BOOK REVIEW

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS A DEBATE RENEWED

AUTHORS
SCOTT D. SAGAN
KENNETH N. WALTZ

PUBLISHERS
W.W.NORTON & COMPANY
NEWYORK & LONDON - 2002

SUBMITTED TO
PROF MUHAMMED SADIQ

SUBMITTED BY
ATIQUE AHMED
DSS-II

1.

The Authors
Scott Sagan, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and Kenneth

Waltz, Senior Research Scholar in the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace
Studies at Columbia University, have co-authored the said book. Both sages are quite
renowned world-over for their valuable contributions as social scientist, researchers and
theorists. Primarily both the intellectuals have discussed the spread of nuclear weapons
to new states and the possible fall out of this proliferation. They have also critically
analyzed the pros and cons of this propagation of nuclear muscle to new states. Dr
Kenneth Waltz analyzed this spread through the lens of optimism under the narrations
of rational deterrence theory while the counter- argument of the philosophy is adopted
by Dr Scott Sagan while using the spectacles of organizational behavior theory.
2.

The Books Theme

The book under review is actually a dialogue between two think tanks of

opposing ideologies regarding nuclear proliferation undertaken in five chapters. The

book is written in the form of logic-supported argument and counter-argument by both
the thinkers. Aside from explanation of the whole issue vis--vis the retrospect of world
powers stance on the subject, both the esteemed scholars have dilated upon
comparative analysis of nuclear potential and its associated structural, organizational as
well as command and control frameworks paraphernalia in Pakistan and India as case
study to elaborate their argument. As per the scheme of the book, the 1 st chapter
comprises of Waltz arguments in favour of proliferation of nukes under the slogan of
more may be better which is immediately confronted in 2 nd chapter with direct counter-

argument on the subject from Sagan who claims that more will be worse. The 3 rd
chapter is actually an amalgamated narration of views of both the scholars vis--vis
nuclear weapons in South Asia; Waltz supports while Sagan denounces their presence
by third world countries like Pakistan and India. The last two chapters include direct
argument and counter-argument respectively by both scholars regarding the issue.
3.

Chapter-I: More May be Better

Professor Waltz, a proliferation optimist, has opened the account of this chapter

with the argument that deterrence is the ability to punish and does work to evade wars
in five ways: by reducing war incentives, making wars less cost effective, ruling out wars
for security, improving morale of attacked and lastly be being sure of enemys strength.
He says that nuclear war is a war of survival or annihilation rather than victory or defeat.
He also argues that presence of nuclear weapons not only assures domestic yet
regional stability as well for a number of reasons supported by number of examples
respectively. While commenting upon pre-emptive and preventive strikes, Dr Waltz has
asserted that a preventive strike against such a nation is more promising as was the
Israeli attack on Osirak reactor of Iraq. Besides, Dr Waltz has also highlighted three
main pre-requisites of deterrence: Retaliatory ability after surviving an attack, survival
without banking upon early firing and reliable C2 (Command & Control) systems to
avoid accidental or unauthorized use. Nuclear power also renders the weak to deter the
strong while the credibility of this deterrent carries both physical and psychological
facets. Nuclear deterrence inhibits the would-be attackers from undertaking war while
likelihood of success motivates attackers to launch attack in a conventional war. In a
nuclear war, much is at stake, so both sides move with care. He stresses that the new

nuclear state would use the nuclear weapon only when survival is at stake and that is
what he admits to be responsible behavior. He defies the argument that nuclear
weapons shall be used in a madman way by a totalitarian rule mentioning the example
that towards the defeat in WW-II, even Hitlers orders to launch a gas war were ignored
by his generals. He also highlights that no nuclear war would be decisive so no country
shall be pushed to the limit in such war. Dr Waltz is convinced that nuclear state are
bound to curtail their military spending and pursuance of ARMS race, primarily because
of three reasons: Nuclear weapons change dynamics of arms race, nuclear deterrents
balances are inherently stable and need for conventional weapons have been reduced.
Dr Waltz is a proponent of the theology that nuclear weapons are the weapons of
peace instead of war and thus denies the claims that humanity is threatened by access
of smaller nations to these weapons arguing that historically the greatest threats and
damages to humanity are both primarily attributed to the powerful nations and not the
weaker ones. He testified philosophy of rational deterrence by quoting examples from
WW-II saying that though most of the forces on both sides had the WMD at their
disposal in the form of poison gas; yet none used it even in the face of an apparent
defeat. He argues that extended deterrence has to have two pre-requisites met which
are vitality of interest and political stability.
Dr Waltz argues that deterrent strategy is more peace-oriented than war fighting
strategy owing to four reasons: these strategies are more cautious, wars under nuclear
umbrella are limited, punishment of enemy has to be proportionate to his expected
gains, wars are stopped short of an absolute defeat.

Dr Waltz concludes that gradual spread of war is better than no or rapid spread
as it would not open the nuclear floodgates. Additionally, he supports nuclear deterrence
as its alternative is a mad conventional arms race. He argues that more nuclear states
shall assure promising future because of three main reasons: Firstly, the international
system is self-help whereby principal parties define their and others fate; secondly,
miscalculation is kept at bay owing to the catastrophic devastation of nuclear weapons,
so nations shall behave responsibly; thirdly, new nuclear states shall feel the same
constraints as the older ones are feeling and are bound to behave rationally.
4.

Chapter-II: More Will be Worse

The cynosures of Scott Sagans argument, a proliferation pessimist and

proponent of Organizational Behavior Theory, are the two assumptions that he narrates
in the start of this chapter as central argument. The first one says that owing to their
common biases, inflexible routines and parochial interests professional military
organizations lead to organizational behaviors which are likely to render deterrence fail
and thus lead to the eruption of deliberate or accidental wars. The second central
argument of his theory is that nuclear armed states will lack the positive mechanism of
assertive civilian control. Scott has outlined three main arguments of deterrence theory
a whom he has viewed from the perspective of organizational theory. These arguments
include:(a) The developmental period of nuclear weapons must be secured from any
preventive attacks against its infant nuclear installations.
(b) Both the nuclear belligerents have to have ability of unacceptable damage
infliction as well as second strike capability.

(c) Nuclear arsenal must be secured from accidental or unauthorized use.

Scott defies the central piece of deterrence theory mentioning rational behavior of states
as being mere assumption lacking empirical evidences. He explains rationality as
impractical by virtue of two major dictates of organizational theory. Firstly, the
organizations are generally more inclined towards specific goal-oriented approach and
secondly, even the selection of organizational goals is also not well-scrutinized to be
rational in some cases. Same theory is applied in military and thus the states behavior
especially that of military influenced states becomes fairly in synch with the
organizational behavior theory. Scott believes that military officers have strong
inclination in favour of preventive nuclear war owing to five reasons. He claims soldiers
are:(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Dubious regarding alternatives of war for solving problems.

Convinced of military logics and focused on organizational goals.
Biased in favour of offensive doctrines and decisive operations.
Oblivious of post-war scenarios and impediments.
Narrow-minded and shortsighted in view.

At this juncture, Scott favors his claim by examples from American history
whereby the policy of preventive wars was advocated strongly by military thinkers until
said policy was ruled out in principal by NSC in April, 1950. The rhetoric of decisive
victory through preventive nuclear war was vocalized by soldiers of highest statures
even afterwards like General Twinings memoranda of The Coming National Crisis
(August, 1953) and Admiral Radfords speech at the National Security Council
(November, 1954). However, the said doctrine was termed as too costly by political
leadership despite its likelihood of gaining some military aims. In the same perspective,

Scott mentioned the disagreement between state department and the Chiefs of Staff on
the question of containing Beijing from attaining nuclear potential or otherwise.
Likewise, disapproval of preventive nuclear attack by Soviet Politburo against Chinese
forces along Ussuri River despite strong advocacy by military leadership. Sagan asserts
that nations with military or military-oriented regimes are more likely to opt for preventive
wars. In the same context, he renders Pakistan and Iran as formidable future threats;
the former being a state influenced by military while the later having the history of
having used chemical weapons in Iran-Iraq war.
Sagan has criticized Waltzs confidence regarding retention of minimum
deterrence of an invulnerable second strike nuclear arsenal on the plea that during the
cold war both USA and USSR undertook unnecessary stock-piling of nuclear weapons
far beyond the threshold of minimum nuclear deterrence. Sagan claims that said
phenomena had not been justly explained by Waltz; instead same can be narrated more
assertively by the dictates of organizational theory. He gave five reasons of this
explanation, which are:-

(b)

(a)
Pursuance of redundant resources by military bureaucracies.
Militaries pursue organizational essence more aptly by virtue of their innate set-

(c)

ups.
Military do not build invulnerable forces if same is not required as per
organizational plans.
(d)
Militaries are inertial in nature and follow definite SOPs.
(e)
Militaries tend to learn only from own mistakes and failures.
Sagan also put forth a number of examples from cold war including creation of

strategic bombers, development of ICBMs & SLBMs in favor of his argument that the

establishment of an assertive second strike capability is attributed solely to civilian rule

in USA. He opined that all these developments did suffer serious resistance from
military echelons. He also narrated three like examples from Russian history whereby
organizational routines inflicted serious invulnerabilities upon nuclear forces. These
include concealment failure of missiles sites in Cuba, leakage of Russian Silos location
and above-all failure to conceal location of Russian Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
fleet.
Sagan suggests that the new nuclear state have to have reliance-worthy
survivable forces which China developed quite late as per the rationalist assumption of
nuclear optimists. He also attributed failure of Egyptian efforts against Israel to two
organizational failure reasons. Firstly, Egyptians parked their aircraft in a pattern which
restricted their dispersal following the Israeli attack, secondly, Egyptian followed atypical
pattern of duties change-over between 0730-0745 hours which was monitored and
exploited successfully by Israelis during attacks.
Commenting upon the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear arsenal, Sagan
comments that the organizations have to be highly rational and have to have three basic
strategies in place: Construct failsafe safety system with backups, learn by trial and
error and build up reliability culture. Sagan mentions that organizations have conflicting
objectives amongst them quoting Perrow, who claims that rational organizations suffer
from system accidents in the presence of:(a)

High Interactive Complexity whereby systems have numerous inter-related yet

unplanned interactions which are beyond comprehension.

(b)

Tight Coupling in which have systems with highly time-dependent and invariant
production sequences with limited built-in slacks.
Owing to the organizational redundancy, internal politics and blame-game factor,

organizational reliability comes to question. Talking about US nuclear hierarchy, Sagan

alleges that though C2 systems of large arsenals are highly complex by necessity and
tightly coupled by design; yet, military echelons controlling them are politicized in their
decisions within the organization itself. Sagan has also criticized delegation of nuclear
authority to lower echelons and the consequent problems that emerged by quoting
pertinent examples including the chaos at Malstorm Air Force Base, Montana during
Cuban missile crisis, misperception of nuclear launch threat at NORAD and B-52
monitoring missions at Thule, Greenland.
Sagan alleges that the history of nuclear accidents and near accidents suggests
that same is likely to hit the new nuclear state more adversely owing to five major
reasons:(a)

Lack of adequately resources to develop mechanism safety devices and

reliable safety design features like highly unstable design of Iraqi bomb.
(b)

Covert developmental programs lead to nuclear safety problems like

programs India, Israel, Pakistan and South Korea.

(c)

Close proximity between nuclear nations and their enemies as in the case

of Pakistan and India.

(d)

Delegation of nuclear authority to lower level command in the wake of a

decapitation attack as delegation of biological and chemical weapons authority

to field commander during Gulf war.
(e)

Weak social fibre and unstable political systems are likely to instill unrest

in these countries which result in accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear

weapons.
Sagan concludes the chapter by re-emphasizing his fears regarding nuclear
proliferation in synch with the dictates of organizational theory; yet, he also bifurcates
the behavior of states into rational and real domains. He points out that American
thinkers like Morgenthau, George Kennan and Waltz also made common mistakes in
believing that states shall follow the logic of balance of power politics. He also asserts
that USA should continue to curb the spread of nuclear weapons in the world and
should also convince the decision makers in potential nuclear states across the globe
that non-proliferation is in their own interest rather than that of USA. He also suggested
that new nuclear state may also be offered some degree of assistance by USA in order
to safeguard their assets from accidental or unauthorized use by improving their
command and control procedures as well as their checks and balances. He however did
admit that in such case both sides shall be apprehensive of others intention and same
cooperation shall be kept limited to only improvement of weapon safety and security
instead of improving their readiness.
5.

Chapter-III: Indian & Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse

This chapter co-authored by both Waltz and Sagan. The chapter starts with a
resume of war-history amongst the two arch-rivals of South Asia highlighting the total
death-toll between the two countries since their inception in 1947 and an influx of
nuclear weapons in the South Asian theatre in 1998. This chapter is composed of two
separate articles by the esteemed intellectuals:5.1.

For the Worse: Till Death do us Part. In this article, Sagan opens the

dialogue with his pessimistic view of Indo-Pak scenario whereby he claims that
the proximity, lack of mutual understanding and hostility reduces to prospects of
nuclear peace. Sagan supported his argument with examples from history of
precarious Indo-Pak relations. The first example quoted by him was that of
Brasstacks during 1984 whereby Pakistans perception of Indian offensive
stance was reacted militarily by Pakistan as India failed to provide full details of
the exercise to Pakistan and Sagan attributes this armed pandemonium to
theology of preventive war in mind of the then Indian Army Chief General
Sunderji upon organizational lapses on behalf of India and Pakistan. He further
discussed Kargil conflict-1999 and stressed that this conflict defied the unwritten
law that nuclear nations do not fight wars. Sagan narrated salient contours of
Kargil crisis vis--vis the organizational perspective and chalking out its three
main aspects. Firstly, Pak Army planned Kargil operation at tactical level
ignoring its strategic fall out; secondly, Army perceived that the conflict shall not
escalate; thirdly, military in Pakistan is aggrieved as PM backed out which
resulted in a military coup. Sagan also supports his arguments with the examples
of 2001-02 stand-off. At this point, Sagan deified the impossibility of nuclear war

in South east Asia on the plea that arms race is looming in the region and a
misperception of imminent nuclear threat could trigger nuclear war even by
mistake and same is very likely in synch with organizational theory. Additionally,
Sagan also object upon the survivability of nuclear forces on the plea that their
signals were leaked during deployment and their locations are traceable by the
adversaries owing to the construction of storage garages of M-11 missiles in a
peculiar pattern at Sargodha Base. Another precarious aspect of nuclear threat is
that of geographical locations, inadequate warning system, and compressed
decision making timelines which can render accidental or unauthorized use more
likely. Besides, terrorist organizations ad their access to nukes in Pakistan is also
of worth. Here the good news is that both countries do not deploy their nuclear
weapons in peace time while the bad one is that Pakistan lacks PAL (Passive
Action Links, locks for weapon codes activation) and Pakistan started to alert its
weapons in crisis. Besides, Sagan has also emphasized the looming possibility
of accidental nuclear war quoting examples like Ojhari Camp blast in April, 1988
and accidental firing at Milan Missile factory at Hyderabad. He has also argued
that no Pakistani personnel is PRP (Personnel Reliability Program) qualified to
undertake the guard duty at nuclear weapons storage sites. He also attributes
failing economy, serious social problems and religious fundamentalism as
potential reasons of accidental or unauthorized use of nukes.
Sagan concludes the talk by suggesting that weapon warheads may be
removed from delivery vehicles to address the concerns raised whereas

awareness to instill reliability in nuclear command and control system of both

countries may also be extended by USA.
5.2.

For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace. In this

article, Waltz undertook optimistic catharsis of the situation in South-east Asia.

He opened the argument by quoting from Joseph Ciriciones article in New York
Times who says that deterrence works precisely because nuclear engagements
may escalate to nuclear level. Nuclear competition between India and Pakistan
remands influx of heavy capital in the program. Waltz supported the nuclear tests
of Pakistan and India on the same premise as that of USA and is optimistic that
both India and Pakistan shall undertake requisite precautions in this regard.
Waltz offers an optimistic view of the presence of nuclear potential in the arena
rendering nuclear deterrence as a catalyst to instigate resolution of core issues
amongst both the neighboring nuclear arch-rivals. He supports Pakistans
pursuance of nuclear program as justified in the wake of a conventionally mighty
India who in fact enforced left Pakistan with no alternate option to resort to. Waltz
takes an optimistic view of all the occurrences that have been advocated by
Sagan as unlikable instances as specific to conventional weapons claiming that
nuclear scenario shall instill maturity amongst nations and same shall be
reflected in their interactions and behaviors under the nuclear realm. Waltz
quotes Joseph Nye who says that nuclear potential generate Crystal Ball effect
whereby everyone is sure that all hell will break loose if force is left uncontrolled
and so the ball is clearer in nuclear era than the conventional one. Waltz says
that nuclear pessimist deal with the potential causes of catastrophe while optimist

deal with the effects that the causes do not produce. He approves the idea that
nuclear nations fight only limited wars. Waltz quotes Karl Kaisers claim that East
and West are miles apart to be treated alike and for the stability of nuclear
deterrence between them to be measured with the same yardstick; so why the
Indo-Pak case is altogether different from USA-USSR case. Waltz says that even
few weapons are good enough to generate deterrence. Waltz persuades that
deterrence does not depend upon historical aspects as five out of eight nuclear
nations have fought with their neighbors in recent near past. Waltz says that as
weapons went to readiness state-III at both sides of the fence; yet, like
examples are repeated at a number of occasions during conflict history of USA &
USSR. In Waltz opinion, the proximity of two nuclear states shall add to their
cautiousness rather than lethality. Waltz presents example sof Brasstacks as
Able archer whereby American Pershing II missiles were deployed in Europe
with fifty kiloton payload, 50 meter accuracy and delivery time of ten minutes to
Moscow. Waltz says that organizational theorists fail to distinguish between the
complexities of nuclear weapons systems and the simplicities of situations that
they create. He argues that nuclear weapons make crisis stable and that is what
asserts that India and Pakistan are better off with these weapons than without
them. Waltz says that the possibility of fighting a low-level war at the cost of
impossibility of not fighting a high-level one is not bad bargain. As Pakistan and
India have not reached any agreement on Kashmir, nuclear weapons do offer an
incentive to both of them to initiate the process. Waltz disagrees with Sagans
explanation of 2001 stand-off calling actions of Pakistani President against

terrorists as conciliatory instead of being instigated by any Indian threat; rather

he claimed that this episode again testified the fact that nuclear weapons are for
peace and not war as these weapons render all countries possessing them to be
at par in the peculiar aspect of defence and security.
6.

Chapter-IV: Waltz Responds to Sagan

This chapter of the book carries counter-argument put forth by Waltz in response

to the grim view of nuclear South East Asia portrayed by Sagan in particular and nuclear
pessimists in general. Waltz has opened the argument quoting C.P Snow who
expressed apprehension in 1960 that in ten years time, some of the nukes shall go off;
Waltz says that we are almost 30 years overdue vis--vis this prediction. Waltz has
talked primarily under the realms of problems and dangers to cover up a number of
facets as follows:6.1.

Terror.

Waltz claims that in the late 1990s, terrorism was on decline as the

death-toll by terrorism fell to almost half that in 1980s; however, 9/11 turned the
tables altogether and an unprecedented manifestation of terrorism surfaced.
Waltz classifies terrorist in three types:(a)
Those, using force to compel a specific course of action.
(b)
Those, who want to punish.
(c)
Those, who kill and destroy for the sake of doing so.
Terrorism germinates from acute frustration and intense agony in an
attempt to raise the voices of the oppressed at higher levels. Terrorists of first
category are not interested in nuclear weapons while the second type, instigated
by the urge to inflict destruction, are likely to pursue nuclear weapons; however,
at the same time, they are limited by the cumbersome logistics involved in use

and maintenance of nuclear weapons. The third category of terrorists is

principally inclined towards acquisition of nuclear weapons; yet, the colossal
devastation and target ambiguity is likely to cause damage to their purpose
rather than serving the same. Waltz concludes the argument with the plea that
owing to the peculiar nature and modus operandi of terrorists, conventional
weapons are likely to be more lucrative for terrorists rather than nuclear ones.
Besides, goals of terrorist can be more prolifically accomplished through patient
harassment rather than immediate annihilation.
6.2.

Accidents. Waltz claims that the prospects of accidents are more in modern
world far too much than in the new nuclear states as they have only fewer
nuclear warheads. He projects an optimistic view regarding accidents by claiming
in order to strike first without success certainty; all in control of nuclear weapons
have to go mad simultaneously. Additionally, Waltz also defied US support for
democracy on the plea that authoritarian rule are more concerned to maintain
peace and stability to ensure maintenance of balance of power. He concludes the
argument pleading that the weaker nations are more likely to opt for nuclear

6.3.

deterrence primarily to compensate for their weakness.

Civilian Control. Commenting upon the civilian control of nuclear weapons in
USA, Waltz criticized the rhetoric of pessimists in this regard claiming that control
of nuclear weapons even in USA is only partially attributed to civilian echelons
quoting disagreement between Eisenhower and military commanders on the
subject of retaliatory strike on USSR. He also referred to the instance were
McNamara demanded authorization of a superfluous number of ICBMs from
Congress to please Joint Chiefs rather than President Kennedy. Eisenhower

changed military budget distribution to 50% for Air Force, 30% for Navy and 20%
for Army under New Look defence policy which was reverted back to 30% each
in Nixons reign following pressure from military bureaucracy. Waltz also denied
Sagans claims that civilian control of military is the main cause of conflicts in the
world by quoting examples of history like Crimean war, Moroccan crisis and
Bosnian intervention. He also stresses that preventive and pre-emptive strikes
are advocated equally by both civilian as well as military regimes quoting
examples of Pananma war and Gulf war of 1990s. Waltz advocates that Sagans
perception of military leaders being more reckless and apprehensive of war
problems is wrong; he claims that it is more personality oriented trait rather than
6.4.

profession.
Second Strike Force.

Waltz claimed that military organizations are known

for their resentment against innovations. He quoted the example of installation of

Polaris program which was initially disowned by US Navy as being a national
program rather than a naval one. Waltz mentioned that during Cuban Missile
Crisis, Tactical Air Command had the potential to destroy 90% weapons while
remaining 10% were thought to be capable of generating second strike capability.
He says that second strike deterrence requirements can be met even with very
6.5.

little nuclear capability to retaliate.

Uncertainty.
Deterrence emerges from the notion of uncertain control
upon escalation while it also guarantees security against accidents. Uncertainty
in a conventional world is likely to lead to war wile in a nuclear world, it deters
war as the extent of damage is not known due to lack of knowledge about
enemys potential. A conventionally uncertain state may jump into war to assess

others potential while an uncertain nuclear nation shall never take dare so,
6.6.

thereby rendering deterrence as a function of uncertainty.

Missile Defence & Proliferation.
Waltz claims that

national

missile

defence poses more grave danger to the world than do nuclear proliferation.
Good thing for them is that they dont work and the bad one is that their
deployment also has detrimental effects & defending against nuclear missiles is
more difficult than shooting ballistic missiles. The only effective defence against
nuclear threat is the ability to retaliate and Waltz thus called SDI as SOI. Waltz
believe that missile defences shall result in an arms race in nuclear regime
whereby nations shall resort to measures to avoid or over-run these defences.
The development in this regime is more hazardous to humanity than nuclear
program of Pakistan, India, North Korea or Iraq. This missile defence program is
thereby causing proliferation in both vertical and horizontal regimes. Nuclear
spread is actually challenging American hegemony in conventional realm. He
accused US of implementing its policies without considering other nations will.
Our treatment of CTBT is an example of same instance. Nuclear defences are
ultimate defences against ultimate weapon and result in motivating non-nuclear
nations to go nuclear. Though, wars can never be over-ruled in totality; yet, the
chances are minimized to lowest probability owing to nuclear weapons.
Waltz concludes the chapter with four arguments: First, nuclear weapons
are poor mans solution to maintain peace against race for conventional
weapons arms race. Second, nuclear war is impossible as nuclear weapons
create best possible means of deterrence by causing ultimate fear. Third, new
nuclear countries have lesser weapons to control and are likely to instigate better

mechanisms of guarding them. The only potent threat of a nuclear fall-out is

looming on humanity from great powers and not the new members of nuclear
club.
7.

Chapter-VI: Sagan Responds to Waltz

This Chapter follows the same scheme as the last one and Sagan responds to

Waltz on the same lines as mentioned in Chapter-5. Sagan opens the argument by
mentioning that while assessing other nations either Americans perceive other nations
less competent, less intelligent and less rational. He called this ethnocentrism while in
other case; Americans over-grade other nations than their self. Sagan says that
disagreement between him and Waltz is that of behavior of nuclear states. He argues
that new nations are not likely to behave with due maturity owing to military or military
controlled rule.
7.1

Terrorism.

Sagan highlights the transformation of terrorism quoting

Brian Jenkins 1975 aphorism that terrorist want a lot of people watching and lot
of people listening but not a lot of people dead while after 9/11 terrorists are now
interested in killing a lot of people also. Sagan puts forward two questions
regarding terrorism: Which terrorists are interested in nuclear weapons and what
is the relationship between nuclear proliferation and danger of nuclear terrorism.
Sagan categorized terrorists into three types: Millenarian group who think end of
world is just over the horizon; Neo-Nazis, who kill people for racial and religious
identities; and Islamic Jihadi Groups, who kill people for moral and political
incentives. He quoted examples of Aum Shinrikyo and Convent, Sword a& Arm of

Lord (CSA) who both believe in their own way that Armageddon is just around
the corner and thus undertook effort of mass-killing using biological weapons
against innocent people. The best defence against these terrorists is to deny
them access to nuclear weapons. Sagan fears that these terrorists can launch
nuclear weapons from any covert source like ship, submarine etc and in such
case retaliation is impossible. He thus argues that deterrence shall not work in
this case and best way is to evade terrorists access to nuclear weapons. He also
raises alarm regarding Pakistans nuclear program declaring it unsafe and
potentially accessible to terrorists. He has quoted statements by the then officials
of Pakistans government. Nuclear proliferation to terrorists can happen through
theft or via sympathizers in governments and thats why nuclear proliferation
should be feared.
7.2.

Accidents: Are they Likely.

Sagan pointed out that the aspect of

nuclear accidents was looked into by social scientists only after Bhopal and
Chernobyl. He counter-argued three main logics by Waltz: smaller size of
arsenal, fear of retaliation and possibility of learning over time. Sagan argues that
states with more complex command and control system are more likely to be
more prone to nuclear accidents. Regarding the second argument, Sagan argues
that smaller states having less weapons yet greater incentives to keep weapons
on high alerts and thus expose them to more threat of accidents owing to unsafe
procedures. Besides, decapitation threat may force leaders to delegate authority
to lower echelons thus raising chances of accidents. Additionally, new nuclear
states are reported to alert their weapons in crisis which is quite alarming. The

third counter-argument by Sagan had criticized the view that states shall learn to
take care of nuclear weapons over time. He supported the view that same shall
be difficult due to inhibitions imposed upon organizations subjected to military
control.
7.3.

Civilian Control & Preventive War.

Sagan argues that preventive

attacks are unsound as only a small number of weapons are needed to create
deterrence. Military was cautious but did not lead to restraint and military officers
are not more war prone yet their organizational biases are more war-oriented.
The military mindset of soldiers tamed over a long period of time is inherently
tilted towards war more than the post-war scenario in the region. They resort to
war as the ultimate solution to a multitude of problems and thus are more
assertive advocates of preventive wars than the civilian decision-makers in same
shoes. So in words of Bernard Brodie, Sagan believed that civilians must without
one hint of apology hold the control of what rightfully belongs to them.
7.4.

Second Strike Force.

Sagan claims that Waltz stance in this realm is

built on logic of interest rather than logic of organization and evidence of history.
Quoting examples from WW-II regarding locking of weapons in stores
upon receiving threat of attack on Pearl Harbor and predictable construction
pattern of storage sites of V-1 Buzz bombs and radar sites by Germany to make
the bombing of pin-point accuracy more easy for the enemy. Sagan made his
point in the wake of these historical evidences that imperfect organizational
structures lead to imperfect decision making and thus the expected second strike
force by new and amateur nuclear nations shall be quite unlikely.

7.5.

Uncertainty.

Nuclear weapons use or otherwise by new nuclear

states is a big question still under the fog of uncertainty. Some states have even
launched attacks in the face of this uncertainty as Israel was attacked by Arabs in
1967 & 1973. Additionally, Argentina also invaded British-owned Falkland
Islands. This is primarily because nations gamble and nuclear weapons produce
prudence which does leave space for war. Sagan claims that nothing can be
claimed with certainty keeping in view the lethality of nuclear weapons and the
threat posed by the probability of their use.
7.6.

National Missile Defence & Proliferation.

Sagan

highlights

two

aspects of American Missile Defence Program claiming them to be technical (that

the ABMs may or may not work as perceived) and political (cost effectiveness of
the program). Missile defence is a no win game and all Presidents have vowed
throughout cold war to maintain nuclear deterrence rather than nations security.
In 1990s, new threats emerged and cutting-edge advancements in technological
regime rendered shooting down of missiles a possibility. Sagan criticizes the idea
for three reasons: Firstly, Chinese and Russian shall feel insecure and thus
pursue development of ICBMs & MIRVs to counter the threat. Secondly, a chain
reaction shall initiate as Chinese pursuance will instigate India which in turn shall
threaten Pakistan and drag her to this star-war. Thirdly, rogue sates like Iran,
Iraq, North Korea shall also retaliate and thus render the plan weak and
vulnerable. Therefore, Sagan stays skeptical of US withdrawal from ABM treaty
and development of missile defence system calling it counter-productive.

Sagan concludes the Chapter with the argument that actual challenge in
hand is to restore the writ of civilian governments and convince non-nuclear
nations to stay non-nuclear. Though, some nations like Argentina, Brazil and
South Africa resorted to nuclear weapon free zone status; yet, treaties can be
renounced and rearmament may start. So the actual decision should come from
new nuclear weapon states and their people instead of USA. In short term and
long term strategies be applied for control and abolishment of arsenal
respectively. Neorealists structural theory and organization theories are put forth
to see the same world from two angles. As nuclear weapons are under control at
organizational level and organizations are run by individuals having parochial
interests and biases, their spread needs to be feared than welcomed.

8.

Critical Appreciation & Reading Recommendation

Both the authors have put forth their arguments in quite assertive manner; yet,

the logics and theology of Waltz appears more convincing being more empirically
supported by historical evidences. Although, Sagan has taken more space of the book
in explaining his argument; yet, his logics appeared quite shallow as compared to Waltz.
Additionally, at times his examples and historical testimonies appeared quite tepid and
irrelevant. At some instances, his argument appeared more of a repetition of few
parochial comments lacking roots, mere argument for the sake of an argument.
Besides, his opinion was more focused towards the Western rhetoric rather than the
realities on ground as compared to Waltz. This fact also rendered his work to be shallow

more like lay-mans job instead of that by a social scientist. Over all, this book is a
master-piece to enlighten the mind of a student of international relations, strategy and
proliferation regarding the perceptions and view-points prevalent vis--vis nuclear
proliferation and its associated effects.
9.

Conclusion
The world has lived in nuclear peace for more than half a century and this is the

longest spell of human history without any major war. Being more precise, modern
history starting from 1648 has not seen great powers of the world at peace for such long
a period as this one. However, this is also a bitter reality that no one is certain about the
continuation of this peace. The concerns raised by both the authors are worthy
especially those concerning American Missile Defence Program and those highlighted
in the wake of nuclear South East Asia.