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the
forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents
consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O
277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents
as malum prohibitum.
On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible
in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were

obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right
to counsel.
We do not agree.
The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court in People
vs.Bagista, 20 thus:
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no
person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The
basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized.
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that
the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been
held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied)
As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A
member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler
truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two
weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue,
they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos

Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in
between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting documents,
accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the
existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a
warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as
evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant's right to counsel under
custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of
appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
- versus PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC.,
G.R. No. 159308

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set
aside the Decision2 dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution3 dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194 entitled "Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. v. Antonio Cerilles, as
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Antonio Mendoza, as
Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region IX."
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc.
executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-040 4 whereby petitioner, represented
by then Regional Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent,
represented by its President Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area
covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of
Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a
production-sharing scheme.
Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP)
which the DENR approved on August 17, 1995.

On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe
regarding respondents alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous
people, and the constant threats and harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio
Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate
and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.
Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving notice of the evaluation and
assessment to be conducted on the area from October 22-30, 1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In
the notice, the DENR requested any representative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office,
Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and maps concerning its IFMA operations.
On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto Wenceslao (Forester, DENR,
Zamboanga del Sur), Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern Chief, RCBF/MCO), Philidor Lluisma (Forester II,
Regional Office), Chanito Paul Siton (C. Forester, CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester,
CENRO, Pagadian City), and Francisco Martin (Carto LEP, CENRO, Pagadian City) went to the IFMA
site. After a briefing conference between the Evaluation Team and respondents Operations Manager,
Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.
On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and assessment of IFMA R-904 was held between DENR officials, namely, CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team
Leader, Forester Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay, and IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma,
and IFMA Representative and Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago at the CENRO, Pagadian
City.5 The exit conference was called to order at 1:30 p.m. and was concluded at 3:00 p.m. Forester
Mangaya-ay presented the representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team, to wit:
The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran, Langapod side. That out of the
estimated number of seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the
result or finding of the inventory conducted at 100% intensity is only 98 hills of seedlings survived
including the doubtful and badly deformed. The species planted along trails are Gmelina and Mahogany
species. The said foot trail planted with the aforementioned species starts from the entrance of the IFMA
are where the notice billboard is posted up to the only existing look-out tower. The estimated average of
percent survival for Gmelina is more or less 30%. There are also portions where higher percentage of
survival is recorded at 56% and lower at 14%. There are areas planted declared by Kagawad Cerning
Becagas of Barangay Cogonan now covered by CSC. The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is needed to
be issued by the IFMA holder.
CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting held before, the IFMA holder was
willing to give up the said areas.
The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Cogonan, Mr. Roberto Palaran recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his barangay as
Community Assistance/service which includes electric generator, handheld radio and laborers for the
repair of Noburan Cogonan road and the repair of the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to which the said
Barangay Chairman issued a duly signed certification to this effect.
With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are approximately a total number of about
44,460 seedlings of Gmelina species. That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there exist only
one look-out tower of the reported 4 look-out towers constructed. Moreover, the team had also noted only
1 bunkhouse and 1 stockroom or shedhouse. There is also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1 dilapidated or
neglected notice billboard poster at the entrance trail leading to the IFMA area. That with regards the
concrete monument, there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located at junctions of
creeks and rivers. But the others cannot be visibly or never planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or
shown to the team allegedly for lack of knowledge by the representative of the IFMA holder. Finally, the
presiding officer reminded the herein IFMA representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey,

inspection and ground verification, the team believes that the other reported areas planted are located
outside the designated IFMA area particularly the Noburan and Langapod sides. 6
After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments, suggestions, or questions
regarding the matter and the manner of the conduct of the evaluation and assessment by the Evaluation
Team. Santiago said he had none, but requested a copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangayaay informed him that it was only RED Mendoza who may furnish him a copy of the report.
Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a Memorandum 7 dated November 6, 1998 to the
DENR-RED of Region 9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA
No. R-9-040. The said Memorandum stated
In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, please be informed that the herein
information is the result or findings of the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment following the
guidelines setforth under Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian
Timber Co., Inc. under IFMA No. R9-040 against their actual accomplishment as mandated under the
terms and conditions of the IFMA including other applicable laws, rules and regulations of the department
on the matter.
At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue with the IFMA holder, the CENR
Officer of Pagadian City and personnel concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and conduct
of the evaluation and assessment (please see attached).
The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the CENRO and PENRO representatives and
the representatives of the IFMA holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area of the
herein IFMA particularly Barangay Cogonan, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The evaluation and
assessment was then conducted on the main nursery, the established plantation, the look-out towers, the
boundary of ISF and claimed or occupied areas, natural or residual forest, the IFMA boundary,
monuments planted, foot trails, other improvements introduced and the billboard and signboard posted.
The inspection, evaluation and assessment conducted were all undertaken in the presence of the IFMA
holder, representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. (please see attached report, tall
sheets, pictorials and map).
In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that assisted the team could only show
the subject area under evaluation but the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the
company appeared upon actual verification and inspection to be negative and non-existent thus dispelling
their allegation.
With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the IFMA holder including other services
extended to the communities within the IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition the
donations made by the company. (Please see attached minutes of the dialogue with the barangay officials
of Barangay Cogonan and pictorials).
The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the facilities and other necessary
implements were generally below par. An inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have
already lapsed its plantability or have overgrown in the seedbed with an average grand total of about
44,460 within the established 2-hectare main nursery area. There was no other subsidiary nursery
established in the area. Also noted is the enrichment planting conducted along both sides of the foot-trail
which extends approximately 18 kms. From the entrance of the IFMA area going to the lookout tower of
the four (4) lookout towers reported, only one (1) has been noted remaining in the area and the rest were
destroyed or burned (pls. see attached pictorials). The signboard posted was unattended and in the state
of disrepair. There were no monument planted or any marking along the IFMA boundary and in residual
forest except the monuments found in the ISF boundaries within the IFMA area (please see attached

pictorials). The plantation established is composed of Gmelina species with 4 x 4 spacing over a total of
about 10.18 hectares. Basing on 5% estimate inventory, the result is 43% seedling survival.
Thereafter, the team also conducted evaluation and assessment at the eastern portion particularly at
Langapod, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The team inspected and verified on the ground the reported
20 hectares mango plantation with a spacing of 10 x 10 meters at 100% intensity inventory. The
accounted number of mango seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, only 98 seedlings survived.
Wherefore, it generally represents 5% seedling survival. (Please see attached)
Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA holder where the
tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-out and presented to the body.
(Please see attached)8
On the basis of such findings, the Evaluation Team made the following recommendations
1. The lessee should be required to explain why they failed to develop their IFMA area (Plantation
Development) in accordance with the approved Comprehensive Development and Management Plan
(CDMP);
2. The boundary and area coverage of IFMA No. R9-040 should be amended to exclude areas covered
by Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSC) under the ISF Program with an area of 226.17 hectares,
other areas previously identified as "occupied/claimed" and other conflict areas;
3. The amended boundary should be delineated/surveyed on the ground with a precise instrument and all
corners appropriately marked/monumented;
4. The company should hire a full time forester.9
Acting on the Memorandum dated November 6, 1998, RED Antonio M. Mendoza, DENR-IX, Zamboanga
City, submitted to the DENR Secretary a Memorandum 10 dated April 7, 1999 regarding the performance
evaluation of IFMA No. R-9-040. The RED Memorandum reads
This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region
IX, Western Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR, to
determine the capabilities of the holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their submitted
and approved Comprehensive Development Management Plan.
xxxx
On 6 November 1998, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional
Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040
of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at Langapod and Cogonan, Municipality of Labangan and
Datagan, Municipality of Sominot, all of Zamboanga del Sur. Result of the evaluation reveals that the
holder violated the following DENR existing Rules and Regulations particularly Section 26 of DAO 97-04
GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION of IFMA which provides that, "any of the following violations shall be
sufficient grounds for the cancellation of IFMA."
1. Paragraph 26.5, Section 26, DAO 97-04, Series of 1997, provides that failure to implement the
approved Comprehensive Development and Management Plan.
As of 1998, the 4th year of existence of IFMA No. R9-040, the holder must have developed a total of
1,597.0 hectares as per approved CDMP. However, based on the report submitted by the Evaluation

Team only 365.2 hectares was planted which are about 22.8%. During the evaluation, however, the IFMA
representative could not even pinpoint the planted areas.
Per report of the Pagadian CENRO Composite Monitoring Team conducted on 21 August 1998 the
plantation area was burned resulting to the damage of about 300 hectares leaving only about 20.0
hectares undamaged. No report had been submitted/received since then.
In infrastructure, the holder managed to put up one (1) out of four (4) programmed look-out towers;
developed one (1) out of two (2) forest nurseries and constructed only 6 km. foot trail which is only about
27% accomplishment of the whole infrastructure.
2. Paragraph 26.8 of Section 26, DAO 97-04, specifically provides that failure to implement or adopt
agreements made with communities and other relevant sectors.
Attached herewith, please find several petitions, sworn statements, affidavits and resolutions from various
sectors particularly the Subanen Communities (IPs) within the area. The existence and approval of IFMA
No. R9-040 contract is being protested and is demanding for its cancellation.
The primary complaint was a blatant disrespect to their rights as an Indigenous People and the nonpeaceful co-existence between them and the holder of the IFMA R9-040. Accordingly, they were
constantly threatened/harassed by armed men employed by the holder.
In the same Memorandum, RED Mendoza recommended to the DENR Secretary the cancellation of
IFMA No. R-9-040. 11
It appears that RED Mendoza issued a subsequent but similar Memorandum 12 dated April 21, 1999 to the
DENR Secretary relative to IFMA No. R-9-040. It stated
This has reference with the instruction to validate the performance/accomplishment of IFMAs of Region
IX, Western Mindanao. Validation of IFMAs is in accordance with the existing policy of the DENR to
determine the capabilities of the holders to develop their Lease areas in consonance with their approved
Comprehensive Development and Management Plan.
In furtherance thereto, Foresters Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay and Philidor Lluisma, pursuant to Regional
Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, conducted the evaluation of the performance of IFMA No. R9-040
of Pagadian City Timber Company, Inc. located at the Municipalities of Labangan, Datagan and Sominot,
all of Zamboanga del Sur, on November 6, 1998. Result of the evaluation revealed that the holder violated
Rules and Regulations which are sufficient ground for cancellation as stipulated under Section 26 of DAO
97-04, they are as follows
1. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROVED COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT AND
MANAGEMENT PLAN.
Under the approved comprehensive and development plan, 1,597.0 ha of plantation should have been
established from the Approval of the CDMP. However, only 365.2 ha were reportedly planted from CY
1995 to 1997. This represents only 28% of the targeted goal on plantation establishment.
Field validation of the reported established plantation revealed otherwise. The findings of the team are:
A. Portion of the area reported as established plantation by the IFMA holder is an ISF project with an area
of 226.17 ha. These are covered with Certificate of Stewardship;

B. Locations and boundaries of reported plantations established from 1995 to 1997 cannot be located on
the ground by the team neither by the representative of the IFMA holder who accompanied the validating
team; and
C. No plantation was established during CY 1998.
On Infrastructure, the holder constructed only one (1) lookout tower as against the goal of 4 towers;
established one (1) nursery as against the goal of two (2); and constructed only 6km foot trail. These
represent only 27% of the total infrastructure to be undertaken by the holder over the area.
2. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT OR ADOPT AGREEMENT WITH COMMUNITIES AND OTHER RELEVANT
SECTORS.
Attached herewith are copies of petitions, sworn statements, affidavit and resolutions from Subanen
Communities (IPs) and other sectors in the area demanding the cancellation of IFMA R9-040.
The complaints and demand for cancellation by the people where the IFMA is located is a manifestation
and proof of non-social acceptance of the project by the residents in the locality.
In view of the above findings, IFMA No. R9-040 is hereby recommended for cancellation. 13
Acting on the latter Memorandum from RED Mendoza, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, on June
7, 1999, issued an Order14 canceling IFMA No. R-9-040 for failure to implement the approved CDMP and
for failure of the lessee to protect the area from forest fires. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, IFMA No. R9-040 issued to Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. is
hereby ordered cancelled. The IFMA holder is hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area and to
surrender/return copy of the Agreement to the Regional Executive Director, DENR Region 9, Zamboanga
City.
The RED concerned or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to serve this Order;
determine best end use of the land; take appropriate measures to protect the same and inform this Office
immediately of his compliance.
SO ORDERED.15
On July 2, 1999, respondents President, Filomena S. San Juan, wrote DENR Secretary Cerilles that the
company was surprised to receive the Order of the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040 on June 22, 1999.
She claimed that
The DENR regional office is fully aware that the company is doing its best to manage and develop the
area by continually planting trees and protecting the area from forest fires and illegalities. No company
would ever set fire on its own plantation for obvious reasons. The company observed precautionary
measures especially during the time of the El Nio phenomenon. If there have been mistakes and
miscommunications in the reports of the DENR field officers, these could have been threshed out by a
conference between DENR and the Pagadian Timber Company Inc.
The company was not accorded due process before the order of cancellation was issued. The company
was not furnished copy of the evaluation and recommendation of the DENR Regional Executive Director
of Region IX. Had the company been given the opportunity to contest the findings, evaluation and
recommendation of the said office, the result would be otherwise. 16

She appealed for the reconsideration of the Order asking that a re-investigation be conducted to comply
with due process.
Even as the said letter for reconsideration was not yet acted upon, respondent appealed to the Office of
the President (OP).
In the Resolution17 dated January 12, 2000, the OP affirmed the cancellation order based on the results of
the actual evaluation and assessment of the DENR team. It ruled that the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9040 was primarily and specifically governed by Section 26 of Department Administrative Order (DAO) 9704. Relative to respondents invocation of due process, the OP held that respondent was afforded the
right to be heard when it filed its motion for reconsideration and its subsequent appeal to the OP.
The motion for reconsideration filed by respondent of the January 12, 2000 Resolution was denied by the
OP in the Resolution18 dated May 8, 2000.
Respondent went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of the assailed Order dated June 7, 1999.
In its Resolution dated January 17, 2001, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for,
"directing and ordering respondents (petitioner) and/or any other person acting under their command,
authority and/or for and in their behalf, to DESIST from implementing the assailed Order of cancellation
dated June 7, 1999, and/or taking over the IFMA premises of [respondent], pending the termination of this
proceeding."
In its Decision19 dated October 18, 2001, the CA ruled in favor of respondents. In striking down the rulings
of the OP and the Order dated June 7, 1999, the CA declared that IFMA No. R-9-040 was a contract that
could not be unilaterally cancelled without infringing on the rights of respondent to due process and
against impairment of contracts. The appellate court agreed with respondent when the latter argued that it
was entitled to the benefits of Sections 3520 and 3621 of IFMA No. R-9-040 such that respondent should
have been given 30 days, after due notice, to remedy any breach or default of the provisions of the IFMA
and/or that the dispute regarding the bases for the cancellation of the IFMA should have first been
submitted to arbitration.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the CA Decision. In the Resolution 22 dated July 24, 2003, the motion was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that IFMA No. R9-040 is a contract and not a mere privilege
granted by the State to respondent.
II. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ordaining that respondent can rightfully invoke prior resort to
arbitration or the option to mend its violations under IFMA No. R9-040. 23
In essence, petitioner argues that an IFMA is not an ordinary contract which is protected by the
Constitution against impairment24 but a mere privilege granted by the State to qualified persons by means
of a permit, license, franchise, agreement, or other similar concessions, which in this case is the
exploration, development and utilization of the forest lands belonging to the State under its full control and
supervision. Thus, the cancellation of the IFMA does not amount to a rescission of a contract but a mere
withdrawal of this privilege. As such, the due process clause under the Constitution 25 does not likewise
apply since the IFMA area cannot be considered as property of respondent. According to petitioner, IFMA
No. R-9-040, with the forest lands covered by it, is imbued with paramount considerations of public
interest and public welfare such that whatever rights respondent may have under it must yield to the
police power of the State. In this sense, respondent cannot take refuge in Sections 35 and 36 of IFMA No.
R-9-040 to prevent the IFMAs cancellation.

Inasmuch as the grounds cited by petitioner are interrelated, they shall be jointly discussed hereunder.
The petition is impressed with merit.
IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry
Code), the law which is the very basis for its existence. 26 Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a
license agreement is defined as "a privilege27 granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources
within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others,
except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the
same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement." This is evident in the
following features, among others, of IFMA No. R-9-040, to wit:
1. The State agreed to devolve to the holder of IFMA No. R-9-040 the responsibility to manage the
specified IFMA area for a period of 25 years, specifically until October 14, 2019, which period is
automatically renewable for another 25 years thereafter;
2. The State imposed upon respondent, as holder of IFMA No. R-9-040, the conditions, the means, and
the manner by which the IFMA area shall be managed, developed, and protected;
3. The State, through the DENR Secretary, shall not collect any rental within the first five (5) years of the
IFMA, after which it shall be entitled to annual rental of fifty centavos (P0.50) per hectare from the sixth to
the tenth year thereof, and one peso (P1.00) per hectare thereafter;
4. The IFMA area, except only the trees and other crops planted and the permanent improvements
constructed by the IFMA holder, remains the property of the State; and
5. Upon cancellation of the IFMA through the fault of the holder, all improvements including forest
plantations existing within the IFMA area shall revert to and become the property of the State.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued
by the State to its grantees for the efficient management of the countrys dwindling forest resources.
Jurisprudence has been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the
purview of the due process and the non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution.
Our pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.28 is enlightening
In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in
the countrys forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government regardless of
changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. (citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No.
101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 811) Such unswerving verdict is synthesized in Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812) where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to
dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to
their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare.
He was aware that as correctly pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section
20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein x x x."

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, [125 SCRA 302, 325 (1983)] this Court held:
"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights. (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary [190
SCRA 673, 684 (1990):
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause. [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the
Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not
absolute.
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under Section
16,29 Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment,30 particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express
policy of the State.31 The DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is
"the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the countrys environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." 32
Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest.
They must give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case through the DENR, to
ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly
and faithfully complied with.

Respondent was not able to overturn by sufficient evidence the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions of the Evaluation Team when the latter inspected, assessed, and
reported the violations respondent committed under DAO No. 97-04 which eventually led to the
cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
It is worthy to note that petitioner followed regular procedure regarding the assessment of IFMA No. R-9040. It gave notice of the evaluation on October 22, 1998 to be held within the period October 22-30,
1998. Respondent admitted through the affidavits of its President, 33 Operations Manager,34 and
workers35 that an Evaluation Team arrived at the IFMA area on October 23, 1998. On October 23, 1998,
prior to the actual assessment, a briefing was held on the conduct thereof in the presence of the IFMA
representatives. On October 29, 1998, an exit conference with IFMA Operations Manager Inocencio
Santiago was held at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, where the results of the assessment were
presented. That day, the DENR officials asked Santiago if he had any questions or comments on the
assessment results and on the manner the evaluation was conducted, but the latter replied that he had
none.
We do not understand why Santiago did not lift a finger or raise an objection to the assessment results,
and only much later in his Affidavit executed almost ten months thereafter, or on August 12, 1999, to claim
so belatedly that there was no notice given on October 22, 1998, that the Evaluation Team did not actually
extensively inspect the IFMA area on October 23, 1998, and that there was no proper exit conference
held on October 29, 1998. The same observation applies to respondents President herself, who instead
claimed that she vehemently opposed the appointment of then DENR Secretary Cerilles because he was
bent on canceling the IFMA at all costs, prior to the cancellation of IFMA No. R-9-040.
Besides, the detailed findings on the failure of respondent to implement its CDMP under its IFMA, as
shown by the November 6, 1998 Report of the Evaluation Team and the Memoranda dated April 7, 1999
and April 21, 1999, together with all its attachments, belie respondents claim that there was no actual
evaluation and assessment that took place on October 23, 1998. That the Evaluation Report was dated
November 6, 1998 does not conclusively show that the evaluation was actually held on that date. Neither
was this properly proven by the Memoranda of RED Mendoza which stated that the evaluation was
conducted on November 6, 1998, since RED Mendoza could have been merely misled into such an
assumption because of the date of the Evaluation Report. The sweeping denials made by the IFMA
representatives and their self-serving accomplishment reports cannot prevail over the actual inspection
conducted, the results of which are shown by documentary proof.
Respondent, likewise, cannot insist that, pursuant to Section 35 of IFMA No. R-9-040, it should have been
given notice of its breach of the IFMA and should have been given 30 days therefrom to remedy the
breach. It is worthy to note that Section 35 uses the word "may" which must be interpreted as granting
petitioner the discretion whether or not to give such notice and allow the option to remedy the breach. In
this case, despite the lack of any specific recommendation from the Evaluation Team for the cancellation
of the IFMA, DENR Secretary Cerilles deemed it proper to cancel the IFMA due to the extent and the
gravity of respondents violations.
It is also futile for respondent to claim that it is entitled to an arbitration under Section 36 of IFMA No. R-9040 before the license agreement may be canceled. A reading of the said Section shows that the dispute
should be based on the provisions of the IFMA to warrant a referral to arbitration of an irreconcilable
conflict between the IFMA holder and the DENR Secretary. In this case, the cancellation was grounded on
Section 26 of DAO No. 97-04, particularly respondents failure to implement the approved CDMP and its
failure to implement or adopt agreements made with communities and other relevant sectors. The
contrary notwithstanding, what remains is that respondent never refuted the findings of the Evaluation
Team when given the opportunity to do so but waited until IFMA No. R-9-040 was already cancelled
before it made its vigorous objections as to the conduct of the evaluation, harping only on its alleged right
to due process.

Indeed, respondent was given the opportunity to contest the findings that caused the cancellation of its
IFMA when it moved to reconsider the Order of cancellation and when it filed its appeal and motion for
reconsideration before the OP.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard;
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present
his side.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution dated July 24, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Order dated June 7, 1999
of then DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles, and the Resolutions of the Office of the President dated
January 12, 2000 and May 8, 2000 affirming the said Order, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.