Ashokkumar 1

Rohith Kiran Ashokkumar

Ms. Fotinos
HZT 4U0
June 13, 2012
An Examination of The Concept of Mind
The Concept of Mind is a philosophical treatise written by Gilbert Ryle in 1949. It is an
objection to Cartesian Dualism and the distinction between mind and body. Ryle is an empiricist
(and a behaviourist) philosopher who focuses on metaphysical concepts; mainly wanting to
explain things, such as the mind, in terms of things we can actually experience, and possibly
measure. The main social movements that Ryle was involved in include the British Ordinary
Language Philosophers, 20th century philosophy and analytic philosophy. The first key
philosophical influence was Cartesian Dualism, which states that the mind and body are distinct
entities that do not affect each other (this is the main perspective that Ryle objects to). The
second key philosophical influence was logical positivism, which Ryle developed along with A.
J. Ayer (the verification principle) in the 1930s. This perspective puts forth a criterion of
meaningfulness that requires a non-analytic, meaningful sentence to be empirically verifiable.
The third key philosophical influence was behaviourism, which states that all consciousness can
be analysed and broken down into observable behaviours (reductionist approach to studying the
mind). However, Ryle only supported some behaviouristic ideas, and he stated that
behaviourism, like rationalism, may be too rigid and mechanistic to provide us with an adequate
understanding of The Concept of Mind.
Ryle took metaphysical concepts, tried to provide answers to them, and defined some key
tenets of his perspective by doing this. He said that there are two types of existence; both in time
(mind and body), but only one in space (body). Bodies can interact with each other directly, but
minds cannot, since we need a frame of reference to understand other minds. Mental and
physical language cannot be joined to give two causes for one thing. In addition, we can

Ashokkumar 1
distinguish human actions from human events without reference to inner mental processes.
Learning is the capacity to do things (we do things to learn). Also, one cannot foresee their next
thought, so it must be mysterious and unexpected. We also have free will since we lack full
awareness of our own actions. Overall, different layers of higher order awareness are possible
and this constitutes self-awareness. Some key tenets of Ryles perspective include episodes,
dispositions, the dogma of The Ghost in the Machine, category-mistakes, and double
causation. In addition, he states that the concept of a self is also a delusion created by the word
I, which is presumed to have a reference, but is false. By examining these concepts, Ryle was
able to form his own philosophical ideas to either support or refute the dominant philosophical
perspectives of Cartesian Dualism and Behaviourism.
According to Ryle, the official doctrine (Cartesian Dualism) has central principles that
are unsound and conflict with everything we know about minds when we are not speculating
about them. The thesis of this philosophical treatise states, It (the official doctrine), is namely,
a category-mistake. It represents the facts of normal life as if they belong to one logical type of
category (or range of types of categories), when they actually belong to another (Ryle 19). A
category-mistake is a failure of reasoning when a predicate is applied to something logically
inappropriate. Ryle uses three examples to describe category mistakes; thinking that a university
is something other than colleges, or that an army division is not just a group of soldiers, or team
spirit is something more than just the behaviour of a sports team.
To begin, Ryle argues against Cartesian Dualism by stating that the mind and the body
are not distinct entities, but are related and affect each other, examined through categorymistakes, the dogma of The Ghost in the Machine and practical applications of reasoning
methods. First, Ryle states that the concept Cartesian Dualism is a category-mistake. It (the

Ashokkumar 1
official doctrine), is namely, a category-mistake. It represents the facts of normal life as if they
belong to one logical type of category (or range of types of categories), when they actually
belong to another (Ryle 19). Ryle is essentially stating that it is a category-mistake to think that
the mind is organized like the body. In fact, if dualism were right, our normal and accurate use of
mental terms would be impossible, since words about mental activity are used to refer to our
subconscious. Therefore, the mind and body are not distinct entities, and are related and affect
each other, examined through category-mistakes. Second, Ryle presents the dogma of The
Ghost in the Machine, which he uses to accuse Descartes of misconceiving facts. As thus
represented, minds are not merely ghosts harnessed to machines, they are themselves just
spectral machines. Though the human body is an engine, it is not quite an ordinary engine, since
some of its workings are governed by another engine inside it this interior governor-engine
being one of a very special sort. It is invisible, inaudible and it has not size or weight. It cannot
be taken to bits and the laws it obeys are not those known to ordinary engineers. Nothing is
known of how it governs the bodily engine (Ryle 15). Descartes thought that there is a ghost
inside of us which controls a mechanical body. Ryle objects to this by saying that Descartes does
not understand that words like mind and consciousness label groups of behaviour, not actual
things (this is also a category-mistake). Instead, Ryle refutes the dogma by saying that minds are
also machines like the body. However, he admits that there may be an unexplainable essence
within the body that does not follow physical laws and governs the body. Therefore, the mind
and body are not distinct entities, but are related and affect each other, examined through the
dogma of The Ghost in the Machine. Last, Ryle states that knowing how to perform an act
skillfully requires knowing how to reason, and then put practical reasoning into action.
Essentially, learning is the acquisition of the capacity to do things, and hasnt occurred if those

Ashokkumar 1
things havent been done. Learning is becoming capable of doing some correct or suitable thing
in any situations of certain general sorts. It is becoming prepared for variable calls within certain
ranges (Ryle 147). Therefore, Ryle recognizes that learning is the ability to reason, and to apply
reasoning methods in a practical manner. One must reason using the mind, and apply reasoning
using the body, which supports Ryles argument that the mind and body are not distinct entities,
but are related and affect each other. In conclusion, Ryle proves that the mind and the body are
not distinct entities, but are related and affect each other, examined through category-mistakes,
the dogma of The Ghost in the Machine and practical applications of reasoning methods.
Cartesian Dualism objects to Gilbert Ryle by saying that the mind and body are distinct
entities. Descartes states that the mind is unextended, necessary when thinking, private, and
unified. Bodies are thought of as public, but minds are non-spatial and private. We also have
privileged (internal) knowledge of some, or even all, of our minds. Descartes defined the mind as
not having the characteristics of matter. In addition, minds follow non-physical, deterministic
laws of action. Descartes also assumed that other minds were unknowable. Gilbert Ryle
counters this objection by saying that the assumption that other minds are unknowable is clearly
untrue, since we can predict the workings of other minds through dispositions.
Next, Ryle states that dispositions are used to describe the world in terms of what we
expect to happen, as well as what actually happens, and this is examined through the cigarettesmoker analogy, the meaning and applications of disposition words and the relationship between
dispositions and episodes. We describe people in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways,
which means that that they will do certain things if a certain situation arises. Episodes are events
which actually occurred, and can be empirically observed (current consciousness can be analysed
into these episodes). First, Ryle uses a cigarette-smoker analogy to explain the distinction
between dispositions and episodes. He states that to actually smoke a cigarette is an episode. But

Ashokkumar 1
when we say that someone is a cigarette smoker, we dont mean anything about their
consciousness, but only that they have a disposition or tendency to buy cigarettes, or accept them
when offered. When a man is said to be a cigarette-smoker, it is not being said that the man is
smoking a cigarette now. To be a cigarette-smoker is to be in the habit of smoking cigarettes...
He is smoking a cigarette now does not say the same sort of thing as he is a cigarettesmoker...The phrase smoke a cigarette has both episodic uses and, derivative from them,
tendency-stating uses (Ryle 117-118). Ryle explains here that being a cigarette smoker names a
disposition, not an actual episode in someones behaviour. Therefore, through the examination of
the cigarette-smoker analogy, it is evident that dispositions are used to describe the world in
terms of what we expect to happen, as well as what actually happens. Second, Ryle explains the
meaning and applications of dispositions words. To say that a person knows something, or
aspires to be something, is not to say that he is at a particular moment in process of doing or
undergoing anything, but that he is able to do certain things, when the need arises, or that he is
prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts (Ryle 116). Ryle is stating here
that a persons mental state of belief (like knowledge, etc.) can be analysed as potential
behaviour, which would be observable if it occurred, and is potentially predictable. By following
Ryles logic, it is evident a person knows something if they have a disposition to be right about
it when the situation arises. Similarly, a person believes something if they have a disposition to
behave in a certain way when the situation arises. To sum up, Ryle holds a view that knowledge
and beliefs are simply dispositions and are potentially predictable concepts. Therefore, through
the examination of the meaning and applications of disposition words, it is evident that
dispositions are used to describe the world in terms of what we expect to happen, as well as what
actually happens. Last, Ryle elaborates further on the relationship between dispositions and

Ashokkumar 1
episodes. The vocabulary we use for describing specifically human behaviour does not consist
only of dispositional words. The judge, the teacher, the novelist, the psychologist and the man in
the street are bound also to employ a large batter of episodic words when talking about how
people do, or should, act and react. These episodic words, no less than dispositional words,
belong to a variety of types, and we shall find that obliviousness to some of these differences of
type has both fostered, and been fostered by, the identification of the mental with the ghostly
(Ryle 117). Here, Ryle explains that episodes and dispositions are used to describe different types
of terms, attuned to a specific situation. However, the idea that the mind is an immaterial entity,
or a ghost, has encouraged the ignorance of the distinction between dispositions and episodes.
Therefore, through the examination of the relationship between dispositions and episodes, it is
evident that dispositions are used to describe the world in terms of what we expect to happen, as
well as what actually happens. In conclusion, Ryle proves that dispositions are used to describe
the world in terms of what we expect to happen, as well as what actually happens, and this is
examined through the cigarette-smoker analogy, the meaning and applications of disposition
words and the relationship between dispositions and episodes.
In The Nature of Mind, David Armstrong objects to Gilbert Ryle by saying that one can
feel or think one thing and do another. He says that It seems as obvious as anything is obvious
that there is something actually going on in me that constitutes my though. He also
adds that Ryles theory is unsatisfactory as a theory of mind. Instead, Armstrong modified
Ryles behaviourism by stating that the minds dispositions may be explainable by science in
materialist terms, and this is the true account of the mind. Gilbert Ryles counters this objection
by saying that, To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo
a particular change, it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular
change, when a particular change is realized.

Ashokkumar 1

Ashokkumar 8
Works Cited
"Gilbert Ryle." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 05 June 2012. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle>.
Lindner, Mark R. "Gilbert Ryle & the Category-mistake." Gilbert Ryle & the Category-mistake.
Philosophy and AI. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://marklindner.info/writings/RyleEssay.htm>.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949. PDF.
"The Concept of Mind." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 05 June 2012. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Concept_of_Mind>.

Ashokkumar 9
Works Consulted
"David Malet Armstrong." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 06 Sept. 2012. Web. 09 June 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Malet_Armstrong>.
"Dualism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, 19 Aug. 2003. Web. 09 June 2012.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/>.
"Gilbert Ryle." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 05 June 2012. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Ryle>.
Lindner, Mark R. "Gilbert Ryle & the Category-mistake." Gilbert Ryle & the Category-mistake.
Philosophy and AI. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://marklindner.info/writings/RyleEssay.htm>.
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949. PDF.
"The Concept of Mind." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 05 June 2012. Web. 07 May 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Concept_of_Mind>.
"The Nature of Mind." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 06 Sept. 2012. Web. 09 June 2012.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nature_of_Mind>.