GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R.

L-27833; 18
APR 1969]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too

early nomination of

candidates

and

limiting

the

period

of election

campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional

grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the
act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an
incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party
official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is
a private individual, a registered voterin the City of Manila and a political
leader

of

his

co-petitioner.

the nomination of

There

candidate

and

was

the

the

fixing

further
of

allegation

period

that

of election

campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which

only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the
regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power,
in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated
that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did
justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine,
there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local
officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess
of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association,
the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers'
Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the
act

was

based

on

the

police

power

of

the

state.

Issue:
Held:

Whether

or

Not

RA

4880

unconstitutional.

Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may

supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of

speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment
or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established.

The

"dangerous

tendency

rule"

is

such

that

If the

words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive

evil

which

the

legislative

body

seeks

to

prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices

prohibited

more

precisely

delineated

to

satisfy

the

constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and

present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of
late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities

in

this

country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the

part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has

right

to

prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the

holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or
indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for
or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.