Political Law Review

Bill of Rights Right Against Involuntary Servitude

Bill of Rights Right Against Involuntary Servitude

Sec. 18(2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution provides that No involuntary servitude in any
form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
GENERAL RULE: Involuntary servitude in any form shall not exist.
EXCEPTIONS:
1.

Punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted;

2.

Service in Defense of the State, as provided in Sec. 4, Art. II: The prime
duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.
In People v. Zosa (38 O.G. 1676, G.R. No. L-45892, 13 July 1938), where
two individuals refused to conscription for various reasons, it was held that:
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
military service, does not go against this constitutional provision
but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty
of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein.
The right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of
the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11;
25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be,
against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against
his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks
of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down
in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed.,
233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property
without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no
right of property to an office or employment.

Prepared by Bobby Johnson O. Sebastian

3.

Naval (Merchant Marine) Enlistment Compulsion of Sailors in

Merchant Vessels to carry out their contracts.
In the case of Robertson v. Baldwin (165 U.S. 75), sections 4598 and
4599 of the Shipping Commissioners' Act authorizing the apprehension of
deserting seamen and requiring them to carry out their contracts, were
questioned for being in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment forbidding
slavery and involuntary servitude. In this case, it was held that:
The question whether sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the
Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding slavery and involuntary
servitude, depends upon the construction to be given to the term
involuntary servitude. Does the epithet involuntary attach to the
word "servitude" continuously, and make illegal any service which
becomes involuntary at any time during its existence; or does it
attach only at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as
unlawful because unlawfully entered into? If the former be the
true construction, then no one, not even a soldier, sailor or
apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even for a day; and the
soldier may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the
sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or
even in a storm at sea, provided only he can find means of
escaping to another vessel. If the latter, then an individual may,
for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his
personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose,
and subordinate his going and coming to the will of another
during the continuance of the contract; not that all such contracts
would be lawful, but that a servitude which was knowingly and
willingly entered into could not be termed "involuntary." Thus, if
one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a
particular capacity during his life, and never to leave his estate
without his consent, the contract might not be enforceable for the
want of a legal remedy, or might be void upon grounds of public
policy; but the servitude could not be properly termed
"involuntary." Such agreement for a limited personal servitude at
one time were very common in England, and by statute of June 17,
1823, 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, 3, it was enacted that if any servant in
husbandry or any artificer, calico printer, handcraftsman, miner,
collier, keelman, pitman, glassman, potter, laborer or other
person should contract to serve another for a definite time and
should desert such service during the term of the contract, he was
made liable to a criminal punishment. The breach of a

Prof. Rene V. Sarmiento - University of the Philippines College of Law

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Political Law Review

Bill of Rights Right Against Involuntary Servitude

contract for personal service has not, however, been

recognized in this country as involving a liability to
criminal punishment, except in the cases of soldiers,
sailors, and possibly some others; nor would public
opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.
xxx
It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to
introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions
of service which have always been treated as exceptional, such as
military and naval enlistments. The amendment, however,
makes no distinction between a public and a private service. To
say that persons engaged in a public service are not within the
amendment is to admit that there are exceptions to its general
language, and the further question is at once presented, where
shall the line be drawn? We know of no better answer to make
than to say that services which have from time immemorial been
treated as exceptional shall not be regarded as within its purview.
From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor
has been treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to
a certain extent, the surrender of his personal liberty
during the life of the contract. Indeed the business of
navigation could scarcely be carried on without some guaranty,
beyond the ordinary civil remedies upon contract, that the sailor
will not desert the ship at a critical moment or leave her at some
place where seamen are impossible to be obtained -- as Molloy
forcibly expresses it, "to rot in her neglected brine." Such desertion
might involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking
another crew, an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases,
the safety of the ship itself. Hence, the laws of nearly all maritime
nations have made provision for securing the personal attendance
of the crew on board, and for their criminal punishment for
desertion, or absence without leave, during the life of the shipping
articles.

4.

Posse Comitatus Latin for power of the community or power of the

county.
U.S. v. Pompeya
31 Phil 245, G.R. No. L-10255, 6 August 1915

Prepared by Bobby Johnson O. Sebastian

Johnson, J. (En Banc)

FACTS: On 1 June 1915, Silvestre Pompeya was charged in the Court of First
Instance in the Province of Iloilo with failure to render service on patrol duty
on 20 March of that same year, in violation of municipal ordinance Executive
Order No. 1, series of 1914. Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a
demurrer on the ground that the acts charged in the complaint do not
constitute a crime. He argued that the municipal ordinance is
unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the
Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. The Court of First
Instance sustained Pompeyas demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint. The Prosecuting Attorney appealed to the Supreme Court, raising
the sole question, thus:
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance in question requiring service on patrol
duy is unconstitutional.
HELD: NO. The municipal ordinance in questions was adopted in
accordance with the Act No. 82, otherwise known as the Municipal Code, as
amended by Act No. 1309. Section 40, paragraph m of said Municipal
Code, as amended, provides that, with the approval of the provincial
governor, when a province or municipality is infested with ladrones (thieves)
or outlaws, the municipal council is granted the power, viz.:
To authorize the municipal president to require able-bodied male
residents of the municipality, between the ages of eighteen and
fifty years, to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any
one month, in apprehending ladrones, robbers, and other
lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for
the protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day in each
week. The failure, refusal, or neglect of any such able-bodied man
to render promptly the service thus required shall be punishable
by a fine not exceeding one hundred pesos or by imprisonment for
not more than three months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
The purpose of the law is to require each able-bodied male residents of the
municipality to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community. There is nothing in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the
Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any
governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules
and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government.

Prof. Rene V. Sarmiento - University of the Philippines College of Law

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Political Law Review

Bill of Rights Right Against Involuntary Servitude

Tradition shows that even back in primitive times, men enjoyed the security
and assurance of assistance from his fellows when his quiet and peace were
violated by malefactors. This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in
the protection of the peace and good order of his community is still
recognized in all well-organized governments in the posse comitatus, or,
power of the county. Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or
town who were charged with the maintenance of peace and good order were
bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all persons who had violated the law.
For that purpose they might command all the male inhabitants of a certain
age to assist them. This power is an exercise of the police power of the state.

In the case of Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamoc

Sawmills (45 O.G. Supp. No. 9, p. 147, G.R. No. L-1573, 29 March 1948),
under scrutiny of constitutionality was Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, which provided that in every contract of employment or tenancy,
whether verbal or written, it is an implied condition that when public
interest so requires, the employees, tenants or laborers shall return to work.
And if they fail to do so, the Court may authorize the employer or landlord to
accept other employees, tenants or laborers. In that case, the Court held that:
An employee entering into a contract of employment said law
went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions,
those prescribed in said section 19. The voluntariness of the
employee's entering into such a contract of employment he has
a free choice between entering into it or not with such an
implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary
servitude ensuing.

Thus, the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.
It should be noted that the law authorizing the municipal president of the
municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain conditions as
prerequisites, to wit: (1) The person called upon to render such services must
be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between
the ages of 18 and 50, and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the
services of such persons. Thus, the persons liable for the service mentioned
in the law cannot be called upon at the mere whim or caprice of the
president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient
in the mind of a reasonable man, before the municipal president can call
upon the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not
apply to all persons. The law does not apply to every condition. The law
applies to special persons and special conditions. Thus, a complaint based
upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must
show that the person charged belongs to the class of persons to which the
law is applicable.
Thus, even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the
court would nonetheless be unable to impose the punishment provided for
by law, because it does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of
the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not
under 18 years of age nor over 50; nor (d) that conditions existed which
justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services
mentioned in the law.
Disposition: Judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.
5.

Return to work order in industries affected with public interest.

Prepared by Bobby Johnson O. Sebastian

xxx
Validity of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned
on constitutional grounds, upon the allegation that it is
tantamount to authorizing involuntary servitude. We cannot
agree with the proposition. Under said section, the question of
involuntary work is not involved, but only the workability of the
settlement of a labor dispute contemplated by Commonwealth Act
No. 103. When workers on strike appear before the Court of
Industrial Relations to seek remedy under Commonwealth Act No.
103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in their
employment were and are agreeable to their conscience and
dignity and, as a matter of fact, they claim the right to continue
performing the same work. Otherwise they would not have
resorted to strike, a means resorted to, to compel the employer
and let them continue working, but on conditions more agreeable
to the workers. If the strikers should feel that their work is in the
nature of involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a strike
nor recur to the Court of Industrial Relations, but will simply
resign and seek some other employment.
6.

Patria Potestas, as provided in paragraph 2, Art. 311, Civil Code, which

states:
Art. 311. The father and mother jointly exercise parental
authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated.

Prof. Rene V. Sarmiento - University of the Philippines College of Law

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Political Law Review

Bill of Rights Right Against Involuntary Servitude

In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless

there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children are obliged to obey their parents so long as they are
under parental power, and to observe respect and reverence
toward them always.
Recognized natural and adopted children who are under the age
of majority are under the parental authority of the father or
mother recognizing or adopting them, and are under the same
obligation stated in the preceding paragraph.
Natural children by legal fiction are under the joint authority of
the father and mother, as provided in the first paragraph of this
article.
This provision has been repealed by the Family Code. The equivalent
provision on parental authority can be found in Art. 211, which provides that:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of

Prepared by Bobby Johnson O. Sebastian

disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a

judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their
parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are
under parental authority.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 113054, 16 March 1995), the
Supreme Court defined Patria Potestas, thus:
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control
and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent
required by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Prof. Rene V. Sarmiento - University of the Philippines College of Law

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