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Emotion Review
Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 2012) 4048
The Author(s) 2012
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421377
er.sagepub.com
Doris Bischof-Khler
Abstract
Empathy means understanding another persons emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to
emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the selfother distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the
second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize
their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to
empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost all recognizers showed compassion and tried to help, whereas
nonrecognizers were perplexed or remained indifferent. Several motivational consequences of empathy are discussed and its special
quality is outlined in comparison with theory of mind and perspective taking.
Keywords
altruism, empathy, selfother distinction, self-recognition, synchronic identification, theory of mind
not know having been absent during the relevant event (Onishi
& Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). From
these and similar findings (for a survey, see Caron, 2009; Sodian,
2010) it is argued that babies already understand the concept of
false belief that has traditionally been considered crucial for the
development of a theory of mind in the fourth year (for a survey,
see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). A more parsimonious
explanation would be that the babies follow a behavior rule
that does not imply mental-state understanding. This aligns with
a proposal by Povinelli and Vonk (2003) in their debate on
chimpanzees theory of mind. According to this rule, the babies
associate an agents gaze orientation or reaching toward an
object with the objects location, and this association causes
them to anticipate where they will going to be active upon their
return (Bischof-Khler, 2011; Perner, 2009; Perner & Ruffman,
2005; Sodian, 2010). Just the same, very young babies tendency
to interpret an agents gaze, reaching, and pointing as goal
directed can be explained by a similar behavior rule and does
not necessarily imply that they attribute intentions to the agent
(for a survey, see Sodian, 2010). Altogether, the explanatory
value of theory-of-mind attributions to young children remains
equivocal. I, personally, sympathize with a position that ascribes
Corresponding author: Doris Bischof-Khler, Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich, Leopoldstr. 13, D-80802 Munich, Germany.
Email: Doris@Bischof.com
a theory of mind only in cases where children explicitly understand the representational character of representations, that is,
conceptualize mental experience as caused by mental acts
(Bischof-Khler, 2000a, 2011; Perner, 1991; see also Figure 2).
According to current knowledge, this capacity is not yet present
in the great apes or in children younger than 3 years old. Does
this mean that neither understands the mental state of others? In
this paper, I propose that empathy is the first mechanism in phylogeny and ontogeny that conveys insight into the subjective
experience of another, and that it can be explained without the
abilities necessary for a theory of mind.
Empathy is a process in which an observer vicariously
shares the emotion or intention of another person and thereby
understands what this other person feels or intends (BischofKhler, 1991). The empathic response may be caused by the
expressive behavior of the other or by the persons situation.
Although primarily an emotional response, empathy should not
be confused with emotional contagion, in which the emotion of
another person takes possession of the observers without them
being aware of the fact that the shared emotion originates in
another persons emotion. Examples of emotional contagion
are: contagious yawning, laughter, mass panic, or breaking into
tears simply by watching other people crying. In empathy, the
observers remain aware of the fact that the emotion or intention
they participate in is actually the others emotion or intention.
Thus, empathy is comprised of emotional as well as cognitive
components. It means vicarious sharing of emotion while
simultaneously recognizing that one shares the emotion without
necessarily being able to conceptualize that emotion. It is an
emotional response that mediates insight.
Empathy must further be distinguished from another mechanism of social cognition, perspective-taking. This ability means
imagining oneself in another persons place and, on this basis,
conceptualizing the others point of view, thinking, and feeling.
Perspective taking is merely a rational mechanism in which
emotional participation is of no importance. In perspective taking, one can imagine the emotion of another person but that
does not imply sharing the emotion.
40
36
30
20
10
11
Recognizer
0
30
24
20
10
Transitionals
0
30
21
20
9
10
Nonrecognizer
0
Indifferent
Perplexed
or Contagious
Helpers
because self-recognition is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for empathy; other variables can override the empathic
response. The correlation between self-recognition and empathy
remains consistent when age is partialed out.
You
Me
Synchronic
Time
Identity
Express
Situation
Emotional
Contagion
Others
Perspective
Identification
Mirror
I (Me)
Self-Recognition
Compassion
Cooperation
Empathy Guilt
Sensation Seeking
Gloating
Cruelty
SelfOther
Distinction
Mood
Costs
Competence
Familiarity
Development of Empathy
The basic capacity to empathize is an effect of maturation rather
than socialization. Empathy is a human potential that evolves in
all children as soon as they are able to mentally represent themselves and to synchronically identify. Along with the refinement
of social cognition by developmental processes, the further fate
of this potential depends on individual experience as well as on
social and cultural influences in general. I cannot delve further
into this, so I will leave it with a few remarks. The basic innate
understanding of emotional expressions has to be differentiated
in a social context. The first steps in this respect are affect
attunement (Stern, 1985) and the tendency of caregivers to mirror the behavior of babies (Papousek & Papousek, 1977), thereby
allowing them to refine the association of inner experience with
its outside appearance.
In our subjects, only a few recognizers did not empathize.
Most tried to help and almost all showed compassion and concern. As we discovered in a separate study, recognizers with
nonempathic response were frequently found to be insecurely
attached (Bischof-Khler, 2000b). Security of attachment to
caregivers was determined by Ainsworths Strange Situation
Test (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Insecurely
attached children tended to show emotional contagion or to
respond indifferently in the empathy situation.
An American study with 2- and 3-year-olds provides a hint
as to which socialization practice may encourage empathy and
which one may not (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1979). Children were
more often inclined to empathize and show compassion when
they had mothers who were empathic and who explained to
them that it is not a good thing to hurt somebody else because
that person would feel pain and sorrow (inductive method). The
children with less empathic mothers, who without explanation
only forbade hurting others, showed less empathy themselves.
Socialization certainly influences the degree to which persons empathize. It may also be the reason why empathy declines
or disappears in some persons or even turns into an inclination
for socially negative reactions. The conditions under which
developments of this kind occur, however, are still far from
being clarified.
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EMR5110.1177/1754073912471619
2013
Erratum
Emotion Review
Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2013) 116
The Author(s) 2013
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073912471619
er.sagepub.com
Doris Bischof-Khler (2012), Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective, Emotion Review,
4: 4048.
(Original DOI: 10.1177/1754073911421377)
On page 41, the following error was made:
Not all nonrecognizers were empathic. should be correctly written as: All nonrecognizers were not empathic.