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HAZID WORKSHEET

Project

: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

Node Description
Date of HAZID Study

: DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform


: 25 May 2012

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

Anchor Handling Work Boat collision with Boat damage / lost boat
the platform / AHT
Personnel injury
(Running
Messanger Line
Under the
Bridge) using
Work Boat

S
2

R
HR

3
Running Anchor Lost control of wire due Damage to redundant
umbilical / subsea structure
/ Anchor Wire to failure of
comunication or control
system

AHT collision with the


platform / complex

Damage to vessel or
complex (damage to riser)
Personnel injury
Schedule delay

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure


2. Reliable / maintained work boat
3. Weather limit
4. Adequate illumination of work area
5. Trained work boat operation
6. Maintain good communication
7. JSA for work boat operation
8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time
9. Suitable PPE: include work vest

R
LR

MR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure


2. DP Vessel as AHT
3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
MWS approval)
4. Competence Vessel Captain
5. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT

LR

HR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure


2. JSA for Anchor Handling
3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling
4. Parachute Buoy
5. DP Vessel as AHT
6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with
MWS approval)
7. Competence Vessel Captain
8. Maintain good communication between
Anchor Tower and AHT
9. Weather limit
10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel
Captain including the location of risers
11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all
time

LR

N1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Page 1 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

DLB Approach /
Final Departure
of AGX

Drop/Drag Anchor on
Subsea Facility

Damage Subsea Facility


Environmental HC
Discharge
Potential fire/explosion
Company reputation

R
HR

DLB colission with


platform and riser

Damage to both DLB and


5
Platform
Personnel injury / Lost of life
Schedule delay
Environmental impact

HR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk
S

1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE


3
2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and
Approved Anchor Pattern
3. Anchor on Deck of AHT
4. Mooring Analysis
5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration
6. Pull test the anchors
7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by
Anchor Tower
8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line
9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure

R
LR

1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure


3
(Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX)
2. Weather limit
3. Maintain good communication with all
parties
4. Final approach only after all anchors are
installed / laid and DAY Light only.
5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize
West Lobe line during Final Approach
6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket
7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the
gangway tip during final approach
8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB
final approach
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the
DLB Final Approach to AGX

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

10. Anchor removal for final departure is


the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting
will be performed with relevant parties
including MWS for removal anchors).

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

Page 2 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
4

DLB Crane
Operation

Dropped loads / objects Damage asset causing HC


on Topside of AGX /
leak
Subsea Facilities
Personnel injury
Schedule delay
Environmental delay

R
HR

Crane Boom collision


Damage asset causing HC
with the AGX Topside
leak
and/or with Other Crane Personnel injury
Schedule delay

Damage asset causing HC 3


leak / Environmental impact
Personnel injury
Schedule delay

Crawler Crane fall over


the side due to bad
weather related during
lifting (overloaded /
dynamic load)

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Approved Lifting Procedure


4
2. Certified and good condition Crane (include
MWS inspection/approval)
3. Certified and good condition Rigging
4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator
and Rigging Personnel
5. Maintain good communication among
parties involved
6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging
7. Weather limit
8. Stay clear from load
9. Suitable PPE

R
MR

HR

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3


Project (CTR).
2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
3. Good illumincation
4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations
6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator
and Rigging Personnel
7. Maintain good communication among all
involved parties

LR

MR

1. Weather limit
2. Barge rails in place
3. Certified and good condition crane
4. Certified and good condition rigging
equipment
5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator
and Rigging Personnel
6. Operate cranes within the design limit

LR

N1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

1. Risk Assessment to be
Timas/POI
performed for using the
Crawler Crane for Personnel
Transfer related to the
visibility (ability of the Crane
Operator to see the FROG)

2. Review Crawler Crane


Operation Procedure

Timas

Page 3 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
5

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust


on DLB
- Gas Release
(10mm hole on
Gas-Gas
Exchanger) with
20knots wind
speed toward
the DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

L
1

R
LR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD


1
Forward.
2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
4. ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB

L
1

R
LR

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,


the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of


DLB (Lights, Etc)
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

LR

1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger 1


is +16 elevation)
2. F&G and ESD System on AGX
3. ERP Procedures
4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during
the Day Light
7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on
the barge deck and crane boom
8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch
speed approx 60m per minute)
9. Construction activities around process area
controlled by PTW asper integrated project
plan
10. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB

Explore the possibility to


Timas
switch off the lights and other
ignition source on crane

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,


the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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Page 4 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Crawler Crane Exhaust

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

L
1

R
LR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60


1
meters away
2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark
Arrestor
3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
4. F&G and ESD System on AGX
5. ERP Procedures
6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention

L
1

R
LR

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,


the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

Welding Machines on
DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

LR

1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are


1
located on DLB are 60m away from the
platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
4. F&G and ESD System on AGX
5. ERP Procedures
6. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
7. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
8. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB
NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,
the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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Page 5 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Hot Works on DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

L
1

R
LR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered 1


by PTW
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding
lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the
welding machines on DLB.
3. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger
is +16 elevation)
4. F&G and ESD System on AGX
. ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of
DLB

L
1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R
LR

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,


the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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Page 6 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
6

Ignition Source DLB Exhaust


on DLB
- Gas Release
(100mm hole on
Gas-Gas
Exchanger) with
20knots wind
speed toward
the DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

L
1

R
LR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is


1
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger

L
1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R
LR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to


ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less.
Additional Safeguards:
1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD
Forward.
2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is
+16 elevation)
3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
4. ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB
NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the
dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT
reach the DLB Exhaust.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

Page 7 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Electrical Equipment on Increase risk of
STERN of DLB (Lights, Fire/Explosion in the event
Etc)
of HC release

L
1

R
HR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is


4
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger

L
1

R
MR

REC #
4

Recommendation

Action Party

Requirement of Multi Gas


Timas
Detector on the STERN of
DLB to be captured in Project
Procedure

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to


ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:
1. F&G and ESD System on AGX
2. ERP Procedures
3. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub
5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of
DLB.
6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS
shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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Page 8 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Crawler Crane Exhaust

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release

L
1

R
HR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is


4
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger

L
1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R
MR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to


ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:
1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters
away
2. F&G and ESD System on AGX
3. ERP Procedures
4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
5. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the
detection of Gas Release after operation is
secured.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

Page 9 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Welding Machines on
DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release resulting:
- Personnel injury
- Asset damage

L
1

R
HR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is


4
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger

L
1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R
MR

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to


ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:
1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located
on DLB are 60m away from the platform.
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
4. ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding
Machines Isolation
8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the
DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

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Page 10 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Hot Works on DLB

Increase risk of
Fire/Explosion in the event
of HC release resulting:
- Personnel Injury
- Asset Damage

L
1

R
HR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

The release of HC with 100mm hole is


4
demonstrated to unlikely because:
1. As per QRA
2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR
Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix
Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check
and improvement are included on the GO and NO
GO Process.
3. No break of containment the process system
during SIMOPS
4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during
SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved
small weights - structure lifted in around the
platform edges west and south
5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas
Exchanger

L
1

R
MR

LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to


ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be
less.
Additional Safguards are:
1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by
PTW
2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead
to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding
machines on DLB.
3. F&G and ESD System on AGX
4 ERP Procedures
5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention
7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB

Emergency (Fire) Fire as Ignition Source


and its Impact to the
on DLB
Safety of the Platform
Complex

Increase Risk of Fire on


Platform (AGX) if there is
concurrent HC Release

LR

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1


Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
minute).
2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of
the DLB.
NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,
the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

Page 11 of 15

Emergency (Fire)
on DLB

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
Helicopter Emergency
on DLB

Increase Risk of Fire on


Platform (AGX) if there is
concurrent HC Release

L
2

R
LR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk
S

1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the 1


Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per
minute).
2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on
the DLB
3. ERP
4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of
the DLB.

L
1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

R
LR

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,


the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud
would NOT reach the DLB.
Failure of Main
Generator / Black Out
on DLB

Process Upset
on AGX

DLB cannot pull away in


case required

LR

1. Redundancy of Generators
2. Emergency Power Generator
3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches
4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all
time
5. PM System on DLB

Increasing Flaring Rate Increase Radiant Heat in the 2


due to Blow Down Event vicinity of AGX Crane

LR

1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it 1


is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the
Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down.
2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther
from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant
Heat is minimal.

LR

LR

1. Process System is designed to fail safe


1
2. Process is continuosly monitored from
CCR
3. Process System will be maintained and
functional with no significant case to operate
in place during SIMOPS
4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX
Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until
ESD event has been rectified
5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO
will communicate potential for escalation to
DLB such that preparation may made for DLB
withdrawl from AGX vicinity.

LR

NOTE: No Effect anticipated


to the DLB based on Flare
Radiation Study

ESD Event Causing


Creates changes in Process 2
AGX Process Instability System Pressure,
Temperature, and Liquid
Inventory which could lead
to an increase potential for
HC release

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

Page 12 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
5

R
HR

Interference with Crane Helicopter collision with


4
Operation
Cranes / Crash
Personnel injury / Lost of life

10 Vessel
Movement /
alongside on
DLB

Collision with the DLB /


Platform / Material
Barge / Anchor Buoy /
Anchor Wire

Asset damage
4
Personnel injury / Lost of life
Schedule delay

11 SIMOPS
Operation
Between DLB
Crane and AGX
Crane

DLB Crane Boom


collision with the AGX
Crane

Damage asset
Personnel injury
Schedule delay

Gas Release Anoa


Riser

Helicopter
Operation on
DLB

Fire / Explosion
Personnel Injury

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk

1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure


5
2. F&G System on AGX
3. ERP Procedures
4. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G
detection system on platform is activated
5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear
from platform (winch speed approx 60m per
minute)

R
HR

HR

1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut


down and/or crane boom would be clear for
Helicopter Operations
2. Trained and experienced HLO
3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming
Helicopters
4. ERP

LR

HR

1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS


2
inspection/approval)
2. Competent Vessel Captain
3. Slack Anchor Wires if required
4. Good communication between paties
involved
5. Weather limit
6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels
7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to
entering 500m zone
8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys
9. Comply with POI Marine Operation
Procedure
10. Establish communication with HOFO prior
to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine
Supertindent prior to approaching DLB

LR

HR

1. All Cranes will be under the control of the 3


Project (CTR).
2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift
3. Good illumincation
4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations
(SIMOPS)
5. Detail planning meeting for Crane
Operations

LR

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Page 13 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk
S

12 Personnel
Transfer

Personnel being
Transferred Fall from
Height

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5

HR

1. Certified and good condition Crane


2. Certified and good condition FROG
3. Certified and good condition rigging
4. Provision of safety sling
5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will
be securely moored
6. Distance of free board between DLB and
vessel is small
7. Provision of tag lines
8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG
9. Maintain good communicaton among
parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and
Riggers).
10. Weather limit defined for personnel
transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane

LR

13 MAE on
AGX/ANOA

Pool Fire on ANOA


coming from ANOA 8"
Riser Pipeline

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5


Impair both ANOA and AGX
Muster Area

HR

1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including 5


POI Personnel
2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline
covered by FIMS
3. PSLL on the pipeline
4. Daily surface inspection
5. DLB will be pull / winched away

HR

14 N2 Operation

Condensate on the sea Personnel Injury / Lost of


due SKIM pile overfilled Life

MR

1. Level Management
2. Daily surface inspection
3. DLB will be pull / winched away

LR

Extreme Temperature
Personnel injury
(minus 160 - minus 200 Cryogenic
C)
Embrittlement

MR

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage


Tanks
2. Scaffold and bunded area
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

MR

N2 Spill

Personnel Injury
Cryogenic
Embrittlement

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

MR

1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage


Tanks
2. Scaffold and bunded area
3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

N1

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

Verify the certification of the


storage tank and inspection
prior to mobilization offshore

Timas / PNS

Review the N2 handling and


storage procedure

Timas / PNS

MR

Page 14 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

No

Type of Event

Potential Hazards

Initial Risk

Consequences

S
15 3rd Party Vessel Collision with the
Anchor Buoy / Anchor
/ Security
Wire

Personnel Injury
Asset Damage
Schedule Delay

R
MR

Safeguards
(Existing and Recommended Control
Measures)

Residual Risk
S

1. High Vis Anchor Buoy


2. Standy By Vessels
3. Radar Watch
4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter
the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away
5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB

R
LR

REC #

Recommendation

Action Party

16 Sabotage

Construction Crew
Increase risk of incident
tempering with Platform
and DLB system

MR

1. Socialization of work to the offshore


construction team in advance
2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks
3. Involve operation team during work pack
review and execution of the works
4. Maintain positive working environment,
provide motivation
5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security
measures) e.g. safety / warning signs,
socialize restricted areas during
meeting/awareness, Access Control
6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC
7. Reward program

LR

Operation to review the


existing "security measures"
and improve as required

POI

17 Communication
between DLB
and its Support
Vessels and
between DLB
and AGX/ANOA

Clear Communication
Method NOT
established

MR

1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness


3
2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily
planning meeting
3. Provision of radio communication
4. English speaking key personnel
5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior
to entering 500m zone
6. Permission to be obtained from Marine
Superintendent for approaching DLB or
entering the Anchor Pattern
7. Competent Vessel Captain
8. Briefing of all support vessels include
socialization of procedures
9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

LR

Establish radio
communication channel for
all parties to minimize
interference

Timas/POI

Increase risk of
miscommunication /
interference leading to
incident resulting to:
- Personnel injury
- Asset damage

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project

N1

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