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Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus is an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, directed to the
person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time &
place & to show sufficient cause for holding in custody the individual so detained.
Purpose of the writ

It has for its purpose to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint or detention as distinguished
from voluntary & to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is found illegal. The writ is the proper remedy
in each & every case or detention without legal cause or authority. Its principal purpose then is to set the
individual at liberty.
How writ operates

This is how the writ of habeas corpus operates to safeguard the liberty of a person:
The prisoner or any person on his behalf petitions the proper court, w/c immediately issues the writ. It
is sent to the person having another in his custody. Such person is ordered to produce the prisoner in court
at a specified time, together with an explanation of the cause of the detention, called the return. After the
order is obeyed, the judge scrutinizes the return and then decides whether it shows that the imprisonment is
authorized by law. If so, the prisoner is remanded (sent back to custody); otherwise, he is set free at once by
the judge.
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

The PRIVILEGE of the writ of habeas corpus (not the writ itself) may be suspended by the President
(Sec 18, Art 7), in case only of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it. Consequently, the person
under detention by the government may not obtain his liberty by its use.
While the person detained must still be produced in court, the official or person detaining him may
ask the court not to continue the proceeding any further as the privilege of the writ as to that particular
person seeking release has been suspended. Unlike in cases where the privilege o the writ is available and
in full force and effect, the judge thus may be prevented in the event of suspension from determining
whether or not the detention is authorized by law. But the SC is empowered to inquire, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, whether or not there was factual basis to justify the suspension by the
president of the privilege.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ enables the state to hold in preventive imprisonment
pending investigation and trial of persons who plot against it or commit acts that endanger its very
existence.
Presidents Power to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Two conditions are necessary in order that the President may suspend the privilege of the writ:
1. There must be invasion or rebellion; and
2. The public safety must require the suspension.
RANDOLF DAVID vs PRESIDENT GMA, 489 SCRA 160
Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power
Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang
Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

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Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot
visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared
by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of
martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of
natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by
reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is
within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still
in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence,
the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the
same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading
of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned
are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply
fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases.
Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly,
lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
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exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared
PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6
of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They
assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power
that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the
assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the
president by the president.

FELIX BARCELON vs COLONEL BAKER OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the
President
Facts: In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned before
the court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why
Barcelon was detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was w/o due process.
The Atty-Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine Bill).
Barcelon argued that there is no rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.

HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the
grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power
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is discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace
and order condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines
of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG),
with all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the
SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order in the country.
MARCELO MONTENEGRO vs CASTANEDA
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative by the
President
Facts: In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210
was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the
court to have his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied
retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of
attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring
his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority
over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional
authority of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under
Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.
TEODOSIO LANSANG, et al vs BRIG-GEN GARCIA
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case
Facts: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the
PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the
suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case
where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two
closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the
members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was
actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force,
as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA vs MINISTER OF DEFENSE JUAN PONCE ENRILE ET AL
Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine
Facts: In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in
Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search
warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of
arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o
just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs
know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.

HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the
Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to
suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again
reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It
was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it
the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced
and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least
doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to
an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized
the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to
bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
HORACIO MORALES JR vs MINISTER OF DEFENSE JUAN PONCE ENRILE ET AL
Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC.
They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were
arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to
counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents
countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for some time before they were
arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus remains suspended with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the natural consequence is that the right
to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat
the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is
anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an
individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the
privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial
those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the States very existence. For this measure
of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these
offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of
charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason,
the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable
in this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what
they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.
OLAGUER vs MILITARY COMMISSION
Habeas Corpus

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Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp
Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of
explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy
to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to
assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted
murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners
went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case
reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the
release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the
Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners
have been released from their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. But the military
court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while
the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the
period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly
committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered
by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned.
ROLANDO ABADILLA vs GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS
Habeas Corpus
Facts: Col. Abadilla was the head of the group that seized GMA 7 in 1987. A subsequent mutiny was done
in Fort Bonifacio. The act was infamously known as the Black Saturday Revolt. The mutiny failed and Abadilla
was later detained. Ramos, the then Chief of Staff, issued an order dropping the name of Abadilla from roll
of regular officers in the military. Later, Susan, the wife of Abadilla, filed a petition for the issuance of the
WoHC together with their minor children. They questioned the validity of Abadillas detention. It was alleged
that when Col Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian
and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to
military law. His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal offense, either before a civil
court or a court-martial
ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of Abadila is legal.
HELD: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to
the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to
prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner
prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first
place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being
dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of
the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service. Military jurisdiction had fully
attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against him before the termination
of his service in the military. The record of the case discloses that Col Abadilla has been charged by the
military authorities for violation of Article of War (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the
corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him. The detention of Col Abadilla under the

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circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this reason, the petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs JUDGE SALAZAR
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion SC Cannot Change Law
Facts: In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and
Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred
during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas
corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal
offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the
strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence
of probable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion
would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murders the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious
form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is
absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was
not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to
file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas
corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that
the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab
power.
PEOPLE vs JUDGE DONATO & RODOLFO SALAS
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Facts: Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with
the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A
conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that
Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation
of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss
the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato
approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The
prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he
withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the
WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does
not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of
withdrawing his petition for WoHC.
AQUINO vs MINISTER OF DEFENSE JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests

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Facts: Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence,
Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a
common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial
Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against
the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion
plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the
state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.
AQUINO VS MILITARY COMMISSION
Martial Law Open Court Theory Military Courts
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody.
He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by
the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same
time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his
other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He
was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the
military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.
HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are
authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and
functioning. The SC basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.
ROQUE GUMAUA VS MAJ. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO
Martial Law as Valid Declaration Military Courts Constitutional Allowance
Facts: In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua, an
ex PC aided Cordova as he even sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumauas house
was raided and he was arrested. Since martial law is being imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under
the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then petitioned for prohibition and mandamus
with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the
AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a
civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military
tribunals cannot try civilians if civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their
jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to
his constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.
HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081
placing the entire country under martial law is valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically
suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. That the President of the Philippines, as Commanderin-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and
decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the
defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the
resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a
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worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly
developed countries . . . . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial law,
can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but
also civilian offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.
And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, coaccused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the
commission of the crime, in much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua
himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan
before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are members of
the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.
VALENTINO LEGASPI VS MINISTER OF FINANCE
Other Options Available to the President Aside from Declaring Martial Law Amendment No. 6
Facts: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of
assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was
promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a
Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of
the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi
averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no
longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: What are the possible options available to the president other than declaring martial law.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the
power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the President (Prime Minister) are to be exercised only on two
specified occasions, namely, (1) when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or
imminence thereof and (2) whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
(now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in
his judgment requires immediate action. The power is to issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of
instruction which shall form part of the law of the land. As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such
power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the
nature of the other powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be
delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.
The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen by the president to avoid declaring another
martial law. There are also other options that the president can recourse to; they are:
(a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan;
(b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks;
(c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(d) martial law [being the last]
President must first exercise emergency powers as may be provided by the legislature. When it fails, it cannot
be adequate when lawless violence becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need
to call out the armed forces. And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive
incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect
of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution, without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would
be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme measure that carries with it repressive
and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country, it is
but natural to think of it only as a very last resort. Again, this is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the
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proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself,
martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by
the military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have
to accompany the exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of
the armed forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants
of martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power.
It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than
disguised martial law.
NORBERTO JIMENEZ & LORETO BARRIOQUINTO VS FERNANDEZ
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty
Facts: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case
was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then
sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant
Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be
charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced
in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission
refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime
as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the
crime being charged to them.
ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36, RPC). While amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as
a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he
is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant
or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may
be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether
or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions
should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both
for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he
is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable
services to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take
notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their

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province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
GAUDENCIO VERA ET AL VS PEOPLE
Amnesty Reversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case
Facts: Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder done against a
certain Lozaes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation. During the
hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact,
Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the
deceased Lozaes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could not take
cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked
only by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said
commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the
enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be
remanded to the court of origin for trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.
HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according
to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty
proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the
existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor
on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the
amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since a person would not need
the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by the proclamation.
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL VS ALEJO LABRADOR & TEOFILO SANTOS
Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Facts: Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to
his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in
Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime against property. This is
pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is
exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative
by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power
does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the
pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign
authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In
the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who
violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise
extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to

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respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it
restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the
disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning
power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of
restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
PEOPLE VS BENEDICTO JOSE
Conditional Pardon How it works after a change of sovereign
Facts: Jose was charged for violating Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the Natl Assembly of RP while the
Japanese were still occupying the country. After serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a
conditional pardon the simple condition was for him not to violate any other Penal Laws of RP. Later he
committed a crime of qualified theft. The Fiscal then went on to file an additional charge against Jose for
violating the conditions of the pardon granted him. Jose argued that he did not violate the pardon
conditions at all because there is no pardon at all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the law
he violated before was a political law which was abrogated when the US army took over the country as
proclaimed by MacArthur in Oct 1944.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the conditional pardon
granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
HELD: The SC held that Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the conditional pardon
granted by the President of the so-called RP (during the Jap Occupation), for the following reasons: Because,
without necessity of discussing and determining the intrinsic validity of the conditional pardon, as an act
done by the President of the so-called RP, after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, no
elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the
sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment inflicted by the sentence ceases to be of any
effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the latter cannot be required to
serve a void sentence of penalty imposed on him, even without such pardon.
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO VS GREGORIO PALATINO
Absolute Pardon
Facts: Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding
alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and
was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is
already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code
which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted
into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after
Palatinos election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon,
all the former disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino
is therefore eligible for the public office in question.
PEOPLE VS EUGENIO PASILAN
Amnesty when cannot be invoked new trial
Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while cleaning his gun outside the house
of one Justina Miguel, a certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra
waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra. Abarra was alleged to be supporting the

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Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who accompanied the Japanese troops in raiding the
barrio where Pasilan lived. After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds on Abarras chest.
Abarra run away towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About 10 years
after the incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes committed during the war.
He conducted some investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify against Pasilan and he later
found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of Abarra. On July 29, 1964, Pasilan moved for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which allegedly would reverse the decision of the lower court. Alleged
as newly discovered evidence are sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguels recantation. Pasilan likewise
seeks to avail of Proclamation No. 8 by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war
committed any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy or against
person aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.
HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the power to grant
a new trial would rest not in the courts but in the witnesses who have testified against the accused. Recanting
testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since Justina Miguels alleged recantation has already
been passed upon by the trial court, new trial is uncalled for.
Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial. In the first place, Proclamation
No. 8 of President Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence, for it was already known when the case was
tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits granted by the amnesty proclamation would be inconsistent with
the plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon his arraignment. Amnesty presupposes the commission
of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot avail of
amnesty.
LEGASPI VS MINISTER OF FINANCE
Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His Power to Legislate
Facts: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang
Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of
assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was
promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a
Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of
the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since
Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi
averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no
longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan
Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence
of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive
clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No.
6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not
need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.
SALVACION MONSANTO VS DEPUTY EXEC SEC FULGENCIO FACTORAN
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

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Facts: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted
pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former
position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the
issue to the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must
first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that
by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about
by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief
for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil
liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability
may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the
thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
RODOLFO LLAMAS VS EXEC SEC ORBOS & MARIANO OCAMPO III
Pardon Applicable to Administrative Cases
Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed
an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III
was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office.
In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he
can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid
and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
WILFREDO TORRES VS HON. NEPTALI GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 Political Law Constitutional Law Pardon Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny
Facts: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the
condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

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1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment
of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which
he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159
of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject
to judicial scrutiny.
PROCLAMATION NO. 80
GRANTING AMNESTY IN FAVOR OF ALL PERSONS WHO, IN THE FURTHERANCE OF THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MAY
HAVE COMMITTED ACTS PENALIZED BY EXISTING LAWS
WHEREAS, certain persons or group/s of persons continue to oppose the government;
WHEREAS, these persons may have committed an act or acts in violation of existing laws in furtherance of
their political beliefs;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the nation to forgive these individuals and forego their prosecution in order
that all may be reunited and peace and order established in our land, and so that they can contribute their
energy and talents to the achievement of political and social reforms within the framework of the laws and
democracy;
WHEREAS, the unity of the Filipino people is necessary so that the nation can recover from the ravages of
dictatorships; cdt
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by Section 6, Art. XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim full and complete amnesty
in favor of all persons who have or may have committed any act penalized under existing laws in furtherance
of their political beliefs and who, not being in the custody of, or charged by, undergoing investigation by,
the authorities of the present administration, as of the date, the 28th of February 1987, and for six months
thereafter, return their own free will to the fold of the law for the following crimes: treason; conspiracy or
proposal to commit the crime of treason; misprision of treason; espionage; rebellion or insurrection;
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition;
conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assemblies; illegal associations; direct assault;
indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or agents of such person or persons;
subversion; and illegal possession of firearms and explosives. This shall not, however, apply to crimes or acts
committed from purely personal motives or outside of the foregoing enumerations.
It is further declared that in order to determine those persons who may come within the terms of this amnesty,
an Amnesty Committee is hereby created in each province or city composed of the Provincial/City Citizens
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Attorney, as Chairman, and four members, namely: the AFP Judge Advocate designated by the Secretary
of National Defense, the Provincial/City Secretary, an IBP representative designated by the Provincial/City
IBP Chapter and the fourth to be chosen by the Chairman and the herein three named members, which
shall examine the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The Committee shall decide each case
within ten (10) working days from receipt of the application, and upon finding that it falls within the terms of
this Proclamation, it shall so declare and the amnesty shall immediately be effective as to said person. Should
the Amnesty Committee fail to make its decision within the given ten day period, such inaction shall be
construed as an automatic grant of amnesty in favor of the applicant concerned. casia
Any person who desires to avail of the amnesty provided herein may, at anytime within six (6) months from
date of issuance of this Proclamation, file an application for amnesty with the Bayanihan Center organized
in each province or city. The Bayanihan Center immediately forward the application to the Amnesty
Committee, which shall then evaluate and pass upon the application in accordance with the Guidelines
that may be issued by the National Reconciliation and Development Council to implement this Proclamation
and shall make the necessary decision in each particular case.
SUZETTE NICOLAS VS ALBERTO ROMULO
578 SCRA 438 Political Law Constitutional Law Ratification of a Treaty Validity of the Visiting Forces
Agreement
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
Facts: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was
convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman
convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys jurisdiction.
But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over
Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA.
Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the
VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable,
precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully
complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US
Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing
legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing
legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
RAMON GONZALES VS RUFINO HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive Agreements Statutes Can Repeal
Executive Agreements
Facts: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with
Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification
from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then
Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the
detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
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ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise
of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very
act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest
in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists
that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
TAN SIN VS THE DEPORTATION BOARD
104 Phil. 868 Political Law Constitutional Law Executive Order Power to Deport an Undesirable Alien
Facts: Tan Sin was a Chinese residing in Pasay. In December 1953, he was convicted of the crime of estafa.
He was sentenced to jail. When he finished serving his sentence, he learned that an order to detain him was
issued by the Deportation Board because apparently, a special prosecutor filed with the Deportation Board
an action to deport Tan Sin because by reason of the crime he had committed, he became an undesirable
alien. The Deportation Board after hearing, recommended to the President of the Philippines that Tan Sin be
deported. In his defense, Tan Sin averred that he cannot be deported by the Deportation Board (an entity
under the executive department) or by the President because only Congress has the absolute and inherent
power to deport aliens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.
HELD: Yes. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive
by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject. There is no provision in the Constitution
nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the intention of the law to grant to the
Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an aliens residence in the country is so undesirable as
to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
COMMISSIONER OR CUSTOMS & COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS VS EASTERN SEA TRADING
3 SCRA 351 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaties vs Executive Agreements
Facts: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into
the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods
because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant
to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial
Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive
agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be
invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar.

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ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was
implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals
and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of
the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are
commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than
are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements
whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes
be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than
those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . .
It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not
anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history,
to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of
the Senate.
They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the
admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal
matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the
general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement
of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ
Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Facts: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the
right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground
that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal
protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict
at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent
could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

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