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II
My firststep, in answeringthat question,is to observethat the view I have
called"relativism"is quitedifferentfroma view, also called"relativism"by
some, whichis with good reasonascribedto at least some of the Sophists.
The view I havein mindhasto do specificallywithevaluativeconcepts,and
may be stated in outline as follows. What is good, or just, or virtuous,or
desirable,depends on the circumstances;there is no one set of things, or
actions,whichare good, just, virtuousor desirablein all circumstancesfor
all people. The same action (for example, helpinga friend)may be just in
one situationandunjustin another;whatis desirablefor a sickpersonto eat
may be undesirablefor healthypeople to eat; and so on.
There is evidencethat an emphasison this kindof relativitywas routine
among the Sophists.Protagoras,questionedby Socratesas to whetherhe
equates"good"with "beneficialto humans",is madeby Platoto replywith
a lengthyharangueon the variabilityof whatis good or beneficial,depending on who one is talkingabout (Protagoras334a3-c6).It is clear from the
context that this is intendedas a parodyof Sophisticthinking(as well as of
Sophisticrhetoricaldisplay);and I see no difficultyin ascribingthese kinds
of ideas to the historicalProtagoras.But even if this would be to take the
less thansympatheticPlatotoo muchon trust,it can hardlybe doubtedthat
the speechis at least meantas an allusionto ideas generallycurrentamong
the Sophists.
"Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge", pp. 21-47, W.NewtonSmith, "Relativismand the Problemof Interpretation",pp. 106-22, and Ernest Gellner,
"Relativism and Universals", pp. 181-200. One well-known characterizationof relativism which is harder to relate to mine is that of Bernard Williams, "The Truth in
Relativism", Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety 75 (1974-5), pp. 215-28.
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IlI
What, then, of relativismin the deep sense? I now come to the heartof my
argument.In thissectionI shallconsiderthe claimof Gorgiasto be calleda
relativistin thissense;in the followingtwo sections,I shalllook at a number
of points relatingto the Sophistsin general.
Gorgiasis often associatedwith relativism;usuallythis is becausesome
form of relativismis taken to be a corollaryof the ideas expressedin his
treatise Peri Tou Me Ontos *19As far as I can see, this has absolutelyno
basis. I say this not becauseI take the stillwidespreadview thatthe treatise
is no more than a joke, affordingno evidencefor Gorgias'actualviews thoughif this were so, it would, of course, undermineany attemptto foist
relativismon him; my reason is simplythat the text itself, taken entirely
seriously,has nothingwhateverto do withrelativism.As is well known,the
treatise, as reportedboth by Sextus Empiricus(M. VII.65-86)and in the
third section of the pseudo-AristotelianDe Melisso XenophaneGorgia,
first,thatnothingis, second, thateven
containedthree mainconclusions;20
andthird,thateven if anythingcan
about,
known
be
it
cannot
if anythingis,
be knownabout,it cannotbe communicatedto someoneelse. Of these, the
second andthe thirdare formsnot of relativism,but of whatwouldnow be
The argumentsfor both trade,in a mannerreminiscent
called scepticism.21
of epistemologicalscepticismsince Descartes,on the idea of an unbridgeable gap between thought, and speech, on the one hand, and that which
thoughtand speech purportto be about, on the other. What these argumentsare supposedto show is not that knowledge,or successfulreference,
is possibleonly withinsome framework,sharedor otherwise.The point is
19 Writers who draw this connection include Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy,
Vol. III, pp. 272-3, and JamesN. Jordan, WesternPhilosophy (New York, 1987), p. 55.
' The differences between the two reports, while far from negligible, need not concern
us here. For a very full accountof these differences(together with an argumentfor their
essential compatibility), see G. B. Kerferd, "Gorgiason Nature or that which is not",
Phronesis 1 (1955), pp. 3-25.
21 This is not, of course, the same as scepticism in the ancient sense, the hallmarkof
which is the refusalto assertanythingin one's own person;in the ancientsceptic'sterms,
Gorgias "dogmatises"as much as anyone. Modern epistemologicalscepticism, by contrast, consists in a denial of the possibilityof knowledge or certainty,and it is this which
Gorgias' conclusions resemble.
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but there are no onta, and even if there were, and they could be known
about, discourseabout them would be impossible.Speech, therefore, is
merespeech, havingno connectionwithanythingbeyonditself;thusspeech
as such is deceptive. On this nihilisticand extraordinaryview, truth becomes not relativebut non-existent.
CouldGorgiasseriouslyhave acceptedthese arguments,and this consequenceof them?Thisis a difficultmatterto judge. It mayseem thatno one
could accept them, and that the "parody"interpretationof Peri Tou Me
Ontosmustbe correct.But one has to be careful,whendealingwithGreek
philosophy, about claimingthat some doctrineis "too bizarreto be believed". Gorgias'position, after all, is scarcelyany more of an affrontto
common sense than those of the Eleatics (with which, on any interpretation, it obviouslyhas muchin common);one mightalso mentionXeniades
of Corinthwho, accordingto Sextus(M. VII.53) actuallydid maintainthat
"every impressionand opinion is false". Gorgias'pupil Isocrates, too,
apparentlytakes him at his word; in two passages he reports Gorgias'
assertionthat "Nothingis", and comparesthis, in a matter-of-facttone,
with the views of certain other thinkers (Helen 3 and Antidosis 268).
Isocrates'own point, on both occasions, is that such speculationsare a
pointlesswaste of time; but the implicationis that the people concerned,
includingGorgias,thoughtotherwise.As for Gorgias'otherwritings,there
are some echoes of the position sketched here, but also some apparent
conflictswithit. However,sincemostof the survivingmaterialcomes from
rhetoricalset-pieces,one couldhardlyexpectto be ableto leanveryheavily
on it as evidence for its author'sphilosophicalviews.24
Legacy, Hermes, Einzelschriften44, 1981, pp. 116-28. In any case, fictional sentences
are not, presumably, candidates for regular truth; so the central point, that Gorgias'
argumentsimply that no statements are true, still remains.
' The Helen speech remarkson the impossibilityof knowledge, and on the deceptiveness of speech itself (DK 82B11, paras. 11 & 10-14respectively);the Palamedesrefersto
the inabilityof wordsto convey the truthplainlyto theiraudience(DK 82B1la, para.35).
x6Xovroe boxriv, r6 bi boxeCv do0evig
See also DK 82B26, t6 Xv rtvat &(pavig
ji^ rvx6v roe revat. (It is unclear, however, whether >& riX6v should be rendered
"since it does not attain" or "if it does not attain". Either way, the fragmentrefers to a
gulf between seeming and being; but on the latter reading, the gulf would not be
explicitlystated to be unbridgeable.)But againstthese passagesmustbe set other partsof
the Helen and the Palamedes,whichdo seem to presupposethe possibilityof discovering,
and speaking, the truth; see Bli, para.1, and Blla, paras. 4,24,33,34. Kerferd, The
Sophistic Movement, pp. 81-2, attempts to reconcile both strands of thought in "a
common conceptual model". But I am not sure either that I understandthe composite
position he sketches, or that this position coheres with all the relevant texts.
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IV
Gorgiaswas not, of course, alone in developinga techniqueof persuasive
speech- even thoughhis particulartheoryof persuasivelanguagemayhave
been idiosyncratic,and more fully workedout than most. The teachingof
rhetoric,and an interestin methodsfor effectivepublicspeaking,were the
mainthingsthe Sophistshadin common;it is thissharedinterest,above all,
which justifies their being groupedtogether, despite considerabledifferences in what else they taughtor thought, as membersof a single "movement". Now, it is sometimesalleged that this very activity, teachingand
theorisingabout the art of persuasivespeaking,is an indicationthat the
Sophists, as a group, were relativists.' For, it is argued, if one devotes a
greatdeal of one's energyto the questionof how best to persuadepeople of
whateverposition one wishes - or, as it was often expressed, how to be
equallypersuasiveon either side of a case - one can hardlyfail to driftinto
the view that truthis merelyrelativeto the speaker(or, perhaps,relativeto
the bewitched listener), that the truth about any given subject simplyis
whateverpositionis mostpersuasivelypresentedat the time. But thislineof
I
On the connections between Gorgias' philosophical position and his theory and
practice of rhetoric, see Verdenius, op.cit.
' See, e.g., the passages from Thilly and (especially) Guthrie cited in note 1; also Carl
Joachim Classen, "The Study of LanguageAmong Socrates' Contemporaries",in Carl
Joachim Classen (ed.), Sophistik (Wege der Forschung187: Darmstadt, 1976), p. 228,
where relativismabout valuesis held to be a necessarycondition of developing a flexible
method of persuasion.
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between physis and nomos.45 A great deal has been written about this
Including, perhaps, linguistic norms; but we have already said enough about the
Sophists' ideas on language.
4 The Greeks tended to thinkof nomoi as havingbeen devised by some singleindividual,
a nomothetes;but this does not affect the present discussion.
4 On the consistency of the two in Antiphon, see David J. Furley, "Antiphon's Case
Against Justice", TheSophistsand TheirLegacy, pp. 81-91. (This had often been seen as
4'
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anythingof the kind. The one Sophistover whomwe have left a questionmarkis Protagoras.It is time to say a word about Protagoras'"Man the
Measure"doctrine,before bringingthe paperto a close.
VI
We have alreadyhad reasonto referseveraltimes to Protagoras'assertion
that"Manis the measureof all things,of the thingsthatare, that[or"how"]
they are, of the thingsthat are not, that [or "how"]they are not", whichis
quotedin Plato'sTheaetetus(152a2-4),in Sextus(PH 1.216andM. VII.60)
and in Diogenes Laertius(IX.51). Plato and Sextusboth offer interpretations of Protagoras'doctrine,and it is these, ratherthanthe exactwording
of the fragmentitself, whichbearon the questionwhetheror not Protagoras
was a relativist.57
Accordingto both interpretations,Protagorasheld that,
wheneversomeone perceivesthat somethingis the case, that thing is the
case for, or in relationto, the personwhose perceptionit is (Tht. 152b,M.
VII.60). Both agree, also, in extendingthe scope of the doctrinebeyond
sense-perceptionin a narrowsense (even though,in the Theaetetus,it is first
introducedas a corollaryof the thesis that "knowledgeis perception");
accordingto Sextus' interpretation,it covers all opinions (VII.60), and
accordingto Plato, it at least covers all mattersexcept those havingto do
with what is healthyor beneficial(171e, 172a5-b2).58
Now, it mightseem
obvious,at this point, that Protagorasis beinginterpretedas a relativist;to
say thatperceptionsandopinionsare "truefor"the personwho has themis
surely to put forwarda radicalrelativismabout truth. But unfortunately,
Sextus' interpretationcontains a further component which changes the
RylandsLibrary37 (1954), pp. 249-56.
s7 It has long been a subject of controversy how Protagoras' words are best to be
translated;in particular,argumenthas centered aroundthe wordsanthropos,chrematon
and (especially) hos. Succinct discussions of these issues occur in Laszlo Versenyi,
"Protagoras' Man-Measure Fragment", American Journal of Philology 83 (1962),
pp. 178-84, and Guthrie, op.cit., pp. 188-92. But the precise manner in which these
questions are resolved will not affect whetherProtagoraswas a relativist;they will only
affect whatkind of relativisthe was, if he was one at all. Whetheror not he was any sort of
relativist depends on how we are to understand the metaphor of human beings as a
"measure"of things; but that takes us far beyond questions of translation.
5 Whether this exception was made by Protagoras himself, or whether Socrates is
charitablyalteringthe original position on Protagoras'behalf, so as to render it (as he
sees it) more defensible, is a matter of some dispute. McDowell, op.cit., ad loc., holds
the latter view; Kerferd, TheSophisticMovement,pp. 104-6, holds the former.
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