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Welcome to the Corrosion 202A course, which discusses the various approaches of
Corrosion Management.
First, we will briefly review several of the fundamental concepts of corrosion.
Second, we will examine Corrosion detectability and establish
assessing corrosion flaws, failures and their consequences.
the
basis
for
Corrosion damage, defects, and failures can have all sorts of consequences on the
operation of a system.
The consequences of a failure may range from replacing a failed component to the
destruction of a piece of equipment and the loss of life. The consequence of
failure then determines the priority of maintenance or possible redesign to avoid
the failure. Corrosion has many serious economic, health, safety, and
technological consequences.
Safety Consequences - Safety is the first consideration in evaluating a failure
possibility. Does the failure cause a loss of function or secondary damage that
could have a direct adverse effect on operating safety? Corrosion of structures
can be a significant problem. Safety can be compromised by corrosion contributing
to failures of bridges, aircraft, automobiles, gas pipelines, etc. Different
corrosion mechanisms can produce different morphologies of damage. The difference
in the release rate created at a pinhole leak or a large rupture can be
significant.
Operational Consequences - an operational failure occurs when the need to correct
a failure disrupts planned operations. Operational consequences include the need
to abort an operation, the delay or cancellation to make unanticipated repairs,
or the need for operating restrictions until repairs can be made.
Nonoperational Consequences a functional failure that has no direct adverse
effect on operational capability. For example, the failure of a navigational unit
on an aircraft with a redundant navigation system. Since other units can provide
the lost function, the failed unit can be replaced at a later time.
Hidden Failure Consequences - a failure mode is defined as hidden when a
component is required to perform its function and the occurrence of the failure
is not evident to operating personnel. Hidden failures are typically failures of
one or more components aligned in parallel with no indication of failure for each
individual component. One of the two components could fail but since each one by
itself can satisfy the function, only when the second one fails will the
functional failure become evident.
The following failures have been selected as examples of documented corrosionrelated failures. These accidents could have been prevented if proper inspection
and maintenance had been carried out.
F-16: The F-16 electrical connection failure caused by fretting corrosion and
subsequent loss of conductivity across connector pins that then closed the main
fuel shutoff valve.
Aloha Boeing 737 Incident: The structural failure on April 28, 1988 of a 19-year
old Boeing 737, operated by Aloha airlines.
cracks
emanating
from
adjacent
Pillowing is the bowing out of the skin due to the volumetric expansion of the
corrosion products between the mating fuselage skins. Failure to detect the
corrosion damage present.
This accident may have been the defining event in creating awareness of aging
aircraft in both the public domain and in the aviation community and the effect
of corrosion on the crack growth rate in fatigue. The plane and the subject lap
joints were exposed to atmospheric corrosion.
Atmospheric corrosion can be
defined as the corrosion of materials exposed to air and its pollutants rather
than immersed in a liquid.
Three classical patterns of failure are for failure rate versus time.
Pattern B is a region of
pronounced wearout region.
gradually
increasing
failure
rate
followed
by
This curve shows the results of inspection of an aluminum alloy stringerstiffened panel using hand ultrasonic technique to measure crack depth. The
probability of detection is plotted versus the actual crack depth. As the actual
crack depths are deeper, the POD is higher. The crack depth, which has a 90%
probability with a 95% confidence, is 0.12 cm.
We would also like to have a POD for corrosion; however, corrosion may appear in
various forms depending on the alloy, product form, environment, general
conditions, and unacceptable residual stresses. These factors complicate the
metrics of corrosion and therefore also complicate the quantification
of
detection reliability.
To measure the degree of pitting (depth, density, shapes) would be considerably
different than for uniform corrosion (thinning) and the other forms of corrosion.
In a following section, we will review the various forms of corrosion and their
respective defining characteristics, which will challenge us to inspect, monitor
and to interpret the results. We will then look at Maintenance, Management and
Inspection Strategies.
Mars G. Fontana and Norbert D. Greene at Ohio State University in their book
Corrosion Engineering first classified corrosion into eight forms. For each form
of corrosion, they showed the appearance, discussed the mechanism and identified
approaches to control that form of corrosion. Others have expanded the number of
forms of corrosion and regrouped by the ease of recognition.
Classification is based on identifying the forms of corrosion by visual
observation with either the naked eye or magnification. The morphology of the
attack is the basis for classification.
Twelve forms of corrosion are identified in the figure. An appreciation of the
appearance of the various forms of corrosion will be helpful as we consider
various approaches to inspect for and to monitor corrosion.
The forms of corrosion can also be classified by whether the corrosion is uniform
or localized. The various forms of localized corrosion can be further classified
by the magnification at which they are viewed.
Macroscopic forms of corrosion affect greater areas of corroded metal and are
generally observable with the naked eye or with a magnifying lens. In the
microscopic case, the amount of metal dissolved may be small and yet considerable
damage can occur before it is visible to the naked eye.
The pie chart displays the failure statistics of the various forms of corrosion
in
a
chemical
plant.
Other
industries,
such
as,
aerospace,
airlines,
infrastructure, military (AF, Navy, Army, Marines, and Coast Guard) may have
different distributions of the forms of corrosion experienced.
On the next chart, the various forms of corrosion will be briefly reviewed with
regards to inspectability and monitoring issues. This chart will also serve as
index to introduce some supplementary ideas or concepts for several of the forms
of corrosion.
Uniform Least threatening type of attack. An example is the uniform thinning of
a sheet.
Pitting often associated with crack initiation and other forms of corrosion:
intergranular, crevice, exfoliation. Pitting can be assessed by various methods:
visual exam of corroded component or localized NDE methods. Reason to reject an
alloy during the design phase for pressure vessels if the alloy has a propensity
for pitting.
Crevice - Crevice corrosion forms between mating surfaces, lap joints and loosefitting washers and gaskets.
Galvanic - the relative tendencies of metals to corrode tend to remain about the
same in many of the environments in which they are likely to be used.
Consequently, their relative positions in a galvanic series may be about the same
in many environments. Since more observations of potentials and galvanic behavior
have been made in seawater than in any other single environment, an arrangement
of metals in a galvanic series based on observations in seawater, is frequently
used as a first approximation of the probable direction of the galvanic effects
in other environments.
The schematic S-N curves represent the cyclic loading of a test sample to failure
at various stress levels. The dashed line shows the stress versus the number of
cycles when the test is conducted in air. The higher the stress; the fewer number
of cycles to failure. At a stress of 120 MPa tested in air, the sample would in
principle not fail. If the corrosion fatigue test was conducted in tap water at a
stress of 120 MPa, the sample would fail at less than 10^6 load cycles.
(a) is the schematic plot of the logarithm of the cyclic crack growth rate,
da/dN, as a function of the logarithm of the stress intensity range, K, showing
the threshold stress intensity factor Kth for fatigue and the critical stress
intensity, KIc,for fast fracture in an inert environment.
K is equal to Kmax minus Kmin.
At a stress intensity below the threshold stress, Kth, no crack growth occurs.
At a stress intensity greater than Kth, the crack growth is described by the
Paris Equation, da/dN = C(K)^n. At a stress intensity greater than KIc,
fracture toughness, fracture occurs.
(b) Shows the schematic plot of the logarithm of the cyclic crack growth rate,
da/dN, as a function of the logarithm of the maximum stress intensity, Kmax,
showing the effect of corrosion environment on corrosion fatigue performance. For
stress intensity above the threshold stress, Kth, the cyclic crack grow rate
would be considerably higher in corrosive versus an inert environment; therefore,
corrosion fatigue occurs.
The three groups of major factors affecting SCC susceptibility are shown in the
graphic.
Schematic plot of crack propagation only occurs when the stress intensity is
above the threshold stress intensity value Kiscc. Crack growth rate increases
rapidly with increasing KI above KIscc value (Stage 1) until a plateau is reached
and the crack growth rate becomes independent of KI (Stage 2). The critical
stress intensity, KIc , for fast fracture in air is also indicated.
Hydrogen damage is close to SCC, but is caused only by hydrogen atoms, molecules,
and tensile stress. It includes: hydrogen induced cracking, stress oriented
hydrogen induced cracking & sulfide stress cracking.
Cracking occurring because of hydrogen is, also called hydrogen embrittlement or
hydrogen cracking.
The sources of hydrogen are cleaning with acid, thermal dissociation of water in
metallurgical processes, decomposition of gases, cathodic protection, galvanic
plating, and some other corrosion reactions.
All types of hydrogen damage occur in stages:
1. Formation of hydrogen atoms and their adsorption on metal surfaces.
2. Diffusion of adsorbed hydrogen atoms into the metallic lattice.
3. Accumulation of hydrogen atoms inside metals
4. leading to increased internal pressure, and thus to blistering or cracks.
Hydrogen blistering (HIC) is the accumulation of hydrogen molecules, H2, inside
metals and the formation of blisters because of large hydrogen pressure.
Stepwise cracking (SWC) is a form of blistering in which laminating-type fissures
parallel to the metal surface link in the through surface direction.
Stress-oriented HIC is a variation of HIC, where the laminations are arranged in
parallel arrays perpendicular to the surface of the metal.
SSC is a form of hydrogen embrittlement that occurs in the presence of hydrogen
sulfide. In some cases, an alloy embrittled with hydrogen can be restored by
removing the hydrogen through baking.
Corrosion is one of the major limiters of the life of various DoD structures and
systems. The cost of corrosion annually for the DoD is tens of billions.
Corrosion can have an effect on a system throughout its life from design and
development,
through
acquisition,
operations,
sustainment
and
retirement.
Selection of materials is frequently driven by the need for greater strength,
lower strength-to-weight ratios, lower costs in production, and lower ownership
costs.
Corrosion may be included in trade studies but is not necessarily a primary
driver in design goals; therefore,
1. It is essential that an integrated set of precautions, evaluations and
provisions be included as appropriate in the life cycle management process
to manage the impact of corrosion.
2. A Corrosion Prevention and Control plan should be considered during the
Acquisition Phase.
3. The best opportunity to reduce the costs of corrosion is in the initial
design of the system or vehicle.
So one of my first jobs working for the Air Force was to start worrying about
corrosion. I actually got assigned to a corrosion organization in the laboratory
here at Wright-Patterson Air Force base. It was kind of interesting though seeing
that the magnitude of the problems early on of my career; I didnt have a good
sense of all this but you really learn quickly the impact in terms of cost and
energy required to prevent corrosion for airplanes.
One of the first jobs I had was working on the C-5 airplane back when it was
still in the early design phases. In that time, there was a great awareness about
the importance of this problem and the impact it could have on system performance
in the long time.
We had written into a lot of those early specifications, the requirements to do
certain things to prevent aircraft corrosion in the future. And I think it is
very important.
We had specifications written. We had lessons learned put together and we made
them all part of the contractual effort at that time. So it resulted in the
contractors paying attention to this early on. The other thing we did back then,
which I think is really important is we created something called Corrosion
Control Boards where we had, I would say subject matter experts maybe 8 to 10 of
them from the government, few of them from the contractors and we would review
every drawing release and look at it in terms of its corrosion. We would conduct
design reviews as part of the normal design review process. There are always
sessions dedicated to what are you doing to protect against corrosion. And I
always thought those boards were really important because they brought attention
to the designers, the guys who were making the day-to-day decisions on whether or
not you use this material or that material, or whether you use this coating or
that coating. They have people knowledgeable about the subject sitting down with
the designers at the right time early on because thats where all the main
decisions are made about what the long-term corrosion effects will gonna be.
I like to tell a story, though despite how good I thought we were doing at the
time. We did make some errors. And Ill never forget one time; we were sitting in
the designer room for the landing gear on the C-5. Now, things that you dont
know much about the C-5, theres something called the yoke of the landing gear.
Its a huge piece of aluminum. I mean its really huge. Its the main loadbearing member of the landing gear for the C-5.
And the contractor because they were interested in saving weight, they want to
make it out of this, an alloy called 7075-T6 aluminum and that was probably the
highest strength, lowest weight producing alloy you can get at the time. But we
all knew it is also very prone to stress corrosion cracking.
That led to a lot of other things subsequently through the 70s and 80s. We start
putting a lot of emphasis on putting in the requirements in the specifications
and standards that the Air Force used at that time, requirements for corrosion
prevention and corrosion control.
Early on in the design process is the most important thing you could think
about. We think about the corrosion; material selection is important. Not only
what material you pick but how do you treat the material. You have painting; you
have plating, anodizing, all these techniques. Theyre all really important and
the only problem is - there is some of them who are expensive too. But I think my
experience is if youre willing to invest that kind of money upfront, the longterm payoffs are there.
Theres been some change recently probably within the last year about how the
Air Force is gonna worry about the managing of systems in the future. We used to
have an organization here in Wright-Patterson called the Aeronautical Systems
Center. They bought all the airplanes for the United States Air Force. It was in
fact an acquisition center.
I was the Executive Director; I was the senior civilian for that organization
for 5 or 6 years and I learned a lot at that time. One of the things I learned is
unless these people who run these programs and they are all really good people
have very well documented requirements for them to follow, not much is gonna
happen. Theyre scored on how they beat the requirements in their program
management director and nothing else.
One of the things Im hoping starting to happen when they make this change from
an acquisition organization to what we call a life cycle management organization
is that they now have to start thinking broader. They cant just think about
well lets build this airplane cheap as fastest way we possible can, turn it
over to some other organization like a logistics center and let them worry about
the sustainment cost to it. You cant do that anymore. You got to think of the
whole life cycle of the airplane and I think thats gonna be a tremendous help.
So how do you do that? How do you worry about sustainment, at the front of the
airplane design and all through the life cycle? Thats gonna be a tough issue to
deal with?
I think the way theyre gonna do it and I dont know for sure yet but one of the
ways I think can be done is to building Instructional Management systems. We have
a very good instructional management system today for fatigue and life of
fatigue-based and structurally-based. We dont have a good life cycle management
system in place for corrosion. The hope is the two could be married somehow
or another, that you could in fact do structure monitoring, structure
maintenance, structure control and do corrosion control at the same time. That
remains to be seen but thats one of the hopes I think we have.
maintenance strategies.
other damage at planned
failures actually occur.
will usually result in
Predictive
or
Condition-based
Maintenance.
Predictive maintenance refers to maintenance based
on
the
actual
condition
of
a
component.
Maintenance is not performed according to fixed
preventive schedules but rather when a certain
change in characteristics is noted. Corrosion
sensors supplying diagnostic information on the
condition of a system or component play an
important role in this maintenance strategy.
A useful analogy can be made with automobile oil changes. Changing the oil every
5000 km to prolong engine life, irrespective of whether the oil change is really
needed or not, is a preventive maintenance strategy.
Predictive maintenance would entail changing the oil based on changes in its
properties, such as the buildup of wear debris. When a car is used exclusively
for long distance highway travel and driven in a very responsible manner, oil
analysis may indicate a longer critical service interval. Some of the resources
required to perform predictive maintenance will be available from the reduction
in breakdown maintenance and the increased utilization that results from proactive planning and scheduling.
Good record keeping is very important to identifying repetitive problems, and the
problem areas with the highest potential impact.
One of the foundations of our Corrosion Prevention and Control (also known as
CPAC) is Identify, Correct and Maintain. Basically, we identify our different
category codes of corrosion from 1-5:
Historical data gathered during previous inspection and repair cycles can be
quite useful to determine the particular locations where future maintenance
actions should be focused.
For example, more than 50 years of service data collected for the P-3 maritime
patrol and antisubmarine warfare aircraft has resulted in the identification of
`hot spots that should be monitored as part of a predictive maintenance regime.
The benefits of identifying hot spots result in improved probability of detection
of defects.
can
be
based
on
either
qualitative
or
Risk Based Inspection schemes are a planning tool used to develop the optimum
plan for the execution of inspection activities.
A risk-based approach to inspection planning is used to:
Ensure risk is reduced to as low as reasonably practical
Optimize the inspection schedule
Focus inspection effort onto the most critical areas
Identify and use the most appropriate methods.
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a logical representation of the various events that
may be triggered by an initiating event, such as a component failure.
Data required for developing a risk assessment program are often acquired during
the analysis of failed components and systems.
However, conducting a failure analysis is not an easy or straightforward task.
Early recognition of corrosion as a factor in a failure is critical, since much
important corrosion information can be lost if a failure scene is altered or
changed before appropriate observations and tests can be made. To avoid these
pitfalls, certain systematic procedures have been proposed to guide an
investigator through the failure analysis process.
The process of failure analysis will be presented in a later section of the
course.
FMEA and FMECA - are inductive failure analyses used in product development,
systems engineering, and operations management analysis of failure modes within a
system for classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures.